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Commits
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d55cbd264e |
@@ -254,15 +254,32 @@ from urllib.parse import urlparse
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def _origin_and_path(url):
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# Normalize a URL to (scheme, host, effective-port) + comment path. The port
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# defaults to the scheme's default (80 http / 443 otherwise) so an implicit
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# port and its explicit default form compare equal.
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# Normalize a URL to (scheme-class, host, distinguishing-port) + comment path.
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#
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# #991: http and https collapse into ONE scheme class ("web"). A Gitea whose
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# ROOT_URL is configured http:// returns http:// object URLs even when every
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# client reaches it over https://, so a scheme-strict comparison rejects the
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# provider's own correct answer about a write that landed — a deterministic
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# false negative on every comment posted against such a deployment. The
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# scheme is also not what this check defends: the forgeries it exists to
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# catch (look-alike host, decoy path prefix, wrong owner/repo/number) all
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# vary the HOST or the PATH, both of which stay strict below. Any OTHER
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# scheme (file:, ftp:, javascript:) remains distinguishing and is rejected.
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#
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# Port: an implicit port and its own scheme's default compare equal, so
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# http://h == https://h. An EXPLICIT non-default port still distinguishes,
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# because a different port is a different service on the same host.
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parsed = urlparse(url or "")
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scheme = (parsed.scheme or "").lower()
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host = (parsed.hostname or "").lower()
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default_port = 80 if scheme == "http" else 443
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port = parsed.port if parsed.port is not None else default_port
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return (scheme, host, port), parsed.path.rstrip("/")
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if scheme in ("http", "https"):
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scheme_class = "web"
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default_port = 80 if scheme == "http" else 443
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port = None if parsed.port in (None, default_port) else parsed.port
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else:
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scheme_class = scheme
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port = parsed.port
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return (scheme_class, host, port), parsed.path.rstrip("/")
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try:
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@@ -243,15 +243,35 @@ from urllib.parse import urlparse
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def _origin_and_path(url):
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# Normalize a URL to (scheme, host, effective-port) + comment path. The port
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# defaults to the scheme's default (80 http / 443 otherwise) so an implicit
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# port and its explicit default form compare equal.
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# Normalize a URL to (scheme-class, host, distinguishing-port) + comment path.
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#
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# #991: http and https collapse into ONE scheme class ("web"). A Gitea whose
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# ROOT_URL is configured http:// returns http:// object URLs even when every
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# client reaches it over https://, so a scheme-strict comparison rejects the
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# provider's own correct answer about a comment that landed — a deterministic
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# false negative on EVERY review comment posted against such a deployment.
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# That matters more here than anywhere else: on a host where no seat can
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# create a review OBJECT, the comment-form review record this path produces
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# is the only gate-16 evidence available, and this check refuses all of it.
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# The scheme is also not what the check defends: the forgeries it exists to
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# catch (look-alike host, decoy path prefix, wrong owner/repo/kind/number)
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# all vary the HOST or the PATH, both of which stay strict below. Any OTHER
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# scheme (file:, ftp:, javascript:) remains distinguishing and is rejected.
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#
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# Port: an implicit port and its own scheme's default compare equal, so
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# http://h == https://h. An EXPLICIT non-default port still distinguishes,
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# because a different port is a different service on the same host.
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parsed = urlparse(url or "")
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scheme = (parsed.scheme or "").lower()
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host = (parsed.hostname or "").lower()
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default_port = 80 if scheme == "http" else 443
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port = parsed.port if parsed.port is not None else default_port
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return (scheme, host, port), parsed.path.rstrip("/")
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if scheme in ("http", "https"):
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scheme_class = "web"
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default_port = 80 if scheme == "http" else 443
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port = None if parsed.port in (None, default_port) else parsed.port
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else:
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scheme_class = scheme
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port = parsed.port
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return (scheme_class, host, port), parsed.path.rstrip("/")
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try:
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@@ -41,7 +41,13 @@
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# that other host's credential cross-host;
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# 10. leaves NO temp files behind (POST/GET bodies + metadata) on either the
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# success or the failure path — nested function-scoped RETURN traps do not
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# clobber each other and every scratch file is removed on all exit paths.
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# clobber each other and every scratch file is removed on all exit paths;
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# 11. (#991) ACCEPTS a record whose provider-returned URL differs from the repo
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# remote ONLY in http-vs-https — the standing state on a deployment whose
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# Gitea ROOT_URL is misconfigured — while still REJECTING a different
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# explicit port and a non-web scheme. Every prior fixture here was https://
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# and every negative varied only host or path, so the one axis that fails
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# in production had zero coverage: the fixtures encoded the assumption.
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set -euo pipefail
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@@ -61,15 +67,29 @@ STATE_FILE="$WORK_DIR/comments.json"
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# A dedicated scratch dir the wrapper is pointed at via TMPDIR, so the leak
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# check can assert every POST/GET body + metadata temp file is cleaned up.
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TMP_SCRATCH="$WORK_DIR/scratch"
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# #1007: a sandboxed HOME. detect-platform.sh's step-0 per-agent identity lookup
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# reads ~/.config/mosaic/gitea-tokens/<identity>, which is OUTSIDE both
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# XDG_CONFIG_HOME and MOSAIC_CREDENTIALS_FILE — so on any seat that has a real
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# per-agent token the suite resolves a PRODUCTION credential and dies at the
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# authenticated-identity read (HTTP 401) before reaching case 1. Pointing HOME
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# at the work dir keeps that lookup inside the sandbox.
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HOME_DIR="$WORK_DIR/home"
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cleanup() {
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rm -rf "$WORK_DIR"
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}
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trap cleanup EXIT
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mkdir -p "$REPO_DIR" "$BIN_DIR" "$XDG_DIR" "$TMP_SCRATCH"
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mkdir -p "$REPO_DIR" "$BIN_DIR" "$XDG_DIR" "$TMP_SCRATCH" "$HOME_DIR"
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git -C "$REPO_DIR" init -q
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git -C "$REPO_DIR" remote add origin https://git.mosaicstack.dev/mosaicstack/stack.git
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# #1007: shadow any GLOBAL `mosaic.gitIdentity` with an empty REPO-LOCAL value.
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# A repo-local key shadows the global and reads back empty at rc=0, which is the
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# only way to make step 0 fall through inside a sandbox. Note the env-var route
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# (MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY="") does NOT work: detect-platform.sh reads it with
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# `${MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY:-}`, and `:-` treats set-but-empty identically to
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# unset, so setting it empty is silently the same as not setting it at all.
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git -C "$REPO_DIR" config mosaic.gitIdentity ""
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ISSUE_NUMBER=7
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REPO_SLUG="mosaicstack/stack"
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@@ -266,6 +286,19 @@ elif mode == "url-wrong-repo":
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elif mode == "url-suffix-injection":
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# Prefix-injected: a bare endswith("/<slug>/issues/7") test would ACCEPT this.
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issue_url = f"https://git.mosaicstack.dev/deceptive/{repo}/issues/7"
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elif mode == "url-scheme-downgrade":
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# #991, and the ONLY one of these modes that must be ACCEPTED. A Gitea whose
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# ROOT_URL is http:// returns http:// object URLs for a repo cloned over
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# https://. Same host, same path, correct record — the provider is telling
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# the truth about a write that landed.
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issue_url = f"http://git.mosaicstack.dev/{repo}/issues/7"
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elif mode == "url-wrong-port":
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# An EXPLICIT non-default port is a different service on the same host and
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# must stay distinguishing — collapsing the scheme must not collapse this.
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issue_url = f"https://git.mosaicstack.dev:8443/{repo}/issues/7"
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elif mode == "url-non-web-scheme":
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# Only http/https collapse. Any other scheme stays distinguishing.
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issue_url = f"ftp://git.mosaicstack.dev/{repo}/issues/7"
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record = {
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"id": new_id,
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"body": body,
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@@ -365,6 +398,7 @@ run_comment() {
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(
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cd "$REPO_DIR"
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PATH="$BIN_DIR:$PATH" \
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HOME="$HOME_DIR" \
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TMPDIR="$TMP_SCRATCH" \
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XDG_CONFIG_HOME="$XDG_DIR" \
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MOSAIC_CREDENTIALS_FILE="$CREDENTIALS_FILE" \
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@@ -545,13 +579,17 @@ if grep -q " $ACTING_LOGIN\$" "$AUTH_LOG"; then
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fi
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assert_no_temp_leak "cross-host"
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# Cases 7-10 (#865 Blocker 3): the created record's id/author/body are all
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# correct, but its provider-returned issue_url is forged. Verification pins the
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# URL's ORIGIN (scheme+host+effective-port) and its FULL path (deployment prefix
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# + exact owner/repo + kind + number), so each forgery must FAIL CLOSED. A bare
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# endswith/suffix test would wrongly accept the look-alike-host and
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# prefix-injection variants.
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for bad_mode in url-wrong-host url-wrong-owner url-wrong-repo url-suffix-injection; do
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# Cases 7-12 (#865 Blocker 3): the created record's id/author/body are all
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# correct, but its provider-returned issue_url does not belong to this issue on
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# this provider/repo. Verification pins the URL's ORIGIN (scheme-class + host +
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# explicit non-default port) and its FULL path (deployment prefix + exact
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# owner/repo + kind + number), so each must FAIL CLOSED. A bare endswith/suffix
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# test would wrongly accept the look-alike-host and prefix-injection variants.
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# url-wrong-port and url-non-web-scheme (#991) bound the scheme relaxation from
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# the other side: collapsing http/https must not also collapse a different port
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# or a different scheme family.
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for bad_mode in url-wrong-host url-wrong-owner url-wrong-repo url-suffix-injection \
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url-wrong-port url-non-web-scheme; do
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if run_comment "$bad_mode"; then
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echo "FAIL: forged comment URL ($bad_mode) was accepted" >&2
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cat "$OUTPUT_FILE" >&2
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@@ -568,4 +606,19 @@ done
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# issue_url (already exercised by Case 1's fresh-success), so the tightened check
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# is not rejecting genuine writes.
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# Case 13 (#991): the deployment's ROOT_URL is http:// while the repo remote is
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# https://, so the provider returns an http:// issue_url for a record that is
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# otherwise entirely correct. This is not a forgery — it is the provider's own
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# truthful answer about a write that landed — and a scheme-strict comparison
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# rejects it deterministically, on EVERY comment, converting a successful write
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# into a reported failure. It must be ACCEPTED. Host, path, owner, repo, kind
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# and number all remain strict; only the http/https distinction is relaxed.
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run_comment url-scheme-downgrade
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grep -q 'Added and verified comment on Gitea issue #7 (comment ID 1)' "$OUTPUT_FILE"
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# The write really happened and was read back by exact id — this case passes
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# through the same POST/GET chain as case 1, not around it.
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grep -q "^POST $API_BASE/issues/7/comments$" "$CURL_LOG"
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grep -q "^GET $API_BASE/issues/comments/1$" "$CURL_LOG"
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assert_no_temp_leak "url-scheme-downgrade"
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echo "issue-comment.sh REST create + exact-id read-back regression passed"
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@@ -436,6 +436,19 @@ elif mode == "comment-url-wrong-repo":
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elif mode == "comment-url-suffix-injection":
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# Prefix-injected: a bare endswith("/<slug>/pulls/123") test would ACCEPT it.
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pr_url = f"{_origin}/deceptive{_slug}/pulls/123"
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elif mode == "comment-url-wrong-port":
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# #991 bound: an EXPLICIT non-default port is a different service on the same
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# host. Relaxing http-vs-https must NOT relax this.
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pr_url = f"{_p.scheme}://{_p.hostname}:8443{_slug}/pulls/123"
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elif mode == "comment-url-non-web-scheme":
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# #991 bound: ONLY http/https collapse; any other scheme stays distinguishing.
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pr_url = f"ftp://{_p.netloc}{_slug}/pulls/123"
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elif mode == "comment-url-scheme-downgrade":
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# #991, and the only URL mode here that must be ACCEPTED. A Gitea whose
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# ROOT_URL is http:// returns http:// object URLs for a repo reached over
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# https://. Same host, same path, correct record — a truthful provider
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# answer about a comment that landed, not a forgery.
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pr_url = f"http://{_p.netloc}{_slug}/pulls/123"
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elif mode == "comment-mixed-case-slug":
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# #875: EXPECTED_REPO_SLUG is taken verbatim from GITEA_API_BASE and can be
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# mixed-case (e.g. "USC/uconnect"), but Gitea canonicalizes the returned
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@@ -890,11 +903,16 @@ fi
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assert_no_temp_leak "review-body-reuse"
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# Cases 12-15 (#865 Blocker 3): a PR comment whose id/author/body are all correct
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# but whose provider-returned pull_request_url is forged must FAIL CLOSED.
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# Verification pins the URL's ORIGIN (scheme+host+effective-port) and FULL path
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# (deployment prefix + exact owner/repo + kind + number); a bare endswith/suffix
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# test would wrongly accept the look-alike-host and prefix-injection variants.
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for bad_mode in comment-url-wrong-host comment-url-wrong-owner comment-url-wrong-repo comment-url-suffix-injection; do
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# but whose provider-returned pull_request_url does not belong to this PR must
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# FAIL CLOSED. Verification pins the URL's ORIGIN (scheme-class + host + explicit
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# non-default port) and FULL path (deployment prefix + exact owner/repo + kind +
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# number); a bare endswith/suffix test would wrongly accept the look-alike-host
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# and prefix-injection variants. comment-url-wrong-port and
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# comment-url-non-web-scheme (#991) bound the scheme relaxation from the other
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# side: collapsing http/https must not also collapse a different port or a
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# different scheme family.
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for bad_mode in comment-url-wrong-host comment-url-wrong-owner comment-url-wrong-repo \
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comment-url-suffix-injection comment-url-wrong-port comment-url-non-web-scheme; do
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if run_review "$bad_mode" comment durable-body; then
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echo "FAIL: forged comment URL ($bad_mode) was accepted" >&2
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cat "$OUTPUT_FILE" >&2
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@@ -920,6 +938,19 @@ run_review comment-mixed-case-slug comment durable-body https://git.mosaicstack.
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grep -q 'Added and verified comment on Gitea PR #123' "$OUTPUT_FILE"
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assert_no_temp_leak "comment-mixed-case-slug"
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# Case 15c (#991): the deployment's Gitea ROOT_URL is http:// while every client
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# reaches it over https://, so the provider returns an http:// pull_request_url
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# for a comment that is otherwise entirely correct. Same class as 15b — a
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# legitimate provider response, not a spoof — and a scheme-strict compare
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# rejects it on EVERY comment, deterministically. That is not a cosmetic false
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# negative here: on a host where no seat can create a review OBJECT, this
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# comment-form record is the only gate-16 evidence obtainable, and the wrapper
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# refuses all of it while the comment sits durably on the PR. Host, path, owner,
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# repo, kind and number stay strict; only http-vs-https is relaxed.
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run_review comment-url-scheme-downgrade comment durable-body
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grep -q 'Added and verified comment on Gitea PR #123' "$OUTPUT_FILE"
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assert_no_temp_leak "comment-url-scheme-downgrade"
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# Case 16 (#865 ITEM 1, current-head TOCTOU): the PR head advances between the
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# pre-submit head read (which pins the review) and the post-verify re-read. The
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# review is genuinely created and verified as pinned to the OLD head, but the
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Reference in New Issue
Block a user