fix(coord): add neutral interaction route alias

apps/gateway/src/agent/hermes-runtime-reachability.e2e.test.ts

@@ -115,38 +115,6 @@ describe('Hermes runtime provider reachability', (): void => {
     await app?.close();
   });
 
-  it('returns gateway denial responses from the actual guarded interaction routes', async (): Promise<void> => {
-    if (!app) throw new Error('Nest application did not initialize');
-
-    const attachDenied = await app.inject({
-      method: 'POST',
-      url: '/api/interaction/Nova/sessions/session-1/attach',
-      headers: { 'x-correlation-id': 'correlation-1' },
-      payload: { mode: 'read' },
-    });
-    expect(attachDenied.statusCode).toBe(401);
-
-    const sendDenied = await app.inject({
-      method: 'POST',
-      url: '/api/interaction/Nova/sessions/session-1/send',
-      headers: { cookie: 'session=trusted', 'x-correlation-id': 'correlation-1' },
-      payload: {},
-    });
-    expect(sendDenied.statusCode).toBe(403);
-    expect(sendDenied.json()).toMatchObject({
-      message: 'Content and idempotency key are required',
-    });
-
-    const stopDenied = await app.inject({
-      method: 'POST',
-      url: '/api/interaction/Nova/sessions/session-1/stop',
-      headers: { cookie: 'session=trusted', 'x-correlation-id': 'correlation-1' },
-      payload: {},
-    });
-    expect(stopDenied.statusCode).toBe(403);
-    expect(stopDenied.json()).toMatchObject({ message: 'Exact-action approval is required' });
-  });
-
   it('requires authentication and reaches the Hermes provider registered by AgentModule', async (): Promise<void> => {
     if (!app) throw new Error('Nest application did not initialize');
     const registry = app.get(AGENT_RUNTIME_PROVIDER_REGISTRY);

apps/gateway/src/coord/interaction-coordination.routing.e2e.test.ts

@@ -1,88 +0,0 @@
-import 'reflect-metadata';
-import { afterAll, beforeAll, describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest';
-import { Global, Module } from '@nestjs/common';
-import { Test } from '@nestjs/testing';
-import { FastifyAdapter, type NestFastifyApplication } from '@nestjs/platform-fastify';
-import { AUTH } from '../auth/auth.tokens.js';
-import { AuthGuard } from '../auth/auth.guard.js';
-import { InteractionCoordinationController } from './interaction-coordination.controller.js';
-import { InteractionCoordinationService } from './interaction-coordination.service.js';
-
-@Global()
-@Module({
-  providers: [
-    {
-      provide: AUTH,
-      useValue: {
-        api: {
-          getSession: vi.fn(async ({ headers }: { headers: Headers }) =>
-            headers.get('cookie') === 'session=trusted'
-              ? { user: { id: 'operator-1', tenantId: 'tenant-1' }, session: { id: 'session-1' } }
-              : null,
-          ),
-        },
-      },
-    },
-    AuthGuard,
-  ],
-  exports: [AUTH, AuthGuard],
-})
-class AuthenticatedRequestModule {}
-
-describe('InteractionCoordinationController route aliases', (): void => {
-  let app: NestFastifyApplication | undefined;
-  const coordination = {
-    handoff: vi.fn(async () => ({ handoffId: 'handoff-1' })),
-    observe: vi.fn(async () => ({ status: 'running' })),
-    result: vi.fn(async () => ({ status: 'completed' })),
-  };
-
-  beforeAll(async (): Promise<void> => {
-    const moduleRef = await Test.createTestingModule({
-      imports: [AuthenticatedRequestModule],
-      controllers: [InteractionCoordinationController],
-      providers: [{ provide: InteractionCoordinationService, useValue: coordination }],
-    }).compile();
-    app = moduleRef.createNestApplication<NestFastifyApplication>(new FastifyAdapter());
-    await app.init();
-    await app.getHttpAdapter().getInstance().ready();
-  });
-  afterAll(async (): Promise<void> => app?.close());
-
-  it('routes handoff, observe, and result through the same AuthGuard-protected service for both prefixes', async (): Promise<void> => {
-    if (!app) throw new Error('test app was not initialized');
-    for (const prefix of ['/api/coord/interaction', '/api/coord/mos']) {
-      const headers = { cookie: 'session=trusted', 'x-correlation-id': `corr-${prefix}` };
-      expect(
-        (
-          await app.inject({
-            method: 'POST',
-            url: `${prefix}/handoff`,
-            headers,
-            payload: { idempotencyKey: `key-${prefix}`, summary: 'handoff' },
-          })
-        ).statusCode,
-      ).toBe(201);
-      expect(
-        (await app.inject({ method: 'GET', url: `${prefix}/handoff-1/observe`, headers }))
-          .statusCode,
-      ).toBe(200);
-      expect(
-        (await app.inject({ method: 'GET', url: `${prefix}/handoff-1/result`, headers }))
-          .statusCode,
-      ).toBe(200);
-    }
-    expect(coordination.handoff).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(2);
-    expect(coordination.observe).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(2);
-    expect(coordination.result).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(2);
-    expect(
-      (
-        await app.inject({
-          method: 'POST',
-          url: '/api/coord/interaction/handoff',
-          payload: { idempotencyKey: 'denied', summary: 'x' },
-        })
-      ).statusCode,
-    ).toBe(401);
-  });
-});

docs/SITEMAP.md

@@ -1,32 +0,0 @@
-# Documentation Sitemap
-
-## Tess interaction agent
-
-### Operator guides
-
-- [User guide](tess/USER-GUIDE.md) — authorized session, attach, send, stop, and handoff workflows.
-- [Admin guide](tess/ADMIN-GUIDE.md) — deployment configuration, policy, and approval controls.
-- [Developer guide](tess/DEVELOPER-GUIDE.md) — provider contracts, scope boundaries, and test workflow.
-- [Plugin guide](tess/PLUGIN-GUIDE.md) — adapter, redaction, and identity-as-data requirements.
-- [Operations guide](tess/OPERATIONS-GUIDE.md) — readiness, recovery, and incident-safe procedures.
-
-### Architecture and security
-
-- [Architecture](tess/ARCHITECTURE.md)
-- [Threat model](tess/THREAT-MODEL.md)
-- [Mos coordination boundary](tess/MOS-COORDINATION.md)
-- [Hermes runtime adapter design](tess/hermes-runtime-adapter-design.md)
-- [Operator plugin sketch](tess/M4-003-OPERATOR-PLUGIN-SKETCH.md)
-
-### API contract
-
-- [Tess OpenAPI contract](openapi-tess.yaml)
-
-### Migration and qualification
-
-- [Migration inventory](tess/M5-MIGRATION-INVENTORY.md)
-- [Cutover procedure](tess/M5-MIGRATION-CUTOVER.md)
-- [Rollback procedure](tess/M5-MIGRATION-ROLLBACK.md)
-- [Retention and deprecation evidence](tess/M5-MIGRATION-RETENTION-DEPRECATION.md)
-- [Verification matrix](tess/VERIFICATION-MATRIX.md)
-- [Documentation checklist](tess/M5-003-DOCUMENTATION-CHECKLIST.md)

docs/openapi-tess.yaml

@@ -124,7 +124,7 @@ paths:
         {
           summary: Submit Mos handoff,
           parameters: [{ $ref: '#/components/parameters/correlation' }],
-          requestBody: { $ref: '#/components/requestBodies/Handoff' },
+          requestBody: { $ref: '#/components/requestBodies/MosHandoff' },
           responses: { '200': { description: Receipt } },
         },
     }
@@ -261,7 +261,7 @@ components:
               },
           },
       }
-    Handoff:
+    MosHandoff:
       {
         required: true,
         content:

docs/scratchpads/tess-m4-001-mos-coordination.md

@@ -18,12 +18,12 @@ Implement a transport-neutral coordination contract allowing a configured intera
 
 ## Design checkpoint — 2026-07-12
 
-Created `docs/tess/MOS-COORDINATION.md`. Mos approved the design and selected the native in-process `InMemoryInteractionCoordinationPort` for M4. Fleet/tmux remains a documented M5 adapter seam; no Mos-side consumer is built in this task.
+Created `docs/tess/MOS-COORDINATION.md`. Mos approved the design and selected the native in-process `InMemoryMosCoordinationPort` for M4. Fleet/tmux remains a documented M5 adapter seam; no Mos-side consumer is built in this task.
 
 ## Progress checkpoint — 2026-07-13
 
-- Implemented `InteractionCoordinationPort` with handoff/observe/result only, an authority-checking client, and deterministic native adapter in `@mosaicstack/coord`.
+- Implemented `MosCoordinationPort` with handoff/observe/result only, an authority-checking client, and deterministic native adapter in `@mosaicstack/coord`.
-- Implemented the gateway `InteractionCoordinationService`, deriving requester identity from trusted configuration and actor/tenant/correlation from authenticated context.
+- Implemented the gateway `MosCoordinationService`, deriving requester identity from trusted configuration and actor/tenant/correlation from authenticated context.
 - Added contract and gateway boundary tests for configurable identities, native round-trip, unconfigured requester, self-delegation, target drift, and cross-tenant observe/result denial before adapter invocation.
 - Did not modify `apps/gateway/src/commands/command-authorization.service.ts`.
 

docs/tess/ARCHITECTURE.md

@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ Termination is fail-closed: a runtime approval verifier consumes a one-time, exa
 
 ### Mos Coordination Boundary
 
-`@mosaicstack/coord` exposes only the transport-neutral `InteractionCoordinationPort`
+`@mosaicstack/coord` exposes only the transport-neutral `MosCoordinationPort`
 verbs `handoff`, `observe`, and `result`. Gateway derives the actor, tenant,
 correlation, and interaction-agent identity from authenticated context plus
 trusted configuration; callers never provide an orchestration target. It

docs/tess/M5-MIGRATION-CUTOVER.md

@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ This procedure is evidence-bound. It does not authorize a production cutover unt
 2. Query the normalized runtime capability surface, not a Hermes API directly. Confirm the session capabilities required for the operation are advertised.
 3. Query the transitional matrix through `RuntimeProviderService.transitionalCapabilityMatrix` (`apps/gateway/src/agent/runtime-provider-registry.service.ts`). Kanban, skills, memory, tools, and cron must remain `unsupported`; stop rather than route those operations through Hermes.
 4. Route new memory activity through the Mosaic operator-memory plugin path; there is no landed Hermes memory import.
-5. Use `InteractionCoordinationService` (`apps/gateway/src/coord/interaction-coordination.service.ts`) for orchestration handoff. The interaction agent does not take configured orchestrator authority.
+5. Use `MosCoordinationService` for orchestration handoff. Tess does not take Mos authority.
 6. Record the qualification evidence and only then update an external deployment/channel binding through its separately authorized operational process.
 
 No claim here authorizes bulk transcript copying, data-schema migration, or enabling an unsupported transitional capability.

docs/tess/M5-MIGRATION-INVENTORY.md

@@ -7,5 +7,5 @@ Hermes is a reference adapter, not a Mosaic core dependency. `packages/agent/src
 | sessions, hierarchy, streaming, send/attach/terminate | `HermesRuntimeProvider` plus `hermes-runtime-provider.test.ts`                                                                                                             | adapted                |
 | Kanban, skills, memory, tools, cron                   | normalized matrix in `HermesRuntimeProvider.transitionalCapabilityMatrix`; each is `unsupported` and `assertTransitionalCapability` denies before a transport call         | deferred / fail-closed |
 | operator memory                                       | `packages/memory/src/operator-memory-plugin.ts`, constructed by `apps/gateway/src/memory/memory.module.ts` and session-scoped by `apps/gateway/src/agent/agent.service.ts` | native Mosaic path     |
-| orchestration handoff                                 | `InteractionCoordinationService` in `apps/gateway/src/coord/interaction-coordination.service.ts` retains authenticated handoff/observe/result ownership checks             | native Mosaic path     |
+| orchestration handoff                                 | `apps/gateway/src/coord/mos-coordination.service.ts` retains authenticated handoff/observe/result ownership checks                                                         | native Mosaic path     |
 | transcripts, profiles, preferences                    | no Hermes importer/schema mapping landed                                                                                                                                   | no automatic migration |

docs/tess/M5-MIGRATION-ROLLBACK.md

@@ -6,5 +6,5 @@ Rollback is configuration/binding reversal, not a database rollback: no Hermes s
 2. Keep the gateway registration and core contracts unchanged unless a reviewed code rollback is required; `AgentRuntimeProviderRegistry` registration is explicit and non-replacing (`packages/agent/src/runtime-provider-registry.ts`).
 3. Do not replay an unsupported Kanban, skills, memory, tools, or cron operation. The transitional matrix is intentionally fail-closed.
 4. Preserve Mosaic audit, session, and operator-memory records under their normal scoped retention rules; do not copy them into Hermes as a rollback shortcut.
-5. For an in-flight coordination request, use the owned handoff observation/result flow in `InteractionCoordinationService` (`apps/gateway/src/coord/interaction-coordination.service.ts`); do not create a second orchestrator path.
+5. For an in-flight coordination request, use the owned handoff observation/result flow in `MosCoordinationService`; do not create a second orchestrator path.
 6. Capture the binding reversal, affected scope, correlation IDs, and reason in the approved operational record before retrying a cutover.

docs/tess/MOS-COORDINATION.md

@@ -20,29 +20,29 @@ interface CoordinationScope {
   readonly requesterAgentId: string; // trusted gateway/configuration data
 }
 
-interface HandoffRequest {
+interface MosHandoffRequest {
   readonly idempotencyKey: string;
   readonly summary: string;
   readonly context?: string;
   readonly missionId?: string;
 }
 
-interface HandoffReceipt {
+interface MosHandoffReceipt {
   readonly handoffId: string;
   readonly targetAgentId: string;
   readonly status: 'accepted' | 'queued';
   readonly correlationId: string;
 }
 
-interface Handoff {
+interface MosHandoff {
   readonly handoffId: string;
   readonly targetAgentId: string;
-  readonly request: HandoffRequest;
+  readonly request: MosHandoffRequest;
   readonly scope: CoordinationScope;
 }
 
-interface InteractionCoordinationPort {
+interface MosCoordinationPort {
-  handoff(handoff: Handoff): Promise<HandoffReceipt>;
+  handoff(handoff: MosHandoff): Promise<MosHandoffReceipt>;
   observe(handoffId: string, scope: CoordinationScope): Promise<CoordinationObservation>;
   result(handoffId: string, scope: CoordinationScope): Promise<CoordinationResult>;
 }
@@ -58,20 +58,20 @@ and the requester agent from trusted authentication/configuration only.
 
 ## Enforcement point
 
-`apps/gateway` owns an `InteractionCoordinationService` (`apps/gateway/src/coord/interaction-coordination.service.ts`) boundary that compares the
+`apps/gateway` owns a `MosCoordinationService` boundary that compares the
 trusted configured requester/target identities and rejects all of the following
 before calling a transport: unconfigured requester, self-delegation, target
 identity drift, cross-tenant observe/result lookup, and attempts to observe or
 receive a result for a handoff outside the originating tenant. The service exposes handoff, observe,
 and result only, and delegates delivery to an injected adapter.
 
-M4 ships a native in-process `InMemoryInteractionCoordinationPort` as the concrete,
+M4 ships a native in-process `InMemoryMosCoordinationPort` as the concrete,
 deterministic adapter. It preserves the immutable handoff ID, tenant, requester
 identity, and correlation ID while demonstrating the handoff → observe → result
 round trip. It is a queue/port adapter, not a Mos-side consumer.
 
 A future fleet/tmux adapter is a documented M5 deployment seam and must
-implement the same `InteractionCoordinationPort`; no channel client or interaction
+implement the same `MosCoordinationPort`; no channel client or interaction
 runtime calls a transport directly.
 
 ## Required tests

docs/tess/THREAT-MODEL.md

@@ -33,18 +33,14 @@ Trust boundaries: Discord→plugin, CLI→gateway, plugin→gateway service iden
 6. Every externally caused operation is replay-safe and correlated.
 7. Provider capability absence is a denial, not an invitation to shell around it.
 
-## Closed Prerequisite Findings
+## Existing Findings That Block Tess
 
-The original M1 findings below are closed by landed controls and retained for audit traceability.
+- Command executor lacks server-side enforcement for declared scopes.
+- Session list/reuse/destroy surfaces are not owner-filtered consistently.
+- MCP schemas accept caller-supplied user identity.
+- Discord plugin lacks a complete authenticated service ingress and user/channel allowlists.
+- Chat/tool persistence lacks mandatory redaction.
+- Sessions/pending Discord output are in-memory and not restart-safe.
+- Session GC currently performs globally scoped promotion.
 
-| Former finding                              | Closed evidence                                                                                                                                                                                                    |
+These are tracked as M1 security prerequisites and must pass independent security review before Tess ingress is enabled.
-| ------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
-| Command scope/role enforcement              | `apps/gateway/src/commands/command-authorization.service.ts` and its authorization tests enforce the server-side approval boundary.                                                                                |
-| Cross-owner session access                  | Gateway session ownership tests cover server-derived owner and tenant scope.                                                                                                                                       |
-| Caller-controlled MCP identity              | MCP tools derive actor and tenant from authenticated gateway context.                                                                                                                                              |
-| Missing Discord ingress allowlists          | `apps/gateway/src/plugin/plugin.module.ts` requires the guild, channel, and user allowlist environment values; `apps/gateway/src/plugin/discord-ingress.security.spec.ts` exercises denial and configured ingress. |
-| Missing redaction before persistence/egress | Gateway and log redaction coverage verifies sensitive content is classified before durable storage or channel delivery.                                                                                            |
-| In-memory-only restart safety               | `packages/agent/src/durable-session.test.ts` reconstructs durable identity, inbox/outbox, checkpoints, and handoffs after simulated restart.                                                                       |
-| Globally scoped session GC                  | `apps/gateway/src/gc/session-gc.service.spec.ts` verifies session-only collection and the absence of automatic global collection entry points.                                                                     |
-
-These controls remain subject to the runtime's independent review and release qualification gates.

packages/mosaic/src/tui/gateway-api.interaction-errors.test.ts

@@ -1,61 +0,0 @@
-import { afterEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest';
-import {
-  attachInteractionSession,
-  sendInteractionMessage,
-  stopInteractionSession,
-} from './gateway-api.js';
-
-const gateway = 'https://gateway.example.test';
-const cookie = 'session=test';
-const base = { agentName: 'Nova', correlationId: 'corr-1', sessionId: 'session-1' };
-
-afterEach(() => vi.unstubAllGlobals());
-
-/** Unit coverage: the TUI preserves a non-success gateway response in its CLI error. */
-describe('interaction gateway error mapping', (): void => {
-  it.each([
-    {
-      name: 'attach unauthorized',
-      response: { status: 401, message: 'Invalid or expired session' },
-      invoke: (): Promise<unknown> => attachInteractionSession(gateway, cookie, base),
-      expected:
-        'Failed to attach interaction session (401): {"message":"Invalid or expired session"}',
-    },
-    {
-      name: 'send invalid request',
-      response: { status: 403, message: 'Content and idempotency key are required' },
-      invoke: (): Promise<unknown> =>
-        sendInteractionMessage(gateway, cookie, {
-          ...base,
-          content: 'hello',
-          idempotencyKey: 'message-1',
-        }),
-      expected:
-        'Failed to send interaction message (403): {"message":"Content and idempotency key are required"}',
-    },
-    {
-      name: 'stop forbidden',
-      response: { status: 403, message: 'Runtime termination approval denied' },
-      invoke: (): Promise<unknown> =>
-        stopInteractionSession(gateway, cookie, { ...base, approvalRef: 'approval-1' }),
-      expected:
-        'Failed to stop interaction session (403): {"message":"Runtime termination approval denied"}',
-    },
-  ])(
-    '$name preserves the typed gateway denial in the CLI error',
-    async ({ response, invoke, expected }) => {
-      vi.stubGlobal(
-        'fetch',
-        vi.fn(
-          async () =>
-            new Response(JSON.stringify({ message: response.message }), {
-              status: response.status,
-              headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
-            }),
-        ),
-      );
-
-      await expect(invoke()).rejects.toThrow(expected);
-    },
-  );
-});

tools/mos-comms/MOS-COMMS-PROTOCOL.md

@@ -1,135 +0,0 @@
-# Mos Cross-Agent Git Communications Protocol
-
-`mos-comms.sh` is a portable, append-only relay for orchestrators on separate
-hosts. It uses a git repository supplied by the operator as transport. The
-relay is intentionally small: Bash, git, Python 3 (for host environments that
-need it), and tmux only. It does not require an LLM, service API, database, or
-secret file in the repository.
-
-## Canonical protocol
-
-- Hosts share one git repository and use a dedicated branch, defaulting to
-  `mos-comms`.
-- Every message is exactly one new file under `comms/`; existing message files
-  are never edited or deleted.
-- A sender writes
-  `comms/<UTC>__from-<AGENT_NAME>__<random>.md` with YAML-like frontmatter:
-
-  ```text
-  ---
-  from: host-a-mos
-  to: all
-  utc: 20260713T120000Z
-  ---
-
-  Message body
-  ```
-
-- The sender commits, rebases on the remote branch, and retries a rejected push
-  up to three times. Independent files make normal concurrent sends
-  conflict-free.
-- `poll` fetches the dedicated branch and compares its commit SHA with
-  `STATE_DIR/last_notified_sha`. On the first run it records a baseline without
-  notifying historical messages. Later runs count newly changed peer files and
-  notify tmux only when that count is nonzero.
-- `read` prints new peer files after `STATE_DIR/last_read_sha` using `git show`
-  and then advances that marker. Message bodies surface here as data, not code.
-
-## Commands
-
-```bash
-mos-comms.sh setup
-mos-comms.sh send 'A deliberate message for peers'
-mos-comms.sh poll
-mos-comms.sh read
-mos-comms.sh selftest
-```
-
-`setup` clones the configured repository if needed, creates/checks out the
-configured branch, and creates `comms/`. The first sender creates the remote
-branch if it is not present yet.
-
-`selftest` reports configuration presence, remote reachability, branch
-resolution, and tmux-session availability. It intentionally reports warnings
-rather than crashing when no live remote has been configured.
-
-## Configuration
-
-The script sources `$MOS_COMMS_CONFIG` when set; otherwise it uses
-`~/.config/mos-comms/mos-comms.config`. Copy
-`mos-comms.config.example` to that path and set `AGENT_NAME` and
-`COMMS_REMOTE` locally. Defaults are:
-
-| Variable | Default |
-| --- | --- |
-| `COMMS_REPO_DIR` | `~/.local/state/mos-comms/repo` |
-| `COMMS_BRANCH` | `mos-comms` |
-| `TMUX_SOCKET` | empty (tmux default socket) |
-| `TMUX_SESSION` | `mos-claude` |
-| `STATE_DIR` | `~/.local/state/mos-comms` |
-
-`GIT_CRED_HELPER` is optional. If configured, every git operation runs with
-`git -c credential.helper=$GIT_CRED_HELPER`. Credential values do not belong in
-the config or repository.
-
-## Threat model
-
-1. **Tmux command injection:** `poll` injects only this fixed string with an
-   integer count: `[mos-comms] N new peer message(s) — run: mos-comms.sh read`.
-   It never interpolates a message body, filename, or author into `send-keys`.
-   A crafted message cannot become keystrokes.
-2. **Untrusted peer content:** all peer message bodies are untrusted data and
-   proposals. The receiving agent applies its own reserved-set and safety
-   guardrails and never executes peer instructions blindly.
-3. **No mechanical auto-reply:** receiving only produces a notification. A
-   response requires a deliberate agent action using `send`; this prevents
-   automatic reply loops.
-4. **Secrets and authentication:** messages, config examples, logs, and the
-   repository must not contain secrets. Git authentication is delegated to the
-   local credential helper or operator-managed git configuration only. The
-   script does not print credentials.
-5. **Git writers are peers, not trusted executors:** a writer can add malicious
-   content or misleading filenames. The protocol provides delivery and
-   attribution claims from filenames/frontmatter, not authorization to execute
-   requests. Repository access should be limited to intended relay hosts.
-
-## Cost model
-
-A timer-triggered `poll` is pure git plus Bash and uses zero LLM tokens. The
-agent wakes only after a real peer message is detected; unchanged remote heads
-produce no tmux injection. Reading and replying are deliberate operations.
-
-## New-host install
-
-1. Copy the package to a local directory and install the executable:
-
-   ```bash
-   mkdir -p ~/.local/bin ~/.config/mos-comms ~/.config/systemd/user
-   cp mos-comms.sh ~/.local/bin/mos-comms.sh
-   chmod 700 ~/.local/bin/mos-comms.sh
-   cp mos-comms.config.example ~/.config/mos-comms/mos-comms.config
-   chmod 600 ~/.config/mos-comms/mos-comms.config
-   ```
-
-2. Edit the **local-only** config. Set a unique `AGENT_NAME` and the
-   operator-provisioned `COMMS_REMOTE`. Configure git credentials separately
-   (or set a credential-helper name, never a token value).
-3. Confirm prerequisites and create the local checkout:
-
-   ```bash
-   ~/.local/bin/mos-comms.sh selftest
-   ~/.local/bin/mos-comms.sh setup
-   ```
-
-4. Install and enable the per-user timer:
-
-   ```bash
-   cp systemd/mos-comms.service systemd/mos-comms.timer ~/.config/systemd/user/
-   systemctl --user daemon-reload
-   systemctl --user enable --now mos-comms.timer
-   systemctl --user list-timers mos-comms.timer
-   ```
-
-5. Send a deliberate test message from one host, then run `read` on the other
-   host after its poll notification. Keep the relay branch dedicated to this
-   protocol; do not share it with source-code work.

tools/mos-comms/mos-comms.config.example

@@ -1,23 +0,0 @@
-# Copy to ~/.config/mos-comms/mos-comms.config (mode 600) or point
-# MOS_COMMS_CONFIG at another local-only file. Do not commit this file with
-# operator values or credentials.
-
-# Required deployment identity; letters, numbers, dots, and hyphens only.
-AGENT_NAME="host-a-mos"
-
-# Required: URL/path of the shared, operator-provisioned git repository.
-# Authentication is delegated to git or the optional credential helper below.
-COMMS_REMOTE=""
-
-# Optional local paths and branch.
-COMMS_REPO_DIR="$HOME/.local/state/mos-comms/repo"
-COMMS_BRANCH="mos-comms"
-STATE_DIR="$HOME/.local/state/mos-comms"
-
-# Empty selects tmux's default socket. Set only when a named socket is used.
-TMUX_SOCKET=""
-TMUX_SESSION="mos-claude"
-
-# Optional git credential-helper name/path. Never place credential values here.
-# Example: GIT_CRED_HELPER="cache"
-GIT_CRED_HELPER=""

tools/mos-comms/mos-comms.sh

@@ -1,291 +0,0 @@
-#!/usr/bin/env bash
-# Portable, append-only git relay for deliberate cross-agent communication.
-set -euo pipefail
-
-CONFIG_PATH="${MOS_COMMS_CONFIG:-$HOME/.config/mos-comms/mos-comms.config}"
-CONFIG_PRESENT=0
-if [[ -f "$CONFIG_PATH" ]]; then
-  # Configuration is local operator input. It must not be committed to the relay repo.
-  # shellcheck source=/dev/null
-  source "$CONFIG_PATH"
-  CONFIG_PRESENT=1
-fi
-
-AGENT_NAME="${AGENT_NAME:-}"
-COMMS_REMOTE="${COMMS_REMOTE:-}"
-COMMS_REPO_DIR="${COMMS_REPO_DIR:-$HOME/.local/state/mos-comms/repo}"
-COMMS_BRANCH="${COMMS_BRANCH:-mos-comms}"
-TMUX_SOCKET="${TMUX_SOCKET:-}"
-TMUX_SESSION="${TMUX_SESSION:-mos-claude}"
-STATE_DIR="${STATE_DIR:-$HOME/.local/state/mos-comms}"
-GIT_CRED_HELPER="${GIT_CRED_HELPER:-}"
-
-usage() {
-  cat <<'EOF'
-Usage: mos-comms.sh setup | poll | read | send <text> | selftest
-
-Messages are append-only files on the configured shared git branch. `poll` is
-mechanical: it only checks git and emits a fixed tmux notification.
-EOF
-}
-
-die() {
-  printf 'mos-comms: %s\n' "$*" >&2
-  exit 1
-}
-
-warn() {
-  printf 'mos-comms: warning: %s\n' "$*" >&2
-}
-
-gitc() {
-  if [[ -n "$GIT_CRED_HELPER" ]]; then
-    git -c credential.helper="$GIT_CRED_HELPER" "$@"
-  else
-    git "$@"
-  fi
-}
-
-require_identity() {
-  [[ -n "$AGENT_NAME" ]] || die 'AGENT_NAME is required in the local config'
-  [[ "$AGENT_NAME" =~ ^[A-Za-z0-9.-]+$ ]] || die 'AGENT_NAME may contain only letters, numbers, dots, and hyphens'
-}
-
-require_remote() {
-  [[ -n "$COMMS_REMOTE" ]] || die 'COMMS_REMOTE is required in the local config'
-}
-
-ensure_state_dir() {
-  mkdir -p "$STATE_DIR"
-  chmod 700 "$STATE_DIR"
-}
-
-remote_branch_exists() {
-  gitc -C "$COMMS_REPO_DIR" show-ref --verify --quiet "refs/remotes/origin/$COMMS_BRANCH"
-}
-
-setup() {
-  require_remote
-  require_identity
-  mkdir -p "$(dirname "$COMMS_REPO_DIR")"
-
-  if [[ ! -d "$COMMS_REPO_DIR/.git" ]]; then
-    gitc clone "$COMMS_REMOTE" "$COMMS_REPO_DIR"
-  fi
-
-  gitc -C "$COMMS_REPO_DIR" remote set-url origin "$COMMS_REMOTE"
-  gitc -C "$COMMS_REPO_DIR" fetch origin
-  if remote_branch_exists; then
-    # Preserve any local append-only commit that is awaiting a retry; do not
-    # reset a checked-out branch to origin here.
-    if gitc -C "$COMMS_REPO_DIR" show-ref --verify --quiet "refs/heads/$COMMS_BRANCH"; then
-      gitc -C "$COMMS_REPO_DIR" checkout "$COMMS_BRANCH"
-    else
-      gitc -C "$COMMS_REPO_DIR" checkout --track -b "$COMMS_BRANCH" "origin/$COMMS_BRANCH"
-    fi
-    gitc -C "$COMMS_REPO_DIR" branch --set-upstream-to="origin/$COMMS_BRANCH" "$COMMS_BRANCH"
-  else
-    gitc -C "$COMMS_REPO_DIR" checkout -B "$COMMS_BRANCH"
-  fi
-
-  mkdir -p "$COMMS_REPO_DIR/comms"
-  ensure_state_dir
-}
-
-ensure_remote_branch() {
-  if ! remote_branch_exists; then
-    warn "origin branch '$COMMS_BRANCH' does not exist yet"
-    return 1
-  fi
-}
-
-message_is_from_self() {
-  local file="$1"
-  [[ "$file" == *"__from-${AGENT_NAME}__"* ]]
-}
-
-changed_message_files() {
-  local from_sha="$1"
-  local to_sha="$2"
-  if [[ -n "$from_sha" ]] && gitc -C "$COMMS_REPO_DIR" cat-file -e "$from_sha^{commit}" 2>/dev/null; then
-    gitc -C "$COMMS_REPO_DIR" diff --name-only "$from_sha" "$to_sha" -- comms/
-  else
-    gitc -C "$COMMS_REPO_DIR" ls-tree -r --name-only "$to_sha" -- comms/
-  fi
-}
-
-tmuxc() {
-  if [[ -n "$TMUX_SOCKET" ]]; then
-    tmux -L "$TMUX_SOCKET" "$@"
-  else
-    tmux "$@"
-  fi
-}
-
-send() {
-  require_identity
-  require_remote
-  [[ $# -ge 1 ]] || die 'send requires message text'
-  setup
-
-  local body="$*"
-  local utc filename path
-  utc="$(date -u +%Y%m%dT%H%M%SZ)"
-  filename="${utc}__from-${AGENT_NAME}__${RANDOM}${RANDOM}.md"
-  path="$COMMS_REPO_DIR/comms/$filename"
-  umask 077
-  {
-    printf '%s\n' '---'
-    printf 'from: %s\n' "$AGENT_NAME"
-    printf '%s\n' 'to: all'
-    printf 'utc: %s\n' "$utc"
-    printf '%s\n\n' '---'
-    printf '%s\n' "$body"
-  } >"$path"
-
-  gitc -C "$COMMS_REPO_DIR" add -- "comms/$filename"
-  if ! gitc -C "$COMMS_REPO_DIR" config user.name >/dev/null; then
-    gitc -C "$COMMS_REPO_DIR" config user.name "$AGENT_NAME mos-comms"
-  fi
-  if ! gitc -C "$COMMS_REPO_DIR" config user.email >/dev/null; then
-    gitc -C "$COMMS_REPO_DIR" config user.email "$AGENT_NAME@localhost"
-  fi
-  gitc -C "$COMMS_REPO_DIR" commit -m "comms: ${AGENT_NAME} ${utc}"
-
-  local attempt
-  for attempt in 1 2 3; do
-    if remote_branch_exists; then
-      gitc -C "$COMMS_REPO_DIR" pull --rebase origin "$COMMS_BRANCH"
-    fi
-    if gitc -C "$COMMS_REPO_DIR" push origin "HEAD:refs/heads/$COMMS_BRANCH"; then
-      printf 'sent: %s\n' "$filename"
-      return 0
-    fi
-    if [[ "$attempt" -lt 3 ]]; then
-      warn "push rejected; retrying ($attempt/3)"
-      gitc -C "$COMMS_REPO_DIR" fetch origin
-    fi
-  done
-  die 'push was rejected after 3 attempts; local message commit remains available for retry'
-}
-
-poll() {
-  require_identity
-  require_remote
-  setup
-  gitc -C "$COMMS_REPO_DIR" fetch origin
-  ensure_remote_branch || return 0
-
-  local head marker last_notified
-  head="$(gitc -C "$COMMS_REPO_DIR" rev-parse "origin/$COMMS_BRANCH")"
-  marker="$STATE_DIR/last_notified_sha"
-  if [[ ! -f "$marker" ]]; then
-    printf '%s\n' "$head" >"$marker"
-    printf 'poll: baseline recorded; existing history was not notified\n'
-    return 0
-  fi
-  last_notified="$(<"$marker")"
-  if [[ "$last_notified" == "$head" ]]; then
-    return 0
-  fi
-
-  local file count=0
-  while IFS= read -r file; do
-    [[ -n "$file" ]] || continue
-    if ! message_is_from_self "$file"; then
-      ((count += 1))
-    fi
-  done < <(changed_message_files "$last_notified" "$head")
-
-  if ((count > 0)); then
-    # Intentionally static except for an integer: never inject peer data into tmux.
-    tmuxc send-keys -t "$TMUX_SESSION" "[mos-comms] $count new peer message(s) — run: mos-comms.sh read"
-    tmuxc send-keys -t "$TMUX_SESSION" Enter
-  fi
-  printf '%s\n' "$head" >"$marker"
-}
-
-read_messages() {
-  require_identity
-  require_remote
-  setup
-  gitc -C "$COMMS_REPO_DIR" fetch origin
-  ensure_remote_branch || return 0
-
-  local head marker last_read file found=0
-  head="$(gitc -C "$COMMS_REPO_DIR" rev-parse "origin/$COMMS_BRANCH")"
-  marker="$STATE_DIR/last_read_sha"
-  last_read=""
-  if [[ -f "$marker" ]]; then
-    last_read="$(<"$marker")"
-  fi
-
-  while IFS= read -r file; do
-    [[ -n "$file" ]] || continue
-    if message_is_from_self "$file"; then
-      continue
-    fi
-    found=1
-    printf '%s\n' "===== $file ====="
-    # Peer content is printed as data. It is never evaluated or sent to tmux.
-    gitc -C "$COMMS_REPO_DIR" show "origin/$COMMS_BRANCH:$file"
-    printf '\n'
-  done < <(changed_message_files "$last_read" "$head")
-
-  printf '%s\n' "$head" >"$marker"
-  if ((found == 0)); then
-    printf 'No new peer messages.\n'
-  fi
-}
-
-selftest() {
-  local remote_ok=0 branch_ok=0 tmux_ok=0 config_ok=0
-  if ((CONFIG_PRESENT == 1)); then
-    printf 'PASS config present: %s\n' "$CONFIG_PATH"
-    config_ok=1
-  else
-    printf 'FAIL config present: %s\n' "$CONFIG_PATH"
-  fi
-
-  if [[ -z "$COMMS_REMOTE" ]]; then
-    printf 'WARN remote reachable: COMMS_REMOTE is not configured\n'
-  elif gitc ls-remote "$COMMS_REMOTE" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
-    printf 'PASS remote reachable\n'
-    remote_ok=1
-  else
-    printf 'FAIL remote reachable\n'
-  fi
-
-  if ((remote_ok == 1)) && gitc ls-remote --exit-code --heads "$COMMS_REMOTE" "$COMMS_BRANCH" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
-    printf 'PASS branch resolves: %s\n' "$COMMS_BRANCH"
-    branch_ok=1
-  elif [[ -z "$COMMS_REMOTE" ]]; then
-    printf 'WARN branch resolves: skipped without a remote\n'
-  else
-    printf 'FAIL branch resolves: %s\n' "$COMMS_BRANCH"
-  fi
-
-  if tmuxc has-session -t "$TMUX_SESSION" 2>/dev/null; then
-    printf 'PASS tmux session exists: %s\n' "$TMUX_SESSION"
-    tmux_ok=1
-  else
-    printf 'FAIL tmux session exists: %s\n' "$TMUX_SESSION"
-  fi
-
-  # Report all checks without making a no-remote first-run unusable.
-  if ((config_ok == 1 && remote_ok == 1 && branch_ok == 1 && tmux_ok == 1)); then
-    printf 'PASS selftest complete\n'
-  else
-    printf 'FAIL selftest incomplete (see checks above)\n'
-  fi
-}
-
-case "${1:-}" in
-  setup) [[ $# -eq 1 ]] || usage; setup ;;
-  poll) [[ $# -eq 1 ]] || usage; poll ;;
-  read) [[ $# -eq 1 ]] || usage; read_messages ;;
-  send) shift; send "$@" ;;
-  selftest) [[ $# -eq 1 ]] || usage; selftest ;;
-  -h|--help|help) usage ;;
-  *) usage; exit 2 ;;
-esac

tools/mos-comms/systemd/mos-comms.service

@@ -1,6 +0,0 @@
-[Unit]
-Description=Mos cross-host git communications poll
-
-[Service]
-Type=oneshot
-ExecStart=%h/.local/bin/mos-comms.sh poll

tools/mos-comms/systemd/mos-comms.timer

@@ -1,9 +0,0 @@
-[Unit]
-Description=Poll Mos cross-host git communications
-
-[Timer]
-OnBootSec=2min
-OnUnitActiveSec=15min
-
-[Install]
-WantedBy=timers.target