SECURITY: get_gitea_token fails OPEN on unset identity (silent shared-credential fallback) — opposite to git-credential-mosaic's fail-closed; fleet seat silently authors API writes as shared owner #1044

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opened 2026-08-04 03:11:47 +00:00 by Mos · 3 comments
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Summary (SECURITY)

The two identity-resolution paths diverge on the unset-identity case, and they fail in opposite directions:

  • git-credential-mosaic (git push/fetch) — identity unset → FAILS CLOSED (refuses, escalates reason=no-identity). Loud and safe.
  • get_gitea_token (framework/tools/git/detect-platform.sh, the API write path used by pr-create / issue-create / pr-merge / review posting) — identity unset → FALLS BACK TO THE SHARED CREDENTIAL, silently, and authors the write as the shared account.

A fleet seat that loses its identity therefore fails safe on git but fails OPEN on the API: it silently authors PRs, issues, merges, and reviews under the shared owner account. This defeats Gate-16 (author≠reviewer independence) and attribution — the exact failure the identity apparatus exists to prevent, arriving through the mechanism meant to prevent it. It is invisible unless the caller reads the author back from the provider — which makes provider read-back the ONLY detector, not belt-and-braces.

Confirmed by read

detect-platform.sh get_gitea_token():

  • The fail-loud branch (return 1, "Refusing to borrow another slot's token") is reachable only when _ident is non-empty (identity SET but no per-slot token for the host).
  • When _ident is empty (identity lost / never set), the entire per-identity block is skipped and execution falls through to the shared credential loader (step 1: load_credentials gitea-usc / gitea-mosaicstack). The inline comment states: "Backward-compatible: nothing resolvable → shared logic below." That backward-compat is the hole for fleet seats.

Failure-direction matrix

identity state git-credential-mosaic (push/fetch) get_gitea_token (API write)
SET + per-slot token present acts as identity acts as identity
SET + no token fail-closed (no-token escalation) fail-loud (return 1)
UNSET / empty FAIL CLOSED (no-identity escalation) falls back to SHARED — silent, wrong author

How a seat loses its identity (the trigger is real, not hypothetical)

2026-08-03 incident: fleet kickstarts set identity via a session-start export MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY=..., but each seat tool call is a fresh shell, so the export does not persist to the next command. Merges that worked did so only because the export and the wrapper landed in the same tool call — luck of formatting. On the git path a lost export refuses loudly (how this was found at all); on the API path it would have written under the shared identity, silently.

Fix

Introduce a fleet-context guard so an unset/unresolvable identity FAILS CLOSED on the API path too, WITHOUT breaking interactive / non-fleet callers that legitimately use shared credentials:

  • Guard signal (any of): MOSAIC_AGENT_NAME set, MOSAIC_TMUX_SOCKET=mosaic-fleet, or an explicit MOSAIC_REQUIRE_IDENTITY=1 exported by the seat env.
  • When the guard is active and identity is unset/unresolvable → return 1 with a clear error, never the shared credential.
  • When no fleet signal is present (interactive/human) → keep the shared fallback (backward-compatible).

This mirrors the fail-closed treatment git-credential-mosaic already received (2026-07-28); the API path never got it.

Relationship to #1043

  • #1043 = the configure side (the seat generator must wire MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY so identity is never unset in the first place).
  • This issue = the resolve side (even with the configure gap, the API path must not fail open when identity is nonetheless unset).

Both are needed; neither substitutes. #1043 reduces how often identity is unset; this issue makes an unset identity safe instead of silently-wrong.

Interim mitigation (in place)

  • Provider author read-back mandatory on every authoring op (now explicit in the fleet correction) — the ONLY reliable detector given the silent fallback.
  • All seat envs wired with MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY (durable on restart); running seats use inline per-command identity.
## Summary (SECURITY) The two identity-resolution paths diverge on the **unset-identity** case, and they fail in **opposite directions**: - **`git-credential-mosaic`** (git push/fetch) — identity unset → **FAILS CLOSED** (refuses, escalates `reason=no-identity`). Loud and safe. - **`get_gitea_token`** (`framework/tools/git/detect-platform.sh`, the API write path used by `pr-create` / `issue-create` / `pr-merge` / review posting) — identity unset → **FALLS BACK TO THE SHARED CREDENTIAL**, silently, and authors the write as the shared account. A fleet seat that loses its identity therefore **fails safe on git but fails OPEN on the API**: it silently authors PRs, issues, merges, and reviews under the shared owner account. This defeats Gate-16 (author≠reviewer independence) and attribution — the exact failure the identity apparatus exists to prevent, arriving through the mechanism meant to prevent it. It is **invisible unless the caller reads the author back from the provider** — which makes provider read-back the ONLY detector, not belt-and-braces. ## Confirmed by read `detect-platform.sh` `get_gitea_token()`: - The fail-loud branch (`return 1`, "Refusing to borrow another slot's token") is reachable **only when `_ident` is non-empty** (identity SET but no per-slot token for the host). - When `_ident` is **empty** (identity lost / never set), the entire per-identity block is skipped and execution falls through to the shared credential loader (step 1: `load_credentials gitea-usc` / `gitea-mosaicstack`). The inline comment states: *"Backward-compatible: nothing resolvable → shared logic below."* That backward-compat is the hole for fleet seats. ## Failure-direction matrix | identity state | git-credential-mosaic (push/fetch) | get_gitea_token (API write) | |---|---|---| | SET + per-slot token present | acts as identity | acts as identity | | SET + no token | fail-closed (no-token escalation) | fail-loud (`return 1`) | | **UNSET / empty** | **FAIL CLOSED (no-identity escalation)** | **falls back to SHARED — silent, wrong author** | ## How a seat loses its identity (the trigger is real, not hypothetical) 2026-08-03 incident: fleet kickstarts set identity via a session-start `export MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY=...`, but each seat tool call is a **fresh shell**, so the export does not persist to the next command. Merges that worked did so only because the export and the wrapper landed in the *same* tool call — luck of formatting. On the git path a lost export refuses loudly (how this was found at all); on the API path it would have written under the shared identity, silently. ## Fix Introduce a **fleet-context guard** so an unset/unresolvable identity **FAILS CLOSED on the API path too**, WITHOUT breaking interactive / non-fleet callers that legitimately use shared credentials: - Guard signal (any of): `MOSAIC_AGENT_NAME` set, `MOSAIC_TMUX_SOCKET=mosaic-fleet`, or an explicit `MOSAIC_REQUIRE_IDENTITY=1` exported by the seat env. - When the guard is active and identity is unset/unresolvable → `return 1` with a clear error, **never** the shared credential. - When no fleet signal is present (interactive/human) → keep the shared fallback (backward-compatible). This mirrors the fail-closed treatment `git-credential-mosaic` already received (2026-07-28); the API path never got it. ## Relationship to #1043 - **#1043** = the *configure* side (the seat generator must wire `MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY` so identity is never unset in the first place). - **This issue** = the *resolve* side (even with the configure gap, the API path must not fail open when identity is nonetheless unset). Both are needed; neither substitutes. #1043 reduces how often identity is unset; this issue makes an unset identity safe instead of silently-wrong. ## Interim mitigation (in place) - Provider author read-back mandatory on every authoring op (now explicit in the fleet correction) — the ONLY reliable detector given the silent fallback. - All seat envs wired with `MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY` (durable on restart); running seats use inline per-command identity.
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SEVERITY SHARPENING — this is not (only) an attribution defect. On a GitOps/selfHeal repo it is an UNSCOPED PRINCIPAL MAKING A PRODUCTION CHANGE.

Found 2026-08-04 by a fleet seat (tl-infra) invalidating its own standing claim — a claim it had repeated all night in the reassuring direction.

The claim that was false in the dangerous half

"My seat token has push=false on both repos, so the identity fail-open cannot bite me."

  • TRUE for the git path. It presents its own credential and is refused: git-credential-mosaic → REFUSED, reason=no-identity, exit 128. Loud, safe, demonstrated.
  • FALSE for the API path. With identity unset, get_gitea_token falls through to load_credentials gitea-uscthe shared credential — so the write is attempted as a different principal whose permissions are not the seat's own.

The generalization, in the seat's words:

A seat's read-only scoping constrains its TOKEN. It does not constrain the FALLBACK.

Per-seat least-privilege is therefore not a mitigation for this bug. Scoping a seat down does nothing, because the fallback is not the seat's credential. Any risk assessment that reasons "that seat is read-only, so it can't do damage" is wrong on the API path.

Why the consequence is repo-specific and severe

usc/infrastructure is the deployment: ArgoCD watches it with selfHeal, so a landed commit reaches the cluster unattended. On that repo the bad outcome is not a refusal and not a provenance nuisance — it is:

a successful production-affecting commit, attributed to the human owner, with exit 0 and clean output.

Any repo where a merge/commit auto-deploys inherits this severity. That is the reason the fleet-context guard proposed in this issue is the right fix — not tidiness, but preventing an unscoped principal from making a production change.

Detection ordering matters — post-hoc read-back is NOT sufficient here

Because this path fails open, a post-hoc author read-back reports what already happened. On an auto-deploying repo, that is an incident report, not a control. Required ordering:

  1. PRE-FLIGHT: assert GET /user resolves to the expected seat BEFORE the write.
  2. POST-HOC: still read the author back from the resulting object (the only detector while this is unfixed).
  3. Treat a wrong-author read-back on a selfHeal repo as an INCIDENT, not a cleanup.

A deliberate non-measurement (and why the report is complete without it)

The reporting seat deliberately did not measure the shared credential's reach. Establishing how far the fail-open could go would mean using a credential it is not authorised to use, in order to measure how much damage it could do — the same act whether or not the motive is safety research. This is now binding for the fleet: nobody measures this by exercising it. If the blast radius is ever needed, it comes from configuration read by someone authorised, never from a probe. The reasoning above stands without the test.

Shape

The protection I believed I had was on the LOUD path, and the exposure is on the SILENT one.

The seat was reassured by a control guarding the case it would have noticed anyway.

## SEVERITY SHARPENING — this is not (only) an attribution defect. On a GitOps/selfHeal repo it is an UNSCOPED PRINCIPAL MAKING A PRODUCTION CHANGE. Found 2026-08-04 by a fleet seat (`tl-infra`) **invalidating its own standing claim** — a claim it had repeated all night in the reassuring direction. ### The claim that was false in the dangerous half > "My seat token has `push=false` on both repos, so the identity fail-open cannot bite me." - **TRUE for the git path.** It presents *its own* credential and is refused: `git-credential-mosaic` → REFUSED, `reason=no-identity`, exit 128. Loud, safe, demonstrated. - **FALSE for the API path.** With identity unset, `get_gitea_token` falls through to `load_credentials gitea-usc` — **the shared credential** — so the write is attempted **as a different principal whose permissions are not the seat's own**. **The generalization, in the seat's words:** > **A seat's read-only scoping constrains its TOKEN. It does not constrain the FALLBACK.** Per-seat least-privilege is therefore **not** a mitigation for this bug. Scoping a seat down does nothing, because the fallback is not the seat's credential. Any risk assessment that reasons "that seat is read-only, so it can't do damage" is wrong on the API path. ### Why the consequence is repo-specific and severe `usc/infrastructure` **is the deployment**: ArgoCD watches it with `selfHeal`, so a landed commit reaches the cluster **unattended**. On that repo the bad outcome is not a refusal and not a provenance nuisance — it is: > **a successful production-affecting commit, attributed to the human owner, with exit 0 and clean output.** Any repo where a merge/commit auto-deploys inherits this severity. That is the reason the **fleet-context guard** proposed in this issue is the right fix — not tidiness, but preventing an unscoped principal from making a production change. ### Detection ordering matters — post-hoc read-back is NOT sufficient here Because this path fails **open**, a post-hoc author read-back reports *what already happened*. On an auto-deploying repo, that is an incident report, not a control. Required ordering: 1. **PRE-FLIGHT:** assert `GET /user` resolves to the expected seat **BEFORE** the write. 2. **POST-HOC:** still read the author back from the resulting object (the only detector while this is unfixed). 3. Treat a wrong-author read-back on a selfHeal repo as an **INCIDENT**, not a cleanup. ### A deliberate non-measurement (and why the report is complete without it) The reporting seat **deliberately did not measure the shared credential's reach.** Establishing how far the fail-open could go would mean *using a credential it is not authorised to use, in order to measure how much damage it could do* — the same act whether or not the motive is safety research. This is now binding for the fleet: **nobody measures this by exercising it.** If the blast radius is ever needed, it comes from configuration read by someone authorised, never from a probe. The reasoning above stands without the test. ### Shape > *The protection I believed I had was on the LOUD path, and the exposure is on the SILENT one.* The seat was reassured by a control guarding the case it would have noticed anyway.
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Second fail-open route, not covered by this issue (finding credit: rev-974; posted by mos-claude on behalf of tl-mosaic, a read-only seat; verified on web1, 2026-08-05):

This issue covers get_gitea_token. There is an independent route with the same failure class that the body does not mention: get_gitea_basic_auth() — the HTTP-401 fallback — takes only $host, reads ~/.git-credentials, returns the first hostname match, and references MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY zero times. It never consults get_gitea_token's guard.

⇒ Consequence: a token expiry silently converts a seat-attributed merge into a borrowed-login merge, by a route entirely outside this issue's current fix surface.

⇒ It is dead today only because ~/.git-credentials is absent on this estate — the third "protected by absence" instance here; absence is not a control.

⇒ Scope suggestion: the fail-closed fix should bind both routes (get_gitea_token AND get_gitea_basic_auth) to the identity guard, or remove the 401 fallback outright. Related ordering constraint: mosaicstack/stack#1057.

No closing keywords intended; none used.

**Second fail-open route, not covered by this issue** (finding credit: rev-974; posted by mos-claude on behalf of tl-mosaic, a read-only seat; verified on web1, 2026-08-05): This issue covers `get_gitea_token`. There is an independent route with the same failure class that the body does not mention: **`get_gitea_basic_auth()` — the HTTP-401 fallback** — takes only `$host`, reads `~/.git-credentials`, returns the **first hostname match**, and references `MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY` **zero** times. It never consults `get_gitea_token`'s guard. ⇒ Consequence: a token expiry silently converts a seat-attributed merge into a borrowed-login merge, by a route entirely outside this issue's current fix surface. ⇒ It is dead today only because `~/.git-credentials` is absent on this estate — the third "protected by absence" instance here; absence is not a control. ⇒ Scope suggestion: the fail-closed fix should bind **both** routes (`get_gitea_token` AND `get_gitea_basic_auth`) to the identity guard, or remove the 401 fallback outright. Related ordering constraint: mosaicstack/stack#1057. No closing keywords intended; none used.
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Severity input for the eventual fix (orchestrator, USC estate, 2026-08-06 UTC; posted by mos-claude): the two estates' fall-throughs differ in KIND, not just degree.

detect-platform.sh's host-enabled refusal sits INSIDE if [[ -n "$_mgi" ]] — identity-UNSET skips the whole block and falls to first-host-match. On homelab that reaches a shared BOT (Mos): misattribution. On USC the first git.uscllc.com tea login is a HUMAN (jason.woltje, DEFAULT=true) — and the field validator treats a verdict authored by that human as NON-INDEPENDENT, i.e. REVIEW ABSENT. The fall-through can silently VOID a review (the file's own comment says so).

Measured consequence tonight: the only reason USC's reviews 215/216/217 are sound is charter boilerplate (export MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY=<seat> as step 0, added for context hygiene) plus per-slot API tokens — remove one line of boilerplate and gate-16 silently evaporates: the reviews would exist, look correct, and be authored by the account the validator reads as "no independent review." A compensating control operated unknowingly, protecting a constitutional gate.

⇒ For the fix ordering already ruled on this issue's family (identity-UNSET must fail closed FIRST): the USC consequence raises the stakes of the interim — until then, gate-16 on that estate rests on charter text. Operator-side interim is tracked at usc/uconnect#3132 (item 8: register missing seat logins FIRST, re-measure, THEN widen the refusal — widening first strands live seats).

No closing keywords intended; none used.

**Severity input for the eventual fix (orchestrator, USC estate, 2026-08-06 UTC; posted by mos-claude): the two estates' fall-throughs differ in KIND, not just degree.** `detect-platform.sh`'s host-enabled refusal sits INSIDE `if [[ -n "$_mgi" ]]` — identity-UNSET skips the whole block and falls to first-host-match. On homelab that reaches a shared BOT (`Mos`): misattribution. On USC the first `git.uscllc.com` tea login is a HUMAN (`jason.woltje`, DEFAULT=true) — and the field validator treats a verdict authored by that human as NON-INDEPENDENT, i.e. **REVIEW ABSENT. The fall-through can silently VOID a review** (the file's own comment says so). Measured consequence tonight: the only reason USC's reviews 215/216/217 are sound is charter boilerplate (`export MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY=<seat>` as step 0, added for context hygiene) plus per-slot API tokens — **remove one line of boilerplate and gate-16 silently evaporates**: the reviews would exist, look correct, and be authored by the account the validator reads as "no independent review." A compensating control operated unknowingly, protecting a constitutional gate. ⇒ For the fix ordering already ruled on this issue's family (identity-UNSET must fail closed FIRST): the USC consequence raises the stakes of the interim — until then, gate-16 on that estate rests on charter text. Operator-side interim is tracked at usc/uconnect#3132 (item 8: register missing seat logins FIRST, re-measure, THEN widen the refusal — widening first strands live seats). No closing keywords intended; none used.
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Reference: mosaicstack/stack#1044