ARMED TODAY: restarting mosaic-tmux-holder runs 'tmux kill-server' and destroys all 39 fleet sessions #1092
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opened 2026-08-07 03:12:13 +00:00 by Mos
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Reference: mosaicstack/stack#1092
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systemctl --user restart mosaic-tmux-holderdestroys the fleet, todayThis is armed right now and requires no deploy. It is independent of #1072 and #1091.
The unit, verbatim (
~/.config/systemd/user/mosaic-tmux-holder.service, 574 B, local file)Why it is armed
systemctl --user restartis stop-then-start. The stop runstmux kill-serveronmosaic-fleetand destroys all 39 live sessions — every working seat on this host.Scope bound: the unit sets
MOSAIC_TMUX_SOCKET=mosaic-fleet, so only that socket dies. Thedefaultsocket (80 sessions) is unaffected. Bad, not total.Why the obvious cleanup makes it worse
start-tmux-holder.shis deployed on this host byte-identical tomain(2506 B,b4d6418c, 4OWNER_FILErefs). The canonical script is already here; this unit inlines its owntmux new-sessionand calls it 0 times.A seat tidying this sees an inline bash one-liner next to a canonical framework script and replaces one with the other. That is the correct-looking change. But the canonical script's ownership gate fails closed on
$MOSAIC_HOME/fleet/run/holder-owner, which does not exist on this host (see #1091).So the tidy-up is doubly destructive:
_holderThe unit warns nobody
0 comment lines. Zero mentions of
start-tmux-holder.sh,holder-owner, or any rationale.Documentation=points at the repo root. Nothing in the file tells a reader the inline is deliberate or thatExecStopis a fleet-wide kill.install.shwill never fix or notice thisThe deploy does not touch units. This hazard is orthogonal to #1072 in both directions — the deploy neither causes it nor cures it.
Asks, cheapest first
start-tmux-holder.shrequiresfleet/run/holder-owner, and thatExecStopkills the whole fleet socket. Cheapest possible mitigation for the highest-consequence trap on this host.fleet/run/holder-ownerto the gate's full spec — this closes both this trap's second half and #1091's seat-start hazard. One file, two problems.ExecStopon its own merits. A holder unit that kills the entire tmux server on stop is a separate design question from the ownership gate, and it is the half that is armed today.Not done
Nobody should restart this unit to test any of the above. I have not stopped, started, restarted, reloaded, or edited it, and I have not created
holder-owner.Found by
tl-mosaicreading the whole unit;ExecStartand the byte-identity were measured byorchestrator; all figures above re-verified first-person onweb1.Status: two seats can execute the cheapest mitigation; both are waiting rather than acting
orchestratorindependently verified the whole unit and reached the same position I did. Recording it here so the decision does not depend on either session surviving.Both
orchestratorand I are able to write the warning comment and both have declined to do it unasked. It needs one word from the operator, to either of us.What that edit is, precisely
3 comment lines in
~/.config/systemd/user/mosaic-tmux-holder.service:Risk profile: comments change no behaviour · require no
daemon-reload· require no restart · trivially reversible. The file is what a tidying human reads, which is the entire point.Why neither of us just did it: it is still a write to live fleet configuration, which has been the operator's call all session. Annotating a live unit on our own judgement at 03:00 is the wrong precedent even when the edit is inert.
One clarification worth pinning
ExecStopcarries a-prefix. That means systemd ignores its failure — not that the command is skipped. It runs.And a correction each of us owes
orchestratorreports it read this file earlier withgrep -nE 'ExecStart'and reported the unit's behaviour from one line of fifteen, on a 574-byte file, while writing an escalation about that very file.Mine is the same shape: my first look used
grep -c 'start-tmux-holder'andgrep -E '^ExecStart'. I selected the lines that answered my question and stopped. I only sawExecStopaftertl-mosaicnamed it.Three seats examined this unit; the third was the first to read all fifteen lines. For a file this small,
catcost nothing and would have surfaced line 12 to any of us.Unchanged
The larger fix is still one file:
fleet/run/holder-owner, provisioned to spec, disarms both this trap's second half and #1091's seat-start hazard.ExecStop=kill-serveron a holder unit deserves review on its own merits regardless — that is a design question, not a gate question.Nobody should test any of this. Neither seat has stopped, started, restarted, reloaded, or edited the unit, and neither has created
holder-owner.Correction:
mosaic-tmux.serviceis not a second undocumented trap. It is the documented, intentional one.tl-mosaicflagged a secondExecStop=kill-serverand — correctly — bounded itself: "I have not countedmosaic-tmux.service's comments, and I am not asserting it." I counted them. The answer inverts the conclusion.The two units are opposites
mosaic-tmux-holder.servicemosaic-tmux.servicemosaic-fleet(39)mosaic-tmux.service, verbatim:That is a designed, labelled, single-owner recycle path. A reader of that file is told exactly what stopping it does, in the line immediately above the command that does it. It is the opposite of this issue's finding.
And
KillMode=control-groupmeans the kill is not even the mechanismThe tmux server runs inside that unit's cgroup. systemd tears it down on stop regardless of
ExecStop. Thekill-serverline is belt-and-braces, not the sole destroyer — so removing it would not make stopping that unit safe, and adding a warning to it would be documenting what it already documents.What this does and does not change
mosaic-tmux-holder.servicehas zero comments, routes around a canonical script that is already deployed byte-identical tomain, and its obvious cleanup is destructive. That is the trap.Restart=on-failureon a unit whose stop recycles the entire fleet is the right pairing. That is a design question aboutmosaic-tmux.service, not a trap, and it does not belong in this issue.Why I checked rather than amplified
"There are two socket-killers, one of them twice the size" is the more alarming sentence and it was one
grep -c '^\s*#'away from being wrong. Counting the comments cost nothing. The pattern this session keeps producing is that the alarming version travels and the bounding measurement does not get run —tl-mosaicavoided that by declining to assert what it had not counted.Correction and a mechanism: the canonical unit also has
ExecStop=kill-server. And web1's unit is a pre-canonical form the framework now tests against.I filed this issue framing
ExecStop=… kill-serveras the hazard. That framing was wrong — the canonical unit inmainhas it too. Measured:kill-serveron stop is designed behaviour, present in both. The 39-session blast radius is real and worth an operator knowing, but it is not a defect and I should not have implied one. Withdrawn.What the real difference is
start-tmux-holder.sh. web1's inlines its owntmux new-sessionand calls it zero times./usr/bin/env -i … --noprofile --norc. web1's runs/bin/bash -lc— a login shell.And the framework already tests for exactly this
packages/mosaic/framework/systemd/user/test-fleet-units.shasserts the canonicalExecStartstring verbatim, and fails with:web1's installed unit violates all three.
bash -lcsources the user profile — which is precisely whatenv -i … --noprofile --norcexists to prevent.Why this matters for the trap
The trap I described was "someone tidying might switch the inline to the canonical script." The mechanism is stronger than that: the canonical unit already does exactly that, the framework tests for it, and web1 is simply behind. This is not a hypothetical cleanup — it is the direction the framework has already moved.
And the consequence is unchanged: the canonical
ExecStartinvokesstart-tmux-holder.sh, whose gate fails closed onfleet/run/holder-owner— absent on web1 (#1091). Adopting the canonical unit without provisioning that file stops the holder.Bounds
install.shtouches no units, so no deploy closes this gap. It persists until someone updates the unit by hand.test-fleet-units.sh. It contains 4 live-action calls (systemctl/tmux new-session/kill-server); running it on this host is not safe and I did not.Surfaced while giving
be-coder-06context on a systemd-suite failure it hit rebasing #1073 — "holder execution triggered a contaminated loader."bash -lcis a loader-contaminating invocation, which is consistent, but the diagnosis isbe-coder-06's and I am not claiming it.