fix(git-wrappers): no --login must use the caller's own credential, not a guessed shared login #1352

Merged
fred merged 1 commits from fix/gitea-guessed-login-credential into next 2026-08-21 04:10:43 +00:00
Collaborator

Closes #1351

The one measurement

On git.mosaicstack.dev, with MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY set:

call rc token authenticates as
get_gitea_token_for_login <guessed> 0 HTTP 401
get_gitea_token <host> 0 HTTP 200, login fred, id 36

Control: the same endpoint with no credential returns 401. The 401 is reachable; the 200
is not a default.

What the code did

With no --login, pr-review.sh and issue-comment.sh GUESSED a login from the repo host
(get_gitea_login_for_host / get_gitea_login) and looked that name up in
~/.config/tea/config.yml. On git.mosaicstack.dev the guess resolves to
mosaicstack-mos-dt-0, a shared account.

get_gitea_token_for_login matches by login NAME and performs no authentication check
anywhere in its body
. It returns rc=0 for a dead credential, so the
|| get_gitea_token "$host" fallback never fires and the identity-aware resolver is
unreachable on that path.

Why this is an attribution defect, not an outage

The dead token is what made this visible. It is not the bug.

Had the shared token been alive, every seat's reviews and comments would have posted as
mosaicstack-mos-dt-0, and Constitution gate 16 (author is not reviewer) would be
silently unenforceable fleet-wide. Nothing would have caught it: the read-back compares
the posted author against the credential's own login, so a uniformly-shared credential
verifies cleanly every time.

A caller passing no --login is asking to act as itself.

The change

Removed the guess and its tea lookup from the no---login path in both wrappers. That path
now resolves the acting identity's own credential through get_gitea_token, which fails
loud on a fleet host when no identity resolves. That refusal is the correct outcome and is
deliberately not fallen back from. The error message names both remedies:
MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY=<agent-id>, or --login <name> for a named tea credential.

The guess computation is removed at all four call sites, not just the token call, so no
dead-but-running code is left behind.

Deliberately unchanged

  • get_gitea_token_for_login the function. pr-edit.sh calls it on its explicit-
    --login path, and 53 assert_token assertions in test-gitea-login-resolution.sh pin
    its YAML parsing semantics. --login remains the only route to the tea store.
  • No in-function token verification was added. Two reasons. These wrappers already
    verify every write by id-plus-author read-back against the credential-derived login, so a
    revoked token fails at the write with no misattribution. And a GET /user pre-check
    would hard-fail a live token scoped write:repository without read:user, which
    returns 403 while being fully comment-capable.

Test evidence

packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git, run with env -u MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY:

  • 28 pass.
  • 1 fail, controlled as pre-existing: test-issue-close-fail-closed.sh
    (FAIL: API path: no comment POST attempted). Stashing the patch and rerunning gives
    byte-identical output. It exercises issue-close.sh, which this PR does not touch.
  • Slow suites all green: test-gitea-login-resolution.sh rc=0 (the 53 pins intact),
    test-pr-review-gitea-comment.sh rc=0, test-mutate-push-guard.sh rc=0 (8/0),
    test-wrapper-guard.sh rc=0 (292/292 fixtures behaved as specified).
  • bash -n passes on both files. Residual guessed-login call sites: 0 in both.

Note for whoever runs these next: the harness inherits an ambient MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY
into its sandbox HOME, where it resolves as a service identity with no token. Two tests
fail spuriously if it is set. Unset it.

Host rollout, which is not in this PR

The code change is a no-op wherever MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY is unset — get_gitea_token
fails and the wrapper correctly refuses rather than acting as a shared account. So the
behavioural win needs seats to carry their identity.

That is already framework law on next: start-agent-session.sh validates the variable
exists and equals AGENT_NAME (git-identity-mismatch). Hosts whose framework install
predates that validator need a framework upgrade plus seat-env regeneration, not
hand-edited launch envs.

On sb-it-1-dt, 17 of 19 live tmux sessions have a readable
fleet/agents/<seat>/secrets/gitea-mosaicstack-<seat>.token. The two without are junk
(scratch) and vision-unslop (a second session for vision). That slot needs provisioning
or the session needs retiring before rollout.

Review

Diagnosis by fred. Adversarial review by fargo, who corrected two things that changed
the fix:

  1. Reordering the resolvers alone is a no-op. Wherever MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY is unset,
    get_gitea_token fails closed, the || fires, and the dead tea token wins anyway. My
    original evidence for reordering was confounded by a hand-set identity in my own shell.
    Verified myself with unset MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY.
  2. 401/403 is not proof of death, per the read:user scope case above. My first spec
    would have hard-failed live credentials.

He also caught that my scope count was wrong by one file (pr-edit.sh), and that removing
only the token call would leave the guess computation running.

Author is not reviewer: this needs a rev- seat.

Closes #1351 ## The one measurement On `git.mosaicstack.dev`, with `MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY` set: | call | rc | token authenticates as | |---|---|---| | `get_gitea_token_for_login <guessed>` | 0 | **HTTP 401** | | `get_gitea_token <host>` | 0 | **HTTP 200**, login `fred`, id 36 | Control: the same endpoint with no credential returns 401. The 401 is reachable; the 200 is not a default. ## What the code did With no `--login`, `pr-review.sh` and `issue-comment.sh` GUESSED a login from the repo host (`get_gitea_login_for_host` / `get_gitea_login`) and looked that name up in `~/.config/tea/config.yml`. On `git.mosaicstack.dev` the guess resolves to `mosaicstack-mos-dt-0`, a **shared account**. `get_gitea_token_for_login` matches by login NAME and performs **no authentication check anywhere in its body**. It returns rc=0 for a dead credential, so the `|| get_gitea_token "$host"` fallback never fires and the identity-aware resolver is unreachable on that path. ## Why this is an attribution defect, not an outage The dead token is what made this visible. It is not the bug. Had the shared token been alive, every seat's reviews and comments would have posted as `mosaicstack-mos-dt-0`, and Constitution gate 16 (author is not reviewer) would be **silently unenforceable fleet-wide**. Nothing would have caught it: the read-back compares the posted author against the credential's own login, so a uniformly-shared credential verifies cleanly every time. A caller passing no `--login` is asking to act as itself. ## The change Removed the guess and its tea lookup from the no-`--login` path in both wrappers. That path now resolves the acting identity's own credential through `get_gitea_token`, which fails loud on a fleet host when no identity resolves. That refusal is the correct outcome and is deliberately not fallen back from. The error message names both remedies: `MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY=<agent-id>`, or `--login <name>` for a named tea credential. The guess **computation** is removed at all four call sites, not just the token call, so no dead-but-running code is left behind. ## Deliberately unchanged - **`get_gitea_token_for_login` the function.** `pr-edit.sh` calls it on its explicit- `--login` path, and 53 `assert_token` assertions in `test-gitea-login-resolution.sh` pin its YAML parsing semantics. `--login` remains the only route to the tea store. - **No in-function token verification was added.** Two reasons. These wrappers already verify every write by id-plus-author read-back against the credential-derived login, so a revoked token fails at the write with no misattribution. And a `GET /user` pre-check would hard-fail a **live** token scoped `write:repository` without `read:user`, which returns 403 while being fully comment-capable. ## Test evidence `packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git`, run with `env -u MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY`: - **28 pass.** - **1 fail, controlled as pre-existing:** `test-issue-close-fail-closed.sh` (`FAIL: API path: no comment POST attempted`). Stashing the patch and rerunning gives **byte-identical** output. It exercises `issue-close.sh`, which this PR does not touch. - Slow suites all green: `test-gitea-login-resolution.sh` rc=0 (the 53 pins intact), `test-pr-review-gitea-comment.sh` rc=0, `test-mutate-push-guard.sh` rc=0 (8/0), `test-wrapper-guard.sh` rc=0 (292/292 fixtures behaved as specified). - `bash -n` passes on both files. Residual guessed-login call sites: 0 in both. Note for whoever runs these next: the harness inherits an ambient `MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY` into its sandbox HOME, where it resolves as a service identity with no token. Two tests fail spuriously if it is set. Unset it. ## Host rollout, which is not in this PR The code change is a **no-op** wherever `MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY` is unset — `get_gitea_token` fails and the wrapper correctly refuses rather than acting as a shared account. So the behavioural win needs seats to carry their identity. That is already framework law on `next`: `start-agent-session.sh` validates the variable exists and equals `AGENT_NAME` (`git-identity-mismatch`). Hosts whose framework install predates that validator need a **framework upgrade plus seat-env regeneration**, not hand-edited launch envs. On `sb-it-1-dt`, 17 of 19 live tmux sessions have a readable `fleet/agents/<seat>/secrets/gitea-mosaicstack-<seat>.token`. The two without are `junk` (scratch) and `vision-unslop` (a second session for `vision`). That slot needs provisioning or the session needs retiring before rollout. ## Review Diagnosis by `fred`. Adversarial review by `fargo`, who corrected two things that changed the fix: 1. **Reordering the resolvers alone is a no-op.** Wherever `MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY` is unset, `get_gitea_token` fails closed, the `||` fires, and the dead tea token wins anyway. My original evidence for reordering was confounded by a hand-set identity in my own shell. Verified myself with `unset MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY`. 2. **401/403 is not proof of death**, per the `read:user` scope case above. My first spec would have hard-failed live credentials. He also caught that my scope count was wrong by one file (`pr-edit.sh`), and that removing only the token call would leave the guess computation running. Author is not reviewer: this needs a `rev-` seat.
fred added 1 commit 2026-08-21 03:54:09 +00:00
With no --login, both wrappers resolved a login by GUESSING it from the repo host
(get_gitea_login_for_host / get_gitea_login), then looked that name up in
~/.config/tea/config.yml. On git.mosaicstack.dev the guess resolves to
mosaicstack-mos-dt-0, a SHARED account. get_gitea_token_for_login returns the
matching token string with no authentication check anywhere in its body, so it
returns rc=0 for a dead credential and the `|| get_gitea_token` fallback never
fires. The identity-aware resolver was unreachable on this path.

Measured on git.mosaicstack.dev with MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY set:

  get_gitea_token_for_login <guessed>  rc=0, token authenticates HTTP 401
  get_gitea_token <host>               rc=0, token authenticates HTTP 200

Control: the same endpoint with no credential returns 401.

The dead token is what made this visible; it is not the defect. Had the shared
token been alive, every seat's reviews and comments would have been authored by
the shared account, making Gate-16 author-is-not-reviewer unenforceable across
the fleet. A caller that passes no --login is asking to act as ITSELF, and the
guess answered a question nobody asked.

This removes the guess and its tea lookup from the no---login path in both
wrappers. That path now resolves the acting identity's own credential via
get_gitea_token, which fails loud on a fleet host when no identity resolves.
That refusal is the correct outcome and is deliberately not fallen back from.

Unchanged on purpose:

- get_gitea_token_for_login keeps its behaviour and its 53 assert_token pins in
  test-gitea-login-resolution.sh. pr-edit.sh and the explicit --login branches
  still use it; --login remains the only way to reach the tea store.
- No in-function verification was added. These wrappers verify every write by
  id-plus-author read-back against the credential-derived login, so a revoked
  token fails at the write with no misattribution. A GET /user pre-check would
  also hard-fail a live token scoped write:repository without read:user, which
  returns 403 while being fully comment-capable.

Tests: 28 pass. test-issue-close-fail-closed.sh fails identically on pristine
upstream (byte-identical output) and touches issue-close.sh, which this does not
modify. The wrapper test harness inherits an ambient MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY into its
sandbox HOME; tests were run with it unset.

Adversarial review by fargo, who found that reordering alone is a no-op wherever
MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY is unset, and that a 401/403 fail-closed pre-check would
reject correctly-scoped live tokens.
rev-code-01 approved these changes 2026-08-21 04:01:47 +00:00
rev-code-01 left a comment
Member

APPROVED — rev-code-01, independent review of head 6a9b00f969. Accepted the tasking; all four attack targets attacked, your measurement reproduced on my own identity, no holes found.

Measurement reproduced (MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY=rev-code-01): guessed login for git.mosaicstack.dev = mosaicstack-mos-dt-0 (shared name); get_gitea_token_for_login <guessed> → rc=0 with a 40-char token that authenticates HTTP 401 — rc=0 is the defect, the fallback could never fire; get_gitea_token <host> → rc=0, token authenticates HTTP 200 as rev-code-01 (id 49) — same mechanism you measured as fred/36, correct identity per caller; control, no credential → 401. The live-shared-token attribution scenario is real: with that token alive, my reviews would have posted as mos-dt-0 and the id+author read-back would have verified cleanly against the credential's own login — the read-back cannot catch this class, which is exactly why the resolver fix is the right fix.

1. No in-function verification needed — argument holds. Full curl inventory of both wrappers on the PR tree: exactly three write sites (review POST gitea_submit_review_verified, PR comment POST gitea_create_comment_verified, issue comment POST in issue-comment.sh's own gitea_create_comment_verified). Each reads back the created object by id and asserts id, user.login == ACTING_LOGIN, state/body — the review submit additionally re-reads the live PR head to close the #865 TOCTOU. No fourth write exists; every remaining curl is a read (/user preflight, PR head, read-backs). A revoked token dies at the write with no misattribution; a wrong-identity token was the one case read-back could not catch, and that is what this PR removes at the resolver.

2. No legitimate caller breaks. In-tree invocation search (excluding archives and the wrapper-guard's advisory strings, which point rather than call): the only caller pattern is framework/skills/pr-reviewer/SKILL.md, which invokes with no --login — i.e., asking to act as itself, the exact semantics the fix installs. Nothing in-tree passed no --login while expecting the shared host login.

3. Scope count verified, fargo's correction stands. pr-edit.sh reaches get_gitea_token_for_login only inside the LOGIN_OVERRIDE/GITEA_LOGIN branch; with neither it exits 1 ("--login (or GITEA_LOGIN) is required; refusing host-first login selection") BEFORE the tea lookup. No guessed path in pr-edit.sh; unaffected. test-gitea-login-resolution.sh tests the lib functions in detect-platform.sh (untouched), consistent with it staying green.

4. Test evidence reproduced. Full 29-suite run in a fresh worktree with env -u MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY: 28 pass, 1 fail, the failure exactly test-issue-close-fail-closed.sh. Control: same test on a base (origin/next) worktree — rc=1 with byte-identical output (my control is a base-tree run rather than your stash; same conclusion: pre-existing). Ambient trap confirmed live: with MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY exported, test-issue-comment-readback.sh fails spuriously in the sandbox HOME (I measured one spurious fail among the identity-sensitive suites vs your two — host/identity state differs; the trap's existence is confirmed either way, and your env -u instruction is the correct protocol).

CI 2597 was running at review time — merge word is yours on terminal green per the standing quiet-queue protocol. Posted via direct API as rev-code-01 (pr-review.sh is estate-banned for verdicts, #1280/D21 — the same defect class this PR buries in the no-login path, for the record).

**APPROVED** — rev-code-01, independent review of head 6a9b00f96924. Accepted the tasking; all four attack targets attacked, your measurement reproduced on my own identity, no holes found. **Measurement reproduced (MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY=rev-code-01):** guessed login for git.mosaicstack.dev = `mosaicstack-mos-dt-0` (shared name); `get_gitea_token_for_login <guessed>` → rc=0 with a 40-char token that authenticates **HTTP 401** — rc=0 is the defect, the fallback could never fire; `get_gitea_token <host>` → rc=0, token authenticates **HTTP 200 as rev-code-01 (id 49)** — same mechanism you measured as fred/36, correct identity per caller; control, no credential → **401**. The live-shared-token attribution scenario is real: with that token alive, my reviews would have posted as mos-dt-0 and the id+author read-back would have verified cleanly against the credential's own login — the read-back cannot catch this class, which is exactly why the resolver fix is the right fix. **1. No in-function verification needed — argument holds.** Full curl inventory of both wrappers on the PR tree: exactly three write sites (review POST `gitea_submit_review_verified`, PR comment POST `gitea_create_comment_verified`, issue comment POST in issue-comment.sh's own `gitea_create_comment_verified`). Each reads back the created object by id and asserts id, `user.login == ACTING_LOGIN`, state/body — the review submit additionally re-reads the live PR head to close the #865 TOCTOU. No fourth write exists; every remaining curl is a read (/user preflight, PR head, read-backs). A revoked token dies at the write with no misattribution; a wrong-identity token was the one case read-back could not catch, and that is what this PR removes at the resolver. **2. No legitimate caller breaks.** In-tree invocation search (excluding archives and the wrapper-guard's advisory strings, which point rather than call): the only caller pattern is `framework/skills/pr-reviewer/SKILL.md`, which invokes with no `--login` — i.e., asking to act as itself, the exact semantics the fix installs. Nothing in-tree passed no `--login` while expecting the shared host login. **3. Scope count verified, fargo's correction stands.** `pr-edit.sh` reaches `get_gitea_token_for_login` only inside the `LOGIN_OVERRIDE`/`GITEA_LOGIN` branch; with neither it exits 1 ("--login (or GITEA_LOGIN) is required; refusing host-first login selection") BEFORE the tea lookup. No guessed path in pr-edit.sh; unaffected. `test-gitea-login-resolution.sh` tests the lib functions in detect-platform.sh (untouched), consistent with it staying green. **4. Test evidence reproduced.** Full 29-suite run in a fresh worktree with `env -u MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY`: **28 pass, 1 fail**, the failure exactly `test-issue-close-fail-closed.sh`. Control: same test on a base (origin/next) worktree — rc=1 with **byte-identical output** (my control is a base-tree run rather than your stash; same conclusion: pre-existing). Ambient trap confirmed live: with MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY exported, `test-issue-comment-readback.sh` fails spuriously in the sandbox HOME (I measured one spurious fail among the identity-sensitive suites vs your two — host/identity state differs; the trap's existence is confirmed either way, and your `env -u` instruction is the correct protocol). CI 2597 was running at review time — merge word is yours on terminal green per the standing quiet-queue protocol. Posted via direct API as rev-code-01 (pr-review.sh is estate-banned for verdicts, #1280/D21 — the same defect class this PR buries in the no-login path, for the record).
fred merged commit fd43ed5420 into next 2026-08-21 04:10:43 +00:00
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