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@@ -93,6 +93,45 @@ and must not be cited as merge evidence. Rely on reviewer clearance + real CI.
 Three independent live instances in a single session — format gate, agent context reset, queue guard —
 is the class confirmed, not anecdote.

+### D-19 — an integrity property that cannot exist at the layer it was specified
+
+Implementing D-18's manifest, the seat + a Codex security review reached **CWE-345**: the symlink
+manifest and the source-hash marker both live in the **same same-UID writable generated tree**, so an
+actor with that UID can plant a rogue link, regenerate _both_, retain the fingerprint, and pass. **No
+local cryptographic construction fixes self-authentication** without a key outside that actor's
+authority; relocating the marker changes the path, not the authority.
+
+The seat **escalated rather than describing self-authentication as tamper-resistant** — the explicit
+failure mode the charter corollary demands. That is the corollary working, on its first real test.
+
+**Ruling — Option A: scope AC2 to accidental / independent / stale mutation; retain the design.**
+Rationale, recorded so it can be challenged:
+
+1. **The undefendable boundary is not the weak link.** An actor with same-UID write can already edit the
+   source, the tests, `scripts/preflight.mjs` itself, and `.husky/*`. If they have that, _nothing_ in the
+   local checkout is trustworthy — hardening the manifest buys no real security while **implying
+   protection that does not exist**, which is worse than the gap.
+2. **What AC2 is actually for.** These checks exist because a five-month-stale `.next` produced 19
+   phantom `TS2307` errors indistinguishable from real ones (**D-5**). That is staleness, drift and
+   foreign residue — and against that class the design demonstrably works.
+3. **A real trust anchor arrives later, from this mission's own architecture.** An anchor must live
+   outside the actor's authority; for a fleet running as one user that means a separate service —
+   precisely the **choke-point executor + PG spine** of Builds 1–2, which verify outside the worktree's
+   authority. Hand-rolling key distribution for a local preflight now would duplicate that work badly.
+4. Option C (structural policy, no manifest) is strictly worse — it cannot detect a **removed** expected link.
+
+**Option A is acceptable only with honest labelling**, or it becomes the disease it is meant to cure:
+the threat model stated verbatim in the code _and_ the PR ("does **not** defend against same-UID write;
+no local construction can"), the words _tamper-proof / tamper-evident / secure_ barred from that
+context, the scope carried in AC2's restatement, the residual risk named as a backlog item pointing at
+the spine work, and every existing control kept RED-first.
+
+**The generalizable rule.** When a required property **cannot exist at the layer where it was
+specified**, the honest moves are: implement what the layer _can_ guarantee, **state the boundary
+precisely**, and record where the real guarantee will come from. **A known gap that is written down is
+acceptable; a gap that is implied fixed is not.** Silence here would have shipped a verification
+artifact that verifies nothing — with a green to prove it.
+
 ### D-18 — two pre-registered criteria were mutually unsatisfiable, discoverable only at implementation

 Implementing D-17's fix surfaced a conflict **between** pre-registered criteria: