✔ agents: a held role with nothing on the bus is idle; a role session gets the claim rows unchanged (125.699861ms)
✔ agents: working counts what the holder received and has not read; routed alone is not working (205.362729ms)
✔ agents: input needed is the role's open decisions routed to the human, gated first, then oldest (338.863369ms)
✔ agents: working wins over waiting, and Input needed still shows (182.529476ms)
✔ agents: a new holder doesn't inherit what the last one left unread; decisions stay with the role (397.318401ms)
✔ agents: state reads only its own business, even for a run name both use (211.381939ms)
✔ agents: a message the holder released unread is stranded; the next holder gets nothing and cannot read it (209.610204ms)
✔ agents: a message the holder read is not stranded; one the current holder has not read is not listed (189.739819ms)
✔ agents: stranded is oldest first and capped at 50 for a role (847.178229ms)
✔ agents: stranded is per role and per business (320.026493ms)
✔ agents: a message routed to a held role and not yet received is not stranded (127.850338ms)
✔ REQ-DEC an approval outlives its run and a broker restart; a new run of the instance consumes it once (289.221866ms)
✔ REQ-DEC another instance of the same definition cannot consume an approval, and its refusal consumes nothing (196.582661ms)
✔ REQ-DEC REQ-THREAD-1 a thread approval is consumed only by a run holding the same thread (256.95272ms)
✔ REQ-DEC a later run of the same instance supersedes an open decision; another instance cannot (356.50824ms)
✔ REQ-DEC REQ-THREAD-1 a thread decision is superseded only from the same thread (335.388615ms)
✔ REQ-DEC REQ-THREAD-1 a thread instance decision raised before row 121 is not consumed or superseded by any thread run (354.819936ms)
✔ launch identity is stamped, payload identity is refused and stale holder cannot send (168.160039ms)
✔ decision classes route from policy; gated resolution is human-only, choice and target must match (263.654142ms)
✔ claim exclusion, holder release, gated revoke and rerouting to a new holder are atomic (264.479316ms)
✔ launch events require a human CLI capability; generic emit cannot forge authority events (240.141855ms)
✔ within-role decisions close atomically and invalid options or blocking omissions refuse (313.005875ms)
✔ a recommendation that is not exactly one option key refuses invalid-recommendation after the options (290.391902ms)
✔ observer capabilities read human inbox but cannot mutate or forge launch identity (176.899546ms)
✔ task action subjects and linked decision trail are complete and ordered (197.542625ms)
✔ launch binding is durable and reconnecting requires the identical trusted record (120.879712ms)
✔ business isolation includes inherited object names and cross-business message references (185.579959ms)
✔ authority never transfers between action, target, unresolved or replaced role holder; a later run of the instance keeps it (275.204017ms)
✔ task projection uses schema current view, skipping earlier and equal-start polls (146.811836ms)
✔ revocation permanently bars the old run from reclaiming first, including after broker restart (211.482422ms)
✔ empty message references refuse before storage; refusal-evidence failure stays a typed error (141.519635ms)
✔ both arbiters require human resolution when their cross-role route is themselves (239.531905ms)
✔ the shipped coder role raises task.reassign as gated to the human; task.scope.change stays cross-role (176.189158ms)
✔ S1 adapter takes resolved limits and refs, rejects mismatched instance, never mutates input (2.278214ms)
✔ REQ-COS-1, REQ-ROLE-2: the chief of staff ends a run with a reason and no decision, and the reason is logged (250.754586ms)
✔ REQ-ROLE-2: a role without role.end still needs a resolved decision to revoke (333.92116ms)
✔ REQ-ROLE-2: storage accepts a revoke with a reason or a decision and aborts one with neither (275.04165ms)
✔ REQ-ROLE-2: the chief of staff may still cite a decision, and a decision alone is the old path (373.793763ms)
✔ REQ-ROLE-2: a role without role.end still ends a run through a resolved decision, which is recorded and has no reason (272.763226ms)
✔ REQ-ROLE-2: a reason is required, bounded, and never sent with a decision (283.376851ms)
✔ REQ-COS-1: the chief of staff cannot end its own run; its end of the assistant gets past the protection (276.079566ms)
✔ REQ-LIMIT-1, REQ-COS-1: organization.set from the chief of staff reaches the shared writer, named as the actor (225.36927ms)
✔ REQ-LIMIT-1, REQ-COS-1: a refused organization.set logs action.refused and no action.allowed, like a refused limits.set (292.342742ms)
✔ REQ-LIMIT-1: organization.set is refused for every caller whose role file lacks organization.change (297.537326ms)
✔ REQ-LIMIT-1: the chief of staff is logged as allowed, and organization.set takes only the human's keys (361.387325ms)
✔ REQ-ROLE-3, REQ-LIMIT-1: a chief-of-staff change is validated, written and logged like a human's; an invalid one is refused (504.350128ms)
✔ REQ-ROLE-2, REQ-COS-1: the 3c→3d migration lets the chief of staff end a held role with a reason; neither is still refused (868.977964ms)
✔ comment cursors isolate businesses, move only forward and remain append-only (137.668418ms)
✔ only trusted sync writes validated cursors; events and cursor share rollback (134.895302ms)
✔ explicit 3b copy migration preserves evidence and opens as 3g; normal startup never migrates (956.967545ms)
✔ migration refuses active writers and drifted legacy schemas, with no partial upgrade (1603.936224ms)
✔ named migration registry chains 3b through 3g to a fixture-only future version in order (790.053343ms)
✔ migration refuses mismatched source metadata without changing schema or evidence (743.746403ms)
✔ offline command migrates only the supplied fixture root and reports usage errors (892.348021ms)
✔ credentials gives human and reader sessions service, account, role, date and state, and nothing else (112.074343ms)
✔ credentials refuses a role session and any argument (176.720102ms)
✔ credentials reads the status on each request, and a broker without one lists none (224.854918ms)
✔ the broker process answers credentials without a token, path or variable in its output, log or store (215.287842ms)
✔ only validated broker references load; returned data and exceptions cannot expose a known token (3.959619ms)
✔ bad file modes, symlinks, repository/data paths, malformed tokens and missing dates refuse (3.853938ms)
✔ expiry refuses use and env references never become client data (0.876826ms)
✔ S1 parsed service refs work, service mismatch refuses, Gitea rotation due is a warning state (1.662871ms)
✔ opaque tokens shorter than 16 characters refuse before use (0.459262ms)
✔ each C-suite role file carries the same two lists: human, chief-of-staff, pm, cto (1.489997ms)
✔ chief-executive-officer: messages to and from the user, chief of staff, pm and cto pass (483.041667ms)
✔ chief-executive-officer: a message to or from the coder, reviewer or assistant is refused and logged, and nothing is stored (595.174046ms)
✔ chief-executive-officer: another C-suite role isn't on the lists either (438.145825ms)
✔ chief-financial-officer: messages to and from the user, chief of staff, pm and cto pass (461.271821ms)
✔ chief-financial-officer: a message to or from the coder, reviewer or assistant is refused and logged, and nothing is stored (425.363388ms)
✔ chief-financial-officer: another C-suite role isn't on the lists either (371.555838ms)
✔ chief-information-officer: messages to and from the user, chief of staff, pm and cto pass (450.310129ms)
✔ chief-information-officer: a message to or from the coder, reviewer or assistant is refused and logged, and nothing is stored (442.572563ms)
✔ chief-information-officer: another C-suite role isn't on the lists either (379.889281ms)
✔ chief-information-security-officer: messages to and from the user, chief of staff, pm and cto pass (457.017026ms)
✔ chief-information-security-officer: a message to or from the coder, reviewer or assistant is refused and logged, and nothing is stored (463.257286ms)
✔ chief-information-security-officer: another C-suite role isn't on the lists either (402.363677ms)
✔ chief-marketing-officer: messages to and from the user, chief of staff, pm and cto pass (625.1149ms)
✔ chief-marketing-officer: a message to or from the coder, reviewer or assistant is refused and logged, and nothing is stored (616.445686ms)
✔ chief-marketing-officer: another C-suite role isn't on the lists either (380.918056ms)
✔ a human resolve sends the raising role one message from the human, and its request is the answer (247.179131ms)
✔ a cross-role decision resolved by its arbiter comes from that role and run, with no request (234.554538ms)
✔ a human withdraw sends one message with the note (244.649699ms)
✔ a human seen before the close leaves the request on the close's answer, not the seen (474.466571ms)
✔ the raising run's withdraw, a supersede, a within-role raise and seen send nothing (320.08729ms)
✔ refused closes send nothing: invalid-choice, decision-closed, not-resolver (286.538674ms)
✔ a raising role nobody holds at the close gets the message on the next claim (269.090654ms)
✔ a human DECISION send keeps its own instruction as the request, not a close's answer (236.998829ms)
✔ a cross-role raise whose arbiter the raiser does not hear from is refused and stores nothing (307.71745ms)
✔ a gated raise by a role that does not hear from the human is refused and stores nothing (293.646196ms)
✔ a route the raiser hears from is allowed, checked from the route to the raiser (458.284239ms)
✔ a refused supersede withdraws nothing (374.334054ms)
✔ the assistant's within-role and gated raises still work (303.704295ms)
✔ roles lists open decisions routed to a role, and never the human inbox (228.074658ms)
✔ recent lists closed decisions of every route, newest close first, with how each closed (286.644963ms)
✔ recent gives the closing event as closed when the decision was seen first (320.407641ms)
✔ recent stops at RECENT rows (1013.34046ms)
✔ every row is what trail already gives the same session for that id (280.477287ms)
✔ a role session can't list decisions, so it can't read another role's open decisions (386.314895ms)
✔ decisions is a read: one business, strict arguments, nothing written (375.028514ms)
✔ endLaunch writes session.ended, releases the run claim and kills its capabilities (150.191444ms)
✔ endLaunch refuses an unknown run, a second end and a rebind of the ended run (129.13801ms)
✔ a restarted broker refuses to rebind an ended run; a refused rebind leaves the run unbound (160.920007ms)
✔ endLaunch leaves a claim another run took alone (181.096051ms)
✔ refuse records action.refused against the caller with the code only (129.013277ms)
✔ launches off refuses role.launch with launch-revoked until launches on (318.597781ms)
✔ broker process: launch ops authorize role.launch, record refusals and end runs (431.219828ms)
✔ REQ-WAIT-1: the broker hard waits are exactly the list, and match the business vocabulary (1.293583ms)
✔ REQ-WAIT-2: a business granting a hard wait at either class is refused; the actions that left are grantable (110.530768ms)
✔ REQ-DEC-2: every hard wait goes to the human, cited or not, and the arbiter cannot resolve it (952.467051ms)
✔ REQ-DEC-2: a gated raise citing the current spec goes to the arbiter for its domain; uncited, to the human (577.936746ms)
✔ REQ-DEC-2: an arbiter-approved cited gated decision authorizes the raiser, and the human cannot resolve it (240.424711ms)
✔ REQ-DEC-2: a cited merge raised by merge-gate goes to the technical arbiter; a merge raised without the grant routes by citation (304.761447ms)
✔ REQ-DEC-2: a stale or unconfirmed citation refuses without a decision; an arbiter raising its own goes to the human (252.30041ms)
✔ Q169: the chief of staff's end of the assistant is not refused role-end-refused; its own run and another ender's are (233.804505ms)
✔ Q169: another role's cited revoke of the assistant, resolved by an arbiter, is refused (228.513998ms)
✔ Q169: a revoke of the assistant citing a decision the human resolved is not refused by the protection (208.363095ms)
✔ Q169: a cited revoke of a role not in END_PROTECTED still goes to the arbiter, and executes (237.518138ms)
✔ Q169: a role granted role.revoke at either class still sends a revoke of the assistant to the human (281.899213ms)
✔ human proof binds CLI entry, process start and nonce; agents and incomplete ancestry refuse (1.366723ms)
✔ process reader gets own kernel identity without exposing environment values (0.387279ms)
✔ EACCES ancestor environments skip only markers; commands and registered launches still refuse (0.554428ms)
✔ real pid 1 remains inspectable when its environment is protected (0.213156ms)
✔ REQ-DEC-2: a merge-gate raise its arbiter resolved lands through the host op: checkLand answers the facts and a ticket, records nothing, and recordLand spends the decision once (270.725185ms)
✔ checkLand refuses on the decision and the review (343.412959ms)
✔ REQ-LAND-1: a gated merge decision refuses not-authorized, cited and approved by the arbiter or uncited and approved by the human (803.779629ms)
✔ REQ-LAND-1: a within-role merge grant refuses not-authorized at the land (247.260461ms)
✔ a cross-role merge that routes to the human, because merge-gate is its own arbiter, lands on the human's CLI answer (275.106383ms)
✔ a merge option with no first line refuses no-subject, as land-work does (246.006244ms)
✔ checkLand refuses with land-work's codes past the authority check, and a decision raised for refactor never lands (608.126834ms)
✔ a ticket outlives the run that asked, and recordLand checks the task again (254.974243ms)
✔ landRefused files the code on the task, tells the role only with notify, and ends the ticket (278.645184ms)
✔ landHeld is true only for an approved, unspent cross-role merge decision this role raised for a task in this thread (296.837244ms)
✔ no run may write the action.allowed for git.merge.protected itself (182.460643ms)
✔ a message to a stopped role sends launch.by one notice, and the result says so (207.643853ms)
✔ a message to a role outside launch.instances says so in its result and in the notice (173.094842ms)
✔ a message to a running role sends no notice and its result is unchanged (142.76387ms)
✔ a re-route at a claim, a release and claim, and a broker restart send no second notice (322.712229ms)
✔ a run launched but not yet claimed counts as no holder (239.707722ms)
✔ no notice for a message to launch.by, from it, from a tester, to the human, or in a thread to a thread instance (310.570822ms)
✔ a business with no launch block tells nobody and says there is no launcher (132.593264ms)
✔ the notice sender stays internal: no role is named _bus and no caller can send as it or to it (327.98753ms)
✔ limits binds actor from human proof and rejects role, reader, tester and forged actor (215.250047ms)
✔ runtime wires verified human settings to the actual shared file writer and actor receipt (287.272027ms)
✔ uncertain organization receipts leave bus startup and reads alone but refuse writes until reconciled (588.860271ms)
✔ within-role sends cite an open gated launch decision without spending it or naming it in grants (373.755343ms)
✔ missing and foreign-business citations refuse and roll back message and grant (241.887413ms)
✔ cross-role sends still need a matching resolved decision and consume it once (251.56093ms)
✔ messages pages all human messages newest first without writes; read state is history (2468.426509ms)
✔ messages refuses role callers, invalid paging and cursors outside this human feed (249.403933ms)
✔ views messages passes only its paging arguments through (0.251032ms)
✔ messages isolates businesses even with a valid foreign cursor (170.928978ms)
✔ the assistant sends to the user and to the chief of staff only (295.770445ms)
✔ an assistant send to any other role, or to the tester, is refused and logged (360.7833ms)
✔ only the user and the chief of staff may send to the assistant; the tester is refused by default (345.253969ms)
✔ REQ-ASSIST-2 REQ-THREAD-1 thread.send to an instance that does not hear from the user is refused and stores nothing (275.77215ms)
✔ a sender-side list alone refuses a send to a role that has no list (310.09649ms)
✔ a target-side list alone refuses a send from a role that has no list (349.021309ms)
✔ the sender list is checked before the target list (287.583656ms)
✔ roles without the field behave exactly as before (409.837969ms)
✔ a business with no role definitions at all is unlimited (316.040122ms)
✔ a malformed messaging field refuses at boot (105.052507ms)
✔ the assistant's review.request to a reviewer is refused and logged, even with an approved decision (357.741574ms)
✔ a review.verdict to the assistant from a role outside its receiveFrom is refused and logged (397.503283ms)
✔ review requests and verdicts between roles without the field are unchanged (426.663696ms)
✔ 3f copy migrates to 3g preserving every old column/row, with an empty instance_names and null to_name (1315.952709ms)
✔ REQ-MSG-2: the chief of staff names an instance under its within-role grant, and the write is logged (188.827969ms)
✔ REQ-MSG-2: the human names an instance through the CLI (181.550411ms)
✔ REQ-MSG-2: a role without the grant, or holding it cross-role, is refused not-authorized (209.963687ms)
✔ REQ-MSG-2: a name is unique in the business and is never an instance key or a role name (376.703955ms)
✔ REQ-MSG-2: a send by name reaches the instance and records both; a send by instance key is unchanged (279.003225ms)
✔ REQ-MSG-2: an instance key beats a name that equals it, as when a later instance takes the key (201.928591ms)
✔ REQ-MSG-2: a role name beats a name that equals it, as when a later definition takes the word (sage-0590) (219.736461ms)
✔ plugins and plugins.set refuse every non-human session and a forged actor, and pass only the patch with the verified actor (205.558332ms)
✔ runtime: the switch changes the organization file, the receipt carries the actor, and a bad shape, an unknown module and a stale revision are refused with nothing written (461.259403ms)
✔ vikunja:19/309 through the broker, a patch switches the kinds it names and keeps the rest; null removes one kind and is trailed (372.661239ms)
✔ broker process binds trusted launches, offers reader capabilities, refuses human mutation, closes cleanly (218.082848ms)
✔ startup token refusal returns safe code without value or partial listening broker (68.222333ms)
✔ loaded fixture token is absent from socket replies and SQLite, including refusal evidence (208.019748ms)
✔ killed broker leaves an explicit stale lock; another process cannot silently reclaim it (221.570493ms)
✔ trusted host registers later launches; socket clients never have a registration verb (211.356145ms)
✔ runtime excludes declared project roots even when host supplies no repoRoots (70.782265ms)
✔ a refused launch binding leaves the broker and existing capabilities alive; bad protocol stops it (198.914018ms)
✔ D1: committed write with a failed receipt refuses outcome-unknown without action.allowed (150.486423ms)
✔ D2: spec.read refuses without content if its role is released during the read (150.66663ms)
✔ D3: spec.read secret check refuses flagged content without content (131.060957ms)
✔ D3: spec.read secret check refuses flagged subject without content (132.995588ms)
✔ a human lists, opens and saves; the save is one commit by the business human (245.456883ms)
✔ an agent and a reader refuse every file verb and nothing is written (277.378697ms)
✔ a stale base refuses stale-base and writes nothing (232.776639ms)
✔ paths outside the spec and docs refuse, as do unknown projects, missing files and odd arguments (366.892333ms)
✔ without a project adapter the file verbs refuse project-not-configured (184.455034ms)
✔ on the socket a save may carry 1 MiB of text; every other request keeps the 64 KiB limit (318.53464ms)
✔ a request that names the save verb first and another verb last is refused at 64 KiB (169.867383ms)
✔ two saves racing for one repository make one commit (248.628402ms)
✔ Broker keeps the existing sandbox client import closure: no new imports or lazy project import (1.439214ms)
✔ without a trusted project adapter all three async paths refuse project-not-configured (200.249432ms)
✔ real startBroker injects the project adapter for socket reads and bound-author record writes (225.875906ms)
✔ a reply is listed for human and reader sessions, and its delivery rows are unchanged (212.958632ms)
✔ the reply still reaches the human message.receive (mosaic talk) after the Console showed it (200.289194ms)
✔ a message with no reply gives an empty list (147.925228ms)
✔ replies come oldest first and stop at REPLIES (713.516363ms)
✔ an id that names no message in the business refuses message-not-found, and the refusal is recorded (290.937614ms)
✔ strict arguments; a role session gets human-required (377.828737ms)
✔ views passes replies through as one call with the id (0.260311ms)
✔ requirements returns the committed list to a holding role session, and no one else (211.649123ms)
✔ the PM's prd.approve with no task, when no id fits, reaches the human's Inbox (146.911453ms)
✔ the PM's non-blocking role.revoke with no task reaches the human's Inbox (166.281691ms)
✔ a push is recorded as the action.allowed for git.push.working on the task, and only the host records one (240.091635ms)
✔ review.request names the latest pushed commit and sends the reviewer a REVIEW-REQUEST (235.08419ms)
✔ review.request says which run holds the reviewer role, or null, and a null request waits for a claim (278.247042ms)
✔ review.request refuses a commit that isn't the latest push, a non-reviewer and a role without the action (364.339451ms)
✔ reviewFetch answers only the addressed reviewer, for the request it cites (243.192785ms)
✔ review.verdict answers one request once, to the role that asked (309.823158ms)
✔ task.close on a pushed task needs an approve verdict for the latest push (378.851504ms)
✔ a refusal the host decided is filed on the task it names, and only a task ref counts (273.314496ms)
✔ v3b prototype refusals, views and append-only mutations (1487.527531ms)
✔ gated approval authorizes once, survives store reopen, and fresh approval works (235.379909ms)
✔ another run of the same instance consumes an approval once; a failed check leaves it usable (203.296997ms)
✔ two scheduled callers have exactly one grant and one consumed refusal (155.430567ms)
✔ failed commit rolls consumption back; cross-role consumes and within-role stays reusable (313.611526ms)
✔ class drift gated to cross-role refuses before consumption (212.526082ms)
✔ class drift cross-role to gated refuses before consumption (254.701342ms)
✔ class drift gated to within-role refuses before consumption (234.032959ms)
✔ class drift cross-role to within-role refuses before consumption (268.172517ms)
✔ class drift within-role to gated refuses before consumption (241.308904ms)
✔ class drift within-role to cross-role refuses before consumption (301.447314ms)
✔ message.send consumes approval and prevents a later send or authorize (364.063195ms)
✔ role.revoke consumes approval and prevents a later revoke or authorize (352.219604ms)
✔ 3e copy migrates through 3f to 3g preserving every old column/row and adding null spec citations (1327.640081ms)
✔ real socket awaits spec reads, record writes and cited raises; other requests still return normally (240.032612ms)
✔ real socket preserves asynchronous refusal codes and disconnects its transient proof (172.950748ms)
✔ two real socket writes to one repository yield one commit and one project-busy refusal (218.330466ms)
✔ client disconnect during await tolerates late reply (175.829763ms)
✔ client disconnect during await tolerates late refusal (157.761903ms)
✔ N-a: slow admitted record.write returns its committed result after the idle deadline (383.48599ms)
✔ current citation is recorded; docs commits do not stale it and a new spec never reopens settlement (286.416818ms)
✔ stale, unconfirmed, missing and partial spec citations refuse without inserting a decision (292.043976ms)
✔ uncited raises retain their synchronous path and spec read is available to any held role in its business (224.418226ms)
✔ record writes bind the session author, require authority and refuse spec and impersonation paths (253.902567ms)
✔ REQ-COS-1: the pm asks the chief of staff for roles and counts; the chief receives a STAFF-REQUEST and answers it (233.190297ms)
✔ REQ-COS-1: only the pm can send a staff request; every other session is refused and the chief of staff hears nothing (306.681346ms)
✔ REQ-COS-1: a pm without message.send is refused like any other gated action (167.462655ms)
✔ REQ-COS-1: the request goes to the business launcher, and only when that is a chief of staff (414.802195ms)
✔ REQ-COS-1: the sender is judged by definition: an instance `lead` of the pm definition can ask, an instance `pm` of the coder definition can't (414.775361ms)
✔ REQ-COS-1: the launcher is judged by definition: an instance `boss` of the chief-of-staff definition receives, a `chief` of the coder definition gives no-chief-of-staff (447.668883ms)
✔ REQ-COS-1: a refused staff request leaves no staff.request action.allowed event (322.74295ms)
✔ REQ-ASSIST-2: the role definitions' messaging lists hold for a staff request, sender and recipient (781.365489ms)
✔ a staff request names a task, 1 to 10 distinct roles and counts of 1 to 20; nothing else is accepted (432.840595ms)
✔ REQ-COS-1: a staff request grants nothing: the pm still can't launch and the chief of staff launches as before (247.56975ms)
✔ a business that never switched launches reads allowed with no time and no event (132.415869ms)
✔ launches revoked and then restored read allowed, with the restore time and event id (141.631186ms)
✔ a task closed on the tracker leaves the open list, and total counts the open ones (146.928157ms)
✔ a tombstone is not open (135.205206ms)
✔ the open list stops at the cap and says so; total still counts every open task (142.095083ms)
✔ a role and a reader session read state; arguments, and an unbound cap, refuse (145.274177ms)
✔ a human session reads the same state, with the same cap (145.945021ms)
✔ reading state writes nothing: every table keeps its row count (154.306612ms)
✔ creates private WAL store and excludes a second writer until explicit close (132.879414ms)
✔ rollback is atomic and schema metadata is checked against trusted DDL, not just itself (164.825597ms)
✔ existing empty database and symlink runtime directory refuse, never initialize over damage (189.825551ms)
✔ crash during a transaction recovers no partial event after explicit fixture-only lock removal (180.81811ms)
✔ writer refuses mixed at/read_at forms atomically, even through trusted SQL helpers (117.671005ms)
✔ async transactions refuse before invoking their function (102.655731ms)
✔ the session default fits under the reply cap and pages to the end with next (297.52382ms)
✔ the short form: no description, assignees by role, every listed key (258.989766ms)
✔ each filter, alone and together, and total counts every match (354.803386ms)
✔ task_ref reads one task in full, as the whole board has it (367.580638ms)
✔ no arguments is the read the Console and mosaic make, unchanged (370.263117ms)
✔ an unknown argument or a bad value refuses invalid-request (973.018287ms)
✔ tasks rows carry priority and requirement for every session that reads tasks (314.378724ms)
✔ the read model rebuilds from the ledger: a reopened bus and each trail give the same values (357.095035ms)
✔ an empty business and one with snapshots but no task.created read cleanly (150.33493ms)
✔ recordTask keeps sync reads and a role write apart (188.380659ms)
✔ read_at must be one canonical UTC format, so the projection compares strings safely (111.147867ms)
✔ a bad entry refuses the whole record (106.379681ms)
✔ taskView reads the projection for one business (137.258896ms)
✔ requestTask hands only a holder and a task verb to the handler, and records refusals (289.476687ms)
✔ the server sends task verbs to the adapter with its own timeout; other verbs stay synchronous (480.348664ms)
✔ without an adapter the server refuses every task verb (354.178368ms)
✔ the runtime refuses an invalid adapter and closes a valid one (218.471201ms)
✔ the process loads the S3 adapter from plain-data trackers (333.285749ms)
✔ the tester binds only when the business sets bus.tester to exactly true (886.725358ms)
✔ a business may not name a role tester, so the tester address is never a role (337.682653ms)
✔ every verb outside the tester list refuses tester-refused and is recorded against the tester (714.715174ms)
✔ a tester message is from tester, starts [mos test], and writes no human.input or authority (227.046276ms)
✔ a role answers a tester only in reply to a tester message, and the answer never reaches the human (240.724437ms)
✔ the tester reads the human views a reader reads (190.814282ms)
✔ tester proof binds its own CLI, start time and nonce, refuses a managed run and allows an agent (1.164634ms)
✔ neither CLI's nonce proves the other: each proof is bound to its own CLI and nonce variable (0.358741ms)
✔ testerNonce reads only the tester's variable and gives null on any read error (0.240372ms)
✔ an envelope carries exactly one of cap, human and tester; no tester authenticator refuses (113.086951ms)
✔ tester-cli.mjs binds through the runtime when the switch is on, and refuses off or under a run marker (872.388287ms)
✔ REQ-THREAD-1 REQ-ORG-2: the 3d→3e migration adds the thread tables and leaves messages from before threads as written (1173.477898ms)
✔ REQ-THREAD-1: a 3d bus with a changed schema is refused and keeps its version and tables (953.361341ms)
✔ REQ-THREAD-1: the offline command prints the kept-message counts before the ready line (807.349758ms)
✔ REQ-ROLE-2 REQ-THREAD-1: one holder per thread, through the broker and the trigger (322.907929ms)
✔ REQ-ROLE-2 REQ-THREAD-1: the 3e triggers refuse writes that skip the broker (1507.304831ms)
✔ REQ-MSG-1: a message to or from the assistant names its thread, or is refused (330.197578ms)
✔ REQ-MSG-1: the chief of staff's reply comes back to the thread that sent the work (3526.387401ms)
✔ REQ-MSG-1: a reply can't carry one thread instance's thread to another thread instance (99.702304ms)
✔ REQ-THREAD-1 REQ-USER-2: one thread's messages never reach another thread's holder (151.689122ms)
✔ REQ-LAUNCH-1: a message to a thread with no holder waits, and the next holder gets it (165.153318ms)
✔ REQ-THREAD-2 REQ-LAUNCH-1: threadIdle releases only a thread with nothing waiting, and only for its holder (189.334977ms)
✔ REQ-THREAD-2 REQ-LAUNCH-1: a message delivered to a run that ended unread doesn't hold up the next holder (161.706509ms)
✔ REQ-ROLE-2 REQ-THREAD-1: an approved role.revoke never reaches a thread run, and the thread stays held (149.021935ms)
✔ REQ-USER-2: the human verbs refuse another owner's thread (156.769317ms)
✔ REQ-THREAD-1: thread.create refuses when the business has no thread instance or more than one (113.12476ms)
✔ REQ-ORG-2: projects and threads are named once, and the repo names a business project (149.004898ms)
✔ REQ-THREAD-2: thread.messages returns the thread's history in pages and writes nothing (466.655955ms)
✔ socket capability stamps launch identity; shared views use wire, no SQL client (146.554439ms)
✔ two wire claims serialize; a lost reply never automatically retries (194.025923ms)
✔ malformed, oversized and identity-forging envelopes refuse without echoing input (132.231397ms)
✔ client preserves UTF-8 when a response divides a multibyte character (11.936165ms)
✔ committed mutation followed by dropped reply reports unknown and is never retried (185.500678ms)
✔ web.search: a granted role gets labelled results, and the call is trailed with role, run, verb and query (151.416219ms)
✔ web.fetch: a granted role gets the page as labelled text, and the call is trailed with the url (157.270195ms)
✔ a role without the grant is refused, the refusal is logged with the verb, and nothing is fetched (224.506246ms)
✔ a broker with no web service refuses a granted role (201.923672ms)
✔ bad requests are refused: unknown verb, extra or missing argument, not a string, a human or reader session (290.1303ms)
✔ a session that is not the role holder is refused (201.401288ms)
✔ web.mjs's fences hold on the broker side: refusals are normal results with the fixed reason (471.138326ms)
✔ web.search with no search source configured is a refused result, not an error (151.90031ms)
✔ a search source that fails with its own refusal, or that throws, is handled (179.559161ms)
✔ a slow search source ends in a refusal at the deadline (188.895962ms)
✔ a secret in the arguments is refused before anything is trailed or fetched (135.47265ms)
✔ over the socket: the server routes web verbs to the service; other roles are refused; no service is web-not-configured (232.500093ms)
✔ busBusiness: the web grant comes from "web" in the resolved tool limit (0.270645ms)
✔ webServices: the business's search-source plug-in and web.searxng var make web.search work; without either it is refused as not configured (202.118718ms)
✔ an ungranted call is refused at once: no admission, no wait, nothing touched (147.873021ms)
✔ over the socket an ungranted caller is dropped by the server timeout and a granted one gets the longer wait (459.630765ms)
✔ a search that never answers is aborted at the deadline, the module sees the signal, and the call is trailed as refused (timeout) (169.553247ms)
✔ a fetch that stalls is cut off at the deadline: the request is destroyed, not left running (188.179463ms)
✔ one query limit: over SEARCH_MAX_QUERY_CHARS or empty is refused with the same reason before any backend, and the tool schema carries the same number (157.216254ms)
✔ merge-gate's technical raise is cross-role, goes to the cto, and only merge-gate can use the approval (279.613042ms)
✔ merge-gate has no message.send, and without a domain its raise goes to the delivery arbiter (328.955573ms)
✔ the cto must be able to message merge-gate, or the technical raise is refused (row 133) (327.106896ms)
✔ security-reviewer answers a review with its verdict alone; it holds no message.send (418.479247ms)
ℹ tests 337
ℹ suites 0
ℹ pass 337
ℹ fail 0
ℹ cancelled 0
ℹ skipped 0
ℹ todo 0
ℹ duration_ms 12586.228676