✔ REQ-LIMIT-4 3h copy migrates to 3i: every row keeps its seq, the sequence carries over, and only the account CHECK changes (1371.347657ms)
✔ REQ-LIMIT-4 a 3h→3i step that fails partway leaves the store at 3h with every row, the sequence and the schema intact (1441.833409ms)
✔ REQ-LIMIT-4 the 3h engine refuses a 3i store, migrating or not, and leaves it at 3i (1519.562513ms)
✔ agents: a held role with nothing on the bus is idle; a role session gets the claim rows unchanged (144.306983ms)
✔ agents: working counts what the holder received and has not read; routed alone is not working (198.299145ms)
✔ agents: input needed is the role's open decisions routed to the human, gated first, then oldest (326.899039ms)
✔ agents: working wins over waiting, and Input needed still shows (168.231115ms)
✔ agents: a new holder doesn't inherit what the last one left unread; decisions stay with the role (187.806696ms)
✔ agents: state reads only its own business, even for a run name both use (181.21066ms)
✔ agents: a message the holder released unread is stranded; the next holder gets nothing and cannot read it (209.209555ms)
✔ agents: a message the holder read is not stranded; one the current holder has not read is not listed (218.206608ms)
✔ agents: stranded is oldest first and capped at 50 for a role (908.678477ms)
✔ agents: stranded is per role and per business (371.149948ms)
✔ agents: a message routed to a held role and not yet received is not stranded (154.237163ms)
✔ REQ-DEC an approval outlives its run and a broker restart; a new run of the instance consumes it once (271.238273ms)
✔ REQ-DEC another instance of the same definition cannot consume an approval, and its refusal consumes nothing (195.887357ms)
✔ REQ-DEC REQ-THREAD-1 a thread approval is consumed only by a run holding the same thread (250.632061ms)
✔ REQ-DEC a later run of the same instance supersedes an open decision; another instance cannot (225.192394ms)
✔ REQ-DEC REQ-THREAD-1 a thread decision is superseded only from the same thread (249.475327ms)
✔ REQ-DEC REQ-THREAD-1 a thread instance decision raised before row 121 is not consumed or superseded by any thread run (347.983558ms)
✔ launch identity is stamped, payload identity is refused and stale holder cannot send (157.755248ms)
✔ decision classes route from policy; gated resolution is human-only, choice and target must match (254.653437ms)
✔ claim exclusion, holder release, gated revoke and rerouting to a new holder are atomic (276.001551ms)
✔ launch events require a human CLI capability; generic emit cannot forge authority events (178.438967ms)
✔ within-role decisions close atomically and invalid options or blocking omissions refuse (172.521096ms)
✔ a recommendation that is not exactly one option key refuses invalid-recommendation after the options (265.429923ms)
✔ observer capabilities read human inbox but cannot mutate or forge launch identity (179.368966ms)
✔ task action subjects and linked decision trail are complete and ordered (209.977687ms)
✔ launch binding is durable and reconnecting requires the identical trusted record (123.712609ms)
✔ business isolation includes inherited object names and cross-business message references (209.943664ms)
✔ authority never transfers between action, target, unresolved or replaced role holder; a later run of the instance keeps it (301.769827ms)
✔ task projection uses schema current view, skipping earlier and equal-start polls (164.701301ms)
✔ revocation permanently bars the old run from reclaiming first, including after broker restart (234.16274ms)
✔ empty message references refuse before storage; refusal-evidence failure stays a typed error (174.175163ms)
✔ both arbiters require human resolution when their cross-role route is themselves (249.658304ms)
✔ the shipped coder role raises task.reassign as gated to the human; task.scope.change stays cross-role (201.864162ms)
✔ S1 adapter takes resolved limits and refs, rejects mismatched instance, never mutates input (1.91291ms)
✔ channel conversion preserves the four proof/transport byte baselines and modules cannot import a proof caller (1.070143ms)
✔ channel recovery still requires the same shim path and rejects an absent or forged proof (384.795276ms)
✔ REQ-COS-1, REQ-ROLE-2: the chief of staff ends a run with a reason and no decision, and the reason is logged (247.2405ms)
✔ REQ-ROLE-2: a role without role.end still needs a resolved decision to revoke (332.102478ms)
✔ REQ-ROLE-2: storage accepts a revoke with a reason or a decision and aborts one with neither (219.920309ms)
✔ REQ-ROLE-2: the chief of staff may still cite a decision, and a decision alone is the old path (236.771027ms)
✔ REQ-ROLE-2: a role without role.end still ends a run through a resolved decision, which is recorded and has no reason (261.50089ms)
✔ REQ-ROLE-2: a reason is required, bounded, and never sent with a decision (298.576377ms)
✔ REQ-COS-1: the chief of staff cannot end its own run; its end of the assistant stops the assistant's thread run (306.13257ms)
✔ REQ-LIMIT-1, REQ-COS-1: organization.set from the chief of staff reaches the shared writer, named as the actor (251.835788ms)
✔ REQ-LIMIT-1, REQ-COS-1: a refused organization.set logs action.refused and no action.allowed, like a refused limits.set (326.685233ms)
✔ REQ-LIMIT-1: organization.set is refused for every caller whose role file lacks organization.change (366.678987ms)
✔ REQ-LIMIT-1: the chief of staff is logged as allowed, and organization.set takes only the human's keys (420.035594ms)
✔ REQ-COS-1: organization.revision answers the revision alone to the chief of staff and spends nothing (314.676736ms)
✔ REQ-COS-1, REQ-LIMIT-1: organization.revision is refused for every caller whose role file lacks organization.change (357.314819ms)
✔ REQ-ROLE-3, REQ-LIMIT-1: a chief-of-staff change is validated, written and logged like a human's; an invalid one is refused (813.573953ms)
✔ REQ-COS-1: the chief of staff reads the revision, changes the file with it, and reads again after a stale one is refused (747.826918ms)
✔ Q169: the chief of staff's change of the assistant is validated, written and logged; a stale or protection-stripping one is refused (692.115583ms)
✔ row 65, Q169: the chief's change of the assistant's route runs the routing checks, and a valid one saves as the chief (380.43333ms)
✔ REQ-ROLE-2, REQ-COS-1: the 3c→3d migration lets the chief of staff end a held role with a reason; neither is still refused (1225.955493ms)
✔ comment cursors isolate businesses, move only forward and remain append-only (118.315453ms)
✔ only trusted sync writes validated cursors; events and cursor share rollback (115.395487ms)
✔ explicit 3b copy migration preserves evidence and opens as 3g; normal startup never migrates (870.899973ms)
✔ migration refuses active writers and drifted legacy schemas, with no partial upgrade (1578.880302ms)
✔ named migration registry chains 3b through 3g to a fixture-only future version in order (957.856494ms)
✔ migration refuses mismatched source metadata without changing schema or evidence (821.85507ms)
✔ offline command migrates only the supplied fixture root and reports usage errors (1281.569896ms)
✔ credentials gives human and reader sessions service, account, role, date and state, and nothing else (109.817059ms)
✔ credentials refuses a role session and any argument (165.17785ms)
✔ credentials reads the status on each request, and a broker without one lists none (219.896488ms)
✔ the broker process answers credentials without a token, path or variable in its output, log or store (226.618529ms)
✔ only validated broker references load; returned data and exceptions cannot expose a known token (5.832541ms)
✔ bad file modes, symlinks, repository/data paths, malformed tokens and missing dates refuse (3.698523ms)
✔ expiry refuses use and env references never become client data (0.840509ms)
✔ S1 parsed service refs work, service mismatch refuses, Gitea rotation due is a warning state (1.976339ms)
✔ opaque tokens shorter than 16 characters refuse before use (0.395292ms)
✔ each C-suite role file carries the same two lists: human, chief-of-staff, pm, cto (2.062117ms)
✔ chief-executive-officer: messages to and from the user, chief of staff, pm and cto pass (476.013214ms)
✔ chief-executive-officer: a message to or from the coder, reviewer or assistant is refused and logged, and nothing is stored (441.933081ms)
✔ chief-executive-officer: another C-suite role isn't on the lists either (386.418946ms)
✔ chief-financial-officer: messages to and from the user, chief of staff, pm and cto pass (502.822181ms)
✔ chief-financial-officer: a message to or from the coder, reviewer or assistant is refused and logged, and nothing is stored (460.366666ms)
✔ chief-financial-officer: another C-suite role isn't on the lists either (415.178587ms)
✔ chief-information-officer: messages to and from the user, chief of staff, pm and cto pass (496.108272ms)
✔ chief-information-officer: a message to or from the coder, reviewer or assistant is refused and logged, and nothing is stored (493.100759ms)
✔ chief-information-officer: another C-suite role isn't on the lists either (437.869516ms)
✔ chief-information-security-officer: messages to and from the user, chief of staff, pm and cto pass (760.378539ms)
✔ chief-information-security-officer: a message to or from the coder, reviewer or assistant is refused and logged, and nothing is stored (487.075348ms)
✔ chief-information-security-officer: another C-suite role isn't on the lists either (486.636552ms)
✔ chief-marketing-officer: messages to and from the user, chief of staff, pm and cto pass (535.691712ms)
✔ chief-marketing-officer: a message to or from the coder, reviewer or assistant is refused and logged, and nothing is stored (518.785164ms)
✔ chief-marketing-officer: another C-suite role isn't on the lists either (649.291598ms)
limits: {"event":"limit-reached","business":"demo","check":"daily-quota","export":"mayLaunch","subject":{"instance":"coder","provider":"anthropic","model":"opus","account":"jason-max"},"path":["tokens","daily","jason-max"],"limit":0,"count":0,"unknownTurns":0}
usage: {"event":"usage-unknown","business":"demo","run":"run1","instance":"coder","turn":"5c33677b-a765-4de5-a26c-890e3ffac685","source":"@none","code":"baseline-unknown"}
limits: {"event":"limit-reached","business":"demo","check":"daily-quota","export":"mustStop","subject":{"instance":"coder","provider":"anthropic","model":"opus","account":"jason-max"},"path":["tokens","daily","jason-max"],"limit":0,"count":0,"unknownTurns":1}
usage: {"event":"usage-unknown","business":"demo","run":"run1","instance":"coder","turn":"bc636e94-240d-4f03-a2be-e009a2422289","source":"@none","code":"baseline-unknown"}
✔ REQ-LIMIT-2 runtime: limits counts the daily quota, and mayLaunch refuses only the account at it (193.24338ms)
✔ REQ-LIMIT-4 runtime: a run bound with the account writes it on its usage records and stops at the quota (209.086321ms)
✔ REQ-LIMIT-4 runtime: a run bound without an account records null and the daily quota never stops it (185.135953ms)
✔ REQ-LIMIT-4 bindLaunch keeps the account off session.launched, refuses one that is not an identifier, and takes null as none (128.072606ms)
✔ a human resolve sends the raising role one message from the human, and its request is the answer (248.557333ms)
✔ a cross-role decision resolved by its arbiter comes from that role and run, with no request (238.998269ms)
✔ a human withdraw sends one message with the note (227.551451ms)
✔ a human seen before the close leaves the request on the close's answer, not the seen (261.684286ms)
✔ the raising run's withdraw, a supersede, a within-role raise and seen send nothing (281.643697ms)
✔ refused closes send nothing: invalid-choice, decision-closed, not-resolver (296.701239ms)
✔ a raising role nobody holds at the close gets the message on the next claim (285.733579ms)
✔ a human DECISION send keeps its own instruction as the request, not a close's answer (270.396993ms)
✔ a cross-role raise whose arbiter the raiser does not hear from is refused and stores nothing (289.318201ms)
✔ a gated raise by a role that does not hear from the human is refused and stores nothing (296.451507ms)
✔ a route the raiser hears from is allowed, checked from the route to the raiser (312.67943ms)
✔ a refused supersede withdraws nothing (285.709246ms)
✔ the assistant's within-role and gated raises still work (302.443651ms)
✔ roles lists open decisions routed to a role, and never the human inbox (230.685382ms)
✔ recent lists closed decisions of every route, newest close first, with how each closed (274.63247ms)
✔ recent gives the closing event as closed when the decision was seen first (284.539164ms)
✔ recent stops at RECENT rows (805.596726ms)
✔ every row is what trail already gives the same session for that id (285.4516ms)
✔ a role session can't list decisions, so it can't read another role's open decisions (413.213025ms)
✔ decisions is a read: one business, strict arguments, nothing written (425.677056ms)
✔ endLaunch writes session.ended, releases the run claim and kills its capabilities (146.310657ms)
✔ endLaunch refuses an unknown run, a second end and a rebind of the ended run (128.88891ms)
✔ a restarted broker refuses to rebind an ended run; a refused rebind leaves the run unbound (164.369904ms)
✔ endLaunch leaves a claim another run took alone (164.143179ms)
✔ refuse records action.refused against the caller with the code only (137.20402ms)
✔ launches off refuses role.launch with launch-revoked until launches on (187.936557ms)
✔ broker process: launch ops authorize role.launch, record refusals and end runs (312.63086ms)
✔ REQ-WAIT-1: the broker hard waits are exactly the list, and match the business vocabulary (1.107882ms)
✔ REQ-WAIT-2: a business granting a hard wait at either class is refused; the actions that left are grantable (104.149329ms)
✔ REQ-DEC-2: every hard wait goes to the human, cited or not, and the arbiter cannot resolve it (717.624552ms)
✔ REQ-DEC-2: a gated raise citing the current spec goes to the arbiter for its domain; uncited, to the human (428.161179ms)
✔ REQ-DEC-2: an arbiter-approved cited gated decision authorizes the raiser, and the human cannot resolve it (259.823332ms)
✔ REQ-DEC-2: a cited merge raised by merge-gate goes to the technical arbiter; a merge raised without the grant routes by citation (308.392715ms)
✔ REQ-DEC-2: a stale or unconfirmed citation refuses without a decision; an arbiter raising its own goes to the human (264.850938ms)
✔ Q169: the chief of staff's end of the assistant stops every thread run; its own run and another ender's are refused (428.339401ms)
✔ Q169: a revoke of the assistant the chief of staff raises goes to the human, cited or not, and no arbiter resolves it (537.15725ms)
✔ Q169: another role's cited revoke of the assistant, resolved by an arbiter, is refused (246.929714ms)
✔ Q169: a revoke of the assistant citing a decision the human resolved stops its thread run (284.747527ms)
✔ Q169: a cited revoke of a role not in END_PROTECTED still goes to the arbiter, and executes (242.761104ms)
✔ Q169: a role granted role.revoke at either class still sends a revoke of the assistant to the human (436.690711ms)
✔ human proof binds CLI entry, process start and nonce; agents and incomplete ancestry refuse (1.861442ms)
✔ process reader gets own kernel identity without exposing environment values (0.378418ms)
✔ EACCES ancestor environments skip only markers; commands and registered launches still refuse (0.523976ms)
✔ real pid 1 remains inspectable when its environment is protected (0.217434ms)
✔ row 165: instances and instances.set refuse every non-human session but the tester, the chief of staff included, and pass the verified actor (301.681511ms)
✔ row 165 runtime: an add and a change reach the organization file with the human as actor; each refusal keeps the bytes and logs nothing (522.062539ms)
✔ REQ-DEC-2: a merge-gate raise its arbiter resolved lands through the host op: checkLand answers the facts and a ticket, records nothing, and recordLand spends the decision once (264.677992ms)
✔ checkLand refuses on the decision and the review (343.610628ms)
✔ REQ-LAND-1: a gated merge decision refuses not-authorized, cited and approved by the arbiter or uncited and approved by the human (565.005839ms)
✔ REQ-LAND-1: a within-role merge grant refuses not-authorized at the land (252.724166ms)
✔ a cross-role merge that routes to the human, because merge-gate is its own arbiter, lands on the human's CLI answer (303.510092ms)
✔ a merge option with no first line refuses no-subject, as land-work does (265.515921ms)
✔ checkLand refuses with land-work's codes past the authority check, and a decision raised for refactor never lands (687.391853ms)
✔ a ticket outlives the run that asked, and recordLand checks the task again (301.495284ms)
✔ landRefused files the code on the task, tells the role only with notify, and ends the ticket (301.854254ms)
✔ landHeld is true only for an approved, unspent cross-role merge decision this role raised for a task in this thread (368.826562ms)
✔ landHolders lists a merge decision exactly while landHeld is true for its non-thread instance, in decision order (581.59348ms)
✔ landHolders leaves out a thread instance's decision, even one raised before its role became one (230.860554ms)
✔ landRelease releases the holding run by land-relaunch once it has asked message.receive and nothing delivered to it is unread, and waiting messages go to the next holder (537.354966ms)
✔ a landing run started after the resolution passes checkLand for its held decision before any message.receive, and lands it (327.647882ms)
✔ the bus process answers landHolders and landRelease from their own lines, not as credentialStatus (195.826417ms)
✔ usage.begin with a decision id needs it held for the run's instance, usage.end needs the begin, and the limit checks see the landing turn (415.076609ms)
✔ no run may write the action.allowed for git.merge.protected itself (232.559694ms)
✔ a message to a stopped role sends launch.by one notice, and the result says so (184.639018ms)
✔ a message to a role outside launch.instances says so in its result and in the notice (162.248805ms)
✔ a message to a running role sends no notice and its result is unchanged (135.452174ms)
✔ a re-route at a claim, a release and claim, and a broker restart send no second notice (252.246101ms)
✔ a run launched but not yet claimed counts as no holder (138.849136ms)
✔ no notice for a message to launch.by, from it, a refused one from a tester, to the human, or in a thread to a thread instance (285.735845ms)
✔ a business with no launch block tells nobody and says there is no launcher (123.881179ms)
✔ the notice sender stays internal: no role is named _bus and no caller can send as it or to it (354.866387ms)
✔ REQ-LIMIT-3 limitLeaves finds every limit object and skips the agent numbers (1.287073ms)
✔ REQ-LIMIT-3 limitLeaves takes token limits at schema depth only, whatever their names (0.212676ms)
✔ REQ-LIMIT-3 with no check switched on a launch is allowed, a turn never stops, and every limit is not enforced (121.539864ms)
✔ REQ-LIMIT-3 a fixture check that refuses refuses the launch and stops the turn, logged with the limit and the count (127.511808ms)
✔ REQ-LIMIT-3 a report that omits a limit shows it not enforced; a counted entry and a reason come through (113.740139ms)
✔ REQ-LIMIT-4 each check gets the business, a copy of the limits, the subject, the records and the time (145.763604ms)
✔ REQ-LIMIT-4 fail closed: a throw refuses, stops and fails the report, naming the check and the code (133.806255ms)
✔ REQ-LIMIT-4 fail closed: a malformed answer, a promise, a rejected promise, a non-boolean or a bad hit is malformed-answer (125.607981ms)
✔ REQ-LIMIT-4 fail closed: a check switched on but not loaded refuses, stops and fails every limit as not-loaded (108.718051ms)
✔ REQ-LIMIT-4 state(), never-loaded case: before any load the report shows not enforced, or not-loaded for a switched-on check (119.698949ms)
✔ REQ-LIMIT-4 state(), first-load-refused case: a check refused on its first load is not-loaded in mayLaunch, mustStop and report (117.79623ms)
✔ REQ-LIMIT-4 fail closed: an unreadable organization file refuses and stops with check null; the report throws (112.876909ms)
✔ REQ-LIMIT-4 fail closed: unreadable records refuse and stop with check null and fail the report (0.563318ms)
✔ REQ-LIMIT-3 the shipped token-limit, through the real loader, counts known records only since the limit was set (211.908287ms)
✔ REQ-LIMIT-3 a token limit for a provider named limit is counted and refuses, beside an agent limit of the same name (145.869869ms)
✔ REQ-LIMIT-3 core reaches limit checks only through the plug-in loader (0.631057ms)
✔ REQ-LIMIT-4 a role run at its limit stops at the end of its turn: RESULT and read land first, the claim is revoked by limit-check (261.149372ms)
✔ REQ-LIMIT-4 the stop also lands on state; a run with no stop ends without a limit (376.105363ms)
✔ REQ-LIMIT-4 fail closed: a mustStop throw or a malformed answer stops the run, naming the bus and the code (925.142098ms)
✔ REQ-LIMIT-4 a thread run at its limit is released with the reason, and its end record names the limit (229.851166ms)
✔ REQ-LIMIT-4 a broker with no limit checks configured never stops a run (177.785784ms)
limits: {"event":"limit-reached","business":"demo","check":"token-limit","export":"mayLaunch","subject":{"instance":"coder","provider":"zai","model":"glm-5.3-flash","account":null},"path":["tokens","instances","coder"],"limit":0,"count":0,"unknownTurns":0}
usage: {"event":"usage-unknown","business":"demo","run":"run1","instance":"coder","turn":"187ae7ee-05bc-400e-927b-0208e6944181","source":"@none","code":"baseline-unknown"}
limits: {"event":"limit-reached","business":"demo","check":"token-limit","export":"mustStop","subject":{"instance":"coder","provider":"zai","model":"glm-5.3-flash","account":null},"path":["tokens","instances","coder"],"limit":0,"count":0,"unknownTurns":1}
usage: {"event":"usage-unknown","business":"demo","run":"run1","instance":"coder","turn":"9df3a8db-2d2f-4c3a-bacb-d3aaa9b6cde2","source":"@none","code":"baseline-unknown"}
✔ REQ-LIMIT-3 REQ-LIMIT-4 runtime: limits carries the token count, mayLaunch refuses at the limit, a reset moves since (349.620698ms)
✔ REQ-LIMIT-3 runtime: with no limit check switched on, the limit shows not enforced and every launch is allowed (113.639621ms)
✔ REQ-LIMIT-4 runtime: the broker asks the shipped token-limit after a turn, and the run at its limit stops on its next receive (224.056975ms)
✔ REQ-LIMIT-4 runtime: with no usage source a turn is unknown, counts zero and stops nothing under a limit of 1 (181.60173ms)
✔ REQ-LIMIT-3 runtime: switching a limit check on with plugins.set loads it without a launch or a turn (277.645191ms)
✔ limits binds actor from human proof and rejects role, reader, a tester set and forged actor (194.236496ms)
✔ runtime wires verified human settings to the actual shared file writer and actor receipt (318.275292ms)
✔ uncertain organization receipts leave bus startup and reads alone but refuse writes until reconciled (445.637273ms)
✔ within-role sends cite an open gated launch decision without spending it or naming it in grants (202.224615ms)
✔ missing and foreign-business citations refuse and roll back message and grant (210.415609ms)
✔ cross-role sends still need a matching resolved decision and consume it once (251.526044ms)
✔ messages pages all human messages newest first without writes; read state is history (3071.138546ms)
✔ messages refuses role callers, invalid paging and cursors outside this human feed (273.124104ms)
✔ views messages passes only its paging arguments through (0.270527ms)
✔ messages isolates businesses even with a valid foreign cursor (197.556148ms)
✔ the assistant sends to the user and to the chief of staff only (335.363024ms)
✔ an assistant send to any other role, or to the tester, is refused and logged (393.798553ms)
✔ only the user and the chief of staff may send to the assistant; the tester is refused by default (375.911015ms)
✔ REQ-ASSIST-2 REQ-THREAD-1 thread.send to an instance that does not hear from the user is refused and stores nothing (318.286078ms)
✔ a sender-side list alone refuses a send to a role that has no list (402.107911ms)
✔ a target-side list alone refuses a send from a role that has no list (582.110731ms)
✔ the sender list is checked before the target list (282.067904ms)
✔ roles without the field behave exactly as before (574.19819ms)
✔ a business with no role definitions at all is unlimited (368.209269ms)
✔ a malformed messaging field refuses at boot (116.668471ms)
✔ the assistant's review.request to a reviewer is refused and logged, even with an approved decision (412.72238ms)
✔ a review.verdict to the assistant from a role outside its receiveFrom is refused and logged (622.976061ms)
✔ review requests and verdicts between roles without the field are unchanged (356.217187ms)
✔ 3f copy migrates to 3g preserving every old column/row, with an empty instance_names and null to_name (1528.185317ms)
✔ REQ-MSG-2: the chief of staff names an instance under its within-role grant, and the write is logged (217.968155ms)
✔ REQ-MSG-2: the human names an instance through the CLI (193.678196ms)
✔ REQ-MSG-2: a role without the grant, or holding it cross-role, is refused not-authorized (256.765505ms)
✔ REQ-MSG-2: a name is unique in the business and is never an instance key or a role name (406.223795ms)
✔ REQ-MSG-2: a send by name reaches the instance and records both; a send by instance key is unchanged (348.169762ms)
✔ REQ-MSG-2: an instance key beats a name that equals it, as when a later instance takes the key (377.585557ms)
✔ REQ-MSG-2: a role name beats a name that equals it, as when a later definition takes the word (sage-0590) (314.11252ms)
✔ plugins and plugins.set refuse every non-human session and a forged actor, and pass only the patch with the verified actor (201.480445ms)
✔ runtime: the switch changes the organization file, the receipt carries the actor, and a bad shape, an unknown module and a stale revision are refused with nothing written (526.268078ms)
✔ vikunja:19/309 through the broker, a patch switches the kinds it names and keeps the rest; null removes one kind and is trailed (440.847854ms)
✔ broker process binds trusted launches, offers reader capabilities, refuses human mutation, closes cleanly (250.246416ms)
✔ startup token refusal returns safe code without value or partial listening broker (82.471092ms)
✔ loaded fixture token is absent from socket replies and SQLite, including refusal evidence (240.758847ms)
✔ killed broker leaves an explicit stale lock; another process cannot silently reclaim it (266.476587ms)
✔ trusted host registers later launches; socket clients never have a registration verb (230.454305ms)
✔ REQ-LIMIT-4 the broker process answers the launcher's mayLaunch op with the limits' awaited decision (209.012725ms)
✔ runtime excludes declared project roots even when host supplies no repoRoots (73.602146ms)
✔ a refused launch binding leaves the broker and existing capabilities alive; bad protocol stops it (373.189367ms)
✔ D1: committed write with a failed receipt refuses outcome-unknown without action.allowed (175.863939ms)
✔ D2: spec.read refuses without content if its role is released during the read (158.99566ms)
✔ D3: spec.read secret check refuses flagged content without content (149.313422ms)
✔ D3: spec.read secret check refuses flagged subject without content (155.663656ms)
✔ a human lists, opens and saves; the save is one commit by the business human (282.764219ms)
✔ an agent and a reader refuse every file verb and nothing is written (279.257434ms)
✔ a stale base refuses stale-base and writes nothing (265.749048ms)
✔ paths outside the spec and docs refuse, as do unknown projects, missing files and odd arguments (653.655224ms)
✔ without a project adapter the file verbs refuse project-not-configured (196.731022ms)
✔ on the socket a save may carry 1 MiB of text; every other request keeps the 64 KiB limit (360.496534ms)
✔ a request that names the save verb first and another verb last is refused at 64 KiB (226.022065ms)
✔ two saves racing for one repository make one commit (261.079021ms)
✔ Broker keeps the sandbox client import closure: only the listed imports, no lazy project import (1.558504ms)
✔ without a trusted project adapter all three async paths refuse project-not-configured (217.386605ms)
✔ real startBroker injects the project adapter for socket reads and bound-author record writes (228.644752ms)
✔ a reply is listed for human and reader sessions, and its delivery rows are unchanged (233.785338ms)
✔ the reply still reaches the human message.receive (mosaic talk) after the Console showed it (233.588725ms)
✔ a message with no reply gives an empty list (275.403562ms)
✔ replies come oldest first and stop at REPLIES (1033.073672ms)
✔ an id that names no message in the business refuses message-not-found, and the refusal is recorded (315.685929ms)
✔ strict arguments; a role session gets human-required (409.767606ms)
✔ views passes replies through as one call with the id (0.233052ms)
✔ requirements returns the committed list to a holding role session, and no one else (247.098884ms)
✔ the PM's prd.approve with no task, when no id fits, reaches the human's Inbox (178.628028ms)
✔ the PM's non-blocking role.revoke with no task reaches the human's Inbox (402.963672ms)
✔ a push is recorded as the action.allowed for git.push.working on the task, and only the host records one (289.007847ms)
✔ review.request names the latest pushed commit and sends the reviewer a REVIEW-REQUEST (468.31489ms)
✔ review.request says which run holds the reviewer role, or null, and a null request waits for a claim (287.3244ms)
✔ review.request refuses a commit that isn't the latest push, a non-reviewer and a role without the action (507.68406ms)
✔ reviewFetch answers only the addressed reviewer, for the request it cites (261.730439ms)
✔ review.verdict answers one request once, to the role that asked (336.762273ms)
✔ task.close on a pushed task needs an approve verdict for the latest push (447.258841ms)
✔ a refusal the host decided is filed on the task it names, and only a task ref counts (435.043605ms)
✔ row 65: routes and routes.set refuse every non-human session, the chief of staff included, the tester may read and set, and each passes the verified actor (551.889426ms)
✔ row 65: a new launch binds only on a switched-on harness with a module name, and a run an earlier broker bound binds again after its harness is switched off (231.210805ms)
✔ row 65 runtime: harnessLevels answers each module in the tree, and null for a name with no module (26.974173ms)
✔ row 65 runtime: routes and routes.set reach the organization file with the human as actor, a new bind reads plugins.harness, and each refusal keeps the bytes and logs nothing (575.141788ms)
✔ v3b prototype refusals, views and append-only mutations (2018.8693ms)
✔ gated approval authorizes once, survives store reopen, and fresh approval works (371.912017ms)
✔ another run of the same instance consumes an approval once; a failed check leaves it usable (209.665679ms)
✔ two scheduled callers have exactly one grant and one consumed refusal (215.970827ms)
✔ failed commit rolls consumption back; cross-role consumes and within-role stays reusable (401.987877ms)
✔ class drift gated to cross-role refuses before consumption (253.268228ms)
✔ class drift cross-role to gated refuses before consumption (254.496936ms)
✔ class drift gated to within-role refuses before consumption (274.782754ms)
✔ class drift cross-role to within-role refuses before consumption (280.944468ms)
✔ class drift within-role to gated refuses before consumption (404.756804ms)
✔ class drift within-role to cross-role refuses before consumption (291.369899ms)
✔ message.send consumes approval and prevents a later send or authorize (245.590743ms)
✔ role.revoke consumes approval and prevents a later revoke or authorize (326.531183ms)
✔ 3e copy migrates through 3f to 3g preserving every old column/row and adding null spec citations (1612.938194ms)
✔ a human spec save sends one notice to each pm and cto, naming the commit, and each commit sends its own (433.808211ms)
✔ no notice for a docs save, an agent record commit, a git commit outside the Console, or a refused save (626.381031ms)
✔ a notice to a role no run holds waits for a claim, and launches nobody and tells nobody (377.63469ms)
✔ a business without a pm or a cto saves the spec and sends nothing (246.365229ms)
✔ a notice that cannot be stored answers outcome-unknown, and the commit stands (461.688913ms)
✔ a BLOCK reaches the chief of staff, the chief relays it to the assistant in the user's thread, and the commit stands (627.599677ms)
✔ with no thread a BLOCK still reaches the chief of staff, and the relay to the assistant is refused (344.366019ms)
✔ within the notice's project the relay lands in the user's most recently opened thread (498.522518ms)
✔ a more recently opened thread in another project does not take the relay (426.085972ms)
✔ a BLOCK is refused from anyone but a pm or cto, to anyone but the chief of staff, and outside a reply to its own notice (505.678526ms)
✔ a role cannot forge a spec notice: its text opens neither a BLOCK nor the assistant's thread (400.226739ms)
✔ the bus receives nothing: a reply to a notice addressed to _bus is refused (340.987363ms)
✔ real socket awaits spec reads, record writes and cited raises; other requests still return normally (251.411985ms)
✔ real socket preserves asynchronous refusal codes and disconnects its transient proof (318.584488ms)
✔ two real socket writes to one repository yield one commit and one project-busy refusal (219.553151ms)
✔ client disconnect during await tolerates late reply (189.686282ms)
✔ client disconnect during await tolerates late refusal (178.00211ms)
✔ N-a: slow admitted record.write returns its committed result after the idle deadline (400.305722ms)
✔ current citation is recorded; docs commits do not stale it and a new spec never reopens settlement (310.119229ms)
✔ stale, unconfirmed, missing and partial spec citations refuse without inserting a decision (341.977382ms)
✔ uncited raises retain their synchronous path and spec read is available to any held role in its business (253.234948ms)
✔ record writes bind the session author, require authority and refuse spec and impersonation paths (296.724855ms)
✔ REQ-COS-1: the pm asks the chief of staff for roles and counts; the chief receives a STAFF-REQUEST and answers it (266.774074ms)
✔ REQ-COS-1: only the pm can send a staff request; every other session is refused and the chief of staff hears nothing (342.29398ms)
✔ REQ-COS-1: a pm without message.send is refused like any other gated action (191.972993ms)
✔ REQ-COS-1: the request goes to the business launcher, and only when that is a chief of staff (625.196336ms)
✔ REQ-COS-1: the sender is judged by definition: an instance `lead` of the pm definition can ask, an instance `pm` of the coder definition can't (477.693259ms)
✔ REQ-COS-1: the launcher is judged by definition: an instance `boss` of the chief-of-staff definition receives, a `chief` of the coder definition gives no-chief-of-staff (463.094373ms)
✔ REQ-COS-1: a refused staff request leaves no staff.request action.allowed event (279.071717ms)
✔ REQ-ASSIST-2: the role definitions' messaging lists hold for a staff request, sender and recipient (686.788267ms)
✔ a staff request names a task, 1 to 10 distinct roles and counts of 1 to 20; nothing else is accepted (500.42507ms)
✔ REQ-COS-1: a staff request grants nothing: the pm still can't launch and the chief of staff launches as before (230.795958ms)
✔ a business that never switched launches reads allowed with no time and no event (145.171408ms)
✔ launches revoked and then restored read allowed, with the restore time and event id (171.380163ms)
✔ a task closed on the tracker leaves the open list, and total counts the open ones (177.297492ms)
✔ a tombstone is not open (166.399658ms)
✔ the open list stops at the cap and says so; total still counts every open task (165.909649ms)
✔ a role and a reader session read state; arguments, and an unbound cap, refuse (222.67428ms)
✔ a human session reads the same state, with the same cap (316.13625ms)
✔ reading state writes nothing: every table keeps its row count (161.202839ms)
✔ creates private WAL store and excludes a second writer until explicit close (141.732052ms)
✔ rollback is atomic and schema metadata is checked against trusted DDL, not just itself (186.6596ms)
✔ existing empty database and symlink runtime directory refuse, never initialize over damage (215.765216ms)
✔ crash during a transaction recovers no partial event after explicit fixture-only lock removal (200.799839ms)
✔ writer refuses mixed at/read_at forms atomically, even through trusted SQL helpers (157.058498ms)
✔ async transactions refuse before invoking their function (225.109691ms)
✔ usage_records refuses non-canonical timestamps atomically (169.311157ms)
✔ the session default fits under the reply cap and pages to the end with next (335.198828ms)
✔ the short form: no description, assignees by role, every listed key (310.908939ms)
✔ each filter, alone and together, and total counts every match (544.61582ms)
✔ task_ref reads one task in full, as the whole board has it (306.635853ms)
✔ no arguments is the read the Console and mosaic make, unchanged (314.276805ms)
✔ an unknown argument or a bad value refuses invalid-request (1019.396466ms)
✔ tasks rows carry priority and requirement for every session that reads tasks (356.184081ms)
✔ the read model rebuilds from the ledger: a reopened bus and each trail give the same values (546.01752ms)
✔ an empty business and one with snapshots but no task.created read cleanly (152.516561ms)
✔ recordTask keeps sync reads and a role write apart (199.103057ms)
✔ read_at must be one canonical UTC format, so the projection compares strings safely (134.235814ms)
✔ a bad entry refuses the whole record (112.734242ms)
✔ taskView reads the projection for one business (305.05954ms)
✔ requestTask hands only a holder and a task verb to the handler, and records refusals (332.057154ms)
✔ the server sends task verbs to the adapter with its own timeout; other verbs stay synchronous (439.46834ms)
✔ without an adapter the server refuses every task verb (287.640216ms)
✔ the runtime refuses an invalid adapter and closes a valid one (286.657489ms)
✔ the process loads the S3 adapter from plain-data trackers (357.391333ms)
✔ row 177 T1: a tester thread is owned by tester, and neither side reaches or lists the other (279.184454ms)
✔ row 177 T2: the tester thread.send is from tester-cli with no human.input; its open is by tester (362.206517ms)
✔ row 177 T3: the lists read the tester as the human in its own thread, and nowhere else (230.336229ms)
✔ row 177 T3: an assistant that would not hear the human refuses the tester too (194.031574ms)
✔ row 177 T4: the tester thread run answers the tester, never the human (306.802502ms)
✔ row 177 T5: each stop revokes only its own threads, recorded by its own actor (328.299194ms)
✔ row 177 T5: the human stop never ends a tester run (204.696543ms)
✔ row 177 T6: a business whose human is tester refuses invalid-business (109.631138ms)
✔ row 177 T7: the human trail shows a tester thread message as the tester (169.51161ms)
✔ row 177 T8: a tester-thread run never raises a decision to the human; a human-thread run still does (243.263793ms)
✔ row 177 T8: a tester-thread raise routed to the arbiter stays allowed (211.159965ms)
✔ row 175: TESTER_VERBS and the organization branch tester set are pinned (1.652115ms)
✔ row 175: each of the six reads as the tester deep-equals the human read (326.061331ms)
✔ row 175: W1-W3 as the tester land with receipt actor tester; the human still logs the human (722.556128ms)
✔ row 175: W2 as the tester refuses credentials, protected definitions, human, tester and bus.tester, and changes nothing (427.644343ms)
✔ row 175: the human-only actions refuse a tester tester-refused, and the file and store stay as they were (314.525733ms)
✔ row 175: W4 as the tester writes by tester and keeps every name check (197.172277ms)
✔ row 175: W6 as the tester records created_by tester; the human records the human (159.83434ms)
✔ row 175: with bus.tester unset or not exactly true no tester binds, so no read or write runs (581.447671ms)
✔ the tester binds only when the business sets bus.tester to exactly true (1049.138959ms)
✔ a business may not name a role tester, so the tester address is never a role (294.497665ms)
✔ every verb outside the tester list refuses tester-refused and is recorded against the tester (594.072296ms)
✔ a tester message is from tester, needs no prefix, and writes no human.input or authority (227.347191ms)
✔ a tester message to a role no run holds refuses tester-target-not-running and stores nothing (155.281625ms)
✔ a tester message is refused while the run is only launched, and routes once it claims (205.999074ms)
✔ a human message to a role no run holds still waits and tells launch.by (153.73644ms)
✔ a role answers a tester only in reply to a tester message, and the answer never reaches the human (249.219729ms)
✔ the tester reads the human views a reader reads (158.057286ms)
✔ tester proof binds its own CLI, start time and nonce, refuses a managed run and allows an agent (2.378328ms)
✔ neither CLI's nonce proves the other: each proof is bound to its own CLI and nonce variable (0.330065ms)
✔ testerNonce reads only the tester's variable and gives null on any read error (0.170382ms)
✔ an envelope carries exactly one of cap, human and tester; no tester authenticator refuses (196.547733ms)
✔ tester-cli.mjs binds through the runtime when the switch is on, and refuses off or under a run marker (1109.185244ms)
✔ REQ-THREAD-1 REQ-ORG-2: the 3d→3e migration adds the thread tables and leaves messages from before threads as written (1224.036506ms)
✔ REQ-THREAD-1: a 3d bus with a changed schema is refused and keeps its version and tables (879.373935ms)
✔ REQ-THREAD-1: the offline command prints the kept-message counts before the ready line (992.309251ms)
✔ REQ-ROLE-2 REQ-THREAD-1: one holder per thread, through the broker and the trigger (365.854627ms)
✔ REQ-ROLE-2 REQ-THREAD-1: the 3e triggers refuse writes that skip the broker (1429.810928ms)
✔ REQ-MSG-1: a message to or from the assistant names its thread, or is refused (379.381618ms)
✔ REQ-MSG-1: the chief of staff's reply comes back to the thread that sent the work (3754.33269ms)
✔ REQ-MSG-1: a reply can't carry one thread instance's thread to another thread instance (100.3203ms)
✔ REQ-THREAD-1 REQ-USER-2: one thread's messages never reach another thread's holder (155.429667ms)
✔ REQ-LAUNCH-1: a message to a thread with no holder waits, and the next holder gets it (166.609442ms)
✔ REQ-THREAD-2 REQ-LAUNCH-1: threadIdle releases only a thread with nothing waiting, and only for its holder (196.549759ms)
✔ REQ-THREAD-2 REQ-LAUNCH-1: a message delivered to a run that ended unread doesn't hold up the next holder (160.661599ms)
✔ REQ-ROLE-2 REQ-THREAD-1 Q169: a role.revoke the human approved ends every thread run of the assistant (149.274327ms)
✔ Q169 REQ-USER-2: assistant.stop ends the human's own assistant thread runs, and only the human's (206.46403ms)
✔ REQ-USER-2: the human verbs refuse another owner's thread (150.945394ms)
✔ REQ-THREAD-1: thread.create refuses when the business has no thread instance or more than one (106.38708ms)
✔ REQ-ORG-2: projects and threads are named once, and the repo names a business project (176.576161ms)
✔ REQ-THREAD-2: thread.messages returns the thread's history in pages and writes nothing (581.016752ms)
✔ project.create refuses a repository name without its matching repo before any write (82.74522ms)
✔ project.create keeps unrelated names with and without a repository (54.590812ms)
✔ socket capability stamps launch identity; shared views use wire, no SQL client (164.617368ms)
✔ two wire claims serialize; a lost reply never automatically retries (174.94668ms)
✔ malformed, oversized and identity-forging envelopes refuse without echoing input (112.412348ms)
✔ client preserves UTF-8 when a response divides a multibyte character (11.723861ms)
✔ committed mutation followed by dropped reply reports unknown and is never retried (193.397446ms)
✔ REQ-LIMIT-4 usage protocol binds run identity, requires a delivered turn and isolates businesses (211.302271ms)
✔ REQ-LIMIT-4 3g copy migrates through 3h to 3i preserving every old column, row and sequence; new usage table is empty (1636.321289ms)
✔ REQ-PLUG-1 runtime reaches transcript only through loader, over the real bus socket (216.475106ms)
✔ REQ-LIMIT-4 loader source records new turn kinds, excludes history and retries exactly once (142.864914ms)
✔ REQ-LIMIT-4 cut: unknown is durable and logged next to every total (160.15494ms)
✔ REQ-LIMIT-4 disabled: unknown is durable and logged next to every total (142.212906ms)
✔ REQ-LIMIT-4 missing-begin: unknown is durable and logged next to every total (131.035743ms)
✔ REQ-LIMIT-4 no-new-usage: unknown is durable and logged next to every total (132.041368ms)
✔ REQ-LIMIT-4 rewrite: unknown is durable and logged next to every total (133.649944ms)
✔ REQ-LIMIT-4 unfinished turn remains visibly unknown after accounting restarts (103.686517ms)
✔ usage records are append-only (129.475633ms)
✔ REQ-LIMIT-4 parse failure logs its safe code, never transcript content (119.966587ms)
✔ REQ-LIMIT-4 resumed run baselines history and exact totals do not overflow (152.622048ms)
✔ REQ-PLUG-1 core has no transcript import and disabled sources do not read any transcript (124.289746ms)
✔ REQ-LIMIT-4 a resumed thread bills only new assistant messages to its next run (122.866824ms)
✔ REQ-LIMIT-4 every enabled source is called; failure is unknown and a partial total stays labelled (144.654406ms)
✔ REQ-LIMIT-4 a turn whose reported sum exceeds safe precision is unknown, not rounded (110.756989ms)
✔ row 65 a run bound without a transcript directory records no-transcript (110.897511ms)
✔ web.search: a granted role gets labelled results, and the call is trailed with role, run, verb and query (201.691387ms)
✔ web.fetch: a granted role gets the page as labelled text, and the call is trailed with the url (195.3765ms)
✔ a role without the grant is refused, the refusal is logged with the verb, and nothing is fetched (224.331675ms)
✔ a broker with no web service refuses a granted role (161.42891ms)
✔ bad requests are refused: unknown verb, extra or missing argument, not a string, a human or reader session (219.702296ms)
✔ a session that is not the role holder is refused (146.128609ms)
✔ web.mjs's fences hold on the broker side: refusals are normal results with the fixed reason (437.227177ms)
✔ web.search with no search source configured is a refused result, not an error (164.107506ms)
✔ a search source that fails with its own refusal, or that throws, is handled (170.899997ms)
✔ a slow search source ends in a refusal at the deadline (205.095599ms)
✔ a secret in the arguments is refused before anything is trailed or fetched (126.050785ms)
✔ over the socket: the server routes web verbs to the service; other roles are refused; no service is web-not-configured (415.506254ms)
✔ busBusiness: the web grant comes from "web" in the resolved tool limit (0.27563ms)
✔ webServices: the business's search-source plug-in and web.searxng var make web.search work; without either it is refused as not configured (231.509996ms)
✔ an ungranted call is refused at once: no admission, no wait, nothing touched (165.650282ms)
✔ over the socket an ungranted caller is dropped by the server timeout and a granted one gets the longer wait (466.150191ms)
✔ a search that never answers is aborted at the deadline, the module sees the signal, and the call is trailed as refused (timeout) (199.855962ms)
✔ a fetch that stalls is cut off at the deadline: the request is destroyed, not left running (179.487287ms)
✔ one query limit: over SEARCH_MAX_QUERY_CHARS or empty is refused with the same reason before any backend, and the tool schema carries the same number (146.593221ms)
✔ merge-gate's technical raise is cross-role, goes to the cto, and only merge-gate can use the approval (313.170168ms)
✔ merge-gate has no message.send, and without a domain its raise goes to the delivery arbiter (277.350732ms)
✔ the cto must be able to message merge-gate, or the technical raise is refused (row 133) (246.957702ms)
✔ security-reviewer answers a review with its verdict alone; it holds no message.send (289.353488ms)
ℹ tests 447
ℹ suites 0
ℹ pass 447
ℹ fail 0
ℹ cancelled 0
ℹ skipped 0
ℹ todo 0
ℹ duration_ms 15803.3436