# #1179 — Required security DI wiring

## Objective

Eliminate the shared fail-open defect class **absence read as permission**:

- FL-01: missing `CommandAuthorizationService` must refuse Nest startup and must not permit command effects.
- FL-11: missing `SystemOverrideService` must refuse Nest startup and must not omit stored instruction authority while allowing provider/session effects.

## Tracking

- Issue: #1179, child of #1156
- Branch: `fix/1179-required-security-di`
- Base: `origin/next` at `216cd72226cd9ee17eea461cfe7cd0e010a22f02`

## Plan

1. RED: compile the real `AppModule` graph with each required provider independently removed, with a positive control for each intact binding.
2. RED: directly exercise each malformed absence path and assert zero command/provider/session effects.
3. Stop and report RED to the coordinator before production implementation.
4. After authorization, make both constructor injections required, remove absence-as-permission branches, and update explicit legitimate optional test seams.
5. Run focused Gateway tests, typecheck, lint, format, build, independent exact-head verification, and focused security review.

## Immutable path fence

Production changes are confined to:

- `apps/gateway/src/commands/command-executor.service.ts`
- `apps/gateway/src/agent/agent.service.ts`

Tests and task evidence are confined to:

- `apps/gateway/src/__tests__/required-security-wiring.test.ts`
- existing direct-constructor specs that require explicit required arguments
- `docs/scratchpads/1179-required-security-di.md`

No files in #1178, #1072, #1080, or #1054 lanes are in scope. `docs/TASKS.md` is orchestrator-owned and will not be modified.

## Budget

No explicit token ceiling was provided. Working assumption: one narrow Gateway security packet; split and stop if either arm requires unrelated module rewiring.

## Progress

- Intake read from #1179 and parent #1156.
- Base independently resolved from the issue's pre-native-stage ordering and repository `origin/next` ref; branch HEAD verified byte-for-byte against the remote ref.
- Real consumers and direct constructors inventoried.

## Tests

### RED

- `required-security-wiring.test.ts`: 4 failed, 2 passed before implementation.
- Both real-graph negative controls showed module compilation accepted the missing target binding.
- Direct FL-01 showed one unauthorized command effect; direct FL-11 showed one provider prompt and one session counter mutation.

### GREEN

- `required-security-wiring.test.ts`: 6/6 passed.
- FL-01-only production revert: exactly the two FL-01 test cases failed; all four other cases, including FL-11, passed.
- FL-11-only production revert: exactly the two FL-11 test cases failed; all four other cases, including FL-01, passed.
- Full Gateway suite: 74 files passed, 7 skipped; 831 tests passed, 17 skipped.
- Gateway typecheck: passed.
- Gateway lint: passed.
- Gateway build: passed.
- Changed-file Prettier check: passed.

### Review

- Codex code review: APPROVE, 0 findings.
- Codex focused security review: risk `none`, 0 findings.
- Independent exact-head review remains assigned to Scrappy through the coordinator.

## Risks / blockers

- `AgentModule` / `CommandsModule` / `ChatModule` contain a production cycle; the module test therefore uses the real top-level `AppModule` and replaces only storage/network leaves, preserving the target service in each arm while isolating the separate required consumer that would otherwise mask that arm's defect.
- No broad module rewrite was required.