# Optional CLIProxyAPI queue telemetry (P5) Enable through the human `plugins.set` transport with `plugins.usage` set to `"cliproxy-queue"`. Omission is off. The same patch may set `usage.cliproxyQueue.pollSeconds` (integer 1 through 59, default 15); `usage: null` removes this setting. Both switches and polling changes are human-only, including on the tester path. The existing instance configuration and proxy key paths do not change. Interface 1 exports `read({ readUsageQueue })`. The bus hands the module one frozen object holding one function, its management client's queue read, and nothing else (row 333 R3), so no key write, credential call or OAuth call is reachable from it. The module never reads credentials, configuration paths or the environment. Each read performs exactly one bounded GET of `/v8/management/observability/usage/queue?count=100` per poll. Existing fixed loopback, timeout, response byte cap and no-redirect/no-retry controls apply. The proxy's array response is validated completely and mapped immediately: `api_key` and `source` become their first 12 hexadecimal SHA-256 characters. Only whitelisted token counts, a failure flag/status, and IDs leave the client. No request IDs, failure bodies, client values or upstream values are retained. Malformed batches fail atomically and yield a fixed, value-free failure code. One bus/store writer owns the reader for its instance. It serializes polls, drains the shared queue once, and assigns IDs to current and retiring model-key metadata owners. Unknown `msk-` IDs go to the reconcile receipt. Foreign keys without that prefix are ignored. Disabled businesses receive no telemetry. Telemetry uses the existing append-only usage table with source `@proxy/cliproxy-queue`, separate from native session source records. `turnRecords` excludes it before every limit check and native usage total. Proxy totals may be incomplete (60-second upstream retention and a 100-event drain); the Console labels them proxy-reported and reports the reader's availability. They never independently enforce quotas. Native transcript counts carry the immutable run's safe `modelKeyId` in the usage cursor, preserved at turn begin and end. The Console exposes `byKey`. A business can set a daily per-key quota at `launch.limits.tokens.keys.<12-hex-key-id>` with `{limit, since, reset, timeZone}`; the human writer stamps `since`. Enable `limit-check: ["daily-quota"]` to apply that quota. Plain `{limit,since}` keys leaves remain cumulative legacy account limits, even when the name is twelve hex characters. They use `token-limit` and never resolve model metadata. Omitting a limit means no quota. Existing named account keys and `tokens.daily.` retain their existing behavior. Model-key limits and resets are human-only through every organization writer. Missing, ambiguous or foreign run-key metadata fails closed with `proxy-key-refused`; a run bound to a retiring key keeps that key id in its usage records. A key quota follows the agent its key id belongs to, across rotations and re-issues, for as long as the agent stays hired: it applies to any key in that agent's lineage (current, retiring and up to 64 earlier ids) and counts the whole lineage, while usage records and the Console's per-key counts stay per key id. A fire removes the agent's model record, so a re-hired agent starts a new lineage and a quota named by an old id matches no agent: it limits nothing, the Console usage view lists it, and the bus logs one value-free `limit-key-orphaned` line when it becomes orphaned. An agent with no model key under a key quota refuses `key-quota-no-model-key`; an id in two agents' lineages, or a run bound to an id the agent no longer holds, refuses `proxy-key-refused`. The human writer stamps a new `since` on a renamed leaf, so moving a quota to a new key id restarts its count; after a rotation no move is needed.