# Remediation Backlog — Reconciled Execution Plan **Owner:** `mos-remediation` (sole writer). Workers read; they never modify this file. **Sources:** [`DECOMP-OPUS.md`](./DECOMP-OPUS.md) (robustness, 38 tasks / 8 dissents) and [`DECOMP-SOL.md`](./DECOMP-SOL.md) (pragmatic, 25 tasks / 10 defers / 7 dissents), produced **independently** — neither planner read the other. Charter: [`MISSION.md`](./MISSION.md). **Status:** EXECUTING — all three blocking decisions RULED by Mos on 2026-07-31 (§5). **RM-01 is dispatched.** RM-03 is held pending Jason's disposition of PR #1023; nothing else is blocked. > **Provenance of the inputs (both clean).** `planner-opus` ran in a fresh session throughout. > `planner-sol` initially began work at 64.3% dirty context despite a brief instructing it to reset; > that run was **interrupted and discarded before it produced any output**, the seat was reset > out-of-band to 0.0%, and the brief was re-dispatched. `DECOMP-SOL.md` is the product of the clean > run only (it peaked at ~26% context). Both decompositions are therefore clean-context artifacts and > are weighted equally here. The discarded dirty run is banked as dogfood seed D-4 and as task RM-58 — > the failure it demonstrates is that _asking_ an agent to reset is not enforcement. --- ## 1. What the two planners agreed on without collusion Independent convergence is the strongest signal available here, because neither planner could see the other's file. Where both arrived at the same conclusion from opposite biases, I treat it as settled. | # | Convergent finding | OPUS | SOL | | --- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------- | -------------- | | C1 | **The charter's wire-in point is wrong.** Do NOT wire the choke point into `mosaic_orchestrator.py::run_single_task`. | D2 (headline) | Dissent 1 | | C2 | P0 hygiene/gate work must precede the spine, not follow it. | D1, phase P0 | G0, SOL-01/02 | | C3 | No new deployable microservice; the executor is a library + the coord daemon. | implicit throughout | Dissent 3 | | C4 | Comms adapters beyond tmux are out of scope for this mission. | D7 | DEFER 4/5/6 | | C5 | The "100 rotations lossless" bar is a late conformance gate, not an early tax. | D4 | Dissent 7 | | C6 | Redis is a derived hot path, never an authority; PG commits first. | R-013, R-054 | SOL-11, SOL-21 | | C7 | Reuse `packages/coord`; do NOT revive the untracked `apps/coordinator` residue. | R-042 | SOL-15 AC5 | **C1 is the single most consequential output of this exercise.** The charter (`MISSION.md`) and my kickoff instruction both name `mosaic_orchestrator.py::run_single_task:126-276` as the integration point. Both planners independently rejected it on the same evidence: that controller is `"enabled": false` (`.mosaic/orchestrator/config.json:2`) and references a dispatcher path (`tools/macp/dispatcher/pi_runner.ts`) that does not exist in this checkout. Wiring the new choke point into a disabled rail produces **a stranded executor — the identical built-but-unwired disease, one layer up, that would look "done" in a PR.** The live paths are `packages/mosaic/src/commands/launch.ts` and `packages/coord/src/runner.ts`. This contradicted the charter and was escalated as DECISION-1 — **now RULED in the planners' favour by Mos (§5)**. The corrected target is a new production Node `TaskExecutor` on the live dispatch path (`packages/mosaic` launch + `packages/coord`) that Coord/Forge/live dispatch submit through; the Python rail is deleted, not ported. --- ## 1a. ★ KEYSTONE DOGFOOD CASE — an inert gate that erased its own evidence **A merged commit shipped past `pnpm format:check` — and then the evidence quietly erased itself.** Verified chain (blob-level, under the repo's own prettier config, at the file's real path): | commit | state of `packages/mosaic/framework/tools/orchestrator/README.md` | | ------------------------------------------------------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- | | `b79336a8` — **merged PR #868** | blob `3ee7f104` — **FAILS** `pnpm format:check` | | `48fd1df2` — merged PR #872 (unrelated: ci-queue-wait 404 handling) | blob `3d3bb132` — passes; incidentally reformatted by that PR's `lint-staged` | | current `origin/main` (`06e0d403`) | passes — **the gate now looks green** | So: PR #868 merged a file that fails a required gate ⇒ **the CI format gate did not block it.** The gate was inert for that merge. Then an unrelated later PR's pre-commit hook reformatted the file as a side effect, so `main` went green again **without anyone ever learning the gate had failed to fire.** > **Correction on record:** my first report to Mos said "format:check is RED on main _now_." That was > true of the `main` my checkout was pinned to (`b79336a8`) and is **no longer true of current `main`**, > which advanced mid-session. The inert-gate finding itself is unchanged and verified; only its > present-tense framing was wrong. The hygiene PR therefore carries the `.prettierignore` fix only — > the README needs no fix today. ### Third live instance, same class — the queue guard, hit by this orchestrator Running the **mandated** pre-push guard during TASK-0: ``` $ ~/.config/mosaic/tools/git/ci-queue-wait.sh --purpose push [ci-queue-wait] platform=gitea purpose=push branch=main sha=06e0d403… [ci-queue-wait] state=unknown purpose=push branch=main $ echo $? → 0 ``` **Two distinct defects in one tool**, both feeding RM-03: 1. **Wrong exit** — `state=unknown` ⇒ `exit 0`. The defect at `ci-queue-wait.sh:282-288` that OPUS documented and that PR #1023 is parked on. A required gate returned PASS on an indeterminate result. 2. **Wrong branch** — it evaluated `branch=main`, not the branch actually being pushed. Even a correctly-exiting guard would have been answering the wrong question. **Standing doctrine (Mos):** until RM-03 lands, a green from this guard carries **zero information** and must not be cited as merge evidence. Rely on reviewer clearance + real CI. Three independent live instances in a single session — format gate, agent context reset, queue guard — is the class confirmed, not anecdote. ### D-11 — seat identity did not survive into git, and seat capability is invisible at dispatch Two defects, one dispatch (RM-01 → `f10-coder`): **(a) Identity drift — P-WRAPPER-001, reproduced on our own delivery.** The brief instructed the seat to `export MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY=f10-coder`. Its commits are authored `mosaic-coder ` — the generic fallback. **You cannot tell from git history which seat did this work.** Recorded, not rewritten: the drift is the evidence. **(b) Capability opacity.** Nothing at dispatch time revealed that `f10-coder` had no credential for the target provider. Per-slot tokens live at `~/.config/mosaic/secrets/gitea-tokens/`; the seat holds `gitea-usc-f10-coder` but not `gitea-mosaicstack-f10-coder`. This surfaced only when the seat failed **mid-task, after ~$9 and 69% of its context.** The orchestrator (me) selected a seat without any way to check it could act on the target repo — and there was no way to check. `get_gitea_token` behaved **correctly**: it refused to fall through and borrow another slot's token, failing loud precisely to protect gate-16 attribution. The tooling was right; the _dispatch-time information_ did not exist. **This is P-RECOVERY-001's "honest capability labeling" applied to seats rather than services.** A seat should declare what it can actually do — which providers, which repos, which credentials — and that declaration must be **checkable before dispatch**, not discovered by failure after the budget is spent. **Requirements:** RM-50 (roster ownership) gains per-seat capability declaration and a pre-dispatch capability check; RM-04 (activation coherence) gains the identity-binding half — a seat's declared identity must provably reach its commits, verified by an exit-asserting test, not assumed from an `export` in a brief. ### D-10 — the queue guard's failure modes are exactly backwards `ci-queue-wait.sh` — a **required** pre-push/pre-merge gate — was observed this session doing both of these: - **Fails OPEN on an unknown result.** `state=unknown ⇒ exit 0`, five times, during real pushes and real merges. It also evaluates `branch=main` rather than the branch being acted on. - **Fails CLOSED on credential resolution.** In a worker seat it aborted with `Gitea token not found`, hard-blocking a legitimate push of completed, tested work. The worker correctly stopped (Constitution gate 8). The identical command run from that worker's _own worktree_ in another shell succeeded, so the checkout and remote were fine — the difference was the worker's process environment. **A gate that waves through work it never checked, and blocks work that is ready, has its failure modes inverted.** Availability failures (cannot reach the provider, cannot resolve a credential) should degrade to a loud, auditable _inability to assert_ — never to a hard stop on delivery, and never to a silent pass. Correctness failures (unknown, malformed, terminal-failure) are what must block. This is also the **Pi-brick shape** (P-RECOVERY-001): a gate whose own unavailability prevents the work needed to recover from it. **Requirement on RM-03, extending its existing two defects:** the guard must distinguish `CANNOT_ASSERT` (credential/transport/provider unavailable — loud, audited, does not silently pass and does not permanently block) from `ASSERTED_NOT_READY` (a real non-green CI state — blocks). Both are registered R-002 cases with must-fail controls; neither may exit 0 silently. ### D-9 — the comms path shell-interprets message bodies (injection-shaped, found by accident) Sending a status message with `agent-send.sh -m "...`backticks`..."` caused bash to **execute** the backticked text as command substitution. The recipient received a mangled body plus a `No such file or directory` error; the intended sentence never arrived. The message was reported as delivered. This is the **same class** as the already-noted `pr-create.sh` backtick-quoting bug (M2 scratchpad): **two tools in the comms path treat a message body as shell input.** A body that can execute on the sender is a _correctness_ bug before it is ever a security one — and note the failure mode: the send reported success while silently transmitting something other than what was written. Silent corruption with a success receipt is precisely the pattern this mission exists to eliminate. **Requirement on RM-40 / RM-42 (comms/v1), hardened by Mos.** The envelope must carry its payload **verbatim** and must not be subject to shell interpretation at **any** hop — sender, transport, or adapter. Concretely: **file/stdin transport, never argv interpolation.** **Standing interim rule, effective now (Mos).** Until the envelope lands, use `agent-send.sh -f ` for any message body containing special characters — **never `-m`**. Passing a file sidesteps argv interpolation entirely. **This rule is mandatory in every worker brief this mission issues**, alongside the D-8 "if a check is unrunnable, say so" clause. Round-trip fidelity (send a body containing backticks, `$(…)`, quotes, and newlines; assert byte-identical receipt) is a required registered test case under RM-02, including a must-fail control proving the assertion can detect corruption. ### D-8 — a PRE-REGISTERED acceptance check that was not runnable as written On PR #1025 the author (me) pre-registered AC2 with the fixture snippet `mkdir -p apps/*/venv/lib`. In bash, when no `venv` exists the glob is unmatched and passes through literally, creating a directory named `apps/*/venv/lib` rather than one per workspace. The check as written did not test what it claimed to test. `rev-974` ran it **exactly as written**, observed the wrong behaviour, then re-ran the intended assertion at an explicit path — **and said so in the review** rather than silently substituting a working fixture and reporting PASS. Two things this establishes: 1. **The instruction "do not adjust a check to fit the diff; if it is unrunnable, say so explicitly" worked.** A silent substitution here would have produced a green AC2 that proved nothing, on the exact task whose subject is gates that appear to work. The disclosure is what made the PASS meaningful. 2. **Pre-registration does not confer correctness.** A pre-registered check is protected from being retrofitted to the implementation; it is not protected from being _wrong when written_. This is a small instance of the mission's own class — an unverified gate — occurring inside the mechanism built to catch unverified gates. **Requirement on RM-02 (non-negotiable, sharpened by Mos).** The registry must **self-verify** that every registered case demonstrably **runs** and demonstrably **fails on a known-bad input**. Presence in the registry is **not** evidence. **A check is not trusted until it has been shown to fail.** This is mutation testing / negative control applied _at the registry level_ — meaning **the conformance harness must itself be conformance-tested.** A registered case that cannot fail, or cannot run, is exactly as inert as an unregistered one, and the registry check must detect that itself rather than assume it. **Requirement on RM-55.** The same recursion applies to the harness: it must be observed red before its green is worth anything (OPUS R-063 AC1 already states this; D-8 is the empirical case for it). **Second, equally load-bearing lesson — reviewer disclosure is what makes a review trustworthy.** rev-974 could have silently swapped in a working fixture and reported `AC2 PASS`. Nothing in the process would have caught it, and the resulting green would have certified nothing — on the very task whose subject is gates that only appear to work. The brief's instruction — _"do not adjust a check to fit the diff; if it is genuinely unrunnable as specified, say so explicitly and explain why rather than silently substituting your own"_ — is therefore not boilerplate. It is the clause that makes a PASS mean something, and it must appear in **every** reviewer brief this mission issues. ### D-7 — shared-tmpfs contention → cascading ENOSPC (live incident, 2026-07-31) The shared 30 G `/tmp` hit **100% ENOSPC** mid-session. It broke tool calls in **two different seats** (mine and Mos's) — a single full disk degrades every agent on the host at once. Recurring: prior incidents 2026-06-18 and 2026-07-17. Attribution matters, because the wrong owner cleans the wrong thing. Measured: | path | size | last modified | owner | | ---------------------------------------------- | --------- | ---------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------- | | `…/-src-mosaic-stack/6d2faee6…` (this session) | **88 K** | live | mos-remediation | | `…/-src-mosaic-stack/c743185d…` | **3.6 G** | **2026-07-22** (9 days dead) | abandoned session, same project path | | `…/claude-1001/pnpm-store` | **1.6 G** | **2026-07-23** (8 days dead) | abandoned; the live store is correctly on `$HOME` | So ~5.2 G — the bulk of the pressure — is **dead session scratch that nothing will ever read again**. This is not a quota problem; it is **P-FLEET-001's stale-session GC, applied to disk instead of tmux sessions.** The same missing capability (nothing owns reaping dead ephemeral state) produces both the orphaned-session failure and this one. Reaping dead-session scratch belongs in RM-50 alongside stale tmux-session GC. **Added to RM-01 as acceptance criteria:** heavy build artifacts (node_modules, package stores, build output) must land on the main disk in the worktree, never on the shared 30 G `/tmp`. **Resolution, and the part that is actually the finding.** Mos verified the attribution independently (mtimes, no process or `lsof` holding either path, no live session maps) and reaped both as lead coordinator: `/tmp` went to 79%, 6.0 G free. But note _how_ it was resolved — **a human-authority seat did it by hand, because the authority exists and the reaper does not.** That gap is the finding, not the disk usage. Two doctrine points fall out, both binding on RM-50: 1. **The fix is not "agents should tidy up."** Asking each seat to clean its own scratch is `instructions are not enforcement` (D-4) wearing a different hat. A deterministic reaper must own it — same conclusion the north star reaches for every other class in this mission. 2. **Refusing to unilaterally delete another session's scratch was correct, and the resolution is not "be braver about deleting."** An agent guessing that someone else's state is garbage is exactly the unreviewed destructive act the Constitution forbids. The resolution is that _ownership and liveness become mechanically decidable_, so reaping is a determination rather than a judgement call. **Reaper requirements for RM-50:** liveness determined mechanically (process/`lsof`/session-map, not mtime alone); an age threshold; a dry-run that reports what it would reap and why; and an audit event per reap. Never a heuristic sweep — that would reintroduce the P-WORKFLOW-001 auto-sync failure in a more destructive form. **The self-erasure is the important part.** An inert gate that is masked by unrelated downstream commits produces no lasting artifact, which is precisely why this class survives for months. Detection cannot rely on "is `main` currently red" — it must be per-merge-commit. This matters more than the one-line fix: - It is the **P-QUEUE-001 / P-CONFORMANCE-001 class** ("gate-6 was inert fleet-wide"), reproduced in the repository this mission is remediating, discovered incidentally. - It independently **validates OPUS premise A1** ("every gate is inert until proven otherwise") with live evidence rather than argument — which is why RM-02 is adopted as the keystone (§2, X2). - The file fix rides in its own hygiene PR. **The inert gate itself is NOT quiet-patched.** Per Mos: it stays a first-class backlog item, because patching the symptom would destroy the signal. **Binding requirement on RM-02 and RM-55:** the gate registry and the conformance harness must assert **"every merged commit passed every required gate"** — evaluated **per merge commit, against that commit's own tree**, not against current `main`. As the table above proves, a "is main green today" check would have reported all-clear. A merged-commit-that-fails-a-required-gate is the exact detection signal, and it must be a registered must-fail case. A gate that cannot prove it blocked something has not been shown to work. --- ## 2. Where they genuinely disagree (not averaged — adjudicated) | # | Axis | OPUS | SOL | My ruling | | --- | ------------------------------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------- | --------------------------------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | | X1 | **Total cost** | 38 tasks, ~5.3M tok | 25 tasks, ~294K tok | **~18× apart.** Not reconcilable by splitting. They measure different things: SOL explicitly excludes orchestration/review/iteration overhead and assumes one remediation pass; OPUS prices the full loop. Adopt **SOL's scope** with **OPUS's rigor**, and treat SOL's G1 as a hard budget checkpoint (§4). Re-estimate empirically after the first three merged PRs rather than trusting either number. | | X2 | **Gate registry (OPUS R-002)** | Keystone; blocks all P2 | Absent; only a queue-guard fix | **ADOPT OPUS.** Empirically validated in this very session: I found `pnpm format:check` red on `main` via merged PR #868 — a required gate that did not block. OPUS's premise A1 ("every gate is inert until proven otherwise") is not theoretical; it reproduced today, unprompted. Scope it tighter than 120K. | | X3 | **Drizzle PG first-install defect (R-010)** | Hidden blocker; everything downstream depends on it | Not mentioned | **ADOPT OPUS.** `packages/db/src/migrate.ts:30-38` carries a TODO admitting postgres-tier first-install fails today. The spine has only ever been proven on PGlite. Every later migration silently depends on this. SOL missed it. | | X4 | **Rollback artifact for the hard cutover** | D3: hard cutover needs a rehearsed rollback snapshot | SOL-07: import-only, explicitly no dual-write | Both obey "no flat-file interim." OPUS wants a one-directional snapshot nothing reads as authority. I read that as compatible with the directive, but it is Jason's call → **DECISION-2** (§5). | | X5 | **Where the queue guard sits** | P0, independent of spine | SOL-02, also early | Agree it is P0. But ownership collides with **parked PR #1023** → **DECISION-3** (§5). | | X6 | **Report-only rollout** | D5: only with a hard expiry, else withdraw | not raised | **ADOPT OPUS.** A report-only gate is by definition inert; expiry is the mechanism that stops it becoming the new fail-open. | | X7 | **Availability trade (FC-7/FC-11)** | D8: "no DB ⇒ fleet stops" must be pre-committed in writing | not raised | Genuine availability regression, correctly identified. Needs Jason → folded into **DECISION-2**. | --- ## 3. Reconciled DAG Phases run in order; `⛔` marks a hard barrier. `src` shows lineage (`O`=opus, `S`=sol, `O+S`=both). Estimates are given as a **range** (SOL low / OPUS high) rather than a fabricated midpoint — the spread is itself information, and X1 says we calibrate on real merged PRs. ### P0 — Make gates provable, and stop the fleet re-bricking ⛔ _No gate-introducing task in any later phase may merge before RM-02._ | id | task | src | depends_on | est (S/O) | tier | | --------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | -------- | ------------ | ---------------- | ------ | | RM-01 | Reproducible non-root checkout; gate fails on **code, not env**; heavy artifacts OFF shared `/tmp` (banks D-1/D-2/D-5/D-7) | O+S+live | — | 6K / 60K | codex | | RM-02 | **Gate registry + negative-control CI check** (anti-inert-gate harness) ★keystone | O | RM-01 | — / 120K | opus | | RM-03 ⏸**HOLD** | Queue-guard: **two** defects — (a) `unknown`/`no-status`/malformed ⇒ ≠0, (b) guard evaluates `branch=main` instead of the branch being pushed | O+S+live | RM-02 | 8K / 100K | sonnet | | RM-04 | Activation/version coherence; block launch on skew, fail SAFE; honest `doctor` labels | O+S | RM-01 | (in S-01) / 140K | sonnet | | RM-05 | Break-glass replaces the three silent `MOSAIC BYPASS` fail-opens | O | RM-04, RM-02 | — / 120K | opus | > ⚠ **RM-05 must not merge before RM-04.** The bypasses exist because the lease-broker daemon was > never _deployed_ on this host — removing the fail-open before deployment coherence is real > re-creates the 2026-07-22 bricking incident. Hard edge, from OPUS. ### P1 — Durable spine (PG) ⛔ _No migration may merge before RM-10._ | id | task | src | depends_on | est (S/O) | tier | | ----- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | --- | ---------- | ---------- | ------ | | RM-10 | **Fix the Drizzle postgres-tier first-install defect** ★hidden blocker | O | RM-01 | — / 90K | sonnet | | RM-11 | Orchestration spine schema (tasks, attempts, gate_results, hash-chained ledger, typed claims) | O+S | RM-10 | 12K / 160K | opus | | RM-12 | Spine client, fail-closed connection (no silent PGlite in prod) | O | RM-11 | — / 80K | sonnet | | RM-13 | Atomic claims/transitions + transactional outbox + reconciliation sweeper | O+S | RM-12 | 12K / 140K | opus | ### P2 — The single choke point ⛔ _RM-25 (no-second-path) lands in the same milestone as RM-20, or the choke point is optional._ | id | task | src | depends_on | est (S/O) | tier | | ----- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | --- | ------------------- | ---------------- | ------ | | RM-20 | Canonical MACP contract completion (Task/Result/Event/Claim/tri-state outcome) | S | — | 8K / (in R-020) | codex | | RM-21 | **Production `TaskExecutor`** backed by `@mosaicstack/macp` ★keystone | O+S | RM-12, RM-02, RM-20 | 16K / 220K | opus | | RM-22 | Gate-runner hardening: `fail_on`, timeouts, **empty gate set = failure** | O | RM-21 | — / 120K | sonnet | | RM-23 | Hash-chained MACPEvent ledger in PG + lifecycle EventType extension | O+S | RM-21, RM-11 | — / 160K | opus | | RM-24 | Seat identity from `MOSAIC_AGENT_NAME` + **mandatory** tri-state write outcomes | O+S | RM-21 | (in S-03) / 150K | opus | | RM-25 | **No-second-path gate:** terminal status writable only by the executor | O | RM-21, RM-23 | — / 140K | opus | | RM-26 | `packages/coord` submits through the executor (retire direct spawn) | O+S | RM-21 | 16K / 140K | sonnet | | RM-27 | `mosaic yolo/claude/codex/pi` launch path records typed Task + events | O | RM-21, RM-23 | — / 160K | sonnet | | RM-28 | Delete the Forge stub executor (empty-gate-list "success"); Forge submits through the real one | O+S | RM-21 | 10K / 90K | codex | | RM-29 | One-shot flat-file import + cutover readiness audit (dry-run, idempotent, no dual-write) | S | RM-13 | 8K / (in R-062) | codex | > **★ G1 — FIRST DOGFOOD. Stop here and prove it.** One live fleet task travels > PG claim → TaskExecutor → worker → gates → terminal PG result/event, with **no** flat-file state. > Adopted from SOL wholesale. If G1 cannot carry a real task, **do not build Redis, rotation, comms, > or conformance** — remediate instead. This is the budget escape hatch (§4). ### P3 — Rotation lifecycle (finish the Mission Control Plane) | id | task | src | depends_on | est (S/O) | tier | | ----- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | --- | ------------ | ---------------- | ------ | | RM-30 | Typed state claims (source/confidence/TTL) with HMAC integrity, fail-closed | O+S | RM-11, RM-21 | (in S-03) / 170K | opus | | RM-31 | Contract-hash binding; stale generation loses mutation authority **mechanically** | O+S | RM-21, RM-30 | 12K / 180K | opus | | RM-32 | Durable compaction/token sensor (per-runtime thresholds, PreCompact event) | O | RM-23, RM-31 | — / 130K | sonnet | | RM-33 | Typed checkpoint writer (structured claims, never transcript) + digest | O+S | RM-30, RM-32 | 12K / 150K | opus | | RM-34 | **Rotation daemon:** watch → checkpoint → revoke → kill → relaunch → rehydrate | O+S | RM-33, RM-26 | 16K / 240K | opus | | RM-35 | Rehydration attestation gate: refuse to act on an incomplete claim set | O | RM-33 | — / 130K | opus | | RM-36 | Broker-independent recovery; remove silent bypass; honest capability labels | S | RM-34 | 12K / (in R-004) | sonnet | | RM-37 | Delete `/compact and continue` from the persistent-seat path (**substitution**, not removal) | O+S | RM-34, RM-44 | (in S-16) / 60K | codex | ### P4 — Comms service ⛔ _RM-50 (one roster-owned socket per host) precedes identity-addressed delivery._ | id | task | src | depends_on | est (S/O) | tier | | ----- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- | --- | ------------ | ---------------- | ------ | | RM-40 | `comms/v1` envelope + protocol-version negotiation, LOUD reject | O+S | RM-11, RM-31 | 8K / 140K | opus | | RM-41 | Comms service: PG state machine PENDING→RECEIVED→CONSUMED→DEAD-LETTER | O+S | RM-40, RM-13 | 16K / 200K | opus | | RM-42 | tmux transport as a **dumb adapter**; durable retry before cursor advance | O+S | RM-41, RM-50 | (in S-19) / 160K | sonnet | | RM-43 | Per-class coalescing + supersede (the stale-consumed-as-live fix) | O+S | RM-41 | 12K / 130K | sonnet | | RM-44 | Redis Streams hot delivery + provenance guard (**Redis is never authority**) | O+S | RM-41, RM-13 | 12K / 170K | opus | | RM-45 | Retire direct tmux sends; only the service may write a pane | O+S | RM-42, RM-43 | (in S-20) / 100K | codex | ### P5 — Retirements, hygiene, conformance | id | task | src | depends_on | est (S/O) | tier | | ----- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | --------------------- | -------------------------- | ---------------- | ------ | | RM-50 | One roster-owned socket/host; quarantine unmanaged; **deterministic reaper for stale sessions AND dead-session disk scratch** (D-7) | O+S+live | RM-04 | 14K / 150K | sonnet | | RM-51 | Auto-sync **allowlist** (never auto-stage unknown paths) + worktree/lease isolation | O+S | RM-02 | 8K / 110K | sonnet | | RM-52 | Retire the Python controller + duplicate MACP islands (3 → 1) | O+S | RM-26, RM-27, RM-25, RM-28 | 14K / 110K | codex | | RM-53 | Flat-file orchestration → DB hard cutover, with rehearsed rollback artifact | O+S | RM-27, RM-30, RM-34, RM-29 | (in S-10) / 200K | opus | | RM-54 | Fleet-wide inert-gate audit against the RM-02 registry | O | RM-02 | — / 120K | sonnet | | RM-55 | **Conformance harness:** fault-inject the live failure classes on real artifacts | O+S | RM-35, RM-41, RM-53 | 18K / 260K | opus | | RM-56 | Retirement proof: CI asserts all three retirements are complete **and stay complete** | O | RM-52, RM-45, RM-53 | — / 90K | codex | | RM-57 | Operator cutover docs + activation proof; map all 15 decisions to evidence | S | RM-04, RM-36, RM-45, RM-55 | 6K / — | codex | | RM-58 | **Mechanical pre-dispatch context reset** — the orchestrator resets a seat out-of-band and verifies it, rather than asking the agent to reset itself | mos-remediation (D-4) | RM-31, RM-50 | 8K | sonnet | **Critical path:** `RM-01 → RM-02 → RM-10 → RM-11 → RM-12 → RM-21 → RM-23 → RM-31 → RM-33 → RM-34 → RM-53 → RM-55`. --- ## 4. Execution discipline - **Every row is one PR.** Author ≠ reviewer; `rev-974` is the mosaicstack reviewer identity. - **Pre-registered, diff-blind acceptance checks are committed BEFORE the reviewer reads the diff.** Both decomps wrote their ACs in runnable `⇒0` / `⇒≠0` form specifically to make this possible. - **Every gate-introducing task carries at least one registered must-fail negative control.** This is RM-02's whole purpose; a gate with no proven failure path manufactures evidence. - **Cost tiers:** codex for mechanical/unambiguous, sonnet for normal feature work, opus reserved for security/integrity/cross-cutting-invariant tasks. SOL priced 0 opus tokens; OPUS priced 14 opus tasks. I am keeping opus only where the failure is _integrity_, not merely complexity. - **G1 is the budget checkpoint.** If the first-dogfood slice overruns SOL's estimate by >3×, stop and re-plan rather than spending the remainder. X1 says neither estimate is trustworthy until calibrated. - **Defer list adopted from SOL** (10 items): mission dashboard/TUI, PRD-to-board auto-decomposition, heuristic churn scoring, Discord/Slack/Telegram adapters, public MCP comms surface, protocol-v2 negotiation, multi-region PG/Redis, event analytics UI. --- ## 5. Decisions — all three ruled by Mos, 2026-07-31 **DECISION-1 — the wire-in point. ✅ RULED: accept the planners (Mos, 2026-07-31).** The charter's `mosaic_orchestrator.py::run_single_task` target is the **disabled Python controller this mission retires**; wiring the new choke point into the rail we are deleting is wrong. > **Corrected target (authoritative):** a **new production Node `TaskExecutor`** sitting on the > **live dispatch path** — `packages/mosaic` launch + `packages/coord` — which Coord, Forge, and live > dispatch all **submit through**. This is the MACP scout's _full_ recommendation ("replace the block > **with** a Node executor **and** make Coord/Forge submit through it"), not a resurrection of the > Python controller. RM-52 is therefore a **deletion** task, and Build 1's acceptance is measured on a > live `mosaic yolo` invocation. Mos ruled this resolvable from the already-accepted retire-the-Python-rail decision — his authority, not a Jason escalation. RM-21/RM-26/RM-27/RM-52 all take the corrected target. **DECISION-2 — rollback artifact + availability trade. ⏸ JASON-PENDING — NOT BLOCKING.** The DB build is phases away, so this is queued for Jason's next session rather than escalated now. **Binding requirement in the meantime (Mos, from P-RECOVERY-001):** the DB spine **must NOT be a single-point hard-stop.** Design for a broker-independent / degraded mode **plus** a rollback artifact. Jason finalises only the specific availability target. This reverses my earlier reading of OPUS D8 ("the fallback is: the fleet stops") — that answer is **not** pre-committed; a degraded mode is now a design requirement on RM-12, RM-13, RM-23, RM-36 and RM-53. **DECISION-3 — RM-03 vs. parked PR #1023. ✅ RULED: HOLD RM-03 (Mos, 2026-07-31).** Do **not** open a third gate-6 lane — that is the postmortem's own anti-pattern performed by the remediation. PR #1023 sits in Jason's **parked delivery stack**; its disposition (close, or supersede by RM-03) is Jason's at his next session. - **PR #1023 → `SUPERSEDED-PENDING-JASON`.** RM-03 stays `HOLD`; when Jason rules, RM-03 proceeds as the single correct lane. - **RM-02 and RM-55 proceed independently and are NOT held.** The per-merge-commit gate-assertion requirement is the _conformance_ capability, not the gate-6 fix itself — different scope, no ownership collision. --- ## 6. Status | phase | state | | ------------------ | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | | Decomposition | DONE — both planners delivered independently | | Reconciliation | DONE — this document | | Blocking decisions | **RULED** — all 3 closed by Mos 2026-07-31 (§5); D-2's availability target is Jason-pending but non-blocking | | Dispatch | **RM-01 IN FLIGHT** — f10-coder (codex), worktree-isolated, AC1–AC8 pre-registered | | Review | PR #1025 with rev-974; ACs pre-registered 22:12:26Z before diff exposure |