#!/usr/bin/env bash # Regression harness for issue-comment.sh's Gitea comment write + verification # (#865). # # The #865 defect class: tea 0.11.1's `tea issue comment ...` (a nonexistent # subcommand) silently no-ops yet exits 0, and tea cannot emit the id of a # record it created — so an exit code is worthless as proof of a durable write. # The wrapper therefore does NOT write via tea at all. It POSTs the comment to # the Gitea REST API (which returns the created comment object, including its # id), then GETs THAT EXACT id back and requires it to match on id, author # (acting identity), body, and issue. Because verification is keyed to the id # the create returned, no concurrent comment can masquerade as this write, and a # suppressed/no-op create yields no id and fails closed. # # This harness models a REAL server: the curl stub keeps persistent comment # state on disk, the POST actually CREATES and PERSISTS a record and returns its # id, and the read-back GET reads that same state. There is no independently # fabricated record for the wrapper to "find" — the only way verification # passes is if the POST genuinely created the record the read-back retrieves. # It proves the wrapper: # 1. never shells out to tea to write (no `tea comment` / `tea issue comment`); # 2. creates the comment via REST POST and learns the provider-returned id; # 3. verifies THAT EXACT id by direct GET, attributed to the acting identity; # 4. fails closed when the write is a no-op even though a concurrent # SAME-IDENTITY comment with the same body already exists (the closed # concurrency window — no fallback list scan can rescue a no-op); # 5. fails closed when the created record is not authored by the acting # identity; # 6. treats the exact-id GET as the SOLE authority — it performs NO follow-up # list enumeration (the stub exposes no comment-list endpoint, so any # residual enumeration attempt would fail the run); # 7. with a RESOLVABLE --login override, performs the write, the /user identity # lookup, and the read-back ALL under THAT login's token/identity — never # the host default; # 8. with an UNRESOLVABLE --login override, FAILS CLOSED (nonzero, no write, no # success line) instead of silently downgrading to the host default # identity — the token seam maps each bearer token to the identity it # authenticates as, so a misattributed write is caught; # 9. with a --login override whose tea config URL is a DIFFERENT host than the # repo remote, FAILS CLOSED (host-bound token selection) rather than sending # that other host's credential cross-host; # 10. leaves NO temp files behind (POST/GET bodies + metadata) on either the # success or the failure path — nested function-scoped RETURN traps do not # clobber each other and every scratch file is removed on all exit paths. set -euo pipefail SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)" WORK_DIR="${MOSAIC_TEST_WORK_DIR:-$PWD/.mosaic-test-work/issue-comment-readback}" REPO_DIR="$WORK_DIR/repo" BIN_DIR="$WORK_DIR/bin" XDG_DIR="$WORK_DIR/xdg" TEA_LOG="$WORK_DIR/tea.log" CURL_LOG="$WORK_DIR/curl.log" # Full curl argv per invocation — proves the bearer token never rides in argv. CURL_ARGV_LOG="$WORK_DIR/curl-argv.log" AUTH_LOG="$WORK_DIR/auth.log" OUTPUT_FILE="$WORK_DIR/output.log" CREDENTIALS_FILE="$WORK_DIR/credentials.json" STATE_FILE="$WORK_DIR/comments.json" # A dedicated scratch dir the wrapper is pointed at via TMPDIR, so the leak # check can assert every POST/GET body + metadata temp file is cleaned up. TMP_SCRATCH="$WORK_DIR/scratch" cleanup() { rm -rf "$WORK_DIR" } trap cleanup EXIT mkdir -p "$REPO_DIR" "$BIN_DIR" "$XDG_DIR" "$TMP_SCRATCH" git -C "$REPO_DIR" init -q git -C "$REPO_DIR" remote add origin https://git.mosaicstack.dev/mosaicstack/stack.git ISSUE_NUMBER=7 REPO_SLUG="mosaicstack/stack" API_BASE="https://git.mosaicstack.dev/api/v1/repos/mosaicstack/stack" API_ROOT="https://git.mosaicstack.dev/api/v1" BODY='durable "note" -- marker' ACTING_LOGIN="primary-reviewer" FOREIGN_LOGIN="other-writer" # A dedicated per-role --login override identity, with its own token stored in # tea's config (exactly the author-not-equal-reviewer hardening path). OVERRIDE_LOGIN="delegated-reviewer" DEFAULT_TOKEN="test-only-placeholder" OVERRIDE_TOKEN="override-token-placeholder" # A --login override whose tea config URL points at a DIFFERENT Gitea host than # the repo remote (git.mosaicstack.dev). Its token must NEVER be sent to the # repo host: host-bound selection must fail closed on the host mismatch. CROSS_HOST_LOGIN="foreign-host-reviewer" CROSS_HOST_TOKEN="cross-host-token-placeholder" # tea config: the override login has its own token here (as tea itself stores # per-login tokens). The default login name ("mosaicstack") is deliberately NOT # present, so the no-override default path resolves via the host credential # fallback while an explicit --login must resolve from this file or fail closed. # A second login is configured for a DIFFERENT host to exercise host-bound # rejection. mkdir -p "$XDG_DIR/tea" OVERRIDE_LOGIN="$OVERRIDE_LOGIN" OVERRIDE_TOKEN="$OVERRIDE_TOKEN" \ CROSS_HOST_LOGIN="$CROSS_HOST_LOGIN" CROSS_HOST_TOKEN="$CROSS_HOST_TOKEN" \ python3 - "$XDG_DIR/tea/config.yml" <<'PY' import os import sys with open(sys.argv[1], "w", encoding="utf-8") as handle: handle.write("logins:\n") handle.write(f" - name: {os.environ['OVERRIDE_LOGIN']}\n") handle.write(" url: https://git.mosaicstack.dev\n") handle.write(f" token: {os.environ['OVERRIDE_TOKEN']}\n") handle.write(f" - name: {os.environ['CROSS_HOST_LOGIN']}\n") handle.write(" url: https://git.uscllc.com\n") handle.write(f" token: {os.environ['CROSS_HOST_TOKEN']}\n") PY CONFIGURED_GITEA_URL="https://git.mosaicstack.dev" python3 - "$CREDENTIALS_FILE" <<'PY' import json import os import sys with open(sys.argv[1], "w", encoding="utf-8") as credentials: json.dump({ "gitea": { "mosaicstack": { "url": os.environ["CONFIGURED_GITEA_URL"], "token": "test-only-placeholder", } } }, credentials) PY # tea stub: only ever answers the login list (used to resolve the default login # name). It must NEVER be asked to write a comment — the wrapper writes via REST. cat > "$BIN_DIR/tea" <<'SH' #!/usr/bin/env bash set -euo pipefail printf '%s\n' "$*" >> "$ISSUE_COMMENT_TEA_LOG" if [[ "$*" == "login list --output json" ]]; then printf '%s\n' '[{"name":"mosaicstack","url":"https://git.mosaicstack.dev"}]' exit 0 fi echo "Unexpected tea command (wrapper must not write via tea): $*" >&2 exit 92 SH chmod +x "$BIN_DIR/tea" # curl stub: a small REST server backed by persistent on-disk comment state. # GET /user -> acting identity # POST /issues/7/comments -> CREATE + PERSIST, return created object # GET /issues/comments/{id} -> read the persisted record by exact id # There is deliberately NO comment-LIST endpoint: exact-id read-back is the sole # authority, so any residual list enumeration attempt hits the unexpected-request # guard and fails the test. cat > "$BIN_DIR/curl" <<'SH' #!/usr/bin/env bash set -euo pipefail # Record the FULL argv exactly as spawned, before consumption. The bearer token # must NOT appear here — it is delivered via a curl --config file (#865 ITEM 3a), # so only the config file PATH may show up. printf '%s\n' "$*" >> "$ISSUE_COMMENT_CURL_ARGV_LOG" output_file="" method="GET" url="" data="" auth_token="" config_file="" while [[ $# -gt 0 ]]; do case "$1" in -o) output_file="$2"; shift 2 ;; -H) [[ "$2" == Authorization:* ]] && auth_token="${2##* }" shift 2 ;; -K|--config) config_file="$2"; shift 2 ;; -w) shift 2 ;; -X) method="$2"; shift 2 ;; -d|--data) data="$2"; shift 2 ;; -s|-S|-sS) shift ;; http://*|https://*) url="$1"; shift ;; *) shift ;; esac done # Resolve the bearer token from the curl --config file (its real, secure source); # fall back to an -H header only for defense in depth. The config line is # `header = "Authorization: token "`. if [[ -z "$auth_token" && -n "$config_file" && -f "$config_file" ]]; then config_hdr="$(grep -i 'Authorization' "$config_file" 2>/dev/null || true)" if [[ "$config_hdr" == *"token "* ]]; then auth_token="${config_hdr##*token }" auth_token="${auth_token%\"}" fi fi path="${url%%\?*}" query="${url#*\?}" [[ "$query" == "$url" ]] && query="" printf '%s %s\n' "$method" "$url" >> "$ISSUE_COMMENT_CURL_LOG" # Map the presented bearer token to the identity it authenticates as — the same # derivation Gitea's own /user does. The wrapper's write, /user lookup, and # read-back must all carry the SAME token, so the acting identity recorded here # reveals which credential actually performed the request. acting_identity="" case "$auth_token" in "$ISSUE_COMMENT_DEFAULT_TOKEN") acting_identity="$ISSUE_COMMENT_ACTING_LOGIN" ;; "$ISSUE_COMMENT_OVERRIDE_TOKEN") acting_identity="$ISSUE_COMMENT_OVERRIDE_LOGIN" ;; "$ISSUE_COMMENT_CROSS_HOST_TOKEN") acting_identity="$ISSUE_COMMENT_CROSS_HOST_LOGIN" ;; esac printf '%s %s %s\n' "$method" "$path" "${acting_identity:-}" >> "$ISSUE_COMMENT_AUTH_LOG" write_response() { local status="$1" body="$2" [[ -n "$output_file" ]] || exit 96 printf '%s' "$body" > "$output_file" printf '%s' "$status" } if [[ "$method" == "GET" && "$path" == "$ISSUE_COMMENT_API_ROOT/user" ]]; then [[ -n "$acting_identity" ]] || { write_response 401 '{"message":"unauthenticated"}'; exit 0; } write_response 200 "$(ISSUE_COMMENT_LOGIN="$acting_identity" python3 - <<'PY' import json import os print(json.dumps({"login": os.environ["ISSUE_COMMENT_LOGIN"]})) PY )" elif [[ "$method" == "POST" && "$path" == "$ISSUE_COMMENT_API_BASE/issues/7/comments" ]]; then result=$(ISSUE_COMMENT_ACTING_LOGIN="${acting_identity:-$ISSUE_COMMENT_ACTING_LOGIN}" ISSUE_COMMENT_DATA="$data" python3 - <<'PY' import json import os state_path = os.environ["ISSUE_COMMENT_STATE"] mode = os.environ["ISSUE_COMMENT_TEST_MODE"] acting = os.environ["ISSUE_COMMENT_ACTING_LOGIN"] foreign = os.environ["ISSUE_COMMENT_FOREIGN_LOGIN"] repo = os.environ["ISSUE_COMMENT_REPO_SLUG"] body = json.loads(os.environ["ISSUE_COMMENT_DATA"]).get("body") with open(state_path, encoding="utf-8") as handle: comments = json.load(handle) # no-op-concurrent: the wrapper's own write is SUPPRESSED (returns 200 with no # created object) even though a concurrent same-identity comment already exists # in state. Nothing is persisted; there is no created id to verify. if mode == "no-op-concurrent": print("200") print(json.dumps({})) raise SystemExit(0) author = foreign if mode == "author-mismatch" else acting new_id = (max((c["id"] for c in comments), default=0)) + 1 # REAL Gitea comment shape: issue_url is the WEB (html) path, not an API path, # and a plain issue comment leaves pull_request_url empty. The URL-injection # modes persist a record whose id/author/body are all correct but whose # issue_url is forged, so ONLY the origin+path verification can catch them. issue_url = f"https://git.mosaicstack.dev/{repo}/issues/7" if mode == "url-wrong-host": issue_url = f"https://evil.example/{repo}/issues/7" elif mode == "url-wrong-owner": issue_url = "https://git.mosaicstack.dev/attacker/stack/issues/7" elif mode == "url-wrong-repo": issue_url = "https://git.mosaicstack.dev/mosaicstack/other/issues/7" elif mode == "url-suffix-injection": # Prefix-injected: a bare endswith("//issues/7") test would ACCEPT this. issue_url = f"https://git.mosaicstack.dev/deceptive/{repo}/issues/7" record = { "id": new_id, "body": body, "user": {"login": author}, "issue_url": issue_url, "pull_request_url": "", } comments.append(record) with open(state_path, "w", encoding="utf-8") as handle: json.dump(comments, handle) print("201") print(json.dumps(record)) PY ) write_response "$(printf '%s' "$result" | head -n1)" "$(printf '%s' "$result" | tail -n +2)" elif [[ "$method" == "GET" && "$path" == "$ISSUE_COMMENT_API_BASE"/issues/comments/* ]]; then result=$(ISSUE_COMMENT_GET_ID="${path##*/}" python3 - <<'PY' import json import os state_path = os.environ["ISSUE_COMMENT_STATE"] wanted = int(os.environ["ISSUE_COMMENT_GET_ID"]) with open(state_path, encoding="utf-8") as handle: comments = json.load(handle) match = next((c for c in comments if c["id"] == wanted), None) if match is None: print("404") print(json.dumps({"message": "not found"})) else: print("200") print(json.dumps(match)) PY ) write_response "$(printf '%s' "$result" | head -n1)" "$(printf '%s' "$result" | tail -n +2)" else echo "Unexpected curl request: $method $url" >&2 exit 97 fi SH chmod +x "$BIN_DIR/curl" # Seed persistent server state for a mode, then run the wrapper against it. seed_state() { local mode="$1" ISSUE_COMMENT_SEED_MODE="$mode" ISSUE_COMMENT_SEED_BODY="$BODY" \ ISSUE_COMMENT_SEED_ACTING="$ACTING_LOGIN" ISSUE_COMMENT_SEED_REPO="$REPO_SLUG" \ python3 - "$STATE_FILE" <<'PY' import json import os import sys mode = os.environ["ISSUE_COMMENT_SEED_MODE"] body = os.environ["ISSUE_COMMENT_SEED_BODY"] acting = os.environ["ISSUE_COMMENT_SEED_ACTING"] repo = os.environ["ISSUE_COMMENT_SEED_REPO"] # REAL Gitea comment shape: issue_url is the WEB path, pull_request_url empty. issue_url = f"https://git.mosaicstack.dev/{repo}/issues/7" def comment(cid, text, author): return { "id": cid, "body": text, "user": {"login": author}, "issue_url": issue_url, "pull_request_url": "", } if mode == "fresh-success": # 50 pre-existing comments already exist; the comment this run creates # becomes id 51, proving exact-id read-back works regardless of how many # comments precede it (no list enumeration is involved). comments = [comment(i, f"prior {i}", acting) for i in range(1, 51)] elif mode == "no-op-concurrent": # A concurrent SAME-IDENTITY comment with the IDENTICAL body already exists. # The wrapper's own write will be a no-op; it must still fail closed because # no created id is returned — it must not scan and accept this record. comments = [comment(55, body, acting)] else: # author-mismatch comments = [] with open(sys.argv[1], "w", encoding="utf-8") as handle: json.dump(comments, handle) PY } run_comment() { local mode="$1" shift : > "$TEA_LOG" : > "$CURL_LOG" : > "$CURL_ARGV_LOG" : > "$AUTH_LOG" : > "$OUTPUT_FILE" seed_state "$mode" ( cd "$REPO_DIR" PATH="$BIN_DIR:$PATH" \ TMPDIR="$TMP_SCRATCH" \ XDG_CONFIG_HOME="$XDG_DIR" \ MOSAIC_CREDENTIALS_FILE="$CREDENTIALS_FILE" \ ISSUE_COMMENT_TEA_LOG="$TEA_LOG" \ ISSUE_COMMENT_CURL_LOG="$CURL_LOG" \ ISSUE_COMMENT_CURL_ARGV_LOG="$CURL_ARGV_LOG" \ ISSUE_COMMENT_AUTH_LOG="$AUTH_LOG" \ ISSUE_COMMENT_STATE="$STATE_FILE" \ ISSUE_COMMENT_TEST_MODE="$mode" \ ISSUE_COMMENT_ACTING_LOGIN="$ACTING_LOGIN" \ ISSUE_COMMENT_FOREIGN_LOGIN="$FOREIGN_LOGIN" \ ISSUE_COMMENT_OVERRIDE_LOGIN="$OVERRIDE_LOGIN" \ ISSUE_COMMENT_CROSS_HOST_LOGIN="$CROSS_HOST_LOGIN" \ ISSUE_COMMENT_DEFAULT_TOKEN="$DEFAULT_TOKEN" \ ISSUE_COMMENT_OVERRIDE_TOKEN="$OVERRIDE_TOKEN" \ ISSUE_COMMENT_CROSS_HOST_TOKEN="$CROSS_HOST_TOKEN" \ ISSUE_COMMENT_REPO_SLUG="$REPO_SLUG" \ ISSUE_COMMENT_API_BASE="$API_BASE" \ ISSUE_COMMENT_API_ROOT="$API_ROOT" \ "$SCRIPT_DIR/issue-comment.sh" -i "$ISSUE_NUMBER" -c "$BODY" "$@" ) > "$OUTPUT_FILE" 2>&1 } # Assert the wrapper left no scratch temp files behind in TMPDIR (POST/GET # request bodies + metadata). Called after both success and failure paths so a # clobbered/leaked RETURN trap is caught on every exit route. assert_no_temp_leak() { local context="$1" leaked # Includes the curl auth-config files (mosaic-gitea-auth-*), which carry the # bearer token and must be unlinked on every exit path. leaked=$(find "$TMP_SCRATCH" -type f \( -name 'mosaic-issue-comment-*' -o -name 'mosaic-gitea-auth-*' \) 2>/dev/null || true) if [[ -n "$leaked" ]]; then echo "FAIL: issue-comment temp files leaked ($context):" >&2 printf '%s\n' "$leaked" >&2 exit 1 fi } # Assert the presented bearer token NEVER appeared in curl's argv (it must travel # via a curl --config file), and that --config auth was actually used. On the # expected path grep matches nothing, so no token value is ever printed. assert_token_not_in_argv() { local context="$1" if grep -qF -e "$DEFAULT_TOKEN" -e "$OVERRIDE_TOKEN" -e "$CROSS_HOST_TOKEN" "$CURL_ARGV_LOG"; then echo "FAIL: a Gitea bearer token leaked into curl argv ($context)" >&2 exit 1 fi if ! grep -q -- '--config' "$CURL_ARGV_LOG"; then echo "FAIL: curl was not invoked with --config file auth ($context)" >&2 exit 1 fi } # Case 1: a genuine REST create (id 51) is verified end to end via its exact # provider-returned id — no list enumeration is involved. run_comment fresh-success grep -q 'Added and verified comment on Gitea issue #7 (comment ID 51)' "$OUTPUT_FILE" # The write is a REST POST, never a tea comment. grep -q "^POST $API_BASE/issues/7/comments$" "$CURL_LOG" if grep -Eq '^comment |^issue comment ' "$TEA_LOG"; then echo "FAIL: wrapper wrote a comment via tea instead of REST" >&2 exit 1 fi # Read-back is a DIRECT GET of the exact created id. grep -q "^GET $API_BASE/issues/comments/51$" "$CURL_LOG" # Acting identity resolved via GET /user. grep -q "^GET $API_ROOT/user$" "$CURL_LOG" # No comment-list enumeration is performed — the exact-id GET is authoritative. if grep -Eq "^GET $API_BASE/issues/7/comments(\?|$)" "$CURL_LOG"; then echo "FAIL: wrapper performed a redundant comment-list enumeration" >&2 exit 1 fi # Default path (no --login): the host credential fallback resolves, and the # write is performed AND self-verified under the host-default acting identity. grep -q "^POST $API_BASE/issues/7/comments $ACTING_LOGIN$" "$AUTH_LOG" grep -q "^GET $API_BASE/issues/comments/51 $ACTING_LOGIN$" "$AUTH_LOG" # Success path leaves no scratch temp files behind. assert_no_temp_leak "fresh-success" # ITEM 3a: the token drove the write/read-back chain but never appeared in curl # argv — it was passed via a curl --config file. assert_token_not_in_argv "fresh-success default-token" # Case 2: a no-op write with a concurrent SAME-IDENTITY, same-body comment # already present must FAIL CLOSED — the closed concurrency window. if run_comment no-op-concurrent; then echo "FAIL: wrapper reported success when its write no-opped but a concurrent same-identity comment existed" >&2 cat "$OUTPUT_FILE" >&2 exit 1 fi if grep -q 'Added and verified comment' "$OUTPUT_FILE"; then echo "FAIL: wrapper accepted a concurrent record for a no-op write (window not closed)" >&2 exit 1 fi # It must NOT have fallen back to a list scan that could find the concurrent id. if grep -q "^GET $API_BASE/issues/comments/55$" "$CURL_LOG"; then echo "FAIL: wrapper read back the concurrent comment id 55 (illegitimate fallback)" >&2 exit 1 fi # Case 3: a created record NOT authored by the acting identity must FAIL CLOSED. if run_comment author-mismatch; then echo "FAIL: wrapper accepted a created comment authored by a different identity" >&2 cat "$OUTPUT_FILE" >&2 exit 1 fi if grep -q 'Added and verified comment' "$OUTPUT_FILE"; then echo "FAIL: read-back did not enforce acting-identity authorship" >&2 exit 1 fi # Failure-after-read-back path must ALSO leave no scratch temp files behind # (proves the RETURN traps clean up on the error-return route, not just success). assert_no_temp_leak "author-mismatch" # Case 4: a RESOLVABLE --login override — the write, the /user identity lookup, # and the read-back must ALL be performed under THAT login's token/identity, not # the host default. The override login has id 1 (empty seed). run_comment override-success --login "$OVERRIDE_LOGIN" grep -q 'Added and verified comment on Gitea issue #7 (comment ID 1)' "$OUTPUT_FILE" grep -q "^GET $API_ROOT/user $OVERRIDE_LOGIN$" "$AUTH_LOG" grep -q "^POST $API_BASE/issues/7/comments $OVERRIDE_LOGIN$" "$AUTH_LOG" grep -q "^GET $API_BASE/issues/comments/1 $OVERRIDE_LOGIN$" "$AUTH_LOG" # The host-default identity must NOT have performed ANY request in this run. if grep -q " $ACTING_LOGIN\$" "$AUTH_LOG"; then echo "FAIL: an explicit --login override request was performed under the host default identity" >&2 cat "$AUTH_LOG" >&2 exit 1 fi # Case 5: an UNRESOLVABLE --login override (name absent from tea config) must # FAIL CLOSED — no silent downgrade to the host default identity: nonzero exit, # no success line, and NO write performed. if run_comment override-unresolvable --login "nonexistent-typo-login"; then echo "FAIL: unresolvable --login override did not fail closed" >&2 cat "$OUTPUT_FILE" >&2 exit 1 fi if grep -q 'Added and verified comment' "$OUTPUT_FILE"; then echo "FAIL: unresolvable --login override reported success" >&2 exit 1 fi if grep -q "^POST $API_BASE/issues/7/comments" "$CURL_LOG"; then echo "FAIL: unresolvable --login override still performed a write" >&2 exit 1 fi # And it must not have silently fallen back to the host default identity. if grep -q " $ACTING_LOGIN\$" "$AUTH_LOG"; then echo "FAIL: unresolvable --login override fell back to the host default identity" >&2 exit 1 fi # Case 6: a --login override that IS present in tea config but whose URL is a # DIFFERENT host than the repo remote must FAIL CLOSED (host-bound selection). # The cross-host token must NEVER be sent to the repo host, and no write occurs. if run_comment cross-host --login "$CROSS_HOST_LOGIN"; then echo "FAIL: cross-host --login override did not fail closed" >&2 cat "$OUTPUT_FILE" >&2 exit 1 fi if grep -q 'Added and verified comment' "$OUTPUT_FILE"; then echo "FAIL: cross-host --login override reported success" >&2 exit 1 fi # The cross-host credential must not have performed ANY request against the repo # host — no request may be attributed to the cross-host identity. if grep -q " $CROSS_HOST_LOGIN\$" "$AUTH_LOG"; then echo "FAIL: cross-host credential was sent to the repo host (cross-host leak)" >&2 cat "$AUTH_LOG" >&2 exit 1 fi if grep -q "^POST $API_BASE/issues/7/comments" "$CURL_LOG"; then echo "FAIL: cross-host --login override still performed a write" >&2 exit 1 fi # It must not have silently downgraded to the host default identity either. if grep -q " $ACTING_LOGIN\$" "$AUTH_LOG"; then echo "FAIL: cross-host --login override fell back to the host default identity" >&2 exit 1 fi assert_no_temp_leak "cross-host" # Cases 7-10 (#865 Blocker 3): the created record's id/author/body are all # correct, but its provider-returned issue_url is forged. Verification pins the # URL's ORIGIN (scheme+host+effective-port) and its FULL path (deployment prefix # + exact owner/repo + kind + number), so each forgery must FAIL CLOSED. A bare # endswith/suffix test would wrongly accept the look-alike-host and # prefix-injection variants. for bad_mode in url-wrong-host url-wrong-owner url-wrong-repo url-suffix-injection; do if run_comment "$bad_mode"; then echo "FAIL: forged comment URL ($bad_mode) was accepted" >&2 cat "$OUTPUT_FILE" >&2 exit 1 fi if grep -q 'Added and verified comment' "$OUTPUT_FILE"; then echo "FAIL: forged comment URL ($bad_mode) passed verification" >&2 exit 1 fi assert_no_temp_leak "$bad_mode" done # Sanity: the exact same verification path still ACCEPTS a legitimate web-shaped # issue_url (already exercised by Case 1's fresh-success), so the tightened check # is not rejecting genuine writes. echo "issue-comment.sh REST create + exact-id read-back regression passed"