# Tess Verification Matrix

| Acceptance criterion | Requirements                             | Planned evidence                                                                                                                                                       | Gate             |
| -------------------- | ---------------------------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ---------------- |
| AC-TESS-01           | TESS-PI-001, TESS-DSC-001, TESS-CLI-001  | Discord/CLI same-session integration and streaming E2E                                                                                                                 | M3-V             |
| AC-TESS-02           | TESS-ARP-001, TESS-CLI-001, TESS-FLT-001 | CLI contract tests for status/sessions/tree/attach/send/stop, typed denial/error snapshots                                                                             | M3-V             |
| AC-TESS-03           | TESS-PI-001, TESS-OBS-001                | Clean service launch; status asserts GPT-5.6 Sol, high reasoning and effective tool policy with secret canaries absent                                                 | M2-V, M3-V       |
| AC-TESS-04           | TESS-MOS-001, TESS-FLT-001               | M4 contract/gateway native-port handoff → observe → result round trip; configurable identity, target-drift and tenant-denial tests; M4-V fleet authority qualification | M4-001, M4-V     |
| AC-TESS-05           | TESS-HRM-001                             | Hermes capability contract suite: sessions/stream/send/tree plus Kanban/skills/memory/tools/cron supported-or-denied matrix                                            | M4-V             |
| AC-TESS-06           | TESS-STA-001, TESS-SEC-008               | Kill/restart/compaction fault injection across inbox/outbox/checkpoint transitions; duplicate side-effect detector                                                     | M2-V, M5-V       |
| AC-TESS-07           | TESS-SEC-001..009                        | Threat-model abuse suite: authz, tenant isolation, forged identity/approval, injection, redaction, transport identity, GC scope                                        | M1-V, M3-V, M5-V |
| AC-TESS-08           | TESS-TRN-001                             | Common provider contract suite against tmux/fleet and Matrix/native; identity and replay tests                                                                         | M5-V             |
| AC-TESS-09           | all                                      | `pnpm typecheck`, lint, format, unit/integration/contract/E2E; independent code and security reviews; CI URLs                                                          | Every milestone  |
| AC-TESS-10           | TESS-MIG-001                             | Completed capability inventory with native/adapted/deferred/rejected state, owner, cutover/rollback evidence                                                           | M5-V             |
| AC-TESS-11           | TESS-PLG-001, TESS-OBS-001               | OpenAPI and user/admin/developer/plugin/ops docs, sitemap links, documentation checklist                                                                               | M5-V             |

## Security Abuse Suite Minimum

- Role/scope matrix for every command and provider capability.
- Cross-tenant and cross-user session ID matrix across REST, WS, Discord, CLI, MCP, and providers.
- Discord service identity, guild/channel/user allowlist, replay, attachment, and mention/DM policy cases.
- Prompt/tool injection corpus and structured-proposal enforcement.
- Approval action-digest mutation, replay, expiry, tenant, and actor mismatch cases.
- Secret/PII canaries through message, attachment, tool args/output, logs, memory, audit, and error paths.
- Restart fault injection before/after enqueue, provider send, side effect, response persistence, and acknowledgement.
- Wrong tmux socket/target and Matrix identity/room/replay cases.

## Evidence Rules

Evidence must include command/test name, terminal result, CI run URL, PR/merge reference, environment, and artifact/log location. A worker self-report is not evidence until independently verified.