--- kind: spec status: active audience: developer --- # Agent Enrollment Command Family — v1 Design (M4-4-0) Status: design note (implementation-facing; amends no contract). Authority chain: tool-gateway-mapping.md §3.1 rank-4 row + §4 envelope (ruled 2026-08-27), onboarding-wizard.md §3.5 (D11 minimal enrollment), custody-schema.md §5.2 at revision 13 (agent-grantee FK bound to the live `agents` table — a binding introduced at rev 4 and standing verbatim), PRD §9 D11. Where this note and a ratified contract disagree, the contract wins. ## 1. What the contracts bind (and what they leave open) There is no standalone enrollment contract. The rank-4 family is defined by composition: 1. **Contract 5 §3.1 rank 4:** "Enroll one agent: harness, credential reference/API-key intake (values never echoed), name/persona, assignment scope (contract 3 §3.5)." 2. **Contract 5 §4 — all five sub-clauses:** §4.1 typed request/result DTOs validated at the Gateway boundary (expected-version only where an owning contract defines one); §4.2 closed per-family error enum (validation, authentication, authorization, not-found, conflict, precondition, internal) with HTTP mappings; §4.3 audit linkage — the envelope contributes correlation: every request accepts/generates a correlation id, carried into the audit events **and returned in the result**, with no second audit stream; §4.4 fail-closed — an operation that cannot evaluate its authorization or reach its owning tool refuses, never degrading to a fallback read or direct data access; §4.5 CLI parity — the family MUST be invocable through the official CLI against the same Gateway commands with the same request/result/error contracts (a Gateway command without CLI exposure is a tracked conformance gap). **Idempotency keys are NOT contract 5 §4.3:** the idempotency-key envelope is contract 3 §4.3, ratified as a drafting addition to contract 5 §4's command envelope via contract 3 §7 item 4. Its fence and replay rules bind as written there; §3.1 rule 5 below designs to them. 3. **Contract 3 §3.5:** the wizard's enrollment step is minimal (one harness, API-key login, agent name and persona — D11), uses ONLY this family, and is skippable. Wizard witness §6.10: a run that skips the step produces zero enrollment-family mutations. 4. **Custody-schema §5.2 (rev 13; binding introduced at rev 4):** contract 7's agent-grantee FK references the live `agents` table (`agents.id`, uuid); an enrollment surface with its own table would force a contract-7 amendment. **Assignment scope (open point, pinned here):** the rank-4 row cites contract 3 §3.5, which defines no assignment semantics; the PRD's full enrollment vision (Part I, Standalone flow) includes "account assignment", but the D11 v1 slice is exactly "one harness, API key, name/persona". v1 therefore scopes assignment to the two bindings the minimal slice already implies — the enrolling user becomes the agent's owner (`agents.owner_id`), and the credential reference names which of that user's stored provider credentials the agent uses. Richer assignment (multi-account, comms auto-enroll, workspace placement) is deferred with the rest of the PRD's full flow (D11); when a contract defines it, this family extends by ordinary amendment of the design. The deferral rests on contract 3 §3.5's explicit delegation of enrollment specifics to this family — not on reading the D11 list as exhaustive (it is not: the §3.1 `model`/`provider` fields are required by the live table's NOT NULL columns, though D11 does not name them). ## 2. Current state (measured 2026-08-29 at `origin/next` = `94d626df`) - `agents` table (packages/db `schema.ts`): id uuid PK, name, provider, model, status enum, project_id (legacy `projects`, ON DELETE SET NULL), owner_id → users, system_prompt, allowed_tools, skills, is_system, config jsonb, timestamps. No harness column (provider and model describe the LLM backend, not the harness), no audit coupling. - Sole write path: `packages/brain/src/agents.ts` repository (the only module issuing `insert(agents)`), with three write consumers: the legacy `/api/agents` CRUD controller (`apps/gateway/src/agent/agent-configs.controller.ts`), the `/agent new` chat command (`apps/gateway/src/commands/command-executor.service.ts` → `brain.agents.create`), and workspace bootstrap (`apps/gateway/src/workspace/project-bootstrap.service.ts`). All three keep serving existing consumers; none is touched by M4-4. - Sealed credential store exists: `ProviderCredentialsService` (apps/gateway/src/agent/) — one row per (userId, provider), values sealed at rest, decrypt server-side only, summaries never carry values. - Harness registry exists (`apps/gateway/src/harness/`), the validation source for the harness field. - Implementation pattern: the merged hierarchy module (M4-1) — transaction-scoped command context, in-tx authorization, discriminated result unions, same-transaction semantic audit event + transactional outbox, no-oracle not_found folding. **F1 — contract-5 mapping note (disposition, not an amendment):** `/api/agents` appears nowhere in contract 5 — neither as a P0 row nor in the §3.2 legacy non-substitutes list (the ruled §3.2 freeze names specific endpoints, and `/api/agents` is not among them). The operative constraints are §3.3's amendment-only rule for new mapping rows and §5's closure rule: this design adds no new consumer to `/api/agents` and builds the rank-4 family as the P1 path for enrollment. Adding the missing P0 row is a contract amendment for a future S2 pass; nothing in M4-4 depends on it. ## 3. Command family surface (v1) One command, one query. Module: `apps/gateway/src/enrollment/` (`enrollment.module.ts`), mirroring the hierarchy module's shape. ### 3.1 `agent.enroll` (mutation) Request DTO (shared types package, class-validator at the boundary): | Field | Type | Rule | | ---------------- | ------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | | `harness` | string | syntactically invalid (empty/malformed) → `validation_failed`; well-formed but not in the harness registry → `precondition_failed` | | `correlationId` | string (uuid) | optional; generated when absent (contract 5 §4.3); carried into audit events and returned in the result | | `replayMode` | 'actor-bound' | optional, default `actor-bound`. `shared` is seed-only (contract 3 §4.3 binds it to the §3.4 canonical seed key set and "no other operation can carry a shared declaration"; §7 item 4 closes it); a `shared` declaration here is refused `validation_failed`, executes nothing, and records no fence row | | `name` | string | non-empty, trimmed, ≤ 200 chars | | `persona` | string \| null | optional; stored as the agent's system prompt | | `model` | string | non-empty (provider-qualified model id) | | `provider` | string | non-empty; names the credential's provider | | `credential` | discriminated union | `{ mode: 'reference' }` — a credential for (actor, provider) MUST already exist; `{ mode: 'intake', type: 'api_key', value: string }` — value is sealed into the credential store in the same flow | | `idempotencyKey` | string (uuid) | required (contract 3 §4.3, ratified into contract 5 §4 via contract 3 §7 item 4) | Rules: 1. **Never echoed.** The credential value appears in no result DTO, no audit event, no outbox payload, and no log line. The result carries only `{ provider, credentialMode }`. 2. **Intake = the existing sealed store, inside the transaction.** `intake` writes through the sealed-store path (`ProviderCredentialsService.store` semantics: seal-at-rest, upsert per (userId, provider)) **in the same transaction** as the agent insert — a failure after the credential write rolls everything back, leaving no orphan credential. Enrollment persists no second copy and no plaintext. 3. **Reference must resolve.** `reference` with no stored credential for (actor, provider) refuses with `precondition_failed` (nothing is created). 4. **Ownership.** `owner_id` = the authenticated actor. v1 authorization is AuthGuard-authenticated user; no hierarchy grant is required because v1 enrollment binds no hierarchy node (§1 assignment-scope pin). `is_system` is never settable through this command. 5. **Idempotency fence (contract 3 §4.3, in full).** The command layer records, in a uniqueness-constrained fence table in the same transaction as the mutation and its audit event: the key, the operation identifier (`agent.enroll`), the acting principal, the authorization scope, a digest of the canonicalized request payload (the digest input EXCLUDES the credential value — it covers provider + credentialMode, never plaintext), the declared replay mode (always `actor-bound` for this family — the `shared` refusal in the table above means no shared fence row can exist here; the column is kept for envelope-shape fidelity and mode-mismatch collision checks), and a reference to the committed outcome (the agent id). The recorded **authorization scope** for this family is pinned to the acting principal's platform-user scope (v1 authorization is grant-free per rule 4, so the scope is the authenticated-user identity domain — recorded so the §4.3 scope-equality check has a defined value). Fence uniqueness is the pair (operation identifier, key). **Replay:** a submission whose (operation, key) is recorded is first authorized exactly as a fresh submission; then replay-mode, scope, and digest equality are checked (a mismatch on any — including scope — is a collision); then **target-result authorization** — the submitter must hold, at replay time, read authority on the referenced agent row under §3.2's rule (owner or admin) — plus recorded-actor equality (`actor-bound`). A passing replay executes nothing, returns the recorded outcome, and appends a replay access event (non-mutation audit class: accessing principal, current correlation id, fence-row reference). Any equality or authorization failure refuses with the single bounded `conflict` shape — constant, identifying no record — preserving the no-existence-oracle rule. **Concurrency (contract 3 §4.3's rule, ratified via §7 item 4):** two submissions with the same (operation, key) serialize on the fence's unique constraint — exactly one executes; the loser waits for the winner's transaction, and is then handled as a replay if it committed (through the full replay path above) or executes afresh if it aborted. A unique-violation race never surfaces as an unhandled internal fault. 6. **Audit + outbox, same transaction.** Insert into `agents` + sealed credential write (intake mode) + fence row + semantic audit event (`agent.enrolled`: actor, agent id, harness, provider, name, credentialMode — no credential material) + outbox row commit atomically, hierarchy-pattern style. Audit rows reference the agent by **snapshot id, not FK** — mirroring the hierarchy audit tables' deliberate FK-free linkage so audit history survives agent deletion through the legacy CRUD DELETE path. Result union: `enrolled { agent, correlationId }` | refusal from the §3.3 enum (refusals also carry the correlation id, per contract 5 §4.3's end-to-end traceability). `agent` in the result is the persisted row minus nothing sensitive (the table stores no credential material). ### 3.2 `agent.enrollment.get` (query) By agent id; actor must be the owner (or admin). Unauthorized and missing fold to the same `not_found` wire shape (contract 2 no-existence-oracle rule, applied family-wide for uniformity). The query carries the same non-state envelope as the mutation (contract 5 §4.3; contract 3's envelope reconciliation confirms closed query responses carry it): typed request DTO with an optional `correlationId` (generated when absent) and a typed result — `found { agent, correlationId }` | `not_found` (the folded shape, also carrying the correlation id). Queries take no idempotency key (the fence binds mutations). ### 3.3 Error enum (closed, §4.2) `validation_failed` 400 · `authentication_failed` 401 · `authorization_refused` 403 (owner-only paths; folded to `not_found` where §3.2 applies) · `not_found` 404 · `conflict` 409 (the single bounded idempotency refusal shape of §3.1 rule 5) · `precondition_failed` 422 (unresolvable credential reference; well-formed harness not in the registry — syntactic invalidity is `validation_failed` per the §3.1 table) · `internal_fault` 500 (also the §4.4 fail-closed class when the owning tool is unreachable; unauthorized-fallback behavior is prohibited). ## 4. Schema delta (migration 0021, additive-only) Extend `agents` — no new agent table, preserving custody-schema §5.2's FK binding without amendment: - `harness` text NULL — registered harness name; NULL for pre-existing rows (legacy rows predate the concept). - `enrolled_at` timestamptz NULL — set by `agent.enroll`; NULL marks a legacy (non-enrolled) row. No backfill: enrollment is a fact this command creates, not one to invent for existing rows. New tables, mirroring the hierarchy audit/outbox pair (pattern reuse, separate store): `agent_audit_events` (append-only: id, event_type, actor id, agent id — snapshot value, no FK, per §3.1 rule 6 — correlation id, causation id, payload jsonb, created_at; per-agent ordering index), `agent_outbox` (hierarchy-outbox shape), and `agent_idempotency_fence` (contract 3 §4.3 shape: operation identifier, key, acting principal, authorization scope, canonicalized-payload digest, replay mode, committed-outcome reference (agent id), created_at; UNIQUE (operation identifier, key)). Persona reuses the existing `system_prompt` column; no version column (no ratified expected-version rule names `agents` — §4.1 binds only where the owning contract defines one). Witnesses (real PostgreSQL, lane standard): append-only enforcement, same-tx atomicity (agent row + credential write + fence row + audit + outbox all-or-nothing under injected failure at multiple points, including after the credential write), fence uniqueness on (operation, key). Sequencing: additive DDL via the same migration path as 0018–0020 (hierarchy). The docs/native-kanban-sot/SHARED-CONTRACT.md §5.3 DDL gate binds the kanban lane's audit/proposal DDL, not this lane; if a pending operator ruling on migration sequencing changes mechanics lane-wide, re-check before generating 0021. ## 5. Witnesses the implementation slice must ship 1. Never-echo: enroll via `intake`, assert the value string is absent from the HTTP result, the audit row, the outbox payload, and captured logs. 2. Sealed-store single-copy: after intake, the credential exists only in `provider_credentials` (sealed), and `agents` has no credential column at all. 3. Reference-resolution refusal (`precondition_failed`, no row created). 4. Harness refusals, both codes: syntactically invalid → `validation_failed`; well-formed registry miss → `precondition_failed` (against the live registry). 5. Idempotency (contract 3 §4.3 set): actor-bound replay returns the recorded outcome and executes nothing (no new agent/audit/outbox mutation rows; a replay access event is appended); payload-digest mismatch, replay-mode mismatch, scope mismatch, and different-actor actor-bound replay each refuse with the single bounded `conflict` shape; a replay is re-authorized fresh (a submitter whose authorization was revoked since the original is refused, not replayed); a `shared` declaration on `agent.enroll` is refused `validation_failed` with nothing executed and no fence row recorded (seed-only rule); two concurrent same-(operation, key) submissions produce exactly one mutation, the loser resolving through the replay path (no unhandled unique-violation fault). 6. Same-tx atomicity fault injection (agent / credential write / fence / audit / outbox), including a failure injected after the intake credential write commits its statement — everything rolls back, no orphan credential. 7. Wizard-facing zero-mutation witness (contract 3 §6.10 shape): no call → zero rows in `agents`/`agent_audit_events`/`agent_outbox`/ `agent_idempotency_fence` attributable to the family. 8. `is_system` injection attempt is rejected by DTO validation. 9. Correlation-id witness (contract 5 §6.3): a correlation id submitted on `agent.enroll` appears in its audit event(s) and in the result; the same holds for `agent.enrollment.get`'s result; the §6.3 static companions (no `any`-typed boundary pass-through; single audit emitter) apply. §6.3's no-existence-oracle probe: an unauthorized `agent.enrollment.get` of an existing agent and a get of a nonexistent id return indistinguishable results. 10. CLI-parity witness (contract 5 §6.4): a CLI smoke invocation of `agent.enroll` and `agent.enrollment.get` against the Gateway succeeds with the same typed results the web client receives. The implementation slice therefore SHIPS CLI exposure for both operations (contract 5 §4.5 — a Gateway command without CLI exposure is a tracked conformance gap; this design refuses to open one). 11. Fail-closed witness (contract 5 §6.5): with the owning tool or grant state unreachable (fault injection), the operation returns the internal-fault or authorization-refusal class and performs no fallback read/write. ## 6. Out of scope Wizard orchestration (M4-6); any UI (D8/D12); un-enroll/update lifecycle (no contract requires it in v1 — the legacy write surfaces named in §2 keep serving existing consumers); OAuth login, multi-account, comms auto-enroll, model recommendation (PRD full flow, deferred by D11); contract amendments (F1 recorded above for a future S2 pass). CLI exposure is explicitly IN scope (witness 10 — contract 5 §4.5 binds it).