stack/agents/darkwing/work/queue-141/gate-r3/pkg-bus.log

✔ agents: a held role with nothing on the bus is idle; a role session gets the claim rows unchanged (132.831972ms)
✔ agents: working counts what the holder received and has not read; routed alone is not working (208.458486ms)
✔ agents: input needed is the role's open decisions routed to the human, gated first, then oldest (322.985669ms)
✔ agents: working wins over waiting, and Input needed still shows (163.610556ms)
✔ agents: a new holder doesn't inherit what the last one left unread; decisions stay with the role (206.45126ms)
✔ agents: state reads only its own business, even for a run name both use (173.248801ms)
✔ agents: a message the holder released unread is stranded; the next holder gets nothing and cannot read it (205.390487ms)
✔ agents: a message the holder read is not stranded; one the current holder has not read is not listed (214.300018ms)
✔ agents: stranded is oldest first and capped at 50 for a role (883.776922ms)
✔ agents: stranded is per role and per business (348.3205ms)
✔ agents: a message routed to a held role and not yet received is not stranded (140.769876ms)
✔ REQ-DEC an approval outlives its run and a broker restart; a new run of the instance consumes it once (299.438737ms)
✔ REQ-DEC another instance of the same definition cannot consume an approval, and its refusal consumes nothing (176.47891ms)
✔ REQ-DEC REQ-THREAD-1 a thread approval is consumed only by a run holding the same thread (274.465483ms)
✔ REQ-DEC a later run of the same instance supersedes an open decision; another instance cannot (237.25867ms)
✔ REQ-DEC REQ-THREAD-1 a thread decision is superseded only from the same thread (259.148015ms)
✔ REQ-DEC REQ-THREAD-1 a thread instance decision raised before row 121 is not consumed or superseded by any thread run (327.808245ms)
✔ launch identity is stamped, payload identity is refused and stale holder cannot send (187.310781ms)
✔ decision classes route from policy; gated resolution is human-only, choice and target must match (241.333209ms)
✔ claim exclusion, holder release, gated revoke and rerouting to a new holder are atomic (271.508639ms)
✔ launch events require a human CLI capability; generic emit cannot forge authority events (187.18091ms)
✔ within-role decisions close atomically and invalid options or blocking omissions refuse (179.556977ms)
✔ a recommendation that is not exactly one option key refuses invalid-recommendation after the options (280.807238ms)
✔ observer capabilities read human inbox but cannot mutate or forge launch identity (180.995943ms)
✔ task action subjects and linked decision trail are complete and ordered (209.138957ms)
✔ launch binding is durable and reconnecting requires the identical trusted record (116.260378ms)
✔ business isolation includes inherited object names and cross-business message references (227.75977ms)
✔ authority never transfers between action, target, unresolved or replaced role holder; a later run of the instance keeps it (271.307132ms)
✔ task projection uses schema current view, skipping earlier and equal-start polls (160.903328ms)
✔ revocation permanently bars the old run from reclaiming first, including after broker restart (224.794239ms)
✔ empty message references refuse before storage; refusal-evidence failure stays a typed error (158.193533ms)
✔ both arbiters require human resolution when their cross-role route is themselves (253.707326ms)
✔ the shipped coder role raises task.reassign as gated to the human; task.scope.change stays cross-role (226.24691ms)
✔ S1 adapter takes resolved limits and refs, rejects mismatched instance, never mutates input (3.290481ms)
✔ REQ-COS-1, REQ-ROLE-2: the chief of staff ends a run with a reason and no decision, and the reason is logged (273.246053ms)
✔ REQ-ROLE-2: a role without role.end still needs a resolved decision to revoke (319.704085ms)
✔ REQ-ROLE-2: storage accepts a revoke with a reason or a decision and aborts one with neither (236.188432ms)
✔ REQ-ROLE-2: the chief of staff may still cite a decision, and a decision alone is the old path (244.928087ms)
✔ REQ-ROLE-2: a role without role.end still ends a run through a resolved decision, which is recorded and has no reason (245.56727ms)
✔ REQ-ROLE-2: a reason is required, bounded, and never sent with a decision (294.896668ms)
✔ REQ-COS-1: the chief of staff cannot end its own run; its end of the assistant gets past the protection (288.85649ms)
✔ REQ-LIMIT-1, REQ-COS-1: organization.set from the chief of staff reaches the shared writer, named as the actor (229.040628ms)
✔ REQ-LIMIT-1, REQ-COS-1: a refused organization.set logs action.refused and no action.allowed, like a refused limits.set (306.188588ms)
✔ REQ-LIMIT-1: organization.set is refused for every caller whose role file lacks organization.change (323.391663ms)
✔ REQ-LIMIT-1: the chief of staff is logged as allowed, and organization.set takes only the human's keys (401.674228ms)
✔ REQ-ROLE-3, REQ-LIMIT-1: a chief-of-staff change is validated, written and logged like a human's; an invalid one is refused (599.221184ms)
✔ REQ-ROLE-2, REQ-COS-1: the 3c→3d migration lets the chief of staff end a held role with a reason; neither is still refused (1028.010538ms)
✔ comment cursors isolate businesses, move only forward and remain append-only (147.453603ms)
✔ only trusted sync writes validated cursors; events and cursor share rollback (111.553922ms)
✔ explicit 3b copy migration preserves evidence and opens as 3g; normal startup never migrates (859.337744ms)
✔ migration refuses active writers and drifted legacy schemas, with no partial upgrade (1544.547566ms)
✔ named migration registry chains 3b through 3g to a fixture-only future version in order (876.732747ms)
✔ migration refuses mismatched source metadata without changing schema or evidence (855.583799ms)
✔ offline command migrates only the supplied fixture root and reports usage errors (1117.363547ms)
✔ credentials gives human and reader sessions service, account, role, date and state, and nothing else (97.122385ms)
✔ credentials refuses a role session and any argument (188.297752ms)
✔ credentials reads the status on each request, and a broker without one lists none (219.561872ms)
✔ the broker process answers credentials without a token, path or variable in its output, log or store (231.788038ms)
✔ only validated broker references load; returned data and exceptions cannot expose a known token (4.381031ms)
✔ bad file modes, symlinks, repository/data paths, malformed tokens and missing dates refuse (3.06364ms)
✔ expiry refuses use and env references never become client data (0.895525ms)
✔ S1 parsed service refs work, service mismatch refuses, Gitea rotation due is a warning state (1.566215ms)
✔ opaque tokens shorter than 16 characters refuse before use (0.444483ms)
✔ each C-suite role file carries the same two lists: human, chief-of-staff, pm, cto (1.923122ms)
✔ chief-executive-officer: messages to and from the user, chief of staff, pm and cto pass (477.539185ms)
✔ chief-executive-officer: a message to or from the coder, reviewer or assistant is refused and logged, and nothing is stored (466.722884ms)
✔ chief-executive-officer: another C-suite role isn't on the lists either (409.884094ms)
✔ chief-financial-officer: messages to and from the user, chief of staff, pm and cto pass (481.918445ms)
✔ chief-financial-officer: a message to or from the coder, reviewer or assistant is refused and logged, and nothing is stored (472.741764ms)
✔ chief-financial-officer: another C-suite role isn't on the lists either (400.012227ms)
✔ chief-information-officer: messages to and from the user, chief of staff, pm and cto pass (490.235998ms)
✔ chief-information-officer: a message to or from the coder, reviewer or assistant is refused and logged, and nothing is stored (487.722743ms)
✔ chief-information-officer: another C-suite role isn't on the lists either (425.754785ms)
✔ chief-information-security-officer: messages to and from the user, chief of staff, pm and cto pass (572.655354ms)
✔ chief-information-security-officer: a message to or from the coder, reviewer or assistant is refused and logged, and nothing is stored (549.549747ms)
✔ chief-information-security-officer: another C-suite role isn't on the lists either (475.218977ms)
✔ chief-marketing-officer: messages to and from the user, chief of staff, pm and cto pass (667.961689ms)
✔ chief-marketing-officer: a message to or from the coder, reviewer or assistant is refused and logged, and nothing is stored (511.760072ms)
✔ chief-marketing-officer: another C-suite role isn't on the lists either (434.415869ms)
✔ a human resolve sends the raising role one message from the human, and its request is the answer (241.928642ms)
✔ a cross-role decision resolved by its arbiter comes from that role and run, with no request (238.466335ms)
✔ a human withdraw sends one message with the note (238.117362ms)
✔ a human seen before the close leaves the request on the close's answer, not the seen (279.199087ms)
✔ the raising run's withdraw, a supersede, a within-role raise and seen send nothing (284.238509ms)
✔ refused closes send nothing: invalid-choice, decision-closed, not-resolver (292.463774ms)
✔ a raising role nobody holds at the close gets the message on the next claim (264.48722ms)
✔ a human DECISION send keeps its own instruction as the request, not a close's answer (266.018329ms)
✔ a cross-role raise whose arbiter the raiser does not hear from is refused and stores nothing (300.040551ms)
✔ a gated raise by a role that does not hear from the human is refused and stores nothing (288.494287ms)
✔ a route the raiser hears from is allowed, checked from the route to the raiser (331.946733ms)
✔ a refused supersede withdraws nothing (293.39589ms)
✔ the assistant's within-role and gated raises still work (292.056902ms)
✔ roles lists open decisions routed to a role, and never the human inbox (217.164746ms)
✔ recent lists closed decisions of every route, newest close first, with how each closed (281.344065ms)
✔ recent gives the closing event as closed when the decision was seen first (301.591522ms)
✔ recent stops at RECENT rows (799.7328ms)
✔ every row is what trail already gives the same session for that id (286.93607ms)
✔ a role session can't list decisions, so it can't read another role's open decisions (404.204485ms)
✔ decisions is a read: one business, strict arguments, nothing written (395.496394ms)
✔ endLaunch writes session.ended, releases the run claim and kills its capabilities (157.347137ms)
✔ endLaunch refuses an unknown run, a second end and a rebind of the ended run (134.34807ms)
✔ a restarted broker refuses to rebind an ended run; a refused rebind leaves the run unbound (140.843989ms)
✔ endLaunch leaves a claim another run took alone (189.959632ms)
✔ refuse records action.refused against the caller with the code only (133.234119ms)
✔ launches off refuses role.launch with launch-revoked until launches on (192.530526ms)
✔ broker process: launch ops authorize role.launch, record refusals and end runs (318.400168ms)
✔ REQ-WAIT-1: the broker hard waits are exactly the list, and match the business vocabulary (1.214466ms)
✔ REQ-WAIT-2: a business granting a hard wait at either class is refused; the actions that left are grantable (135.497546ms)
✔ REQ-DEC-2: every hard wait goes to the human, cited or not, and the arbiter cannot resolve it (716.613652ms)
✔ REQ-DEC-2: a gated raise citing the current spec goes to the arbiter for its domain; uncited, to the human (441.024333ms)
✔ REQ-DEC-2: an arbiter-approved cited gated decision authorizes the raiser, and the human cannot resolve it (246.384977ms)
✔ REQ-DEC-2: a cited merge raised by merge-gate goes to the technical arbiter; a merge raised without the grant routes by citation (312.078817ms)
✔ REQ-DEC-2: a stale or unconfirmed citation refuses without a decision; an arbiter raising its own goes to the human (288.586751ms)
✔ Q169: the chief of staff's end of the assistant is not refused role-end-refused; its own run and another ender's are (229.129557ms)
✔ Q169: another role's cited revoke of the assistant, resolved by an arbiter, is refused (243.578632ms)
✔ Q169: a revoke of the assistant citing a decision the human resolved is not refused by the protection (235.331341ms)
✔ Q169: a cited revoke of a role not in END_PROTECTED still goes to the arbiter, and executes (266.082773ms)
✔ Q169: a role granted role.revoke at either class still sends a revoke of the assistant to the human (354.396669ms)
✔ human proof binds CLI entry, process start and nonce; agents and incomplete ancestry refuse (1.411156ms)
✔ process reader gets own kernel identity without exposing environment values (0.4305ms)
✔ EACCES ancestor environments skip only markers; commands and registered launches still refuse (0.587551ms)
✔ real pid 1 remains inspectable when its environment is protected (0.234741ms)
✔ REQ-DEC-2: a merge-gate raise its arbiter resolved lands through the host op: checkLand answers the facts and a ticket, records nothing, and recordLand spends the decision once (276.084122ms)
✔ checkLand refuses on the decision and the review (334.640757ms)
✔ REQ-LAND-1: a gated merge decision refuses not-authorized, cited and approved by the arbiter or uncited and approved by the human (545.853168ms)
✔ REQ-LAND-1: a within-role merge grant refuses not-authorized at the land (254.083876ms)
✔ a cross-role merge that routes to the human, because merge-gate is its own arbiter, lands on the human's CLI answer (292.901714ms)
✔ a merge option with no first line refuses no-subject, as land-work does (279.108366ms)
✔ checkLand refuses with land-work's codes past the authority check, and a decision raised for refactor never lands (641.275419ms)
✔ a ticket outlives the run that asked, and recordLand checks the task again (293.560367ms)
✔ landRefused files the code on the task, tells the role only with notify, and ends the ticket (344.594129ms)
✔ landHeld is true only for an approved, unspent cross-role merge decision this role raised for a task in this thread (321.751523ms)
✔ no run may write the action.allowed for git.merge.protected itself (207.284343ms)
✔ a message to a stopped role sends launch.by one notice, and the result says so (210.743741ms)
✔ a message to a role outside launch.instances says so in its result and in the notice (159.664491ms)
✔ a message to a running role sends no notice and its result is unchanged (140.100541ms)
✔ a re-route at a claim, a release and claim, and a broker restart send no second notice (244.045704ms)
✔ a run launched but not yet claimed counts as no holder (132.589033ms)
✔ no notice for a message to launch.by, from it, from a tester, to the human, or in a thread to a thread instance (278.183204ms)
✔ a business with no launch block tells nobody and says there is no launcher (120.812663ms)
✔ the notice sender stays internal: no role is named _bus and no caller can send as it or to it (361.266861ms)
✔ limits binds actor from human proof and rejects role, reader, tester and forged actor (187.255526ms)
✔ runtime wires verified human settings to the actual shared file writer and actor receipt (291.507155ms)
✔ uncertain organization receipts leave bus startup and reads alone but refuse writes until reconciled (402.250445ms)
✔ within-role sends cite an open gated launch decision without spending it or naming it in grants (195.635088ms)
✔ missing and foreign-business citations refuse and roll back message and grant (180.73199ms)
✔ cross-role sends still need a matching resolved decision and consume it once (252.133567ms)
✔ messages pages all human messages newest first without writes; read state is history (2694.563971ms)
✔ messages refuses role callers, invalid paging and cursors outside this human feed (297.312482ms)
✔ views messages passes only its paging arguments through (0.256315ms)
✔ messages isolates businesses even with a valid foreign cursor (201.839001ms)
✔ the assistant sends to the user and to the chief of staff only (316.534394ms)
✔ an assistant send to any other role, or to the tester, is refused and logged (381.098427ms)
✔ only the user and the chief of staff may send to the assistant; the tester is refused by default (341.673735ms)
✔ REQ-ASSIST-2 REQ-THREAD-1 thread.send to an instance that does not hear from the user is refused and stores nothing (312.204269ms)
✔ a sender-side list alone refuses a send to a role that has no list (332.326211ms)
✔ a target-side list alone refuses a send from a role that has no list (408.344104ms)
✔ the sender list is checked before the target list (327.086904ms)
✔ roles without the field behave exactly as before (468.709012ms)
✔ a business with no role definitions at all is unlimited (365.480783ms)
✔ a malformed messaging field refuses at boot (141.983535ms)
✔ the assistant's review.request to a reviewer is refused and logged, even with an approved decision (435.303199ms)
✔ a review.verdict to the assistant from a role outside its receiveFrom is refused and logged (478.883983ms)
✔ review requests and verdicts between roles without the field are unchanged (421.214259ms)
✔ 3f copy migrates to 3g preserving every old column/row, with an empty instance_names and null to_name (1405.906046ms)
✔ REQ-MSG-2: the chief of staff names an instance under its within-role grant, and the write is logged (194.532736ms)
✔ REQ-MSG-2: the human names an instance through the CLI (208.781298ms)
✔ REQ-MSG-2: a role without the grant, or holding it cross-role, is refused not-authorized (235.184849ms)
✔ REQ-MSG-2: a name is unique in the business and is never an instance key or a role name (377.219101ms)
✔ REQ-MSG-2: a send by name reaches the instance and records both; a send by instance key is unchanged (305.05764ms)
✔ REQ-MSG-2: an instance key beats a name that equals it, as when a later instance takes the key (218.849452ms)
✔ REQ-MSG-2: a role name beats a name that equals it, as when a later definition takes the word (sage-0590) (261.07661ms)
✔ plugins and plugins.set refuse every non-human session and a forged actor, and pass only the patch with the verified actor (197.115944ms)
✔ runtime: the switch changes the organization file, the receipt carries the actor, and a bad shape, an unknown module and a stale revision are refused with nothing written (508.962777ms)
✔ vikunja:19/309 through the broker, a patch switches the kinds it names and keeps the rest; null removes one kind and is trailed (417.037819ms)
✔ broker process binds trusted launches, offers reader capabilities, refuses human mutation, closes cleanly (245.208498ms)
✔ startup token refusal returns safe code without value or partial listening broker (75.312274ms)
✔ loaded fixture token is absent from socket replies and SQLite, including refusal evidence (219.083015ms)
✔ killed broker leaves an explicit stale lock; another process cannot silently reclaim it (238.0484ms)
✔ trusted host registers later launches; socket clients never have a registration verb (229.236028ms)
✔ runtime excludes declared project roots even when host supplies no repoRoots (75.357574ms)
✔ a refused launch binding leaves the broker and existing capabilities alive; bad protocol stops it (233.372626ms)
✔ D1: committed write with a failed receipt refuses outcome-unknown without action.allowed (148.078411ms)
✔ D2: spec.read refuses without content if its role is released during the read (144.185694ms)
✔ D3: spec.read secret check refuses flagged content without content (142.654762ms)
✔ D3: spec.read secret check refuses flagged subject without content (143.379584ms)
✖ Broker keeps the existing sandbox client import closure: no new imports or lazy project import (2.156829ms)
✔ without a trusted project adapter all three async paths refuse project-not-configured (209.30377ms)
✔ real startBroker injects the project adapter for socket reads and bound-author record writes (228.971194ms)
✔ a reply is listed for human and reader sessions, and its delivery rows are unchanged (235.017045ms)
✔ the reply still reaches the human message.receive (mosaic talk) after the Console showed it (218.882024ms)
✔ a message with no reply gives an empty list (202.153364ms)
✔ replies come oldest first and stop at REPLIES (827.516423ms)
✔ an id that names no message in the business refuses message-not-found, and the refusal is recorded (356.469714ms)
✔ strict arguments; a role session gets human-required (474.11055ms)
✔ views passes replies through as one call with the id (0.2629ms)
✔ requirements returns the committed list to a holding role session, and no one else (217.184921ms)
✔ the PM's prd.approve with no task, when no id fits, reaches the human's Inbox (167.24998ms)
✔ the PM's non-blocking role.revoke with no task reaches the human's Inbox (215.029997ms)
✔ a push is recorded as the action.allowed for git.push.working on the task, and only the host records one (264.248837ms)
✔ review.request names the latest pushed commit and sends the reviewer a REVIEW-REQUEST (295.134684ms)
✔ review.request says which run holds the reviewer role, or null, and a null request waits for a claim (315.475691ms)
✔ review.request refuses a commit that isn't the latest push, a non-reviewer and a role without the action (408.957697ms)
✔ reviewFetch answers only the addressed reviewer, for the request it cites (283.312249ms)
✔ review.verdict answers one request once, to the role that asked (348.63435ms)
✔ task.close on a pushed task needs an approve verdict for the latest push (476.615991ms)
✔ a refusal the host decided is filed on the task it names, and only a task ref counts (312.89031ms)
✔ v3b prototype refusals, views and append-only mutations (1712.351219ms)
✔ gated approval authorizes once, survives store reopen, and fresh approval works (303.741575ms)
✔ another run of the same instance consumes an approval once; a failed check leaves it usable (241.558508ms)
✔ two scheduled callers have exactly one grant and one consumed refusal (181.250728ms)
✔ failed commit rolls consumption back; cross-role consumes and within-role stays reusable (347.880616ms)
✔ class drift gated to cross-role refuses before consumption (272.001948ms)
✔ class drift cross-role to gated refuses before consumption (301.958864ms)
✔ class drift gated to within-role refuses before consumption (313.000252ms)
✔ class drift cross-role to within-role refuses before consumption (308.084236ms)
✔ class drift within-role to gated refuses before consumption (259.181677ms)
✔ class drift within-role to cross-role refuses before consumption (294.625006ms)
✔ message.send consumes approval and prevents a later send or authorize (310.963631ms)
✔ role.revoke consumes approval and prevents a later revoke or authorize (318.200294ms)
✔ 3e copy migrates through 3f to 3g preserving every old column/row and adding null spec citations (1553.379252ms)
✔ real socket awaits spec reads, record writes and cited raises; other requests still return normally (284.328573ms)
✔ real socket preserves asynchronous refusal codes and disconnects its transient proof (204.644394ms)
✔ two real socket writes to one repository yield one commit and one project-busy refusal (240.7522ms)
✔ client disconnect during await tolerates late reply (208.52467ms)
✔ client disconnect during await tolerates late refusal (182.302954ms)
✔ N-a: slow admitted record.write returns its committed result after the idle deadline (411.251424ms)
✔ current citation is recorded; docs commits do not stale it and a new spec never reopens settlement (315.671193ms)
✔ stale, unconfirmed, missing and partial spec citations refuse without inserting a decision (341.175436ms)
✔ uncited raises retain their synchronous path and spec read is available to any held role in its business (252.342085ms)
✔ record writes bind the session author, require authority and refuse spec and impersonation paths (256.000622ms)
✔ REQ-COS-1: the pm asks the chief of staff for roles and counts; the chief receives a STAFF-REQUEST and answers it (262.73083ms)
✔ REQ-COS-1: only the pm can send a staff request; every other session is refused and the chief of staff hears nothing (335.214982ms)
✔ REQ-COS-1: a pm without message.send is refused like any other gated action (195.136639ms)
✔ REQ-COS-1: the request goes to the business launcher, and only when that is a chief of staff (493.721707ms)
✔ REQ-COS-1: the sender is judged by definition: an instance `lead` of the pm definition can ask, an instance `pm` of the coder definition can't (515.278ms)
✔ REQ-COS-1: the launcher is judged by definition: an instance `boss` of the chief-of-staff definition receives, a `chief` of the coder definition gives no-chief-of-staff (480.256397ms)
✔ REQ-COS-1: a refused staff request leaves no staff.request action.allowed event (303.868779ms)
✔ REQ-ASSIST-2: the role definitions' messaging lists hold for a staff request, sender and recipient (769.248084ms)
✔ a staff request names a task, 1 to 10 distinct roles and counts of 1 to 20; nothing else is accepted (507.086172ms)
✔ REQ-COS-1: a staff request grants nothing: the pm still can't launch and the chief of staff launches as before (270.704723ms)
✔ a business that never switched launches reads allowed with no time and no event (131.281884ms)
✔ launches revoked and then restored read allowed, with the restore time and event id (178.774524ms)
✔ a task closed on the tracker leaves the open list, and total counts the open ones (160.108968ms)
✔ a tombstone is not open (155.890319ms)
✔ the open list stops at the cap and says so; total still counts every open task (152.449315ms)
✔ a role and a reader session read state; arguments, and an unbound cap, refuse (167.096452ms)
✔ a human session reads the same state, with the same cap (164.458476ms)
✔ reading state writes nothing: every table keeps its row count (190.824245ms)
✔ creates private WAL store and excludes a second writer until explicit close (123.985313ms)
✔ rollback is atomic and schema metadata is checked against trusted DDL, not just itself (194.222273ms)
✔ existing empty database and symlink runtime directory refuse, never initialize over damage (207.451608ms)
✔ crash during a transaction recovers no partial event after explicit fixture-only lock removal (210.267396ms)
✔ writer refuses mixed at/read_at forms atomically, even through trusted SQL helpers (123.22364ms)
✔ async transactions refuse before invoking their function (123.011606ms)
✔ the session default fits under the reply cap and pages to the end with next (352.549956ms)
✔ the short form: no description, assignees by role, every listed key (341.764412ms)
✔ each filter, alone and together, and total counts every match (414.464266ms)
✔ task_ref reads one task in full, as the whole board has it (373.275626ms)
✔ no arguments is the read the Console and mosaic make, unchanged (302.096044ms)
✔ an unknown argument or a bad value refuses invalid-request (1075.920989ms)
✔ tasks rows carry priority and requirement for every session that reads tasks (380.535332ms)
✔ the read model rebuilds from the ledger: a reopened bus and each trail give the same values (427.272702ms)
✔ an empty business and one with snapshots but no task.created read cleanly (154.207512ms)
✔ recordTask keeps sync reads and a role write apart (207.486021ms)
✔ read_at must be one canonical UTC format, so the projection compares strings safely (151.046539ms)
✔ a bad entry refuses the whole record (125.924816ms)
✔ taskView reads the projection for one business (166.81229ms)
✔ requestTask hands only a holder and a task verb to the handler, and records refusals (322.458821ms)
✔ the server sends task verbs to the adapter with its own timeout; other verbs stay synchronous (466.406633ms)
✔ without an adapter the server refuses every task verb (282.369721ms)
✔ the runtime refuses an invalid adapter and closes a valid one (217.987156ms)
✔ the process loads the S3 adapter from plain-data trackers (355.948469ms)
✔ the tester binds only when the business sets bus.tester to exactly true (1015.988817ms)
✔ a business may not name a role tester, so the tester address is never a role (339.685375ms)
✔ every verb outside the tester list refuses tester-refused and is recorded against the tester (652.087319ms)
✔ a tester message is from tester, starts [mos test], and writes no human.input or authority (245.128213ms)
✔ a role answers a tester only in reply to a tester message, and the answer never reaches the human (298.930931ms)
✔ the tester reads the human views a reader reads (206.696828ms)
✔ tester proof binds its own CLI, start time and nonce, refuses a managed run and allows an agent (1.325279ms)
✔ neither CLI's nonce proves the other: each proof is bound to its own CLI and nonce variable (0.381158ms)
✔ testerNonce reads only the tester's variable and gives null on any read error (0.219867ms)
✔ an envelope carries exactly one of cap, human and tester; no tester authenticator refuses (123.177572ms)
✔ tester-cli.mjs binds through the runtime when the switch is on, and refuses off or under a run marker (942.441255ms)
✔ REQ-THREAD-1 REQ-ORG-2: the 3d→3e migration adds the thread tables and leaves messages from before threads as written (1278.964876ms)
✔ REQ-THREAD-1: a 3d bus with a changed schema is refused and keeps its version and tables (968.13988ms)
✔ REQ-THREAD-1: the offline command prints the kept-message counts before the ready line (938.86301ms)
✔ REQ-ROLE-2 REQ-THREAD-1: one holder per thread, through the broker and the trigger (421.535009ms)
✔ REQ-ROLE-2 REQ-THREAD-1: the 3e triggers refuse writes that skip the broker (1518.983147ms)
✔ REQ-MSG-1: a message to or from the assistant names its thread, or is refused (373.775929ms)
✔ REQ-MSG-1: the chief of staff's reply comes back to the thread that sent the work (3707.315692ms)
✔ REQ-MSG-1: a reply can't carry one thread instance's thread to another thread instance (106.182589ms)
✔ REQ-THREAD-1 REQ-USER-2: one thread's messages never reach another thread's holder (154.973562ms)
✔ REQ-LAUNCH-1: a message to a thread with no holder waits, and the next holder gets it (192.686142ms)
✔ REQ-THREAD-2 REQ-LAUNCH-1: threadIdle releases only a thread with nothing waiting, and only for its holder (178.656801ms)
✔ REQ-THREAD-2 REQ-LAUNCH-1: a message delivered to a run that ended unread doesn't hold up the next holder (147.949707ms)
✔ REQ-ROLE-2 REQ-THREAD-1: an approved role.revoke never reaches a thread run, and the thread stays held (132.629307ms)
✔ REQ-USER-2: the human verbs refuse another owner's thread (166.393267ms)
✔ REQ-THREAD-1: thread.create refuses when the business has no thread instance or more than one (160.392936ms)
✔ REQ-ORG-2: projects and threads are named once, and the repo names a business project (167.920399ms)
✔ REQ-THREAD-2: thread.messages returns the thread's history in pages and writes nothing (533.75344ms)
✔ socket capability stamps launch identity; shared views use wire, no SQL client (215.405834ms)
✔ two wire claims serialize; a lost reply never automatically retries (223.045511ms)
✔ malformed, oversized and identity-forging envelopes refuse without echoing input (117.934534ms)
✔ client preserves UTF-8 when a response divides a multibyte character (12.047194ms)
✔ committed mutation followed by dropped reply reports unknown and is never retried (188.130888ms)
✔ web.search: a granted role gets labelled results, and the call is trailed with role, run, verb and query (198.611854ms)
✔ web.fetch: a granted role gets the page as labelled text, and the call is trailed with the url (198.528918ms)
✔ a role without the grant is refused, the refusal is logged with the verb, and nothing is fetched (235.431165ms)
✔ a broker with no web service refuses a granted role (191.734549ms)
✔ bad requests are refused: unknown verb, extra or missing argument, not a string, a human or reader session (259.177397ms)
✔ a session that is not the role holder is refused (192.074379ms)
✔ web.mjs's fences hold on the broker side: refusals are normal results with the fixed reason (464.583467ms)
✔ web.search with no search source configured is a refused result, not an error (173.787557ms)
✔ a search source that fails with its own refusal, or that throws, is handled (192.959569ms)
✔ a slow search source ends in a refusal at the deadline (210.050468ms)
✔ a secret in the arguments is refused before anything is trailed or fetched (154.591683ms)
✔ over the socket: the server routes web verbs to the service; other roles are refused; no service is web-not-configured (279.617898ms)
✔ busBusiness: the web grant comes from "web" in the resolved tool limit (0.291343ms)
✔ webServices: the business's search-source plug-in and web.searxng var make web.search work; without either it is refused as not configured (231.107852ms)
✔ an ungranted call is refused at once: no admission, no wait, nothing touched (193.493445ms)
✔ over the socket an ungranted caller is dropped by the server timeout and a granted one gets the longer wait (456.359585ms)
✔ a search that never answers is aborted at the deadline, the module sees the signal, and the call is trailed as refused (timeout) (201.695478ms)
✔ a fetch that stalls is cut off at the deadline: the request is destroyed, not left running (214.302781ms)
✔ one query limit: over SEARCH_MAX_QUERY_CHARS or empty is refused with the same reason before any backend, and the tool schema carries the same number (166.889007ms)
ℹ tests 325
ℹ suites 0
ℹ pass 324
ℹ fail 1
ℹ cancelled 0
ℹ skipped 0
ℹ todo 0
ℹ duration_ms 12993.736816

✖ failing tests:

test at tests/project-runtime.test.mjs:12:1
✖ Broker keeps the existing sandbox client import closure: no new imports or lazy project import (2.156829ms)
  AssertionError [ERR_ASSERTION]: Expected values to be strictly deep-equal:
  + actual - expected
  
    [
      "import { randomUUID, randomBytes } from 'node:crypto';",
      "import { loadRequirements } from '../../tasks/src/requirements.mjs';",
      "import { MERGE, LandingRefusal, readLanding } from './landing.mjs';",
  +   "import { ID_PATTERN } from '../../business/src/vocabulary.mjs';"
    ]
  
      at TestContext.<anonymous> (file:///home/jwoltje/darkwing-scratch/r141/wt3/packages/bus/tests/project-runtime.test.mjs:14:10)
      at Test.runInAsyncScope (node:async_hooks:226:14)
      at Test.run (node:internal/test_runner/test:1402:25)
      at Test.start (node:internal/test_runner/test:1262:17)
      at startSubtestAfterBootstrap (node:internal/test_runner/harness:387:17) {
    generatedMessage: true,
    code: 'ERR_ASSERTION',
    actual: [ "import { randomUUID, randomBytes } from 'node:crypto';", "import { loadRequirements } from '../../tasks/src/requirements.mjs';", "import { MERGE, LandingRefusal, readLanding } from './landing.mjs';", "import { ID_PATTERN } from '../../business/src/vocabulary.mjs';" ],
    expected: [ "import { randomUUID, randomBytes } from 'node:crypto';", "import { loadRequirements } from '../../tasks/src/requirements.mjs';", "import { MERGE, LandingRefusal, readLanding } from './landing.mjs';" ],
    operator: 'deepStrictEqual',
    diff: 'simple'
  }