stack/agents/darkwing/work/queue-141/gate-r4/bus.log

✔ agents: a held role with nothing on the bus is idle; a role session gets the claim rows unchanged (136.493276ms)
✔ agents: working counts what the holder received and has not read; routed alone is not working (219.914616ms)
✔ agents: input needed is the role's open decisions routed to the human, gated first, then oldest (362.593209ms)
✔ agents: working wins over waiting, and Input needed still shows (179.068836ms)
✔ agents: a new holder doesn't inherit what the last one left unread; decisions stay with the role (225.575284ms)
✔ agents: state reads only its own business, even for a run name both use (199.072358ms)
✔ agents: a message the holder released unread is stranded; the next holder gets nothing and cannot read it (228.823606ms)
✔ agents: a message the holder read is not stranded; one the current holder has not read is not listed (239.091484ms)
✔ agents: stranded is oldest first and capped at 50 for a role (921.956813ms)
✔ agents: stranded is per role and per business (367.292488ms)
✔ agents: a message routed to a held role and not yet received is not stranded (141.359657ms)
✔ REQ-DEC an approval outlives its run and a broker restart; a new run of the instance consumes it once (286.142507ms)
✔ REQ-DEC another instance of the same definition cannot consume an approval, and its refusal consumes nothing (203.661705ms)
✔ REQ-DEC REQ-THREAD-1 a thread approval is consumed only by a run holding the same thread (288.155353ms)
✔ REQ-DEC a later run of the same instance supersedes an open decision; another instance cannot (265.657345ms)
✔ REQ-DEC REQ-THREAD-1 a thread decision is superseded only from the same thread (271.363217ms)
✔ REQ-DEC REQ-THREAD-1 a thread instance decision raised before row 121 is not consumed or superseded by any thread run (411.38925ms)
✔ launch identity is stamped, payload identity is refused and stale holder cannot send (180.695637ms)
✔ decision classes route from policy; gated resolution is human-only, choice and target must match (276.864418ms)
✔ claim exclusion, holder release, gated revoke and rerouting to a new holder are atomic (301.07085ms)
✔ launch events require a human CLI capability; generic emit cannot forge authority events (200.5907ms)
✔ within-role decisions close atomically and invalid options or blocking omissions refuse (198.946524ms)
✔ a recommendation that is not exactly one option key refuses invalid-recommendation after the options (304.041416ms)
✔ observer capabilities read human inbox but cannot mutate or forge launch identity (185.501611ms)
✔ task action subjects and linked decision trail are complete and ordered (222.995909ms)
✔ launch binding is durable and reconnecting requires the identical trusted record (123.335486ms)
✔ business isolation includes inherited object names and cross-business message references (223.271218ms)
✔ authority never transfers between action, target, unresolved or replaced role holder; a later run of the instance keeps it (301.35441ms)
✔ task projection uses schema current view, skipping earlier and equal-start polls (177.99899ms)
✔ revocation permanently bars the old run from reclaiming first, including after broker restart (257.343922ms)
✔ empty message references refuse before storage; refusal-evidence failure stays a typed error (168.815833ms)
✔ both arbiters require human resolution when their cross-role route is themselves (263.083917ms)
✔ the shipped coder role raises task.reassign as gated to the human; task.scope.change stays cross-role (196.423834ms)
✔ S1 adapter takes resolved limits and refs, rejects mismatched instance, never mutates input (2.577483ms)
✔ REQ-COS-1, REQ-ROLE-2: the chief of staff ends a run with a reason and no decision, and the reason is logged (271.720532ms)
✔ REQ-ROLE-2: a role without role.end still needs a resolved decision to revoke (353.633258ms)
✔ REQ-ROLE-2: storage accepts a revoke with a reason or a decision and aborts one with neither (253.178072ms)
✔ REQ-ROLE-2: the chief of staff may still cite a decision, and a decision alone is the old path (255.214993ms)
✔ REQ-ROLE-2: a role without role.end still ends a run through a resolved decision, which is recorded and has no reason (299.889198ms)
✔ REQ-ROLE-2: a reason is required, bounded, and never sent with a decision (318.961389ms)
✔ REQ-COS-1: the chief of staff cannot end its own run; its end of the assistant gets past the protection (293.769041ms)
✔ REQ-LIMIT-1, REQ-COS-1: organization.set from the chief of staff reaches the shared writer, named as the actor (243.824126ms)
✔ REQ-LIMIT-1, REQ-COS-1: a refused organization.set logs action.refused and no action.allowed, like a refused limits.set (342.431701ms)
✔ REQ-LIMIT-1: organization.set is refused for every caller whose role file lacks organization.change (345.740055ms)
✔ REQ-LIMIT-1: the chief of staff is logged as allowed, and organization.set takes only the human's keys (415.688075ms)
✔ REQ-ROLE-3, REQ-LIMIT-1: a chief-of-staff change is validated, written and logged like a human's; an invalid one is refused (547.90472ms)
✔ REQ-ROLE-2, REQ-COS-1: the 3c→3d migration lets the chief of staff end a held role with a reason; neither is still refused (1063.083481ms)
✔ comment cursors isolate businesses, move only forward and remain append-only (109.685225ms)
✔ only trusted sync writes validated cursors; events and cursor share rollback (155.375289ms)
✔ explicit 3b copy migration preserves evidence and opens as 3g; normal startup never migrates (908.336928ms)
✔ migration refuses active writers and drifted legacy schemas, with no partial upgrade (1672.759948ms)
✔ named migration registry chains 3b through 3g to a fixture-only future version in order (907.393582ms)
✔ migration refuses mismatched source metadata without changing schema or evidence (838.332411ms)
✔ offline command migrates only the supplied fixture root and reports usage errors (1025.682163ms)
✔ credentials gives human and reader sessions service, account, role, date and state, and nothing else (114.523152ms)
✔ credentials refuses a role session and any argument (181.600619ms)
✔ credentials reads the status on each request, and a broker without one lists none (263.32293ms)
✔ the broker process answers credentials without a token, path or variable in its output, log or store (234.887195ms)
✔ only validated broker references load; returned data and exceptions cannot expose a known token (4.083057ms)
✔ bad file modes, symlinks, repository/data paths, malformed tokens and missing dates refuse (4.964215ms)
✔ expiry refuses use and env references never become client data (2.688043ms)
✔ S1 parsed service refs work, service mismatch refuses, Gitea rotation due is a warning state (4.05313ms)
✔ opaque tokens shorter than 16 characters refuse before use (0.481633ms)
✔ each C-suite role file carries the same two lists: human, chief-of-staff, pm, cto (2.706216ms)
✔ chief-executive-officer: messages to and from the user, chief of staff, pm and cto pass (495.144602ms)
✔ chief-executive-officer: a message to or from the coder, reviewer or assistant is refused and logged, and nothing is stored (487.947811ms)
✔ chief-executive-officer: another C-suite role isn't on the lists either (442.951581ms)
✔ chief-financial-officer: messages to and from the user, chief of staff, pm and cto pass (517.929725ms)
✔ chief-financial-officer: a message to or from the coder, reviewer or assistant is refused and logged, and nothing is stored (472.696674ms)
✔ chief-financial-officer: another C-suite role isn't on the lists either (418.650729ms)
✔ chief-information-officer: messages to and from the user, chief of staff, pm and cto pass (521.75041ms)
✔ chief-information-officer: a message to or from the coder, reviewer or assistant is refused and logged, and nothing is stored (495.302402ms)
✔ chief-information-officer: another C-suite role isn't on the lists either (439.101378ms)
✔ chief-information-security-officer: messages to and from the user, chief of staff, pm and cto pass (539.835558ms)
✔ chief-information-security-officer: a message to or from the coder, reviewer or assistant is refused and logged, and nothing is stored (553.919912ms)
✔ chief-information-security-officer: another C-suite role isn't on the lists either (450.434423ms)
✔ chief-marketing-officer: messages to and from the user, chief of staff, pm and cto pass (524.819683ms)
✔ chief-marketing-officer: a message to or from the coder, reviewer or assistant is refused and logged, and nothing is stored (449.422211ms)
✔ chief-marketing-officer: another C-suite role isn't on the lists either (428.987131ms)
✔ a human resolve sends the raising role one message from the human, and its request is the answer (243.043513ms)
✔ a cross-role decision resolved by its arbiter comes from that role and run, with no request (250.261938ms)
✔ a human withdraw sends one message with the note (254.263756ms)
✔ a human seen before the close leaves the request on the close's answer, not the seen (311.196367ms)
✔ the raising run's withdraw, a supersede, a within-role raise and seen send nothing (306.428164ms)
✔ refused closes send nothing: invalid-choice, decision-closed, not-resolver (312.370897ms)
✔ a raising role nobody holds at the close gets the message on the next claim (310.476165ms)
✔ a human DECISION send keeps its own instruction as the request, not a close's answer (266.40933ms)
✔ a cross-role raise whose arbiter the raiser does not hear from is refused and stores nothing (319.570555ms)
✔ a gated raise by a role that does not hear from the human is refused and stores nothing (321.979155ms)
✔ a route the raiser hears from is allowed, checked from the route to the raiser (367.918888ms)
✔ a refused supersede withdraws nothing (313.964093ms)
✔ the assistant's within-role and gated raises still work (332.574863ms)
✔ roles lists open decisions routed to a role, and never the human inbox (260.298233ms)
✔ recent lists closed decisions of every route, newest close first, with how each closed (316.020888ms)
✔ recent gives the closing event as closed when the decision was seen first (315.837595ms)
✔ recent stops at RECENT rows (885.48936ms)
✔ every row is what trail already gives the same session for that id (296.293737ms)
✔ a role session can't list decisions, so it can't read another role's open decisions (431.830866ms)
✔ decisions is a read: one business, strict arguments, nothing written (434.00653ms)
✔ endLaunch writes session.ended, releases the run claim and kills its capabilities (157.238147ms)
✔ endLaunch refuses an unknown run, a second end and a rebind of the ended run (149.488108ms)
✔ a restarted broker refuses to rebind an ended run; a refused rebind leaves the run unbound (168.875896ms)
✔ endLaunch leaves a claim another run took alone (186.529519ms)
✔ refuse records action.refused against the caller with the code only (148.200433ms)
✔ launches off refuses role.launch with launch-revoked until launches on (213.046077ms)
✔ broker process: launch ops authorize role.launch, record refusals and end runs (337.310639ms)
✔ REQ-WAIT-1: the broker hard waits are exactly the list, and match the business vocabulary (2.145917ms)
✔ REQ-WAIT-2: a business granting a hard wait at either class is refused; the actions that left are grantable (125.44801ms)
✔ REQ-DEC-2: every hard wait goes to the human, cited or not, and the arbiter cannot resolve it (775.377742ms)
✔ REQ-DEC-2: a gated raise citing the current spec goes to the arbiter for its domain; uncited, to the human (481.486047ms)
✔ REQ-DEC-2: an arbiter-approved cited gated decision authorizes the raiser, and the human cannot resolve it (286.813844ms)
✔ REQ-DEC-2: a cited merge raised by merge-gate goes to the technical arbiter; a merge raised without the grant routes by citation (307.434875ms)
✔ REQ-DEC-2: a stale or unconfirmed citation refuses without a decision; an arbiter raising its own goes to the human (277.997308ms)
✔ Q169: the chief of staff's end of the assistant is not refused role-end-refused; its own run and another ender's are (252.574282ms)
✔ Q169: another role's cited revoke of the assistant, resolved by an arbiter, is refused (254.063814ms)
✔ Q169: a revoke of the assistant citing a decision the human resolved is not refused by the protection (244.460446ms)
✔ Q169: a cited revoke of a role not in END_PROTECTED still goes to the arbiter, and executes (243.108152ms)
✔ Q169: a role granted role.revoke at either class still sends a revoke of the assistant to the human (322.635644ms)
✔ human proof binds CLI entry, process start and nonce; agents and incomplete ancestry refuse (1.637098ms)
✔ process reader gets own kernel identity without exposing environment values (0.456228ms)
✔ EACCES ancestor environments skip only markers; commands and registered launches still refuse (0.695064ms)
✔ real pid 1 remains inspectable when its environment is protected (0.248432ms)
✔ REQ-DEC-2: a merge-gate raise its arbiter resolved lands through the host op: checkLand answers the facts and a ticket, records nothing, and recordLand spends the decision once (305.123457ms)
✔ checkLand refuses on the decision and the review (359.766709ms)
✔ REQ-LAND-1: a gated merge decision refuses not-authorized, cited and approved by the arbiter or uncited and approved by the human (585.161447ms)
✔ REQ-LAND-1: a within-role merge grant refuses not-authorized at the land (274.993256ms)
✔ a cross-role merge that routes to the human, because merge-gate is its own arbiter, lands on the human's CLI answer (310.924878ms)
✔ a merge option with no first line refuses no-subject, as land-work does (279.737653ms)
✔ checkLand refuses with land-work's codes past the authority check, and a decision raised for refactor never lands (690.419416ms)
✔ a ticket outlives the run that asked, and recordLand checks the task again (304.05057ms)
✔ landRefused files the code on the task, tells the role only with notify, and ends the ticket (324.711229ms)
✔ landHeld is true only for an approved, unspent cross-role merge decision this role raised for a task in this thread (335.219603ms)
✔ no run may write the action.allowed for git.merge.protected itself (219.584806ms)
✔ a message to a stopped role sends launch.by one notice, and the result says so (218.899369ms)
✔ a message to a role outside launch.instances says so in its result and in the notice (190.72671ms)
✔ a message to a running role sends no notice and its result is unchanged (148.073587ms)
✔ a re-route at a claim, a release and claim, and a broker restart send no second notice (267.709209ms)
✔ a run launched but not yet claimed counts as no holder (154.388787ms)
✔ no notice for a message to launch.by, from it, from a tester, to the human, or in a thread to a thread instance (295.476341ms)
✔ a business with no launch block tells nobody and says there is no launcher (123.69822ms)
✔ the notice sender stays internal: no role is named _bus and no caller can send as it or to it (388.938213ms)
✔ limits binds actor from human proof and rejects role, reader, tester and forged actor (224.454147ms)
✔ runtime wires verified human settings to the actual shared file writer and actor receipt (284.725995ms)
✔ uncertain organization receipts leave bus startup and reads alone but refuse writes until reconciled (435.483768ms)
✔ within-role sends cite an open gated launch decision without spending it or naming it in grants (219.126783ms)
✔ missing and foreign-business citations refuse and roll back message and grant (198.238786ms)
✔ cross-role sends still need a matching resolved decision and consume it once (272.410233ms)
✔ messages pages all human messages newest first without writes; read state is history (2778.132023ms)
✔ messages refuses role callers, invalid paging and cursors outside this human feed (300.186286ms)
✔ views messages passes only its paging arguments through (0.275836ms)
✔ messages isolates businesses even with a valid foreign cursor (202.818232ms)
✔ the assistant sends to the user and to the chief of staff only (356.861237ms)
✔ an assistant send to any other role, or to the tester, is refused and logged (393.996788ms)
✔ only the user and the chief of staff may send to the assistant; the tester is refused by default (369.479808ms)
✔ REQ-ASSIST-2 REQ-THREAD-1 thread.send to an instance that does not hear from the user is refused and stores nothing (317.116338ms)
✔ a sender-side list alone refuses a send to a role that has no list (363.733619ms)
✔ a target-side list alone refuses a send from a role that has no list (388.089779ms)
✔ the sender list is checked before the target list (332.522481ms)
✔ roles without the field behave exactly as before (474.669068ms)
✔ a business with no role definitions at all is unlimited (366.88773ms)
✔ a malformed messaging field refuses at boot (131.320271ms)
✔ the assistant's review.request to a reviewer is refused and logged, even with an approved decision (442.003014ms)
✔ a review.verdict to the assistant from a role outside its receiveFrom is refused and logged (431.1964ms)
✔ review requests and verdicts between roles without the field are unchanged (362.450891ms)
✔ 3f copy migrates to 3g preserving every old column/row, with an empty instance_names and null to_name (1483.610121ms)
✔ REQ-MSG-2: the chief of staff names an instance under its within-role grant, and the write is logged (181.433714ms)
✔ REQ-MSG-2: the human names an instance through the CLI (206.079269ms)
✔ REQ-MSG-2: a role without the grant, or holding it cross-role, is refused not-authorized (245.447559ms)
✔ REQ-MSG-2: a name is unique in the business and is never an instance key or a role name (424.769642ms)
✔ REQ-MSG-2: a send by name reaches the instance and records both; a send by instance key is unchanged (328.426484ms)
✔ REQ-MSG-2: an instance key beats a name that equals it, as when a later instance takes the key (230.146974ms)
✔ REQ-MSG-2: a role name beats a name that equals it, as when a later definition takes the word (sage-0590) (248.361719ms)
✔ plugins and plugins.set refuse every non-human session and a forged actor, and pass only the patch with the verified actor (210.958162ms)
✔ runtime: the switch changes the organization file, the receipt carries the actor, and a bad shape, an unknown module and a stale revision are refused with nothing written (514.327653ms)
✔ vikunja:19/309 through the broker, a patch switches the kinds it names and keeps the rest; null removes one kind and is trailed (439.681951ms)
✔ broker process binds trusted launches, offers reader capabilities, refuses human mutation, closes cleanly (214.552976ms)
✔ startup token refusal returns safe code without value or partial listening broker (70.522969ms)
✔ loaded fixture token is absent from socket replies and SQLite, including refusal evidence (226.783749ms)
✔ killed broker leaves an explicit stale lock; another process cannot silently reclaim it (249.469834ms)
✔ trusted host registers later launches; socket clients never have a registration verb (222.735242ms)
✔ runtime excludes declared project roots even when host supplies no repoRoots (77.667805ms)
✔ a refused launch binding leaves the broker and existing capabilities alive; bad protocol stops it (201.772856ms)
✔ D1: committed write with a failed receipt refuses outcome-unknown without action.allowed (159.722775ms)
✔ D2: spec.read refuses without content if its role is released during the read (158.943632ms)
✔ D3: spec.read secret check refuses flagged content without content (150.689969ms)
✔ D3: spec.read secret check refuses flagged subject without content (147.523756ms)
✔ Broker keeps the existing sandbox client import closure: no new imports or lazy project import (1.380743ms)
✔ without a trusted project adapter all three async paths refuse project-not-configured (218.003921ms)
✔ real startBroker injects the project adapter for socket reads and bound-author record writes (233.797854ms)
✔ a reply is listed for human and reader sessions, and its delivery rows are unchanged (241.29464ms)
✔ the reply still reaches the human message.receive (mosaic talk) after the Console showed it (223.685739ms)
✔ a message with no reply gives an empty list (173.058267ms)
✔ replies come oldest first and stop at REPLIES (821.69586ms)
✔ an id that names no message in the business refuses message-not-found, and the refusal is recorded (346.746186ms)
✔ strict arguments; a role session gets human-required (483.011038ms)
✔ views passes replies through as one call with the id (0.24244ms)
✔ requirements returns the committed list to a holding role session, and no one else (225.331236ms)
✔ the PM's prd.approve with no task, when no id fits, reaches the human's Inbox (161.459933ms)
✔ the PM's non-blocking role.revoke with no task reaches the human's Inbox (197.121465ms)
✔ a push is recorded as the action.allowed for git.push.working on the task, and only the host records one (254.301745ms)
✔ review.request names the latest pushed commit and sends the reviewer a REVIEW-REQUEST (267.221733ms)
✔ review.request says which run holds the reviewer role, or null, and a null request waits for a claim (317.162869ms)
✔ review.request refuses a commit that isn't the latest push, a non-reviewer and a role without the action (412.845384ms)
✔ reviewFetch answers only the addressed reviewer, for the request it cites (281.372218ms)
✔ review.verdict answers one request once, to the role that asked (366.800294ms)
✔ task.close on a pushed task needs an approve verdict for the latest push (456.053608ms)
✔ a refusal the host decided is filed on the task it names, and only a task ref counts (283.60005ms)
✔ v3b prototype refusals, views and append-only mutations (1695.380094ms)
✔ gated approval authorizes once, survives store reopen, and fresh approval works (279.720253ms)
✔ another run of the same instance consumes an approval once; a failed check leaves it usable (243.658239ms)
✔ two scheduled callers have exactly one grant and one consumed refusal (177.498479ms)
✔ failed commit rolls consumption back; cross-role consumes and within-role stays reusable (351.492626ms)
✔ class drift gated to cross-role refuses before consumption (281.388827ms)
✔ class drift cross-role to gated refuses before consumption (270.261457ms)
✔ class drift gated to within-role refuses before consumption (286.192309ms)
✔ class drift cross-role to within-role refuses before consumption (307.162694ms)
✔ class drift within-role to gated refuses before consumption (255.967035ms)
✔ class drift within-role to cross-role refuses before consumption (237.913208ms)
✔ message.send consumes approval and prevents a later send or authorize (259.158138ms)
✔ role.revoke consumes approval and prevents a later revoke or authorize (283.765797ms)
✔ 3e copy migrates through 3f to 3g preserving every old column/row and adding null spec citations (1563.980756ms)
✔ real socket awaits spec reads, record writes and cited raises; other requests still return normally (278.374463ms)
✔ real socket preserves asynchronous refusal codes and disconnects its transient proof (212.894202ms)
✔ two real socket writes to one repository yield one commit and one project-busy refusal (254.342628ms)
✔ client disconnect during await tolerates late reply (212.772541ms)
✔ client disconnect during await tolerates late refusal (180.58211ms)
✔ N-a: slow admitted record.write returns its committed result after the idle deadline (440.954496ms)
✔ current citation is recorded; docs commits do not stale it and a new spec never reopens settlement (299.151456ms)
✔ stale, unconfirmed, missing and partial spec citations refuse without inserting a decision (330.564501ms)
✔ uncited raises retain their synchronous path and spec read is available to any held role in its business (253.822486ms)
✔ record writes bind the session author, require authority and refuse spec and impersonation paths (280.868124ms)
✔ REQ-COS-1: the pm asks the chief of staff for roles and counts; the chief receives a STAFF-REQUEST and answers it (265.032673ms)
✔ REQ-COS-1: only the pm can send a staff request; every other session is refused and the chief of staff hears nothing (364.109643ms)
✔ REQ-COS-1: a pm without message.send is refused like any other gated action (172.162917ms)
✔ REQ-COS-1: the request goes to the business launcher, and only when that is a chief of staff (493.928153ms)
✔ REQ-COS-1: the sender is judged by definition: an instance `lead` of the pm definition can ask, an instance `pm` of the coder definition can't (507.400488ms)
✔ REQ-COS-1: the launcher is judged by definition: an instance `boss` of the chief-of-staff definition receives, a `chief` of the coder definition gives no-chief-of-staff (438.813931ms)
✔ REQ-COS-1: a refused staff request leaves no staff.request action.allowed event (262.413248ms)
✔ REQ-ASSIST-2: the role definitions' messaging lists hold for a staff request, sender and recipient (645.069939ms)
✔ a staff request names a task, 1 to 10 distinct roles and counts of 1 to 20; nothing else is accepted (470.153184ms)
✔ REQ-COS-1: a staff request grants nothing: the pm still can't launch and the chief of staff launches as before (232.341991ms)
✔ a business that never switched launches reads allowed with no time and no event (136.729313ms)
✔ launches revoked and then restored read allowed, with the restore time and event id (173.137289ms)
✔ a task closed on the tracker leaves the open list, and total counts the open ones (166.763579ms)
✔ a tombstone is not open (168.799033ms)
✔ the open list stops at the cap and says so; total still counts every open task (156.912435ms)
✔ a role and a reader session read state; arguments, and an unbound cap, refuse (166.096027ms)
✔ a human session reads the same state, with the same cap (142.870868ms)
✔ reading state writes nothing: every table keeps its row count (195.961562ms)
✔ creates private WAL store and excludes a second writer until explicit close (151.642883ms)
✔ rollback is atomic and schema metadata is checked against trusted DDL, not just itself (187.594979ms)
✔ existing empty database and symlink runtime directory refuse, never initialize over damage (199.404449ms)
✔ crash during a transaction recovers no partial event after explicit fixture-only lock removal (220.148297ms)
✔ writer refuses mixed at/read_at forms atomically, even through trusted SQL helpers (132.776359ms)
✔ async transactions refuse before invoking their function (126.08069ms)
✔ the session default fits under the reply cap and pages to the end with next (360.243234ms)
✔ the short form: no description, assignees by role, every listed key (323.233967ms)
✔ each filter, alone and together, and total counts every match (378.98119ms)
✔ task_ref reads one task in full, as the whole board has it (318.102149ms)
✔ no arguments is the read the Console and mosaic make, unchanged (266.603874ms)
✔ an unknown argument or a bad value refuses invalid-request (945.699537ms)
✔ tasks rows carry priority and requirement for every session that reads tasks (394.779636ms)
✔ the read model rebuilds from the ledger: a reopened bus and each trail give the same values (389.238284ms)
✔ an empty business and one with snapshots but no task.created read cleanly (132.064477ms)
✔ recordTask keeps sync reads and a role write apart (217.817811ms)
✔ read_at must be one canonical UTC format, so the projection compares strings safely (128.32905ms)
✔ a bad entry refuses the whole record (142.515368ms)
✔ taskView reads the projection for one business (142.918801ms)
✔ requestTask hands only a holder and a task verb to the handler, and records refusals (275.20692ms)
✔ the server sends task verbs to the adapter with its own timeout; other verbs stay synchronous (441.938518ms)
✔ without an adapter the server refuses every task verb (215.418714ms)
✔ the runtime refuses an invalid adapter and closes a valid one (203.861646ms)
✔ the process loads the S3 adapter from plain-data trackers (334.450427ms)
✔ the tester binds only when the business sets bus.tester to exactly true (953.722779ms)
✔ a business may not name a role tester, so the tester address is never a role (272.672965ms)
✔ every verb outside the tester list refuses tester-refused and is recorded against the tester (565.057145ms)
✔ a tester message is from tester, starts [mos test], and writes no human.input or authority (249.873158ms)
✔ a role answers a tester only in reply to a tester message, and the answer never reaches the human (276.200454ms)
✔ the tester reads the human views a reader reads (168.74591ms)
✔ tester proof binds its own CLI, start time and nonce, refuses a managed run and allows an agent (1.147762ms)
✔ neither CLI's nonce proves the other: each proof is bound to its own CLI and nonce variable (0.368876ms)
✔ testerNonce reads only the tester's variable and gives null on any read error (0.217266ms)
✔ an envelope carries exactly one of cap, human and tester; no tester authenticator refuses (114.874278ms)
✔ tester-cli.mjs binds through the runtime when the switch is on, and refuses off or under a run marker (877.836102ms)
✔ REQ-THREAD-1 REQ-ORG-2: the 3d→3e migration adds the thread tables and leaves messages from before threads as written (1156.712635ms)
✔ REQ-THREAD-1: a 3d bus with a changed schema is refused and keeps its version and tables (838.742377ms)
✔ REQ-THREAD-1: the offline command prints the kept-message counts before the ready line (849.271684ms)
✔ REQ-ROLE-2 REQ-THREAD-1: one holder per thread, through the broker and the trigger (404.64082ms)
✔ REQ-ROLE-2 REQ-THREAD-1: the 3e triggers refuse writes that skip the broker (1288.992262ms)
✔ REQ-MSG-1: a message to or from the assistant names its thread, or is refused (350.352737ms)
✔ REQ-MSG-1: the chief of staff's reply comes back to the thread that sent the work (3707.343032ms)
✔ REQ-MSG-1: a reply can't carry one thread instance's thread to another thread instance (102.087388ms)
✔ REQ-THREAD-1 REQ-USER-2: one thread's messages never reach another thread's holder (145.377513ms)
✔ REQ-LAUNCH-1: a message to a thread with no holder waits, and the next holder gets it (147.69357ms)
✔ REQ-THREAD-2 REQ-LAUNCH-1: threadIdle releases only a thread with nothing waiting, and only for its holder (241.307262ms)
✔ REQ-THREAD-2 REQ-LAUNCH-1: a message delivered to a run that ended unread doesn't hold up the next holder (240.876171ms)
✔ REQ-ROLE-2 REQ-THREAD-1: an approved role.revoke never reaches a thread run, and the thread stays held (132.622188ms)
✔ REQ-USER-2: the human verbs refuse another owner's thread (151.126374ms)
✔ REQ-THREAD-1: thread.create refuses when the business has no thread instance or more than one (108.080272ms)
✔ REQ-ORG-2: projects and threads are named once, and the repo names a business project (164.006154ms)
✔ REQ-THREAD-2: thread.messages returns the thread's history in pages and writes nothing (489.797779ms)
✔ socket capability stamps launch identity; shared views use wire, no SQL client (193.110581ms)
✔ two wire claims serialize; a lost reply never automatically retries (200.901373ms)
✔ malformed, oversized and identity-forging envelopes refuse without echoing input (127.052524ms)
✔ client preserves UTF-8 when a response divides a multibyte character (11.967636ms)
✔ committed mutation followed by dropped reply reports unknown and is never retried (143.784649ms)
✔ web.search: a granted role gets labelled results, and the call is trailed with role, run, verb and query (190.511217ms)
✔ web.fetch: a granted role gets the page as labelled text, and the call is trailed with the url (180.822488ms)
✔ a role without the grant is refused, the refusal is logged with the verb, and nothing is fetched (236.587379ms)
✔ a broker with no web service refuses a granted role (163.115692ms)
✔ bad requests are refused: unknown verb, extra or missing argument, not a string, a human or reader session (215.221849ms)
✔ a session that is not the role holder is refused (146.499454ms)
✔ web.mjs's fences hold on the broker side: refusals are normal results with the fixed reason (396.129194ms)
✔ web.search with no search source configured is a refused result, not an error (148.358788ms)
✔ a search source that fails with its own refusal, or that throws, is handled (191.886528ms)
✔ a slow search source ends in a refusal at the deadline (209.372848ms)
✔ a secret in the arguments is refused before anything is trailed or fetched (139.96745ms)
✔ over the socket: the server routes web verbs to the service; other roles are refused; no service is web-not-configured (231.513206ms)
✔ busBusiness: the web grant comes from "web" in the resolved tool limit (0.228252ms)
✔ webServices: the business's search-source plug-in and web.searxng var make web.search work; without either it is refused as not configured (211.059187ms)
✔ an ungranted call is refused at once: no admission, no wait, nothing touched (149.835294ms)
✔ over the socket an ungranted caller is dropped by the server timeout and a granted one gets the longer wait (475.569893ms)
✔ a search that never answers is aborted at the deadline, the module sees the signal, and the call is trailed as refused (timeout) (178.93582ms)
✔ a fetch that stalls is cut off at the deadline: the request is destroyed, not left running (197.691494ms)
✔ one query limit: over SEARCH_MAX_QUERY_CHARS or empty is refused with the same reason before any backend, and the tool schema carries the same number (156.20549ms)
ℹ tests 325
ℹ suites 0
ℹ pass 325
ℹ fail 0
ℹ cancelled 0
ℹ skipped 0
ℹ todo 0
ℹ duration_ms 12935.727689