stack/agents/dewey/work/queue-143/runs/pkg-bus.log

✔ agents: a held role with nothing on the bus is idle; a role session gets the claim rows unchanged (157.639766ms)
✔ agents: working counts what the holder received and has not read; routed alone is not working (240.837464ms)
✔ agents: input needed is the role's open decisions routed to the human, gated first, then oldest (404.69704ms)
✔ agents: working wins over waiting, and Input needed still shows (177.180814ms)
✔ agents: a new holder doesn't inherit what the last one left unread; decisions stay with the role (202.611576ms)
✔ agents: state reads only its own business, even for a run name both use (195.086565ms)
✔ agents: a message the holder released unread is stranded; the next holder gets nothing and cannot read it (202.282317ms)
✔ agents: a message the holder read is not stranded; one the current holder has not read is not listed (202.944748ms)
✔ agents: stranded is oldest first and capped at 50 for a role (847.9236ms)
✔ agents: stranded is per role and per business (356.535869ms)
✔ agents: a message routed to a held role and not yet received is not stranded (143.234697ms)
✔ REQ-DEC an approval outlives its run and a broker restart; a new run of the instance consumes it once (330.538997ms)
✔ REQ-DEC another instance of the same definition cannot consume an approval, and its refusal consumes nothing (277.308033ms)
✔ REQ-DEC REQ-THREAD-1 a thread approval is consumed only by a run holding the same thread (255.333667ms)
✔ REQ-DEC a later run of the same instance supersedes an open decision; another instance cannot (243.133076ms)
✔ REQ-DEC REQ-THREAD-1 a thread decision is superseded only from the same thread (259.243443ms)
✔ REQ-DEC REQ-THREAD-1 a thread instance decision raised before row 121 is not consumed or superseded by any thread run (334.059688ms)
✔ launch identity is stamped, payload identity is refused and stale holder cannot send (176.523807ms)
✔ decision classes route from policy; gated resolution is human-only, choice and target must match (284.901934ms)
✔ claim exclusion, holder release, gated revoke and rerouting to a new holder are atomic (344.938146ms)
✔ launch events require a human CLI capability; generic emit cannot forge authority events (183.903608ms)
✔ within-role decisions close atomically and invalid options or blocking omissions refuse (168.383621ms)
✔ a recommendation that is not exactly one option key refuses invalid-recommendation after the options (271.405338ms)
✔ observer capabilities read human inbox but cannot mutate or forge launch identity (171.514208ms)
✔ task action subjects and linked decision trail are complete and ordered (199.97089ms)
✔ launch binding is durable and reconnecting requires the identical trusted record (115.380587ms)
✔ business isolation includes inherited object names and cross-business message references (201.134933ms)
✔ authority never transfers between action, target, unresolved or replaced role holder; a later run of the instance keeps it (271.252687ms)
✔ task projection uses schema current view, skipping earlier and equal-start polls (153.625375ms)
✔ revocation permanently bars the old run from reclaiming first, including after broker restart (232.830202ms)
✔ empty message references refuse before storage; refusal-evidence failure stays a typed error (160.403077ms)
✔ both arbiters require human resolution when their cross-role route is themselves (255.103667ms)
✔ the shipped coder role raises task.reassign as gated to the human; task.scope.change stays cross-role (187.839338ms)
✔ S1 adapter takes resolved limits and refs, rejects mismatched instance, never mutates input (2.29811ms)
✔ REQ-COS-1, REQ-ROLE-2: the chief of staff ends a run with a reason and no decision, and the reason is logged (291.99084ms)
✔ REQ-ROLE-2: a role without role.end still needs a resolved decision to revoke (405.532156ms)
✔ REQ-ROLE-2: storage accepts a revoke with a reason or a decision and aborts one with neither (252.069251ms)
✔ REQ-ROLE-2: the chief of staff may still cite a decision, and a decision alone is the old path (226.133146ms)
✔ REQ-ROLE-2: a role without role.end still ends a run through a resolved decision, which is recorded and has no reason (258.396343ms)
✔ REQ-ROLE-2: a reason is required, bounded, and never sent with a decision (286.147476ms)
✔ REQ-COS-1: the chief of staff cannot end its own run; its end of the assistant gets past the protection (262.88935ms)
✔ REQ-LIMIT-1, REQ-COS-1: organization.set from the chief of staff reaches the shared writer, named as the actor (228.13733ms)
✔ REQ-LIMIT-1, REQ-COS-1: a refused organization.set logs action.refused and no action.allowed, like a refused limits.set (304.041536ms)
✔ REQ-LIMIT-1: organization.set is refused for every caller whose role file lacks organization.change (309.454312ms)
✔ REQ-LIMIT-1: the chief of staff is logged as allowed, and organization.set takes only the human's keys (398.064436ms)
✔ REQ-ROLE-3, REQ-LIMIT-1: a chief-of-staff change is validated, written and logged like a human's; an invalid one is refused (521.5127ms)
✔ REQ-ROLE-2, REQ-COS-1: the 3c→3d migration lets the chief of staff end a held role with a reason; neither is still refused (879.881206ms)
✔ comment cursors isolate businesses, move only forward and remain append-only (155.93329ms)
✔ only trusted sync writes validated cursors; events and cursor share rollback (132.578478ms)
✔ explicit 3b copy migration preserves evidence and opens as 3g; normal startup never migrates (1006.594573ms)
✔ migration refuses active writers and drifted legacy schemas, with no partial upgrade (1495.520022ms)
✔ named migration registry chains 3b through 3g to a fixture-only future version in order (851.621501ms)
✔ migration refuses mismatched source metadata without changing schema or evidence (745.389507ms)
✔ offline command migrates only the supplied fixture root and reports usage errors (892.456271ms)
✔ credentials gives human and reader sessions service, account, role, date and state, and nothing else (118.76361ms)
✔ credentials refuses a role session and any argument (203.540981ms)
✔ credentials reads the status on each request, and a broker without one lists none (314.759214ms)
✔ the broker process answers credentials without a token, path or variable in its output, log or store (227.755813ms)
✔ only validated broker references load; returned data and exceptions cannot expose a known token (4.154526ms)
✔ bad file modes, symlinks, repository/data paths, malformed tokens and missing dates refuse (2.815988ms)
✔ expiry refuses use and env references never become client data (1.049157ms)
✔ S1 parsed service refs work, service mismatch refuses, Gitea rotation due is a warning state (1.867402ms)
✔ opaque tokens shorter than 16 characters refuse before use (0.473605ms)
✔ each C-suite role file carries the same two lists: human, chief-of-staff, pm, cto (1.900879ms)
✔ chief-executive-officer: messages to and from the user, chief of staff, pm and cto pass (584.075657ms)
✔ chief-executive-officer: a message to or from the coder, reviewer or assistant is refused and logged, and nothing is stored (472.280046ms)
✔ chief-executive-officer: another C-suite role isn't on the lists either (400.30921ms)
✔ chief-financial-officer: messages to and from the user, chief of staff, pm and cto pass (460.605391ms)
✔ chief-financial-officer: a message to or from the coder, reviewer or assistant is refused and logged, and nothing is stored (438.188259ms)
✔ chief-financial-officer: another C-suite role isn't on the lists either (388.503001ms)
✔ chief-information-officer: messages to and from the user, chief of staff, pm and cto pass (507.637742ms)
✔ chief-information-officer: a message to or from the coder, reviewer or assistant is refused and logged, and nothing is stored (442.714269ms)
✔ chief-information-officer: another C-suite role isn't on the lists either (370.067058ms)
✔ chief-information-security-officer: messages to and from the user, chief of staff, pm and cto pass (449.875135ms)
✔ chief-information-security-officer: a message to or from the coder, reviewer or assistant is refused and logged, and nothing is stored (463.037972ms)
✔ chief-information-security-officer: another C-suite role isn't on the lists either (409.183854ms)
✔ chief-marketing-officer: messages to and from the user, chief of staff, pm and cto pass (728.095721ms)
✔ chief-marketing-officer: a message to or from the coder, reviewer or assistant is refused and logged, and nothing is stored (428.256475ms)
✔ chief-marketing-officer: another C-suite role isn't on the lists either (444.440212ms)
✔ a human resolve sends the raising role one message from the human, and its request is the answer (280.572126ms)
✔ a cross-role decision resolved by its arbiter comes from that role and run, with no request (313.10079ms)
✔ a human withdraw sends one message with the note (243.317249ms)
✔ a human seen before the close leaves the request on the close's answer, not the seen (293.320279ms)
✔ the raising run's withdraw, a supersede, a within-role raise and seen send nothing (287.58932ms)
✔ refused closes send nothing: invalid-choice, decision-closed, not-resolver (278.246784ms)
✔ a raising role nobody holds at the close gets the message on the next claim (262.181955ms)
✔ a human DECISION send keeps its own instruction as the request, not a close's answer (244.807596ms)
✔ a cross-role raise whose arbiter the raiser does not hear from is refused and stores nothing (326.728602ms)
✔ a gated raise by a role that does not hear from the human is refused and stores nothing (371.302231ms)
✔ a route the raiser hears from is allowed, checked from the route to the raiser (347.004928ms)
✔ a refused supersede withdraws nothing (297.539217ms)
✔ the assistant's within-role and gated raises still work (298.53788ms)
✔ roles lists open decisions routed to a role, and never the human inbox (255.378629ms)
✔ recent lists closed decisions of every route, newest close first, with how each closed (374.854312ms)
✔ recent gives the closing event as closed when the decision was seen first (294.321362ms)
✔ recent stops at RECENT rows (806.649465ms)
✔ every row is what trail already gives the same session for that id (276.201741ms)
✔ a role session can't list decisions, so it can't read another role's open decisions (399.407298ms)
✔ decisions is a read: one business, strict arguments, nothing written (395.571139ms)
✔ endLaunch writes session.ended, releases the run claim and kills its capabilities (172.199465ms)
✔ endLaunch refuses an unknown run, a second end and a rebind of the ended run (161.26897ms)
✔ a restarted broker refuses to rebind an ended run; a refused rebind leaves the run unbound (223.608644ms)
✔ endLaunch leaves a claim another run took alone (189.864529ms)
✔ refuse records action.refused against the caller with the code only (141.36835ms)
✔ launches off refuses role.launch with launch-revoked until launches on (197.774564ms)
✔ broker process: launch ops authorize role.launch, record refusals and end runs (316.184039ms)
✔ REQ-WAIT-1: the broker hard waits are exactly the list, and match the business vocabulary (1.209085ms)
✔ REQ-WAIT-2: a business granting a hard wait at either class is refused; the actions that left are grantable (135.165995ms)
✔ REQ-DEC-2: every hard wait goes to the human, cited or not, and the arbiter cannot resolve it (826.624672ms)
✔ REQ-DEC-2: a gated raise citing the current spec goes to the arbiter for its domain; uncited, to the human (450.883289ms)
✔ REQ-DEC-2: an arbiter-approved cited gated decision authorizes the raiser, and the human cannot resolve it (234.697792ms)
✔ REQ-DEC-2: a cited merge raised by merge-gate goes to the technical arbiter; a merge raised without the grant routes by citation (284.688808ms)
✔ REQ-DEC-2: a stale or unconfirmed citation refuses without a decision; an arbiter raising its own goes to the human (261.278119ms)
✔ Q169: the chief of staff's end of the assistant is not refused role-end-refused; its own run and another ender's are (229.585357ms)
✔ Q169: another role's cited revoke of the assistant, resolved by an arbiter, is refused (237.931743ms)
✔ Q169: a revoke of the assistant citing a decision the human resolved is not refused by the protection (229.615889ms)
✔ Q169: a cited revoke of a role not in END_PROTECTED still goes to the arbiter, and executes (238.954659ms)
✔ Q169: a role granted role.revoke at either class still sends a revoke of the assistant to the human (314.609607ms)
✔ human proof binds CLI entry, process start and nonce; agents and incomplete ancestry refuse (1.461605ms)
✔ process reader gets own kernel identity without exposing environment values (0.440131ms)
✔ EACCES ancestor environments skip only markers; commands and registered launches still refuse (0.578159ms)
✔ real pid 1 remains inspectable when its environment is protected (0.224916ms)
✔ REQ-DEC-2: a merge-gate raise its arbiter resolved lands through the host op: checkLand answers the facts and a ticket, records nothing, and recordLand spends the decision once (337.234208ms)
✔ checkLand refuses on the decision and the review (412.979305ms)
✔ REQ-LAND-1: a gated merge decision refuses not-authorized, cited and approved by the arbiter or uncited and approved by the human (530.363179ms)
✔ REQ-LAND-1: a within-role merge grant refuses not-authorized at the land (237.77118ms)
✔ a cross-role merge that routes to the human, because merge-gate is its own arbiter, lands on the human's CLI answer (262.397434ms)
✔ a merge option with no first line refuses no-subject, as land-work does (244.620128ms)
✔ checkLand refuses with land-work's codes past the authority check, and a decision raised for refactor never lands (613.431618ms)
✔ a ticket outlives the run that asked, and recordLand checks the task again (283.594995ms)
✔ landRefused files the code on the task, tells the role only with notify, and ends the ticket (310.600026ms)
✔ landHeld is true only for an approved, unspent cross-role merge decision this role raised for a task in this thread (298.46632ms)
✔ no run may write the action.allowed for git.merge.protected itself (193.100688ms)
✔ a message to a stopped role sends launch.by one notice, and the result says so (260.788861ms)
✔ a message to a role outside launch.instances says so in its result and in the notice (237.936638ms)
✔ a message to a running role sends no notice and its result is unchanged (146.756769ms)
✔ a re-route at a claim, a release and claim, and a broker restart send no second notice (257.029727ms)
✔ a run launched but not yet claimed counts as no holder (127.597172ms)
✔ no notice for a message to launch.by, from it, from a tester, to the human, or in a thread to a thread instance (270.685632ms)
✔ a business with no launch block tells nobody and says there is no launcher (123.44398ms)
✔ the notice sender stays internal: no role is named _bus and no caller can send as it or to it (339.940824ms)
✔ limits binds actor from human proof and rejects role, reader, tester and forged actor (277.107754ms)
✔ runtime wires verified human settings to the actual shared file writer and actor receipt (292.803404ms)
✔ uncertain organization receipts leave bus startup and reads alone but refuse writes until reconciled (415.470843ms)
✔ within-role sends cite an open gated launch decision without spending it or naming it in grants (206.229464ms)
✔ missing and foreign-business citations refuse and roll back message and grant (176.395837ms)
✔ cross-role sends still need a matching resolved decision and consume it once (243.711879ms)
✔ messages pages all human messages newest first without writes; read state is history (2529.995983ms)
✔ messages refuses role callers, invalid paging and cursors outside this human feed (262.849884ms)
✔ views messages passes only its paging arguments through (0.29691ms)
✔ messages isolates businesses even with a valid foreign cursor (166.188012ms)
✔ the assistant sends to the user and to the chief of staff only (308.741758ms)
✔ an assistant send to any other role, or to the tester, is refused and logged (358.69596ms)
✔ only the user and the chief of staff may send to the assistant; the tester is refused by default (337.597234ms)
✔ REQ-ASSIST-2 REQ-THREAD-1 thread.send to an instance that does not hear from the user is refused and stores nothing (297.089858ms)
✔ a sender-side list alone refuses a send to a role that has no list (322.522176ms)
✔ a target-side list alone refuses a send from a role that has no list (364.396237ms)
✔ the sender list is checked before the target list (306.409133ms)
✔ roles without the field behave exactly as before (404.515665ms)
✔ a business with no role definitions at all is unlimited (307.791005ms)
✔ a malformed messaging field refuses at boot (127.613552ms)
✔ the assistant's review.request to a reviewer is refused and logged, even with an approved decision (335.594556ms)
✔ a review.verdict to the assistant from a role outside its receiveFrom is refused and logged (392.649382ms)
✔ review requests and verdicts between roles without the field are unchanged (337.968566ms)
✔ 3f copy migrates to 3g preserving every old column/row, with an empty instance_names and null to_name (1346.487353ms)
✔ REQ-MSG-2: the chief of staff names an instance under its within-role grant, and the write is logged (187.911337ms)
✔ REQ-MSG-2: the human names an instance through the CLI (185.534207ms)
✔ REQ-MSG-2: a role without the grant, or holding it cross-role, is refused not-authorized (228.589002ms)
✔ REQ-MSG-2: a name is unique in the business and is never an instance key or a role name (379.450389ms)
✔ REQ-MSG-2: a send by name reaches the instance and records both; a send by instance key is unchanged (301.753819ms)
✔ REQ-MSG-2: an instance key beats a name that equals it, as when a later instance takes the key (236.741833ms)
✔ REQ-MSG-2: a role name beats a name that equals it, as when a later definition takes the word (sage-0590) (222.026294ms)
✔ plugins and plugins.set refuse every non-human session and a forged actor, and pass only the patch with the verified actor (196.459291ms)
✔ runtime: the switch changes the organization file, the receipt carries the actor, and a bad shape, an unknown module and a stale revision are refused with nothing written (471.266293ms)
✔ vikunja:19/309 through the broker, a patch switches the kinds it names and keeps the rest; null removes one kind and is trailed (400.784483ms)
✔ broker process binds trusted launches, offers reader capabilities, refuses human mutation, closes cleanly (205.919681ms)
✔ startup token refusal returns safe code without value or partial listening broker (67.664836ms)
✔ loaded fixture token is absent from socket replies and SQLite, including refusal evidence (184.66921ms)
✔ killed broker leaves an explicit stale lock; another process cannot silently reclaim it (219.119005ms)
✔ trusted host registers later launches; socket clients never have a registration verb (231.915484ms)
✔ runtime excludes declared project roots even when host supplies no repoRoots (70.368124ms)
✔ a refused launch binding leaves the broker and existing capabilities alive; bad protocol stops it (194.810922ms)
✔ D1: committed write with a failed receipt refuses outcome-unknown without action.allowed (154.871434ms)
✔ D2: spec.read refuses without content if its role is released during the read (152.297515ms)
✔ D3: spec.read secret check refuses flagged content without content (136.437338ms)
✔ D3: spec.read secret check refuses flagged subject without content (154.754156ms)
✔ a human lists, opens and saves; the save is one commit by the business human (261.5552ms)
✔ an agent and a reader refuse every file verb and nothing is written (298.672363ms)
✔ a stale base refuses stale-base and writes nothing (236.063638ms)
✔ paths outside the spec and docs refuse, as do unknown projects, missing files and odd arguments (362.282331ms)
✔ without a project adapter the file verbs refuse project-not-configured (192.380227ms)
✔ on the socket a save may carry 1 MiB of text; every other request keeps the 64 KiB limit (331.364854ms)
✔ a request that names the save verb first and another verb last is refused at 64 KiB (185.694697ms)
✔ two saves racing for one repository make one commit (258.993879ms)
✔ Broker keeps the existing sandbox client import closure: no new imports or lazy project import (1.486425ms)
✔ without a trusted project adapter all three async paths refuse project-not-configured (196.765019ms)
✔ real startBroker injects the project adapter for socket reads and bound-author record writes (231.125196ms)
✔ a reply is listed for human and reader sessions, and its delivery rows are unchanged (230.630766ms)
✔ the reply still reaches the human message.receive (mosaic talk) after the Console showed it (219.988681ms)
✔ a message with no reply gives an empty list (172.530136ms)
✔ replies come oldest first and stop at REPLIES (719.346094ms)
✔ an id that names no message in the business refuses message-not-found, and the refusal is recorded (297.996019ms)
✔ strict arguments; a role session gets human-required (358.96789ms)
✔ views passes replies through as one call with the id (0.279576ms)
✔ requirements returns the committed list to a holding role session, and no one else (240.169748ms)
✔ the PM's prd.approve with no task, when no id fits, reaches the human's Inbox (155.218144ms)
✔ the PM's non-blocking role.revoke with no task reaches the human's Inbox (181.675705ms)
✔ a push is recorded as the action.allowed for git.push.working on the task, and only the host records one (261.987901ms)
✔ review.request names the latest pushed commit and sends the reviewer a REVIEW-REQUEST (254.064567ms)
✔ review.request says which run holds the reviewer role, or null, and a null request waits for a claim (282.433879ms)
✔ review.request refuses a commit that isn't the latest push, a non-reviewer and a role without the action (365.902572ms)
✔ reviewFetch answers only the addressed reviewer, for the request it cites (254.266913ms)
✔ review.verdict answers one request once, to the role that asked (300.348314ms)
✔ task.close on a pushed task needs an approve verdict for the latest push (371.076722ms)
✔ a refusal the host decided is filed on the task it names, and only a task ref counts (269.321857ms)
✔ v3b prototype refusals, views and append-only mutations (1506.742619ms)
✔ gated approval authorizes once, survives store reopen, and fresh approval works (257.332861ms)
✔ another run of the same instance consumes an approval once; a failed check leaves it usable (215.967426ms)
✔ two scheduled callers have exactly one grant and one consumed refusal (164.472271ms)
✔ failed commit rolls consumption back; cross-role consumes and within-role stays reusable (306.382278ms)
✔ class drift gated to cross-role refuses before consumption (222.691447ms)
✔ class drift cross-role to gated refuses before consumption (239.662318ms)
✔ class drift gated to within-role refuses before consumption (226.180155ms)
✔ class drift cross-role to within-role refuses before consumption (258.855832ms)
✔ class drift within-role to gated refuses before consumption (242.390803ms)
✔ class drift within-role to cross-role refuses before consumption (238.852246ms)
✔ message.send consumes approval and prevents a later send or authorize (421.978165ms)
✔ role.revoke consumes approval and prevents a later revoke or authorize (278.511852ms)
✔ 3e copy migrates through 3f to 3g preserving every old column/row and adding null spec citations (1349.338927ms)
✔ a human spec save sends one notice to each pm and cto, naming the commit, and each commit sends its own (438.768642ms)
✔ no notice for a docs save, an agent record commit, a git commit outside the Console, or a refused save (486.08628ms)
✔ a notice to a role no run holds waits for a claim, and launches nobody and tells nobody (374.839122ms)
✔ a business without a pm or a cto saves the spec and sends nothing (246.363512ms)
✔ a notice that cannot be stored answers outcome-unknown, and the commit stands (388.342226ms)
✔ a BLOCK reaches the chief of staff, the chief relays it to the assistant in the user's thread, and the commit stands (887.525931ms)
✔ with no thread a BLOCK still reaches the chief of staff, and the relay to the assistant is refused (348.32913ms)
✔ the relay lands in the user's most recently opened thread of the notice's project (433.444844ms)
✔ a BLOCK is refused from anyone but a pm or cto, to anyone but the chief of staff, and outside a reply to its own notice (456.147307ms)
✔ a role cannot forge a spec notice: its text opens neither a BLOCK nor the assistant's thread (436.881861ms)
✔ the bus receives nothing: a reply to a notice addressed to _bus is refused (347.979645ms)
✔ real socket awaits spec reads, record writes and cited raises; other requests still return normally (270.810049ms)
✔ real socket preserves asynchronous refusal codes and disconnects its transient proof (165.006937ms)
✔ two real socket writes to one repository yield one commit and one project-busy refusal (215.330176ms)
✔ client disconnect during await tolerates late reply (169.674641ms)
✔ client disconnect during await tolerates late refusal (166.709581ms)
✔ N-a: slow admitted record.write returns its committed result after the idle deadline (356.458251ms)
✔ current citation is recorded; docs commits do not stale it and a new spec never reopens settlement (288.921007ms)
✔ stale, unconfirmed, missing and partial spec citations refuse without inserting a decision (294.878598ms)
✔ uncited raises retain their synchronous path and spec read is available to any held role in its business (205.98907ms)
✔ record writes bind the session author, require authority and refuse spec and impersonation paths (257.171133ms)
✔ REQ-COS-1: the pm asks the chief of staff for roles and counts; the chief receives a STAFF-REQUEST and answers it (231.493936ms)
✔ REQ-COS-1: only the pm can send a staff request; every other session is refused and the chief of staff hears nothing (292.584736ms)
✔ REQ-COS-1: a pm without message.send is refused like any other gated action (171.627439ms)
✔ REQ-COS-1: the request goes to the business launcher, and only when that is a chief of staff (414.013358ms)
✔ REQ-COS-1: the sender is judged by definition: an instance `lead` of the pm definition can ask, an instance `pm` of the coder definition can't (411.482205ms)
✔ REQ-COS-1: the launcher is judged by definition: an instance `boss` of the chief-of-staff definition receives, a `chief` of the coder definition gives no-chief-of-staff (525.541427ms)
✔ REQ-COS-1: a refused staff request leaves no staff.request action.allowed event (318.196057ms)
✔ REQ-ASSIST-2: the role definitions' messaging lists hold for a staff request, sender and recipient (673.805854ms)
✔ a staff request names a task, 1 to 10 distinct roles and counts of 1 to 20; nothing else is accepted (423.482594ms)
✔ REQ-COS-1: a staff request grants nothing: the pm still can't launch and the chief of staff launches as before (225.891727ms)
✔ a business that never switched launches reads allowed with no time and no event (136.605795ms)
✔ launches revoked and then restored read allowed, with the restore time and event id (145.906123ms)
✔ a task closed on the tracker leaves the open list, and total counts the open ones (147.813747ms)
✔ a tombstone is not open (158.390962ms)
✔ the open list stops at the cap and says so; total still counts every open task (148.933669ms)
✔ a role and a reader session read state; arguments, and an unbound cap, refuse (150.29397ms)
✔ a human session reads the same state, with the same cap (161.903998ms)
✔ reading state writes nothing: every table keeps its row count (154.704101ms)
✔ creates private WAL store and excludes a second writer until explicit close (125.556124ms)
✔ rollback is atomic and schema metadata is checked against trusted DDL, not just itself (179.271273ms)
✔ existing empty database and symlink runtime directory refuse, never initialize over damage (205.404424ms)
✔ crash during a transaction recovers no partial event after explicit fixture-only lock removal (197.433046ms)
✔ writer refuses mixed at/read_at forms atomically, even through trusted SQL helpers (105.439859ms)
✔ async transactions refuse before invoking their function (89.179576ms)
✔ the session default fits under the reply cap and pages to the end with next (315.21121ms)
✔ the short form: no description, assignees by role, every listed key (263.063735ms)
✔ each filter, alone and together, and total counts every match (360.304423ms)
✔ task_ref reads one task in full, as the whole board has it (661.929254ms)
✔ no arguments is the read the Console and mosaic make, unchanged (265.132747ms)
✔ an unknown argument or a bad value refuses invalid-request (1000.607871ms)
✔ tasks rows carry priority and requirement for every session that reads tasks (303.988438ms)
✔ the read model rebuilds from the ledger: a reopened bus and each trail give the same values (346.973923ms)
✔ an empty business and one with snapshots but no task.created read cleanly (117.141257ms)
✔ recordTask keeps sync reads and a role write apart (189.666066ms)
✔ read_at must be one canonical UTC format, so the projection compares strings safely (110.592317ms)
✔ a bad entry refuses the whole record (108.31162ms)
✔ taskView reads the projection for one business (150.792269ms)
✔ requestTask hands only a holder and a task verb to the handler, and records refusals (259.370649ms)
✔ the server sends task verbs to the adapter with its own timeout; other verbs stay synchronous (641.078566ms)
✔ without an adapter the server refuses every task verb (203.763657ms)
✔ the runtime refuses an invalid adapter and closes a valid one (284.686823ms)
✔ the process loads the S3 adapter from plain-data trackers (343.302906ms)
✔ the tester binds only when the business sets bus.tester to exactly true (996.134173ms)
✔ a business may not name a role tester, so the tester address is never a role (327.660129ms)
✔ every verb outside the tester list refuses tester-refused and is recorded against the tester (616.932604ms)
✔ a tester message is from tester, starts [mos test], and writes no human.input or authority (214.953191ms)
✔ a role answers a tester only in reply to a tester message, and the answer never reaches the human (261.601253ms)
✔ the tester reads the human views a reader reads (171.183934ms)
✔ tester proof binds its own CLI, start time and nonce, refuses a managed run and allows an agent (1.195648ms)
✔ neither CLI's nonce proves the other: each proof is bound to its own CLI and nonce variable (0.396822ms)
✔ testerNonce reads only the tester's variable and gives null on any read error (0.239271ms)
✔ an envelope carries exactly one of cap, human and tester; no tester authenticator refuses (132.359834ms)
✔ tester-cli.mjs binds through the runtime when the switch is on, and refuses off or under a run marker (931.19518ms)
✔ REQ-THREAD-1 REQ-ORG-2: the 3d→3e migration adds the thread tables and leaves messages from before threads as written (1288.375084ms)
✔ REQ-THREAD-1: a 3d bus with a changed schema is refused and keeps its version and tables (847.585355ms)
✔ REQ-THREAD-1: the offline command prints the kept-message counts before the ready line (884.723475ms)
✔ REQ-ROLE-2 REQ-THREAD-1: one holder per thread, through the broker and the trigger (334.990696ms)
✔ REQ-ROLE-2 REQ-THREAD-1: the 3e triggers refuse writes that skip the broker (1390.631489ms)
✔ REQ-MSG-1: a message to or from the assistant names its thread, or is refused (342.279445ms)
✔ REQ-MSG-1: the chief of staff's reply comes back to the thread that sent the work (3787.561151ms)
✔ REQ-MSG-1: a reply can't carry one thread instance's thread to another thread instance (107.016111ms)
✔ REQ-THREAD-1 REQ-USER-2: one thread's messages never reach another thread's holder (167.171843ms)
✔ REQ-LAUNCH-1: a message to a thread with no holder waits, and the next holder gets it (170.42589ms)
✔ REQ-THREAD-2 REQ-LAUNCH-1: threadIdle releases only a thread with nothing waiting, and only for its holder (263.5875ms)
✔ REQ-THREAD-2 REQ-LAUNCH-1: a message delivered to a run that ended unread doesn't hold up the next holder (164.407643ms)
✔ REQ-ROLE-2 REQ-THREAD-1: an approved role.revoke never reaches a thread run, and the thread stays held (146.212133ms)
✔ REQ-USER-2: the human verbs refuse another owner's thread (162.582964ms)
✔ REQ-THREAD-1: thread.create refuses when the business has no thread instance or more than one (108.029753ms)
✔ REQ-ORG-2: projects and threads are named once, and the repo names a business project (145.381746ms)
✔ REQ-THREAD-2: thread.messages returns the thread's history in pages and writes nothing (524.340065ms)
✔ socket capability stamps launch identity; shared views use wire, no SQL client (159.030468ms)
✔ two wire claims serialize; a lost reply never automatically retries (182.738878ms)
✔ malformed, oversized and identity-forging envelopes refuse without echoing input (126.655585ms)
✔ client preserves UTF-8 when a response divides a multibyte character (11.795773ms)
✔ committed mutation followed by dropped reply reports unknown and is never retried (139.576119ms)
✔ web.search: a granted role gets labelled results, and the call is trailed with role, run, verb and query (172.647187ms)
✔ web.fetch: a granted role gets the page as labelled text, and the call is trailed with the url (332.604213ms)
✔ a role without the grant is refused, the refusal is logged with the verb, and nothing is fetched (237.823188ms)
✔ a broker with no web service refuses a granted role (137.701984ms)
✔ bad requests are refused: unknown verb, extra or missing argument, not a string, a human or reader session (230.329753ms)
✔ a session that is not the role holder is refused (152.046005ms)
✔ web.mjs's fences hold on the broker side: refusals are normal results with the fixed reason (390.609676ms)
✔ web.search with no search source configured is a refused result, not an error (135.237917ms)
✔ a search source that fails with its own refusal, or that throws, is handled (177.951997ms)
✔ a slow search source ends in a refusal at the deadline (223.442909ms)
✔ a secret in the arguments is refused before anything is trailed or fetched (179.149837ms)
✔ over the socket: the server routes web verbs to the service; other roles are refused; no service is web-not-configured (253.481715ms)
✔ busBusiness: the web grant comes from "web" in the resolved tool limit (0.261149ms)
✔ webServices: the business's search-source plug-in and web.searxng var make web.search work; without either it is refused as not configured (220.366408ms)
✔ an ungranted call is refused at once: no admission, no wait, nothing touched (160.519342ms)
✔ over the socket an ungranted caller is dropped by the server timeout and a granted one gets the longer wait (469.935429ms)
✔ a search that never answers is aborted at the deadline, the module sees the signal, and the call is trailed as refused (timeout) (174.24986ms)
✔ a fetch that stalls is cut off at the deadline: the request is destroyed, not left running (196.914235ms)
✔ one query limit: over SEARCH_MAX_QUERY_CHARS or empty is refused with the same reason before any backend, and the tool schema carries the same number (167.259658ms)
ℹ tests 344
ℹ suites 0
ℹ pass 344
ℹ fail 0
ℹ cancelled 0
ℹ skipped 0
ℹ todo 0
ℹ duration_ms 12971.57571