stack/agents/rocko/work/queue-124/r2/suite-bus.log

✔ agents: a held role with nothing on the bus is idle; a role session gets the claim rows unchanged (17.354159ms)
✔ agents: working counts what the holder received and has not read; routed alone is not working (16.027207ms)
✔ agents: input needed is the role's open decisions routed to the human, gated first, then oldest (28.096934ms)
✔ agents: working wins over waiting, and Input needed still shows (11.930567ms)
✔ agents: a new holder doesn't inherit what the last one left unread; decisions stay with the role (14.313904ms)
✔ agents: state reads only its own business, even for a run name both use (12.688332ms)
✔ agents: a message the holder released unread is stranded; the next holder gets nothing and cannot read it (15.133783ms)
✔ agents: a message the holder read is not stranded; one the current holder has not read is not listed (14.471636ms)
✔ agents: stranded is oldest first and capped at 50 for a role (71.620388ms)
✔ agents: stranded is per role and per business (25.085ms)
✔ agents: a message routed to a held role and not yet received is not stranded (9.577533ms)
✔ REQ-DEC an approval outlives its run and a broker restart; a new run of the instance consumes it once (25.195582ms)
✔ REQ-DEC another instance of the same definition cannot consume an approval, and its refusal consumes nothing (13.141406ms)
✔ REQ-DEC REQ-THREAD-1 a thread approval is consumed only by a run holding the same thread (17.827803ms)
✔ REQ-DEC a later run of the same instance supersedes an open decision; another instance cannot (15.286987ms)
✔ REQ-DEC REQ-THREAD-1 a thread decision is superseded only from the same thread (16.857846ms)
✔ REQ-DEC REQ-THREAD-1 a thread instance decision raised before row 121 is not consumed or superseded by any thread run (22.336034ms)
✔ launch identity is stamped, payload identity is refused and stale holder cannot send (16.954712ms)
✔ decision classes route from policy; gated resolution is human-only, choice and target must match (17.568589ms)
✔ claim exclusion, holder release, gated revoke and rerouting to a new holder are atomic (18.825603ms)
✔ launch events require a human CLI capability; generic emit cannot forge authority events (12.845676ms)
✔ within-role decisions close atomically and invalid options or blocking omissions refuse (11.403018ms)
✔ a recommendation that is not exactly one option key refuses invalid-recommendation after the options (18.77796ms)
✔ observer capabilities read human inbox but cannot mutate or forge launch identity (11.761192ms)
✔ task action subjects and linked decision trail are complete and ordered (19.891323ms)
✔ launch binding is durable and reconnecting requires the identical trusted record (7.987032ms)
✔ business isolation includes inherited object names and cross-business message references (13.869625ms)
✔ authority never transfers between action, target, unresolved or replaced role holder; a later run of the instance keeps it (20.405306ms)
✔ task projection uses schema current view, skipping earlier and equal-start polls (10.710209ms)
✔ revocation permanently bars the old run from reclaiming first, including after broker restart (15.426207ms)
✔ empty message references refuse before storage; refusal-evidence failure stays a typed error (9.955492ms)
✔ both arbiters require human resolution when their cross-role route is themselves (15.979841ms)
✔ the shipped coder role raises task.reassign as gated to the human; task.scope.change stays cross-role (15.137387ms)
✔ S1 adapter takes resolved limits and refs, rejects mismatched instance, never mutates input (1.121958ms)
✔ REQ-COS-1, REQ-ROLE-2: the chief of staff ends a run with a reason and no decision, and the reason is logged (22.942132ms)
✔ REQ-ROLE-2: a role without role.end still needs a resolved decision to revoke (21.194214ms)
✔ REQ-ROLE-2: storage accepts a revoke with a reason or a decision and aborts one with neither (14.625051ms)
✔ REQ-ROLE-2: the chief of staff may still cite a decision, and a decision alone is the old path (14.72247ms)
✔ REQ-ROLE-2: a role without role.end still ends a run through a resolved decision, which is recorded and has no reason (19.469737ms)
✔ REQ-ROLE-2: a reason is required, bounded, and never sent with a decision (18.866624ms)
✔ REQ-COS-1: the chief of staff cannot end its own run; its end of the assistant gets past the protection (18.114185ms)
✔ REQ-LIMIT-1, REQ-COS-1: organization.set from the chief of staff reaches the shared writer, named as the actor (15.798684ms)
✔ REQ-LIMIT-1, REQ-COS-1: a refused organization.set logs action.refused and no action.allowed, like a refused limits.set (19.911134ms)
✔ REQ-LIMIT-1: organization.set is refused for every caller whose role file lacks organization.change (20.522586ms)
✔ REQ-LIMIT-1: the chief of staff is logged as allowed, and organization.set takes only the human's keys (22.32596ms)
✔ REQ-ROLE-3, REQ-LIMIT-1: a chief-of-staff change is validated, written and logged like a human's; an invalid one is refused (44.209726ms)
✔ REQ-ROLE-2, REQ-COS-1: the 3c→3d migration lets the chief of staff end a held role with a reason; neither is still refused (48.904779ms)
✔ comment cursors isolate businesses, move only forward and remain append-only (11.96552ms)
✔ only trusted sync writes validated cursors; events and cursor share rollback (8.688626ms)
✔ explicit 3b copy migration preserves evidence and opens as 3g; normal startup never migrates (46.020457ms)
✔ migration refuses active writers and drifted legacy schemas, with no partial upgrade (72.779476ms)
✔ named migration registry chains 3b through 3g to a fixture-only future version in order (50.840187ms)
✔ migration refuses mismatched source metadata without changing schema or evidence (28.829082ms)
✔ offline command migrates only the supplied fixture root and reports usage errors (116.360983ms)
✔ credentials gives human and reader sessions service, account, role, date and state, and nothing else (13.798137ms)
✔ credentials refuses a role session and any argument (11.501376ms)
✔ credentials reads the status on each request, and a broker without one lists none (17.200199ms)
✔ the broker process answers credentials without a token, path or variable in its output, log or store (86.168917ms)
✔ only validated broker references load; returned data and exceptions cannot expose a known token (2.31597ms)
✔ bad file modes, symlinks, repository/data paths, malformed tokens and missing dates refuse (1.360145ms)
✔ expiry refuses use and env references never become client data (0.464152ms)
✔ S1 parsed service refs work, service mismatch refuses, Gitea rotation due is a warning state (1.020846ms)
✔ opaque tokens shorter than 16 characters refuse before use (0.243515ms)
✔ each C-suite role file carries the same two lists: human, chief-of-staff, pm, cto (1.347302ms)
✔ chief-executive-officer: messages to and from the user, chief of staff, pm and cto pass (39.385661ms)
✔ chief-executive-officer: a message to or from the coder, reviewer or assistant is refused and logged, and nothing is stored (32.034227ms)
✔ chief-executive-officer: another C-suite role isn't on the lists either (27.119902ms)
✔ chief-financial-officer: messages to and from the user, chief of staff, pm and cto pass (33.226579ms)
✔ chief-financial-officer: a message to or from the coder, reviewer or assistant is refused and logged, and nothing is stored (29.856046ms)
✔ chief-financial-officer: another C-suite role isn't on the lists either (25.269031ms)
✔ chief-information-officer: messages to and from the user, chief of staff, pm and cto pass (30.90206ms)
✔ chief-information-officer: a message to or from the coder, reviewer or assistant is refused and logged, and nothing is stored (29.216508ms)
✔ chief-information-officer: another C-suite role isn't on the lists either (24.828363ms)
✔ chief-information-security-officer: messages to and from the user, chief of staff, pm and cto pass (31.075295ms)
✔ chief-information-security-officer: a message to or from the coder, reviewer or assistant is refused and logged, and nothing is stored (32.259578ms)
✔ chief-information-security-officer: another C-suite role isn't on the lists either (24.267305ms)
✔ chief-marketing-officer: messages to and from the user, chief of staff, pm and cto pass (32.102573ms)
✔ chief-marketing-officer: a message to or from the coder, reviewer or assistant is refused and logged, and nothing is stored (62.632948ms)
✔ chief-marketing-officer: another C-suite role isn't on the lists either (87.864905ms)
✔ a human resolve sends the raising role one message from the human, and its request is the answer (95.165768ms)
✔ a cross-role decision resolved by its arbiter comes from that role and run, with no request (19.523378ms)
✔ a human withdraw sends one message with the note (19.03508ms)
✔ a human seen before the close leaves the request on the close's answer, not the seen (21.303738ms)
✔ the raising run's withdraw, a supersede, a within-role raise and seen send nothing (20.38918ms)
✔ refused closes send nothing: invalid-choice, decision-closed, not-resolver (21.546616ms)
✔ a raising role nobody holds at the close gets the message on the next claim (18.32796ms)
✔ a human DECISION send keeps its own instruction as the request, not a close's answer (16.827726ms)
✔ a cross-role raise whose arbiter the raiser does not hear from is refused and stores nothing (29.250522ms)
✔ a gated raise by a role that does not hear from the human is refused and stores nothing (21.434867ms)
✔ a route the raiser hears from is allowed, checked from the route to the raiser (26.119409ms)
✔ a refused supersede withdraws nothing (20.438995ms)
✔ the assistant's within-role and gated raises still work (20.960743ms)
✔ roles lists open decisions routed to a role, and never the human inbox (22.552125ms)
✔ recent lists closed decisions of every route, newest close first, with how each closed (21.650642ms)
✔ recent gives the closing event as closed when the decision was seen first (22.697337ms)
✔ recent stops at RECENT rows (74.985229ms)
✔ every row is what trail already gives the same session for that id (35.629051ms)
✔ a role session can't list decisions, so it can't read another role's open decisions (33.539242ms)
✔ decisions is a read: one business, strict arguments, nothing written (34.699376ms)
✔ endLaunch writes session.ended, releases the run claim and kills its capabilities (16.704218ms)
✔ endLaunch refuses an unknown run, a second end and a rebind of the ended run (10.476628ms)
✔ a restarted broker refuses to rebind an ended run; a refused rebind leaves the run unbound (11.79868ms)
✔ endLaunch leaves a claim another run took alone (13.395981ms)
✔ refuse records action.refused against the caller with the code only (9.924341ms)
✔ launches off refuses role.launch with launch-revoked until launches on (14.214768ms)
✔ broker process: launch ops authorize role.launch, record refusals and end runs (121.109891ms)
✔ REQ-WAIT-1: the broker hard waits are exactly the list, and match the business vocabulary (1.299682ms)
✔ REQ-WAIT-2: a business granting a hard wait at either class is refused; the actions that left are grantable (16.337535ms)
✔ REQ-DEC-2: every hard wait goes to the human, cited or not, and the arbiter cannot resolve it (308.466824ms)
✔ REQ-DEC-2: a gated raise citing the current spec goes to the arbiter for its domain; uncited, to the human (152.914883ms)
✔ REQ-DEC-2: an arbiter-approved cited gated decision authorizes the raiser, and the human cannot resolve it (40.491251ms)
✔ REQ-DEC-2: a cited merge raised by merge-gate goes to the technical arbiter; a merge raised without the grant routes by citation (58.272961ms)
✔ REQ-DEC-2: a stale or unconfirmed citation refuses without a decision; an arbiter raising its own goes to the human (92.254799ms)
✔ Q169: the chief of staff's end of the assistant is not refused role-end-refused; its own run and another ender's are (25.975414ms)
✔ Q169: another role's cited revoke of the assistant, resolved by an arbiter, is refused (54.383697ms)
✔ Q169: a revoke of the assistant citing a decision the human resolved is not refused by the protection (43.010265ms)
✔ Q169: a cited revoke of a role not in END_PROTECTED still goes to the arbiter, and executes (43.813729ms)
✔ Q169: a role granted role.revoke at either class still sends a revoke of the assistant to the human (64.267311ms)
✔ human proof binds CLI entry, process start and nonce; agents and incomplete ancestry refuse (1.524209ms)
✔ process reader gets own kernel identity without exposing environment values (0.435701ms)
✔ EACCES ancestor environments skip only markers; commands and registered launches still refuse (0.653947ms)
✔ real pid 1 remains inspectable when its environment is protected (0.252861ms)
✔ REQ-DEC-2: a merge-gate raise its arbiter resolved lands through the host op: checkLand answers the facts and a ticket, records nothing, and recordLand spends the decision once (41.282047ms)
✔ checkLand refuses on the decision and the review (26.951616ms)
✔ REQ-LAND-1: a gated merge decision refuses not-authorized, cited and approved by the arbiter or uncited and approved by the human (73.279172ms)
✔ REQ-LAND-1: a within-role merge grant refuses not-authorized at the land (17.65495ms)
✔ a cross-role merge that routes to the human, because merge-gate is its own arbiter, lands on the human's CLI answer (20.074704ms)
✔ a merge option with no first line refuses no-subject, as land-work does (16.987855ms)
✔ checkLand refuses with land-work's codes past the authority check, and a decision raised for refactor never lands (46.154427ms)
✔ a ticket outlives the run that asked, and recordLand checks the task again (21.45353ms)
✔ landRefused files the code on the task, tells the role only with notify, and ends the ticket (23.593636ms)
✔ landHeld is true only for an approved, unspent cross-role merge decision this role raised for a task in this thread (22.639057ms)
✔ no run may write the action.allowed for git.merge.protected itself (12.539441ms)
✔ a message to a stopped role sends launch.by one notice, and the result says so (20.122757ms)
✔ a message to a role outside launch.instances says so in its result and in the notice (12.754187ms)
✔ a message to a running role sends no notice and its result is unchanged (9.783853ms)
✔ a re-route at a claim, a release and claim, and a broker restart send no second notice (15.640942ms)
✔ a run launched but not yet claimed counts as no holder (8.316296ms)
✔ no notice for a message to launch.by, from it, from a tester, to the human, or in a thread to a thread instance (18.805951ms)
✔ a business with no launch block tells nobody and says there is no launcher (7.77444ms)
✔ the notice sender stays internal: no role is named _bus and no caller can send as it or to it (24.615014ms)
✔ limits binds actor from human proof and rejects role, reader, tester and forged actor (17.795755ms)
✔ runtime wires verified human settings to the actual shared file writer and actor receipt (51.131896ms)
✔ uncertain organization receipts leave bus startup and reads alone but refuse writes until reconciled (25.377264ms)
✔ within-role sends cite an open gated launch decision without spending it or naming it in grants (21.126853ms)
✔ missing and foreign-business citations refuse and roll back message and grant (12.896356ms)
✔ cross-role sends still need a matching resolved decision and consume it once (17.877639ms)
✔ messages pages all human messages newest first without writes; read state is history (252.891104ms)
✔ messages refuses role callers, invalid paging and cursors outside this human feed (19.622748ms)
✔ views messages passes only its paging arguments through (0.240713ms)
✔ messages isolates businesses even with a valid foreign cursor (12.64145ms)
✔ the assistant sends to the user and to the chief of staff only (28.333519ms)
✔ an assistant send to any other role, or to the tester, is refused and logged (23.484141ms)
✔ only the user and the chief of staff may send to the assistant; the tester is refused by default (24.420407ms)
✔ REQ-ASSIST-2 REQ-THREAD-1 thread.send to an instance that does not hear from the user is refused and stores nothing (20.021429ms)
✔ a sender-side list alone refuses a send to a role that has no list (19.829974ms)
✔ a target-side list alone refuses a send from a role that has no list (22.023709ms)
✔ the sender list is checked before the target list (18.522023ms)
✔ roles without the field behave exactly as before (29.440049ms)
✔ a business with no role definitions at all is unlimited (21.837848ms)
✔ a malformed messaging field refuses at boot (9.083407ms)
✔ the assistant's review.request to a reviewer is refused and logged, even with an approved decision (24.660274ms)
✔ a review.verdict to the assistant from a role outside its receiveFrom is refused and logged (26.539913ms)
✔ review requests and verdicts between roles without the field are unchanged (22.446066ms)
✔ 3f copy migrates to 3g preserving every old column/row, with an empty instance_names and null to_name (65.466159ms)
✔ REQ-MSG-2: the chief of staff names an instance under its within-role grant, and the write is logged (19.259681ms)
✔ REQ-MSG-2: the human names an instance through the CLI (14.582107ms)
✔ REQ-MSG-2: a role without the grant, or holding it cross-role, is refused not-authorized (15.91645ms)
✔ REQ-MSG-2: a name is unique in the business and is never an instance key or a role name (26.58731ms)
✔ REQ-MSG-2: a send by name reaches the instance and records both; a send by instance key is unchanged (22.375632ms)
✔ REQ-MSG-2: an instance key beats a name that equals it, as when a later instance takes the key (12.722727ms)
✔ REQ-MSG-2: a role name beats a name that equals it, as when a later definition takes the word (sage-0590) (13.659202ms)
✔ plugins and plugins.set refuse every non-human session and a forged actor, and pass only the patch with the verified actor (17.062065ms)
✔ runtime: the switch changes the organization file, the receipt carries the actor, and a bad shape, an unknown module and a stale revision are refused with nothing written (64.727984ms)
✔ vikunja:19/309 through the broker, a patch switches the kinds it names and keeps the rest; null removes one kind and is trailed (25.190232ms)
✔ broker process binds trusted launches, offers reader capabilities, refuses human mutation, closes cleanly (111.154265ms)
✔ startup token refusal returns safe code without value or partial listening broker (73.836987ms)
✔ loaded fixture token is absent from socket replies and SQLite, including refusal evidence (106.969785ms)
✔ killed broker leaves an explicit stale lock; another process cannot silently reclaim it (156.075389ms)
✔ trusted host registers later launches; socket clients never have a registration verb (111.176493ms)
✔ runtime excludes declared project roots even when host supplies no repoRoots (74.163509ms)
✔ a refused launch binding leaves the broker and existing capabilities alive; bad protocol stops it (103.180974ms)
✔ D1: committed write with a failed receipt refuses outcome-unknown without action.allowed (16.618083ms)
✔ D2: spec.read refuses without content if its role is released during the read (10.803496ms)
✔ D3: spec.read secret check refuses flagged content without content (9.678909ms)
✔ D3: spec.read secret check refuses flagged subject without content (9.458522ms)
✔ a human lists, opens and saves; the save is one commit by the business human (110.33736ms)
✔ an agent and a reader refuse every file verb and nothing is written (38.508909ms)
✔ a stale base refuses stale-base and writes nothing (69.138987ms)
✔ paths outside the spec and docs refuse, as do unknown projects, missing files and odd arguments (53.587725ms)
✔ without a project adapter the file verbs refuse project-not-configured (23.504117ms)
✔ on the socket a save may carry 1 MiB of text; every other request keeps the 64 KiB limit (128.726541ms)
✔ a request that names the save verb first and another verb last is refused at 64 KiB (35.001141ms)
✔ two saves racing for one repository make one commit (75.822591ms)
✔ Broker keeps the existing sandbox client import closure: no new imports or lazy project import (1.423203ms)
✔ without a trusted project adapter all three async paths refuse project-not-configured (32.732005ms)
✔ real startBroker injects the project adapter for socket reads and bound-author record writes (60.763326ms)
✔ a reply is listed for human and reader sessions, and its delivery rows are unchanged (28.387927ms)
✔ the reply still reaches the human message.receive (mosaic talk) after the Console showed it (14.598495ms)
✔ a message with no reply gives an empty list (11.898303ms)
✔ replies come oldest first and stop at REPLIES (59.699998ms)
✔ an id that names no message in the business refuses message-not-found, and the refusal is recorded (21.17209ms)
✔ strict arguments; a role session gets human-required (25.751142ms)
✔ views passes replies through as one call with the id (0.219174ms)
✔ requirements returns the committed list to a holding role session, and no one else (20.541736ms)
✔ the PM's prd.approve with no task, when no id fits, reaches the human's Inbox (11.899212ms)
✔ the PM's non-blocking role.revoke with no task reaches the human's Inbox (12.637871ms)
✔ a push is recorded as the action.allowed for git.push.working on the task, and only the host records one (22.805054ms)
✔ review.request names the latest pushed commit and sends the reviewer a REVIEW-REQUEST (17.653818ms)
✔ review.request says which run holds the reviewer role, or null, and a null request waits for a claim (21.449632ms)
✔ review.request refuses a commit that isn't the latest push, a non-reviewer and a role without the action (27.30701ms)
✔ reviewFetch answers only the addressed reviewer, for the request it cites (18.164973ms)
✔ review.verdict answers one request once, to the role that asked (23.342545ms)
✔ task.close on a pushed task needs an approve verdict for the latest push (31.643331ms)
✔ a refusal the host decided is filed on the task it names, and only a task ref counts (17.096842ms)
✔ v3b prototype refusals, views and append-only mutations (67.121577ms)
✔ gated approval authorizes once, survives store reopen, and fresh approval works (24.619055ms)
✔ another run of the same instance consumes an approval once; a failed check leaves it usable (16.429288ms)
✔ two scheduled callers have exactly one grant and one consumed refusal (11.469035ms)
✔ failed commit rolls consumption back; cross-role consumes and within-role stays reusable (24.611344ms)
✔ class drift gated to cross-role refuses before consumption (15.779997ms)
✔ class drift cross-role to gated refuses before consumption (16.82467ms)
✔ class drift gated to within-role refuses before consumption (15.803422ms)
✔ class drift cross-role to within-role refuses before consumption (16.161525ms)
✔ class drift within-role to gated refuses before consumption (13.958752ms)
✔ class drift within-role to cross-role refuses before consumption (13.928768ms)
✔ message.send consumes approval and prevents a later send or authorize (16.286506ms)
✔ role.revoke consumes approval and prevents a later revoke or authorize (18.411268ms)
✔ 3e copy migrates through 3f to 3g preserving every old column/row and adding null spec citations (69.470068ms)
✔ a human spec save sends one notice to each pm and cto, naming the commit, and each commit sends its own (107.173548ms)
✔ no notice for a docs save, an agent record commit, a git commit outside the Console, or a refused save (123.786737ms)
✔ a notice to a role no run holds waits for a claim, and launches nobody and tells nobody (60.970546ms)
✔ a business without a pm or a cto saves the spec and sends nothing (52.929922ms)
✔ a notice that cannot be stored answers outcome-unknown, and the commit stands (62.882999ms)
✔ a BLOCK reaches the chief of staff, the chief relays it to the assistant in the user's thread, and the commit stands (69.82834ms)
✔ with no thread a BLOCK still reaches the chief of staff, and the relay to the assistant is refused (63.565995ms)
✔ within the notice's project the relay lands in the user's most recently opened thread (68.231435ms)
✔ a more recently opened thread in another project does not take the relay (64.511478ms)
✔ a BLOCK is refused from anyone but a pm or cto, to anyone but the chief of staff, and outside a reply to its own notice (71.44416ms)
✔ a role cannot forge a spec notice: its text opens neither a BLOCK nor the assistant's thread (69.286951ms)
✔ the bus receives nothing: a reply to a notice addressed to _bus is refused (66.279914ms)
✔ real socket awaits spec reads, record writes and cited raises; other requests still return normally (90.081153ms)
✔ real socket preserves asynchronous refusal codes and disconnects its transient proof (26.218475ms)
✔ two real socket writes to one repository yield one commit and one project-busy refusal (46.458893ms)
✔ client disconnect during await tolerates late reply (39.160482ms)
✔ client disconnect during await tolerates late refusal (24.179ms)
✔ N-a: slow admitted record.write returns its committed result after the idle deadline (190.804773ms)
✔ current citation is recorded; docs commits do not stale it and a new spec never reopens settlement (89.842435ms)
✔ stale, unconfirmed, missing and partial spec citations refuse without inserting a decision (88.240263ms)
✔ uncited raises retain their synchronous path and spec read is available to any held role in its business (39.112967ms)
✔ record writes bind the session author, require authority and refuse spec and impersonation paths (43.20143ms)
✔ REQ-COS-1: the pm asks the chief of staff for roles and counts; the chief receives a STAFF-REQUEST and answers it (22.748475ms)
✔ REQ-COS-1: only the pm can send a staff request; every other session is refused and the chief of staff hears nothing (21.37668ms)
✔ REQ-COS-1: a pm without message.send is refused like any other gated action (10.458375ms)
✔ REQ-COS-1: the request goes to the business launcher, and only when that is a chief of staff (28.110925ms)
✔ REQ-COS-1: the sender is judged by definition: an instance `lead` of the pm definition can ask, an instance `pm` of the coder definition can't (27.013655ms)
✔ REQ-COS-1: the launcher is judged by definition: an instance `boss` of the chief-of-staff definition receives, a `chief` of the coder definition gives no-chief-of-staff (25.424299ms)
✔ REQ-COS-1: a refused staff request leaves no staff.request action.allowed event (16.232461ms)
✔ REQ-ASSIST-2: the role definitions' messaging lists hold for a staff request, sender and recipient (39.809997ms)
✔ a staff request names a task, 1 to 10 distinct roles and counts of 1 to 20; nothing else is accepted (29.175099ms)
✔ REQ-COS-1: a staff request grants nothing: the pm still can't launch and the chief of staff launches as before (15.458049ms)
✔ a business that never switched launches reads allowed with no time and no event (13.940884ms)
✔ launches revoked and then restored read allowed, with the restore time and event id (11.741402ms)
✔ a task closed on the tracker leaves the open list, and total counts the open ones (11.405816ms)
✔ a tombstone is not open (9.057773ms)
✔ the open list stops at the cap and says so; total still counts every open task (12.068698ms)
✔ a role and a reader session read state; arguments, and an unbound cap, refuse (10.569259ms)
✔ a human session reads the same state, with the same cap (11.934604ms)
✔ reading state writes nothing: every table keeps its row count (10.692273ms)
✔ creates private WAL store and excludes a second writer until explicit close (11.128906ms)
✔ rollback is atomic and schema metadata is checked against trusted DDL, not just itself (10.725609ms)
✔ existing empty database and symlink runtime directory refuse, never initialize over damage (10.553855ms)
✔ crash during a transaction recovers no partial event after explicit fixture-only lock removal (49.876469ms)
✔ writer refuses mixed at/read_at forms atomically, even through trusted SQL helpers (7.633968ms)
✔ async transactions refuse before invoking their function (5.757715ms)
✔ usage_records refuses non-canonical timestamps atomically (6.652684ms)
✔ the session default fits under the reply cap and pages to the end with next (114.444166ms)
✔ the short form: no description, assignees by role, every listed key (74.291383ms)
✔ each filter, alone and together, and total counts every match (150.944876ms)
✔ task_ref reads one task in full, as the whole board has it (94.338978ms)
✔ no arguments is the read the Console and mosaic make, unchanged (73.735111ms)
✔ an unknown argument or a bad value refuses invalid-request (307.259998ms)
✔ tasks rows carry priority and requirement for every session that reads tasks (29.609422ms)
✔ the read model rebuilds from the ledger: a reopened bus and each trail give the same values (33.012112ms)
✔ an empty business and one with snapshots but no task.created read cleanly (7.969536ms)
✔ recordTask keeps sync reads and a role write apart (17.449094ms)
✔ read_at must be one canonical UTC format, so the projection compares strings safely (7.081719ms)
✔ a bad entry refuses the whole record (7.147408ms)
✔ taskView reads the projection for one business (9.196839ms)
✔ requestTask hands only a holder and a task verb to the handler, and records refusals (17.488987ms)
✔ the server sends task verbs to the adapter with its own timeout; other verbs stay synchronous (285.994379ms)
✔ without an adapter the server refuses every task verb (17.968107ms)
✔ the runtime refuses an invalid adapter and closes a valid one (22.108158ms)
✔ the process loads the S3 adapter from plain-data trackers (179.014456ms)
✔ the tester binds only when the business sets bus.tester to exactly true (67.111843ms)
✔ a business may not name a role tester, so the tester address is never a role (18.216683ms)
✔ every verb outside the tester list refuses tester-refused and is recorded against the tester (45.68984ms)
✔ a tester message is from tester, starts [mos test], and writes no human.input or authority (18.924432ms)
✔ a role answers a tester only in reply to a tester message, and the answer never reaches the human (24.483963ms)
✔ the tester reads the human views a reader reads (29.199391ms)
✔ tester proof binds its own CLI, start time and nonce, refuses a managed run and allows an agent (2.218638ms)
✔ neither CLI's nonce proves the other: each proof is bound to its own CLI and nonce variable (0.686244ms)
✔ testerNonce reads only the tester's variable and gives null on any read error (0.37973ms)
✔ an envelope carries exactly one of cap, human and tester; no tester authenticator refuses (24.308399ms)
✔ tester-cli.mjs binds through the runtime when the switch is on, and refuses off or under a run marker (770.44514ms)
✔ REQ-THREAD-1 REQ-ORG-2: the 3d→3e migration adds the thread tables and leaves messages from before threads as written (74.091183ms)
✔ REQ-THREAD-1: a 3d bus with a changed schema is refused and keeps its version and tables (43.969698ms)
✔ REQ-THREAD-1: the offline command prints the kept-message counts before the ready line (101.266153ms)
✔ REQ-ROLE-2 REQ-THREAD-1: one holder per thread, through the broker and the trigger (32.572753ms)
✔ REQ-ROLE-2 REQ-THREAD-1: the 3e triggers refuse writes that skip the broker (50.51672ms)
✔ REQ-MSG-1: a message to or from the assistant names its thread, or is refused (30.652359ms)
✔ REQ-MSG-1: the chief of staff's reply comes back to the thread that sent the work (604.946045ms)
✔ REQ-MSG-1: a reply can't carry one thread instance's thread to another thread instance (19.77638ms)
✔ REQ-THREAD-1 REQ-USER-2: one thread's messages never reach another thread's holder (24.615619ms)
✔ REQ-LAUNCH-1: a message to a thread with no holder waits, and the next holder gets it (29.972709ms)
✔ REQ-THREAD-2 REQ-LAUNCH-1: threadIdle releases only a thread with nothing waiting, and only for its holder (32.78117ms)
✔ REQ-THREAD-2 REQ-LAUNCH-1: a message delivered to a run that ended unread doesn't hold up the next holder (27.758733ms)
✔ REQ-ROLE-2 REQ-THREAD-1: an approved role.revoke never reaches a thread run, and the thread stays held (23.478987ms)
✔ REQ-USER-2: the human verbs refuse another owner's thread (24.618867ms)
✔ REQ-THREAD-1: thread.create refuses when the business has no thread instance or more than one (17.510613ms)
✔ REQ-ORG-2: projects and threads are named once, and the repo names a business project (21.40808ms)
✔ REQ-THREAD-2: thread.messages returns the thread's history in pages and writes nothing (88.706192ms)
✔ socket capability stamps launch identity; shared views use wire, no SQL client (22.250451ms)
✔ two wire claims serialize; a lost reply never automatically retries (16.351907ms)
✔ malformed, oversized and identity-forging envelopes refuse without echoing input (8.473176ms)
✔ client preserves UTF-8 when a response divides a multibyte character (11.322887ms)
✔ committed mutation followed by dropped reply reports unknown and is never retried (11.003176ms)
✔ REQ-LIMIT-4 usage protocol binds run identity, requires a delivered turn and isolates businesses (19.533168ms)
✔ REQ-LIMIT-4 3g copy migrates to 3h preserving every old column, row and sequence; new usage table is empty (67.095807ms)
✔ REQ-PLUG-1 runtime reaches transcript only through loader, over the real bus socket (28.897656ms)
✔ REQ-LIMIT-4 loader source records new turn kinds, excludes history and retries exactly once (15.883823ms)
✔ REQ-LIMIT-4 cut: unknown is durable and logged next to every total (9.869815ms)
✔ REQ-LIMIT-4 disabled: unknown is durable and logged next to every total (8.320671ms)
✔ REQ-LIMIT-4 missing-begin: unknown is durable and logged next to every total (8.354387ms)
✔ REQ-LIMIT-4 no-new-usage: unknown is durable and logged next to every total (10.081953ms)
✔ REQ-LIMIT-4 rewrite: unknown is durable and logged next to every total (8.552638ms)
✔ REQ-LIMIT-4 unfinished turn remains visibly unknown after accounting restarts (7.610387ms)
✔ usage records are append-only (7.523295ms)
✔ REQ-LIMIT-4 parse failure logs its safe code, never transcript content (8.092966ms)
✔ REQ-LIMIT-4 resumed run baselines history and exact totals do not overflow (10.569415ms)
✔ REQ-PLUG-1 core has no transcript import and disabled sources do not read any transcript (7.870933ms)
✔ REQ-LIMIT-4 a resumed thread bills only new assistant messages to its next run (8.866313ms)
✔ REQ-LIMIT-4 every enabled source is called; failure is unknown and a partial total stays labelled (12.198692ms)
✔ REQ-LIMIT-4 a turn whose reported sum exceeds safe precision is unknown, not rounded (8.051215ms)
✔ web.search: a granted role gets labelled results, and the call is trailed with role, run, verb and query (17.187407ms)
✔ web.fetch: a granted role gets the page as labelled text, and the call is trailed with the url (16.559763ms)
✔ a role without the grant is refused, the refusal is logged with the verb, and nothing is fetched (15.230656ms)
✔ a broker with no web service refuses a granted role (9.860611ms)
✔ bad requests are refused: unknown verb, extra or missing argument, not a string, a human or reader session (14.405698ms)
✔ a session that is not the role holder is refused (8.603591ms)
✔ web.mjs's fences hold on the broker side: refusals are normal results with the fixed reason (32.244243ms)
✔ web.search with no search source configured is a refused result, not an error (10.914363ms)
✔ a search source that fails with its own refusal, or that throws, is handled (13.055732ms)
✔ a slow search source ends in a refusal at the deadline (60.584757ms)
✔ a secret in the arguments is refused before anything is trailed or fetched (9.300179ms)
✔ over the socket: the server routes web verbs to the service; other roles are refused; no service is web-not-configured (24.235177ms)
✔ busBusiness: the web grant comes from "web" in the resolved tool limit (0.209587ms)
✔ webServices: the business's search-source plug-in and web.searxng var make web.search work; without either it is refused as not configured (26.768011ms)
✔ an ungranted call is refused at once: no admission, no wait, nothing touched (12.674434ms)
✔ over the socket an ungranted caller is dropped by the server timeout and a granted one gets the longer wait (323.832391ms)
✔ a search that never answers is aborted at the deadline, the module sees the signal, and the call is trailed as refused (timeout) (72.436518ms)
✔ a fetch that stalls is cut off at the deadline: the request is destroyed, not left running (92.721019ms)
✔ one query limit: over SEARCH_MAX_QUERY_CHARS or empty is refused with the same reason before any backend, and the tool schema carries the same number (13.778937ms)
ℹ tests 363
ℹ suites 0
ℹ pass 363
ℹ fail 0
ℹ cancelled 0
ℹ skipped 0
ℹ todo 0
ℹ duration_ms 17115.14999