stack/agents/rocko/work/queue-124/suite-bus.log

✔ agents: a held role with nothing on the bus is idle; a role session gets the claim rows unchanged (16.809697ms)
✔ agents: working counts what the holder received and has not read; routed alone is not working (15.555845ms)
✔ agents: input needed is the role's open decisions routed to the human, gated first, then oldest (26.2355ms)
✔ agents: working wins over waiting, and Input needed still shows (10.642077ms)
✔ agents: a new holder doesn't inherit what the last one left unread; decisions stay with the role (13.91188ms)
✔ agents: state reads only its own business, even for a run name both use (12.610009ms)
✔ agents: a message the holder released unread is stranded; the next holder gets nothing and cannot read it (14.807621ms)
✔ agents: a message the holder read is not stranded; one the current holder has not read is not listed (14.181506ms)
✔ agents: stranded is oldest first and capped at 50 for a role (69.364549ms)
✔ agents: stranded is per role and per business (24.889618ms)
✔ agents: a message routed to a held role and not yet received is not stranded (9.684149ms)
✔ REQ-DEC an approval outlives its run and a broker restart; a new run of the instance consumes it once (26.690132ms)
✔ REQ-DEC another instance of the same definition cannot consume an approval, and its refusal consumes nothing (13.35026ms)
✔ REQ-DEC REQ-THREAD-1 a thread approval is consumed only by a run holding the same thread (18.836443ms)
✔ REQ-DEC a later run of the same instance supersedes an open decision; another instance cannot (15.794319ms)
✔ REQ-DEC REQ-THREAD-1 a thread decision is superseded only from the same thread (17.192156ms)
✔ REQ-DEC REQ-THREAD-1 a thread instance decision raised before row 121 is not consumed or superseded by any thread run (22.451841ms)
✔ launch identity is stamped, payload identity is refused and stale holder cannot send (17.827706ms)
✔ decision classes route from policy; gated resolution is human-only, choice and target must match (18.745106ms)
✔ claim exclusion, holder release, gated revoke and rerouting to a new holder are atomic (18.089868ms)
✔ launch events require a human CLI capability; generic emit cannot forge authority events (12.154987ms)
✔ within-role decisions close atomically and invalid options or blocking omissions refuse (10.958208ms)
✔ a recommendation that is not exactly one option key refuses invalid-recommendation after the options (16.918343ms)
✔ observer capabilities read human inbox but cannot mutate or forge launch identity (10.731819ms)
✔ task action subjects and linked decision trail are complete and ordered (18.47772ms)
✔ launch binding is durable and reconnecting requires the identical trusted record (8.633739ms)
✔ business isolation includes inherited object names and cross-business message references (13.266553ms)
✔ authority never transfers between action, target, unresolved or replaced role holder; a later run of the instance keeps it (19.270812ms)
✔ task projection uses schema current view, skipping earlier and equal-start polls (10.276011ms)
✔ revocation permanently bars the old run from reclaiming first, including after broker restart (14.979998ms)
✔ empty message references refuse before storage; refusal-evidence failure stays a typed error (9.345475ms)
✔ both arbiters require human resolution when their cross-role route is themselves (16.199611ms)
✔ the shipped coder role raises task.reassign as gated to the human; task.scope.change stays cross-role (16.336651ms)
✔ S1 adapter takes resolved limits and refs, rejects mismatched instance, never mutates input (1.139296ms)
✔ REQ-COS-1, REQ-ROLE-2: the chief of staff ends a run with a reason and no decision, and the reason is logged (22.904907ms)
✔ REQ-ROLE-2: a role without role.end still needs a resolved decision to revoke (21.703354ms)
✔ REQ-ROLE-2: storage accepts a revoke with a reason or a decision and aborts one with neither (14.795861ms)
✔ REQ-ROLE-2: the chief of staff may still cite a decision, and a decision alone is the old path (15.764762ms)
✔ REQ-ROLE-2: a role without role.end still ends a run through a resolved decision, which is recorded and has no reason (20.229655ms)
✔ REQ-ROLE-2: a reason is required, bounded, and never sent with a decision (18.447449ms)
✔ REQ-COS-1: the chief of staff cannot end its own run; its end of the assistant gets past the protection (16.652622ms)
✔ REQ-LIMIT-1, REQ-COS-1: organization.set from the chief of staff reaches the shared writer, named as the actor (14.652054ms)
✔ REQ-LIMIT-1, REQ-COS-1: a refused organization.set logs action.refused and no action.allowed, like a refused limits.set (19.653001ms)
✔ REQ-LIMIT-1: organization.set is refused for every caller whose role file lacks organization.change (18.300319ms)
✔ REQ-LIMIT-1: the chief of staff is logged as allowed, and organization.set takes only the human's keys (24.428758ms)
✔ REQ-ROLE-3, REQ-LIMIT-1: a chief-of-staff change is validated, written and logged like a human's; an invalid one is refused (44.116639ms)
✔ REQ-ROLE-2, REQ-COS-1: the 3c→3d migration lets the chief of staff end a held role with a reason; neither is still refused (51.878921ms)
✔ comment cursors isolate businesses, move only forward and remain append-only (13.52842ms)
✔ only trusted sync writes validated cursors; events and cursor share rollback (8.968446ms)
✔ explicit 3b copy migration preserves evidence and opens as 3g; normal startup never migrates (45.38078ms)
✔ migration refuses active writers and drifted legacy schemas, with no partial upgrade (66.620641ms)
✔ named migration registry chains 3b through 3g to a fixture-only future version in order (50.39161ms)
✔ migration refuses mismatched source metadata without changing schema or evidence (29.214383ms)
✔ offline command migrates only the supplied fixture root and reports usage errors (121.610457ms)
✔ credentials gives human and reader sessions service, account, role, date and state, and nothing else (13.367298ms)
✔ credentials refuses a role session and any argument (11.730218ms)
✔ credentials reads the status on each request, and a broker without one lists none (13.563617ms)
✔ the broker process answers credentials without a token, path or variable in its output, log or store (88.324488ms)
✔ only validated broker references load; returned data and exceptions cannot expose a known token (2.102949ms)
✔ bad file modes, symlinks, repository/data paths, malformed tokens and missing dates refuse (1.323687ms)
✔ expiry refuses use and env references never become client data (0.438569ms)
✔ S1 parsed service refs work, service mismatch refuses, Gitea rotation due is a warning state (0.900608ms)
✔ opaque tokens shorter than 16 characters refuse before use (0.210788ms)
✔ each C-suite role file carries the same two lists: human, chief-of-staff, pm, cto (1.219333ms)
✔ chief-executive-officer: messages to and from the user, chief of staff, pm and cto pass (36.293586ms)
✔ chief-executive-officer: a message to or from the coder, reviewer or assistant is refused and logged, and nothing is stored (29.496821ms)
✔ chief-executive-officer: another C-suite role isn't on the lists either (24.076292ms)
✔ chief-financial-officer: messages to and from the user, chief of staff, pm and cto pass (29.837599ms)
✔ chief-financial-officer: a message to or from the coder, reviewer or assistant is refused and logged, and nothing is stored (27.041373ms)
✔ chief-financial-officer: another C-suite role isn't on the lists either (24.698664ms)
✔ chief-information-officer: messages to and from the user, chief of staff, pm and cto pass (28.477278ms)
✔ chief-information-officer: a message to or from the coder, reviewer or assistant is refused and logged, and nothing is stored (27.245705ms)
✔ chief-information-officer: another C-suite role isn't on the lists either (25.081881ms)
✔ chief-information-security-officer: messages to and from the user, chief of staff, pm and cto pass (29.538033ms)
✔ chief-information-security-officer: a message to or from the coder, reviewer or assistant is refused and logged, and nothing is stored (28.477586ms)
✔ chief-information-security-officer: another C-suite role isn't on the lists either (24.593062ms)
✔ chief-marketing-officer: messages to and from the user, chief of staff, pm and cto pass (29.971665ms)
✔ chief-marketing-officer: a message to or from the coder, reviewer or assistant is refused and logged, and nothing is stored (28.286075ms)
✔ chief-marketing-officer: another C-suite role isn't on the lists either (25.023224ms)
✔ a human resolve sends the raising role one message from the human, and its request is the answer (31.505478ms)
✔ a cross-role decision resolved by its arbiter comes from that role and run, with no request (17.186986ms)
✔ a human withdraw sends one message with the note (15.763ms)
✔ a human seen before the close leaves the request on the close's answer, not the seen (18.605844ms)
✔ the raising run's withdraw, a supersede, a within-role raise and seen send nothing (18.938728ms)
✔ refused closes send nothing: invalid-choice, decision-closed, not-resolver (19.154961ms)
✔ a raising role nobody holds at the close gets the message on the next claim (17.057435ms)
✔ a human DECISION send keeps its own instruction as the request, not a close's answer (15.51925ms)
✔ a cross-role raise whose arbiter the raiser does not hear from is refused and stores nothing (23.990037ms)
✔ a gated raise by a role that does not hear from the human is refused and stores nothing (17.735947ms)
✔ a route the raiser hears from is allowed, checked from the route to the raiser (21.817539ms)
✔ a refused supersede withdraws nothing (17.665164ms)
✔ the assistant's within-role and gated raises still work (20.152367ms)
✔ roles lists open decisions routed to a role, and never the human inbox (21.510756ms)
✔ recent lists closed decisions of every route, newest close first, with how each closed (19.927701ms)
✔ recent gives the closing event as closed when the decision was seen first (19.679776ms)
✔ recent stops at RECENT rows (63.458981ms)
✔ every row is what trail already gives the same session for that id (30.297455ms)
✔ a role session can't list decisions, so it can't read another role's open decisions (31.427106ms)
✔ decisions is a read: one business, strict arguments, nothing written (28.985479ms)
✔ endLaunch writes session.ended, releases the run claim and kills its capabilities (14.547474ms)
✔ endLaunch refuses an unknown run, a second end and a rebind of the ended run (8.433723ms)
✔ a restarted broker refuses to rebind an ended run; a refused rebind leaves the run unbound (9.379768ms)
✔ endLaunch leaves a claim another run took alone (10.763844ms)
✔ refuse records action.refused against the caller with the code only (7.889612ms)
✔ launches off refuses role.launch with launch-revoked until launches on (11.434359ms)
✔ broker process: launch ops authorize role.launch, record refusals and end runs (92.580479ms)
✔ REQ-WAIT-1: the broker hard waits are exactly the list, and match the business vocabulary (1.068711ms)
✔ REQ-WAIT-2: a business granting a hard wait at either class is refused; the actions that left are grantable (12.865511ms)
✔ REQ-DEC-2: every hard wait goes to the human, cited or not, and the arbiter cannot resolve it (302.540043ms)
✔ REQ-DEC-2: a gated raise citing the current spec goes to the arbiter for its domain; uncited, to the human (151.397717ms)
✔ REQ-DEC-2: an arbiter-approved cited gated decision authorizes the raiser, and the human cannot resolve it (39.270228ms)
✔ REQ-DEC-2: a cited merge raised by merge-gate goes to the technical arbiter; a merge raised without the grant routes by citation (58.858236ms)
✔ REQ-DEC-2: a stale or unconfirmed citation refuses without a decision; an arbiter raising its own goes to the human (86.785156ms)
✔ Q169: the chief of staff's end of the assistant is not refused role-end-refused; its own run and another ender's are (26.32952ms)
✔ Q169: another role's cited revoke of the assistant, resolved by an arbiter, is refused (53.776237ms)
✔ Q169: a revoke of the assistant citing a decision the human resolved is not refused by the protection (37.93783ms)
✔ Q169: a cited revoke of a role not in END_PROTECTED still goes to the arbiter, and executes (38.595609ms)
✔ Q169: a role granted role.revoke at either class still sends a revoke of the assistant to the human (58.44798ms)
✔ human proof binds CLI entry, process start and nonce; agents and incomplete ancestry refuse (1.303727ms)
✔ process reader gets own kernel identity without exposing environment values (0.352521ms)
✔ EACCES ancestor environments skip only markers; commands and registered launches still refuse (0.540905ms)
✔ real pid 1 remains inspectable when its environment is protected (0.200836ms)
✔ REQ-DEC-2: a merge-gate raise its arbiter resolved lands through the host op: checkLand answers the facts and a ticket, records nothing, and recordLand spends the decision once (27.319662ms)
✔ checkLand refuses on the decision and the review (26.561506ms)
✔ REQ-LAND-1: a gated merge decision refuses not-authorized, cited and approved by the arbiter or uncited and approved by the human (68.793588ms)
✔ REQ-LAND-1: a within-role merge grant refuses not-authorized at the land (16.562771ms)
✔ a cross-role merge that routes to the human, because merge-gate is its own arbiter, lands on the human's CLI answer (19.080381ms)
✔ a merge option with no first line refuses no-subject, as land-work does (16.514912ms)
✔ checkLand refuses with land-work's codes past the authority check, and a decision raised for refactor never lands (46.408689ms)
✔ a ticket outlives the run that asked, and recordLand checks the task again (19.490423ms)
✔ landRefused files the code on the task, tells the role only with notify, and ends the ticket (20.936654ms)
✔ landHeld is true only for an approved, unspent cross-role merge decision this role raised for a task in this thread (19.893335ms)
✔ no run may write the action.allowed for git.merge.protected itself (11.764086ms)
✔ a message to a stopped role sends launch.by one notice, and the result says so (18.447483ms)
✔ a message to a role outside launch.instances says so in its result and in the notice (10.648614ms)
✔ a message to a running role sends no notice and its result is unchanged (8.568643ms)
✔ a re-route at a claim, a release and claim, and a broker restart send no second notice (14.78607ms)
✔ a run launched but not yet claimed counts as no holder (8.3099ms)
✔ no notice for a message to launch.by, from it, from a tester, to the human, or in a thread to a thread instance (20.255278ms)
✔ a business with no launch block tells nobody and says there is no launcher (8.027414ms)
✔ the notice sender stays internal: no role is named _bus and no caller can send as it or to it (25.326064ms)
✔ limits binds actor from human proof and rejects role, reader, tester and forged actor (16.166197ms)
✔ runtime wires verified human settings to the actual shared file writer and actor receipt (46.642178ms)
✔ uncertain organization receipts leave bus startup and reads alone but refuse writes until reconciled (24.907815ms)
✔ within-role sends cite an open gated launch decision without spending it or naming it in grants (18.385036ms)
✔ missing and foreign-business citations refuse and roll back message and grant (11.930818ms)
✔ cross-role sends still need a matching resolved decision and consume it once (16.408618ms)
✔ messages pages all human messages newest first without writes; read state is history (240.310119ms)
✔ messages refuses role callers, invalid paging and cursors outside this human feed (19.904285ms)
✔ views messages passes only its paging arguments through (0.249745ms)
✔ messages isolates businesses even with a valid foreign cursor (11.901637ms)
✔ the assistant sends to the user and to the chief of staff only (27.579383ms)
✔ an assistant send to any other role, or to the tester, is refused and logged (24.406926ms)
✔ only the user and the chief of staff may send to the assistant; the tester is refused by default (23.113991ms)
✔ REQ-ASSIST-2 REQ-THREAD-1 thread.send to an instance that does not hear from the user is refused and stores nothing (18.588671ms)
✔ a sender-side list alone refuses a send to a role that has no list (19.254168ms)
✔ a target-side list alone refuses a send from a role that has no list (21.361305ms)
✔ the sender list is checked before the target list (18.29636ms)
✔ roles without the field behave exactly as before (27.238822ms)
✔ a business with no role definitions at all is unlimited (20.500849ms)
✔ a malformed messaging field refuses at boot (8.272484ms)
✔ the assistant's review.request to a reviewer is refused and logged, even with an approved decision (21.821093ms)
✔ a review.verdict to the assistant from a role outside its receiveFrom is refused and logged (23.897321ms)
✔ review requests and verdicts between roles without the field are unchanged (20.026081ms)
✔ 3f copy migrates to 3g preserving every old column/row, with an empty instance_names and null to_name (63.178258ms)
✔ REQ-MSG-2: the chief of staff names an instance under its within-role grant, and the write is logged (16.99018ms)
✔ REQ-MSG-2: the human names an instance through the CLI (12.043046ms)
✔ REQ-MSG-2: a role without the grant, or holding it cross-role, is refused not-authorized (14.221922ms)
✔ REQ-MSG-2: a name is unique in the business and is never an instance key or a role name (25.723592ms)
✔ REQ-MSG-2: a send by name reaches the instance and records both; a send by instance key is unchanged (20.990517ms)
✔ REQ-MSG-2: an instance key beats a name that equals it, as when a later instance takes the key (13.345112ms)
✔ REQ-MSG-2: a role name beats a name that equals it, as when a later definition takes the word (sage-0590) (13.948118ms)
✔ plugins and plugins.set refuse every non-human session and a forged actor, and pass only the patch with the verified actor (16.985716ms)
✔ runtime: the switch changes the organization file, the receipt carries the actor, and a bad shape, an unknown module and a stale revision are refused with nothing written (54.566941ms)
✔ vikunja:19/309 through the broker, a patch switches the kinds it names and keeps the rest; null removes one kind and is trailed (22.194364ms)
✔ broker process binds trusted launches, offers reader capabilities, refuses human mutation, closes cleanly (91.779439ms)
✔ startup token refusal returns safe code without value or partial listening broker (66.520307ms)
✔ loaded fixture token is absent from socket replies and SQLite, including refusal evidence (96.125723ms)
✔ killed broker leaves an explicit stale lock; another process cannot silently reclaim it (138.780202ms)
✔ trusted host registers later launches; socket clients never have a registration verb (89.357963ms)
✔ runtime excludes declared project roots even when host supplies no repoRoots (71.485401ms)
✔ a refused launch binding leaves the broker and existing capabilities alive; bad protocol stops it (90.805443ms)
✔ D1: committed write with a failed receipt refuses outcome-unknown without action.allowed (15.375213ms)
✔ D2: spec.read refuses without content if its role is released during the read (10.744126ms)
✔ D3: spec.read secret check refuses flagged content without content (9.816871ms)
✔ D3: spec.read secret check refuses flagged subject without content (9.86005ms)
✔ a human lists, opens and saves; the save is one commit by the business human (95.584553ms)
✔ an agent and a reader refuse every file verb and nothing is written (35.904052ms)
✔ a stale base refuses stale-base and writes nothing (65.299977ms)
✔ paths outside the spec and docs refuse, as do unknown projects, missing files and odd arguments (49.570637ms)
✔ without a project adapter the file verbs refuse project-not-configured (22.638726ms)
✔ on the socket a save may carry 1 MiB of text; every other request keeps the 64 KiB limit (127.000337ms)
✔ a request that names the save verb first and another verb last is refused at 64 KiB (35.943767ms)
✔ two saves racing for one repository make one commit (76.318482ms)
✔ Broker keeps the existing sandbox client import closure: no new imports or lazy project import (1.424949ms)
✔ without a trusted project adapter all three async paths refuse project-not-configured (32.770805ms)
✔ real startBroker injects the project adapter for socket reads and bound-author record writes (58.597239ms)
✔ a reply is listed for human and reader sessions, and its delivery rows are unchanged (28.20562ms)
✔ the reply still reaches the human message.receive (mosaic talk) after the Console showed it (13.14454ms)
✔ a message with no reply gives an empty list (10.16311ms)
✔ replies come oldest first and stop at REPLIES (57.807087ms)
✔ an id that names no message in the business refuses message-not-found, and the refusal is recorded (20.258703ms)
✔ strict arguments; a role session gets human-required (22.965344ms)
✔ views passes replies through as one call with the id (0.186941ms)
✔ requirements returns the committed list to a holding role session, and no one else (20.894758ms)
✔ the PM's prd.approve with no task, when no id fits, reaches the human's Inbox (11.38937ms)
✔ the PM's non-blocking role.revoke with no task reaches the human's Inbox (11.81789ms)
✔ a push is recorded as the action.allowed for git.push.working on the task, and only the host records one (24.215099ms)
✔ review.request names the latest pushed commit and sends the reviewer a REVIEW-REQUEST (17.791159ms)
✔ review.request says which run holds the reviewer role, or null, and a null request waits for a claim (20.851115ms)
✔ review.request refuses a commit that isn't the latest push, a non-reviewer and a role without the action (26.504487ms)
✔ reviewFetch answers only the addressed reviewer, for the request it cites (16.323797ms)
✔ review.verdict answers one request once, to the role that asked (19.162722ms)
✔ task.close on a pushed task needs an approve verdict for the latest push (28.746914ms)
✔ a refusal the host decided is filed on the task it names, and only a task ref counts (16.212629ms)
✔ v3b prototype refusals, views and append-only mutations (73.031132ms)
✔ gated approval authorizes once, survives store reopen, and fresh approval works (22.624364ms)
✔ another run of the same instance consumes an approval once; a failed check leaves it usable (14.170801ms)
✔ two scheduled callers have exactly one grant and one consumed refusal (10.758341ms)
✔ failed commit rolls consumption back; cross-role consumes and within-role stays reusable (21.813123ms)
✔ class drift gated to cross-role refuses before consumption (16.454111ms)
✔ class drift cross-role to gated refuses before consumption (16.417639ms)
✔ class drift gated to within-role refuses before consumption (15.025835ms)
✔ class drift cross-role to within-role refuses before consumption (16.188086ms)
✔ class drift within-role to gated refuses before consumption (13.574808ms)
✔ class drift within-role to cross-role refuses before consumption (13.100704ms)
✔ message.send consumes approval and prevents a later send or authorize (15.929465ms)
✔ role.revoke consumes approval and prevents a later revoke or authorize (17.773359ms)
✔ 3e copy migrates through 3f to 3g preserving every old column/row and adding null spec citations (68.419759ms)
✔ a human spec save sends one notice to each pm and cto, naming the commit, and each commit sends its own (109.108062ms)
✔ no notice for a docs save, an agent record commit, a git commit outside the Console, or a refused save (125.441783ms)
✔ a notice to a role no run holds waits for a claim, and launches nobody and tells nobody (61.263736ms)
✔ a business without a pm or a cto saves the spec and sends nothing (52.615196ms)
✔ a notice that cannot be stored answers outcome-unknown, and the commit stands (60.901903ms)
✔ a BLOCK reaches the chief of staff, the chief relays it to the assistant in the user's thread, and the commit stands (68.73497ms)
✔ with no thread a BLOCK still reaches the chief of staff, and the relay to the assistant is refused (59.671947ms)
✔ within the notice's project the relay lands in the user's most recently opened thread (66.69673ms)
✔ a more recently opened thread in another project does not take the relay (60.798241ms)
✔ a BLOCK is refused from anyone but a pm or cto, to anyone but the chief of staff, and outside a reply to its own notice (70.388037ms)
✔ a role cannot forge a spec notice: its text opens neither a BLOCK nor the assistant's thread (64.293853ms)
✔ the bus receives nothing: a reply to a notice addressed to _bus is refused (59.365715ms)
✔ real socket awaits spec reads, record writes and cited raises; other requests still return normally (83.908148ms)
✔ real socket preserves asynchronous refusal codes and disconnects its transient proof (25.131123ms)
✔ two real socket writes to one repository yield one commit and one project-busy refusal (38.262779ms)
✔ client disconnect during await tolerates late reply (36.152349ms)
✔ client disconnect during await tolerates late refusal (23.499763ms)
✔ N-a: slow admitted record.write returns its committed result after the idle deadline (195.014738ms)
✔ current citation is recorded; docs commits do not stale it and a new spec never reopens settlement (92.989884ms)
✔ stale, unconfirmed, missing and partial spec citations refuse without inserting a decision (88.83316ms)
✔ uncited raises retain their synchronous path and spec read is available to any held role in its business (38.935456ms)
✔ record writes bind the session author, require authority and refuse spec and impersonation paths (42.36397ms)
✔ REQ-COS-1: the pm asks the chief of staff for roles and counts; the chief receives a STAFF-REQUEST and answers it (22.116259ms)
✔ REQ-COS-1: only the pm can send a staff request; every other session is refused and the chief of staff hears nothing (20.133967ms)
✔ REQ-COS-1: a pm without message.send is refused like any other gated action (9.975916ms)
✔ REQ-COS-1: the request goes to the business launcher, and only when that is a chief of staff (29.729063ms)
✔ REQ-COS-1: the sender is judged by definition: an instance `lead` of the pm definition can ask, an instance `pm` of the coder definition can't (26.630905ms)
✔ REQ-COS-1: the launcher is judged by definition: an instance `boss` of the chief-of-staff definition receives, a `chief` of the coder definition gives no-chief-of-staff (23.61149ms)
✔ REQ-COS-1: a refused staff request leaves no staff.request action.allowed event (14.481961ms)
✔ REQ-ASSIST-2: the role definitions' messaging lists hold for a staff request, sender and recipient (38.157523ms)
✔ a staff request names a task, 1 to 10 distinct roles and counts of 1 to 20; nothing else is accepted (30.122097ms)
✔ REQ-COS-1: a staff request grants nothing: the pm still can't launch and the chief of staff launches as before (17.194295ms)
✔ a business that never switched launches reads allowed with no time and no event (12.914276ms)
✔ launches revoked and then restored read allowed, with the restore time and event id (10.473541ms)
✔ a task closed on the tracker leaves the open list, and total counts the open ones (10.809997ms)
✔ a tombstone is not open (8.951849ms)
✔ the open list stops at the cap and says so; total still counts every open task (11.525795ms)
✔ a role and a reader session read state; arguments, and an unbound cap, refuse (9.640689ms)
✔ a human session reads the same state, with the same cap (11.50846ms)
✔ reading state writes nothing: every table keeps its row count (10.177281ms)
✔ creates private WAL store and excludes a second writer until explicit close (11.417209ms)
✔ rollback is atomic and schema metadata is checked against trusted DDL, not just itself (10.499873ms)
✔ existing empty database and symlink runtime directory refuse, never initialize over damage (10.425447ms)
✔ crash during a transaction recovers no partial event after explicit fixture-only lock removal (49.759431ms)
✔ writer refuses mixed at/read_at forms atomically, even through trusted SQL helpers (7.861121ms)
✔ async transactions refuse before invoking their function (5.841541ms)
✔ the session default fits under the reply cap and pages to the end with next (125.926687ms)
✔ the short form: no description, assignees by role, every listed key (74.383614ms)
✔ each filter, alone and together, and total counts every match (137.54066ms)
✔ task_ref reads one task in full, as the whole board has it (83.874627ms)
✔ no arguments is the read the Console and mosaic make, unchanged (70.41761ms)
✔ an unknown argument or a bad value refuses invalid-request (295.431602ms)
✔ tasks rows carry priority and requirement for every session that reads tasks (28.382524ms)
✔ the read model rebuilds from the ledger: a reopened bus and each trail give the same values (32.749973ms)
✔ an empty business and one with snapshots but no task.created read cleanly (7.806189ms)
✔ recordTask keeps sync reads and a role write apart (16.934937ms)
✔ read_at must be one canonical UTC format, so the projection compares strings safely (7.211528ms)
✔ a bad entry refuses the whole record (7.575019ms)
✔ taskView reads the projection for one business (9.18163ms)
✔ requestTask hands only a holder and a task verb to the handler, and records refusals (16.963701ms)
✔ the server sends task verbs to the adapter with its own timeout; other verbs stay synchronous (286.024363ms)
✔ without an adapter the server refuses every task verb (19.559741ms)
✔ the runtime refuses an invalid adapter and closes a valid one (19.520587ms)
✔ the process loads the S3 adapter from plain-data trackers (158.805435ms)
✔ the tester binds only when the business sets bus.tester to exactly true (53.145898ms)
✔ a business may not name a role tester, so the tester address is never a role (15.26488ms)
✔ every verb outside the tester list refuses tester-refused and is recorded against the tester (35.896921ms)
✔ a tester message is from tester, starts [mos test], and writes no human.input or authority (15.520261ms)
✔ a role answers a tester only in reply to a tester message, and the answer never reaches the human (18.445361ms)
✔ the tester reads the human views a reader reads (21.328253ms)
✔ tester proof binds its own CLI, start time and nonce, refuses a managed run and allows an agent (1.129351ms)
✔ neither CLI's nonce proves the other: each proof is bound to its own CLI and nonce variable (0.343644ms)
✔ testerNonce reads only the tester's variable and gives null on any read error (0.196842ms)
✔ an envelope carries exactly one of cap, human and tester; no tester authenticator refuses (17.032302ms)
✔ tester-cli.mjs binds through the runtime when the switch is on, and refuses off or under a run marker (618.376129ms)
✔ REQ-THREAD-1 REQ-ORG-2: the 3d→3e migration adds the thread tables and leaves messages from before threads as written (63.448867ms)
✔ REQ-THREAD-1: a 3d bus with a changed schema is refused and keeps its version and tables (40.205727ms)
✔ REQ-THREAD-1: the offline command prints the kept-message counts before the ready line (86.408695ms)
✔ REQ-ROLE-2 REQ-THREAD-1: one holder per thread, through the broker and the trigger (27.399298ms)
✔ REQ-ROLE-2 REQ-THREAD-1: the 3e triggers refuse writes that skip the broker (48.219176ms)
✔ REQ-MSG-1: a message to or from the assistant names its thread, or is refused (28.381645ms)
✔ REQ-MSG-1: the chief of staff's reply comes back to the thread that sent the work (575.931075ms)
✔ REQ-MSG-1: a reply can't carry one thread instance's thread to another thread instance (17.16797ms)
✔ REQ-THREAD-1 REQ-USER-2: one thread's messages never reach another thread's holder (25.984451ms)
✔ REQ-LAUNCH-1: a message to a thread with no holder waits, and the next holder gets it (26.783524ms)
✔ REQ-THREAD-2 REQ-LAUNCH-1: threadIdle releases only a thread with nothing waiting, and only for its holder (30.249132ms)
✔ REQ-THREAD-2 REQ-LAUNCH-1: a message delivered to a run that ended unread doesn't hold up the next holder (23.766482ms)
✔ REQ-ROLE-2 REQ-THREAD-1: an approved role.revoke never reaches a thread run, and the thread stays held (21.411076ms)
✔ REQ-USER-2: the human verbs refuse another owner's thread (21.369724ms)
✔ REQ-THREAD-1: thread.create refuses when the business has no thread instance or more than one (17.363867ms)
✔ REQ-ORG-2: projects and threads are named once, and the repo names a business project (22.748288ms)
✔ REQ-THREAD-2: thread.messages returns the thread's history in pages and writes nothing (81.264192ms)
✔ socket capability stamps launch identity; shared views use wire, no SQL client (23.157709ms)
✔ two wire claims serialize; a lost reply never automatically retries (15.957264ms)
✔ malformed, oversized and identity-forging envelopes refuse without echoing input (9.712976ms)
✔ client preserves UTF-8 when a response divides a multibyte character (11.876425ms)
✔ committed mutation followed by dropped reply reports unknown and is never retried (12.351635ms)
✔ REQ-LIMIT-4 usage protocol binds run identity, requires a delivered turn and isolates businesses (21.113596ms)
✔ REQ-LIMIT-4 3g copy migrates to 3h preserving every old column, row and sequence; new usage table is empty (67.902ms)
✔ REQ-PLUG-1 runtime reaches transcript only through loader, over the real bus socket (31.222693ms)
✔ REQ-LIMIT-4 loader source records new turn kinds, excludes history and retries exactly once (16.087897ms)
✔ REQ-LIMIT-4 cut: unknown is durable and logged next to every total (10.696018ms)
✔ REQ-LIMIT-4 disabled: unknown is durable and logged next to every total (9.361712ms)
✔ REQ-LIMIT-4 missing-begin: unknown is durable and logged next to every total (8.50506ms)
✔ REQ-LIMIT-4 no-new-usage: unknown is durable and logged next to every total (9.361695ms)
✔ REQ-LIMIT-4 rewrite: unknown is durable and logged next to every total (9.144361ms)
✔ REQ-LIMIT-4 unfinished turn remains visibly unknown after accounting restarts (7.790234ms)
✔ usage records are append-only (8.196223ms)
✔ REQ-LIMIT-4 parse failure logs its safe code, never transcript content (8.411549ms)
✔ REQ-LIMIT-4 resumed run baselines history and exact totals do not overflow (9.629643ms)
✔ REQ-PLUG-1 core has no transcript import and disabled sources do not read any transcript (7.891122ms)
✔ REQ-LIMIT-4 a resumed thread bills only new assistant messages to its next run (8.903964ms)
✔ REQ-LIMIT-4 every enabled source is called; failure is unknown and a partial total stays labelled (13.648794ms)
✔ REQ-LIMIT-4 a turn whose reported sum exceeds safe precision is unknown, not rounded (7.941996ms)
✔ web.search: a granted role gets labelled results, and the call is trailed with role, run, verb and query (16.478356ms)
✔ web.fetch: a granted role gets the page as labelled text, and the call is trailed with the url (17.504075ms)
✔ a role without the grant is refused, the refusal is logged with the verb, and nothing is fetched (18.258911ms)
✔ a broker with no web service refuses a granted role (10.622082ms)
✔ bad requests are refused: unknown verb, extra or missing argument, not a string, a human or reader session (16.061005ms)
✔ a session that is not the role holder is refused (9.488987ms)
✔ web.mjs's fences hold on the broker side: refusals are normal results with the fixed reason (32.86808ms)
✔ web.search with no search source configured is a refused result, not an error (11.085507ms)
✔ a search source that fails with its own refusal, or that throws, is handled (13.73711ms)
✔ a slow search source ends in a refusal at the deadline (62.583079ms)
✔ a secret in the arguments is refused before anything is trailed or fetched (10.800245ms)
✔ over the socket: the server routes web verbs to the service; other roles are refused; no service is web-not-configured (27.301546ms)
✔ busBusiness: the web grant comes from "web" in the resolved tool limit (0.292661ms)
✔ webServices: the business's search-source plug-in and web.searxng var make web.search work; without either it is refused as not configured (32.248772ms)
✔ an ungranted call is refused at once: no admission, no wait, nothing touched (14.347238ms)
✔ over the socket an ungranted caller is dropped by the server timeout and a granted one gets the longer wait (325.781222ms)
✔ a search that never answers is aborted at the deadline, the module sees the signal, and the call is trailed as refused (timeout) (71.066484ms)
✔ a fetch that stalls is cut off at the deadline: the request is destroyed, not left running (91.911158ms)
✔ one query limit: over SEARCH_MAX_QUERY_CHARS or empty is refused with the same reason before any backend, and the tool schema carries the same number (13.30582ms)
ℹ tests 362
ℹ suites 0
ℹ pass 362
ℹ fail 0
ℹ cancelled 0
ℹ skipped 0
ℹ todo 0
ℹ duration_ms 15855.664071