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jason.woltje 4c8bf9ca4e fix(organization,cli): refusals name the file by label, never by host path
PR #1916 rule: a refusal names the field or file, never a config value
or a host path. readJsonFile's three refusals and parseJsonFileText now
name the file by its `what` label only. Callers whose label alone is
ambiguous add a name that already passed a strict pattern (business id,
role name, org id, turn id, project key) or a fixed path under the data
root. Exit codes, refusal codes and check order are unchanged.

organization: util, access, project, config-command, library-seats,
org-service deleteOrg receipt, agent-levels regex; T1 files role.mjs and
organization-config.mjs change only the readJsonFile label.
cli: access lock, accounts owner, host state/lock, notifier journal,
notify-config, run-evidence, dev-fixture, git-socket, org-bus, org-console.
discord: turn record label names the turn id.

Sentinel tests (sk-test-NOT-A-SECRET-1234 as a path component) cover each
changed refusal and fail on BASE; old path pins updated.
2026-11-11 01:04:15 -06:00

175 lines
8.4 KiB
JavaScript

// The access file, <configDir>/access.json (federation design section 3.5,
// FED R1, #414). It names the extra users who may sign in to this instance
// and the grants that let them reach a business's threads. The validator is
// pure: providers, peers, businesses and the owner's sign-in subjects come in
// as arguments. Any failed rule refuses the whole file, which leaves every
// user with no grant (fail closed).
import { join } from "node:path";
import { refuse } from "./errors.mjs";
import { configDir } from "./organization-config.mjs";
import { isPlainObject, requireObject, rejectUnknownKeys, requireId, requirePositiveInt, readJsonFile, deepFreeze } from "./util.mjs";
// FED R3 r5 (row 274): LEVELS, the all marker and covers() live in the vocabulary, which the session
// sandbox mounts, because the broker checks a user's grant with covers(). This file re-exports them.
import { LEVELS, GRANT_ALL as ALL, covers } from "./vocabulary.mjs";
export { LEVELS, covers };
// Ids a user may never take: the bus's own principals.
const RESERVED_USERS = Object.freeze(["human", "tester"]);
const LOCAL_HOME = "local";
const UUID = /^[0-9a-f]{8}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{12}$/;
const ISO_TIME = /^\d{4}-\d{2}-\d{2}T\d{2}:\d{2}:\d{2}(\.\d{1,3})?Z$/;
const SUB_MAX = 255;
export function accessFilePath(dir = configDir()) {
return join(dir, "access.json");
}
function requireArray(value, where) {
if (!Array.isArray(value)) refuse(`${where} must be an array`);
return value;
}
function requireText(value, where) {
if (typeof value !== "string" || value.length === 0 || value.length > SUB_MAX || value.includes("\0")) {
refuse(`${where} must be a non-empty string of at most ${SUB_MAX} characters`);
}
return value;
}
function subjectKey(provider, sub) {
return JSON.stringify([provider, sub]);
}
function checkContext(context) {
const where = "access context";
requireObject(context, where);
rejectUnknownKeys(context, ["providers", "peers", "businesses", "ssoSubjects"], where);
const providers = new Set(requireArray(context.providers, `${where}.providers`).map((p, i) => requireText(p, `${where}.providers[${i}]`)));
const peers = new Set(requireArray(context.peers, `${where}.peers`).map((p, i) => requireId(p, `${where}.peers[${i}]`)));
if (peers.has(LOCAL_HOME)) refuse(`${where}.peers must not name ${JSON.stringify(LOCAL_HOME)}`);
requireObject(context.businesses, `${where}.businesses`);
const businesses = new Map();
for (const [id, business] of Object.entries(context.businesses)) {
const at = `${where}.businesses.${id}`;
requireId(id, `${where}.businesses key`);
requireObject(business, at);
requireId(business.human, `${at}.human`);
const instances = requireArray(business.instances, `${at}.instances`).map((x, i) => requireId(x, `${at}.instances[${i}]`));
businesses.set(id, { human: business.human, instances: new Set(instances) });
}
const owners = new Set();
requireArray(context.ssoSubjects, `${where}.ssoSubjects`).forEach((s, i) => {
const at = `${where}.ssoSubjects[${i}]`;
requireObject(s, at);
owners.add(subjectKey(requireText(s.provider, `${at}.provider`), requireText(s.sub, `${at}.sub`)));
});
return { providers, peers, businesses, owners };
}
function checkUser(user, at, ctx, humans, seenSubjects) {
requireObject(user, at);
rejectUnknownKeys(user, ["id", "home", "subjects"], at);
requireId(user.id, `${at}.id`);
if (RESERVED_USERS.includes(user.id)) refuse(`${at}.id must not be ${JSON.stringify(user.id)}, a bus principal`);
if (humans.has(user.id)) refuse(`${at}.id must not be a business's human (${JSON.stringify(user.id)})`);
if (user.home !== LOCAL_HOME && !ctx.peers.has(user.home)) {
refuse(`${at}.home must be a configured peer or ${JSON.stringify(LOCAL_HOME)}`);
}
const subjects = requireArray(user.subjects, `${at}.subjects`);
if (subjects.length === 0) refuse(`${at}.subjects must not be empty`);
subjects.forEach((s, i) => {
const sat = `${at}.subjects[${i}]`;
requireObject(s, sat);
rejectUnknownKeys(s, ["provider", "sub"], sat);
if (typeof s.provider !== "string" || !ctx.providers.has(s.provider)) {
refuse(`${sat}.provider must be a configured provider`);
}
requireText(s.sub, `${sat}.sub`);
const key = subjectKey(s.provider, s.sub);
if (ctx.owners.has(key)) refuse(`${sat} is an owner sign-in subject (console.sso.subjects)`);
if (seenSubjects.has(key)) refuse(`${sat} appears more than once in the file`);
seenSubjects.add(key);
});
}
// Either ["*"] alone or a non-empty list of distinct entries, each checked.
function checkScope(value, where, check) {
const list = requireArray(value, where);
if (list.length === 0) refuse(`${where} must not be empty`);
if (list.includes(ALL)) {
if (list.length !== 1) refuse(`${where} must be ["*"] alone or list entries without "*"`);
return;
}
const seen = new Set();
list.forEach((entry, i) => {
check(entry, `${where}[${i}]`);
if (seen.has(entry)) refuse(`duplicate entry in ${where}: ${JSON.stringify(entry)}`);
seen.add(entry);
});
}
function checkExpires(value, where) {
if (typeof value !== "string" || !ISO_TIME.test(value) || Number.isNaN(Date.parse(value))) {
refuse(`${where} must be an ISO time such as 2026-12-31T00:00:00Z`);
}
const iso = new Date(value).toISOString();
if (iso.slice(0, 19) !== value.slice(0, 19)) refuse(`${where} is not a real time`);
}
function checkGrant(grant, at, ctx, users, seenGrants) {
requireObject(grant, at);
rejectUnknownKeys(grant, ["id", "user", "business", "projects", "instances", "level", "expires"], at);
requireId(grant.id, `${at}.id`);
if (seenGrants.has(grant.id)) refuse(`${at}.id is a duplicate grant id: ${grant.id}`);
seenGrants.add(grant.id);
if (typeof grant.user !== "string" || !users.has(grant.user)) refuse(`${at}.user must name a user in this file`);
if (typeof grant.business !== "string" || !ctx.businesses.has(grant.business)) {
refuse(`${at}.business must name a declared business`);
}
const business = ctx.businesses.get(grant.business);
checkScope(grant.projects, `${at}.projects`, (p, where) => {
if (typeof p !== "string" || !UUID.test(p)) refuse(`${where} must be "*" or a bus project id, a lowercase UUID`);
});
checkScope(grant.instances, `${at}.instances`, (x, where) => {
if (typeof x !== "string" || !business.instances.has(x)) refuse(`${where} must be "*" or a declared instance of the grant's business`);
});
if (!LEVELS.includes(grant.level)) refuse(`${at}.level must be one of ${LEVELS.join(", ")}`);
if (grant.expires !== undefined) checkExpires(grant.expires, `${at}.expires`);
}
// Check a parsed access document against the instance's context. Returns the
// document frozen. Every refusal is a BusinessError naming the key path. An
// expired grant is not refused: covers() treats it as absent.
export function checkAccess(document, context) {
const ctx = checkContext(context);
const humans = new Set([...ctx.businesses.values()].map((b) => b.human));
if (!isPlainObject(document)) refuse("access file must be a JSON object");
rejectUnknownKeys(document, ["accessVersion", "revision", "users", "grants"], "access file");
if (document.accessVersion !== 1) refuse(`accessVersion must be 1`);
requirePositiveInt(document.revision, "revision");
const users = new Set();
const seenSubjects = new Set();
requireArray(document.users, "users").forEach((user, i) => {
checkUser(user, `users[${i}]`, ctx, humans, seenSubjects);
if (users.has(user.id)) refuse(`users[${i}].id is a duplicate user id: ${user.id}`);
users.add(user.id);
});
const seenGrants = new Set();
requireArray(document.grants, "grants").forEach((grant, i) => checkGrant(grant, `grants[${i}]`, ctx, users, seenGrants));
return deepFreeze(structuredClone(document));
}
// Read and check the access file. One descriptor, opened without following a
// link, serves the stat checks and the read (readJsonFile). The file holds
// authority, so it must belong to this uid and not be writable by group or
// other, as the business file is.
export function loadAccess(file, context, { uid = process.getuid() } = {}) {
const document = readJsonFile(file, "access file", (stat) => {
if (stat.uid !== uid) refuse(`access file must belong to uid ${uid}`);
if ((stat.mode & 0o022) !== 0) refuse(`access file must not be writable by group or other (mode ${(stat.mode & 0o777).toString(8)})`);
});
return checkAccess(document, context);
}