Hermes Agent
029af418f0
The scope gate asked for a scheme URL, a `/api/v[0-9]` path, or a provider-CLI
`api` subcommand. `/api/v[0-9]` is Gitea's spelling. GitHub's API carries no
version segment at all -- `api.github.com/repos/a/b/issues` -- so the schemeless
Gitea write was in scope and the schemeless GitHub one was not:
curl -X POST -d x api.github.com/repos/a/b/issues rc 0
curl -X POST -d x api.github.com/repos/a/b/issues/1/comments rc 0
host=api.github.com; curl -X POST -d x ${host}/repos/a/b/issues rc 0
A gate calibrated to one provider's spelling rather than to what identifies a
provider API. `/repos/` is the marker both dialects share -- every forge API
addresses a repository through it -- so the gate now names both.
This is SPAN a third time, and the third layer it has appeared on. Round 8: a
block message named a wrapper that could not make the call. Round 9: a map
claimed a span its wrapper did not cover. Round 10: a control claimed a surface
it did not measure. Here the scope gate itself claimed a class of API and
recognised one member of it. Same question each time -- does this thing SPAN
what it claims -- and it has now been the answer four rounds running, which is
the argument for asking it of every arm rather than of the reported one.
Widening a scope gate can only make the guard stricter. Downstream a block still
requires a body flag AND either a mapped endpoint or an unreadable one, so this
widens what is CONSIDERED, not what is refused. The three fixtures asserting that
-- a schemeless GitHub read, an unwrapped GitHub endpoint, and a read past `--`
-- exist to hold that claim to account rather than state it.
Also: the provider-CLI arm's option scanner required a letter after the dashes,
so `gh api -X POST -- ${p}${q} -f title=x` walked its endpoint straight past.
The end-of-options marker is the one option not spelled like one, and a scanner
that skips options had to be told so.
Because the new endpoints are READABLE, each blocked fixture asserts the wrapper
its message must name. A rc-only fixture here would have passed on the unreadable
arm and proved nothing -- which is the failure mode this suite caught in itself
last round.
Evidence: 110/110 fixtures (was 101) locally and in ci-base. Negative-controlled
per change, not in aggregate: dropping `/repos/` from the gate fails exactly the
five GitHub fixtures; dropping the `--` alternative fails exactly one; neither
disturbs a pre-existing fixture. 18-command sweep unchanged (same three round-6
flips, nothing new); 12-command ordinary-work sweep 0 blocked. shellcheck clean
at warning+. CI 2374 on the previous head was green across all nine steps.
Residual, stated rather than implied: a caller who splits `/repos/` itself in a
schemeless GitHub URL leaves no literal marker anywhere and is out of scope --
the same boundary as splitting the hostname, and no longer a mistake anyone
makes by accident.
Round 11, addressing rev0 review 154.
@mosaicstack/mosaic
CLI package for the Mosaic self-hosted AI agent platform.
Usage
mosaic wizard # First-run setup wizard
mosaic gateway install # Install the gateway daemon
mosaic config show # View current configuration
mosaic config hooks list # Manage Claude hooks
Headless / CI Installation
Set MOSAIC_ASSUME_YES=1 (or ensure stdin is not a TTY) to skip all interactive prompts. The following environment variables control the install:
Gateway configuration (mosaic gateway install)
| Variable | Default | Required |
|---|---|---|
MOSAIC_STORAGE_TIER |
local |
No |
MOSAIC_GATEWAY_PORT |
14242 |
No |
MOSAIC_DATABASE_URL |
(none) | Yes if tier=team |
MOSAIC_VALKEY_URL |
(none) | Yes if tier=team |
MOSAIC_ANTHROPIC_API_KEY |
(none) | No |
MOSAIC_CORS_ORIGIN |
http://localhost:3000 |
No |
Admin user bootstrap
| Variable | Default | Required |
|---|---|---|
MOSAIC_ADMIN_NAME |
(none) | Yes (headless) |
MOSAIC_ADMIN_EMAIL |
(none) | Yes (headless) |
MOSAIC_ADMIN_PASSWORD |
(none) | Yes (headless) |
MOSAIC_ADMIN_PASSWORD must be at least 8 characters. In headless mode a missing or too-short password causes a non-zero exit.
Example: Docker / CI install
export MOSAIC_ASSUME_YES=1
export MOSAIC_ADMIN_NAME="Admin"
export MOSAIC_ADMIN_EMAIL="[email protected]"
export MOSAIC_ADMIN_PASSWORD="securepass123"
mosaic gateway install
Runtime launchers
mosaic claude # Launch Claude Code with Mosaic injection
mosaic yolo claude # …with --dangerously-skip-permissions
mosaic codex | opencode | pi
mosaic claudex (EXPERIMENTAL)
Runs GPT models inside the Claude Code harness by pointing Claude Code at a
local claude-code-proxy that
translates the Anthropic Messages API to a ChatGPT-subscription (Codex OAuth)
backend. This is not Anthropic Claude — model behavior, tool use, and output
quality may differ. Intended for evaluation, not production delivery.
mosaic claudex # launch (prompts through the proxy readiness gate)
mosaic yolo claudex # …with --dangerously-skip-permissions
mosaic claudex --print "hello" # trailing args are forwarded to Claude Code
Prerequisite: the claude-code-proxy binary must be installed and
authenticated (claude-code-proxy codex auth …). mosaic claudex runs a
preflight that verifies the binary, the OAuth state (triggering a device re-auth
if needed), and a trusted local listener before launching; it fails closed
if the proxy cannot be brought up with a verified identity.
Isolation (never touches your real Claude state). claudex always launches
against an isolated CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR (default ~/.config/mosaic/claudex/home).
The ambient CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR is deliberately ignored, and a guard proves the
resolved dir can never be — or live under — the real ~/.claude. A claudex
session therefore cannot mutate your normal Claude Code config.
No token leakage. claudex never reads the proxy's credential file. Claude
Code is handed only ANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN=unused pointed at the loopback proxy;
the entire credential-bearing env family (ANTHROPIC_*, AWS_*, GOOGLE_CLOUD_*,
GOOGLE_APPLICATION_CREDENTIALS, *_TOKEN, *_KEY, *_SECRET, …) is stripped
from the composed environment. The Bedrock/Vertex routing switches
(CLAUDE_CODE_USE_BEDROCK, CLAUDE_CODE_USE_VERTEX, and the _SKIP_*_AUTH
pair) are force-removed regardless of value — otherwise their mere presence
would route Claude Code to the real Anthropic API via AWS/GCP and bypass the
proxy. The proxy holds the real OAuth credential.
Model tiers (override via env).
| Tier | Env var | Default |
|---|---|---|
| primary (opus/sonnet) | ANTHROPIC_MODEL |
gpt-5.6-sol |
| small/fast (haiku) | ANTHROPIC_SMALL_FAST_MODEL |
gpt-5.6-luna |
Operator-provided values win over the defaults. Additional overrides:
MOSAIC_CLAUDEX_CONFIG_DIR (isolated config dir), ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL (proxy
endpoint).
Hooks management
After running mosaic wizard, Claude hooks are installed in ~/.claude/hooks-config.json.
mosaic config hooks list # Show all hooks and enabled/disabled status
mosaic config hooks disable PostToolUse # Disable a hook (reversible)
mosaic config hooks enable PostToolUse # Re-enable a disabled hook
Set CLAUDE_HOME to override the default ~/.claude directory.