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stack/apps/gateway/src/agent/tools/shell-tools.ts
Jason Woltje 7f6464bbda
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feat(gateway): tool path hardening + sandbox escape prevention (P8-016) (#177)
Co-authored-by: Jason Woltje <jason@diversecanvas.com>
Co-committed-by: Jason Woltje <jason@diversecanvas.com>
2026-03-16 02:02:48 +00:00

219 lines
5.5 KiB
TypeScript

import { Type } from '@sinclair/typebox';
import type { ToolDefinition } from '@mariozechner/pi-coding-agent';
import { spawn } from 'node:child_process';
import { guardPath, SandboxEscapeError } from './path-guard.js';
const DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_MS = 30_000;
const MAX_OUTPUT_BYTES = 100 * 1024; // 100 KB
/**
* Commands that are outright blocked for safety.
* This is a denylist; the agent should be instructed to use
* the least-privilege command necessary.
*/
const BLOCKED_COMMANDS = new Set([
'rm',
'rmdir',
'mkfs',
'dd',
'format',
'fdisk',
'parted',
'shred',
'wipefs',
'sudo',
'su',
'chown',
'chmod',
'passwd',
'useradd',
'userdel',
'groupadd',
'shutdown',
'reboot',
'halt',
'poweroff',
'kill',
'killall',
'pkill',
'curl',
'wget',
'nc',
'netcat',
'ncat',
'ssh',
'scp',
'sftp',
'rsync',
'iptables',
'ip6tables',
'nft',
'ufw',
'firewall-cmd',
'docker',
'podman',
'kubectl',
'helm',
'terraform',
'ansible',
'crontab',
'at',
'batch',
]);
function extractBaseCommand(command: string): string {
// Extract the first word (the binary name), stripping path
const trimmed = command.trim();
const firstToken = trimmed.split(/\s+/)[0] ?? '';
return firstToken.split('/').pop() ?? firstToken;
}
function runCommand(
command: string,
options: { timeoutMs: number; cwd?: string },
): Promise<{ stdout: string; stderr: string; exitCode: number | null; timedOut: boolean }> {
return new Promise((resolve) => {
const child = spawn('sh', ['-c', command], {
cwd: options.cwd,
stdio: ['ignore', 'pipe', 'pipe'],
detached: false,
});
let stdout = '';
let stderr = '';
let timedOut = false;
let totalBytes = 0;
let truncated = false;
child.stdout?.on('data', (chunk: Buffer) => {
if (truncated) return;
totalBytes += chunk.length;
if (totalBytes > MAX_OUTPUT_BYTES) {
stdout += chunk.subarray(0, MAX_OUTPUT_BYTES - (totalBytes - chunk.length)).toString();
stdout += '\n[output truncated at 100 KB limit]';
truncated = true;
child.kill('SIGTERM');
} else {
stdout += chunk.toString();
}
});
child.stderr?.on('data', (chunk: Buffer) => {
if (stderr.length < MAX_OUTPUT_BYTES) {
stderr += chunk.toString();
}
});
const timer = setTimeout(() => {
timedOut = true;
child.kill('SIGTERM');
setTimeout(() => {
try {
child.kill('SIGKILL');
} catch {
// already exited
}
}, 2000);
}, options.timeoutMs);
child.on('close', (exitCode) => {
clearTimeout(timer);
resolve({ stdout, stderr, exitCode, timedOut });
});
child.on('error', (err) => {
clearTimeout(timer);
resolve({ stdout, stderr: stderr + String(err), exitCode: null, timedOut: false });
});
});
}
export function createShellTools(sandboxDir?: string): ToolDefinition[] {
const defaultCwd = sandboxDir ?? process.cwd();
const shellExec: ToolDefinition = {
name: 'shell_exec',
label: 'Shell Execute',
description:
'Execute a shell command with timeout and output limits. Dangerous commands (rm, sudo, docker, etc.) are blocked. Working directory is restricted to the session sandbox.',
parameters: Type.Object({
command: Type.String({ description: 'Shell command to execute' }),
cwd: Type.Optional(
Type.String({
description:
'Working directory for the command (relative to sandbox or absolute within it).',
}),
),
timeout: Type.Optional(
Type.Number({ description: 'Timeout in milliseconds (default 30000, max 60000)' }),
),
}),
async execute(_toolCallId, params) {
const { command, cwd, timeout } = params as {
command: string;
cwd?: string;
timeout?: number;
};
const base = extractBaseCommand(command);
if (BLOCKED_COMMANDS.has(base)) {
return {
content: [
{
type: 'text' as const,
text: `Error: command "${base}" is blocked for safety reasons.`,
},
],
details: undefined,
};
}
const timeoutMs = Math.min(timeout ?? DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_MS, 60_000);
let safeCwd: string;
try {
safeCwd = guardPath(cwd ?? '.', defaultCwd);
} catch (err) {
if (err instanceof SandboxEscapeError) {
return {
content: [{ type: 'text' as const, text: `Error: ${err.message}` }],
details: undefined,
};
}
return {
content: [{ type: 'text' as const, text: `Error: ${String(err)}` }],
details: undefined,
};
}
const result = await runCommand(command, {
timeoutMs,
cwd: safeCwd,
});
if (result.timedOut) {
return {
content: [
{
type: 'text' as const,
text: `Command timed out after ${timeoutMs}ms.\nPartial stdout:\n${result.stdout}\nPartial stderr:\n${result.stderr}`,
},
],
details: undefined,
};
}
const parts: string[] = [];
if (result.stdout) parts.push(`stdout:\n${result.stdout}`);
if (result.stderr) parts.push(`stderr:\n${result.stderr}`);
parts.push(`exit code: ${result.exitCode ?? 'null'}`);
return {
content: [{ type: 'text' as const, text: parts.join('\n') }],
details: undefined,
};
},
};
return [shellExec];
}