13 KiB
13 KiB
Issue #755 — Logical Mos identity and connector lease fencing
- Task:
MOS-PORT-M1-001 - Branch:
feat/mos-logical-identity-fencing - Base:
origin/main - Started: 2026-07-14
- Working budget: 38K tokens (task ledger estimate); one implementation lane, bounded to M1.
Objective
Implement the first runtime-portability security boundary: normalized logical-agent identity plus a PostgreSQL-durable exclusive connector lease and server-validated fencing grants.
Scope
- Normalized identity contract independent of harness/provider-native session IDs.
- DB migration/schema/repository for one lease per tenant/logical-agent/binding.
- CAS acquire/takeover, monotonic epoch, TTL, heartbeat, release, expiry handling.
- Server-derived grants bound to tenant, logical agent, binding, connector, scopes, expiry, and lease epoch.
- Reject and credential-safely audit stale, expired, forged, unauthorized, cross-tenant, and cross-binding grants before adapter side effects.
- Runtime adapter boundary consumes normalized lease context.
- Unit, migration, close/reopen, concurrency, abuse, and gateway integration tests.
- Required developer/operations documentation for schema and security behavior.
Explicit exclusions
No checkpoint/handoff payloads, exactly-once journal/receipts, concrete Claude/Pi/Codex harness adapter, channel cutover, or full cross-harness failover E2E.
Reconciliation baseline
- Prospective remediation handoff:
web1:coder1; PR #757, issue #755. - Before rebase:
dff8ce4f79ef90370c29d925002118a708010091; required base:origin/mainat2e2280070ae67288be45f41743cf67052a8ca5a6; original branch base:d0771835542deab048ad8e79f271e3abdb6151f7. - Provider metadata: #757 is open, targets
main, head isfeat/mos-logical-identity-fencing, prior CI is green, and the provider reports it is not mergeable because of conflicts. - Affected delivery paths:
apps/gateway/src/agent/agent.module.ts; connector-lease gateway repository/service and three focused tests;packages/agent/src/connector-lease.tsplus test/export;packages/types/src/agent/connector-lease.dto.tsplus test/export;packages/db/src/schema.ts, migration0016_salty_morlocks.sql, Drizzle snapshot/journal;docs/PRD.md,docs/SITEMAP.md, MOS architecture/operations pages, this scratchpad, anddocs/tess/TASKS.md. - Read-only merge-tree inspection found only
docs/PRD.mdanddocs/SITEMAP.mdconflicts. Current-main #756 channel contracts, #758 roster-v2 structural compiler, and Native Kanban SOT use distinct contract domains; no substantive architecture collision was identified before mechanical reconciliation. - Reconciliation constraints: retain all current-main #752/#756/#758/KBN content; add only nonduplicative #755 references; do not alter semantics or conflate connector leases/grants with Kanban task leases/fences, local Fleet leases, auth sessions, ResetSession generations, or federation grants.
Plan (TDD RED → GREEN → REFACTOR)
- Map existing contracts, DB/migration conventions, gateway authorization/audit boundaries, and test infrastructure.
- Add failing contract/repository/concurrency/restart/abuse/gateway tests and capture RED evidence.
- Implement the smallest normalized contracts, schema/migration/repository, grant validator, audit sink, and gateway service/adapter boundary needed to pass.
- Refactor for clear invariants and credential-safe observability; rerun focused suites.
- Run package/repo typecheck, lint, format, and appropriate tests.
- Run independent code + security review, remediate, and re-review.
- Inspect the final diff for security/scope drift; commit; queue guard; push; open PR with
Refs #755and exact verification; stop without merge/issue closure.
Constraints and safety notes
docs/tess/TASKS.mdis orchestrator-only and will not be edited.- Existing dirty
.mosaic/orchestrator/mission.jsonand.mosaic/orchestrator/session.lockare launcher/orchestrator state and will not be staged or altered intentionally. - No client-supplied identity may confer authority.
- No credential, token, or raw grant material may be persisted to audit/log output.
- Existing authorization checks remain intact; fencing is an additional fail-closed layer.
Assumptions resolved from existing architecture
ASSUMPTION:M1 exposes no public lease endpoint. The gateway service is an internal policy surface with deny-all default policy because concrete connector activation/cutover is explicitly deferred.ASSUMPTION:Fencing epochs use PostgreSQLbigintand cross-module decimal strings, preserving JSON portability without JavaScript number precision loss.ASSUMPTION:Process-local grant provenance intentionally fails closed across restart; durable lease/epoch state survives and fresh grants require current policy + lease validation.
TDD evidence
RED observed before implementation:
corepack pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/types exec vitest run src/agent/connector-lease.dto.spec.ts→ failed to load missingconnector-lease.dto.js.corepack pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/agent exec vitest run src/connector-lease.test.ts→ failed to load missingconnector-lease.js.- Gateway focused tests failed before implementation because the new repository/service boundaries did not exist (workspace dependencies were then built before behavioral GREEN runs).
GREEN to date:
- Types contract: 6/6 passed.
- Agent grant/fencing unit suite: 5/5 passed.
- Gateway PGlite repository + policy/side-effect integration: 7/7 passed; 1 real-PostgreSQL test skipped when
DATABASE_URLabsent. - Real PostgreSQL focused run with configured
DATABASE_URL: 1/1 passed (credential value not emitted in reports).
Documentation checklist
docs/PRD.mdcontains current MOS-PORT M1 scope and acceptance criteria.- Developer architecture:
docs/architecture/mos-runtime-portability-m1.md. - Admin/operations guidance:
docs/guides/mos-connector-lease-operations.md. docs/SITEMAP.mdlinks both pages.- No user-guide change: M1 exposes no user-facing flow or channel cutover.
- No OpenAPI/endpoint-index change: M1 adds no HTTP endpoint.
- Migration/restart/rollback safety and credential-safe audit constraints documented.
- Canonical source remains in-repo; no external publishing action is in scope.
- Independent review confirms documentation matches implementation; implementation-specific findings were remediated.
Independent review and remediation
Codex code/security review ran in multiple rounds. Findings and root-cause remediations:
- Policy could not inspect requested scope/TTL → policy subject now receives normalized requested scopes and explicit requested TTL.
- Unbounded authority lifetime → hard defaults cap leases at 5 minutes and grants at 30 seconds; overrides may only tighten; over-limit tests added.
- Cross-tenant denial could audit under submitted tenant → mismatch audit uses authenticated tenant plus sanitized
untrustedtarget metadata; integration assertion added. - Malformed forged grant could break the denial/audit path → runtime-safe shape validation with sanitized fallback audit; malformed-input test added.
- Gateway integration test depended on prior test state → denial test now seeds a unique binding itself; isolated
-trun passed. - Reviewer repeatedly identified launcher-generated
.mosaic/orchestrator/*state; those files remain unstaged and excluded from the implementation commit.
Latest independent security review: no critical/high/medium/low findings. Final commit-level code review remains to run after the intended diff is committed without launcher state.
Verification evidence
- Focused contracts/fencing: types 6/6; agent 9/9.
- Gateway focused PGlite repository/policy integration: 7/7; isolated denial test 1/1.
- Real PostgreSQL close/reopen/CAS test: 1/1 with configured
DATABASE_URL. - Root
corepack pnpm typecheck: 42/42 Turbo tasks passed. - Root
corepack pnpm lint: 23/23 Turbo tasks passed. - Root
corepack pnpm format:check: all matched files passed. - Root
corepack pnpm test: 42/42 Turbo tasks passed; gateway 616 passed / 12 environment-gated skipped; DB 19 passed / 7 environment-gated skipped; Mosaic 650 passed.
Known residual risks
- Concrete connector policies and Claude/Pi/Codex adapters are intentionally deferred; production policy defaults deny-all.
- Gateway pre-side-effect validation cannot make an external system exactly-once. Adapters must propagate/enforce the epoch at downstream effect boundaries; receipts/journaling are later #754 scope.
- Migration rollback is additive-only; dropping lease/audit tables is intentionally manual to avoid destroying authority/audit evidence.
Commit-level review remediation
- Commit-level Codex code review found one
should-fix: heartbeat, release, and grant issuance authorized caller-supplied lease fields before canonical normalization. - TDD RED: the isolated gateway policy-boundary test showed mixed-case/padded logical agent, binding, connector, scope, and epoch values reaching policy unchanged.
- Remediation: exported the coordinator's canonical lease normalizer and applied it at the gateway boundary before tenant/policy checks and coordinator dispatch for heartbeat, release, and grant issuance.
- GREEN: isolated policy test 1/1; focused types 6/6, agent 9/9, gateway 8/8; root typecheck 42/42, lint 23/23, format check passed, and root tests 42/42 (gateway 617 passed / 12 environment-gated skipped).
- Commit-level security review remained clean: no critical/high/medium/low findings.
Durable grant-expiry review remediation
- Final commit review found a second
should-fix: grant expiry was capped against submitted lease metadata after current-authority validation, rather than the durable lease row. - TDD RED: a crafted same-authority lease with a later submitted expiry produced a grant expiring after the durable row.
- Remediation: grant authority fields and expiry now derive from the durable current lease; submitted scopes remain an additional narrowing constraint.
- GREEN: focused agent fencing suite 10/10.
Current-main reconciliation (2026-07-14)
- Rebased the existing PR branch from
dff8ce4f79ef90370c29d925002118a708010091(old based0771835542deab048ad8e79f271e3abdb6151f7) ontoorigin/main2e2280070ae67288be45f41743cf67052a8ca5a6; current uncommitted reconciliation head isd190732a550918161b91d3eb54640f4ea0e2e499. - Resolved only
docs/PRD.mdanddocs/SITEMAP.md: preserved current-main #752 Native Kanban, #756 official-channel, and #758 FCM material; retained the nonduplicative #755 M1 workstream and placed its two documentation links in the existing Runtime-neutral Mos section. No #755 source semantics changed. - Compatibility review confirmed separate authority domains: connector lease/epoch/grant remains distinct from KBN task leases/fences, local Fleet roster lifecycle, auth sessions, ResetSession context, and federation grants. No channel cutover, adapter activation, checkpoint/exactly-once behavior, UI convergence, or #754 expansion was added.
- Focused verification after building the required workspace dependencies: types contract 6/6; agent fencing/grant 10/10; gateway repository/PGlite and policy integration 8/8. The focused real-PostgreSQL test was skipped because
DATABASE_URLwas not configured; no credentials were inspected or emitted. - Generated schema check:
pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/db db:generatereported no schema changes; migration0016_salty_morlocks, snapshot, and journal were unchanged by generation. - Full verification:
pnpm typecheck42/42;pnpm lint23/23;pnpm format:checkpassed;pnpm test42/42 (gateway 627 passed / 12 environment-gated skipped). Scoped diff check and local documentation-link scan passed. - Pending only: commit this reconciliation record, queue guard, force-with-lease push of the rebased existing branch, then fresh independent DB/code/security review and Ultron. Do not claim merge or issue closure.
Durable lifecycle-authority remediation (2026-07-14)
- Independent review found that heartbeat and release authorized the submitted lease, allowing forged lifecycle scope data to influence policy before the durable row was consulted.
- Remediation: lifecycle operations tenant-check the submitted lease, load the durable current lease, compare tenant, logical agent, binding, lease UUID, connector, epoch, and canonical ordered scopes, audit and deny any absent/mismatched authority, then run policy and coordinator lifecycle calls with the durable lease. Coordinator CAS/fencing checks remain unchanged.
- Adversarial gateway integration coverage proves forged
tool.executescopes on a durableruntime.sendlease deny before policy or mutation, preserve heartbeat/release state, and write a denial audit for both lifecycle actions; canonical heartbeat and release remain accepted. - Verification: focused types 6/6; agent 10/10; gateway PGlite integration/repository 9/9 with one
DATABASE_URL-gated PostgreSQL test skipped; Drizzle check passed; root typecheck 42/42; lint 23/23; format check passed; root test 42/42 (gateway 628 passed / 12 environment-gated skipped). - Pending: commit, queue-guard, force-with-lease push, then independent DB/code/security rereview and CI. Do not merge or close #755.