Hermes Agent
46f52eedfe
Round-five remediation of both blockers gate-ultron-01 raised ondf83a9ee. Measured against that head first; all eight returned rc=0 and each executes the program the check exists to recognize: cu"rl" --config /tmp/w.cfg -> allowed cu'rl' --config /tmp/w.cfg -> allowed /usr/bin/cu\rl --config /tmp/w.cfg -> allowed g"h" api -X POST repos/a/b/issues … -> allowed /usr/bin/g\h api -X POST repos/a/b/… … -> allowed curl --con"fig" /tmp/w.cfg -> allowed /usr/bin/gh api -X POST repos/a/b/$EP … -> allowed g"h" api -X POST repos/a/b/$EP … -> allowed BLOCKER 1. The previous commit said names are recognized "after quote removal" and did not do that. It replaced quote characters with whitespace, which is token SEPARATION: a shell removes a quote WITHOUT splitting the word around it, so `cu"rl"` is one word naming curl, while whitespace made it two words naming neither. `"/usr/bin/curl"` blocked under that version only because the inserted space happened to land after a slash — a passing case that established nothing about quote removal, and I read it as confirmation. The characters are now DELETED, which is what quote removal is. Backslashes go with them, because escaping is ordinary word formation too. Deletion still handles substitution: `$(which curl)` becomes `which curl`, where the name is a word on its own. The flag is read from the same normalized copy for the same reason — `--con"fig"` is one word spelling --config. No review raised that; the name was simply the easier half to reach, and reading both halves the same way is the entire point of having one normalization. BLOCKER 2. A THIRD name consumer never went through the shared site: the unreadable-endpoint arm kept a private bare-name copy of the scope gate's regex against raw $CMD. A caller could be admitted by the repaired gate and then go unrecognized by the fail-closed refinement — a gate and its own refinement disagreeing about who the caller is, which is the defect one layer downstream. Fixing that surfaced the same mistake a third time inside this very edit: my first version left the NAME in the refinement's tail regex, so the name gate recognized `g"h" api` while the tail still demanded the undressed spelling, and the two halves disagreed exactly as before. Caught by the fixture, not by reading. Each half now asks one question: the name gate asks WHO, from the normalized copy; the tail asks whether the ENDPOINT is readable, from the raw text — deliberately raw, because the expansion markers that make an endpoint unreadable are the characters the normalized copy removes, and reading the tail from it would erase the evidence. Controls: the 8 positive fixtures FAIL atdf83a9eeand pass here; the negatives — mycurl, curl-wrapper, mygh, mygh with an assembled endpoint, an absolute-path read, and -K on a non-curl — pass at BOTH heads. Suite 166/166. Unchanged and still stated in the comment rather than this message: a name ABSENT from the text, assembled from variables or reached through a wrapper script that execs the program, is invisible to any of this.
@mosaicstack/mosaic
CLI package for the Mosaic self-hosted AI agent platform.
Usage
mosaic wizard # First-run setup wizard
mosaic gateway install # Install the gateway daemon
mosaic config show # View current configuration
mosaic config hooks list # Manage Claude hooks
Headless / CI Installation
Set MOSAIC_ASSUME_YES=1 (or ensure stdin is not a TTY) to skip all interactive prompts. The following environment variables control the install:
Gateway configuration (mosaic gateway install)
| Variable | Default | Required |
|---|---|---|
MOSAIC_STORAGE_TIER |
local |
No |
MOSAIC_GATEWAY_PORT |
14242 |
No |
MOSAIC_DATABASE_URL |
(none) | Yes if tier=team |
MOSAIC_VALKEY_URL |
(none) | Yes if tier=team |
MOSAIC_ANTHROPIC_API_KEY |
(none) | No |
MOSAIC_CORS_ORIGIN |
http://localhost:3000 |
No |
Admin user bootstrap
| Variable | Default | Required |
|---|---|---|
MOSAIC_ADMIN_NAME |
(none) | Yes (headless) |
MOSAIC_ADMIN_EMAIL |
(none) | Yes (headless) |
MOSAIC_ADMIN_PASSWORD |
(none) | Yes (headless) |
MOSAIC_ADMIN_PASSWORD must be at least 8 characters. In headless mode a missing or too-short password causes a non-zero exit.
Example: Docker / CI install
export MOSAIC_ASSUME_YES=1
export MOSAIC_ADMIN_NAME="Admin"
export MOSAIC_ADMIN_EMAIL="[email protected]"
export MOSAIC_ADMIN_PASSWORD="securepass123"
mosaic gateway install
Runtime launchers
mosaic claude # Launch Claude Code with Mosaic injection
mosaic yolo claude # …with --dangerously-skip-permissions
mosaic codex | opencode | pi
mosaic claudex (EXPERIMENTAL)
Runs GPT models inside the Claude Code harness by pointing Claude Code at a
local claude-code-proxy that
translates the Anthropic Messages API to a ChatGPT-subscription (Codex OAuth)
backend. This is not Anthropic Claude — model behavior, tool use, and output
quality may differ. Intended for evaluation, not production delivery.
mosaic claudex # launch (prompts through the proxy readiness gate)
mosaic yolo claudex # …with --dangerously-skip-permissions
mosaic claudex --print "hello" # trailing args are forwarded to Claude Code
Prerequisite: the claude-code-proxy binary must be installed and
authenticated (claude-code-proxy codex auth …). mosaic claudex runs a
preflight that verifies the binary, the OAuth state (triggering a device re-auth
if needed), and a trusted local listener before launching; it fails closed
if the proxy cannot be brought up with a verified identity.
Isolation (never touches your real Claude state). claudex always launches
against an isolated CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR (default ~/.config/mosaic/claudex/home).
The ambient CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR is deliberately ignored, and a guard proves the
resolved dir can never be — or live under — the real ~/.claude. A claudex
session therefore cannot mutate your normal Claude Code config.
No token leakage. claudex never reads the proxy's credential file. Claude
Code is handed only ANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN=unused pointed at the loopback proxy;
the entire credential-bearing env family (ANTHROPIC_*, AWS_*, GOOGLE_CLOUD_*,
GOOGLE_APPLICATION_CREDENTIALS, *_TOKEN, *_KEY, *_SECRET, …) is stripped
from the composed environment. The Bedrock/Vertex routing switches
(CLAUDE_CODE_USE_BEDROCK, CLAUDE_CODE_USE_VERTEX, and the _SKIP_*_AUTH
pair) are force-removed regardless of value — otherwise their mere presence
would route Claude Code to the real Anthropic API via AWS/GCP and bypass the
proxy. The proxy holds the real OAuth credential.
Model tiers (override via env).
| Tier | Env var | Default |
|---|---|---|
| primary (opus/sonnet) | ANTHROPIC_MODEL |
gpt-5.6-sol |
| small/fast (haiku) | ANTHROPIC_SMALL_FAST_MODEL |
gpt-5.6-luna |
Operator-provided values win over the defaults. Additional overrides:
MOSAIC_CLAUDEX_CONFIG_DIR (isolated config dir), ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL (proxy
endpoint).
Hooks management
After running mosaic wizard, Claude hooks are installed in ~/.claude/hooks-config.json.
mosaic config hooks list # Show all hooks and enabled/disabled status
mosaic config hooks disable PostToolUse # Disable a hook (reversible)
mosaic config hooks enable PostToolUse # Re-enable a disabled hook
Set CLAUDE_HOME to override the default ~/.claude directory.