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stack/packages/mosaic/framework/tools/wake/preimage.sh
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Jason WoltjeandClaude Fable 5 8aff7d8b47
ci/woodpecker/pr/ci Pipeline was successful
fix(wake): #964 re-verdict — record-only polarity, both-forms deny, absent-ledger refusal
Answers the NOT CLEAR verdict on #964 (B2 cases C+D, B11), new commit per
the re-verdict terms.

- B2-D (polarity): extras are RECORD-ONLY by default; byte capture for an
  extra requires WAKE_PREIMAGE_CAPTURE opt-in. Core set (adapter,
  watch-list) stays capture-eligible. Case D is safe by polarity alone —
  verified with the content shape list stubbed to always-allow.
- B2-C (both forms): path deny evaluates raw AND realpath-resolved
  candidate forms against unresolved AND resolved mosaic-home anchors;
  deny runs first in the gate chain, so an allowlisted symlink cannot
  smuggle a denied target.
- Content deny is defense-in-depth on the opt-in path only: six scrub
  shapes + named-assignment probe; probe errors fail TOWARD refusal
  (grep rc>=2 is a deny, not a fall-through).
- B11: absent/empty ledger over non-empty objects/ is a loud non-zero
  refusal to re-baseline — that state cannot be a first install.
- Suite: P2 moved to the core adapter; P4/P5/P10 exercise the opt-in
  path; new needles P13-P17 mirror every verdict probe (symlinked store,
  outside-store copy, live secret no-opt-in/opt-in, record-only
  tracking, ledger deletion, allowlist-symlink both halves). Red-first:
  pre-fix code fails exactly P13/P14/P15/P16 (14 assertions); fixed
  17/17. P17's deny half is green pre-fix (basename rule) — kept as a
  guard needle, disclosed in the PR body.

All 10 wake suites green.

Written-by: pepper (sb-it-1-dt)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NsKce8iZuSuRnu3gVMCBKB
2026-07-30 16:29:33 -05:00

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Executable File

#!/usr/bin/env bash
# preimage.sh — A11 of the wake canon (#958): durable PROVENANCE for the
# OPERATOR-SIDE preimage definition.
#
# THE GAP THIS CLOSES (#958): every observed_hash in the lane store is
# sha256(adapter stdout) — the operator's source adapter (plus the watch-list
# and any operator-declared preimage files) IS the preimage definition for
# every hash the pipeline ever records. Those files live OUTSIDE the versioned
# wake component, so a byte change to them was attributable only through agent
# transcripts: provenance thinner than any hash it feeds. A changed preimage
# also re-baselines EVERY source at once, which previously surfaced only as N
# per-source deltas / UNACCOUNTED lines with no first-class cause.
#
# WHAT THIS TOOL DOES:
# - Derives the PREIMAGE SET generically (no operator paths baked in):
# * the resolved file behind WAKE_DETECTOR_SOURCE_CMD (first word),
# * the WAKE_WATCH_LIST file,
# * operator-declared extras via WAKE_PREIMAGE_EXTRA (colon-separated —
# e.g. sink/feed scripts). Extras are RECORD-ONLY by default (see the
# credential hard gate below); never list key-material files.
# - Records each file's (sha256, size, mtime, ts) as an APPEND-ONLY ledger
# row in <state>/preimage/preimage-ledger.jsonl and stores the full bytes
# CONTENT-ADDRESSED at <state>/preimage/objects/<sha256> — so a change is
# attributable (prior bytes + change time) from durable state alone, with
# no transcript required. Acceptance (a) of #958.
# - On a CHANGE (not first-seen), `check --enqueue` enqueues ONE first-class
# class=actionable entry per changed file via the store's single allocator
# (#908), carrying a §2.1 hard locator (`path`), BEFORE the per-source
# deltas it explains are observed — so the digest shows the cause line,
# not just N re-baselined sources. Acceptance (c).
#
# CREDENTIAL HARD GATE — acceptance (b): the mechanism must be UNABLE to
# capture credential material even by operator error. Layered, every layer
# fail-closed toward NOT capturing bytes (the hash/size/mtime row is still
# written — change-time attribution survives, content capture does not;
# a sha256 discloses nothing about the bytes):
# 1. POLARITY (#964 review, case D): byte capture is DENY-BY-DEFAULT for
# operator extras. WAKE_PREIMAGE_EXTRA paths are RECORD-ONLY (rows +
# first-class change entries, no bytes) unless explicitly listed in
# WAKE_PREIMAGE_CAPTURE — a shape list can only refuse the secrets
# someone already enumerated, so arbitrary operator-pointed files must
# not default to capture. The CORE set (the resolved adapter file, the
# watch-list) is capture-eligible: it IS the preimage definition this
# tool exists to snapshot, and the deny layers below still apply to it.
# 2. PATH deny: the mosaic credential store locations
# (<mosaic-home>/credentials.json, <mosaic-home>/tools/_lib/
# credentials.json, anything under <mosaic-home>/credentials/, and any
# file literally named credentials.json) are refused. Evaluated on BOTH
# the operator-supplied form AND the symlink-resolved form, against BOTH
# the unresolved and resolved forms of the mosaic-home anchor — a deny
# list written only in unresolved paths cannot match a path that was
# resolved before it arrived (#964 review, case C).
# 3. CONTENT deny: a candidate whose bytes match the well-known secret-token
# shapes (same conservative set digest.sh redacts: PAT/Slack/AKIA/JWT/PEM)
# OR a named-assignment secret shape (key/token/secret/passw/hmac/
# credential/bearer = long unbroken value — catches prefix-less
# high-entropy keys, e.g. an HMAC key in an env file) is refused —
# refusal, not redaction: a redacted preimage would be a false witness,
# and secret bytes must never land in the object store. Deliberately
# conservative toward REFUSAL: a false match only withholds byte capture,
# never tracking.
# Plus a size cap (WAKE_PREIMAGE_MAX_BYTES, default 1 MiB) so a stray extra
# pointing at a large binary cannot turn provenance into data hoovering.
# Deny ALWAYS wins over the WAKE_PREIMAGE_CAPTURE opt-in.
#
# FAIL-LOUD DISCIPLINE (the D2/#955 class, both layers): an infrastructure
# failure of THIS tool (unresolvable adapter, unreadable/corrupt ledger,
# failed durable write, failed enqueue) exits NON-ZERO and is never read as
# "no change". A corrupt ledger REFUSES to compare (and to re-baseline):
# silently restarting history would erase the very attribution this exists
# to provide. Likewise (#964 review, B11) an ABSENT/EMPTY ledger while
# objects/ still holds prior captures is DELETED HISTORY, not a first
# install — it refuses loudly instead of re-baselining, because a silent
# restart would absorb the next real change as first-seen.
#
# Operator-agnostic (framework firewall): all state via XDG/env; the deny
# list names only framework-defined credential locations, no operator hosts/
# names/secrets. This tool never prints file CONTENT to any stream.
set -uo pipefail
SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
# shellcheck source=./_wake-common.sh disable=SC1091
. "$SCRIPT_DIR/_wake-common.sh"
STATE_DIR="$(wake_state_dir)"
STORE_SH="$SCRIPT_DIR/store.sh"
PRE_DIR="$STATE_DIR/preimage"
LEDGER="$PRE_DIR/preimage-ledger.jsonl"
OBJECTS="$PRE_DIR/objects"
_need_jq() {
command -v jq >/dev/null 2>&1 || {
echo "preimage.sh: jq is required" >&2
exit 3
}
}
# _hash_stdin — sha256 of stdin, first field only (portable, same fallback
# chain as detector.sh).
_hash_stdin() {
if command -v sha256sum >/dev/null 2>&1; then
sha256sum | awk '{print $1}'
elif command -v shasum >/dev/null 2>&1; then
shasum -a 256 | awk '{print $1}'
elif command -v openssl >/dev/null 2>&1; then
openssl dgst -sha256 | awk '{print $NF}'
else
echo "preimage.sh: no sha256 tool (sha256sum/shasum/openssl) available" >&2
exit 3
fi
}
usage() {
cat >&2 <<'EOF'
Usage: preimage.sh <command>
Commands:
check [--enqueue] Compare every preimage-set file against the ledger head.
A changed file gets a new ledger row (+ captured bytes
when capture-eligible and not denied — see Environment);
with --enqueue each change (not first-seen) also enqueues
ONE first-class class=actionable store entry (hard
locator: path). First-seen files baseline SILENTLY (row,
no enqueue — same idiom as the detector's first-seen).
Exit 0 whether or not changes were found; non-zero ONLY
on infrastructure failure (never read as "no change").
record Alias of `check` without enqueue (baseline/refresh).
set Print the derived preimage set, one resolved path per
line (diagnostic).
status Print the ledger head row for every tracked path.
Environment:
WAKE_DETECTOR_SOURCE_CMD Adapter command; its resolved file joins the set.
WAKE_WATCH_LIST Watch-list path; joins the set when set.
WAKE_PREIMAGE_EXTRA Colon-separated additional operator preimage files
(e.g. sink/feed scripts). Extras are RECORD-ONLY
by default: changes get a hash/size/mtime row and
a first-class change entry, but their BYTES are
never captured unless the path is also listed in
WAKE_PREIMAGE_CAPTURE. A listed path that does not
exist is tracked as ABSENT (deletion of a preimage
file is a change, not an error).
WAKE_PREIMAGE_CAPTURE Colon-separated allowlist of extras whose bytes
MAY be captured. The credential deny rules ALWAYS
win over this list. NEVER list files that can hold
key material (env files with keys/HMACs, credential
stores): the deny gate is a backstop, not a
license.
WAKE_PREIMAGE_MAX_BYTES Byte-capture cap (default 1048576). Larger files:
hash/size/mtime recorded, bytes refused.
WAKE_STATE_HOME/WAKE_AGENT store namespace (see store.sh).
EOF
}
# --- preimage-set derivation (generic; no operator paths baked in) ----------
# _realpath_or_self PATH — resolved form when resolvable, the input otherwise.
_realpath_or_self() {
local p="$1"
if command -v realpath >/dev/null 2>&1; then
realpath -- "$p" 2>/dev/null || printf '%s' "$p"
else
printf '%s' "$p"
fi
}
# _resolve_cmd_file CMD — resolve the FIRST WORD of an adapter command string
# to a real file; prints `raw<TAB>resolved`. Non-zero (loud) if it cannot be
# resolved: an adapter the detector will invoke but provenance cannot see is
# an infrastructure failure, not a smaller set. BOTH forms are kept: the deny
# gate must see the pre-resolution form too (#964 review, case C).
_resolve_cmd_file() {
local cmd="$1" word path
# shellcheck disable=SC2086
set -- $cmd
word="${1:-}"
[ -n "$word" ] || return 1
if [ -f "$word" ]; then
path="$word"
else
path="$(command -v -- "$word" 2>/dev/null)" || return 1
[ -f "$path" ] || return 1
fi
# realpath so the ledger keys on the actual file, not a symlink alias.
printf '%s\t%s' "$path" "$(_realpath_or_self "$path")"
}
# _preimage_set — print the derived set, one member per line as
# `origin<TAB>raw<TAB>resolved` (origin: core|extra). BOTH path forms travel
# with every member so the deny gate and the capture allowlist are evaluated
# on the SAME candidate in BOTH its forms — resolving before denying is the
# #964 case-C ordering defect. Paths from WAKE_PREIMAGE_EXTRA are printed
# EVEN IF ABSENT (deletion is a tracked state); the adapter and watch-list
# must resolve (loud failure otherwise — see _resolve_cmd_file rationale).
_preimage_set() {
local failed=0
if [ -n "${WAKE_DETECTOR_SOURCE_CMD:-}" ]; then
local af
if af="$(_resolve_cmd_file "$WAKE_DETECTOR_SOURCE_CMD")"; then
printf 'core\t%s\n' "$af"
else
echo "preimage.sh: FAIL LOUD — WAKE_DETECTOR_SOURCE_CMD ('$WAKE_DETECTOR_SOURCE_CMD') does not resolve to a file; the preimage definition cannot be observed (NOT treated as 'no change')." >&2
failed=1
fi
fi
if [ -n "${WAKE_WATCH_LIST:-}" ]; then
if [ -f "$WAKE_WATCH_LIST" ]; then
printf 'core\t%s\t%s\n' "$WAKE_WATCH_LIST" "$(_realpath_or_self "$WAKE_WATCH_LIST")"
else
echo "preimage.sh: FAIL LOUD — WAKE_WATCH_LIST ('$WAKE_WATCH_LIST') is not a file; the preimage definition cannot be observed." >&2
failed=1
fi
fi
if [ -n "${WAKE_PREIMAGE_EXTRA:-}" ]; then
local IFS=':' p
for p in $WAKE_PREIMAGE_EXTRA; do
[ -n "$p" ] || continue
# Extras are tracked even when absent (ABSENT is a state). Resolve the
# realpath only when the file exists; otherwise track the literal path.
if [ -e "$p" ]; then
printf 'extra\t%s\t%s\n' "$p" "$(_realpath_or_self "$p")"
else
printf 'extra\t%s\t%s\n' "$p" "$p"
fi
done
fi
return "$failed"
}
# --- credential hard gate (acceptance (b)) ----------------------------------
# _deny_path RAW RESOLVED — 0 (deny) iff EITHER form of the candidate names a
# known credential-store location. Framework-defined locations only
# (firewall): the mosaic credential store, the tools/_lib credential file the
# framework-manifest itself carves out of tools/**, the credentials/ operator
# subtree, and any file literally named credentials.json.
#
# Evaluated on BOTH the operator-supplied (raw) form and the symlink-resolved
# form, against BOTH the unresolved and resolved forms of the mosaic-home
# anchor: a deny list written only in unresolved paths cannot match a path
# that was resolved before it arrived (#964 review, case C — a symlink whose
# target was renamed slipped every path rule because the candidate had
# already been realpath'd but the anchors never were).
_deny_path() {
local raw="$1" resolved="$2"
local home="${MOSAIC_HOME:-$HOME/.config/mosaic}" rhome p a
rhome="$(_realpath_or_self "$home")"
for p in "$raw" "$resolved"; do
[ -n "$p" ] || continue
for a in "$home" "$rhome"; do
case "$p" in
"$a/credentials.json") return 0 ;;
"$a/tools/_lib/credentials.json") return 0 ;;
"$a/credentials/"*) return 0 ;;
esac
done
case "$(basename -- "$p")" in
credentials.json) return 0 ;;
esac
done
return 1
}
# _deny_content FILE — 0 (deny) iff FILE's bytes look secret-shaped.
# Two probes: (a) the well-known vendor-token shapes digest.sh redacts
# (PAT / Slack / AKIA / JWT / PEM — conservative: a 40-hex git sha never
# matches); (b) a named-assignment shape (key/token/secret/passw/hmac/
# credential/bearer = long unbroken value) that catches prefix-less
# high-entropy keys, e.g. an HMAC key in an env file (#964 review, case D).
#
# (b) is defense-in-depth for the OPT-IN path only, NOT the thing that keeps
# case D safe — polarity does that (extras are record-only unless allowlisted;
# a shape list can only refuse the secrets someone already enumerated). It is
# deliberately conservative toward REFUSAL: a false match (a checksum in a
# config, a path that happens to be long and unbroken) only withholds byte
# capture — the hash/size/mtime row and change entry still land. A variable
# REFERENCE (token="$GITEA_TOKEN") never matches: `$` is not in the value
# class — only literal secret values do.
#
# FAILS TOWARD REFUSAL: if a probe itself errors (unreadable file, grep
# failure — rc >= 2), the answer is DENY, not capture. An error exit is not a
# negative result.
_deny_content() {
local rc
LC_ALL=C grep -Eq \
-e 'gh[pousr]_[A-Za-z0-9]{16,}' \
-e 'github_pat_[A-Za-z0-9_]{16,}' \
-e 'xox[baprs]-[A-Za-z0-9-]{10,}' \
-e 'AKIA[0-9A-Z]{16}' \
-e 'eyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}' \
-e '-----BEGIN[A-Z ]*PRIVATE KEY-----' \
-- "$1" 2>/dev/null
rc=$?
[ "$rc" -eq 1 ] || return 0
LC_ALL=C grep -Eiq \
-e "[A-Za-z0-9_]*(key|token|secret|passw|hmac|credential|bearer)[A-Za-z0-9_]*[[:space:]]*[=:][[:space:]]*[\"']?[A-Za-z0-9+/=_-]{16,}" \
-- "$1" 2>/dev/null
rc=$?
[ "$rc" -eq 1 ] || return 0
return 1
}
# _capture_allowed ORIGIN RAW RESOLVED — 0 iff byte capture may even be
# ATTEMPTED for this member (the deny gate still runs after, and wins).
# POLARITY (#964 review, case D): core members (the adapter file, the
# watch-list) are capture-eligible — they ARE the preimage definition this
# tool exists to snapshot (acceptance (a)). Extras are RECORD-ONLY unless
# listed in WAKE_PREIMAGE_CAPTURE.
#
# The allowlist is matched with the SAME both-forms discipline as the deny
# list (entry raw/resolved vs candidate raw/resolved): two lists keyed on
# different strings would let a symlink alias slip between them. "Deny wins
# over opt-in" is a precedence rule, not a guarantee both lists see the same
# path — the guarantee comes from _check_one running _deny_path on both forms
# FIRST, independent of anything matched here.
_capture_allowed() {
local origin="$1" raw="$2" resolved="$3"
[ "$origin" = "core" ] && return 0
[ -n "${WAKE_PREIMAGE_CAPTURE:-}" ] || return 1
local IFS=':' e er
for e in $WAKE_PREIMAGE_CAPTURE; do
[ -n "$e" ] || continue
er="$e"
[ -e "$e" ] && er="$(_realpath_or_self "$e")"
if [ "$e" = "$raw" ] || [ "$e" = "$resolved" ] ||
[ "$er" = "$raw" ] || [ "$er" = "$resolved" ]; then
return 0
fi
done
return 1
}
# --- ledger primitives ------------------------------------------------------
# _ledger_head PATH — print the LAST ledger row for PATH (empty if none).
# Non-zero (loud) if the ledger exists but is unparseable: a corrupt ledger
# must REFUSE to compare, never silently re-baseline (that would erase the
# attribution history this tool exists to keep).
_ledger_head() {
local path="$1"
[ -f "$LEDGER" ] || return 0
if [ -s "$LEDGER" ] && ! jq -cn 'inputs' <"$LEDGER" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
echo "preimage.sh: FAIL LOUD — preimage ledger $LEDGER is unparseable; REFUSING to compare or re-baseline over corrupt history. Investigate/restore the ledger." >&2
return 1
fi
jq -c --arg p "$path" 'select(.path == $p)' "$LEDGER" 2>/dev/null | tail -n 1
}
# _ledger_append ROW_JSON — append one row atomically (read + append + rename;
# rows are small and the writer is serialized by the preimage lock).
_ledger_append() {
local row="$1"
{
[ -f "$LEDGER" ] && cat "$LEDGER"
printf '%s\n' "$row"
} | _atomic_write "$LEDGER"
}
# --- the check itself -------------------------------------------------------
# _check_one ORIGIN RAW PATH ENQUEUE — compare PATH (the resolved form; the
# ledger keys on it) to its ledger head; on change record (+bytes only if
# capture-eligible and not denied) and optionally enqueue. Prints nothing on
# no-change. Returns: 0 ok (changed or not), 1 infrastructure failure.
_check_one() {
local origin="$1" raw="$2" path="$3" enqueue="$4"
local cur_sha size mtime denied="" refused=""
if [ -f "$path" ]; then
cur_sha="$(_hash_stdin <"$path")" || return 1
[ -n "$cur_sha" ] || {
echo "preimage.sh: FAIL LOUD — could not hash $path" >&2
return 1
}
size="$(wc -c <"$path" | tr -d '[:space:]')"
# Portable mtime (GNU stat -c / BSD stat -f).
mtime="$(stat -c %Y -- "$path" 2>/dev/null || stat -f %m -- "$path" 2>/dev/null || echo 0)"
local cap="${WAKE_PREIMAGE_MAX_BYTES:-1048576}"
case "$cap" in '' | *[!0-9]*) cap=1048576 ;; esac
# Gate order matters: path deny FIRST, on BOTH forms, INDEPENDENT of the
# capture allowlist — so an allowlisted symlink whose target is denied
# refuses no matter what string the allowlist matched (a known credential
# store is refused without a content probe; the hash read above is
# deliberate: a sha256 discloses nothing about the bytes). Then polarity
# (record-only extras never reach the content probe — case D must be safe
# WITHOUT the shape list), then size cap (never content-grep an oversized
# file), content shape last.
if _deny_path "$raw" "$path"; then
denied="credential-store path (deny list)"
elif ! _capture_allowed "$origin" "$raw" "$path"; then
denied="extra is record-only by default (byte capture requires WAKE_PREIMAGE_CAPTURE; deny rules still win)"
elif [ "$size" -gt "$cap" ]; then
denied="exceeds WAKE_PREIMAGE_MAX_BYTES ($size > $cap)"
elif _deny_content "$path"; then
denied="secret-shaped content"
fi
else
# ABSENT is a state (deletion of a preimage file is a change to record).
cur_sha="ABSENT"
size=0
mtime=0
fi
local head prev_sha=""
head="$(_ledger_head "$path")" || return 1
[ -n "$head" ] && prev_sha="$(jq -r '.sha256 // ""' <<<"$head")"
if [ "$cur_sha" = "$prev_sha" ]; then
return 0 # unchanged — no row, no enqueue (idempotent)
fi
# --- capture bytes (content-addressed) unless the hard gate refuses -------
local captured=true
if [ "$cur_sha" != "ABSENT" ]; then
if [ -n "$denied" ]; then
captured=false
refused="$denied"
echo "preimage.sh: byte capture WITHHELD for $path ($denied) — hash/size/mtime recorded, content NOT stored (#958)." >&2
else
mkdir -p "$OBJECTS" || return 1
if [ ! -f "$OBJECTS/$cur_sha" ]; then
if ! _atomic_write "$OBJECTS/$cur_sha" <"$path"; then
echo "preimage.sh: FAIL LOUD — durable object write failed for $path ($OBJECTS/$cur_sha); NO ledger row recorded (a row whose bytes were never durably kept would be a false witness)." >&2
return 1
fi
fi
fi
fi
local ts row
ts="$(date +%s)"
row="$(jq -cn \
--arg path "$path" \
--arg sha "$cur_sha" \
--arg prev "$prev_sha" \
--argjson size "$size" \
--argjson mtime "$mtime" \
--argjson ts "$ts" \
--argjson captured "$captured" \
--arg refused "$refused" \
'{ts:$ts, path:$path, sha256:$sha, size:$size, mtime:$mtime, captured:$captured}
+ (if $prev != "" then {prev:$prev} else {} end)
+ (if $refused != "" then {refused:$refused} else {} end)')" || return 1
if ! _ledger_append "$row"; then
echo "preimage.sh: FAIL LOUD — durable ledger append failed ($LEDGER)" >&2
return 1
fi
if [ -z "$head" ]; then
# First-seen: baseline SILENTLY (row only, no enqueue) — the same idiom as
# the detector's first-seen source baseline.
return 0
fi
echo "preimage.sh: preimage definition CHANGED — $path ($prev_sha -> $cur_sha); prior bytes: $OBJECTS/$prev_sha" >&2
if [ "$enqueue" = "1" ]; then
# First-class cause line (acceptance (c)): ONE class=actionable entry per
# changed preimage file, allocated by the store's single allocator (#908).
# `path` is a §2.1 hard locator, so the digest renders it — never
# quarantined. Callers run this BEFORE polling sources, so this seq is
# LOWER than the per-source deltas the change explains.
local locators
locators="$(jq -cn \
--arg path "$path" \
--arg sha "$cur_sha" \
--arg prev "$prev_sha" \
'{kind:"preimage", id:$path, path:$path, observed_hash:$sha, prev_hash:$prev,
preimage:true, reason:"preimage-definition-changed"}')"
if ! "$STORE_SH" enqueue --class actionable --locators "$locators" --emit-ts "$(date +%s)" >/dev/null; then
echo "preimage.sh: FAIL LOUD — store enqueue of the preimage-change entry FAILED for $path (the change IS recorded in the ledger; the first-class wake line is NOT — treat as infrastructure failure)." >&2
return 1
fi
fi
return 0
}
cmd_check() {
local enqueue=0
while [ $# -gt 0 ]; do
case "$1" in
--enqueue)
enqueue=1
shift
;;
*)
echo "preimage.sh check: unknown option '$1'" >&2
exit 2
;;
esac
done
_need_jq
local set_list
if ! set_list="$(_preimage_set)"; then
exit 1
fi
if [ -z "$set_list" ]; then
# Nothing declared (no adapter/watch-list/extras in env) — an empty set is
# a no-op, not an error: standalone invocations outside a wake runtime
# must not fail loud for lacking one.
return 0
fi
mkdir -p "$PRE_DIR" || exit 1
# Serialize concurrent checks (detector tick vs reconcile vs manual) — the
# ledger append is read+rewrite, so two writers must not interleave.
if ! _wake_lock_acquire "$PRE_DIR/preimage.lock"; then
echo "preimage.sh: FAIL LOUD — cannot acquire preimage lock" >&2
exit 1
fi
# #964 review (B11): an ABSENT/EMPTY ledger while objects/ still holds
# prior captures is DELETED HISTORY, not a first install — the asymmetry is
# locally detectable and is the whole detection. Re-baselining here would
# silently absorb the next real change as first-seen (the exact erasure
# this tool exists to prevent). ABSENT is not CORRUPT: it must not take the
# first-install path either.
if [ ! -s "$LEDGER" ] && [ -d "$OBJECTS" ] && [ -n "$(ls -A -- "$OBJECTS" 2>/dev/null)" ]; then
echo "preimage.sh: FAIL LOUD — preimage ledger $LEDGER is ABSENT/EMPTY but $OBJECTS still holds prior objects: history was deleted; REFUSING to re-baseline over it (a silent restart would absorb the next real change as first-seen). Restore the ledger, or move objects/ aside explicitly after investigation." >&2
_wake_lock_release
exit 1
fi
local failed=0 origin raw resolved
while IFS=$'\t' read -r origin raw resolved; do
[ -n "$resolved" ] || continue
_check_one "$origin" "$raw" "$resolved" "$enqueue" || failed=1
done <<EOF
$set_list
EOF
_wake_lock_release
[ "$failed" -eq 0 ] || exit 1
}
cmd_status() {
_need_jq
[ -f "$LEDGER" ] || {
echo "preimage.sh: no ledger yet ($LEDGER)" >&2
return 0
}
# Head row per path (last wins).
jq -cs 'group_by(.path) | map(last) | .[]' "$LEDGER"
}
cmd_set() {
local s
s="$(_preimage_set)" || exit 1
[ -n "$s" ] && printf '%s\n' "$s" | cut -f3
}
main() {
[ $# -ge 1 ] || {
usage
exit 2
}
local cmd="$1"
shift
case "$cmd" in
check) cmd_check "$@" ;;
record) cmd_check ;;
set) cmd_set "$@" ;;
status) cmd_status "$@" ;;
-h | --help | help) usage ;;
*)
echo "preimage.sh: unknown command '$cmd'" >&2
usage
exit 2
;;
esac
}
main "$@"