Ratifies the Mosaic Stack PRD rev1 (Jason Woltje, 2026-09-01) as project source of truth and installs the GOV.1 lifecycle model: - docs/PRD.md becomes a permanent shim (kind: shim, current_rev -> docs/PRDs/2026-08-31_PRD_rev1/). Its path never changes again. - docs/PRDs/2026-08-26_PRD_rev0/PRD.md archives the 2026-08-26 North Star verbatim (sha256 60cc2f98...36afdf unchanged). Archive, never delete. - docs/PRDs/2026-08-31_PRD_rev1/ is the frozen rev1 bundle: 18 sectioned documents (VIS, DATA, AUTHN, AUTHZ, SEAT, ROLE, HARN, PROV, SESS, UI, CLI, GOV.1-5) consolidating rev0 D1-D15, the fleet north star, the agent-runtime L1/L2 contracts and the control-plane-surfaces lane findings, with a single decision map (GOV.3) and a closed open-questions frontier (GOV.5, grill rounds 1-8). Drafting inputs (_source-* snapshots) are not shipped. Consequences of the ratified rulings carried in the same change: - Q-T1 (ruling B, "shipped but frozen"): D3 amended in GOV.3/VIS.1; federation M1-M3 acknowledged as shipped behind tier === 'federated', excluded from the v1 bar and frozen, with a security re-audit gate before any resumption. docs/MISSION-MANIFEST.md, docs/federation/MISSION-MANIFEST.md and docs/scratchpads/mvp-20260312.md get status: superseded + banners (content preserved verbatim); docs/guides/deployment.md gains a "Relationship to the PRD (D15)" section. NORTH_STAR.yaml adds dormant workstream M (projects no goals by design); NORTH_STAR.md regenerated. - Q-G2 (distinct registry prefixes): every citation of the operator DECISION-REGISTER in the bundle reads OD-nn; the stack registry stays D1-D15; L1-Dnn/L2-Dnn untouched. Prefix rule recorded in GOV.1. Follow-ups (not in this PR): CI parity drift-gate witness (Q-C1); brain-side DECISION-REGISTER rename to OD- with redirect table on its next touch.
4.3 KiB
id, status, ratified
| id | status | ratified |
|---|---|---|
| AUTHN.1 | ratified | 2026-09-01 (Jason Woltje; PRD rev1 ratification PR) |
AUTHN.1 — Authentication accounts
Agent-side provider credentials: the accounts seats use to reach providers. (Human login identity is D10 territory — better-auth as system of record — and is out of this section's scope.)
Authentication configuration surface (WebUI page + CLI)
| Control | Notes |
|---|---|
| in-browser OAuth establishment | the OAuth flow runs in-browser; whether the backing terminal flow is tmux-bridged is open: GOV.5-open-questions Q-N1 |
| configured accounts list | provider, mode (OAuth/API), status, holder |
| force renew | |
| deactivate | deactivated accounts drop out of every seat/harness selector |
| allowed harnesses | which harnesses may use this account |
Custody rules
- Secrets live with the credential broker (OpenBao/Vault or flat files per
deployment mode — D3), never in the brain tree, never in manifests, never in
Postgres records. Enforced role manifests declare
credentials: {store: none, providerTokens: denied}— the enforced roles hold no credentials at all; accounts are a launcher/broker concern. - Multi-account per provider is a requirement (onboarding D4 already captures multi-account enrollment).
- Account shape in the seat record (single account vs per-provider map) is open: GOV.5-open-questions Q-D2.
Credential-broker custody rules (pulled 2026-08-31, generalized from the vault draft)
- Reads require a token scoped to the needed paths; provisioning and writes go through a declared channel with documented purpose. An ordinary role never mints credentials or creates production paths.
- Canonical secret path:
environment / service / component / secret-name, lowercase kebab-case, nothing sensitive encoded in the path; environments never cross-reference each other's mounts. Standard field names (username/password,token,host/port/url). - Only the needed field is extracted into the consuming process; values are never echoed to logs or transcripts — read success is proven by field presence and digest, never by printing the value.
- Least privilege, short-lived tokens, no local copies, immediate rotation on compromise; every access audited by the broker.
E2 inputs (triage 2026-08-31; see GOV.2-docs-inventory)
Canonical ground truth: ADMIN-GUIDE/security/sso-providers.md (D10 ground
truth: better-auth + Authentik/WorkOS/Keycloak OIDC).
Pending pulls: DRAFT S2 identity-lifecycle.md (D10 + the #1430 bootstrap
fix) and custody-schema.md; brain docs/guides/proposed/operations/vault.md
(credential-broker custody rules this section states without operational detail).
S2 contract feed (extraction 2026-08-31)
Full extraction record: lane S2-EXTRACTION-2026-08-31.md (per-contract cores, dependency edges, ruling cross-checks). Pulls binding on this section (identity-lifecycle, contract 4, plus
wizard AUTHN clauses):
- better-auth tables are the only account system of record (D10); IdPs are login methods only; account creation grants nothing.
registration_modeopen/invite/closed, defaults closed post-bootstrap, forced closed during the epoch, enforced at a better-auth hook.- Bootstrap/first-admin invariant (#1430): zero-to-one-admin exactly once per
epoch, one atomic transaction, durable fail-closed
bootstrap_state, re-runnable; first-admin-via-SSO runs as a bootstrap-writer transaction, never JIT. v1 first admin is password-only — a disclosed PRD deviation. - JIT defaults OFF per-provider always; JIT users get
member, never elevated; role/authorization attributes are never mapped from IdP claims. Linking keyed(issuer, subject); explicit linking = step-up reauth ≤10 min; automatic linking gated by off-by-defaulttrusted_for_linking+ verified email. - Deactivation (ban) must bound all entry paths — live defect: the
admin-bearer-token path does not check banned status. Deletion deferred;
the existing hard-delete endpoint and
mosaic auth users deleteare mandated for removal.
Seat auth shape ruling (Q-D2, Jason 2026-09-01)
Per-provider map in profile.json, values are credential-broker references —
never secret material. The broker custody rules above govern resolution;
extraction stays field-scoped and digest-proven.