veronica
f0d2dd9920
Applies the document contract from
docs/plans/2026-08-20_stack-docs-flatten-and-alignment.md section 3, partially:
`kind` and `status` only. `parent` is deliberately held until the flatten in
section 4 lands, so that 127 documents do not have to be re-pointed by hand
when docs/fleet/NORTH_STAR.yaml moves to docs/NORTH_STAR.yaml.
Scope, measured on origin/next at 63069149:
127 live docs = all *.md under docs/ minus docs/archive/ minus docs/_old_structure/
104 stamped here
19 held operator judgement (plan section 9), worklist in the same PR
3 held the SUPERSEDED TASKS.md stamps, which cite the moving path
1 untouched docs/fleet/FLEET-DOCTRINE.md, already stamped in W1
Kinds applied: 54 guide, 34 record, 9 spec, 6 tracking, 1 projection.
Every row carries a confidence and a one-line rationale in the worklist.
Two collisions with the existing state, both flagged rather than resolved:
1. docs/README.md:150-160 already documents a front-matter convention
(title/type/audience/status/source_of_truth) with its own allowed values.
It is applied to 4 of 127 files. Its `status` vocabulary is
current|draft|deprecated|historical; the new contract's is active|superseded-by.
The key collides. This commit lets the new contract win and rewrites
`status: current` to `status: active` on those 4 files, keeping their other
legacy keys untouched. No code reads any of them: `git grep source_of_truth`
outside docs/ returns nothing. docs/README.md still prescribes the old
convention and is an operator row, so it is not edited here.
2. Two of the plan's 20 operator rows are YAML files, not markdown
(docs/fleet/examples/roster-v2.yaml, docs/openapi-tess.yaml), and the
contract's front-matter form has no defined meaning for a .yaml document.
That gap also applies to docs/fleet/NORTH_STAR.yaml, the source of truth
itself. Raised in the worklist.
A third row from the plan, docs/fleet/north-star.md, no longer exists: W1
renamed it to docs/fleet/FLEET-DOCTRINE.md.
Verification: 104/104 parse with the expected kind and status in front matter;
the check was shown to reject a wrong kind before it was trusted. The diff
removes 4 lines total, all of them `status: current`.
5.3 KiB
5.3 KiB
kind, status
| kind | status |
|---|---|
| record | active |
Security Review — Issue #756
Scope: final current uncommitted Discord plugin, shared channel contract, gateway ingress, AgentService, and plugin registration delta
Snapshot: plugins/discord/src/index.ts SHA-256 5ee6b6aa4e2ff349f137f76b918d02c1254e12066cb48b136048e57bef36fdb2
Verdict: APPROVE
Final remediation verification
| Area | Current evidence | Result |
|---|---|---|
| Attachment confidentiality and integrity | Ingress accepts bounded attachment metadata only when URL is HTTPS, query-free, fragment-free, and credential-free. Count, aggregate size, field length, MIME, and finite non-negative size validation apply before dispatch; sizeBytes is signed and retained. |
Pass |
| Trusted agent selection | Each binding names a required trusted agentConfigId; gateway resolves that config server-side and requires its configured name to equal the binding logical-agent ID. Client/provider input cannot select the agent for Discord ingress. |
Pass |
| Privileged operation routing | Gateway revalidates the binding and requires the signed conversation identity to match the configured logical agent before approve/stop actions. Paired admin identity and one-time approval checks remain enforced. | Pass |
| Egress containment and delivery | Egress requires an aligned message/route, configured parent or exact observed thread target, and cleans response routes after completion, errors, typed-ingress failure, or bounded-map pressure. | Pass |
| Side-effect limits | Per guild/authorized-parent/user rolling message and thread limits execute before thread creation or dispatch. | Pass |
Security controls reviewed
- Default-deny guild, parent-channel, user, configured pairing, and role checks precede rate consumption and all side effects.
- Gateway independently enforces Discord service authentication, HMAC integrity, allowlists, binding/role checks, attachment validation, and replay-ID rejection.
- Thread authorization uses only the Discord thread parent; category parents cannot authorize ingress.
- Agent-visible attachment references are explicitly labeled untrusted; binary content is not embedded. Persisted attachment name/URL values are redacted.
- Egress uses deterministic nonces, bounded transient retry, typed terminal errors, and does not send to forged targets.
- No secrets or message content were added to plugin logs.
Verification evidence
| Command | Result |
|---|---|
pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/discord-plugin test |
PASS — 44 tests; v8 coverage: 92.18% statements/lines, 86.55% branches, 100% functions |
pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/discord-plugin typecheck |
PASS |
pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/types typecheck |
PASS |
pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/gateway typecheck |
PASS |
pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/gateway exec vitest run src/plugin/discord-ingress.security.spec.ts src/agent/__tests__/agent-service-ownership.test.ts |
PASS — 29 tests |
git diff --check |
PASS |
No unresolved critical, high, medium, or low security findings were identified in the reviewed final delta.