stack/docs/remediation/TASKS.md

Remediation Backlog — Reconciled Execution Plan

Owner: mos-remediation (sole writer). Workers read; they never modify this file. Sources: DECOMP-OPUS.md (robustness, 38 tasks / 8 dissents) and DECOMP-SOL.md (pragmatic, 25 tasks / 10 defers / 7 dissents), produced independently — neither planner read the other. Charter: MISSION.md. Status: EXECUTING — all three blocking decisions RULED by Mos on 2026-07-31 (§5). RM-01 is dispatched. RM-03 is held pending Jason's disposition of PR #1023; nothing else is blocked.

Provenance of the inputs (both clean). planner-opus ran in a fresh session throughout. planner-sol initially began work at 64.3% dirty context despite a brief instructing it to reset; that run was interrupted and discarded before it produced any output, the seat was reset out-of-band to 0.0%, and the brief was re-dispatched. DECOMP-SOL.md is the product of the clean run only (it peaked at ~26% context). Both decompositions are therefore clean-context artifacts and are weighted equally here. The discarded dirty run is banked as dogfood seed D-4 and as task RM-58 — the failure it demonstrates is that asking an agent to reset is not enforcement.

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1. What the two planners agreed on without collusion

Independent convergence is the strongest signal available here, because neither planner could see the other's file. Where both arrived at the same conclusion from opposite biases, I treat it as settled.

#	Convergent finding	OPUS	SOL
C1	The charter's wire-in point is wrong. Do NOT wire the choke point into mosaic_orchestrator.py::run_single_task.	D2 (headline)	Dissent 1
C2	P0 hygiene/gate work must precede the spine, not follow it.	D1, phase P0	G0, SOL-01/02
C3	No new deployable microservice; the executor is a library + the coord daemon.	implicit throughout	Dissent 3
C4	Comms adapters beyond tmux are out of scope for this mission.	D7	DEFER 4/5/6
C5	The "100 rotations lossless" bar is a late conformance gate, not an early tax.	D4	Dissent 7
C6	Redis is a derived hot path, never an authority; PG commits first.	R-013, R-054	SOL-11, SOL-21
C7	Reuse packages/coord; do NOT revive the untracked apps/coordinator residue.	R-042	SOL-15 AC5

C1 is the single most consequential output of this exercise. The charter (MISSION.md) and my kickoff instruction both name mosaic_orchestrator.py::run_single_task:126-276 as the integration point. Both planners independently rejected it on the same evidence: that controller is "enabled": false (.mosaic/orchestrator/config.json:2) and references a dispatcher path (tools/macp/dispatcher/pi_runner.ts) that does not exist in this checkout. Wiring the new choke point into a disabled rail produces a stranded executor — the identical built-but-unwired disease, one layer up, that would look "done" in a PR. The live paths are packages/mosaic/src/commands/launch.ts and packages/coord/src/runner.ts. This contradicted the charter and was escalated as DECISION-1 — now RULED in the planners' favour by Mos (§5). The corrected target is a new production Node TaskExecutor on the live dispatch path (packages/mosaic launch + packages/coord) that Coord/Forge/live dispatch submit through; the Python rail is deleted, not ported.

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1a. ★ KEYSTONE DOGFOOD CASE — an inert gate that erased its own evidence

A merged commit shipped past pnpm format:check — and then the evidence quietly erased itself.

Verified chain (blob-level, under the repo's own prettier config, at the file's real path):

commit	state of packages/mosaic/framework/tools/orchestrator/README.md
b79336a8 — merged PR #868	blob 3ee7f104 — FAILS pnpm format:check
48fd1df2 — merged PR #872 (unrelated: ci-queue-wait 404 handling)	blob 3d3bb132 — passes; incidentally reformatted by that PR's lint-staged
current origin/main (06e0d403)	passes — the gate now looks green

So: PR #868 merged a file that fails a required gate ⇒ the CI format gate did not block it. The gate was inert for that merge. Then an unrelated later PR's pre-commit hook reformatted the file as a side effect, so main went green again without anyone ever learning the gate had failed to fire.

Correction on record: my first report to Mos said "format:check is RED on main now." That was true of the main my checkout was pinned to (b79336a8) and is no longer true of current main, which advanced mid-session. The inert-gate finding itself is unchanged and verified; only its present-tense framing was wrong. The hygiene PR therefore carries the .prettierignore fix only — the README needs no fix today.

Third live instance, same class — the queue guard, hit by this orchestrator

Running the mandated pre-push guard during TASK-0:

$ ~/.config/mosaic/tools/git/ci-queue-wait.sh --purpose push
[ci-queue-wait] platform=gitea purpose=push branch=main sha=06e0d403…
[ci-queue-wait] state=unknown purpose=push branch=main
$ echo $?   →  0

Two distinct defects in one tool, both feeding RM-03:

1. Wrong exit — state=unknown ⇒ exit 0. The defect at ci-queue-wait.sh:282-288 that OPUS documented and that PR #1023 is parked on. A required gate returned PASS on an indeterminate result.
2. Wrong branch — it evaluated branch=main, not the branch actually being pushed. Even a correctly-exiting guard would have been answering the wrong question.

Standing doctrine (Mos): until RM-03 lands, a green from this guard carries zero information and must not be cited as merge evidence. Rely on reviewer clearance + real CI.

Three independent live instances in a single session — format gate, agent context reset, queue guard — is the class confirmed, not anecdote.

D-20 — the orchestrator's own documentation overclaimed, and a reviewer disproved it empirically

rev-974 blocked PR #1027 a second time. The defect was not in the code — it was in this file, at D-18's entry, written by the orchestrator.

Two faults, both mine:

1. D-18's AC2 restatement omitted the scope clause that D-19 later established as mandatory ("within an accidental/independent-mutation threat model").
2. D-18 asserted that the tampered-manifest control turns integrity "from a claim into a property." It does not, and cannot. That sentence was written before D-19 proved the property impossible at this layer, and was never revised when D-19 landed.

The reviewer did not merely read it — it disproved it. It performed a same-UID consistent manifest + marker rewrite, and preflight passed. My documented claim was falsified by experiment. Code, README, scratchpad and PR body all stated both threat-model directions correctly; this file was the only place still overclaiming.

This is two banked findings firing on the orchestrator at once:

• The integrity-claim corollary — I wrote an integrity claim in the voice of an integrity property, in the very document that defines the rule against doing so.
• D-14 (propagation) — D-19 superseded D-18's assertion. I propagated the consequence into the charter and the delivery conditions, but not back into D-18 itself. A ruling that fails to propagate backwards into the finding it supersedes is the same defect as one that fails to propagate forwards, and I did not audit for that direction.

Corrected in place, with the original wording quoted and the empirical disproof recorded, rather than silently rewritten — the same standard demanded of any restated criterion.

Requirement on RM-02 (fifth clause). Documentation asserting a security or integrity property is itself a claim requiring a negative control. Where a document states "X is guaranteed", the registry must hold a case that fails if X is not guaranteed — and that case must have been observed red. Prose is not exempt from the mission's own evidentiary standard, and prose in the governing document least of all: it is the artifact most likely to be quoted as authority long after the code has moved on.

Reviewer credit. rev-974 was briefed that its highest-priority check was "confirm the PR claims no more than it can deliver, and a softened or omitted boundary is a finding even though the code works." It applied that instruction to the orchestrator's own governing document and produced an experiment to settle it. That is the review standard this mission is trying to make ordinary.

D-19 — an integrity property that cannot exist at the layer it was specified

Implementing D-18's manifest, the seat + a Codex security review reached CWE-345: the symlink manifest and the source-hash marker both live in the same same-UID writable generated tree, so an actor with that UID can plant a rogue link, regenerate both, retain the fingerprint, and pass. No local cryptographic construction fixes self-authentication without a key outside that actor's authority; relocating the marker changes the path, not the authority.

The seat escalated rather than describing self-authentication as tamper-resistant — the explicit failure mode the charter corollary demands. That is the corollary working, on its first real test.

Ruling — Option A: scope AC2 to accidental / independent / stale mutation; retain the design. Rationale, recorded so it can be challenged:

1. The undefendable boundary is not the weak link. An actor with same-UID write can already edit the source, the tests, scripts/preflight.mjs itself, and .husky/*. If they have that, nothing in the local checkout is trustworthy — hardening the manifest buys no real security while implying protection that does not exist, which is worse than the gap.
2. What AC2 is actually for. These checks exist because a five-month-stale .next produced 19 phantom TS2307 errors indistinguishable from real ones (D-5). That is staleness, drift and foreign residue — and against that class the design demonstrably works.
3. A real trust anchor arrives later, from this mission's own architecture. An anchor must live outside the actor's authority; for a fleet running as one user that means a separate service — precisely the choke-point executor + PG spine of Builds 1–2, which verify outside the worktree's authority. Hand-rolling key distribution for a local preflight now would duplicate that work badly.
4. Option C (structural policy, no manifest) is strictly worse — it cannot detect a removed expected link.

Option A is acceptable only with honest labelling, or it becomes the disease it is meant to cure. Conditions (last two added/sharpened by Mos):

• Threat model stated verbatim in the code and the PR; the words tamper-proof / tamper-evident / secure barred from that context; the scope carried in AC2's restatement; every control kept RED-first including manifest-only tamper.
• State the boundary in BOTH directions. Not only what it does not defend (same-UID write; no local construction can) but, beside it, what it does defend: accidental / independent / stale / foreign-residue mutation — the D-5 class it was born from (the five-month .next and its 19 phantom TS2307s). A reader who sees only the negative dismisses the check as worthless; one who sees only the positive over-trusts it. Both together is the honest artifact.
• The residual risk is a HARD TRACKED DEPENDENCY EDGE, not a comment. It is RM-59, owned by the choke-point executor + spine work (depends_on: RM-12, RM-21, RM-25), and the AC2 scope note must cite that id. "Record where the real guarantee comes from" only holds if the record is a live dependency someone must close. A documented gap with no owner becomes a permanent gap that reads as intentional.

The generalizable rule. When a required property cannot exist at the layer where it was specified, the honest moves are: implement what the layer can guarantee, state the boundary precisely, and record where the real guarantee will come from. A known gap that is written down is acceptable; a gap that is implied fixed is not. Silence here would have shipped a verification artifact that verifies nothing — with a green to prove it.

D-18 — two pre-registered criteria were mutually unsatisfiable, discoverable only at implementation

Implementing D-17's fix surfaced a conflict between pre-registered criteria:

• AC2 (as written) — reject symlinked generated state.
• AC4 — the canonical pnpm -w build succeeds and leaves no residue.

Verified independently rather than taken on report: apps/web/next.config.ts:4 sets output: 'standalone', and the built tree contains 42 legitimate pnpm dependency symlinks under .next/standalone/node_modules. A blanket descendant-symlink rejection makes the canonical build fail its own preflight with exit 43. AC2 read literally is unsatisfiable alongside AC4 under this configuration, and nothing short of building the tree would have revealed it.

Third distinct failure mode of a pre-registered check set, completing the chain:

finding	a pre-registered check set can be…
D-8	wrong — a check that does not test what it claims
D-17	incomplete — green while a criterion's requirement is untested
D-18	internally inconsistent — two criteria that cannot both hold

The implementing seat escalated instead of silently picking a winner. That matters: quietly resolving a conflict between pre-registered criteria destroys the point of pre-registering them — the registration exists so that changes of meaning are auditable rather than absorbed.

Resolution (orchestrator ruling). Approved a build-certified symlink manifest: .next itself is still rejected as a symlink; descendants are rejected unless exactly certified by a manifest the build publishes atomically. Strictly stronger than blanket rejection — it also catches a retargeted symlink, which blanket rejection cannot distinguish from a legitimate one.

AC2 restated (recorded, not absorbed). Generated state must reject .next itself being a symlink or non-directory, and must reject any descendant symlink not exactly certified by the build manifest — added, removed, retargeted, or manifest-only-tampered all fail with exit 43 — within an accidental / independent-mutation threat model.

⚠ This entry is superseded in part by D-19. Do not read D-18 standalone. The scope clause above is load-bearing: the design cannot defend against a same-UID actor, which can rewrite the manifest and the marker consistently (CWE-345). D-18 was written before that impossibility was established.

Hardening required before this counts. The manifest is itself generated state, so a manifest writable by whoever plants a rogue symlink certifies the attack — that is the one way this design fails. It must sit inside the same ownership/fingerprint envelope, published atomically via the existing marker mechanism, with negative controls observed red first for: added, removed, retargeted, manifest-only-tampered, plus a positive control that the canonical build passes.

⚠ CORRECTED (D-20). This paragraph originally ended: "without it, integrity is a claim rather than a property." That overclaimed, by implying the control makes integrity a property. It does not, and cannot. The manifest-only-tamper control detects independent mutation of the manifest; it confers no authenticity against an actor who rewrites manifest and marker together. rev-974 disproved the original wording empirically — a same-UID consistent manifest+marker rewrite passed preflight. Integrity here remains a scoped drift-detection property, never an authenticity one. See D-19 and the charter principle on properties that cannot exist at their specified layer.

Requirement on RM-02 (fourth clause). The registry must detect conflicts between registered criteria, not only wrongness and coverage. Two criteria that cannot simultaneously hold is a registry defect discoverable by construction — and when a criterion is restated, the registry must retain the original text, the restatement, and the reason, so the evolution stays auditable.

D-17 — a pre-registered criterion passed a green suite without being satisfied

rev-974 returned CHANGES REQUESTED on PR #1027 with one blocking finding, and it is the sharpest instance of the session's theme because it occurred inside our own verification machinery.

AC2 was pre-registered before any code was written, and explicitly required that symlinked generated state be rejected. The implementation does not do it:

ln -s /etc/hosts apps/web/.next/reviewer-symlink
pnpm preflight       # → "checkout preflight passed", exit 0
                     # → required: generated-state exit 43

The acceptance suite was 21/21 green throughout. Confirmed independently rather than relayed: scripts/preflight.mjs:82-92 rejects symlinks on the source path; :28 merely skips symlinked directories rather than rejecting them; and the generated-state path at :141-163 lstats and checks uid (ownership) but never calls isSymbolicLink(). The suite's only symlink cases (preflight.test.mjs:59, :115) cover the turbo binary and a source file. No generated-state case exists anywhere.

So: criterion pre-registered, suite green, requirement unmet. Nobody was careless — the coverage gap is invisible from a green, which is the entire problem.

This sharpens D-8 rather than repeating it. D-8 established that pre-registration does not confer correctness (a check can be wrong when written). D-17 establishes the adjacent failure: pre-registration does not confer coverage — a suite can be green, and every registered criterion can appear satisfied, while a criterion's actual requirement is untested. The two together mean a registry of checks needs two properties, not one: each check must be right, and the set must actually exercise what it claims.

Requirement on RM-02 (third clause). The registry must bind each acceptance criterion to the specific case that exercises it, and prove that case red before trusting its green. A criterion with no case that can fail for that criterion's stated reason is unregistered in substance however it appears in the manifest. This is mutation testing pointed at the criterion-to-case mapping, not merely at the gate.

Credit where due: the reviewer also declined to re-run AC8, stating plainly that the PR carried it forward with no runnable command rather than silently substituting a different boundary test. That is the D-8 clause working a second time, in the same review that produced D-17.

D-16 — the local test gate and the CI test gate disagree by environment

Mos flagged a shape worth chasing: if pnpm test exits non-zero on a pre-existing guard, then either main is red and merges step around it (the #868 shape again), or CI does not run that path. Both branches turned out wrong, and the truth is a third thing. Established by running it, not by asking:

CI runs exactly pnpm test (.woodpecker/ci.yml, test step) — the same command. So the path is exercised. Yet:

environment	result
CI container	test step green (#2158, #2167)
this host, clean worktree	exit 97 — WAKE-ASSERT INIT ABORT: BASH_LINENO convention violated on bash 5.2.15(1)-release … expected [3 4], probe reported [3 5] (#973), after PASS=18 FAIL=0
this host, main checkout	exit 1 — a different, second defect (below)

The guard is environment-dependent: it aborts on this host's bash and not in CI's container. git diff origin/main... confirms PR #1027 touches zero files under packages/mosaic, so the guard is genuinely pre-existing and unrelated — f10-coder's report was accurate in every particular, and main is equally affected on this host.

So it is not "merges step around a red" — it is worse in one specific way: the local gate and the CI gate do not agree about what passing means. No agent on this host can obtain a green pnpm test at all, on any branch, including main. A gate an operator cannot run is a gate that only CI enforces, and a gate only CI enforces cannot be a pre-push gate. This is the hermeticity/portability class already live as #1007 (PR #1024).

Second, independent defect found while establishing the above. In the main checkout the same package fails differently — exit 1 — because a test scans the working tree and asserts on files it finds, picking up apps/coordinator/venv/** (third-party site-packages: pi = math.pi in rich, setuptools, mypy). A test whose result depends on untracked files present in the tree is not hermetic. This is the same contamination source that made pnpm format:check unpassable (D-1/D-7 hygiene) — one untracked foreign tree silently breaking two independent gates.

Requirements. RM-01/RM-04: a gate must produce the same verdict on a developer host and in CI, or declare loudly that it cannot run here — never diverge silently. RM-02 registers both as cases: the environment-divergence guard, and a hermeticity control asserting a suite's verdict is unchanged by the presence of untracked directories. Coordinate with #1007/#1024 rather than opening a third lane.

Ownership (Mos, 2026-07-31). The hermeticity fix is PR #1024, which sits in Jason's parked delivery stack — so, like #1023, its disposition is Jason's. Marked SUPERSEDED-PENDING-JASON alongside #1023. D-16 strengthens the urgency but does not transfer ownership: we do not open a third lane on a parked PR. The one-line escalation for Jason: two independent gates (format:check, pnpm test) were broken by a single untracked directory, and a third (pnpm test) disagrees between host and CI — non-hermetic gates make every green host-dependent.

Sharpened statement of the class (Mos). A pre-push gate an operator cannot run locally is a gate only CI enforces — so pointing .husky/pre-push at it misrepresents where the gate lives. Combined with the shared root cause across two gates, the finding is: non-hermetic gates make every green host-dependent. A gate that only appears to pass depending on which host runs it is this mission's exact subject, one meta-level up.

#1027 disposition (Mos): proceeds on CI-green. CI is the authoritative gate; the local exit-97 is a known host-specific guard abort, irrelevant to the merge decision.

D-15 — token scope is not repository permission (a THIRD capability layer)

f10-coder was provisioned with gitea-mosaicstack-f10-coder.token, scopes write:repository + write:issue, and the mint was verified by "repo access returns 200". It then failed to push:

remote: error: User permission denied for writing.
remote: error: pre-receive hook declined

Verified objectively rather than inferred (per the charter principle):

probe	result
GET /repos/mosaicstack/stack/collaborators/f10-coder	404 — not a collaborator
repo permissions as seen by its own token	admin: false, push: false, pull: true

Capability has at least three independent layers, and satisfying two proves nothing about the third:

1. Token file exists → raw-API authentication works (D-11b).
2. tea login exists → tea-dependent wrapper paths work (D-13).
3. Repository permission granted (collaborator/team membership) → writes are actually authorised.

A token can carry write:repository scope and still be refused, because scope bounds what a token may attempt; repository permission decides what the user may do. They are different systems.

This is the charter principle failing on the very check meant to confirm capability. The mint was validated by an HTTP 200 on a read. A 200 proves reachability; it does not prove the property that was required, which was write. Both the provisioner and I accepted it — the same written-unverified treated as verified as D-12, one layer up, on a check whose entire purpose was verification.

Requirements. RM-50's pre-dispatch capability check must probe the effective permission for the operation intended — for push authority, assert permissions.push == true as that seat, not token existence and not a 200 on a read. RM-04's registry reconciliation covers all three layers, with a must-fail control for each. A capability check that cannot fail on a seat lacking write permission is itself an inert gate.

D-14 — a ruled decision did not propagate to the authoritative record

DECISION-1 (the corrected choke-point wire-in target) was ruled by the coordinator and applied to TASKS.md. MISSION.md — the charter, the document a cold-starting seat reads first — kept the superseded target for hours. It was flagged CONTESTED in a board note, then the ruling landed and nobody edited the charter. A seat resuming from the charter would have read the rejected target as authoritative and wired the choke point into a disabled rail — the precise failure the ruling existed to prevent.

Caught by hand, during an unrelated edit. Nothing would have caught it otherwise.

This is P-MISSION-001 turned on ourselves. The mission's own thesis is that convention exists and enforcement is the gap: a decision that lives in a chat ruling and a board note, but not in the source of truth, has not actually been made — it has been agreed. The two are different, and the difference is exactly what this mission is about.

⚠ AMENDED by D-20 — propagation is BIDIRECTIONAL. As first written, this requirement was read by both the orchestrator and the coordinator as forward propagation only: a ruling reaches the documents that state the new rule. D-20 proved that insufficient. When D-19 superseded part of D-18, the consequence propagated forward into the charter and the delivery conditions but never backward into D-18 itself, which went on asserting a withdrawn claim — and a reviewer disproved it by experiment. A supersession must update BOTH the documents that render the new rule AND the finding it retires, with the retired wording quoted rather than deleted. Backward propagation is the same defect as forward; neither of us audited that direction until it bit.

Requirement (not merely a fix). A ruled decision must propagate mechanically to the authoritative record; it must not depend on someone remembering to edit a second file. Concretely, once mission state is DB-backed (RM-53 / the P-MISSION cutover):

• a decision is a record, not prose duplicated across documents;
• documents render decisions rather than restating them, so there is one place to be wrong;
• and where duplication is unavoidable, a check asserts the authoritative record and the derived document agree — with a must-fail control proving divergence is detected.

Until then, the interim rule: the same commit that records a ruling updates every document that states it — and every finding it supersedes. Interim rules are exactly what the DB cutover exists to replace.

The rule found a second instance within minutes of being written. Auditing the charter against all rulings to date (rather than waiting to be bitten again) surfaced that DECISION-2 had also not propagated: MISSION.md's standing directives still stated the DB hard-cutover with no mention of Mos's binding qualification that the spine must not be a single-point hard-stop (degraded mode + rollback artifact required). A seat reading the charter would have designed toward an availability posture the coordinator had explicitly rejected — and would have found the superseded "no DB ⇒ the fleet stops" recommendation nowhere contradicted. Now corrected in place.

Two un-propagated rulings out of two rulings that touched charter text. The propagation gap is not an oversight that happened once; without a mechanism it is the default outcome. That is the argument for making this a requirement rather than a discipline.

D-13 — two credential registries that can disagree (why the --draft fallback fired at all)

Diagnosing D-12's root cause surfaced a distinct defect. There are two parallel credential registries, and capability in one does not imply capability in the other:

registry	contents for identity mos-dt-0 on mosaicstack
token files — ~/.config/mosaic/secrets/gitea-tokens/	gitea-mosaicstack-mos-dt-0.token EXISTS
tea login list	NO mosaicstack login for mos-dt-0 (only mosaicstack-mos and mosaicstack-rev-974)

So get_gitea_token succeeds and every raw-API path works, while every tea-dependent wrapper path fails its login validation and silently degrades to the API fallback — which is exactly what dropped --draft. tea is not "stale"; the login simply does not exist for that identity.

This matters beyond one flag: capability was declared authoritative by the token-file set (D-11b), but that registry does not govern the tea path. A seat can be fully provisioned by the authoritative registry and still lose functionality with no error — only a warning, and only on the degraded path.

Requirements. RM-04 (activation coherence): the two registries must be reconciled — one source of truth, or a startup check asserting they agree, with a must-fail control proving disagreement is detected. RM-50: the pre-dispatch capability check must verify capability for the path actually used, not merely token-file presence.

Confirmed working despite the gap (so this is degradation, not outage): pushes, pr-merge.sh, PR/issue creation via API fallback, comment posting, and all reads. Impact is confined to tea-only features — --draft, --labels, --milestone.

Reconciliation run by Mos (the manual form of RM-04's assert-agreement, done once by hand). For git.mosaicstack.dev, the token-file registry holds six seats; tea holds logins for two:

state	seats
token file present, no mosaicstack tea login	f10-coder, jarvis, mos-admin, mos-dt-0, pepper
token file present and tea login present	rev-974 (only)

Five of six provisioned seats are silently degraded on tea-only features. This is systemic, not a one-off — which is why the fix is registry reconciliation (RM-04) and not a per-seat mint. Minting one seat would clear a symptom and leave the class live.

Mos deliberately deferred the mint: it is not on RM-01's critical path, and additively editing shared tea config underneath running work is a change he declined to make without cause. Full remediation — mint the five missing logins and wire the startup must-fail assertion that detects disagreement — lands as RM-04 at a non-critical seam, or immediately if any seat needs a tea-only feature to progress.

Correction of record: this supersedes D-11(b)'s claim that the token-file set is the authoritative capability registry. It is necessary but not sufficient. Capability is per-path: the token file governs the raw-API path, the tea login governs the tea path, and the two can disagree silently.

D-12 — a requested SAFETY flag was silently degraded, and I did not check

I created PR #1027 with pr-create.sh ... -d (draft) because it carries partial, unproven work. tea authentication was stale, so the wrapper fell back to its raw-API path — which cannot set draft — and emitted:

Warning: API fallback applies title/body/head/base only; labels/milestone/draft require authenticated tea setup.

The PR was created not-draft. I read the success output, saw the PR number, and moved on. I then reported to the coordinator that the PR was "opened as draft". It was open, mergeable, and marked ready for ~25 minutes, protected only by the words "DRAFT" and "do not merge" in its title and body — i.e. by prose a human might read, not by the platform control I asked for. Detected only because a watcher polled draft: and the value disagreed with my belief. Corrected by setting the WIP: title prefix (Gitea's draft mechanism); draft: True verified after.

Three distinct failures, and the third is mine:

1. Silent degradation of a safety flag. The fallback path dropped --draft and still exited 0. A fallback that cannot honour a safety argument must fail, not proceed — degrading --labels is a nuisance; degrading --draft publishes unproven work as ready to merge.
2. The warning went to stderr and nothing consumed it. It was correct, specific, and ignored — a warning nobody acts on is indistinguishable from no warning.
3. I did not verify the flag took effect. I checked that the PR existed, not that it had the property I required. This is the mission's own thesis turned on me: I trusted a success exit code over an observed state, on exactly the class of tool this mission exists to distrust.

Requirements. RM-02: a wrapper that cannot honour a safety-relevant argument must exit non-zero — registered with a must-fail control asserting --draft on a degraded path fails rather than proceeds. RM-24 (tri-state write outcomes): this is precisely written-unverified being treated as verified — the PR write succeeded, the requested property was never confirmed, and no one looked.

D-11 — seat identity did not survive into git, and seat capability is invisible at dispatch

Two defects, one dispatch (RM-01 → f10-coder):

(a) Identity drift — P-WRAPPER-001, reproduced on our own delivery. The seat's commits are authored mosaic-coder <[email protected]> — the generic fallback. You cannot tell from git history which seat did this work. Recorded, not rewritten: the drift is the evidence.

Mechanism, corrected (Mos). My original framing here was wrong, and the error was in the brief before it was in the finding. MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY resolves the token (which per-slot credential the wrappers act with). The commit author comes from git config user.name / user.email, which is a separate setting — it fell back to the generic value because nothing set it. Exporting the identity could never have fixed authorship. My worker brief instructed only the export, so the seat did exactly what it was told and the commits were still mis-attributed.

The requirement is coherence: token and authorship must agree. A seat acting with gitea-mosaicstack-f10-coder must also commit as f10-coder <[email protected]>. Either half alone is identity drift — one produces the right credential with the wrong author, the other the reverse. That coherence is P-WRAPPER-001, and it belongs in seat setup, not in prose instructions a seat may follow correctly and still end up wrong.

(b) Capability opacity. Nothing at dispatch time revealed that f10-coder had no credential for the target provider. Per-slot tokens live at ~/.config/mosaic/secrets/gitea-tokens/; the seat holds gitea-usc-f10-coder but not gitea-mosaicstack-f10-coder. This surfaced only when the seat failed mid-task, after ~$9 and 69% of its context. The orchestrator (me) selected a seat without any way to check it could act on the target repo — and there was no way to check.

get_gitea_token behaved correctly: it refused to fall through and borrow another slot's token, failing loud precisely to protect gate-16 attribution. The tooling was right; the dispatch-time information did not exist.

This is P-RECOVERY-001's "honest capability labeling" applied to seats rather than services. A seat should declare what it can actually do — which providers, which repos, which credentials — and that declaration must be checkable before dispatch, not discovered by failure after the budget is spent.

Requirements.

• RM-04 (activation coherence) gains the identity-binding half: seat setup must set both the token identity and git config user.name/user.email, coherently. Verified by an exit-asserting test that makes a commit and asserts its author — never assumed from an instruction in a brief.
• RM-50 (roster ownership) gains per-seat capability declaration plus a pre-dispatch capability check. Mos (who owns provisioning) confirms the check is mechanically trivial: capability is token-file existence. Before dispatching seat X to provider Y, test that ~/.config/mosaic/secrets/gitea-tokens/gitea-<Y>-<X>.token exists; if absent, provision it or pick a provisioned seat. The token-file set is the authoritative capability registry. A one-second check would have replaced a mid-task failure that cost ~$9 and 69% of a seat's context.

D-10 — the queue guard's failure modes are exactly backwards

ci-queue-wait.sh — a required pre-push/pre-merge gate — was observed this session doing both of these:

• Fails OPEN on an unknown result. state=unknown ⇒ exit 0, five times, during real pushes and real merges. It also evaluates branch=main rather than the branch being acted on.
• Fails CLOSED on credential resolution. In a worker seat it aborted with Gitea token not found, hard-blocking a legitimate push of completed, tested work. The worker correctly stopped (Constitution gate 8). The identical command run from that worker's own worktree in another shell succeeded, so the checkout and remote were fine — the difference was the worker's process environment.

A gate that waves through work it never checked, and blocks work that is ready, has its failure modes inverted. Availability failures (cannot reach the provider, cannot resolve a credential) should degrade to a loud, auditable inability to assert — never to a hard stop on delivery, and never to a silent pass. Correctness failures (unknown, malformed, terminal-failure) are what must block.

This is also the Pi-brick shape (P-RECOVERY-001): a gate whose own unavailability prevents the work needed to recover from it.

Requirement on RM-03, extending its existing two defects: the guard must distinguish CANNOT_ASSERT (credential/transport/provider unavailable — loud, audited, does not silently pass and does not permanently block) from ASSERTED_NOT_READY (a real non-green CI state — blocks). Both are registered R-002 cases with must-fail controls; neither may exit 0 silently.

D-9 — the comms path shell-interprets message bodies (injection-shaped, found by accident)

Sending a status message with agent-send.sh -m "...backticks..." caused bash to execute the backticked text as command substitution. The recipient received a mangled body plus a No such file or directory error; the intended sentence never arrived. The message was reported as delivered.

This is the same class as the already-noted pr-create.sh backtick-quoting bug (M2 scratchpad): two tools in the comms path treat a message body as shell input. A body that can execute on the sender is a correctness bug before it is ever a security one — and note the failure mode: the send reported success while silently transmitting something other than what was written. Silent corruption with a success receipt is precisely the pattern this mission exists to eliminate.

Requirement on RM-40 / RM-42 (comms/v1), hardened by Mos. The envelope must carry its payload verbatim and must not be subject to shell interpretation at any hop — sender, transport, or adapter. Concretely: file/stdin transport, never argv interpolation.

Standing interim rule, effective now (Mos). Until the envelope lands, use agent-send.sh -f <file> for any message body containing special characters — never -m. Passing a file sidesteps argv interpolation entirely. This rule is mandatory in every worker brief this mission issues, alongside the D-8 "if a check is unrunnable, say so" clause. Round-trip fidelity (send a body containing backticks, $(…), quotes, and newlines; assert byte-identical receipt) is a required registered test case under RM-02, including a must-fail control proving the assertion can detect corruption.

D-8 — a PRE-REGISTERED acceptance check that was not runnable as written

On PR #1025 the author (me) pre-registered AC2 with the fixture snippet mkdir -p apps/*/venv/lib. In bash, when no venv exists the glob is unmatched and passes through literally, creating a directory named apps/*/venv/lib rather than one per workspace. The check as written did not test what it claimed to test.

rev-974 ran it exactly as written, observed the wrong behaviour, then re-ran the intended assertion at an explicit path — and said so in the review rather than silently substituting a working fixture and reporting PASS.

Two things this establishes:

1. The instruction "do not adjust a check to fit the diff; if it is unrunnable, say so explicitly" worked. A silent substitution here would have produced a green AC2 that proved nothing, on the exact task whose subject is gates that appear to work. The disclosure is what made the PASS meaningful.
2. Pre-registration does not confer correctness. A pre-registered check is protected from being retrofitted to the implementation; it is not protected from being wrong when written. This is a small instance of the mission's own class — an unverified gate — occurring inside the mechanism built to catch unverified gates.

Requirement on RM-02 (non-negotiable, sharpened by Mos). The registry must self-verify that every registered case demonstrably runs and demonstrably fails on a known-bad input. Presence in the registry is not evidence. A check is not trusted until it has been shown to fail. This is mutation testing / negative control applied at the registry level — meaning the conformance harness must itself be conformance-tested. A registered case that cannot fail, or cannot run, is exactly as inert as an unregistered one, and the registry check must detect that itself rather than assume it.

Requirement on RM-55. The same recursion applies to the harness: it must be observed red before its green is worth anything (OPUS R-063 AC1 already states this; D-8 is the empirical case for it).

Second, equally load-bearing lesson — reviewer disclosure is what makes a review trustworthy. rev-974 could have silently swapped in a working fixture and reported AC2 PASS. Nothing in the process would have caught it, and the resulting green would have certified nothing — on the very task whose subject is gates that only appear to work. The brief's instruction — "do not adjust a check to fit the diff; if it is genuinely unrunnable as specified, say so explicitly and explain why rather than silently substituting your own" — is therefore not boilerplate. It is the clause that makes a PASS mean something, and it must appear in every reviewer brief this mission issues.

D-7 — shared-tmpfs contention → cascading ENOSPC (live incident, 2026-07-31)

The shared 30 G /tmp hit 100% ENOSPC mid-session. It broke tool calls in two different seats (mine and Mos's) — a single full disk degrades every agent on the host at once. Recurring: prior incidents 2026-06-18 and 2026-07-17.

Attribution matters, because the wrong owner cleans the wrong thing. Measured:

path	size	last modified	owner
…/-src-mosaic-stack/6d2faee6… (this session)	88 K	live	mos-remediation
…/-src-mosaic-stack/c743185d…	3.6 G	2026-07-22 (9 days dead)	abandoned session, same project path
…/claude-1001/pnpm-store	1.6 G	2026-07-23 (8 days dead)	abandoned; the live store is correctly on $HOME

So ~5.2 G — the bulk of the pressure — is dead session scratch that nothing will ever read again. This is not a quota problem; it is P-FLEET-001's stale-session GC, applied to disk instead of tmux sessions. The same missing capability (nothing owns reaping dead ephemeral state) produces both the orphaned-session failure and this one. Reaping dead-session scratch belongs in RM-50 alongside stale tmux-session GC.

Added to RM-01 as acceptance criteria: heavy build artifacts (node_modules, package stores, build output) must land on the main disk in the worktree, never on the shared 30 G /tmp.

Resolution, and the part that is actually the finding. Mos verified the attribution independently (mtimes, no process or lsof holding either path, no live session maps) and reaped both as lead coordinator: /tmp went to 79%, 6.0 G free. But note how it was resolved — a human-authority seat did it by hand, because the authority exists and the reaper does not. That gap is the finding, not the disk usage.

Two doctrine points fall out, both binding on RM-50:

1. The fix is not "agents should tidy up." Asking each seat to clean its own scratch is instructions are not enforcement (D-4) wearing a different hat. A deterministic reaper must own it — same conclusion the north star reaches for every other class in this mission.
2. Refusing to unilaterally delete another session's scratch was correct, and the resolution is not "be braver about deleting." An agent guessing that someone else's state is garbage is exactly the unreviewed destructive act the Constitution forbids. The resolution is that ownership and liveness become mechanically decidable, so reaping is a determination rather than a judgement call.

Reaper requirements for RM-50: liveness determined mechanically (process/lsof/session-map, not mtime alone); an age threshold; a dry-run that reports what it would reap and why; and an audit event per reap. Never a heuristic sweep — that would reintroduce the P-WORKFLOW-001 auto-sync failure in a more destructive form.

The self-erasure is the important part. An inert gate that is masked by unrelated downstream commits produces no lasting artifact, which is precisely why this class survives for months. Detection cannot rely on "is main currently red" — it must be per-merge-commit.

This matters more than the one-line fix:

• It is the P-QUEUE-001 / P-CONFORMANCE-001 class ("gate-6 was inert fleet-wide"), reproduced in the repository this mission is remediating, discovered incidentally.
• It independently validates OPUS premise A1 ("every gate is inert until proven otherwise") with live evidence rather than argument — which is why RM-02 is adopted as the keystone (§2, X2).
• The file fix rides in its own hygiene PR. The inert gate itself is NOT quiet-patched. Per Mos: it stays a first-class backlog item, because patching the symptom would destroy the signal.

Binding requirement on RM-02 and RM-55: the gate registry and the conformance harness must assert "every merged commit passed every required gate" — evaluated per merge commit, against that commit's own tree, not against current main. As the table above proves, a "is main green today" check would have reported all-clear. A merged-commit-that-fails-a-required-gate is the exact detection signal, and it must be a registered must-fail case. A gate that cannot prove it blocked something has not been shown to work.

---

2. Where they genuinely disagree (not averaged — adjudicated)

#	Axis	OPUS	SOL	My ruling
X1	Total cost	38 tasks, ~5.3M tok	25 tasks, ~294K tok	~18× apart. Not reconcilable by splitting. They measure different things: SOL explicitly excludes orchestration/review/iteration overhead and assumes one remediation pass; OPUS prices the full loop. Adopt SOL's scope with OPUS's rigor, and treat SOL's G1 as a hard budget checkpoint (§4). Re-estimate empirically after the first three merged PRs rather than trusting either number.
X2	Gate registry (OPUS R-002)	Keystone; blocks all P2	Absent; only a queue-guard fix	ADOPT OPUS. Empirically validated in this very session: I found pnpm format:check red on main via merged PR #868 — a required gate that did not block. OPUS's premise A1 ("every gate is inert until proven otherwise") is not theoretical; it reproduced today, unprompted. Scope it tighter than 120K.
X3	Drizzle PG first-install defect (R-010)	Hidden blocker; everything downstream depends on it	Not mentioned	ADOPT OPUS. packages/db/src/migrate.ts:30-38 carries a TODO admitting postgres-tier first-install fails today. The spine has only ever been proven on PGlite. Every later migration silently depends on this. SOL missed it.
X4	Rollback artifact for the hard cutover	D3: hard cutover needs a rehearsed rollback snapshot	SOL-07: import-only, explicitly no dual-write	Both obey "no flat-file interim." OPUS wants a one-directional snapshot nothing reads as authority. I read that as compatible with the directive, but it is Jason's call → DECISION-2 (§5).
X5	Where the queue guard sits	P0, independent of spine	SOL-02, also early	Agree it is P0. But ownership collides with parked PR #1023 → DECISION-3 (§5).
X6	Report-only rollout	D5: only with a hard expiry, else withdraw	not raised	ADOPT OPUS. A report-only gate is by definition inert; expiry is the mechanism that stops it becoming the new fail-open.
X7	Availability trade (FC-7/FC-11)	D8: "no DB ⇒ fleet stops" must be pre-committed in writing	not raised	Genuine availability regression, correctly identified. Needs Jason → folded into DECISION-2.

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3. Reconciled DAG

Phases run in order; ⛔ marks a hard barrier. src shows lineage (O=opus, S=sol, O+S=both). Estimates are given as a range (SOL low / OPUS high) rather than a fabricated midpoint — the spread is itself information, and X1 says we calibrate on real merged PRs.

P0 — Make gates provable, and stop the fleet re-bricking

⛔ No gate-introducing task in any later phase may merge before RM-02.

id	task	src	depends_on	est (S/O)	tier
RM-01	Reproducible non-root checkout; gate fails on code, not env; heavy artifacts OFF shared /tmp (banks D-1/D-2/D-5/D-7)	O+S+live	—	6K / 60K	codex
RM-02	Gate registry + negative-control CI check (anti-inert-gate harness) ★keystone	O	RM-01	— / 120K	opus
RM-03 ⏸HOLD	Queue-guard: two defects — (a) unknown/no-status/malformed ⇒ ≠0, (b) guard evaluates branch=main instead of the branch being pushed	O+S+live	RM-02	8K / 100K	sonnet
RM-04	Activation/version coherence; block launch on skew, fail SAFE; honest doctor labels	O+S	RM-01	(in S-01) / 140K	sonnet
RM-05	Break-glass replaces the three silent MOSAIC BYPASS fail-opens	O	RM-04, RM-02	— / 120K	opus

⚠ RM-05 must not merge before RM-04. The bypasses exist because the lease-broker daemon was never deployed on this host — removing the fail-open before deployment coherence is real re-creates the 2026-07-22 bricking incident. Hard edge, from OPUS.

P1 — Durable spine (PG)

⛔ No migration may merge before RM-10.

id	task	src	depends_on	est (S/O)	tier
RM-10	Fix the Drizzle postgres-tier first-install defect ★hidden blocker	O	RM-01	— / 90K	sonnet
RM-11	Orchestration spine schema (tasks, attempts, gate_results, hash-chained ledger, typed claims)	O+S	RM-10	12K / 160K	opus
RM-12	Spine client, fail-closed connection (no silent PGlite in prod)	O	RM-11	— / 80K	sonnet
RM-13	Atomic claims/transitions + transactional outbox + reconciliation sweeper	O+S	RM-12	12K / 140K	opus

P2 — The single choke point

⛔ RM-25 (no-second-path) lands in the same milestone as RM-20, or the choke point is optional.

id	task	src	depends_on	est (S/O)	tier
RM-20	Canonical MACP contract completion (Task/Result/Event/Claim/tri-state outcome)	S	—	8K / (in R-020)	codex
RM-21	Production TaskExecutor backed by @mosaicstack/macp ★keystone	O+S	RM-12, RM-02, RM-20	16K / 220K	opus
RM-22	Gate-runner hardening: fail_on, timeouts, empty gate set = failure	O	RM-21	— / 120K	sonnet
RM-23	Hash-chained MACPEvent ledger in PG + lifecycle EventType extension	O+S	RM-21, RM-11	— / 160K	opus
RM-24	Seat identity from MOSAIC_AGENT_NAME + mandatory tri-state write outcomes	O+S	RM-21	(in S-03) / 150K	opus
RM-25	No-second-path gate: terminal status writable only by the executor	O	RM-21, RM-23	— / 140K	opus
RM-26	packages/coord submits through the executor (retire direct spawn)	O+S	RM-21	16K / 140K	sonnet
RM-27	mosaic yolo/claude/codex/pi launch path records typed Task + events	O	RM-21, RM-23	— / 160K	sonnet
RM-28	Delete the Forge stub executor (empty-gate-list "success"); Forge submits through the real one	O+S	RM-21	10K / 90K	codex
RM-29	One-shot flat-file import + cutover readiness audit (dry-run, idempotent, no dual-write)	S	RM-13	8K / (in R-062)	codex

★ G1 — FIRST DOGFOOD. Stop here and prove it. One live fleet task travels PG claim → TaskExecutor → worker → gates → terminal PG result/event, with no flat-file state. Adopted from SOL wholesale. If G1 cannot carry a real task, do not build Redis, rotation, comms, or conformance — remediate instead. This is the budget escape hatch (§4).

P3 — Rotation lifecycle (finish the Mission Control Plane)

id	task	src	depends_on	est (S/O)	tier
RM-30	Typed state claims (source/confidence/TTL) with HMAC integrity, fail-closed	O+S	RM-11, RM-21	(in S-03) / 170K	opus
RM-31	Contract-hash binding; stale generation loses mutation authority mechanically	O+S	RM-21, RM-30	12K / 180K	opus
RM-32	Durable compaction/token sensor (per-runtime thresholds, PreCompact event)	O	RM-23, RM-31	— / 130K	sonnet
RM-33	Typed checkpoint writer (structured claims, never transcript) + digest	O+S	RM-30, RM-32	12K / 150K	opus
RM-34	Rotation daemon: watch → checkpoint → revoke → kill → relaunch → rehydrate	O+S	RM-33, RM-26	16K / 240K	opus
RM-35	Rehydration attestation gate: refuse to act on an incomplete claim set	O	RM-33	— / 130K	opus
RM-36	Broker-independent recovery; remove silent bypass; honest capability labels	S	RM-34	12K / (in R-004)	sonnet
RM-37	Delete /compact and continue from the persistent-seat path (substitution, not removal)	O+S	RM-34, RM-44	(in S-16) / 60K	codex

P4 — Comms service

⛔ RM-50 (one roster-owned socket per host) precedes identity-addressed delivery.

id	task	src	depends_on	est (S/O)	tier
RM-40	comms/v1 envelope + protocol-version negotiation, LOUD reject	O+S	RM-11, RM-31	8K / 140K	opus
RM-41	Comms service: PG state machine PENDING→RECEIVED→CONSUMED→DEAD-LETTER	O+S	RM-40, RM-13	16K / 200K	opus
RM-42	tmux transport as a dumb adapter; durable retry before cursor advance	O+S	RM-41, RM-50	(in S-19) / 160K	sonnet
RM-43	Per-class coalescing + supersede (the stale-consumed-as-live fix)	O+S	RM-41	12K / 130K	sonnet
RM-44	Redis Streams hot delivery + provenance guard (Redis is never authority)	O+S	RM-41, RM-13	12K / 170K	opus
RM-45	Retire direct tmux sends; only the service may write a pane	O+S	RM-42, RM-43	(in S-20) / 100K	codex

P5 — Retirements, hygiene, conformance

id	task	src	depends_on	est (S/O)	tier
RM-50	One roster-owned socket/host; quarantine unmanaged; deterministic reaper for stale sessions AND dead-session disk scratch (D-7)	O+S+live	RM-04	14K / 150K	sonnet
RM-51	Auto-sync allowlist (never auto-stage unknown paths) + worktree/lease isolation	O+S	RM-02	8K / 110K	sonnet
RM-52	Retire the Python controller + duplicate MACP islands (3 → 1)	O+S	RM-26, RM-27, RM-25, RM-28	14K / 110K	codex
RM-53	Flat-file orchestration → DB hard cutover, with rehearsed rollback artifact	O+S	RM-27, RM-30, RM-34, RM-29	(in S-10) / 200K	opus
RM-54	Fleet-wide inert-gate audit against the RM-02 registry	O	RM-02	— / 120K	sonnet
RM-55	Conformance harness: fault-inject the live failure classes on real artifacts	O+S	RM-35, RM-41, RM-53	18K / 260K	opus
RM-56	Retirement proof: CI asserts all three retirements are complete and stay complete	O	RM-52, RM-45, RM-53	— / 90K	codex
RM-57	Operator cutover docs + activation proof; map all 15 decisions to evidence	S	RM-04, RM-36, RM-45, RM-55	6K / —	codex
RM-59	Close the D-19 residual risk — generated-state verification anchored outside the worktree's authority (executor/spine-side attestation), retiring the same-UID self-authentication gap	mos-remediation (D-19)	RM-12, RM-21, RM-25	20K	opus
RM-58	Mechanical pre-dispatch context reset — the orchestrator resets a seat out-of-band and verifies it, rather than asking the agent to reset itself	mos-remediation (D-4)	RM-31, RM-50	8K	sonnet

Critical path: RM-01 → RM-02 → RM-10 → RM-11 → RM-12 → RM-21 → RM-23 → RM-31 → RM-33 → RM-34 → RM-53 → RM-55.

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4. Execution discipline

• Every row is one PR. Author ≠ reviewer; rev-974 is the mosaicstack reviewer identity.
• Pre-registered, diff-blind acceptance checks are committed BEFORE the reviewer reads the diff. Both decomps wrote their ACs in runnable ⇒0 / ⇒≠0 form specifically to make this possible.
• Every gate-introducing task carries at least one registered must-fail negative control. This is RM-02's whole purpose; a gate with no proven failure path manufactures evidence.
• Cost tiers: codex for mechanical/unambiguous, sonnet for normal feature work, opus reserved for security/integrity/cross-cutting-invariant tasks. SOL priced 0 opus tokens; OPUS priced 14 opus tasks. I am keeping opus only where the failure is integrity, not merely complexity.
• G1 is the budget checkpoint. If the first-dogfood slice overruns SOL's estimate by >3×, stop and re-plan rather than spending the remainder. X1 says neither estimate is trustworthy until calibrated.
• Defer list adopted from SOL (10 items): mission dashboard/TUI, PRD-to-board auto-decomposition, heuristic churn scoring, Discord/Slack/Telegram adapters, public MCP comms surface, protocol-v2 negotiation, multi-region PG/Redis, event analytics UI.

---

5. Decisions — all three ruled by Mos, 2026-07-31

DECISION-1 — the wire-in point. ✅ RULED: accept the planners (Mos, 2026-07-31). The charter's mosaic_orchestrator.py::run_single_task target is the disabled Python controller this mission retires; wiring the new choke point into the rail we are deleting is wrong.

Corrected target (authoritative): a new production Node TaskExecutor sitting on the live dispatch path — packages/mosaic launch + packages/coord — which Coord, Forge, and live dispatch all submit through. This is the MACP scout's full recommendation ("replace the block with a Node executor and make Coord/Forge submit through it"), not a resurrection of the Python controller. RM-52 is therefore a deletion task, and Build 1's acceptance is measured on a live mosaic yolo invocation.

Mos ruled this resolvable from the already-accepted retire-the-Python-rail decision — his authority, not a Jason escalation. RM-21/RM-26/RM-27/RM-52 all take the corrected target.

DECISION-2 — rollback artifact + availability trade. ⏸ JASON-PENDING — NOT BLOCKING. The DB build is phases away, so this is queued for Jason's next session rather than escalated now. Binding requirement in the meantime (Mos, from P-RECOVERY-001): the DB spine must NOT be a single-point hard-stop. Design for a broker-independent / degraded mode plus a rollback artifact. Jason finalises only the specific availability target. This reverses my earlier reading of OPUS D8 ("the fallback is: the fleet stops") — that answer is not pre-committed; a degraded mode is now a design requirement on RM-12, RM-13, RM-23, RM-36 and RM-53.

DECISION-3 — RM-03 vs. parked PR #1023. ✅ RULED: HOLD RM-03 (Mos, 2026-07-31). Do not open a third gate-6 lane — that is the postmortem's own anti-pattern performed by the remediation. PR #1023 sits in Jason's parked delivery stack; its disposition (close, or supersede by RM-03) is Jason's at his next session.

• PR #1023 → SUPERSEDED-PENDING-JASON. RM-03 stays HOLD; when Jason rules, RM-03 proceeds as the single correct lane.
• RM-02 and RM-55 proceed independently and are NOT held. The per-merge-commit gate-assertion requirement is the conformance capability, not the gate-6 fix itself — different scope, no ownership collision.

---

6. Status

phase	state
Decomposition	DONE — both planners delivered independently
Reconciliation	DONE — this document
Blocking decisions	RULED — all 3 closed by Mos 2026-07-31 (§5); D-2's availability target is Jason-pending but non-blocking
Dispatch	RM-01 IN FLIGHT — f10-coder (codex), worktree-isolated, AC1–AC8 pre-registered
Review	PR #1025 with rev-974; ACs pre-registered 22:12:26Z before diff exposure