jason.woltjeandClaude Opus 5.5
4f28c09069
Verdict comment 26765, queue rev 140. R1: message.send and role.revoke verbs use gated decisions without consuming them. R2: a cross-role decision authorizes without limit once policy makes the action gated. Two rulings for Sage on cross-role reuse and class drift. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>
58 lines
4.8 KiB
Plaintext
58 lines
4.8 KiB
Plaintext
v24.21.0
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✔ launch identity is stamped, payload identity is refused and stale holder cannot send (160.989147ms)
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✔ decision classes route from policy; gated resolution is human-only, choice and target must match (254.968273ms)
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✔ claim exclusion, holder release, gated revoke and rerouting to a new holder are atomic (251.099433ms)
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✔ launch events require a human CLI capability; generic emit cannot forge authority events (146.970564ms)
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✔ within-role decisions close atomically and invalid options or blocking omissions refuse (150.298836ms)
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✔ observer capabilities read human inbox but cannot mutate or forge launch identity (91.593414ms)
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✔ task action subjects and linked decision trail are complete and ordered (81.43039ms)
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✔ launch binding is durable and reconnecting requires the identical trusted record (41.427316ms)
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✔ business isolation includes inherited object names and cross-business message references (86.10921ms)
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✔ authority never transfers between action, run, target, unresolved or replaced role holder (120.840149ms)
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✔ task projection uses schema current view, skipping earlier and equal-start polls (60.520573ms)
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✔ revocation permanently bars the old run from reclaiming first, including after broker restart (99.416738ms)
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✔ empty message references refuse before storage; refusal-evidence failure stays a typed error (62.793345ms)
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✔ both arbiters require human resolution when their cross-role route is themselves (101.64615ms)
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✔ S1 adapter takes resolved limits and refs, rejects mismatched instance, never mutates input (1.800875ms)
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✔ only validated broker references load; returned data and exceptions cannot expose a known token (3.75381ms)
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✔ bad file modes, symlinks, repository/data paths, malformed tokens and missing dates refuse (1.897443ms)
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✔ expiry refuses use and env references never become client data (0.558257ms)
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✔ S1 parsed service refs work, service mismatch refuses, Gitea rotation due is a warning state (1.227213ms)
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✔ opaque tokens shorter than 16 characters refuse before use (0.288504ms)
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✔ human proof binds CLI entry, process start and nonce; agents and incomplete ancestry refuse (2.473733ms)
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✔ process reader gets own kernel identity without exposing environment values (0.583835ms)
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✔ EACCES ancestor environments skip only markers; commands and registered launches still refuse (1.926785ms)
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✔ real pid 1 remains inspectable when its environment is protected (0.28948ms)
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✔ broker process binds trusted launches, offers reader capabilities, refuses human mutation, closes cleanly (168.916833ms)
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✔ startup token refusal returns safe code without value or partial listening broker (33.320604ms)
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✔ loaded fixture token is absent from socket replies and SQLite, including refusal evidence (174.35308ms)
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✔ killed broker leaves an explicit stale lock; another process cannot silently reclaim it (156.939263ms)
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✔ trusted host registers later launches; socket clients never have a registration verb (173.330156ms)
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✔ runtime excludes declared project roots even when host supplies no repoRoots (34.890355ms)
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✔ a refused launch binding leaves the broker and existing capabilities alive; bad protocol stops it (146.627101ms)
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✔ v3b prototype refusals, views and append-only mutations (997.18416ms)
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✔ gated approval authorizes once, survives store reopen, and fresh approval works (244.016807ms)
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✔ another run cannot consume an approval; a failed check leaves it usable (208.439405ms)
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✔ two scheduled callers have exactly one grant and one consumed refusal (152.945877ms)
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✔ failed commit rolls consumption back; within-role and cross-role stay reusable (236.622595ms)
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✔ a decision raised gated stays single-use after policy changes its action to cross-role (149.152888ms)
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✔ creates private WAL store and excludes a second writer until explicit close (113.627745ms)
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✔ rollback is atomic and schema metadata is checked against trusted DDL, not just itself (187.960529ms)
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✔ existing empty database and symlink runtime directory refuse, never initialize over damage (182.741706ms)
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✔ crash during a transaction recovers no partial event after explicit fixture-only lock removal (170.646801ms)
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✔ writer refuses mixed at/read_at forms atomically, even through trusted SQL helpers (84.442872ms)
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✔ async transactions refuse before invoking their function (77.644716ms)
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✔ socket capability stamps launch identity; shared views use wire, no SQL client (148.630522ms)
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✔ two wire claims serialize; a lost reply never automatically retries (179.578612ms)
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✔ malformed, oversized and identity-forging envelopes refuse without echoing input (106.952818ms)
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✔ client preserves UTF-8 when a response divides a multibyte character (11.555363ms)
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✔ committed mutation followed by dropped reply reports unknown and is never retried (135.25781ms)
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ℹ tests 48
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ℹ suites 0
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ℹ pass 48
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ℹ fail 0
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ℹ cancelled 0
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ℹ skipped 0
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ℹ todo 0
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ℹ duration_ms 1767.695056
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