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docs(remediation): sharpen D-8 — the conformance harness must itself be conformance-tested

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Per Mos. Two requirements, both load-bearing:

RM-02: the gate registry must SELF-VERIFY that every registered case demonstrably
runs and demonstrably fails on a known-bad input. Presence in the registry is not
evidence. A check is not trusted until it has been shown to fail. This is mutation
testing / negative control at the registry level — the conformance harness must
itself be conformance-tested. RM-55 inherits the same recursion: the harness must be
observed red before its green means anything.

Reviewer disclosure: rev-974 could have silently substituted a working fixture and
reported AC2 PASS, and nothing would have caught it. The 'if a check is unrunnable,
say so rather than silently substituting' clause is what makes a PASS mean anything,
and must appear in every reviewer brief this mission issues.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
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mos-dt-0
2026-07-31 17:28:35 -05:00
co-authored by Claude Opus 5
parent 27350d9f8d
commit b705a4dae9
1 changed files with 18 additions and 3 deletions
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docs/remediation/TASKS.md
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@@ -115,9 +115,24 @@ Two things this establishes:
small instance of the mission's own class — an unverified gate — occurring inside the mechanism
built to catch unverified gates.
**Requirement on RM-02:** the gate registry must itself be exercised. A registered case that cannot
fail (or cannot run) is as inert as an unregistered one, and the registry check must detect that —
`--dry-run`-style self-verification of every registered case, not merely its presence.
**Requirement on RM-02 (non-negotiable, sharpened by Mos).** The registry must **self-verify** that
every registered case demonstrably **runs** and demonstrably **fails on a known-bad input**.
Presence in the registry is **not** evidence. **A check is not trusted until it has been shown to
fail.** This is mutation testing / negative control applied _at the registry level_ — meaning
**the conformance harness must itself be conformance-tested.** A registered case that cannot fail, or
cannot run, is exactly as inert as an unregistered one, and the registry check must detect that
itself rather than assume it.
**Requirement on RM-55.** The same recursion applies to the harness: it must be observed red before
its green is worth anything (OPUS R-063 AC1 already states this; D-8 is the empirical case for it).
**Second, equally load-bearing lesson — reviewer disclosure is what makes a review trustworthy.**
rev-974 could have silently swapped in a working fixture and reported `AC2 PASS`. Nothing in the
process would have caught it, and the resulting green would have certified nothing — on the very task
whose subject is gates that only appear to work. The brief's instruction — _"do not adjust a check to
fit the diff; if it is genuinely unrunnable as specified, say so explicitly and explain why rather
than silently substituting your own"_ — is therefore not boilerplate. It is the clause that makes a
PASS mean something, and it must appear in **every** reviewer brief this mission issues.
### D-7 — shared-tmpfs contention → cascading ENOSPC (live incident, 2026-07-31)