Implements FED-010: Agent Spawn via Federation feature that enables spawning and managing Claude agents on remote federated Mosaic Stack instances via COMMAND message type. Features: - Federation agent command types (spawn, status, kill) - FederationAgentService for handling agent operations - Integration with orchestrator's agent spawner/lifecycle services - API endpoints for spawning, querying status, and killing agents - Full command routing through federation COMMAND infrastructure - Comprehensive test coverage (12/12 tests passing) Architecture: - Hub → Spoke: Spawn agents on remote instances - Command flow: FederationController → FederationAgentService → CommandService → Remote Orchestrator - Response handling: Remote orchestrator returns agent status/results - Security: Connection validation, signature verification Files created: - apps/api/src/federation/types/federation-agent.types.ts - apps/api/src/federation/federation-agent.service.ts - apps/api/src/federation/federation-agent.service.spec.ts Files modified: - apps/api/src/federation/command.service.ts (agent command routing) - apps/api/src/federation/federation.controller.ts (agent endpoints) - apps/api/src/federation/federation.module.ts (service registration) - apps/orchestrator/src/api/agents/agents.controller.ts (status endpoint) - apps/orchestrator/src/api/agents/agents.module.ts (lifecycle integration) Testing: - 12/12 tests passing for FederationAgentService - All command service tests passing - TypeScript compilation successful - Linting passed Refs #93 Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
83 lines
2.9 KiB
Markdown
83 lines
2.9 KiB
Markdown
# Issue #86: [FED-003] Authentik OIDC Integration - Security Fixes
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## Code Review Findings
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The initial implementation (commit 6878d57) was high quality but included placeholder implementations for security-critical functions. This document tracks the completion of those implementations.
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## Security-Critical Issues
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### 1. JWT Token Validation (CRITICAL)
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**Problem**: `validateToken()` always returns `valid: false`
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**Risk**: Cannot verify authenticity of federated tokens
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**Solution**: Implement proper JWT validation with signature verification
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### 2. OIDC Discovery (CRITICAL)
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**Problem**: `generateAuthUrl()` returns hardcoded placeholder URL
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**Risk**: Cannot initiate real federated authentication flows
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**Solution**: Implement OIDC discovery and proper authorization URL generation
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## Implementation Plan
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### 1. Add Dependencies
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- [x] Add `jose` library for JWT handling (industry-standard, secure)
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### 2. Implement JWT Validation
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- [ ] Fetch OIDC discovery metadata from issuer
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- [ ] Cache JWKS (JSON Web Key Set) for performance
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- [ ] Verify JWT signature using remote public key
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- [ ] Validate standard claims (iss, aud, exp, iat)
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- [ ] Extract user identity from token
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- [ ] Handle expired tokens gracefully
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- [ ] Return proper validation results
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### 3. Implement OIDC Discovery
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- [ ] Fetch `.well-known/openid-configuration` from remote instance
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- [ ] Cache discovery metadata
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- [ ] Generate proper OAuth2 authorization URL
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- [ ] Add PKCE (code_challenge, code_verifier) for security
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- [ ] Include proper state parameter for CSRF protection
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- [ ] Support standard OIDC scopes (openid, profile, email)
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### 4. Update Tests
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- [ ] Replace mock-based tests with real behavior tests
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- [ ] Test valid JWT validation
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- [ ] Test expired/invalid token rejection
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- [ ] Test OIDC discovery and URL generation
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- [ ] Test PKCE parameter generation
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- [ ] Maintain 85%+ test coverage
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### 5. Security Considerations
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- Cache JWKS to avoid excessive network calls
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- Validate token expiration strictly
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- Use PKCE to prevent authorization code interception
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- Validate issuer matches expected remote instance
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- Validate audience matches our instance ID
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- Handle network failures gracefully
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## Implementation Notes
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**PKCE Flow**:
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1. Generate random code_verifier (base64url-encoded random bytes)
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2. Generate code_challenge = base64url(SHA256(code_verifier))
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3. Store code_verifier in session/database
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4. Include code_challenge in authorization URL
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5. Send code_verifier in token exchange
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**JWT Validation Flow**:
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1. Parse JWT without verification to get header
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2. Fetch JWKS from issuer (cache for 1 hour)
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3. Find matching key by kid (key ID)
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4. Verify signature using public key
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5. Validate claims (iss, aud, exp, iat, nbf)
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6. Extract user identity (sub, email, etc.)
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## Progress
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- [x] Add jose library
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- [ ] Implement validateToken()
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- [ ] Implement generateAuthUrl()
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- [ ] Add PKCE support
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- [ ] Update tests
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- [ ] Verify all tests pass
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- [ ] Commit security fixes
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