Implement explicit deny-lists in QueryService and CommandService to prevent user credentials from leaking across federation boundaries. ## Changes ### Core Implementation - QueryService: Block all credential-related queries with keyword detection - CommandService: Block all credential operations (create/update/delete/read) - Case-insensitive keyword matching for both queries and commands ### Security Features - Deny-list includes: credential, api_key, secret, token, password, oauth - Errors returned for blocked operations - No impact on existing allowed operations (tasks, events, projects, agent commands) ### Testing - Added 2 unit tests to query.service.spec.ts - Added 3 unit tests to command.service.spec.ts - Added 8 integration tests in credential-isolation.integration.spec.ts - All 377 federation tests passing ### Documentation - Created comprehensive security doc at docs/security/federation-credential-isolation.md - Documents 4 security guarantees (G1-G4) - Includes testing strategy and incident response procedures ## Security Guarantees 1. G1: Credential Confidentiality - Credentials never leave instance in plaintext 2. G2: Cross-Instance Isolation - Compromised key on one instance doesn't affect others 3. G3: Query/Command Isolation - Federated instances cannot query/modify credentials 4. G4: Accidental Exposure Prevention - Credentials cannot leak via messages ## Defense-in-Depth This implementation adds application-layer protection on top of existing: - Transit key separation (mosaic-credentials vs mosaic-federation) - Per-instance OpenBao servers - Workspace-scoped credential access Fixes #360 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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