docs: PRD rev1 review Q90 — Prettier-format the bundle, add rev0 archive README
ci/woodpecker/pr/ci Pipeline failed

Addresses CPS-PRD-REV1-REVIEW-Q90 findings F1 and F3 on PR #1491:

F1 (format gate): `prettier --write` on the 18 rev1 bundle documents.
Whitespace, table padding, list markers and emphasis delimiters only — a
normalized token comparison of every file before/after shows zero content
difference, so the ratified text is unchanged and no re-ratification applies.

F3 (rev0 relative links): the archived rev0 PRD stays byte-identical
(sha256 60cc2f98...36afdf verified) per GOV.1 archive-never-edit. A sibling
docs/PRDs/2026-08-26_PRD_rev0/README.md records the digest, the original
location, the owner disposition that the in-file links are intentionally
historical, and a resolution table for all 9 targets (11 occurrences), each
verified to exist. Future relocated archives ship the same README instead of
edited bytes.

F2 (test step) is investigated separately against the CI log.
This commit is contained in:
2026-09-02 09:40:46 -05:00
parent ad21ad7ac5
commit 13968e9a8b
19 changed files with 279 additions and 234 deletions
@@ -36,14 +36,14 @@ actions performed on-page.
## Page inventory
| Page | Section doc | Functions |
|---|---|---|
| Seat configuration | [[SEAT.1-seat-profile]] | harness, model, reasoning, workdir, auth account, overlay; separated role-binding section |
| Role configuration | [[ROLE.1-role-governance]] | manifest editing, revision create/diff/activate/rollback, role links, projection status |
| Harness configuration | [[HARN.1-harness-config]] | install (button), enable/disable, available-models allowlist, reasoning defaults, provider link, linked accounts |
| Provider configuration | [[PROV.1-providers]] | provider dropdown, named instances, OAuth/API mode, local providers, activate/deactivate |
| Authentication | [[AUTHN.1-auth-accounts]] | in-browser OAuth establishment, account list, force renew, deactivate, allowed harnesses |
| Authorization audit | below | effective grants, escapation potential, drift |
| Page | Section doc | Functions |
| ---------------------- | -------------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| Seat configuration | [[SEAT.1-seat-profile]] | harness, model, reasoning, workdir, auth account, overlay; separated role-binding section |
| Role configuration | [[ROLE.1-role-governance]] | manifest editing, revision create/diff/activate/rollback, role links, projection status |
| Harness configuration | [[HARN.1-harness-config]] | install (button), enable/disable, available-models allowlist, reasoning defaults, provider link, linked accounts |
| Provider configuration | [[PROV.1-providers]] | provider dropdown, named instances, OAuth/API mode, local providers, activate/deactivate |
| Authentication | [[AUTHN.1-auth-accounts]] | in-browser OAuth establishment, account list, force renew, deactivate, allowed harnesses |
| Authorization audit | below | effective grants, escapation potential, drift |
## Page: Authorization audit (closes gap G3)
@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ Surfaces, per seat, to the user:
- **Misdirection potential** — which seats hold capabilities that would let
another seat's work be routed around its own role lane.
- **Escalation potential** — any path that would add capability. Should be
provably empty; the audit's job is proving it *stays* empty.
provably empty; the audit's job is proving it _stays_ empty.
- **Drift** — seats whose on-disk projection diverges from their active role
revision (`role check` class).
- **Failure/blocked surfacing** (register OD-64) — the canonical alert stream's