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docs(remediation): complete the D-11b addendum with coder-mos1's status-code control

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The advisory on coder-mos1 is retracted and the hold released; the token was valid all along and the
403 was a scope refusal on /user, not an authentication rejection.

coder-mos1 contributed the piece neither Mos nor I had. My differential proves capability but cannot
tell a BROKEN credential from a NARROW one, and that distinction is exactly what a credential advisory
turns on. Its addition: a genuinely invalid token returns 401, while a scope refusal returns 403 with a
required-scope body. So body-aware classification plus an invalid-token 401 control settles credential
validity without needing read:user at all.

A status code read as a bare number cannot distinguish "wrong key" from "right key, narrow door", and
reading it as a bare number nearly cost an escalation on f10-coder and an indefinite silent hold on
coder-mos1 on the same day. A held seat is externally indistinguishable from an idle one, which is what
makes that false negative expensive.

Also banked: capability and identity are separate conditions with different evidence and neither
substitutes for the other. coder-mos1 held that line in its own release criterion after I had corrected
only the capability half, and refused to widen its own token scope to make a check pass — which would
have been D-45, an audited party relaxing its own audit.

read:user is an enhancement for mechanical self-checking, not a repair. The classification belongs in
the seat-provisioning checklist rather than only in this ledger.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
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mos-dt-0
2026-08-05 11:54:38 -05:00
co-authored by Claude Opus 5
parent 8fe14d8e1a
commit 673fbdb978
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@@ -1999,6 +1999,32 @@ governs the raw-API path, the tea login governs the tea path, and the two can di
> perfectly working seat to the coordinator as unprovisioned — burning a provisioning round trip and
> stalling the keystone on a phantom.
> **★ COMPLETION — THE STATUS-CODE CONTROL (contributed by `coder-mos1`, 2026-08-05, and it is better
> than what either the orchestrator or the coordinator had).** The differential proves **capability**.
> It does **not** distinguish a _broken_ credential from a _narrow_ one — and that distinction is what
> a credential advisory actually turns on. The cheap, complete classification:
>
> | observation | means |
> | --------------------------------------------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------- |
> | **401** | **authentication rejected — a REAL credential failure** |
> | **403 + scope message** (`required=[read:user]`) | **token is VALID, scope is narrow — not a failure** |
> | authenticated `push=true` / unauth `push=false` | **capability**, attributable to this token |
> | `/user` 200 with matching login **or** authored read-back | **identity** (needs `read:user`, or coordinator sequencing) |
>
> **Body-aware classification plus an invalid-token 401 control settles credential validity WITHOUT
> needing `read:user` at all.** A status code read as a bare number cannot tell "wrong key" from "right
> key, narrow door" — and reading it as a bare number is what nearly cost an escalation on `f10-coder`
> and an **indefinite silent hold** on `coder-mos1` the same day. **A held seat is externally
> indistinguishable from an idle one**, which is what makes that false negative expensive.
>
> **Capability and identity are SEPARATE conditions with DIFFERENT evidence — do not let one stand in
> for the other.** `coder-mos1` held that line in its own release criterion after the orchestrator
> corrected only the capability half, and declined to widen its own token scope to make a check pass
> (that would be D-45: an audited party relaxing its own audit).
>
> **Belongs in the seat-provisioning checklist, not only in this ledger.** `read:user` is an
> **enhancement for mechanical self-checking, not a repair.**
### D-12 — a requested SAFETY flag was silently degraded, and I did not check
I created PR #1027 with `pr-create.sh ... -d` (draft) because it carries **partial, unproven work**.