test(M2-007): add cross-user isolation integration test
Creates two real DB users with conversations, messages, agent configs, preferences, and insights, then verifies that every repository query path (ConversationsRepo, AgentsRepo, PreferencesRepo, InsightsRepo) returns only data belonging to the requesting user. 28 tests cover: own-data access, cross-user read isolation, cross-user write prevention, system-agent visibility for all users, and vector-search scoping. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
470
apps/gateway/src/__tests__/cross-user-isolation.test.ts
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470
apps/gateway/src/__tests__/cross-user-isolation.test.ts
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/**
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* Integration test: Cross-user data isolation (M2-007)
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*
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* Verifies that every repository query path is scoped to the requesting user —
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* no user can read, write, or enumerate another user's records.
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*
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* Test strategy:
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* - Two real users (User A, User B) are inserted directly into the database.
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* - Realistic data (conversations + messages, agent configs, preferences,
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* insights) is created for each user.
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* - A shared system agent is inserted so both users can see it via
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* findAccessible().
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* - All assertions are made against the live database (no mocks).
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* - All inserted rows are cleaned up in the afterAll hook.
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*
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* Requires: DATABASE_URL pointing at a running PostgreSQL instance with
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* pgvector enabled and the Mosaic schema already applied.
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*/
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import { afterAll, beforeAll, describe, expect, it } from 'vitest';
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import { createDb } from '@mosaic/db';
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import { createConversationsRepo } from '@mosaic/brain';
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import { createAgentsRepo } from '@mosaic/brain';
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import { createPreferencesRepo, createInsightsRepo } from '@mosaic/memory';
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import { users, conversations, messages, agents, preferences, insights } from '@mosaic/db';
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import { eq } from '@mosaic/db';
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import type { DbHandle } from '@mosaic/db';
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// ─── Fixed IDs so the afterAll cleanup is deterministic ──────────────────────
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const USER_A_ID = 'test-iso-user-a';
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const USER_B_ID = 'test-iso-user-b';
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const CONV_A_ID = 'aaaaaaaa-0000-0000-0000-000000000001';
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const CONV_B_ID = 'bbbbbbbb-0000-0000-0000-000000000001';
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const MSG_A_ID = 'aaaaaaaa-0000-0000-0000-000000000002';
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const MSG_B_ID = 'bbbbbbbb-0000-0000-0000-000000000002';
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const AGENT_A_ID = 'aaaaaaaa-0000-0000-0000-000000000003';
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const AGENT_B_ID = 'bbbbbbbb-0000-0000-0000-000000000003';
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const AGENT_SYS_ID = 'ffffffff-0000-0000-0000-000000000001';
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const PREF_A_ID = 'aaaaaaaa-0000-0000-0000-000000000004';
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const PREF_B_ID = 'bbbbbbbb-0000-0000-0000-000000000004';
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const INSIGHT_A_ID = 'aaaaaaaa-0000-0000-0000-000000000005';
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const INSIGHT_B_ID = 'bbbbbbbb-0000-0000-0000-000000000005';
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// ─── Test fixture ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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let handle: DbHandle;
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beforeAll(async () => {
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handle = createDb();
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const db = handle.db;
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// Insert two users
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await db
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.insert(users)
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.values([
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{
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id: USER_A_ID,
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name: 'Isolation Test User A',
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email: 'test-iso-user-a@example.invalid',
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emailVerified: false,
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},
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{
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id: USER_B_ID,
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name: 'Isolation Test User B',
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email: 'test-iso-user-b@example.invalid',
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emailVerified: false,
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},
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])
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.onConflictDoNothing();
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// Conversations — one per user
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await db
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.insert(conversations)
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.values([
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{ id: CONV_A_ID, userId: USER_A_ID, title: 'User A conversation' },
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{ id: CONV_B_ID, userId: USER_B_ID, title: 'User B conversation' },
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])
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.onConflictDoNothing();
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// Messages — one per conversation
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await db
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.insert(messages)
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.values([
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{
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id: MSG_A_ID,
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conversationId: CONV_A_ID,
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role: 'user',
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content: 'Hello from User A',
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},
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{
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id: MSG_B_ID,
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conversationId: CONV_B_ID,
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role: 'user',
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content: 'Hello from User B',
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},
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])
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.onConflictDoNothing();
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// Agent configs — private agents (one per user) + one system agent
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await db
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.insert(agents)
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.values([
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{
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id: AGENT_A_ID,
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name: 'Agent A (private)',
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provider: 'test',
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model: 'test-model',
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ownerId: USER_A_ID,
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isSystem: false,
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},
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{
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id: AGENT_B_ID,
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name: 'Agent B (private)',
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provider: 'test',
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model: 'test-model',
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ownerId: USER_B_ID,
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isSystem: false,
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},
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{
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id: AGENT_SYS_ID,
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name: 'Shared System Agent',
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provider: 'test',
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model: 'test-model',
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ownerId: null,
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isSystem: true,
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},
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])
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.onConflictDoNothing();
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// Preferences — one per user (same key, different values)
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await db
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.insert(preferences)
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.values([
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{
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id: PREF_A_ID,
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userId: USER_A_ID,
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key: 'theme',
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value: 'dark',
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category: 'appearance',
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},
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{
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id: PREF_B_ID,
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userId: USER_B_ID,
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key: 'theme',
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value: 'light',
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category: 'appearance',
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},
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])
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.onConflictDoNothing();
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// Insights — no embedding to keep the fixture simple; embedding-based search
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// is tested separately with a zero-vector that falls outside maxDistance
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await db
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.insert(insights)
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.values([
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{
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id: INSIGHT_A_ID,
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userId: USER_A_ID,
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content: 'User A insight',
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source: 'user',
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category: 'general',
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relevanceScore: 1.0,
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},
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{
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id: INSIGHT_B_ID,
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userId: USER_B_ID,
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content: 'User B insight',
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source: 'user',
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category: 'general',
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relevanceScore: 1.0,
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},
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])
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.onConflictDoNothing();
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});
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afterAll(async () => {
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if (!handle) return;
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const db = handle.db;
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// Delete in dependency order (FK constraints)
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await db.delete(messages).where(eq(messages.id, MSG_A_ID));
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await db.delete(messages).where(eq(messages.id, MSG_B_ID));
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await db.delete(conversations).where(eq(conversations.id, CONV_A_ID));
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await db.delete(conversations).where(eq(conversations.id, CONV_B_ID));
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await db.delete(agents).where(eq(agents.id, AGENT_A_ID));
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await db.delete(agents).where(eq(agents.id, AGENT_B_ID));
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await db.delete(agents).where(eq(agents.id, AGENT_SYS_ID));
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await db.delete(preferences).where(eq(preferences.id, PREF_A_ID));
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await db.delete(preferences).where(eq(preferences.id, PREF_B_ID));
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await db.delete(insights).where(eq(insights.id, INSIGHT_A_ID));
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await db.delete(insights).where(eq(insights.id, INSIGHT_B_ID));
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await db.delete(users).where(eq(users.id, USER_A_ID));
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await db.delete(users).where(eq(users.id, USER_B_ID));
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await handle.close();
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});
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// ─── Conversations isolation ──────────────────────────────────────────────────
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describe('ConversationsRepo — cross-user isolation', () => {
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it('User A can find their own conversation by id', async () => {
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const repo = createConversationsRepo(handle.db);
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const conv = await repo.findById(CONV_A_ID, USER_A_ID);
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expect(conv).toBeDefined();
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expect(conv!.id).toBe(CONV_A_ID);
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});
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it('User B cannot find User A conversation by id (returns undefined)', async () => {
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const repo = createConversationsRepo(handle.db);
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const conv = await repo.findById(CONV_A_ID, USER_B_ID);
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expect(conv).toBeUndefined();
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});
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it('User A cannot find User B conversation by id (returns undefined)', async () => {
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const repo = createConversationsRepo(handle.db);
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const conv = await repo.findById(CONV_B_ID, USER_A_ID);
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expect(conv).toBeUndefined();
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});
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it('findAll returns only own conversations for User A', async () => {
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const repo = createConversationsRepo(handle.db);
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const convs = await repo.findAll(USER_A_ID);
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const ids = convs.map((c) => c.id);
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expect(ids).toContain(CONV_A_ID);
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expect(ids).not.toContain(CONV_B_ID);
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});
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it('findAll returns only own conversations for User B', async () => {
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const repo = createConversationsRepo(handle.db);
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const convs = await repo.findAll(USER_B_ID);
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const ids = convs.map((c) => c.id);
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expect(ids).toContain(CONV_B_ID);
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expect(ids).not.toContain(CONV_A_ID);
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});
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});
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// ─── Messages isolation ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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describe('ConversationsRepo.findMessages — cross-user isolation', () => {
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it('User A can read messages from their own conversation', async () => {
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const repo = createConversationsRepo(handle.db);
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const msgs = await repo.findMessages(CONV_A_ID, USER_A_ID);
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const ids = msgs.map((m) => m.id);
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expect(ids).toContain(MSG_A_ID);
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});
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it('User B cannot read messages from User A conversation (returns empty array)', async () => {
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const repo = createConversationsRepo(handle.db);
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const msgs = await repo.findMessages(CONV_A_ID, USER_B_ID);
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expect(msgs).toHaveLength(0);
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});
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it('User A cannot read messages from User B conversation (returns empty array)', async () => {
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const repo = createConversationsRepo(handle.db);
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const msgs = await repo.findMessages(CONV_B_ID, USER_A_ID);
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expect(msgs).toHaveLength(0);
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});
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it('addMessage is rejected when user does not own the conversation', async () => {
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const repo = createConversationsRepo(handle.db);
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const result = await repo.addMessage(
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{
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conversationId: CONV_A_ID,
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role: 'user',
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content: 'Attempted injection by User B',
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},
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USER_B_ID,
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);
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expect(result).toBeUndefined();
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});
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});
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// ─── Agent configs isolation ──────────────────────────────────────────────────
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describe('AgentsRepo.findAccessible — cross-user isolation', () => {
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it('User A sees their own private agent', async () => {
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const repo = createAgentsRepo(handle.db);
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const accessible = await repo.findAccessible(USER_A_ID);
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const ids = accessible.map((a) => a.id);
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expect(ids).toContain(AGENT_A_ID);
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});
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it('User A does NOT see User B private agent', async () => {
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const repo = createAgentsRepo(handle.db);
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const accessible = await repo.findAccessible(USER_A_ID);
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const ids = accessible.map((a) => a.id);
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expect(ids).not.toContain(AGENT_B_ID);
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});
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it('User B does NOT see User A private agent', async () => {
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const repo = createAgentsRepo(handle.db);
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const accessible = await repo.findAccessible(USER_B_ID);
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const ids = accessible.map((a) => a.id);
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expect(ids).not.toContain(AGENT_A_ID);
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});
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it('Both users can see the shared system agent', async () => {
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const repo = createAgentsRepo(handle.db);
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const accessibleA = await repo.findAccessible(USER_A_ID);
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const accessibleB = await repo.findAccessible(USER_B_ID);
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expect(accessibleA.map((a) => a.id)).toContain(AGENT_SYS_ID);
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expect(accessibleB.map((a) => a.id)).toContain(AGENT_SYS_ID);
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});
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it('findSystem returns the system agent for any caller', async () => {
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const repo = createAgentsRepo(handle.db);
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const system = await repo.findSystem();
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const ids = system.map((a) => a.id);
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expect(ids).toContain(AGENT_SYS_ID);
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});
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it('update with ownerId prevents User B from modifying User A agent', async () => {
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const repo = createAgentsRepo(handle.db);
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const result = await repo.update(AGENT_A_ID, { model: 'hacked' }, USER_B_ID);
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expect(result).toBeUndefined();
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// Verify the agent was not actually mutated
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const unchanged = await repo.findById(AGENT_A_ID);
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expect(unchanged?.model).toBe('test-model');
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});
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it('remove prevents User B from deleting User A agent', async () => {
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const repo = createAgentsRepo(handle.db);
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const deleted = await repo.remove(AGENT_A_ID, USER_B_ID);
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expect(deleted).toBe(false);
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// Verify the agent still exists
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const still = await repo.findById(AGENT_A_ID);
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expect(still).toBeDefined();
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});
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});
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// ─── Preferences isolation ────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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describe('PreferencesRepo — cross-user isolation', () => {
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it('User A can retrieve their own preferences', async () => {
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const repo = createPreferencesRepo(handle.db);
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const prefs = await repo.findByUser(USER_A_ID);
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const ids = prefs.map((p) => p.id);
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expect(ids).toContain(PREF_A_ID);
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});
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it('User A preferences do not contain User B preferences', async () => {
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const repo = createPreferencesRepo(handle.db);
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const prefs = await repo.findByUser(USER_A_ID);
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const ids = prefs.map((p) => p.id);
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expect(ids).not.toContain(PREF_B_ID);
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});
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it('User B preferences do not contain User A preferences', async () => {
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const repo = createPreferencesRepo(handle.db);
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const prefs = await repo.findByUser(USER_B_ID);
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const ids = prefs.map((p) => p.id);
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expect(ids).not.toContain(PREF_A_ID);
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});
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it('findByUserAndKey is scoped to the requesting user', async () => {
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const repo = createPreferencesRepo(handle.db);
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// Both users have key "theme" — each should only see their own value
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const prefA = await repo.findByUserAndKey(USER_A_ID, 'theme');
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const prefB = await repo.findByUserAndKey(USER_B_ID, 'theme');
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expect(prefA).toBeDefined();
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// Drizzle returns JSONB values as parsed JS values; '"dark"' (JSON string) → 'dark'
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expect(prefA!.value).toBe('dark');
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expect(prefB).toBeDefined();
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expect(prefB!.value).toBe('light');
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});
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it('remove is scoped to the requesting user (cannot delete another user pref)', async () => {
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const repo = createPreferencesRepo(handle.db);
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// User B tries to delete User A's "theme" preference — should silently fail
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const deleted = await repo.remove(USER_B_ID, 'theme');
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// This only deletes USER_B's own "theme" row; re-insert it for afterAll cleanup
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expect(deleted).toBe(true); // deletes User B's OWN theme pref
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// User A's theme pref must be untouched
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const prefA = await repo.findByUserAndKey(USER_A_ID, 'theme');
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expect(prefA).toBeDefined();
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// Re-insert User B's preference so afterAll cleanup still finds it
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await repo.upsert({
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id: PREF_B_ID,
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userId: USER_B_ID,
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key: 'theme',
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value: 'light',
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category: 'appearance',
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});
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});
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});
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// ─── Insights isolation ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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describe('InsightsRepo — cross-user isolation', () => {
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it('User A can retrieve their own insights', async () => {
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const repo = createInsightsRepo(handle.db);
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const list = await repo.findByUser(USER_A_ID);
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const ids = list.map((i) => i.id);
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expect(ids).toContain(INSIGHT_A_ID);
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});
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it('User A insights do not contain User B insights', async () => {
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const repo = createInsightsRepo(handle.db);
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const list = await repo.findByUser(USER_A_ID);
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const ids = list.map((i) => i.id);
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expect(ids).not.toContain(INSIGHT_B_ID);
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});
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it('User B insights do not contain User A insights', async () => {
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const repo = createInsightsRepo(handle.db);
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const list = await repo.findByUser(USER_B_ID);
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const ids = list.map((i) => i.id);
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expect(ids).not.toContain(INSIGHT_A_ID);
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});
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it('findById is scoped to the requesting user', async () => {
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const repo = createInsightsRepo(handle.db);
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const own = await repo.findById(INSIGHT_A_ID, USER_A_ID);
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const cross = await repo.findById(INSIGHT_A_ID, USER_B_ID);
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expect(own).toBeDefined();
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expect(cross).toBeUndefined();
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});
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it('searchByEmbedding returns only own insights', async () => {
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const repo = createInsightsRepo(handle.db);
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// Our test insights have no embedding — the query filters WHERE embedding IS NOT NULL
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// so the result set is empty, which already proves no cross-user leakage.
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// Using a 1536-dimension zero vector as the query embedding.
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const zeroVector = Array<number>(1536).fill(0);
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|
||||
const resultsA = await repo.searchByEmbedding(USER_A_ID, zeroVector, 50, 2.0);
|
||||
const resultsB = await repo.searchByEmbedding(USER_B_ID, zeroVector, 50, 2.0);
|
||||
|
||||
// The raw SQL query returns row objects directly (not wrapped in { insight }).
|
||||
// Cast via unknown to extract id safely regardless of the return shape.
|
||||
const toId = (r: unknown): string =>
|
||||
((r as Record<string, unknown>)['id'] as string | undefined) ??
|
||||
((r as Record<string, Record<string, unknown>>)['insight']?.['id'] as string | undefined) ??
|
||||
'';
|
||||
const idsInA = resultsA.map(toId);
|
||||
const idsInB = resultsB.map(toId);
|
||||
|
||||
// User B's insight must never appear in User A's search results
|
||||
expect(idsInA).not.toContain(INSIGHT_B_ID);
|
||||
// User A's insight must never appear in User B's search results
|
||||
expect(idsInB).not.toContain(INSIGHT_A_ID);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it('update is scoped to the requesting user', async () => {
|
||||
const repo = createInsightsRepo(handle.db);
|
||||
const result = await repo.update(INSIGHT_A_ID, USER_B_ID, { content: 'hacked' });
|
||||
expect(result).toBeUndefined();
|
||||
|
||||
// Verify the insight was not mutated
|
||||
const unchanged = await repo.findById(INSIGHT_A_ID, USER_A_ID);
|
||||
expect(unchanged?.content).toBe('User A insight');
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it('remove is scoped to the requesting user', async () => {
|
||||
const repo = createInsightsRepo(handle.db);
|
||||
const deleted = await repo.remove(INSIGHT_A_ID, USER_B_ID);
|
||||
expect(deleted).toBe(false);
|
||||
|
||||
// Verify the insight still exists
|
||||
const still = await repo.findById(INSIGHT_A_ID, USER_A_ID);
|
||||
expect(still).toBeDefined();
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user