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docs(remediation): propagate DECISION-2 to charter — second un-propagated ruling, found by applying D-14

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Applied D-14's own interim rule immediately instead of waiting to be bitten again, and
it caught a second instance within minutes: MISSION.md's standing directives still
stated the DB hard-cutover with no mention of Mos's binding qualification that the
spine must not be a single-point hard-stop (degraded mode + rollback artifact
required). A seat reading the charter would have designed toward an availability
posture the coordinator had explicitly rejected, with the superseded 'no DB means the
fleet stops' recommendation nowhere contradicted.

Two un-propagated rulings out of two that touched charter text. Without a mechanism,
propagation failure is the default outcome, not an oversight — which is the argument
for D-14 being a requirement rather than a discipline.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
This commit is contained in:
mos-dt-0
2026-07-31 18:12:16 -05:00
co-authored by Claude Opus 5
parent 7f686aaf6d
commit d0ad6e942b
2 changed files with 17 additions and 0 deletions
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docs/remediation/TASKS.md
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@@ -121,6 +121,18 @@ mission state is DB-backed (RM-53 / the P-MISSION cutover):
Until then, the interim rule: **the same commit that records a ruling updates every document that
states it.** Interim rules are exactly what the DB cutover exists to replace.
**The rule found a second instance within minutes of being written.** Auditing the charter against all
rulings to date (rather than waiting to be bitten again) surfaced that **DECISION-2 had also not
propagated**: `MISSION.md`'s standing directives still stated the DB hard-cutover with no mention of
Mos's binding qualification that _the spine must not be a single-point hard-stop_ (degraded mode +
rollback artifact required). A seat reading the charter would have designed toward an availability
posture the coordinator had explicitly rejected — and would have found the superseded
"no DB ⇒ the fleet stops" recommendation nowhere contradicted. Now corrected in place.
**Two un-propagated rulings out of two rulings that touched charter text.** The propagation gap is not
an oversight that happened once; without a mechanism it is the _default outcome_. That is the argument
for making this a requirement rather than a discipline.
### D-13 — two credential registries that can disagree (why the `--draft` fallback fired at all)
Diagnosing D-12's root cause surfaced a distinct defect. There are **two parallel credential