docs: identity lifecycle contract revision 3

Addresses the revision-2 re-review residuals and new findings:
- emailVerified joins the canonical set; defined reset rule on email change
- external-principal uniqueness moved to (issuer, subject)
- 'usable login method' defined for unlink refusal
- shipped delete affordances (web admin, mosaic CLI) must be removed or
  disabled with a defined visible state; deactivation exposed instead
- admin-creation switch dropped in favor of plain admin authorization
- verification matrix extended: IdP removal, forward-auth non-use,
  first-admin SSO, wizard-recorded JIT choice, step-up positive/expiry,
  issuer-aliasing witness, UI/CLI delete assertions, docs observable

docs/requirements/identity-lifecycle.md

@@ -17,6 +17,18 @@ hard-delete endpoint required to fail closed (§7.3), workspace identity
 reconciled with the native-kanban SOT (§1.4), verification matrix expanded
 (§8), factual labels corrected (§7.3, §8.1).
 
+Revision 3: addresses the residuals and new findings of the revision-2
+re-review (`fleet/lanes/webui-audit/findings/pr1433-review-r2.md`) —
+`users.emailVerified` added to the canonical set with a defined reset rule on
+email change (§5.1–5.2), external-principal uniqueness moved to
+(issuer, subject) (§6.1), "can actually use" defined (§6.5), the shipped
+delete affordances (web admin page, `mosaic auth users delete`) required to
+be removed or disabled with a defined user-visible state (§7.3), the
+admin-creation switch removed in favor of plain admin authorization (§2.3),
+and §8 extended with observables for IdP removal, forward-auth non-use,
+first-admin SSO, wizard-recorded JIT choice, the admin-guide statement, and
+positive/expiry-bound step-up cases.
+
 Scope: account creation, bootstrap, federated login, account linking, claim
 mapping, deactivation, and (minimally) deletion gating. Out of scope: RBAC
 grant semantics (contract 2), wizard UX flow (contract 3), hierarchy schema
@@ -57,8 +69,10 @@ Contract:
    regardless of any stored value: the setting takes effect only after the
    epoch completes.
 3. `closed` blocks self-service email/password sign-up. It does not block
-   admin-created users or OIDC JIT (§4); each of those is gated by its own
-   switch, and all of them are closed while the bootstrap epoch is open (§3).
+   admin-created users or OIDC JIT (§4). Post-bootstrap admin creation is
+   gated by admin authorization alone — there is no separate switch for it.
+   JIT is gated by its per-provider flag (§4.1). All user-creating paths are
+   closed while the bootstrap epoch is open (§3).
 4. `invite` requires a single-use, expiring invite token bound to an email
    address. Invite issuance is an admin operation and is audit-logged.
 5. Enforcement point: a better-auth hook (or equivalent middleware executed
@@ -138,14 +152,21 @@ in PR #1431's review, `fleet/lanes/webui-audit/findings/pr1431-review.md`):
    `email_verified`, display name, avatar) are recorded per external
    principal — keyed by issuer + subject (§6.1) — at first login and
    refreshed at each login. The canonical account fields (`users.email`,
-   `users.name`, `users.image`) are set from the provider claims exactly
-   once, at account creation (JIT or first-admin SSO), and are never silently
-   overwritten by a later login.
+   `users.emailVerified`, `users.name`, `users.image`) are set exactly once
+   at account creation and are never silently overwritten by a later login.
+   For SSO-created accounts (JIT or first-admin SSO), `users.emailVerified`
+   is set from the provider's `email_verified` claim at creation; for
+   password-created accounts it is false until the address completes
+   verification.
 2. **Canonical email changes only through an explicit workflow.** Either the
    user-initiated email change (with verification of the new address) or an
-   admin edit. A provider-claim refresh never rebinds `users.email`; a
-   divergence between canonical email and the latest provider-observed email
-   is surfaced per §6.3.
+   admin edit. Any canonical email change — user- or admin-initiated — sets
+   `users.emailVerified` to false until the new address completes
+   verification; an admin may instead explicitly attest the address as
+   verified in the same operation, and that attestation is audit-logged. A
+   provider-claim refresh never rebinds `users.email` or
+   `users.emailVerified`; a divergence between canonical email and the latest
+   provider-observed email is surfaced per §6.4.
 3. Never mapped from IdP claims: `role` and any future authorization
    attribute. Authorization lives in the system of record and in the RBAC
    layer (contract 2). An IdP group/role claim may at most be recorded for
@@ -155,13 +176,17 @@ in PR #1431's review, `fleet/lanes/webui-audit/findings/pr1431-review.md`):
 
 1. **External principal identity is issuer + subject.** A linked identity is
    keyed by the OIDC issuer and subject claims, not by an unqualified
-   provider subject id and not by email. Each configured provider binds to
-   exactly one issuer; that binding is immutable after creation (changing the
-   issuer means creating a new provider). The database enforces at most one
-   local account per (provider, subject) with a unique constraint — the
-   current non-unique `(provider_id, account_id)` index does not satisfy
-   this; application-level checks without a uniqueness witness lose
-   concurrent-callback races.
+   provider subject id and not by email. The linked-identity row stores the
+   issuer, and the database enforces at most one local account per
+   **(issuer, subject)** with a unique constraint on those stored columns —
+   uniqueness on (provider, subject) is insufficient because provider →
+   issuer is not one-to-one: two provider configurations can point at the
+   same issuer, and the identity must not alias across them. The current
+   non-unique `(provider_id, account_id)` index satisfies neither;
+   application-level checks without a uniqueness witness lose
+   concurrent-callback races. Each configured provider additionally binds to
+   exactly one issuer, immutable after creation (changing the issuer means
+   creating a new provider).
 2. Linking an OIDC identity to an existing account happens only in one of two
    ways: (a) explicit link initiated by the logged-in user from settings,
    which requires step-up: a fresh reauthentication (password or existing
@@ -178,8 +203,12 @@ in PR #1431's review, `fleet/lanes/webui-audit/findings/pr1431-review.md`):
    §6.1) but the divergence is surfaced in the user's settings and audit log
    (the per-principal claim store in §5.1 is what makes the divergence
    representable).
-5. Unlinking the last login method that the user can actually use is refused
-   unless a password is set first.
+5. Unlinking a login method is refused when it would leave the account with
+   no **usable** login method. Usable means: a set password, or a linked
+   identity whose provider is currently configured and enabled on this
+   deployment. A linked identity whose provider has been removed or disabled
+   (§1.2) is not usable and does not count; setting a password first lifts
+   the refusal.
 
 ## 7. Deactivation propagation
 
@@ -215,6 +244,16 @@ in PR #1431's review, `fleet/lanes/webui-audit/findings/pr1431-review.md`):
    closed, and deactivation is the only supported removal operation. A
    contract that merely declared deactivation "the only supported removal"
    while the endpoint stayed live would be false on its face.
+   Disabling the endpoint alone is insufficient — its shipped callers must
+   not be left as advertised operations that now fail generically:
+   - The admin web UI delete action (`apps/web/src/app/(dashboard)/admin/page.tsx`
+     and any SPA port of it) is removed, or replaced by a disabled control
+     whose visible text states that deletion is unavailable pending the
+     deletion-and-retention contract and points at deactivation.
+   - The CLI command `mosaic auth users delete`
+     (`packages/mosaic/src/commands/auth.ts`) is removed, or exits non-zero
+     with a message stating the same and naming the deactivation command.
+   - Both surfaces expose deactivation as the supported operation.
 
 ## 8. Verification requirements
 
@@ -241,19 +280,46 @@ Every MUST above needs a bounded observable. The matrix:
    allowlist rejects an unverified email claim even when the domain matches;
    JIT refused while the epoch is open.
 4. **Claim mapping (§5).** Login refresh updates the per-principal claim
-   store and does not touch canonical `users.email`/name/image; explicit
-   email-change workflow is the only path that rebinds canonical email.
+   store and touches none of the canonical fields (`users.email`,
+   `users.emailVerified`, name, image); explicit email-change workflow is the
+   only path that rebinds canonical email; every canonical email change
+   resets `users.emailVerified` to false unless the admin attestation path
+   is taken, and that attestation appears in the audit log.
 5. **Linking (§6).** Unique-constraint witness: concurrent first-login
-   callbacks for the same (provider, subject) yield exactly one account;
-   trusted auto-link; untrusted collision error; explicit link refused
-   without fresh step-up reauthentication; last-usable-method unlink refusal;
-   divergence surfaced after IdP email change.
+   callbacks for the same (issuer, subject) yield exactly one account, and
+   two provider configurations sharing one issuer cannot create two accounts
+   for the same subject; trusted auto-link; untrusted collision error;
+   step-up both ways: an explicit link succeeds immediately after a fresh
+   reauthentication and is refused once the implementation's chosen bound
+   (≤ 10 minutes) has elapsed, and refused with no reauthentication at all;
+   unlink refusal when no remaining method is usable per §6.5, including the
+   removed-provider case, and acceptance after a password is set; divergence
+   surfaced after IdP email change.
 6. **Deactivation (§7).** Ban revokes sessions atomically or fails closed
    (partial-failure injection); guard denial post-ban on each transport:
    HTTP session, admin bearer token, MCP, Socket.IO; active socket terminated
    within the 30-second/next-message bound; banned user's admin tokens
    unusable; hard-delete endpoint returns a fail-closed error while the
-   deletion contract is unratified.
+   deletion contract is unratified; the admin web UI renders no live delete
+   action (absent, or disabled with the §7.3 text) and `mosaic auth users
+   delete` exits non-zero with the §7.3 message — both asserted by spec.
+7. **System of record and bootstrap edges (§1, §3.6, §4.3).** IdP removal:
+   deleting a provider configuration leaves every user row intact and every
+   other login method working (spec over the provider-config removal path).
+   Forward-auth non-use: with in-app OIDC configured, a request carrying
+   forward-auth identity headers and no session is treated as anonymous —
+   no code path derives identity from those headers (negative spec at the
+   Gateway entry). First-admin SSO: the §3.6 transition commits account,
+   token, and epoch atomically from the asserted identity, and fault
+   injection mid-transition leaves nothing observable (same harness as §8.1).
+   Wizard-recorded JIT choice: enabling JIT for a provider writes an
+   explicit per-provider operator-choice record, and no mode selection
+   enables it implicitly (assert the stored record, not UI behavior).
+8. **Documentation observable (§7.2).** The admin guide contains the
+   IdP-removal-does-not-deactivate statement; verified by a docs assertion
+   (content check in CI or an enumerated review-checklist item on the
+   implementing PR) — a MUST about documentation needs a checkable artifact,
+   not intent.
 
 ## Ruling request