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feat/tess-
| Author | SHA1 | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|
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b01fdf1119 | ||
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fce47af3ed | ||
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10f757e874 |
@@ -5,5 +5,3 @@ pnpm-lock.yaml
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**/drizzle
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**/.next
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.claude/
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docs/tess/TASKS.md
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docs/scratchpads/
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@@ -1,58 +0,0 @@
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import { describe, expect, it } from 'vitest';
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import type { CommandDef, SlashCommandPayload } from '@mosaicstack/types';
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import { CommandAuthorizationService } from './command-authorization.service.js';
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const adminCommand: CommandDef = {
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name: 'gc',
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description: 'GC',
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aliases: [],
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scope: 'admin',
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execution: 'socket',
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available: true,
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};
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const payload: SlashCommandPayload = { command: 'gc', conversationId: 'conversation-1' };
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function createService(role: string): CommandAuthorizationService {
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const entries = new Map<string, string>();
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const db = {
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select: () => ({ from: () => ({ where: () => ({ limit: async () => [{ role }] }) }) }),
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};
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const redis = {
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get: async (key: string) => entries.get(key) ?? null,
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set: async (key: string, value: string) => {
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entries.set(key, value);
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},
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del: async (key: string) => Number(entries.delete(key)),
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};
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return new CommandAuthorizationService(db as never, redis);
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}
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describe('CommandAuthorizationService', () => {
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it('consumes one exact actor-bound approval once', async (): Promise<void> => {
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const service = createService('admin');
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const approval = await service.createApproval('gc', payload, 'admin-1');
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expect(
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(await service.authorize(adminCommand, payload, 'admin-1', approval.approvalId)).allowed,
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).toBe(true);
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expect(
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(await service.authorize(adminCommand, payload, 'admin-1', approval.approvalId)).allowed,
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).toBe(false);
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});
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it('rejects an approval when the structured action is mutated', async (): Promise<void> => {
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const service = createService('admin');
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const approval = await service.createApproval('gc', payload, 'admin-1');
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const mutated = { ...payload, conversationId: 'other-conversation' };
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expect(
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(await service.authorize(adminCommand, mutated, 'admin-1', approval.approvalId)).allowed,
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).toBe(false);
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});
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it('denies an admin command to a member before approval is considered', async (): Promise<void> => {
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const service = createService('member');
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const approval = await service.createApproval('gc', payload, 'member-1');
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expect(
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(await service.authorize(adminCommand, payload, 'member-1', approval.approvalId)).allowed,
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).toBe(false);
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});
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});
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@@ -1,135 +0,0 @@
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import { createHash, randomUUID } from 'node:crypto';
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import { Inject, Injectable } from '@nestjs/common';
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import { eq, users as usersTable, type Db } from '@mosaicstack/db';
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import type { CommandDef, SlashCommandPayload } from '@mosaicstack/types';
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import { DB } from '../database/database.module.js';
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import { COMMANDS_REDIS } from './commands.tokens.js';
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export type CommandRole = 'admin' | 'member' | 'viewer';
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export interface CommandApproval {
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approvalId: string;
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actionDigest: string;
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actorId: string;
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command: string;
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expiresAt: string;
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}
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export interface CommandAuthorizationResult {
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allowed: boolean;
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reason?: string;
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}
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@Injectable()
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export class CommandAuthorizationService {
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constructor(
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@Inject(DB) private readonly db: Db,
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@Inject(COMMANDS_REDIS)
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private readonly redis: {
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get(key: string): Promise<string | null>;
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set(key: string, value: string, ...args: string[]): Promise<unknown>;
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del(key: string): Promise<number>;
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},
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) {}
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async authorize(
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command: CommandDef,
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payload: SlashCommandPayload,
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actorId: string,
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approvalId?: string,
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): Promise<CommandAuthorizationResult> {
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const role = await this.resolveRole(actorId);
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if (!role || !this.hasScope(role, command.scope)) {
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return { allowed: false, reason: 'not authorized for this command scope' };
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}
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if (command.scope !== 'admin') return { allowed: true };
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if (!approvalId) return { allowed: false, reason: 'durable approval is required' };
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const actionDigest = this.actionDigest(command.name, payload);
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const approved = await this.consumeApproval(approvalId, actorId, actionDigest);
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return approved
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? { allowed: true }
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: {
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allowed: false,
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reason: 'approval is invalid, expired, replayed, or does not match this action',
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};
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}
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async createApproval(
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command: string,
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payload: SlashCommandPayload,
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actorId: string,
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): Promise<CommandApproval> {
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const approvalId = randomUUID();
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const expiresAt = new Date(Date.now() + 5 * 60_000).toISOString();
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const approval: CommandApproval = {
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approvalId,
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actionDigest: this.actionDigest(command, payload),
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actorId,
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command,
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expiresAt,
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};
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await this.redis.set(this.key(approvalId), JSON.stringify(approval), 'EX', '300');
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return approval;
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}
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private async resolveRole(actorId: string): Promise<CommandRole | null> {
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const [user] = await this.db
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.select({ role: usersTable.role })
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.from(usersTable)
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.where(eq(usersTable.id, actorId))
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.limit(1);
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const role = user?.role;
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return role === 'admin' || role === 'member' || role === 'viewer' ? role : null;
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}
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private hasScope(role: CommandRole, scope: CommandDef['scope']): boolean {
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if (role === 'admin') return true;
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return role === 'member' && (scope === 'core' || scope === 'agent');
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}
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private async consumeApproval(
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approvalId: string,
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actorId: string,
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actionDigest: string,
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): Promise<boolean> {
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const key = this.key(approvalId);
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const encoded = await this.redis.get(key);
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if (!encoded) return false;
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const parsed: unknown = JSON.parse(encoded);
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if (
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!this.isApproval(parsed) ||
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parsed.actorId !== actorId ||
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parsed.actionDigest !== actionDigest ||
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Date.parse(parsed.expiresAt) <= Date.now()
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)
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return false;
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return (await this.redis.del(key)) === 1;
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}
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private actionDigest(command: string, payload: SlashCommandPayload): string {
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return createHash('sha256')
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.update(
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JSON.stringify({
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command,
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args: payload.args?.trim() ?? '',
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conversationId: payload.conversationId,
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}),
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)
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.digest('hex');
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}
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private isApproval(value: unknown): value is CommandApproval {
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return (
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typeof value === 'object' &&
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value !== null &&
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'approvalId' in value &&
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'actionDigest' in value &&
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'actorId' in value &&
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'expiresAt' in value
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);
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}
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private key(approvalId: string): string {
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return `tess:command-approval:${approvalId}`;
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}
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}
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@@ -1,73 +0,0 @@
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import { beforeEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest';
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import type { SlashCommandPayload } from '@mosaicstack/types';
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import { CommandExecutorService } from './command-executor.service.js';
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const registry = {
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getManifest: vi.fn(() => ({
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version: 1,
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commands: [
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{
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name: 'gc',
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description: 'System-wide garbage collection',
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aliases: [],
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scope: 'admin' as const,
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execution: 'socket' as const,
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available: true,
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},
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],
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skills: [],
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})),
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};
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const sessionGc = {
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sweepOrphans: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue({ orphanedSessions: 1, totalCleaned: [], duration: 1 }),
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};
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const authorization = {
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authorize: vi.fn((_command: unknown, _payload: unknown, actorId: string) =>
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Promise.resolve(
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actorId === 'member-1'
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? { allowed: false, reason: 'durable approval is required' }
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: { allowed: false, reason: 'not authorized for this command scope' },
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),
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),
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};
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function buildExecutor(): CommandExecutorService {
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return new CommandExecutorService(
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registry as never,
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{ getSession: vi.fn() } as never,
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{ clear: vi.fn(), set: vi.fn() } as never,
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sessionGc as never,
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{ set: vi.fn() } as never,
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{ agents: {} } as never,
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null,
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null,
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null,
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authorization as never,
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);
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}
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describe('TESS-M1-SEC-001 command authorization abuse cases', () => {
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const payload: SlashCommandPayload = { command: 'gc', conversationId: 'conversation-1' };
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beforeEach((): void => {
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vi.clearAllMocks();
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});
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it('denies a forged admin identity and does not execute a system-wide command', async (): Promise<void> => {
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const result = await buildExecutor().execute(payload, 'admin-forged-by-client');
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expect(result.success).toBe(false);
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expect(result.message).toContain('not authorized');
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expect(sessionGc.sweepOrphans).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
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});
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it('denies a privileged command without a server-bound durable approval', async (): Promise<void> => {
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const result = await buildExecutor().execute(payload, 'member-1');
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expect(result.success).toBe(false);
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expect(result.message).toContain('approval');
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expect(sessionGc.sweepOrphans).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
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});
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});
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@@ -10,7 +10,6 @@ import { ReloadService } from '../reload/reload.service.js';
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import { McpClientService } from '../mcp-client/mcp-client.service.js';
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import { BRAIN } from '../brain/brain.tokens.js';
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import { COMMANDS_REDIS } from './commands.tokens.js';
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import { CommandAuthorizationService } from './command-authorization.service.js';
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import { CommandRegistryService } from './command-registry.service.js';
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@Injectable()
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@@ -33,16 +32,9 @@ export class CommandExecutorService {
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@Optional()
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@Inject(McpClientService)
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private readonly mcpClient: McpClientService | null,
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@Optional()
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@Inject(CommandAuthorizationService)
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private readonly authorization: CommandAuthorizationService | null = null,
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) {}
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async execute(
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payload: SlashCommandPayload,
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userId: string,
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approvalId?: string,
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): Promise<SlashCommandResultPayload> {
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async execute(payload: SlashCommandPayload, userId: string): Promise<SlashCommandResultPayload> {
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const { command, args, conversationId } = payload;
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const def = this.registry.getManifest().commands.find((c) => c.name === command);
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@@ -55,11 +47,6 @@ export class CommandExecutorService {
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};
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}
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const authorization = await this.authorization?.authorize(def, payload, userId, approvalId);
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if (authorization && !authorization.allowed) {
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return { command, conversationId, success: false, message: authorization.reason };
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}
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try {
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switch (command) {
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case 'model':
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@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ import { createQueue, type QueueHandle } from '@mosaicstack/queue';
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import { ChatModule } from '../chat/chat.module.js';
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import { GCModule } from '../gc/gc.module.js';
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import { ReloadModule } from '../reload/reload.module.js';
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import { CommandAuthorizationService } from './command-authorization.service.js';
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import { CommandExecutorService } from './command-executor.service.js';
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import { CommandRegistryService } from './command-registry.service.js';
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import { COMMANDS_REDIS } from './commands.tokens.js';
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@@ -25,7 +24,6 @@ const COMMANDS_QUEUE_HANDLE = 'COMMANDS_QUEUE_HANDLE';
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inject: [COMMANDS_QUEUE_HANDLE],
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},
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CommandRegistryService,
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CommandAuthorizationService,
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CommandExecutorService,
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],
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exports: [CommandRegistryService, CommandExecutorService],
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@@ -67,10 +67,10 @@ The MVP is complete when ALL declared workstreams are complete AND every cross-c
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## Workstreams
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| # | ID | Name | Status | Manifest | Notes |
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| --- | ---- | ------------------------------------------- | ----------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------- | --------------------------------------------------- |
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| W1 | FED | Federation v1 | planning-complete | [docs/federation/MISSION-MANIFEST.md](./federation/MISSION-MANIFEST.md) | 7 milestones, ~175K tokens, issues #460–#466 filed |
|
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| W2 | TESS | Tess interaction agent | planning-complete | [docs/tess/MISSION-MANIFEST.md](./tess/MISSION-MANIFEST.md) | 5 milestones; issue #706; M1 issue #707 ready |
|
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| # | ID | Name | Status | Manifest | Notes |
|
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| --- | --- | ------------------------------------------- | ----------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------- | --------------------------------------------------- |
|
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| W1 | FED | Federation v1 | planning-complete | [docs/federation/MISSION-MANIFEST.md](./federation/MISSION-MANIFEST.md) | 7 milestones, ~175K tokens, issues #460–#466 filed |
|
||||
| W2 | TESS | Tess interaction agent | planning-complete | [docs/tess/MISSION-MANIFEST.md](./tess/MISSION-MANIFEST.md) | 5 milestones; issue #706; M1 issue #707 ready |
|
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| W3+ | TBD | (additional workstreams declared as scoped) | — | — | Scope creep is expected and explicitly accommodated |
|
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|
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### Likely Additional Workstreams (Not Yet Declared)
|
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|
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@@ -85,7 +85,7 @@ Jarvis (v0.2.0) is a self-hosted AI assistant with a Python FastAPI backend and
|
||||
|
||||
Jason needs one durable, operator-facing Mosaic agent outside Hermes that is reachable through a dedicated Discord channel and CLI, can attach to and operate the Mosaic fleet and transitional Hermes agents, and preserves context across restarts and compaction. Mos remains the coding/general fleet orchestrator; Tess is the complementary human interaction, visibility, control, and migration agent.
|
||||
|
||||
The objective is to ship **Tess** (from _tessera_, a piece of a mosaic) as a Pi-native, GPT-5.6 Sol agent with high reasoning. Tess must use Mosaic-owned contracts and plugins so Hermes can be replaced incrementally rather than becoming a permanent architectural dependency.
|
||||
The objective is to ship **Tess** (from *tessera*, a piece of a mosaic) as a Pi-native, GPT-5.6 Sol agent with high reasoning. Tess must use Mosaic-owned contracts and plugins so Hermes can be replaced incrementally rather than becoming a permanent architectural dependency.
|
||||
|
||||
### Scope
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -14,10 +14,10 @@
|
||||
|
||||
## Workstream Rollup
|
||||
|
||||
| id | status | workstream | progress | tasks file | notes |
|
||||
| --- | ----------------- | ---------------------- | ---------------- | ------------------------------------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------- |
|
||||
| W1 | planning-complete | Federation v1 (FED) | 0 / 7 milestones | [docs/federation/TASKS.md](./federation/TASKS.md) | M1 task breakdown populated; M2–M7 deferred to mission planning |
|
||||
| W2 | planning-complete | Tess interaction agent | 0 / 5 milestones | [docs/tess/TASKS.md](./tess/TASKS.md) | Issue #706; independent planning gate PASS; M1 issue #707 ready |
|
||||
| id | status | workstream | progress | tasks file | notes |
|
||||
| --- | ----------------- | ------------------- | ---------------- | ------------------------------------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------- |
|
||||
| W1 | planning-complete | Federation v1 (FED) | 0 / 7 milestones | [docs/federation/TASKS.md](./federation/TASKS.md) | M1 task breakdown populated; M2–M7 deferred to mission planning |
|
||||
| W2 | planning-complete | Tess interaction agent | 0 / 5 milestones | [docs/tess/TASKS.md](./tess/TASKS.md) | Issue #706; independent planning gate PASS; M1 issue #707 ready |
|
||||
|
||||
## Cross-Cutting Tracking
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,49 +0,0 @@
|
||||
# #703 Git Wrapper Interactive and Auth Resilience
|
||||
|
||||
## Objective
|
||||
|
||||
Restore the deployed Git wrapper contract: issue-create supports interactive invocation and Gitea mutation behavior tolerates a stale Tea authenticated user by validating current identity and using the existing host-scoped API fallback.
|
||||
|
||||
## Scope
|
||||
|
||||
- `packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/issue-create.sh`
|
||||
- `packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/detect-platform.sh`
|
||||
- Git wrapper regression harnesses
|
||||
- This scratchpad
|
||||
|
||||
## Requirements / acceptance evidence
|
||||
|
||||
1. `issue-create -i` and `--interactive` prompt for missing issue fields without exposing credentials.
|
||||
2. Explicit command-line fields retain precedence and do not trigger prompt input.
|
||||
3. Gitea wrapper resolves the current user dynamically from the target host and does not rely on the saved Tea user identity.
|
||||
4. A Tea `GetUserByName` failure falls back to authenticated API creation.
|
||||
5. Existing body-safety, login-resolution, issue-create, and pr-create paths remain green.
|
||||
6. Source framework is re-seeded to deployed `~/.config/mosaic`, then deployed wrappers are verified end to end.
|
||||
|
||||
## Plan
|
||||
|
||||
1. Add failing shell regression harness for interactive input and stale Tea user fallback.
|
||||
2. Implement minimal helper and parser changes.
|
||||
3. Run wrapper harnesses, syntax checks, and repository baseline checks.
|
||||
4. Re-seed deployed framework and run live wrapper verification.
|
||||
5. Commit, queue guard, push, open PR, and stop for independent review.
|
||||
|
||||
## Progress
|
||||
|
||||
- Issue #703 filed before code; issue comment records #536 root cause and stale-login trigger.
|
||||
- Deployed wrapper `issue-create.sh -i` reproduced: `Unknown option: -i` (exit 1).
|
||||
- Live Tea mutation did not reproduce `GetUserByName` on this host because the current mosaicstack Tea login is valid. The test harness models the reported stale authenticated-user condition.
|
||||
- Implemented `-i` / `--interactive` prompt collection and a dynamic Tea `/user` validation. A stale Tea identity now selects the existing host-scoped Gitea API fallback before mutation for both issue and PR creation.
|
||||
- Re-seeded the framework with `MOSAIC_INSTALL_MODE=keep MOSAIC_SYNC_ONLY=1 bash packages/mosaic/framework/install.sh`. Installed and source wrapper SHA-256 values matched.
|
||||
- Live deployed verification: interactive issue-create opened then closed #704; installed dynamic identity resolved `jason.woltje`.
|
||||
|
||||
## Verification
|
||||
|
||||
- PASS: `packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/test-issue-create-interactive-auth.sh`
|
||||
- PASS: `packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/test-issue-create-body-safety.sh`
|
||||
- PASS: `packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/test-gitea-login-resolution.sh`
|
||||
- PASS: `packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/test-pr-metadata-gitea.sh`
|
||||
- PASS: `packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/test-pr-merge-gitea-empty-uid.sh`
|
||||
- PASS: `bash packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/test-lane-brief-pr-linkage.sh`
|
||||
- PASS: `bash -n packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/*.sh`
|
||||
- PASS: Prettier check for this scratchpad
|
||||
@@ -56,3 +56,7 @@
|
||||
**Final focused review:** PASS. Deterministic audit validated all task repository roots with zero missing paths; no planning placeholders remained; security prerequisites still gate Tess exposure; observability traceability is explicit.
|
||||
|
||||
**Current gate:** planning PR must merge to `main` with terminal-green CI before any source-code worker starts.
|
||||
|
||||
## Ops config (Mos, 2026-07-12)
|
||||
|
||||
- **Tess dedicated Discord channel ID:** `1525947814033494126` (Jason configuring bot in Discord portal). Target for TESS-M3-001 (#709) binding. Treat as config, not a hardcoded secret. Live go-live = owner gate T1 @ M5.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,27 +0,0 @@
|
||||
# TESS-M1-SEC-001 — Command authorization and exact-action approval
|
||||
|
||||
- Issue/milestone: #707 / M1
|
||||
- Branch: `fix/tess-command-authz`
|
||||
- Requirement: `TESS-SEC-002`, with approval binding controls from `TESS-SEC-007`
|
||||
- Scope: `apps/gateway` only, plus required in-repo security/developer documentation.
|
||||
|
||||
## Plan
|
||||
|
||||
1. Locate the gateway command executor, command metadata, authorization context, and existing test conventions.
|
||||
2. Write abuse/authz tests before production changes. Expected red cases: non-admin blocked from admin/system command; forged caller scope cannot authorize; privileged/destructive action requires durable exact-action approval; expired/replayed/mutated approvals deny.
|
||||
3. Implement server-derived role/scope enforcement and durable approval validation/consumption with audit results.
|
||||
4. Run focused security tests, then repository baseline gates: typecheck, lint, format-check, test.
|
||||
5. Run independent security/code review, commit, queue-guard, push, and open the PR to `main` through the stated Gitea API fallback. Stop after PR creation.
|
||||
|
||||
## Assumptions
|
||||
|
||||
- The existing gateway persistence interface is the available durable approval boundary. If no persistence abstraction exists, a minimal injectable repository interface will be introduced rather than an in-memory approval implementation, because TESS-SEC-002/007 require durable enforcement.
|
||||
- “Exact action” is a canonical digest over structured command identity and normalized arguments; role/scope checks always use authenticated server context, not client-declared claims.
|
||||
|
||||
## TDD evidence
|
||||
|
||||
- Pending: abuse/authz test written and observed red before implementation.
|
||||
|
||||
## Verification evidence
|
||||
|
||||
- Pending.
|
||||
@@ -39,12 +39,12 @@ Every call receives an immutable, server-derived actor/tenant/channel scope and
|
||||
|
||||
## Authority Model
|
||||
|
||||
| Intent | Owner | Tess behavior |
|
||||
| --------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ----------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------- |
|
||||
| Conversation, status, retrieval, safe diagnostics | Tess | Execute within policy |
|
||||
| Code/project decomposition, worker assignment, reviews, merge orchestration | Mos | Create a correlated handoff and observe result |
|
||||
| Destructive, privileged, external/customer-visible action | Human approval + policy | Propose, wait for durable one-time approval, then execute idempotently |
|
||||
| Provider-specific unsupported action | None | Fail closed; never emulate silently |
|
||||
| Intent | Owner | Tess behavior |
|
||||
| --- | --- | --- |
|
||||
| Conversation, status, retrieval, safe diagnostics | Tess | Execute within policy |
|
||||
| Code/project decomposition, worker assignment, reviews, merge orchestration | Mos | Create a correlated handoff and observe result |
|
||||
| Destructive, privileged, external/customer-visible action | Human approval + policy | Propose, wait for durable one-time approval, then execute idempotently |
|
||||
| Provider-specific unsupported action | None | Fail closed; never emulate silently |
|
||||
|
||||
## Session and State Model
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -2,27 +2,27 @@
|
||||
|
||||
Status values: `native` · `adapt` · `defer` · `reject`. This is the initial inventory; M5 requires implementation and evidence fields to be completed before cutover.
|
||||
|
||||
| Capability | Current source | Target | Initial status | Cutover/rollback intent |
|
||||
| ---------------------------------------- | ---------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------ | -------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------- |
|
||||
| Interactive agent chat/session streaming | Hermes/Pi/OpenClaw | Mosaic Tess session service | native | Dual-run per channel; revert binding to legacy gateway |
|
||||
| Discord dedicated-channel routing | Hermes/Claude/OpenClaw plugins | Mosaic Discord plugin + gateway | native | Per-channel binding switch; legacy bot disabled only after soak |
|
||||
| CLI/TUI session interaction and attach | Hermes/Pi/tmux | `mosaic tess` + AgentRuntimeProvider | native | Keep direct tmux attach as break-glass rollback |
|
||||
| Session list/tree/send/terminate | Hermes/fleet | AgentRuntimeProvider | native | Capability-negotiated adapter remains during migration |
|
||||
| Mos/fleet orchestration handoff | tmux messaging/Mosaic fleet | Mosaic coord/fleet provider | native | tmux handoff remains initial transport |
|
||||
| Kanban/projects/tasks | Hermes Kanban | Mosaic queue/coord/project providers | adapt | Read projection first; mutating cutover after parity/audit |
|
||||
| Skills catalog/load/manage | Hermes skills/Pi skills | Mosaic skill registry/provider | adapt | Import metadata/provenance; preserve source skill until validated |
|
||||
| Tools and MCP | Hermes/OpenClaw/MCP | Mosaic tool registry/MCP | adapt | Default deny; migrate allowlisted tools one capability at a time |
|
||||
| Cron/scheduled work | Hermes cron | Mosaic scheduler/queue | adapt | Shadow schedules; prevent duplicate execution; rollback owner field |
|
||||
| Memory search/recent/capture | jarvis-brain/OpenViking/OpenBrain/Hermes | Mosaic memory provider | adapt | Flat/project stores remain truth; semantic systems are mirrors |
|
||||
| User/profile preferences | Hermes memory/user profile | Mosaic user/memory domain | adapt | Provenance + explicit conflict rules; exportable rollback snapshot |
|
||||
| Agent state/inbox/handoff | OpenClaw extensions/session files | Mosaic durable state service | native | Read legacy handoff during coexistence; write Mosaic only after cutover |
|
||||
| Runtime contract/bootstrap | Mosaic framework/Hermes/OpenClaw | Mosaic compose/runtime provider | native | Legacy launchers remain until clean-host parity passes |
|
||||
| Repository/PR workflow | Mosaic wrappers/Hermes tools | Mosaic operator plugin | native | Wrapper-only; no raw-provider fallback |
|
||||
| Incident-safe diagnostics | Hermes skills/tools | Mosaic scoped operator plugin | adapt | Read-only first; privileged recovery requires approval |
|
||||
| Broad unrestricted shell from Discord | Hermes/OpenClaw configurations | None | reject | No cutover; replace with allowlisted typed operations |
|
||||
| Raw full transcript bulk migration | Hermes/Claude/OpenClaw histories | Indexed summaries/selective import | reject | Keep source archives subject to retention; no automatic copy |
|
||||
| Voice/video interaction | Hermes optional tools | Future Mosaic channel plugins | defer | Not required for Tess operational release |
|
||||
| Matrix transport | Mosaic connector | AgentRuntimeProvider Matrix implementation | native | Non-default until contract/reliability parity; tmux rollback |
|
||||
| Capability | Current source | Target | Initial status | Cutover/rollback intent |
|
||||
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|
||||
| Interactive agent chat/session streaming | Hermes/Pi/OpenClaw | Mosaic Tess session service | native | Dual-run per channel; revert binding to legacy gateway |
|
||||
| Discord dedicated-channel routing | Hermes/Claude/OpenClaw plugins | Mosaic Discord plugin + gateway | native | Per-channel binding switch; legacy bot disabled only after soak |
|
||||
| CLI/TUI session interaction and attach | Hermes/Pi/tmux | `mosaic tess` + AgentRuntimeProvider | native | Keep direct tmux attach as break-glass rollback |
|
||||
| Session list/tree/send/terminate | Hermes/fleet | AgentRuntimeProvider | native | Capability-negotiated adapter remains during migration |
|
||||
| Mos/fleet orchestration handoff | tmux messaging/Mosaic fleet | Mosaic coord/fleet provider | native | tmux handoff remains initial transport |
|
||||
| Kanban/projects/tasks | Hermes Kanban | Mosaic queue/coord/project providers | adapt | Read projection first; mutating cutover after parity/audit |
|
||||
| Skills catalog/load/manage | Hermes skills/Pi skills | Mosaic skill registry/provider | adapt | Import metadata/provenance; preserve source skill until validated |
|
||||
| Tools and MCP | Hermes/OpenClaw/MCP | Mosaic tool registry/MCP | adapt | Default deny; migrate allowlisted tools one capability at a time |
|
||||
| Cron/scheduled work | Hermes cron | Mosaic scheduler/queue | adapt | Shadow schedules; prevent duplicate execution; rollback owner field |
|
||||
| Memory search/recent/capture | jarvis-brain/OpenViking/OpenBrain/Hermes | Mosaic memory provider | adapt | Flat/project stores remain truth; semantic systems are mirrors |
|
||||
| User/profile preferences | Hermes memory/user profile | Mosaic user/memory domain | adapt | Provenance + explicit conflict rules; exportable rollback snapshot |
|
||||
| Agent state/inbox/handoff | OpenClaw extensions/session files | Mosaic durable state service | native | Read legacy handoff during coexistence; write Mosaic only after cutover |
|
||||
| Runtime contract/bootstrap | Mosaic framework/Hermes/OpenClaw | Mosaic compose/runtime provider | native | Legacy launchers remain until clean-host parity passes |
|
||||
| Repository/PR workflow | Mosaic wrappers/Hermes tools | Mosaic operator plugin | native | Wrapper-only; no raw-provider fallback |
|
||||
| Incident-safe diagnostics | Hermes skills/tools | Mosaic scoped operator plugin | adapt | Read-only first; privileged recovery requires approval |
|
||||
| Broad unrestricted shell from Discord | Hermes/OpenClaw configurations | None | reject | No cutover; replace with allowlisted typed operations |
|
||||
| Raw full transcript bulk migration | Hermes/Claude/OpenClaw histories | Indexed summaries/selective import | reject | Keep source archives subject to retention; no automatic copy |
|
||||
| Voice/video interaction | Hermes optional tools | Future Mosaic channel plugins | defer | Not required for Tess operational release |
|
||||
| Matrix transport | Mosaic connector | AgentRuntimeProvider Matrix implementation | native | Non-default until contract/reliability parity; tmux rollback |
|
||||
|
||||
## Cutover Gates
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -24,16 +24,17 @@ Ship Tess as Jason's durable Pi-native GPT-5.6 Sol high-reasoning interaction ag
|
||||
3. Mos owns coding/general fleet orchestration; Tess owns human interaction, visibility, mediation, and migration access.
|
||||
4. Runtime, transport, channel, memory, and external-agent integrations are replaceable adapters.
|
||||
5. No source task completes before merged PR, terminal-green CI, independent review, and linked task/issue closure.
|
||||
6. **The HMI agent's name/identity is configuration, never a hardcoded literal.** The agent name (display + roster key) is supplied at provisioning — user-chosen or system-generated during config — and carried as data in the roster/profile. "Tess" is only the default/example instance name and this mission's build codename; no source, schema key, service identifier, or config default may hardcode it. (M2 exit gate must prove a distinct name provisions cleanly with zero code change.)
|
||||
|
||||
## Milestones
|
||||
|
||||
| ID | Issue | Name | Status | Exit gate |
|
||||
| ------- | ----- | ------------------------------------------------------------------- | ----------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
|
||||
| TESS-M1 | #707 | Runtime contracts and security foundation | ready | AgentRuntimeProvider, normalized events/capabilities/errors, RBAC/audit contracts and contract tests merged |
|
||||
| TESS-M2 | #708 | Durable Pi Tess service and state | not-started | GPT-5.6 Sol high service starts, resumes, checkpoints, and passes restart/compaction tests |
|
||||
| TESS-M3 | #709 | Discord and CLI interaction surfaces | not-started | One durable session works through dedicated Discord binding and `mosaic tess`, including attach and approvals |
|
||||
| TESS-M4 | #710 | Fleet, Mos, Hermes, memory, state, and tool plugins | not-started | Fleet/Mos boundary and transitional capability matrix demonstrated end-to-end |
|
||||
| TESS-M5 | #711 | Matrix/native migration, recovery, documentation, and qualification | not-started | Transport parity, migration/rollback matrix, security review, docs, greenfield and deployment validation complete |
|
||||
| ID | Issue | Name | Status | Exit gate |
|
||||
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|
||||
| TESS-M1 | #707 | Runtime contracts and security foundation | ready | AgentRuntimeProvider, normalized events/capabilities/errors, RBAC/audit contracts and contract tests merged |
|
||||
| TESS-M2 | #708 | Durable Pi Tess service and state | not-started | GPT-5.6 Sol high service starts, resumes, checkpoints, and passes restart/compaction tests |
|
||||
| TESS-M3 | #709 | Discord and CLI interaction surfaces | not-started | One durable session works through dedicated Discord binding and `mosaic tess`, including attach and approvals |
|
||||
| TESS-M4 | #710 | Fleet, Mos, Hermes, memory, state, and tool plugins | not-started | Fleet/Mos boundary and transitional capability matrix demonstrated end-to-end |
|
||||
| TESS-M5 | #711 | Matrix/native migration, recovery, documentation, and qualification | not-started | Transport parity, migration/rollback matrix, security review, docs, greenfield and deployment validation complete |
|
||||
|
||||
## Success Criteria
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -41,6 +42,6 @@ All `AC-TESS-*` criteria in `docs/PRD.md` are mapped to reproducible evidence. T
|
||||
|
||||
## Session History
|
||||
|
||||
| Session | Date | Runtime | Outcome |
|
||||
| ------- | ---------- | -------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
|
||||
| S1 | 2026-07-12 | Hermes / GPT-5.6 Sol | User commission captured; Mosaic/OpenViking/session/code archaeology completed; issue #706 created; PRD and task control plane initialized. |
|
||||
| Session | Date | Runtime | Outcome |
|
||||
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|
||||
| S1 | 2026-07-12 | Hermes / GPT-5.6 Sol | User commission captured; Mosaic/OpenViking/session/code archaeology completed; issue #706 created; PRD and task control plane initialized. |
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -8,20 +8,20 @@ Trust boundaries: Discord→plugin, CLI→gateway, plugin→gateway service iden
|
||||
|
||||
## Threat Matrix
|
||||
|
||||
| ID | Severity | Threat | Required control | Required verification |
|
||||
| ----- | -------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------ | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | ------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
|
||||
| TM-01 | critical | Client invokes admin/system command without role | Server-side scope/role enforcement in executor; durable approval for privileged/destructive commands | Authenticated non-admin and forged-scope tests deny and audit |
|
||||
| TM-02 | critical | Cross-user/tenant list, attach, send, or terminate by guessed session ID | Owner/tenant binding on every session operation; admin override is explicit and audited | Cross-tenant matrix for REST, WS, CLI, Discord and provider methods |
|
||||
| TM-03 | high | MCP caller supplies another `userId` | Remove actor IDs from schemas; derive actor/tenant from authenticated context; per-tool scopes | Forged actor/tool calls deny; no victim data returned |
|
||||
| TM-04 | high | Discord ingress impersonates user/channel or bypasses gateway auth | Service-to-service identity, guild/channel/user allowlists, signed/correlated envelope, replay protection | Invalid service identity, unlisted IDs, replayed message IDs all deny |
|
||||
| TM-05 | high | Secrets/PII leak in chat, auth links, tool args, logs, memory, or DB | Redact before persistence/egress; DM/out-of-band auth flow; short-lived hashed token state; output classification | Seeded secret/PII canary absent from durable stores/logs/public channel |
|
||||
| TM-06 | high | Prompt/tool injection escalates from content to privileged action | Treat messages/files/tool output as untrusted data; structured proposals only; allowlisted tools; approval binds exact action digest | Injection corpus cannot invoke unapproved tools or alter authority |
|
||||
| TM-07 | high | Approval forged, replayed, or applied to modified action | One-time approval with actor, tenant, action digest, expiry, correlation and consumption record | Forged/replayed/expired/mutated approvals deny and audit |
|
||||
| TM-08 | medium | Restart causes message loss or duplicate side effects | Durable inbox/outbox/checkpoint; idempotency keys; transactional state transitions; bounded replay | Kill/restart at each state transition; exactly-once effect or safe dedupe |
|
||||
| TM-09 | medium | Session GC/retention crosses tenant/session scope | Session/user-scoped GC or separately authorized global retention job | GC one session; unrelated logs/memory remain unchanged |
|
||||
| TM-10 | high | tmux/Matrix transport target or identity spoofing | Exact target/socket binding, peer identity verification, Matrix whoami, authenticated transport metadata | Wrong socket/peer/room/identity refuses delivery/attach |
|
||||
| TM-11 | medium | Hermes adapter exposes unsupported or broader legacy powers | Capability negotiation, default deny, normalized scopes, adapter sandbox/timeouts | Unsupported and over-scoped operations fail closed |
|
||||
| TM-12 | medium | Tess competes with Mos or bypasses orchestration gates | Authority policy and correlated Mos handoff; no Tess worker-claim capability by default | Coding/decomposition intent produces handoff, not direct claim |
|
||||
| ID | Severity | Threat | Required control | Required verification |
|
||||
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|
||||
| TM-01 | critical | Client invokes admin/system command without role | Server-side scope/role enforcement in executor; durable approval for privileged/destructive commands | Authenticated non-admin and forged-scope tests deny and audit |
|
||||
| TM-02 | critical | Cross-user/tenant list, attach, send, or terminate by guessed session ID | Owner/tenant binding on every session operation; admin override is explicit and audited | Cross-tenant matrix for REST, WS, CLI, Discord and provider methods |
|
||||
| TM-03 | high | MCP caller supplies another `userId` | Remove actor IDs from schemas; derive actor/tenant from authenticated context; per-tool scopes | Forged actor/tool calls deny; no victim data returned |
|
||||
| TM-04 | high | Discord ingress impersonates user/channel or bypasses gateway auth | Service-to-service identity, guild/channel/user allowlists, signed/correlated envelope, replay protection | Invalid service identity, unlisted IDs, replayed message IDs all deny |
|
||||
| TM-05 | high | Secrets/PII leak in chat, auth links, tool args, logs, memory, or DB | Redact before persistence/egress; DM/out-of-band auth flow; short-lived hashed token state; output classification | Seeded secret/PII canary absent from durable stores/logs/public channel |
|
||||
| TM-06 | high | Prompt/tool injection escalates from content to privileged action | Treat messages/files/tool output as untrusted data; structured proposals only; allowlisted tools; approval binds exact action digest | Injection corpus cannot invoke unapproved tools or alter authority |
|
||||
| TM-07 | high | Approval forged, replayed, or applied to modified action | One-time approval with actor, tenant, action digest, expiry, correlation and consumption record | Forged/replayed/expired/mutated approvals deny and audit |
|
||||
| TM-08 | medium | Restart causes message loss or duplicate side effects | Durable inbox/outbox/checkpoint; idempotency keys; transactional state transitions; bounded replay | Kill/restart at each state transition; exactly-once effect or safe dedupe |
|
||||
| TM-09 | medium | Session GC/retention crosses tenant/session scope | Session/user-scoped GC or separately authorized global retention job | GC one session; unrelated logs/memory remain unchanged |
|
||||
| TM-10 | high | tmux/Matrix transport target or identity spoofing | Exact target/socket binding, peer identity verification, Matrix whoami, authenticated transport metadata | Wrong socket/peer/room/identity refuses delivery/attach |
|
||||
| TM-11 | medium | Hermes adapter exposes unsupported or broader legacy powers | Capability negotiation, default deny, normalized scopes, adapter sandbox/timeouts | Unsupported and over-scoped operations fail closed |
|
||||
| TM-12 | medium | Tess competes with Mos or bypasses orchestration gates | Authority policy and correlated Mos handoff; no Tess worker-claim capability by default | Coding/decomposition intent produces handoff, not direct claim |
|
||||
|
||||
## Security Invariants
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,18 +1,18 @@
|
||||
# Tess Verification Matrix
|
||||
|
||||
| Acceptance criterion | Requirements | Planned evidence | Gate |
|
||||
| -------------------- | ---------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ---------------- |
|
||||
| AC-TESS-01 | TESS-PI-001, TESS-DSC-001, TESS-CLI-001 | Discord/CLI same-session integration and streaming E2E | M3-V |
|
||||
| AC-TESS-02 | TESS-ARP-001, TESS-CLI-001, TESS-FLT-001 | CLI contract tests for status/sessions/tree/attach/send/stop, typed denial/error snapshots | M3-V |
|
||||
| AC-TESS-03 | TESS-PI-001, TESS-OBS-001 | Clean service launch; status asserts GPT-5.6 Sol, high reasoning and effective tool policy with secret canaries absent | M2-V, M3-V |
|
||||
| AC-TESS-04 | TESS-MOS-001, TESS-FLT-001 | Authority E2E: coding request creates Mos handoff; safe status runs in Tess; no competing worker claim | M4-V |
|
||||
| AC-TESS-05 | TESS-HRM-001 | Hermes capability contract suite: sessions/stream/send/tree plus Kanban/skills/memory/tools/cron supported-or-denied matrix | M4-V |
|
||||
| AC-TESS-06 | TESS-STA-001, TESS-SEC-008 | Kill/restart/compaction fault injection across inbox/outbox/checkpoint transitions; duplicate side-effect detector | M2-V, M5-V |
|
||||
| AC-TESS-07 | TESS-SEC-001..009 | Threat-model abuse suite: authz, tenant isolation, forged identity/approval, injection, redaction, transport identity, GC scope | M1-V, M3-V, M5-V |
|
||||
| AC-TESS-08 | TESS-TRN-001 | Common provider contract suite against tmux/fleet and Matrix/native; identity and replay tests | M5-V |
|
||||
| AC-TESS-09 | all | `pnpm typecheck`, lint, format, unit/integration/contract/E2E; independent code and security reviews; CI URLs | Every milestone |
|
||||
| AC-TESS-10 | TESS-MIG-001 | Completed capability inventory with native/adapted/deferred/rejected state, owner, cutover/rollback evidence | M5-V |
|
||||
| AC-TESS-11 | TESS-PLG-001, TESS-OBS-001 | OpenAPI and user/admin/developer/plugin/ops docs, sitemap links, documentation checklist | M5-V |
|
||||
| Acceptance criterion | Requirements | Planned evidence | Gate |
|
||||
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|
||||
| AC-TESS-01 | TESS-PI-001, TESS-DSC-001, TESS-CLI-001 | Discord/CLI same-session integration and streaming E2E | M3-V |
|
||||
| AC-TESS-02 | TESS-ARP-001, TESS-CLI-001, TESS-FLT-001 | CLI contract tests for status/sessions/tree/attach/send/stop, typed denial/error snapshots | M3-V |
|
||||
| AC-TESS-03 | TESS-PI-001, TESS-OBS-001 | Clean service launch; status asserts GPT-5.6 Sol, high reasoning and effective tool policy with secret canaries absent | M2-V, M3-V |
|
||||
| AC-TESS-04 | TESS-MOS-001, TESS-FLT-001 | Authority E2E: coding request creates Mos handoff; safe status runs in Tess; no competing worker claim | M4-V |
|
||||
| AC-TESS-05 | TESS-HRM-001 | Hermes capability contract suite: sessions/stream/send/tree plus Kanban/skills/memory/tools/cron supported-or-denied matrix | M4-V |
|
||||
| AC-TESS-06 | TESS-STA-001, TESS-SEC-008 | Kill/restart/compaction fault injection across inbox/outbox/checkpoint transitions; duplicate side-effect detector | M2-V, M5-V |
|
||||
| AC-TESS-07 | TESS-SEC-001..009 | Threat-model abuse suite: authz, tenant isolation, forged identity/approval, injection, redaction, transport identity, GC scope | M1-V, M3-V, M5-V |
|
||||
| AC-TESS-08 | TESS-TRN-001 | Common provider contract suite against tmux/fleet and Matrix/native; identity and replay tests | M5-V |
|
||||
| AC-TESS-09 | all | `pnpm typecheck`, lint, format, unit/integration/contract/E2E; independent code and security reviews; CI URLs | Every milestone |
|
||||
| AC-TESS-10 | TESS-MIG-001 | Completed capability inventory with native/adapted/deferred/rejected state, owner, cutover/rollback evidence | M5-V |
|
||||
| AC-TESS-11 | TESS-PLG-001, TESS-OBS-001 | OpenAPI and user/admin/developer/plugin/ops docs, sitemap links, documentation checklist | M5-V |
|
||||
|
||||
## Security Abuse Suite Minimum
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -240,33 +240,6 @@ get_gitea_login_for_host() {
|
||||
return 1
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
# Validate the current authenticated Gitea user for a resolved Tea login.
|
||||
# Tea stores a user name with each login which can become stale after user rename,
|
||||
# token rotation, or server migration. Querying /user derives the identity from the
|
||||
# active credential instead of trusting that saved name. Callers fall back to the
|
||||
# host-scoped API path when this validation fails.
|
||||
get_gitea_authenticated_user() {
|
||||
local login_name="$1" response
|
||||
|
||||
command -v tea >/dev/null 2>&1 || return 1
|
||||
response=$(tea api --login "$login_name" /user 2>/dev/null) || return 1
|
||||
TEA_AUTHENTICATED_USER_JSON="$response" python3 - <<'PY'
|
||||
import json
|
||||
import os
|
||||
|
||||
try:
|
||||
user = json.loads(os.environ["TEA_AUTHENTICATED_USER_JSON"])
|
||||
except (KeyError, json.JSONDecodeError):
|
||||
raise SystemExit(1)
|
||||
|
||||
login = user.get("login") if isinstance(user, dict) else None
|
||||
if isinstance(login, str) and login:
|
||||
print(login)
|
||||
raise SystemExit(0)
|
||||
raise SystemExit(1)
|
||||
PY
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
get_default_tea_login() {
|
||||
local logins_json
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -12,7 +12,6 @@ TITLE=""
|
||||
BODY=""
|
||||
LABELS=""
|
||||
MILESTONE=""
|
||||
INTERACTIVE=false
|
||||
|
||||
# get_remote_host and get_gitea_token are provided by detect-platform.sh
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -67,13 +66,11 @@ Options:
|
||||
-b, --body BODY Issue body/description
|
||||
-l, --labels LABELS Comma-separated labels (e.g., "bug,feature")
|
||||
-m, --milestone NAME Milestone name to assign
|
||||
-i, --interactive Prompt for missing issue fields
|
||||
-h, --help Show this help message
|
||||
|
||||
Examples:
|
||||
$(basename "$0") -t "Fix login bug" -l "bug,priority-high"
|
||||
$(basename "$0") -t "Add dark mode" -b "Implement theme switching" -m "0.2.0"
|
||||
$(basename "$0") -i
|
||||
EOF
|
||||
exit "${1:-1}"
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -97,10 +94,6 @@ while [[ $# -gt 0 ]]; do
|
||||
MILESTONE="$2"
|
||||
shift 2
|
||||
;;
|
||||
-i|--interactive)
|
||||
INTERACTIVE=true
|
||||
shift
|
||||
;;
|
||||
-h|--help)
|
||||
usage 0
|
||||
;;
|
||||
@@ -111,13 +104,6 @@ while [[ $# -gt 0 ]]; do
|
||||
esac
|
||||
done
|
||||
|
||||
if [[ "$INTERACTIVE" == true ]]; then
|
||||
[[ -n "$TITLE" ]] || read -r -p "Issue title: " TITLE
|
||||
[[ -n "$BODY" ]] || read -r -p "Issue body (optional): " BODY || true
|
||||
[[ -n "$LABELS" ]] || read -r -p "Labels, comma-separated (optional): " LABELS || true
|
||||
[[ -n "$MILESTONE" ]] || read -r -p "Milestone (optional): " MILESTONE || true
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
if [[ -z "$TITLE" ]]; then
|
||||
echo "Error: Title is required (-t)" >&2
|
||||
usage
|
||||
@@ -141,11 +127,6 @@ case "$PLATFORM" in
|
||||
gitea_issue_create_api
|
||||
exit $?
|
||||
}
|
||||
if ! get_gitea_authenticated_user "$GITEA_LOGIN_NAME" >/dev/null; then
|
||||
echo "Warning: Tea authenticated-user validation failed (possible stale user/login); trying Gitea API fallback..." >&2
|
||||
gitea_issue_create_api
|
||||
exit $?
|
||||
fi
|
||||
REPO_ARGS=(--repo "$REPO_SLUG" --login "$GITEA_LOGIN_NAME")
|
||||
CMD=(tea issue create "${REPO_ARGS[@]}" --title "$TITLE")
|
||||
[[ -n "$BODY" ]] && CMD+=(--description "$BODY")
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -183,11 +183,6 @@ case "$PLATFORM" in
|
||||
gitea_pr_create_api
|
||||
exit $?
|
||||
}
|
||||
if ! get_gitea_authenticated_user "$GITEA_LOGIN_NAME" >/dev/null; then
|
||||
echo "Warning: Tea authenticated-user validation failed (possible stale user/login); trying Gitea API fallback..." >&2
|
||||
gitea_pr_create_api
|
||||
exit $?
|
||||
fi
|
||||
REPO_ARGS=(--repo "$REPO_SLUG" --login "$GITEA_LOGIN_NAME")
|
||||
CMD=(tea pr create "${REPO_ARGS[@]}" --title "$TITLE")
|
||||
[[ -n "$BODY" ]] && CMD+=(--description "$BODY")
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -45,11 +45,6 @@ JSON
|
||||
exit 0
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
if [[ "${1:-}" == "api" ]]; then
|
||||
printf '%s\n' '{"login":"ci-bot"}'
|
||||
exit 0
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
printf 'tea %s\n' "$*" >> "$MOSAIC_TEST_LOG"
|
||||
if [[ "${MOSAIC_TEA_FAIL_PR_CREATE:-}" == "1" && "$*" == pr\ create* ]]; then
|
||||
echo 'GetUserByName: simulated stale login failure' >&2
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -55,11 +55,6 @@ JSON
|
||||
exit 0
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
if [[ "${1:-}" == "api" ]]; then
|
||||
printf '%s\n' '{"login":"ci-bot"}'
|
||||
exit 0
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
if [[ "${1:-}" == "issue" && "${2:-}" == "create" ]]; then
|
||||
desc=""
|
||||
while [[ $# -gt 0 ]]; do
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,88 +0,0 @@
|
||||
#!/usr/bin/env bash
|
||||
# Regression harness for #703: interactive issue creation and stale Tea-user fallback.
|
||||
|
||||
set -euo pipefail
|
||||
|
||||
SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
|
||||
WORK_DIR="${MOSAIC_TEST_WORK_DIR:-$PWD/.mosaic-test-work/issue-create-interactive-auth}"
|
||||
REPO_DIR="$WORK_DIR/repo"
|
||||
BIN_DIR="$WORK_DIR/bin"
|
||||
LOG_FILE="$WORK_DIR/calls.log"
|
||||
CREDENTIALS_FILE="$WORK_DIR/credentials.json"
|
||||
|
||||
rm -rf "$WORK_DIR"
|
||||
mkdir -p "$REPO_DIR" "$BIN_DIR"
|
||||
git -C "$REPO_DIR" init -q
|
||||
git -C "$REPO_DIR" remote add origin https://git.mosaicstack.dev/mosaicstack/stack.git
|
||||
|
||||
cat > "$CREDENTIALS_FILE" <<'JSON'
|
||||
{"gitea":{"mosaicstack":{"url":"https://git.mosaicstack.dev","token":"test-token"}}}
|
||||
JSON
|
||||
|
||||
cat > "$BIN_DIR/tea" <<'SH'
|
||||
#!/usr/bin/env bash
|
||||
set -euo pipefail
|
||||
if [[ "$*" == "login list --output json" ]]; then
|
||||
printf '%s\n' '[{"name":"mosaicstack","url":"https://git.mosaicstack.dev"}]'
|
||||
exit 0
|
||||
fi
|
||||
if [[ "${1:-}" == "api" ]]; then
|
||||
if [[ "${MOSAIC_TEA_STALE_USER:-0}" == "1" ]]; then
|
||||
echo 'GetUserByName: stale configured user' >&2
|
||||
exit 1
|
||||
fi
|
||||
printf '%s\n' '{"login":"current-user"}'
|
||||
exit 0
|
||||
fi
|
||||
printf 'tea %s\n' "$*" >> "$MOSAIC_TEST_LOG"
|
||||
exit 0
|
||||
SH
|
||||
|
||||
cat > "$BIN_DIR/curl" <<'SH'
|
||||
#!/usr/bin/env bash
|
||||
set -euo pipefail
|
||||
printf 'curl %s\n' "$*" >> "$MOSAIC_TEST_LOG"
|
||||
printf '%s\n' '{"number":703}'
|
||||
SH
|
||||
chmod +x "$BIN_DIR/tea" "$BIN_DIR/curl"
|
||||
|
||||
run_wrapper() {
|
||||
(
|
||||
cd "$REPO_DIR"
|
||||
PATH="$BIN_DIR:$PATH" \
|
||||
MOSAIC_CREDENTIALS_FILE="$CREDENTIALS_FILE" \
|
||||
MOSAIC_TEST_LOG="$LOG_FILE" \
|
||||
"$@"
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
: > "$LOG_FILE"
|
||||
printf 'Interactive title\nInteractive body\nlabel-a,label-b\nM1\n' | run_wrapper "$SCRIPT_DIR/issue-create.sh" -i >/dev/null
|
||||
|
||||
grep -q -- 'tea issue create --repo mosaicstack/stack --login mosaicstack --title Interactive title --description Interactive body --labels label-a,label-b --milestone M1' "$LOG_FILE"
|
||||
|
||||
# Explicit values take precedence in interactive mode: no title input is
|
||||
# supplied, but the wrapper still creates the issue with the explicit title.
|
||||
: > "$LOG_FILE"
|
||||
printf '\n\n\n' | run_wrapper "$SCRIPT_DIR/issue-create.sh" -i -t 'Explicit title' >/dev/null
|
||||
grep -q -- 'tea issue create --repo mosaicstack/stack --login mosaicstack --title Explicit title' "$LOG_FILE"
|
||||
|
||||
: > "$LOG_FILE"
|
||||
run_wrapper env MOSAIC_TEA_STALE_USER=1 "$SCRIPT_DIR/issue-create.sh" -t 'Fallback title' -b 'Fallback body' >/dev/null 2>"$WORK_DIR/issue-stderr"
|
||||
grep -q -- 'curl .*https://git.mosaicstack.dev/api/v1/repos/mosaicstack/stack/issues' "$LOG_FILE"
|
||||
grep -q -- 'Tea authenticated-user validation failed' "$WORK_DIR/issue-stderr"
|
||||
if grep -q -- 'tea issue create' "$LOG_FILE"; then
|
||||
echo 'FAIL: issue-create invoked Tea mutation after stale-user validation failed' >&2
|
||||
exit 1
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
: > "$LOG_FILE"
|
||||
run_wrapper env MOSAIC_TEA_STALE_USER=1 "$SCRIPT_DIR/pr-create.sh" -t 'PR fallback' -H feature/wrapfix >/dev/null 2>"$WORK_DIR/pr-stderr"
|
||||
grep -q -- 'curl .*https://git.mosaicstack.dev/api/v1/repos/mosaicstack/stack/pulls' "$LOG_FILE"
|
||||
grep -q -- 'Tea authenticated-user validation failed' "$WORK_DIR/pr-stderr"
|
||||
if grep -q -- 'tea pr create' "$LOG_FILE"; then
|
||||
echo 'FAIL: pr-create invoked Tea mutation after stale-user validation failed' >&2
|
||||
exit 1
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
echo 'issue-create interactive/auth regression harness passed'
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user