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Author SHA1 Message Date
Hermes Agent
e88a89f34d fix(framework): remediate Codex review findings in VAULT-SECRETS.md
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Two should-fix findings from automated Codex review:

1. Vault KV v2 policy path — add explicit path for exact top-level
   `secret/data/k3s/<app>` entry alongside the wildcard `/*` sub-path
   rule. Without the exact path, apps reading the top-level secret get
   permission denied from Vault KV v2 even with the wildcard.

2. Go envconfig example — remove unused `os` import from config.go
   snippet (os was only referenced in a comment). Move the main() usage
   to a separate clearly-labelled main.go block to make both snippets
   copy-paste compilable.

Both fixes mirrored to duplicate path:
  guides/ <-> packages/mosaic/framework/guides/

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-22 12:01:29 -05:00
Hermes Agent
373e4558a3 chore(framework): canonize Vault-as-SSOT + ESO-default secrets policy
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Encodes operator-approved (Jason, 2026-05-22) secrets policy as binding
framework rules across all Mosaic agent sessions and projects.

Changes:
- STANDARDS.md: add "Secrets handling (HARD RULE)" subsection under
  Non-Negotiables — Vault as SSOT, ESO bridge as default, Direct-Vault
  opt-in only, forbidden ${VAR:-default} for required values, forbidden
  .env in prod, required startup schema validation
- VAULT-SECRETS.md: add four new sections — architecture decision matrix
  (ESO vs Direct-Vault), full ESO bridge worked example (Vault path +
  ExternalSecret + Deployment YAML + zod/pydantic/Go validators),
  Direct-Vault opt-in pattern (AppRole provisioning + ESO bootstrap
  for chicken-and-egg), and forbidden patterns CI lint targets
- BOOTSTRAP.md: add "Secrets Bootstrap" required subsection with
  checklist for new apps (Vault path, README docs, ExternalSecret,
  secretKeyRef, schema validator, Direct-Vault justification)

All duplicate file paths kept in sync (md5-equal pairs):
  guides/ <-> packages/mosaic/framework/guides/
  packages/mosaic/framework/defaults/STANDARDS.md (single copy in repo)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-22 11:58:27 -05:00
16 changed files with 808 additions and 76 deletions

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@@ -453,6 +453,26 @@ Initialize standard labels and the first pre-MVP milestone:
---
## Secrets Bootstrap (Required for Every New App)
Every new application MUST complete the following secrets bootstrap before deploying to any non-local environment. This is a hard gate — deployment without completed secrets bootstrap is forbidden.
### Secrets bootstrap checklist
- [ ] Vault path created: `vault kv put secret/k3s/<app>/ ...` with all required secret fields
- [ ] Required secrets listed in project README under a "Secrets architecture" section, including:
- Vault path(s) used
- All required secret keys and their purpose
- Whether the app uses ESO bridge (default) or Direct-Vault (opt-in, with justification)
- [ ] `external-secret.yaml` manifest committed to repo's `deploy/` or `k8s/` directory
- [ ] Deployment YAML references the synced k8s Secret via `secretKeyRef` (not raw env vars or `.env` files)
- [ ] App startup has schema-based validation for all required env vars (zod / pydantic / envconfig equivalent) that exits non-zero on missing required values
- [ ] Direct-Vault opt-in (if applicable): justification documented in README + AppRole provisioned + bootstrap credentials stored in Vault and synced via a separate `ExternalSecret`
See `~/.config/mosaic/guides/VAULT-SECRETS.md` for full worked examples of the ESO bridge pattern, the Direct-Vault opt-in pattern, and the forbidden antipatterns.
---
## Checklist
After bootstrapping, verify:

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@@ -203,3 +203,374 @@ Error: token expired
3. **Audit logging** - All access is logged; act accordingly
4. **No local copies** - Don't store secrets in files or env vars long-term
5. **Rotate on compromise** - Immediately rotate any exposed secrets
---
## Secrets Architecture Decision Matrix
Use this table to choose between the ESO bridge (default) and Direct-Vault (opt-in) patterns for every new app or integration.
| Factor | ESO Bridge (default) | Direct-Vault (opt-in) |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Use-case** | All static secrets (DB creds, API keys, signing keys, OAuth secrets) | Dynamic creds with short TTLs (DB rotation, AWS STS, PKI), per-request audit trails, or lease renewal mid-pod-lifecycle |
| **App code change** | None — reads standard env vars via `secretKeyRef` | Requires Vault client (`hvac`, `node-vault`, `vault/api`) in application code |
| **Secret rotation** | ESO re-syncs on Vault write; pod restart or secret refresh picks up new value | App manages lease renewal or re-auth within the running process |
| **Audit granularity** | Access logged at Vault when ESO syncs; no per-request app audit | Every app request to Vault is a separate audit log entry |
| **Operational burden** | Low — ESO handles polling, sync, and k8s Secret lifecycle | Higher — app must handle auth, lease renewal, error paths, and token rotation |
| **Justification required?** | No — this is the default | Yes — document in project README under "Secrets architecture" |
| **Example use cases** | Web app DB password, OAuth client secret, JWT signing key, API token | HashiCorp DB secrets engine with 15-min TTL leases, AWS STS assume-role, Vault PKI short-lived certs |
**Decision rule:** If you are unsure, use ESO. Only justify Direct-Vault when the secret cannot be safely stored in a k8s Secret (too short-lived, per-request TTL required, or mid-lifecycle renewal needed).
---
## ESO Bridge Pattern (Default)
This is the required default for all k8s workloads. Follow this exact pattern unless a documented dynamic-secrets requirement justifies Direct-Vault.
### 1. Provision Vault path
```bash
# Write the secrets for the app (run once; use IaC/Terraform for repeatable provisioning)
vault kv put secret/k3s/<app> \
db_password="..." \
api_key="..." \
jwt_secret="..."
```
Use the canonical path structure: `secret/k3s/<app>` for k3s cluster workloads.
### 2. ExternalSecret manifest
Commit this to the repo's `deploy/` or `k8s/` directory:
```yaml
# deploy/external-secret.yaml
apiVersion: external-secrets.io/v1beta1
kind: ExternalSecret
metadata:
name: <app>-secrets
namespace: <namespace>
spec:
refreshInterval: 1h
secretStoreRef:
name: vault-backend # ClusterSecretStore name — verify with cluster admin
kind: ClusterSecretStore
target:
name: <app>-secrets # k8s Secret name that will be created
creationPolicy: Owner
data:
- secretKey: DB_PASSWORD # key in the k8s Secret
remoteRef:
key: secret/k3s/<app> # Vault path
property: db_password # field within the Vault secret
- secretKey: API_KEY
remoteRef:
key: secret/k3s/<app>
property: api_key
- secretKey: JWT_SECRET
remoteRef:
key: secret/k3s/<app>
property: jwt_secret
```
### 3. Deployment manifest — reference synced k8s Secret
```yaml
# deploy/deployment.yaml (env section)
env:
- name: DB_PASSWORD
valueFrom:
secretKeyRef:
name: <app>-secrets # matches ExternalSecret target.name
key: DB_PASSWORD
- name: API_KEY
valueFrom:
secretKeyRef:
name: <app>-secrets
key: API_KEY
- name: JWT_SECRET
valueFrom:
secretKeyRef:
name: <app>-secrets
key: JWT_SECRET
- name: PORT
value: "3000" # safe-default: non-secret, no Vault needed
```
### 4. App-side schema validation — TypeScript (zod)
Validate all required env vars at startup. Exit non-zero on missing values.
```typescript
// src/env.ts
import { z } from 'zod';
const envSchema = z.object({
DB_PASSWORD: z.string().min(1, 'DB_PASSWORD is required'),
API_KEY: z.string().min(1, 'API_KEY is required'),
JWT_SECRET: z.string().min(32, 'JWT_SECRET must be at least 32 chars'),
PORT: z.coerce.number().default(3000),
NODE_ENV: z.enum(['development', 'production', 'test']).default('production'),
});
const result = envSchema.safeParse(process.env);
if (!result.success) {
console.error('Missing or invalid environment variables:');
console.error(result.error.flatten().fieldErrors);
process.exit(1);
}
export const env = result.data;
```
### 4b. App-side schema validation — Python (pydantic)
```python
# src/config.py
from pydantic_settings import BaseSettings, SettingsConfigDict
class Settings(BaseSettings):
db_password: str
api_key: str
jwt_secret: str
port: int = 3000
node_env: str = "production"
model_config = SettingsConfigDict(env_file=None) # no .env in prod
try:
settings = Settings()
except Exception as e:
import sys
print(f"Missing or invalid environment variables: {e}", file=sys.stderr)
sys.exit(1)
```
### 4c. App-side schema validation — Go (envconfig)
```go
// config/config.go
package config
import (
"fmt"
"github.com/kelseyhightower/envconfig"
)
type Config struct {
DBPassword string `envconfig:"DB_PASSWORD" required:"true"`
APIKey string `envconfig:"API_KEY" required:"true"`
JWTSecret string `envconfig:"JWT_SECRET" required:"true"`
Port int `envconfig:"PORT" default:"3000"`
}
func Load() (*Config, error) {
var cfg Config
if err := envconfig.Process("", &cfg); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid environment: %w", err)
}
return &cfg, nil
}
```
In your `main.go`:
```go
cfg, err := config.Load()
if err != nil {
fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, err)
os.Exit(1)
}
```
---
## Direct-Vault Opt-In Pattern
Use this pattern ONLY when a documented dynamic-secrets requirement applies (DB rotation with short TTLs, AWS STS, PKI, per-request audit). Document the justification in the project README under "Secrets architecture" before implementing.
### When it is justified
- Vault DB secrets engine with lease TTLs shorter than a typical pod lifecycle (< 1 hour)
- AWS STS assume-role tokens generated per-request
- Vault PKI short-lived certificates (< 24 hours) that must be renewed within a running pod
- Per-request audit trail requirement (each app call must appear separately in Vault audit log)
### Provision an AppRole for the app
```bash
# Enable AppRole auth (if not already enabled)
vault auth enable approle
# Create a Vault policy for the app
# Note: KV v2 paths require both the exact path (for the top-level secret) and the
# wildcard (for sub-paths). Always include both to avoid permission denied errors.
vault policy write <app>-policy - <<EOF
path "secret/data/k3s/<app>" {
capabilities = ["read"]
}
path "secret/data/k3s/<app>/*" {
capabilities = ["read"]
}
path "database/creds/<app>-role" {
capabilities = ["read"]
}
EOF
# Create the AppRole
vault write auth/approle/role/<app>-role \
token_policies="<app>-policy" \
token_ttl=1h \
token_max_ttl=4h \
secret_id_ttl=0
# Retrieve role-id and secret-id
vault read auth/approle/role/<app>-role/role-id
vault write -f auth/approle/role/<app>-role/secret-id
```
### Bootstrap AppRole credentials via ESO (solving the chicken-and-egg problem)
The AppRole `role-id` and `secret-id` are themselves secrets. Store them in Vault at a bootstrap path, then use ESO to sync them into a k8s Secret. The app reads that k8s Secret at startup to authenticate with Vault directly.
```bash
# Store the bootstrap credentials in Vault
vault kv put secret/k3s/<app>-bootstrap \
role_id="<role-id>" \
secret_id="<secret-id>"
```
```yaml
# deploy/external-secret-bootstrap.yaml
apiVersion: external-secrets.io/v1beta1
kind: ExternalSecret
metadata:
name: <app>-vault-auth
namespace: <namespace>
spec:
refreshInterval: 24h
secretStoreRef:
name: vault-backend
kind: ClusterSecretStore
target:
name: <app>-vault-auth
creationPolicy: Owner
data:
- secretKey: VAULT_ROLE_ID
remoteRef:
key: secret/k3s/<app>-bootstrap
property: role_id
- secretKey: VAULT_SECRET_ID
remoteRef:
key: secret/k3s/<app>-bootstrap
property: secret_id
```
```yaml
# deploy/deployment.yaml (env section for Direct-Vault app)
env:
- name: VAULT_ADDR
value: "https://vault.example.com" # safe-default: non-secret cluster address
- name: VAULT_ROLE_ID
valueFrom:
secretKeyRef:
name: <app>-vault-auth
key: VAULT_ROLE_ID
- name: VAULT_SECRET_ID
valueFrom:
secretKeyRef:
name: <app>-vault-auth
key: VAULT_SECRET_ID
```
### App-side Vault client pattern
```typescript
// src/vault-client.ts — only exists in Direct-Vault apps
import vault from 'node-vault';
import { z } from 'zod';
const bootstrapSchema = z.object({
VAULT_ADDR: z.string().url(),
VAULT_ROLE_ID: z.string().min(1),
VAULT_SECRET_ID: z.string().min(1),
});
const bootstrap = bootstrapSchema.parse(process.env);
const client = vault({ endpoint: bootstrap.VAULT_ADDR });
export async function getVaultClient() {
const { auth } = await client.approleLogin({
role_id: bootstrap.VAULT_ROLE_ID,
secret_id: bootstrap.VAULT_SECRET_ID,
});
client.token = auth.client_token;
return client;
}
```
Document in README under "Secrets architecture": the Vault path, why Direct-Vault is required, and the lease/renewal strategy.
---
## Forbidden Patterns (CI Lint Targets)
The following patterns are forbidden in all Mosaic projects. CI lint SHOULD catch these automatically (implementation tracked separately). Agents MUST NOT introduce these patterns.
### 1. Untagged fallback defaults for required values
```yaml
# FORBIDDEN — required secret with silent fallback
environment:
- DB_PASSWORD=${DB_PASSWORD:-changeme}
- API_KEY=${API_KEY:-}
# REQUIRED — fast-fail on missing required values
environment:
- DB_PASSWORD=${DB_PASSWORD:?DB_PASSWORD is required}
- API_KEY=${API_KEY:?API_KEY is required}
# ALLOWED — true convenience default, tagged
environment:
- PORT=${PORT:-3000} # safe-default: non-secret, app works at any port
```
This applies to: `docker-compose.yml`, k8s manifests, Helm `values.yaml`, any env file committed to git.
### 2. Vault KV calls in application source code (ESO-default projects)
```python
# FORBIDDEN in ESO-default apps — direct Vault client in app source
import hvac
client = hvac.Client(url=os.environ['VAULT_ADDR'])
secret = client.secrets.kv.v2.read_secret_version(path='myapp/db')
```
ESO-default apps read env vars only. Direct-Vault clients belong only in apps with a documented dynamic-secrets justification in README.
### 3. Hardcoded secrets or API keys in committed files
```python
# FORBIDDEN — hardcoded credential
DB_PASSWORD = "supersecret123"
API_KEY = "sk-live-abc123"
```
No exceptions. CI lint must flag any string matching common secret patterns (`password`, `secret`, `api_key`, `token` assigned a literal non-env-var value).
### 4. `.env` files in production deployment paths
```
# FORBIDDEN — .env file in a production deploy path
deploy/.env
k8s/.env
docker/.env
# ALLOWED — local dev only
.env.example # template only, no real values
.env # local dev, must be in .gitignore
```
`.env` files are acceptable in local-dev contexts only and MUST be in `.gitignore`. They are forbidden in any path that a CI pipeline or production deployment process reads directly.

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@@ -27,6 +27,16 @@ Master/slave model:
- Do not perform destructive git/file actions without explicit instruction.
- Browser automation (Playwright, Cypress, Puppeteer) MUST run in headless mode. Never launch a visible browser — it collides with the user's display and active session.
### Secrets handling (HARD RULE)
- Vault is the canonical source-of-truth for every secret in every environment. No exceptions.
- For k8s workloads, the default read path is **External Secrets Operator → k8s Secret → env var** (`secretKeyRef`). The app reads standard env vars; no Vault client in app code.
- Direct-Vault clients in application code are **opt-in only**, justified per-app by a documented dynamic-secrets requirement (e.g., DB rotation, AWS STS). Default to ESO. Document the justification in the project's README under "Secrets architecture".
- `${VAR:-default}` fallback syntax in any deployment configuration (compose, k8s manifests, Helm values, env files committed to git) is **forbidden** for required values. Use `${VAR:?VAR is required}` to fast-fail. Defaults are allowed only for true conveniences (e.g. `${PORT:-3000}`) and MUST be tagged `# safe-default: <reason>` so a reviewer can confirm the intent.
- `.env` files in production deployment paths are **forbidden**. `.env.example` and `.env` in local-dev paths are fine.
- App startup MUST validate required secrets against a schema (zod / pydantic / equivalent) and exit non-zero on missing required values. Never run with defaulted weak fallbacks.
- New apps: bootstrap checklist (see `~/.config/mosaic/guides/BOOTSTRAP.md`) MUST include Vault path provisioning + `ExternalSecret` manifest + README declaring the Vault path and required keys.
## Session Lifecycle Contract
- Start: `scripts/agent/session-start.sh`

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@@ -453,6 +453,26 @@ Initialize standard labels and the first pre-MVP milestone:
---
## Secrets Bootstrap (Required for Every New App)
Every new application MUST complete the following secrets bootstrap before deploying to any non-local environment. This is a hard gate — deployment without completed secrets bootstrap is forbidden.
### Secrets bootstrap checklist
- [ ] Vault path created: `vault kv put secret/k3s/<app>/ ...` with all required secret fields
- [ ] Required secrets listed in project README under a "Secrets architecture" section, including:
- Vault path(s) used
- All required secret keys and their purpose
- Whether the app uses ESO bridge (default) or Direct-Vault (opt-in, with justification)
- [ ] `external-secret.yaml` manifest committed to repo's `deploy/` or `k8s/` directory
- [ ] Deployment YAML references the synced k8s Secret via `secretKeyRef` (not raw env vars or `.env` files)
- [ ] App startup has schema-based validation for all required env vars (zod / pydantic / envconfig equivalent) that exits non-zero on missing required values
- [ ] Direct-Vault opt-in (if applicable): justification documented in README + AppRole provisioned + bootstrap credentials stored in Vault and synced via a separate `ExternalSecret`
See `~/.config/mosaic/guides/VAULT-SECRETS.md` for full worked examples of the ESO bridge pattern, the Direct-Vault opt-in pattern, and the forbidden antipatterns.
---
## Checklist
After bootstrapping, verify:

View File

@@ -203,3 +203,374 @@ Error: token expired
3. **Audit logging** - All access is logged; act accordingly
4. **No local copies** - Don't store secrets in files or env vars long-term
5. **Rotate on compromise** - Immediately rotate any exposed secrets
---
## Secrets Architecture Decision Matrix
Use this table to choose between the ESO bridge (default) and Direct-Vault (opt-in) patterns for every new app or integration.
| Factor | ESO Bridge (default) | Direct-Vault (opt-in) |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Use-case** | All static secrets (DB creds, API keys, signing keys, OAuth secrets) | Dynamic creds with short TTLs (DB rotation, AWS STS, PKI), per-request audit trails, or lease renewal mid-pod-lifecycle |
| **App code change** | None — reads standard env vars via `secretKeyRef` | Requires Vault client (`hvac`, `node-vault`, `vault/api`) in application code |
| **Secret rotation** | ESO re-syncs on Vault write; pod restart or secret refresh picks up new value | App manages lease renewal or re-auth within the running process |
| **Audit granularity** | Access logged at Vault when ESO syncs; no per-request app audit | Every app request to Vault is a separate audit log entry |
| **Operational burden** | Low — ESO handles polling, sync, and k8s Secret lifecycle | Higher — app must handle auth, lease renewal, error paths, and token rotation |
| **Justification required?** | No — this is the default | Yes — document in project README under "Secrets architecture" |
| **Example use cases** | Web app DB password, OAuth client secret, JWT signing key, API token | HashiCorp DB secrets engine with 15-min TTL leases, AWS STS assume-role, Vault PKI short-lived certs |
**Decision rule:** If you are unsure, use ESO. Only justify Direct-Vault when the secret cannot be safely stored in a k8s Secret (too short-lived, per-request TTL required, or mid-lifecycle renewal needed).
---
## ESO Bridge Pattern (Default)
This is the required default for all k8s workloads. Follow this exact pattern unless a documented dynamic-secrets requirement justifies Direct-Vault.
### 1. Provision Vault path
```bash
# Write the secrets for the app (run once; use IaC/Terraform for repeatable provisioning)
vault kv put secret/k3s/<app> \
db_password="..." \
api_key="..." \
jwt_secret="..."
```
Use the canonical path structure: `secret/k3s/<app>` for k3s cluster workloads.
### 2. ExternalSecret manifest
Commit this to the repo's `deploy/` or `k8s/` directory:
```yaml
# deploy/external-secret.yaml
apiVersion: external-secrets.io/v1beta1
kind: ExternalSecret
metadata:
name: <app>-secrets
namespace: <namespace>
spec:
refreshInterval: 1h
secretStoreRef:
name: vault-backend # ClusterSecretStore name — verify with cluster admin
kind: ClusterSecretStore
target:
name: <app>-secrets # k8s Secret name that will be created
creationPolicy: Owner
data:
- secretKey: DB_PASSWORD # key in the k8s Secret
remoteRef:
key: secret/k3s/<app> # Vault path
property: db_password # field within the Vault secret
- secretKey: API_KEY
remoteRef:
key: secret/k3s/<app>
property: api_key
- secretKey: JWT_SECRET
remoteRef:
key: secret/k3s/<app>
property: jwt_secret
```
### 3. Deployment manifest — reference synced k8s Secret
```yaml
# deploy/deployment.yaml (env section)
env:
- name: DB_PASSWORD
valueFrom:
secretKeyRef:
name: <app>-secrets # matches ExternalSecret target.name
key: DB_PASSWORD
- name: API_KEY
valueFrom:
secretKeyRef:
name: <app>-secrets
key: API_KEY
- name: JWT_SECRET
valueFrom:
secretKeyRef:
name: <app>-secrets
key: JWT_SECRET
- name: PORT
value: "3000" # safe-default: non-secret, no Vault needed
```
### 4. App-side schema validation — TypeScript (zod)
Validate all required env vars at startup. Exit non-zero on missing values.
```typescript
// src/env.ts
import { z } from 'zod';
const envSchema = z.object({
DB_PASSWORD: z.string().min(1, 'DB_PASSWORD is required'),
API_KEY: z.string().min(1, 'API_KEY is required'),
JWT_SECRET: z.string().min(32, 'JWT_SECRET must be at least 32 chars'),
PORT: z.coerce.number().default(3000),
NODE_ENV: z.enum(['development', 'production', 'test']).default('production'),
});
const result = envSchema.safeParse(process.env);
if (!result.success) {
console.error('Missing or invalid environment variables:');
console.error(result.error.flatten().fieldErrors);
process.exit(1);
}
export const env = result.data;
```
### 4b. App-side schema validation — Python (pydantic)
```python
# src/config.py
from pydantic_settings import BaseSettings, SettingsConfigDict
class Settings(BaseSettings):
db_password: str
api_key: str
jwt_secret: str
port: int = 3000
node_env: str = "production"
model_config = SettingsConfigDict(env_file=None) # no .env in prod
try:
settings = Settings()
except Exception as e:
import sys
print(f"Missing or invalid environment variables: {e}", file=sys.stderr)
sys.exit(1)
```
### 4c. App-side schema validation — Go (envconfig)
```go
// config/config.go
package config
import (
"fmt"
"github.com/kelseyhightower/envconfig"
)
type Config struct {
DBPassword string `envconfig:"DB_PASSWORD" required:"true"`
APIKey string `envconfig:"API_KEY" required:"true"`
JWTSecret string `envconfig:"JWT_SECRET" required:"true"`
Port int `envconfig:"PORT" default:"3000"`
}
func Load() (*Config, error) {
var cfg Config
if err := envconfig.Process("", &cfg); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid environment: %w", err)
}
return &cfg, nil
}
```
In your `main.go`:
```go
cfg, err := config.Load()
if err != nil {
fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, err)
os.Exit(1)
}
```
---
## Direct-Vault Opt-In Pattern
Use this pattern ONLY when a documented dynamic-secrets requirement applies (DB rotation with short TTLs, AWS STS, PKI, per-request audit). Document the justification in the project README under "Secrets architecture" before implementing.
### When it is justified
- Vault DB secrets engine with lease TTLs shorter than a typical pod lifecycle (< 1 hour)
- AWS STS assume-role tokens generated per-request
- Vault PKI short-lived certificates (< 24 hours) that must be renewed within a running pod
- Per-request audit trail requirement (each app call must appear separately in Vault audit log)
### Provision an AppRole for the app
```bash
# Enable AppRole auth (if not already enabled)
vault auth enable approle
# Create a Vault policy for the app
# Note: KV v2 paths require both the exact path (for the top-level secret) and the
# wildcard (for sub-paths). Always include both to avoid permission denied errors.
vault policy write <app>-policy - <<EOF
path "secret/data/k3s/<app>" {
capabilities = ["read"]
}
path "secret/data/k3s/<app>/*" {
capabilities = ["read"]
}
path "database/creds/<app>-role" {
capabilities = ["read"]
}
EOF
# Create the AppRole
vault write auth/approle/role/<app>-role \
token_policies="<app>-policy" \
token_ttl=1h \
token_max_ttl=4h \
secret_id_ttl=0
# Retrieve role-id and secret-id
vault read auth/approle/role/<app>-role/role-id
vault write -f auth/approle/role/<app>-role/secret-id
```
### Bootstrap AppRole credentials via ESO (solving the chicken-and-egg problem)
The AppRole `role-id` and `secret-id` are themselves secrets. Store them in Vault at a bootstrap path, then use ESO to sync them into a k8s Secret. The app reads that k8s Secret at startup to authenticate with Vault directly.
```bash
# Store the bootstrap credentials in Vault
vault kv put secret/k3s/<app>-bootstrap \
role_id="<role-id>" \
secret_id="<secret-id>"
```
```yaml
# deploy/external-secret-bootstrap.yaml
apiVersion: external-secrets.io/v1beta1
kind: ExternalSecret
metadata:
name: <app>-vault-auth
namespace: <namespace>
spec:
refreshInterval: 24h
secretStoreRef:
name: vault-backend
kind: ClusterSecretStore
target:
name: <app>-vault-auth
creationPolicy: Owner
data:
- secretKey: VAULT_ROLE_ID
remoteRef:
key: secret/k3s/<app>-bootstrap
property: role_id
- secretKey: VAULT_SECRET_ID
remoteRef:
key: secret/k3s/<app>-bootstrap
property: secret_id
```
```yaml
# deploy/deployment.yaml (env section for Direct-Vault app)
env:
- name: VAULT_ADDR
value: "https://vault.example.com" # safe-default: non-secret cluster address
- name: VAULT_ROLE_ID
valueFrom:
secretKeyRef:
name: <app>-vault-auth
key: VAULT_ROLE_ID
- name: VAULT_SECRET_ID
valueFrom:
secretKeyRef:
name: <app>-vault-auth
key: VAULT_SECRET_ID
```
### App-side Vault client pattern
```typescript
// src/vault-client.ts — only exists in Direct-Vault apps
import vault from 'node-vault';
import { z } from 'zod';
const bootstrapSchema = z.object({
VAULT_ADDR: z.string().url(),
VAULT_ROLE_ID: z.string().min(1),
VAULT_SECRET_ID: z.string().min(1),
});
const bootstrap = bootstrapSchema.parse(process.env);
const client = vault({ endpoint: bootstrap.VAULT_ADDR });
export async function getVaultClient() {
const { auth } = await client.approleLogin({
role_id: bootstrap.VAULT_ROLE_ID,
secret_id: bootstrap.VAULT_SECRET_ID,
});
client.token = auth.client_token;
return client;
}
```
Document in README under "Secrets architecture": the Vault path, why Direct-Vault is required, and the lease/renewal strategy.
---
## Forbidden Patterns (CI Lint Targets)
The following patterns are forbidden in all Mosaic projects. CI lint SHOULD catch these automatically (implementation tracked separately). Agents MUST NOT introduce these patterns.
### 1. Untagged fallback defaults for required values
```yaml
# FORBIDDEN — required secret with silent fallback
environment:
- DB_PASSWORD=${DB_PASSWORD:-changeme}
- API_KEY=${API_KEY:-}
# REQUIRED — fast-fail on missing required values
environment:
- DB_PASSWORD=${DB_PASSWORD:?DB_PASSWORD is required}
- API_KEY=${API_KEY:?API_KEY is required}
# ALLOWED — true convenience default, tagged
environment:
- PORT=${PORT:-3000} # safe-default: non-secret, app works at any port
```
This applies to: `docker-compose.yml`, k8s manifests, Helm `values.yaml`, any env file committed to git.
### 2. Vault KV calls in application source code (ESO-default projects)
```python
# FORBIDDEN in ESO-default apps — direct Vault client in app source
import hvac
client = hvac.Client(url=os.environ['VAULT_ADDR'])
secret = client.secrets.kv.v2.read_secret_version(path='myapp/db')
```
ESO-default apps read env vars only. Direct-Vault clients belong only in apps with a documented dynamic-secrets justification in README.
### 3. Hardcoded secrets or API keys in committed files
```python
# FORBIDDEN — hardcoded credential
DB_PASSWORD = "supersecret123"
API_KEY = "sk-live-abc123"
```
No exceptions. CI lint must flag any string matching common secret patterns (`password`, `secret`, `api_key`, `token` assigned a literal non-env-var value).
### 4. `.env` files in production deployment paths
```
# FORBIDDEN — .env file in a production deploy path
deploy/.env
k8s/.env
docker/.env
# ALLOWED — local dev only
.env.example # template only, no real values
.env # local dev, must be in .gitignore
```
`.env` files are acceptable in local-dev contexts only and MUST be in `.gitignore`. They are forbidden in any path that a CI pipeline or production deployment process reads directly.

View File

@@ -74,16 +74,6 @@ get_repo_name() {
echo "${repo_info##*/}"
}
get_repo_slug() {
get_repo_info
}
get_gitea_repo_args() {
local repo
repo=$(get_repo_slug) || return 1
printf -- '--repo %q --login %q' "$repo" "${GITEA_LOGIN:-mosaicstack}"
}
get_remote_host() {
local remote_url
remote_url=$(git remote get-url origin 2>/dev/null || true)

View File

@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ if [[ "$PLATFORM" == "github" ]]; then
gh issue comment "$ISSUE_NUMBER" --body "$COMMENT"
echo "Added comment to GitHub issue #$ISSUE_NUMBER"
elif [[ "$PLATFORM" == "gitea" ]]; then
tea issue comment "$ISSUE_NUMBER" "$COMMENT" $(get_gitea_repo_args)
tea issue comment "$ISSUE_NUMBER" "$COMMENT"
echo "Added comment to Gitea issue #$ISSUE_NUMBER"
else
echo "Error: Unknown platform"

View File

@@ -120,8 +120,7 @@ case "$PLATFORM" in
;;
gitea)
if command -v tea >/dev/null 2>&1; then
REPO_ARGS=$(get_gitea_repo_args)
CMD="tea issue create $REPO_ARGS --title \"$TITLE\""
CMD="tea issue create --title \"$TITLE\""
[[ -n "$BODY" ]] && CMD="$CMD --description \"$BODY\""
[[ -n "$LABELS" ]] && CMD="$CMD --labels \"$LABELS\""
# tea accepts milestone by name directly (verified 2026-02-05)

View File

@@ -80,8 +80,7 @@ case "$PLATFORM" in
eval "$CMD"
;;
gitea)
REPO_ARGS=$(get_gitea_repo_args)
CMD="tea issues list $REPO_ARGS --state $STATE --limit $LIMIT"
CMD="tea issues list --state $STATE --limit $LIMIT"
[[ -n "$LABEL" ]] && CMD="$CMD --labels \"$LABEL\""
[[ -n "$MILESTONE" ]] && CMD="$CMD --milestones \"$MILESTONE\""
# Note: tea may not support assignee filter directly

View File

@@ -52,9 +52,9 @@ if [[ "$PLATFORM" == "github" ]]; then
echo "Reopened GitHub issue #$ISSUE_NUMBER"
elif [[ "$PLATFORM" == "gitea" ]]; then
if [[ -n "$COMMENT" ]]; then
tea issue comment "$ISSUE_NUMBER" "$COMMENT" $(get_gitea_repo_args)
tea issue comment "$ISSUE_NUMBER" "$COMMENT"
fi
tea issue reopen "$ISSUE_NUMBER" $(get_gitea_repo_args)
tea issue reopen "$ISSUE_NUMBER"
echo "Reopened Gitea issue #$ISSUE_NUMBER"
else
echo "Error: Unknown platform"

View File

@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ if [[ "$PLATFORM" == "github" ]]; then
gh issue view "$ISSUE_NUMBER"
elif [[ "$PLATFORM" == "gitea" ]]; then
if command -v tea >/dev/null 2>&1; then
if tea issue "$ISSUE_NUMBER" $(get_gitea_repo_args); then
if tea issue "$ISSUE_NUMBER"; then
exit 0
fi
echo "Warning: tea issue view failed, trying Gitea API fallback..." >&2

View File

@@ -52,9 +52,9 @@ if [[ "$PLATFORM" == "github" ]]; then
echo "Closed GitHub PR #$PR_NUMBER"
elif [[ "$PLATFORM" == "gitea" ]]; then
if [[ -n "$COMMENT" ]]; then
tea pr comment "$PR_NUMBER" "$COMMENT" $(get_gitea_repo_args)
tea pr comment "$PR_NUMBER" "$COMMENT"
fi
tea pr close "$PR_NUMBER" $(get_gitea_repo_args)
tea pr close "$PR_NUMBER"
echo "Closed Gitea PR #$PR_NUMBER"
else
echo "Error: Unknown platform"

View File

@@ -17,51 +17,6 @@ MILESTONE=""
DRAFT=false
ISSUE=""
# get_remote_host, get_gitea_token, get_repo_info, and get_gitea_repo_args are provided by detect-platform.sh
gitea_pr_create_api() {
local host repo token url payload
host=$(get_remote_host) || {
echo "Error: could not determine remote host for API fallback" >&2
return 1
}
repo=$(get_repo_info) || {
echo "Error: could not determine repo owner/name for API fallback" >&2
return 1
}
token=$(get_gitea_token "$host") || {
echo "Error: Gitea token not found for API fallback (set GITEA_TOKEN or configure ~/.git-credentials)" >&2
return 1
}
if [[ -n "$LABELS" || -n "$MILESTONE" || "$DRAFT" == true ]]; then
echo "Warning: API fallback applies title/body/head/base only; labels/milestone/draft require authenticated tea setup." >&2
fi
payload=$(TITLE="$TITLE" BODY="$BODY" HEAD_BRANCH="$HEAD_BRANCH" BASE_BRANCH="$BASE_BRANCH" python3 - <<'PY'
import json
import os
payload = {
"title": os.environ["TITLE"],
"head": os.environ["HEAD_BRANCH"],
"base": os.environ["BASE_BRANCH"] or "main",
}
body = os.environ.get("BODY", "")
if body:
payload["body"] = body
print(json.dumps(payload))
PY
)
url="https://${host}/api/v1/repos/${repo}/pulls"
curl -fsS -X POST \
-H "Authorization: token ${token}" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d "$payload" \
"$url"
}
usage() {
cat <<EOF
Usage: $(basename "$0") [OPTIONS]
@@ -173,10 +128,8 @@ case "$PLATFORM" in
eval "$CMD"
;;
gitea)
# tea pull create syntax. Always pass --repo because tea repo inference
# is unreliable in Mosaic worktrees/profile shells.
REPO_ARGS=$(get_gitea_repo_args)
CMD="tea pr create $REPO_ARGS --title \"$TITLE\""
# tea pull create syntax
CMD="tea pr create --title \"$TITLE\""
[[ -n "$BODY" ]] && CMD="$CMD --description \"$BODY\""
[[ -n "$BASE_BRANCH" ]] && CMD="$CMD --base \"$BASE_BRANCH\""
[[ -n "$HEAD_BRANCH" ]] && CMD="$CMD --head \"$HEAD_BRANCH\""
@@ -189,7 +142,7 @@ case "$PLATFORM" in
# Handle milestone for tea
if [[ -n "$MILESTONE" ]]; then
MILESTONE_ID=$(tea milestones list $REPO_ARGS 2>/dev/null | grep -E "^\s*[0-9]+" | grep "$MILESTONE" | awk '{print $1}' | head -1)
MILESTONE_ID=$(tea milestones list 2>/dev/null | grep -E "^\s*[0-9]+" | grep "$MILESTONE" | awk '{print $1}' | head -1)
if [[ -n "$MILESTONE_ID" ]]; then
CMD="$CMD --milestone $MILESTONE_ID"
else

View File

@@ -74,8 +74,7 @@ case "$PLATFORM" in
;;
gitea)
# tea pr list - note: tea uses 'pulls' subcommand in some versions
REPO_ARGS=$(get_gitea_repo_args)
CMD="tea pr list $REPO_ARGS --state $STATE --limit $LIMIT"
CMD="tea pr list --state $STATE --limit $LIMIT"
# tea filtering may be limited
if [[ -n "$LABEL" ]]; then

View File

@@ -85,7 +85,7 @@ if [[ "$PLATFORM" == "github" ]]; then
elif [[ "$PLATFORM" == "gitea" ]]; then
case $ACTION in
approve)
tea pr approve "$PR_NUMBER" $(get_gitea_repo_args) ${COMMENT:+--comment "$COMMENT"}
tea pr approve "$PR_NUMBER" ${COMMENT:+--comment "$COMMENT"}
echo "Approved Gitea PR #$PR_NUMBER"
;;
request-changes)
@@ -93,7 +93,7 @@ elif [[ "$PLATFORM" == "gitea" ]]; then
echo "Error: Comment required for request-changes"
exit 1
fi
tea pr reject "$PR_NUMBER" $(get_gitea_repo_args) --comment "$COMMENT"
tea pr reject "$PR_NUMBER" --comment "$COMMENT"
echo "Requested changes on Gitea PR #$PR_NUMBER"
;;
comment)
@@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ elif [[ "$PLATFORM" == "gitea" ]]; then
echo "Error: Comment required"
exit 1
fi
tea pr comment "$PR_NUMBER" "$COMMENT" $(get_gitea_repo_args)
tea pr comment "$PR_NUMBER" "$COMMENT"
echo "Added comment to Gitea PR #$PR_NUMBER"
;;
*)

View File

@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ detect_platform
if [[ "$PLATFORM" == "github" ]]; then
gh pr view "$PR_NUMBER"
elif [[ "$PLATFORM" == "gitea" ]]; then
tea pr "$PR_NUMBER" $(get_gitea_repo_args)
tea pr "$PR_NUMBER"
else
echo "Error: Unknown platform"
exit 1