test(fleet): cover reconciler lifecycle gates (#786)

CLAUDE.md

@@ -26,13 +26,14 @@ pnpm test             # Vitest (all packages)
 pnpm build            # Build all packages
 
 # Database
-pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/db db:push      # Push schema to PG (dev)
+pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/db db:generate  # Offline migration artifact generation only
-pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/db db:generate  # Generate migrations
+# PostgreSQL execution is held until KBN-101-00/-03/-05 land. Do not invoke a runner,
-pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/db db:migrate   # Run migrations
+# init SQL, or Compose PostgreSQL service from this checkout.
 
-# Dev
+# Dev: local PGlite data-layer work needs no PostgreSQL. Optional local queue service only:
-docker compose up -d                  # Start PG, Valkey, OTEL, Jaeger
+docker compose up -d valkey
-pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/gateway exec tsx src/main.ts  # Start gateway
+# Do not start Gateway/Web or root pnpm dev as a local PGlite route: the current unguarded dotenv
+# loader can inherit a daemon PostgreSQL DSN. KBN-101-02 must make that state fail closed first.
 ```
 
 ## Conventions

README.md

@@ -157,7 +157,12 @@ mosaic storage status
 mosaic storage tier
 mosaic storage export
 mosaic storage import
-mosaic storage migrate
+# Schema migration is unavailable in this release. The current storage wrapper shells
+# directly to `pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/db db:migrate`; it is legacy N-1,
+# uncertified, and MUST NOT be invoked pending KBN-101-02/-03/-06/-08 activation.
+# Future schema migration is non-operative: external bootstrap → TLS/roles → runner
+# --run → runner --verify → readiness. Tier copy uses only the separately held secure
+# migrate-tier route.
 ```
 
 ### Telemetry
@@ -192,29 +197,32 @@ Consent state is persisted in config. Remote upload is a no-op until you run `mo
 git clone git@git.mosaicstack.dev:mosaicstack/stack.git
 cd stack
 
-# Start infrastructure (Postgres, Valkey, Jaeger)
+# Install dependencies. The local tier uses in-process PGlite; leave DATABASE_URL unset.
-docker compose up -d
-
-# Install dependencies
 pnpm install
 
-# Run migrations
+# Optional local queue service only. This does not start PostgreSQL.
-pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/db run db:migrate
+docker compose up -d valkey
 
-# Start all services in dev mode
+# The current Gateway/Web local process is held; see docs/guides/dev-guide.md.
-pnpm dev
+# Do not start it until KBN-101-02 makes inherited dotenv/DSN state fail closed.
 ```
 
-### Infrastructure
+### Held future procedure
 
-Docker Compose provides:
+The checked-in Compose PostgreSQL service mounts legacy initialization SQL and is **not** a
+current PostgreSQL, standalone, or federated developer route. Do not start it with Compose,
+invoke initialization SQL, or treat the planned migrator as currently executable.
 
-| Service               | Port      | Purpose                |
+**Held future activation procedure — non-operative and no current command authority until KBN-101-00, KBN-101-03, and KBN-101-05
-| --------------------- | --------- | ---------------------- |
+land:** external bootstrap → TLS/roles → `mosaic-db-migrator --run` →
-| PostgreSQL (pgvector) | 5433      | Primary database       |
+`mosaic-db-migrator --verify` → Gateway/Compose readiness. The future deployment artifacts—not
-| Valkey                | 6380      | Task queue + caching   |
+this README—will provide the reviewed commands and secret-consumer interface.
-| Jaeger                | 16686     | Distributed tracing UI |
+
-| OTEL Collector        | 4317/4318 | Telemetry ingestion    |
+For local data-layer work, PGlite needs no PostgreSQL service. The optional Compose command above
+starts only Valkey; OTEL Collector and Jaeger may likewise be started individually if needed,
+without starting PostgreSQL. A Gateway/Web local process is not currently a safe PGlite route:
+its unguarded dotenv loader may inherit a daemon PostgreSQL DSN. Do not use root `pnpm dev` or a
+Gateway start command until KBN-101-02 makes that state fail closed.
 
 ### Quality Gates
 
@@ -231,7 +239,7 @@ pnpm format                  # Prettier auto-fix
 Woodpecker CI runs on every push:
 
 - `pnpm install --frozen-lockfile`
-- Database migration against a fresh Postgres
+- **Legacy N-1 CI status only — active, uncertified, and non-authorizing as an operator route:** the checked-in job currently invokes `pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/db run db:migrate` with `DATABASE_URL` against an isolated disposable PostgreSQL CI database. It performs direct DDL in that CI database, is not approved ordinary behavior or an operator route, and remains a known exception pending KBN-101-06 removal/replacement by the certified runner-backed CI path.
 - `pnpm test` (Turbo-orchestrated across all packages)
 
 npm packages are published to the Gitea package registry on main merges.

apps/gateway/src/__tests__/integration/tess-cross-surface.integration.test.ts

@@ -72,6 +72,7 @@ describe('interaction Discord/CLI durable-session integration', () => {
     process.env['DISCORD_INTERACTION_BINDINGS'] = JSON.stringify([
       {
         instanceId: 'Nova',
+        agentConfigId: 'agent-config-nova',
         guildId: 'guild-1',
         channelId: 'channel-1',
         pairedUsers: {
@@ -133,6 +134,7 @@ describe('interaction Discord/CLI durable-session integration', () => {
       interactionBindings: [
         {
           instanceId: 'Nova',
+          agentConfigId: 'agent-config-nova',
           guildId: 'guild-1',
           channelId: 'channel-1',
           pairedUsers: {

apps/gateway/src/agent/__tests__/agent-service-ownership.test.ts

@@ -115,6 +115,18 @@ describe('AgentService owner/tenant scope enforcement', () => {
     ).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(ForbiddenException);
     await service.prompt(CONVERSATION_ID, 'owner prompt', OWNER_SCOPE);
     expect(session.piSession.prompt).toHaveBeenCalledWith('owner prompt');
+    await service.prompt(CONVERSATION_ID, '', OWNER_SCOPE, [
+      {
+        id: 'attachment-001',
+        name: 'diagram.png',
+        url: 'https://cdn.example.test/diagram.png',
+        mimeType: 'image/png',
+      },
+    ]);
+    expect(session.piSession.prompt).toHaveBeenLastCalledWith(
+      '\n\n[Untrusted channel attachments]\n' +
+        '{"id":"attachment-001","name":"diagram.png","mimeType":"image/png","url":"https://cdn.example.test/diagram.png"}',
+    );
 
     await expect(service.destroySession(CONVERSATION_ID, FOREIGN_SCOPE)).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(
       ForbiddenException,

apps/gateway/src/agent/agent.module.ts

@@ -21,6 +21,12 @@ import { LogModule } from '../log/log.module.js';
 import { CommandsModule } from '../commands/commands.module.js';
 import { CommandRuntimeApprovalVerifier } from '../commands/runtime-approval-verifier.js';
 import { GatewayHermesRuntimeTransport } from './hermes-runtime.transport.js';
+import { ConnectorLeaseRepository } from './connector-lease.repository.js';
+import {
+  CONNECTOR_LEASE_POLICY,
+  ConnectorLeaseService,
+  DenyConnectorLeasePolicy,
+} from './connector-lease.service.js';
 import {
   AGENT_RUNTIME_PROVIDER_REGISTRY,
   RUNTIME_APPROVAL_VERIFIER,
@@ -46,6 +52,13 @@ export function createGatewayRuntimeProviderRegistry(): AgentRuntimeProviderRegi
     SkillLoaderService,
     DurableSessionRepository,
     DurableSessionService,
+    ConnectorLeaseRepository,
+    DenyConnectorLeasePolicy,
+    {
+      provide: CONNECTOR_LEASE_POLICY,
+      useExisting: DenyConnectorLeasePolicy,
+    },
+    ConnectorLeaseService,
     {
       provide: AGENT_RUNTIME_PROVIDER_REGISTRY,
       useFactory: createGatewayRuntimeProviderRegistry,
@@ -78,6 +91,7 @@ export function createGatewayRuntimeProviderRegistry(): AgentRuntimeProviderRegi
     SkillLoaderService,
     DurableSessionService,
     RuntimeProviderService,
+    ConnectorLeaseService,
     AGENT_RUNTIME_PROVIDER_REGISTRY,
   ],
 })

apps/gateway/src/agent/agent.service.ts

@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ import {
   type ToolDefinition,
 } from '@mariozechner/pi-coding-agent';
 import type { Brain } from '@mosaicstack/brain';
+import type { ChannelAttachmentDto } from '@mosaicstack/types';
 import type { Memory, OperatorMemoryPlugin } from '@mosaicstack/memory';
 import { BRAIN } from '../brain/brain.tokens.js';
 import { MEMORY } from '../memory/memory.tokens.js';
@@ -43,6 +44,8 @@ export interface ConversationHistoryMessage {
   role: 'user' | 'assistant' | 'system';
   content: string;
   createdAt: Date;
+  /** Validated, URI-referenced channel attachments preserved on session resume. */
+  attachments?: readonly ChannelAttachmentDto[];
 }
 
 export interface AgentSessionOptions {
@@ -428,7 +431,7 @@ export class AgentService implements OnModuleDestroy {
     const formatMessage = (msg: ConversationHistoryMessage): string => {
       const roleLabel =
         msg.role === 'user' ? 'User' : msg.role === 'assistant' ? 'Assistant' : 'System';
-      return `**${roleLabel}:** ${msg.content}`;
+      return `**${roleLabel}:** ${msg.content}${this.attachmentContext(msg.attachments ?? [])}`;
     };
 
     const formatted = history.map((msg) => formatMessage(msg));
@@ -487,6 +490,21 @@ export class AgentService implements OnModuleDestroy {
     return result;
   }
 
+  private attachmentContext(attachments: readonly ChannelAttachmentDto[]): string {
+    if (attachments.length === 0) return '';
+    return `\n\n[Untrusted channel attachments]\n${attachments
+      .map((attachment: ChannelAttachmentDto): string =>
+        JSON.stringify({
+          id: attachment.id,
+          name: attachment.name,
+          mimeType: attachment.mimeType,
+          url: attachment.url,
+          ...(attachment.sizeBytes !== undefined ? { sizeBytes: attachment.sizeBytes } : {}),
+        }),
+      )
+      .join('\n')}`;
+  }
+
   private resolveModel(options?: AgentSessionOptions) {
     if (!options?.provider && !options?.modelId) {
       return this.providerService.getDefaultModel() ?? null;
@@ -673,7 +691,19 @@ export class AgentService implements OnModuleDestroy {
     session.channels.delete(channel);
   }
 
-  async prompt(sessionId: string, message: string, scope: ActorTenantScope): Promise<void> {
+  async prompt(sessionId: string, message: string, scope: ActorTenantScope): Promise<void>;
+  async prompt(
+    sessionId: string,
+    message: string,
+    scope: ActorTenantScope,
+    attachments: readonly ChannelAttachmentDto[] | undefined,
+  ): Promise<void>;
+  async prompt(
+    sessionId: string,
+    message: string,
+    scope: ActorTenantScope,
+    attachments: readonly ChannelAttachmentDto[] = [],
+  ): Promise<void> {
     const session = this.sessions.get(sessionId);
     if (!session) {
       throw new Error(`No agent session found: ${sessionId}`);
@@ -681,12 +711,16 @@ export class AgentService implements OnModuleDestroy {
     this.assertSessionScope(session, scope);
     session.promptCount += 1;
 
+    // Channel attachments are untrusted URI references. Preserve exact,
+    // authenticated metadata for the agent without treating it as authority.
+    const attachmentContext = this.attachmentContext(attachments);
+
     // Prepend session-scoped system override if present (renew TTL on each turn)
-    let effectiveMessage = message;
+    let effectiveMessage = `${message}${attachmentContext}`;
     if (this.systemOverride) {
       const override = await this.systemOverride.get(sessionId, scope);
       if (override) {
-        effectiveMessage = `[System Override]\n${override}\n\n${message}`;
+        effectiveMessage = `[System Override]\n${override}\n\n${effectiveMessage}`;
         await this.systemOverride.renew(sessionId, scope);
         this.logger.debug(`Applied system override for session ${sessionId}`);
       }

apps/gateway/src/agent/connector-lease.integration.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,341 @@
+import { mkdtemp, rm } from 'node:fs/promises';
+import { tmpdir } from 'node:os';
+import { join } from 'node:path';
+import { afterAll, beforeAll, describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest';
+import { Test, type TestingModule } from '@nestjs/testing';
+import {
+  connectorLeaseAuditLog,
+  createPgliteDb,
+  eq,
+  runPgliteMigrations,
+  type DbHandle,
+} from '@mosaicstack/db';
+import type { ConnectorExecutionContext, FencedConnectorAdapter } from '@mosaicstack/types';
+import { DB } from '../database/database.module.js';
+import { ConnectorLeaseRepository } from './connector-lease.repository.js';
+import {
+  CONNECTOR_LEASE_POLICY,
+  ConnectorLeaseService,
+  type ConnectorLeasePolicy,
+  type ConnectorLeasePolicySubject,
+} from './connector-lease.service.js';
+
+const authorize = vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(true);
+const policy: ConnectorLeasePolicy = { authorize };
+const context = {
+  actorScope: { userId: 'operator-a', tenantId: 'tenant-a' },
+  correlationId: 'correlation-acquire',
+};
+
+describe('gateway connector lease fencing integration', (): void => {
+  let dataDir: string;
+  let handle: DbHandle;
+  let moduleRef: TestingModule;
+  let service: ConnectorLeaseService;
+  let repository: ConnectorLeaseRepository;
+
+  beforeAll(async (): Promise<void> => {
+    vi.useFakeTimers();
+    vi.setSystemTime(new Date('2026-07-14T17:00:00.000Z'));
+    dataDir = await mkdtemp(join(tmpdir(), 'mosaic-gateway-connector-lease-'));
+    handle = createPgliteDb(dataDir);
+    await runPgliteMigrations(handle);
+    moduleRef = await Test.createTestingModule({
+      providers: [
+        ConnectorLeaseRepository,
+        ConnectorLeaseService,
+        { provide: DB, useValue: handle.db },
+        { provide: CONNECTOR_LEASE_POLICY, useValue: policy },
+      ],
+    }).compile();
+    service = moduleRef.get(ConnectorLeaseService);
+    repository = moduleRef.get(ConnectorLeaseRepository);
+  });
+
+  afterAll(async (): Promise<void> => {
+    vi.useRealTimers();
+    await moduleRef.close();
+    await handle.close();
+    await rm(dataDir, { recursive: true, force: true });
+  });
+
+  it('derives tenant authority at the gateway and validates a grant before side effects', async (): Promise<void> => {
+    const lease = await service.acquire(
+      {
+        logicalAgentId: 'Mos',
+        bindingId: 'operator-chat',
+        connectorId: 'pi-worker-a',
+        scopes: ['runtime.send'],
+        ttlMs: 60_000,
+      },
+      context,
+    );
+    const grant = await service.issueGrant(
+      { lease, scopes: ['runtime.send'], ttlMs: 30_000 },
+      { ...context, correlationId: 'correlation-grant' },
+    );
+    const execute = vi.fn(async (_message: string, leaseContext: ConnectorExecutionContext) => {
+      return leaseContext.leaseEpoch;
+    });
+    const adapter: FencedConnectorAdapter<string, string> = { execute };
+
+    await expect(service.executeGrant(grant, 'runtime.send', 'hello', adapter)).resolves.toBe('1');
+    expect(execute).toHaveBeenCalledOnce();
+    expect(authorize).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
+      expect.objectContaining({
+        action: 'grant.issue',
+        requestedScopes: ['runtime.send'],
+        requestedTtlMs: 30_000,
+      }),
+    );
+    expect(execute.mock.calls[0]?.[1]).toMatchObject({
+      identity: { tenantId: 'tenant-a', logicalAgentId: 'mos' },
+      bindingId: 'operator-chat',
+      connectorId: 'pi-worker-a',
+    });
+  });
+
+  it('normalizes lease-derived policy subjects before authorization', async (): Promise<void> => {
+    const lease = await service.acquire(
+      {
+        logicalAgentId: 'mos',
+        bindingId: 'operator-chat-policy',
+        connectorId: 'pi-worker-a',
+        scopes: ['runtime.send'],
+        ttlMs: 60_000,
+      },
+      { ...context, correlationId: 'correlation-policy-setup' },
+    );
+    const aliasedLease = {
+      ...lease,
+      identity: { ...lease.identity, logicalAgentId: ' MOS ' },
+      bindingId: ' Operator-Chat-Policy ',
+      connectorId: ' PI-Worker-A ',
+      scopes: [' Runtime.Send '],
+      leaseEpoch: `00${lease.leaseEpoch}`,
+    };
+
+    await service.heartbeat(aliasedLease, 30_000, {
+      ...context,
+      correlationId: 'correlation-policy-heartbeat',
+    });
+    expect(authorize).toHaveBeenLastCalledWith(
+      expect.objectContaining({
+        action: 'lease.heartbeat',
+        logicalAgentId: 'mos',
+        bindingId: 'operator-chat-policy',
+        connectorId: 'pi-worker-a',
+        requestedScopes: ['runtime.send'],
+      }),
+    );
+
+    await service.issueGrant(
+      { lease: aliasedLease, scopes: [' Runtime.Send '], ttlMs: 1_000 },
+      { ...context, correlationId: 'correlation-policy-grant' },
+    );
+    expect(authorize).toHaveBeenLastCalledWith(
+      expect.objectContaining({
+        action: 'grant.issue',
+        logicalAgentId: 'mos',
+        bindingId: 'operator-chat-policy',
+        connectorId: 'pi-worker-a',
+        requestedScopes: ['runtime.send'],
+      }),
+    );
+
+    await service.release(aliasedLease, {
+      ...context,
+      correlationId: 'correlation-policy-release',
+    });
+    expect(authorize).toHaveBeenLastCalledWith(
+      expect.objectContaining({
+        action: 'lease.release',
+        logicalAgentId: 'mos',
+        bindingId: 'operator-chat-policy',
+        connectorId: 'pi-worker-a',
+        requestedScopes: ['runtime.send'],
+      }),
+    );
+  });
+
+  it('denies stale, forged, expired, cross-tenant, and cross-binding grants before effects', async (): Promise<void> => {
+    const bindingId = 'operator-chat-denials';
+    const current = await service.acquire(
+      {
+        logicalAgentId: 'mos',
+        bindingId,
+        connectorId: 'pi-worker-a',
+        scopes: ['runtime.send'],
+        ttlMs: 60_000,
+      },
+      { ...context, correlationId: 'correlation-denial-setup' },
+    );
+    const stale = await service.issueGrant(
+      { lease: current, scopes: ['runtime.send'], ttlMs: 30_000 },
+      { ...context, correlationId: 'correlation-stale' },
+    );
+    await service.takeover(
+      {
+        logicalAgentId: 'mos',
+        bindingId,
+        connectorId: 'pi-worker-b',
+        scopes: ['runtime.send'],
+        ttlMs: 60_000,
+        expectedEpoch: current.leaseEpoch,
+      },
+      { ...context, correlationId: 'correlation-takeover' },
+    );
+    const adapter = { execute: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined) };
+
+    await expect(service.executeGrant(stale, 'runtime.send', undefined, adapter)).rejects.toThrow();
+
+    const active = await service.current('mos', bindingId, context);
+    if (!active) throw new Error('active lease fixture is unavailable');
+    const grant = await service.issueGrant(
+      { lease: active, scopes: ['runtime.send'], ttlMs: 1_000 },
+      { ...context, correlationId: 'correlation-active' },
+    );
+    await expect(
+      service.executeGrant({ ...grant }, 'runtime.send', undefined, adapter),
+    ).rejects.toThrow();
+    await expect(
+      service.executeGrant(
+        { ...grant, bindingId: 'other-binding' },
+        'runtime.send',
+        undefined,
+        adapter,
+      ),
+    ).rejects.toThrow();
+    await expect(
+      service.issueGrant(
+        { lease: active, scopes: ['runtime.send'], ttlMs: 30_000 },
+        {
+          actorScope: { userId: 'operator-b', tenantId: 'tenant-b' },
+          correlationId: 'correlation-cross-tenant',
+        },
+      ),
+    ).rejects.toThrow();
+    const crossTenantAudit = await handle.db
+      .select()
+      .from(connectorLeaseAuditLog)
+      .where(eq(connectorLeaseAuditLog.correlationId, 'correlation-cross-tenant'));
+    expect(crossTenantAudit).toHaveLength(1);
+    expect(crossTenantAudit[0]).toMatchObject({
+      tenantId: 'tenant-b',
+      logicalAgentId: 'untrusted',
+      bindingId: 'untrusted',
+      connectorId: 'untrusted',
+      reason: 'policy_denied',
+    });
+
+    vi.setSystemTime(new Date('2026-07-14T17:00:02.000Z'));
+    await expect(service.executeGrant(grant, 'runtime.send', undefined, adapter)).rejects.toThrow();
+    expect(adapter.execute).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+  });
+
+  it('rejects submitted lifecycle scopes that differ from durable authority before policy or mutation', async (): Promise<void> => {
+    authorize.mockResolvedValue(true);
+    const heartbeatLease = await service.acquire(
+      {
+        logicalAgentId: 'mos',
+        bindingId: 'operator-chat-heartbeat-scope',
+        connectorId: 'pi-worker-a',
+        scopes: ['runtime.send'],
+        ttlMs: 60_000,
+      },
+      { ...context, correlationId: 'correlation-heartbeat-scope-setup' },
+    );
+    const releaseLease = await service.acquire(
+      {
+        logicalAgentId: 'mos',
+        bindingId: 'operator-chat-release-scope',
+        connectorId: 'pi-worker-a',
+        scopes: ['runtime.send'],
+        ttlMs: 60_000,
+      },
+      { ...context, correlationId: 'correlation-release-scope-setup' },
+    );
+    const forgedHeartbeat = { ...heartbeatLease, scopes: ['tool.execute'] };
+    const forgedRelease = { ...releaseLease, scopes: ['tool.execute'] };
+
+    authorize.mockImplementation(async (subject: ConnectorLeasePolicySubject) => {
+      return subject.requestedScopes.length === 1 && subject.requestedScopes[0] === 'tool.execute';
+    });
+    authorize.mockClear();
+
+    await expect(
+      service.heartbeat(forgedHeartbeat, 30_000, {
+        ...context,
+        correlationId: 'correlation-heartbeat-scope-forgery',
+      }),
+    ).rejects.toThrow('Connector authority policy denied');
+    await expect(
+      service.release(forgedRelease, {
+        ...context,
+        correlationId: 'correlation-release-scope-forgery',
+      }),
+    ).rejects.toThrow('Connector authority policy denied');
+    expect(authorize).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+
+    const currentHeartbeat = await repository.findCurrent({
+      identity: heartbeatLease.identity,
+      bindingId: heartbeatLease.bindingId,
+    });
+    const currentRelease = await repository.findCurrent({
+      identity: releaseLease.identity,
+      bindingId: releaseLease.bindingId,
+    });
+    expect(currentHeartbeat).toMatchObject({
+      leaseId: heartbeatLease.leaseId,
+      scopes: ['runtime.send'],
+      heartbeatAt: heartbeatLease.heartbeatAt,
+      expiresAt: heartbeatLease.expiresAt,
+    });
+    expect(currentRelease).toMatchObject({
+      leaseId: releaseLease.leaseId,
+      scopes: ['runtime.send'],
+    });
+    expect(currentRelease?.releasedAt).toBeUndefined();
+
+    const forgedAudits = await handle.db
+      .select()
+      .from(connectorLeaseAuditLog)
+      .where(eq(connectorLeaseAuditLog.correlationId, 'correlation-heartbeat-scope-forgery'));
+    expect(forgedAudits).toHaveLength(1);
+    expect(forgedAudits[0]).toMatchObject({
+      bindingId: heartbeatLease.bindingId,
+      connectorId: heartbeatLease.connectorId,
+      event: 'reject',
+      outcome: 'denied',
+      reason: 'policy_denied',
+    });
+    const forgedReleaseAudits = await handle.db
+      .select()
+      .from(connectorLeaseAuditLog)
+      .where(eq(connectorLeaseAuditLog.correlationId, 'correlation-release-scope-forgery'));
+    expect(forgedReleaseAudits).toHaveLength(1);
+    expect(forgedReleaseAudits[0]).toMatchObject({
+      bindingId: releaseLease.bindingId,
+      connectorId: releaseLease.connectorId,
+      event: 'reject',
+      outcome: 'denied',
+      reason: 'policy_denied',
+    });
+
+    authorize.mockImplementation(async (subject: ConnectorLeasePolicySubject) => {
+      return subject.requestedScopes.length === 1 && subject.requestedScopes[0] === 'runtime.send';
+    });
+    await expect(
+      service.heartbeat(heartbeatLease, 30_000, {
+        ...context,
+        correlationId: 'correlation-heartbeat-scope-canonical',
+      }),
+    ).resolves.toMatchObject({ scopes: ['runtime.send'] });
+    await expect(
+      service.release(releaseLease, {
+        ...context,
+        correlationId: 'correlation-release-scope-canonical',
+      }),
+    ).resolves.toBeUndefined();
+  });
+});

apps/gateway/src/agent/connector-lease.postgres.integration.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,76 @@
+import { randomUUID } from 'node:crypto';
+import { afterAll, beforeAll, describe, expect, it } from 'vitest';
+import {
+  connectorLeaseAuditLog,
+  createDb,
+  eq,
+  logicalAgentConnectorLeases,
+  type DbHandle,
+} from '@mosaicstack/db';
+import { ConnectorLeaseCoordinator } from '@mosaicstack/agent';
+import { ConnectorLeaseRepository } from './connector-lease.repository.js';
+
+const hasPostgres = Boolean(process.env['DATABASE_URL']);
+const tenantId = `lease-test-${randomUUID()}`;
+const identity = { tenantId, logicalAgentId: 'mos' } as const;
+
+describe.skipIf(!hasPostgres)('ConnectorLeaseRepository real PostgreSQL integration', (): void => {
+  let handle: DbHandle;
+
+  beforeAll((): void => {
+    handle = createDb(process.env['DATABASE_URL']);
+  });
+
+  afterAll(async (): Promise<void> => {
+    if (!handle) return;
+    await handle.db
+      .delete(connectorLeaseAuditLog)
+      .where(eq(connectorLeaseAuditLog.tenantId, tenantId));
+    await handle.db
+      .delete(logicalAgentConnectorLeases)
+      .where(eq(logicalAgentConnectorLeases.tenantId, tenantId));
+    await handle.close();
+  });
+
+  it('preserves the exclusive CAS fence across a real pool close/reopen', async (): Promise<void> => {
+    const command = {
+      identity,
+      bindingId: 'operator-chat',
+      scopes: ['runtime.send'],
+      ttlMs: 60_000,
+    } as const;
+    const firstCoordinator = new ConnectorLeaseCoordinator(new ConnectorLeaseRepository(handle.db));
+    const contenders = await Promise.allSettled([
+      firstCoordinator.acquire({
+        ...command,
+        connectorId: 'connector-a',
+        correlationId: 'postgres-acquire-a',
+      }),
+      firstCoordinator.acquire({
+        ...command,
+        connectorId: 'connector-b',
+        correlationId: 'postgres-acquire-b',
+      }),
+    ]);
+    const acquired = contenders.find((result) => result.status === 'fulfilled');
+    if (!acquired || acquired.status !== 'fulfilled') throw new Error('no lease contender won');
+    expect(contenders.filter((result) => result.status === 'fulfilled')).toHaveLength(1);
+
+    await handle.close();
+    handle = createDb(process.env['DATABASE_URL']);
+    const reopened = new ConnectorLeaseCoordinator(new ConnectorLeaseRepository(handle.db));
+    const persisted = await reopened.current({ identity, bindingId: 'operator-chat' });
+    expect(persisted).toMatchObject({
+      leaseId: acquired.value.leaseId,
+      leaseEpoch: '1',
+    });
+
+    const takeover = await reopened.takeover({
+      ...command,
+      connectorId: 'connector-c',
+      correlationId: 'postgres-takeover',
+      expectedEpoch: acquired.value.leaseEpoch,
+    });
+    expect(takeover).toMatchObject({ connectorId: 'connector-c', leaseEpoch: '2' });
+  });
+});

apps/gateway/src/agent/connector-lease.repository.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,149 @@
+import { mkdtemp, rm } from 'node:fs/promises';
+import { tmpdir } from 'node:os';
+import { join } from 'node:path';
+import { afterEach, beforeEach, describe, expect, it } from 'vitest';
+import {
+  connectorLeaseAuditLog,
+  createPgliteDb,
+  eq,
+  runPgliteMigrations,
+  type DbHandle,
+} from '@mosaicstack/db';
+import { ConnectorLeaseCoordinator, ConnectorLeaseError } from '@mosaicstack/agent';
+import { ConnectorLeaseRepository } from './connector-lease.repository.js';
+
+const identity = { tenantId: 'tenant-a', logicalAgentId: 'mos' } as const;
+
+function acquireCommand(connectorId: string, correlationId: string) {
+  return {
+    identity,
+    bindingId: 'operator-chat',
+    connectorId,
+    scopes: ['runtime.send', 'tool.execute'],
+    ttlMs: 60_000,
+    correlationId,
+  };
+}
+
+describe('ConnectorLeaseRepository PostgreSQL semantics', (): void => {
+  let dataDir: string;
+  let handle: DbHandle;
+  let now: Date;
+  let coordinator: ConnectorLeaseCoordinator;
+
+  beforeEach(async (): Promise<void> => {
+    dataDir = await mkdtemp(join(tmpdir(), 'mosaic-connector-lease-'));
+    handle = createPgliteDb(dataDir);
+    await runPgliteMigrations(handle);
+    now = new Date('2026-07-14T17:00:00.000Z');
+    coordinator = new ConnectorLeaseCoordinator(new ConnectorLeaseRepository(handle.db), {
+      now: (): Date => now,
+    });
+  });
+
+  afterEach(async (): Promise<void> => {
+    await handle.close();
+    await rm(dataDir, { recursive: true, force: true });
+  });
+
+  it('allows only one concurrent contender to acquire a binding', async (): Promise<void> => {
+    const outcomes = await Promise.allSettled([
+      coordinator.acquire(acquireCommand('connector-a', 'correlation-a')),
+      coordinator.acquire(acquireCommand('connector-b', 'correlation-b')),
+    ]);
+
+    expect(outcomes.filter((result) => result.status === 'fulfilled')).toHaveLength(1);
+    const rejected = outcomes.find((result) => result.status === 'rejected');
+    expect(rejected).toMatchObject({
+      reason: { code: 'lease_held' } satisfies Partial<ConnectorLeaseError>,
+    });
+  });
+
+  it('uses compare-and-swap takeover and increments the fencing epoch monotonically', async (): Promise<void> => {
+    const acquired = await coordinator.acquire(acquireCommand('connector-a', 'correlation-a'));
+    const results = await Promise.allSettled([
+      coordinator.takeover({
+        ...acquireCommand('connector-b', 'correlation-b'),
+        expectedEpoch: acquired.leaseEpoch,
+      }),
+      coordinator.takeover({
+        ...acquireCommand('connector-c', 'correlation-c'),
+        expectedEpoch: acquired.leaseEpoch,
+      }),
+    ]);
+    const winner = results.find((result) => result.status === 'fulfilled');
+
+    expect(results.filter((result) => result.status === 'fulfilled')).toHaveLength(1);
+    expect(winner?.status === 'fulfilled' ? winner.value.leaseEpoch : null).toBe('2');
+    expect(results.find((result) => result.status === 'rejected')).toMatchObject({
+      reason: { code: 'cas_mismatch' } satisfies Partial<ConnectorLeaseError>,
+    });
+  });
+
+  it('heartbeats and releases only the current connector epoch', async (): Promise<void> => {
+    const acquired = await coordinator.acquire(acquireCommand('connector-a', 'correlation-a'));
+    now = new Date('2026-07-14T17:00:30.000Z');
+    const renewed = await coordinator.heartbeat({
+      lease: acquired,
+      ttlMs: 120_000,
+      correlationId: 'correlation-renew',
+    });
+    expect(renewed.expiresAt).toBe('2026-07-14T17:02:30.000Z');
+
+    await coordinator.release({ lease: renewed, correlationId: 'correlation-release' });
+    await expect(
+      coordinator.heartbeat({
+        lease: renewed,
+        ttlMs: 120_000,
+        correlationId: 'correlation-stale',
+      }),
+    ).rejects.toMatchObject({ code: 'lease_released' } satisfies Partial<ConnectorLeaseError>);
+  });
+
+  it('survives close/reopen and requires CAS takeover to recover an expired lease', async (): Promise<void> => {
+    const acquired = await coordinator.acquire(acquireCommand('connector-a', 'correlation-a'));
+    await handle.close();
+
+    now = new Date('2026-07-14T17:02:00.000Z');
+    handle = createPgliteDb(dataDir);
+    await runPgliteMigrations(handle);
+    coordinator = new ConnectorLeaseCoordinator(new ConnectorLeaseRepository(handle.db), {
+      now: (): Date => now,
+    });
+
+    await expect(
+      coordinator.acquire(acquireCommand('connector-b', 'correlation-plain-acquire')),
+    ).rejects.toMatchObject({ code: 'takeover_required' } satisfies Partial<ConnectorLeaseError>);
+    const recovered = await coordinator.takeover({
+      ...acquireCommand('connector-b', 'correlation-takeover'),
+      expectedEpoch: acquired.leaseEpoch,
+    });
+    expect(recovered).toMatchObject({ connectorId: 'connector-b', leaseEpoch: '2' });
+  });
+
+  it('writes credential-safe lifecycle and rejection audit records', async (): Promise<void> => {
+    const acquired = await coordinator.acquire(acquireCommand('connector-a', 'correlation-a'));
+    await coordinator.heartbeat({
+      lease: acquired,
+      ttlMs: 60_000,
+      correlationId: 'correlation-renew',
+    });
+    await expect(
+      coordinator.acquire(acquireCommand('connector-b', 'correlation-reject')),
+    ).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(ConnectorLeaseError);
+
+    const rows = await handle.db
+      .select()
+      .from(connectorLeaseAuditLog)
+      .where(eq(connectorLeaseAuditLog.tenantId, identity.tenantId));
+    expect(rows.map((row) => row.event)).toEqual(
+      expect.arrayContaining(['acquire', 'renew', 'reject']),
+    );
+    const serialized = JSON.stringify(rows, (_key: string, value: unknown): unknown =>
+      typeof value === 'bigint' ? value.toString(10) : value,
+    );
+    expect(serialized).not.toContain('tool.execute');
+    expect(serialized).not.toContain('runtime.send');
+    expect(serialized).not.toMatch(/token|secret|credential/i);
+  });
+});

apps/gateway/src/agent/connector-lease.repository.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,354 @@
+import { Inject, Injectable } from '@nestjs/common';
+import {
+  and,
+  connectorLeaseAuditLog,
+  eq,
+  gt,
+  isNull,
+  logicalAgentConnectorLeases,
+  sql,
+  type Db,
+} from '@mosaicstack/db';
+import { ConnectorLeaseError } from '@mosaicstack/agent';
+import type {
+  ConnectorLease,
+  ConnectorLeaseAcquireMutation,
+  ConnectorLeaseAuditEvent,
+  ConnectorLeaseHeartbeatMutation,
+  ConnectorLeaseRejectReason,
+  ConnectorLeaseReleaseMutation,
+  ConnectorLeaseStore,
+  ConnectorLeaseTakeoverMutation,
+  LogicalAgentBinding,
+} from '@mosaicstack/types';
+import { DB } from '../database/database.module.js';
+
+interface SuccessfulMutation {
+  readonly ok: true;
+  readonly lease: ConnectorLease;
+}
+
+interface FailedMutation {
+  readonly ok: false;
+  readonly reason: ConnectorLeaseRejectReason;
+}
+
+type MutationResult = SuccessfulMutation | FailedMutation;
+
+@Injectable()
+export class ConnectorLeaseRepository implements ConnectorLeaseStore {
+  constructor(@Inject(DB) private readonly db: Db) {}
+
+  async acquire(input: ConnectorLeaseAcquireMutation): Promise<ConnectorLease> {
+    const result: MutationResult = await this.db.transaction(
+      async (tx): Promise<MutationResult> => {
+        const inserted = await tx
+          .insert(logicalAgentConnectorLeases)
+          .values({
+            leaseId: input.leaseId,
+            tenantId: input.identity.tenantId,
+            logicalAgentId: input.identity.logicalAgentId,
+            bindingId: input.bindingId,
+            connectorId: input.connectorId,
+            scopes: [...input.scopes],
+            leaseEpoch: 1n,
+            acquiredAt: new Date(input.now),
+            heartbeatAt: new Date(input.now),
+            expiresAt: new Date(input.expiresAt),
+            updatedAt: new Date(input.now),
+          })
+          .onConflictDoNothing()
+          .returning();
+        const row = inserted[0];
+        if (row) {
+          const lease = toLease(row);
+          await insertAudit(tx, lifecycleAudit(input, lease, 'acquire'));
+          return { ok: true, lease };
+        }
+
+        const current = await findRow(tx, input);
+        if (current && current.expiresAt <= new Date(input.now) && !current.releasedAt) {
+          await insertAudit(tx, lifecycleAudit(input, toLease(current), 'expiry'));
+        }
+        const reason: ConnectorLeaseRejectReason =
+          current && (current.releasedAt || current.expiresAt <= new Date(input.now))
+            ? 'takeover_required'
+            : 'lease_held';
+        await insertAudit(tx, rejectionAudit(input, current ? toLease(current) : null, reason));
+        return { ok: false, reason };
+      },
+    );
+    return unwrap(result);
+  }
+
+  async takeover(input: ConnectorLeaseTakeoverMutation): Promise<ConnectorLease> {
+    const result: MutationResult = await this.db.transaction(
+      async (tx): Promise<MutationResult> => {
+        const current = await findRow(tx, input);
+        if (!current || current.leaseEpoch.toString(10) !== input.expectedEpoch) {
+          await insertAudit(
+            tx,
+            rejectionAudit(input, current ? toLease(current) : null, 'cas_mismatch'),
+          );
+          return { ok: false, reason: 'cas_mismatch' };
+        }
+        if (current.expiresAt <= new Date(input.now) && !current.releasedAt) {
+          await insertAudit(tx, lifecycleAudit(input, toLease(current), 'expiry'));
+        }
+        const updated = await tx
+          .update(logicalAgentConnectorLeases)
+          .set({
+            leaseId: input.leaseId,
+            connectorId: input.connectorId,
+            scopes: [...input.scopes],
+            leaseEpoch: sql`${logicalAgentConnectorLeases.leaseEpoch} + 1`,
+            acquiredAt: new Date(input.now),
+            heartbeatAt: new Date(input.now),
+            expiresAt: new Date(input.expiresAt),
+            releasedAt: null,
+            updatedAt: new Date(input.now),
+          })
+          .where(
+            and(
+              bindingPredicate(input),
+              eq(logicalAgentConnectorLeases.leaseId, current.leaseId),
+              eq(logicalAgentConnectorLeases.leaseEpoch, BigInt(input.expectedEpoch)),
+            ),
+          )
+          .returning();
+        const row = updated[0];
+        if (!row) {
+          await insertAudit(tx, rejectionAudit(input, toLease(current), 'cas_mismatch'));
+          return { ok: false, reason: 'cas_mismatch' };
+        }
+        const lease = toLease(row);
+        await insertAudit(tx, lifecycleAudit(input, lease, 'takeover'));
+        return { ok: true, lease };
+      },
+    );
+    return unwrap(result);
+  }
+
+  async heartbeat(input: ConnectorLeaseHeartbeatMutation): Promise<ConnectorLease> {
+    const result: MutationResult = await this.db.transaction(
+      async (tx): Promise<MutationResult> => {
+        const updated = await tx
+          .update(logicalAgentConnectorLeases)
+          .set({
+            heartbeatAt: new Date(input.now),
+            expiresAt: new Date(input.expiresAt),
+            updatedAt: new Date(input.now),
+          })
+          .where(
+            and(
+              bindingPredicate(input.lease),
+              eq(logicalAgentConnectorLeases.leaseId, input.lease.leaseId),
+              eq(logicalAgentConnectorLeases.connectorId, input.lease.connectorId),
+              eq(logicalAgentConnectorLeases.leaseEpoch, BigInt(input.lease.leaseEpoch)),
+              isNull(logicalAgentConnectorLeases.releasedAt),
+              gt(logicalAgentConnectorLeases.expiresAt, new Date(input.now)),
+            ),
+          )
+          .returning();
+        const row = updated[0];
+        if (row) {
+          const lease = toLease(row);
+          await insertAudit(tx, lifecycleAudit(input, lease, 'renew'));
+          return { ok: true, lease };
+        }
+        const current = await findRow(tx, input.lease);
+        const reason = classifyAuthorityFailure(
+          current ? toLease(current) : null,
+          input.lease,
+          input.now,
+        );
+        if (reason === 'lease_expired' && current) {
+          await insertAudit(tx, lifecycleAudit(input, toLease(current), 'expiry'));
+        }
+        await insertAudit(
+          tx,
+          rejectionAudit(
+            { ...input.lease, correlationId: input.correlationId, now: input.now },
+            current ? toLease(current) : null,
+            reason,
+          ),
+        );
+        return { ok: false, reason };
+      },
+    );
+    return unwrap(result);
+  }
+
+  async release(input: ConnectorLeaseReleaseMutation): Promise<void> {
+    const result: MutationResult = await this.db.transaction(
+      async (tx): Promise<MutationResult> => {
+        const updated = await tx
+          .update(logicalAgentConnectorLeases)
+          .set({
+            releasedAt: new Date(input.now),
+            expiresAt: new Date(input.now),
+            updatedAt: new Date(input.now),
+          })
+          .where(
+            and(
+              bindingPredicate(input.lease),
+              eq(logicalAgentConnectorLeases.leaseId, input.lease.leaseId),
+              eq(logicalAgentConnectorLeases.connectorId, input.lease.connectorId),
+              eq(logicalAgentConnectorLeases.leaseEpoch, BigInt(input.lease.leaseEpoch)),
+              isNull(logicalAgentConnectorLeases.releasedAt),
+              gt(logicalAgentConnectorLeases.expiresAt, new Date(input.now)),
+            ),
+          )
+          .returning();
+        const row = updated[0];
+        if (row) {
+          const lease = toLease(row);
+          await insertAudit(tx, lifecycleAudit(input, lease, 'release'));
+          return { ok: true, lease };
+        }
+        const current = await findRow(tx, input.lease);
+        const reason = classifyAuthorityFailure(
+          current ? toLease(current) : null,
+          input.lease,
+          input.now,
+        );
+        if (reason === 'lease_expired' && current) {
+          await insertAudit(tx, lifecycleAudit(input, toLease(current), 'expiry'));
+        }
+        await insertAudit(
+          tx,
+          rejectionAudit(
+            { ...input.lease, correlationId: input.correlationId, now: input.now },
+            current ? toLease(current) : null,
+            reason,
+          ),
+        );
+        return { ok: false, reason };
+      },
+    );
+    unwrap(result);
+  }
+
+  async findCurrent(binding: LogicalAgentBinding): Promise<ConnectorLease | null> {
+    const row = await findRow(this.db, binding);
+    return row ? toLease(row) : null;
+  }
+
+  async recordAudit(event: ConnectorLeaseAuditEvent): Promise<void> {
+    await insertAudit(this.db, event);
+  }
+}
+
+function unwrap(result: MutationResult): ConnectorLease {
+  if (!result.ok) throw new ConnectorLeaseError(result.reason, safeErrorMessage(result.reason));
+  return result.lease;
+}
+
+function safeErrorMessage(reason: ConnectorLeaseRejectReason): string {
+  return `Connector lease mutation denied: ${reason}`;
+}
+
+function bindingPredicate(binding: LogicalAgentBinding) {
+  return and(
+    eq(logicalAgentConnectorLeases.tenantId, binding.identity.tenantId),
+    eq(logicalAgentConnectorLeases.logicalAgentId, binding.identity.logicalAgentId),
+    eq(logicalAgentConnectorLeases.bindingId, binding.bindingId),
+  );
+}
+
+async function findRow(
+  db: Pick<Db, 'select'>,
+  binding: LogicalAgentBinding,
+): Promise<typeof logicalAgentConnectorLeases.$inferSelect | null> {
+  const rows = await db
+    .select()
+    .from(logicalAgentConnectorLeases)
+    .where(bindingPredicate(binding))
+    .limit(1);
+  return rows[0] ?? null;
+}
+
+function toLease(row: typeof logicalAgentConnectorLeases.$inferSelect): ConnectorLease {
+  return Object.freeze({
+    identity: Object.freeze({ tenantId: row.tenantId, logicalAgentId: row.logicalAgentId }),
+    bindingId: row.bindingId,
+    leaseId: row.leaseId,
+    connectorId: row.connectorId,
+    scopes: Object.freeze([...row.scopes]),
+    leaseEpoch: row.leaseEpoch.toString(10),
+    acquiredAt: row.acquiredAt.toISOString(),
+    heartbeatAt: row.heartbeatAt.toISOString(),
+    expiresAt: row.expiresAt.toISOString(),
+    ...(row.releasedAt ? { releasedAt: row.releasedAt.toISOString() } : {}),
+  });
+}
+
+function classifyAuthorityFailure(
+  current: ConnectorLease | null,
+  claimed: ConnectorLease,
+  now: string,
+): ConnectorLeaseRejectReason {
+  if (!current) return 'lease_missing';
+  if (current.releasedAt) return 'lease_released';
+  if (new Date(current.expiresAt) <= new Date(now)) return 'lease_expired';
+  if (current.leaseEpoch !== claimed.leaseEpoch) return 'stale_epoch';
+  return 'connector_mismatch';
+}
+
+function lifecycleAudit(
+  input: { readonly correlationId: string; readonly now: string },
+  lease: ConnectorLease,
+  event: Exclude<ConnectorLeaseAuditEvent['event'], 'reject'>,
+): ConnectorLeaseAuditEvent {
+  return {
+    identity: lease.identity,
+    bindingId: lease.bindingId,
+    connectorId: lease.connectorId,
+    leaseId: lease.leaseId,
+    leaseEpoch: lease.leaseEpoch,
+    event,
+    outcome: 'succeeded',
+    correlationId: input.correlationId,
+    occurredAt: input.now,
+  };
+}
+
+function rejectionAudit(
+  input: {
+    readonly identity: ConnectorLease['identity'];
+    readonly bindingId: string;
+    readonly connectorId: string;
+    readonly correlationId: string;
+    readonly now: string;
+  },
+  current: ConnectorLease | null,
+  reason: ConnectorLeaseRejectReason,
+): ConnectorLeaseAuditEvent {
+  return {
+    identity: input.identity,
+    bindingId: input.bindingId,
+    connectorId: input.connectorId,
+    event: 'reject',
+    outcome: 'denied',
+    correlationId: input.correlationId,
+    occurredAt: input.now,
+    ...(current ? { leaseId: current.leaseId, leaseEpoch: current.leaseEpoch } : {}),
+    reason,
+  };
+}
+
+async function insertAudit(db: Pick<Db, 'insert'>, event: ConnectorLeaseAuditEvent): Promise<void> {
+  await db.insert(connectorLeaseAuditLog).values({
+    tenantId: event.identity.tenantId,
+    logicalAgentId: event.identity.logicalAgentId,
+    bindingId: event.bindingId,
+    connectorId: event.connectorId,
+    ...(event.leaseId ? { leaseId: event.leaseId } : {}),
+    ...(event.leaseEpoch ? { leaseEpoch: BigInt(event.leaseEpoch) } : {}),
+    event: event.event,
+    outcome: event.outcome,
+    ...(event.reason ? { reason: event.reason } : {}),
+    correlationId: event.correlationId,
+    occurredAt: new Date(event.occurredAt),
+  });
+}

apps/gateway/src/agent/connector-lease.service.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,285 @@
+import { ForbiddenException, Inject, Injectable } from '@nestjs/common';
+import { ConnectorLeaseCoordinator, normalizeConnectorLease } from '@mosaicstack/agent';
+import {
+  normalizeConnectorId,
+  normalizeConnectorScopes,
+  normalizeCorrelationId,
+  normalizeLogicalAgentIdentity,
+  normalizeLogicalBindingId,
+  type AcquireConnectorLeaseInput,
+  type ConnectorExecutionGrant,
+  type ConnectorLease,
+  type ConnectorLeaseAuditEvent,
+  type FencedConnectorAdapter,
+} from '@mosaicstack/types';
+import type { ActorTenantScope } from '../auth/session-scope.js';
+import { ConnectorLeaseRepository } from './connector-lease.repository.js';
+
+export const CONNECTOR_LEASE_POLICY = Symbol('CONNECTOR_LEASE_POLICY');
+
+export type ConnectorLeasePolicyAction =
+  | 'lease.acquire'
+  | 'lease.takeover'
+  | 'lease.heartbeat'
+  | 'lease.release'
+  | 'lease.read'
+  | 'grant.issue';
+
+export interface ConnectorLeaseRequestContext {
+  readonly actorScope: ActorTenantScope;
+  readonly correlationId: string;
+}
+
+export interface GatewayConnectorLeaseRequest {
+  readonly logicalAgentId: string;
+  readonly bindingId: string;
+  readonly connectorId: string;
+  readonly scopes: readonly string[];
+  readonly ttlMs: number;
+}
+
+export interface GatewayConnectorLeaseTakeoverRequest extends GatewayConnectorLeaseRequest {
+  readonly expectedEpoch: string;
+}
+
+export interface GatewayConnectorGrantRequest {
+  readonly lease: ConnectorLease;
+  readonly scopes: readonly string[];
+  readonly ttlMs: number;
+}
+
+export interface ConnectorLeasePolicySubject {
+  readonly action: ConnectorLeasePolicyAction;
+  readonly actorId: string;
+  readonly tenantId: string;
+  readonly logicalAgentId: string;
+  readonly bindingId: string;
+  readonly connectorId: string;
+  readonly requestedScopes: readonly string[];
+  readonly requestedTtlMs: number | null;
+}
+
+export interface ConnectorLeasePolicy {
+  authorize(subject: ConnectorLeasePolicySubject): Promise<boolean>;
+}
+
+/** M1 has no concrete cutover policy: unconfigured production use fails closed. */
+@Injectable()
+export class DenyConnectorLeasePolicy implements ConnectorLeasePolicy {
+  async authorize(_subject: ConnectorLeasePolicySubject): Promise<boolean> {
+    return false;
+  }
+}
+
+/** Gateway-owned policy surface for durable connector authority and fenced effects. */
+@Injectable()
+export class ConnectorLeaseService {
+  private readonly coordinator: ConnectorLeaseCoordinator;
+
+  constructor(
+    @Inject(ConnectorLeaseRepository) private readonly repository: ConnectorLeaseRepository,
+    @Inject(CONNECTOR_LEASE_POLICY) private readonly policy: ConnectorLeasePolicy,
+  ) {
+    this.coordinator = new ConnectorLeaseCoordinator(repository);
+  }
+
+  async acquire(
+    request: GatewayConnectorLeaseRequest,
+    context: ConnectorLeaseRequestContext,
+  ): Promise<ConnectorLease> {
+    const command = this.command(request, context);
+    await this.assertPolicy('lease.acquire', command, context, command.scopes, command.ttlMs);
+    return this.coordinator.acquire({ ...command, correlationId: this.correlation(context) });
+  }
+
+  async takeover(
+    request: GatewayConnectorLeaseTakeoverRequest,
+    context: ConnectorLeaseRequestContext,
+  ): Promise<ConnectorLease> {
+    const command = this.command(request, context);
+    await this.assertPolicy('lease.takeover', command, context, command.scopes, command.ttlMs);
+    return this.coordinator.takeover({
+      ...command,
+      expectedEpoch: request.expectedEpoch,
+      correlationId: this.correlation(context),
+    });
+  }
+
+  async heartbeat(
+    lease: ConnectorLease,
+    ttlMs: number,
+    context: ConnectorLeaseRequestContext,
+  ): Promise<ConnectorLease> {
+    const normalizedLease = normalizeConnectorLease(lease);
+    const durableLease = await this.durableLifecycleLease(normalizedLease, context);
+    await this.assertPolicy('lease.heartbeat', durableLease, context, durableLease.scopes, ttlMs);
+    return this.coordinator.heartbeat({
+      lease: durableLease,
+      ttlMs,
+      correlationId: this.correlation(context),
+    });
+  }
+
+  async release(lease: ConnectorLease, context: ConnectorLeaseRequestContext): Promise<void> {
+    const normalizedLease = normalizeConnectorLease(lease);
+    const durableLease = await this.durableLifecycleLease(normalizedLease, context);
+    await this.assertPolicy('lease.release', durableLease, context, durableLease.scopes, null);
+    await this.coordinator.release({
+      lease: durableLease,
+      correlationId: this.correlation(context),
+    });
+  }
+
+  async current(
+    logicalAgentId: string,
+    bindingId: string,
+    context: ConnectorLeaseRequestContext,
+  ): Promise<ConnectorLease | null> {
+    const binding = {
+      identity: normalizeLogicalAgentIdentity({
+        tenantId: context.actorScope.tenantId,
+        logicalAgentId,
+      }),
+      bindingId: normalizeLogicalBindingId(bindingId),
+      connectorId: 'gateway',
+    };
+    await this.assertPolicy('lease.read', binding, context, [], null);
+    return this.coordinator.current(binding);
+  }
+
+  async issueGrant(
+    request: GatewayConnectorGrantRequest,
+    context: ConnectorLeaseRequestContext,
+  ): Promise<ConnectorExecutionGrant> {
+    const lease = normalizeConnectorLease(request.lease);
+    await this.assertTenant(lease, context);
+    const scopes = normalizeConnectorScopes(request.scopes);
+    await this.assertPolicy('grant.issue', lease, context, scopes, request.ttlMs);
+    return this.coordinator.issueGrant({
+      lease,
+      scopes,
+      ttlMs: request.ttlMs,
+      correlationId: this.correlation(context),
+    });
+  }
+
+  async executeGrant<TInput, TOutput>(
+    grant: ConnectorExecutionGrant,
+    requiredScope: string,
+    input: TInput,
+    adapter: FencedConnectorAdapter<TInput, TOutput>,
+  ): Promise<TOutput> {
+    return this.coordinator.executeGrant(grant, requiredScope, input, adapter);
+  }
+
+  private command(
+    request: GatewayConnectorLeaseRequest,
+    context: ConnectorLeaseRequestContext,
+  ): Omit<AcquireConnectorLeaseInput, 'correlationId'> {
+    return {
+      identity: normalizeLogicalAgentIdentity({
+        tenantId: context.actorScope.tenantId,
+        logicalAgentId: request.logicalAgentId,
+      }),
+      bindingId: normalizeLogicalBindingId(request.bindingId),
+      connectorId: normalizeConnectorId(request.connectorId),
+      scopes: normalizeConnectorScopes(request.scopes),
+      ttlMs: request.ttlMs,
+    };
+  }
+
+  private async assertTenant(
+    lease: Pick<ConnectorLease, 'identity' | 'bindingId' | 'connectorId'>,
+    context: ConnectorLeaseRequestContext,
+  ): Promise<void> {
+    if (lease.identity.tenantId !== context.actorScope.tenantId) {
+      await this.recordPolicyDenial(
+        {
+          identity: {
+            tenantId: context.actorScope.tenantId,
+            logicalAgentId: 'untrusted',
+          },
+          bindingId: 'untrusted',
+          connectorId: 'untrusted',
+        },
+        context,
+      );
+      throw new ForbiddenException('Connector authority tenant scope denied');
+    }
+  }
+
+  private async durableLifecycleLease(
+    submittedLease: ConnectorLease,
+    context: ConnectorLeaseRequestContext,
+  ): Promise<ConnectorLease> {
+    await this.assertTenant(submittedLease, context);
+    const durableLease = await this.coordinator.current(submittedLease);
+    if (!durableLease || !hasSameLifecycleAuthority(submittedLease, durableLease)) {
+      await this.recordPolicyDenial(durableLease ?? submittedLease, context);
+      throw new ForbiddenException('Connector authority policy denied');
+    }
+    return durableLease;
+  }
+
+  private async assertPolicy(
+    action: ConnectorLeasePolicyAction,
+    subject: Pick<ConnectorLease, 'identity' | 'bindingId' | 'connectorId'>,
+    context: ConnectorLeaseRequestContext,
+    requestedScopes: readonly string[],
+    requestedTtlMs: number | null,
+  ): Promise<void> {
+    const allowed = await this.policy.authorize({
+      action,
+      actorId: context.actorScope.userId,
+      tenantId: subject.identity.tenantId,
+      logicalAgentId: subject.identity.logicalAgentId,
+      bindingId: subject.bindingId,
+      connectorId: subject.connectorId,
+      requestedScopes: Object.freeze([...requestedScopes]),
+      requestedTtlMs,
+    });
+    if (!allowed) {
+      await this.recordPolicyDenial(subject, context);
+      throw new ForbiddenException('Connector authority policy denied');
+    }
+  }
+
+  private async recordPolicyDenial(
+    subject: Pick<ConnectorLease, 'identity' | 'bindingId' | 'connectorId'>,
+    context: ConnectorLeaseRequestContext,
+  ): Promise<void> {
+    const event: ConnectorLeaseAuditEvent = {
+      identity: subject.identity,
+      bindingId: subject.bindingId,
+      connectorId: subject.connectorId,
+      event: 'reject',
+      outcome: 'denied',
+      reason: 'policy_denied',
+      correlationId: this.correlation(context),
+      occurredAt: new Date().toISOString(),
+    };
+    await this.repository.recordAudit(event);
+  }
+
+  private correlation(context: ConnectorLeaseRequestContext): string {
+    return normalizeCorrelationId(context.correlationId);
+  }
+}
+
+function hasSameLifecycleAuthority(
+  submittedLease: ConnectorLease,
+  durableLease: ConnectorLease,
+): boolean {
+  return (
+    submittedLease.identity.tenantId === durableLease.identity.tenantId &&
+    submittedLease.identity.logicalAgentId === durableLease.identity.logicalAgentId &&
+    submittedLease.bindingId === durableLease.bindingId &&
+    submittedLease.leaseId === durableLease.leaseId &&
+    submittedLease.connectorId === durableLease.connectorId &&
+    submittedLease.leaseEpoch === durableLease.leaseEpoch &&
+    submittedLease.scopes.length === durableLease.scopes.length &&
+    submittedLease.scopes.every((scope: string, index: number): boolean => {
+      return scope === durableLease.scopes[index];
+    })
+  );
+}

apps/gateway/src/chat/chat.dto.ts

@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+import type { ChannelAttachmentDto } from '@mosaicstack/types';
 import { IsOptional, IsString, IsUUID, MaxLength } from 'class-validator';
 
 export class ChatRequestDto {
@@ -32,4 +33,7 @@ export class ChatSocketMessageDto {
   @IsOptional()
   @IsUUID()
   agentId?: string;
+
+  /** Validated channel attachment references; binary content is not embedded. */
+  attachments?: readonly ChannelAttachmentDto[];
 }

apps/gateway/src/chat/chat.gateway-redaction.spec.ts

@@ -4,6 +4,10 @@ import { ChatGateway } from './chat.gateway.js';
 const CONVERSATION_ID = 'conversation-1';
 const CANARY = 'sk_canary12345678';
 
+function clientConversationKey(clientId: string, conversationId: string): string {
+  return `${clientId}\u0000${conversationId}`;
+}
+
 type GatewayInternals = {
   clientSessions: Map<string, unknown>;
   relayEvent(client: unknown, conversationId: string, event: unknown): void;
@@ -40,6 +44,7 @@ describe('ChatGateway redaction boundary', (): void => {
       emit: vi.fn(),
     };
     const session = {
+      clientId: client.id,
       conversationId: CONVERSATION_ID,
       cleanup: vi.fn(),
       assistantText: '',
@@ -47,7 +52,7 @@ describe('ChatGateway redaction boundary', (): void => {
       pendingToolCalls: new Map(),
       scope: { userId: 'user-1', tenantId: 'tenant-1' },
     };
-    gateway.clientSessions.set(client.id, session);
+    gateway.clientSessions.set(clientConversationKey(client.id, CONVERSATION_ID), session);
 
     gateway.relayEvent(client, CONVERSATION_ID, {
       type: 'message_update',
@@ -139,6 +144,51 @@ describe('ChatGateway redaction boundary', (): void => {
     });
   });
 
+  it('isolates concurrent conversation streams sharing one Discord socket', (): void => {
+    const { gateway } = buildGateway();
+    const client = {
+      connected: true,
+      id: 'discord-client',
+      data: { user: { id: 'user-1' } },
+      emit: vi.fn(),
+    };
+    const firstConversation = 'Nova:discord:thread-1';
+    const secondConversation = 'Nova:discord:thread-2';
+    const createSession = (conversationId: string) => ({
+      clientId: client.id,
+      conversationId,
+      cleanup: vi.fn(),
+      assistantText: '',
+      toolCalls: [],
+      pendingToolCalls: new Map(),
+      scope: { userId: 'user-1', tenantId: 'tenant-1' },
+    });
+    const firstSession = createSession(firstConversation);
+    const secondSession = createSession(secondConversation);
+    gateway.clientSessions.set(clientConversationKey(client.id, firstConversation), firstSession);
+    gateway.clientSessions.set(clientConversationKey(client.id, secondConversation), secondSession);
+
+    gateway.relayEvent(client, firstConversation, {
+      type: 'message_update',
+      assistantMessageEvent: { type: 'text_delta', delta: 'first response ' },
+    });
+    gateway.relayEvent(client, secondConversation, {
+      type: 'message_update',
+      assistantMessageEvent: { type: 'text_delta', delta: 'second response ' },
+    });
+
+    expect(firstSession.assistantText).toBe('first response ');
+    expect(secondSession.assistantText).toBe('second response ');
+    expect(client.emit).toHaveBeenCalledWith('agent:text', {
+      conversationId: firstConversation,
+      text: 'first response ',
+    });
+    expect(client.emit).toHaveBeenCalledWith('agent:text', {
+      conversationId: secondConversation,
+      text: 'second response ',
+    });
+  });
+
   it('persists only redacted assistant content with classifications', (): void => {
     const { gateway, brain } = buildGateway();
     const client = {
@@ -147,7 +197,8 @@ describe('ChatGateway redaction boundary', (): void => {
       data: { user: { id: 'user-1' } },
       emit: vi.fn(),
     };
-    gateway.clientSessions.set(client.id, {
+    gateway.clientSessions.set(clientConversationKey(client.id, CONVERSATION_ID), {
+      clientId: client.id,
       conversationId: CONVERSATION_ID,
       cleanup: vi.fn(),
       assistantText: CANARY,

apps/gateway/src/chat/chat.gateway.ts

@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ import {
   parseDiscordInteractionBindings,
   resolveDiscordInteractionActorId,
   resolveDiscordInteractionBinding,
+  type DiscordAttachment,
   type DiscordIngressEnvelope,
   type DiscordIngressPayload,
 } from '@mosaicstack/discord-plugin';
@@ -30,6 +31,7 @@ import type {
   SystemReloadPayload,
   RoutingDecisionInfo,
   AbortPayload,
+  ChannelAttachmentDto,
 } from '@mosaicstack/types';
 import { AgentService, type ConversationHistoryMessage } from '../agent/agent.service.js';
 import {
@@ -56,6 +58,7 @@ import { DiscordReplayProtector } from '../plugin/discord-replay-protector.js';
 
 /** Per-client state tracking streaming accumulation for persistence. */
 interface ClientSession {
+  clientId: string;
   conversationId: string;
   cleanup: () => void;
   /** Accumulated assistant response text for the current turn. */
@@ -76,6 +79,68 @@ interface ClientSession {
  */
 const modelOverrides = new Map<string, string>();
 const MAX_REDACTION_BUFFER_LENGTH = 8_192;
+const MAX_CHANNEL_ATTACHMENTS = 10;
+const MAX_ATTACHMENT_METADATA_BYTES = 16_384;
+const MAX_ATTACHMENT_ID_LENGTH = 128;
+const MAX_ATTACHMENT_NAME_LENGTH = 255;
+const MAX_ATTACHMENT_URL_LENGTH = 2_048;
+const MAX_ATTACHMENT_MIME_LENGTH = 255;
+
+function isSafeAttachmentUrl(value: string): boolean {
+  if (value.length === 0 || value.length > MAX_ATTACHMENT_URL_LENGTH) return false;
+  try {
+    const url = new URL(value);
+    return (
+      url.protocol === 'https:' &&
+      !url.username &&
+      !url.password &&
+      !url.hash &&
+      url.search.length === 0
+    );
+  } catch {
+    return false;
+  }
+}
+
+function hasValidAttachmentBounds(value: {
+  id: string;
+  name: string;
+  url: string;
+  sizeBytes?: number;
+}): boolean {
+  return (
+    value.id.length > 0 &&
+    value.id.length <= MAX_ATTACHMENT_ID_LENGTH &&
+    value.name.length > 0 &&
+    value.name.length <= MAX_ATTACHMENT_NAME_LENGTH &&
+    isSafeAttachmentUrl(value.url) &&
+    (value.sizeBytes === undefined || (Number.isFinite(value.sizeBytes) && value.sizeBytes >= 0))
+  );
+}
+
+function isDiscordAttachment(value: unknown): value is DiscordAttachment {
+  if (typeof value !== 'object' || value === null) return false;
+  const attachment = value as Partial<DiscordAttachment>;
+  return (
+    typeof attachment.id === 'string' &&
+    typeof attachment.name === 'string' &&
+    typeof attachment.url === 'string' &&
+    (attachment.contentType === null ||
+      (typeof attachment.contentType === 'string' &&
+        attachment.contentType.length <= MAX_ATTACHMENT_MIME_LENGTH)) &&
+    (attachment.sizeBytes === undefined || typeof attachment.sizeBytes === 'number') &&
+    hasValidAttachmentBounds(attachment as DiscordAttachment)
+  );
+}
+
+function hasValidAttachmentArray(value: unknown, guard: (attachment: unknown) => boolean): boolean {
+  return (
+    Array.isArray(value) &&
+    value.length <= MAX_CHANNEL_ATTACHMENTS &&
+    JSON.stringify(value).length <= MAX_ATTACHMENT_METADATA_BYTES &&
+    value.every(guard)
+  );
+}
 
 function isDiscordIngressEnvelope(value: unknown): value is DiscordIngressEnvelope {
   if (typeof value !== 'object' || value === null) return false;
@@ -88,7 +153,8 @@ function isDiscordIngressEnvelope(value: unknown): value is DiscordIngressEnvelo
     return false;
   }
   const payload = envelope.payload as Record<string, unknown>;
-  return [
+  return (
+    [
       payload['correlationId'],
       payload['messageId'],
       payload['guildId'],
@@ -96,15 +162,40 @@ function isDiscordIngressEnvelope(value: unknown): value is DiscordIngressEnvelo
       payload['userId'],
       payload['conversationId'],
       payload['content'],
-  ].every((field: unknown): boolean => typeof field === 'string');
+    ].every((field: unknown): boolean => typeof field === 'string') &&
+    (payload['threadId'] === undefined || typeof payload['threadId'] === 'string') &&
+    (payload['attachments'] === undefined ||
+      hasValidAttachmentArray(payload['attachments'], isDiscordAttachment))
+  );
+}
+
+function isChannelAttachment(value: unknown): value is ChannelAttachmentDto {
+  if (typeof value !== 'object' || value === null) return false;
+  const attachment = value as Partial<ChannelAttachmentDto>;
+  return (
+    typeof attachment.id === 'string' &&
+    typeof attachment.name === 'string' &&
+    typeof attachment.url === 'string' &&
+    (attachment.mimeType === null ||
+      (typeof attachment.mimeType === 'string' &&
+        attachment.mimeType.length <= MAX_ATTACHMENT_MIME_LENGTH)) &&
+    (attachment.sizeBytes === undefined || typeof attachment.sizeBytes === 'number') &&
+    hasValidAttachmentBounds(attachment as ChannelAttachmentDto)
+  );
 }
 
 function isChatSocketMessage(value: unknown): value is ChatSocketMessageDto {
   if (typeof value !== 'object' || value === null) return false;
-  const payload = value as { content?: unknown; conversationId?: unknown };
+  const payload = value as {
+    content?: unknown;
+    conversationId?: unknown;
+    attachments?: unknown;
+  };
   return (
     typeof payload.content === 'string' &&
-    (payload.conversationId === undefined || typeof payload.conversationId === 'string')
+    (payload.conversationId === undefined || typeof payload.conversationId === 'string') &&
+    (payload.attachments === undefined ||
+      hasValidAttachmentArray(payload.attachments, isChannelAttachment))
   );
 }
 
@@ -174,20 +265,24 @@ export class ChatGateway implements OnGatewayInit, OnGatewayConnection, OnGatewa
 
   handleDisconnect(client: Socket): void {
     this.logger.log(`Client disconnected: ${client.id}`);
-    const session = this.clientSessions.get(client.id);
+    for (const [key, session] of this.clientSessions) {
-    if (session) {
+      if (session.clientId !== client.id) continue;
       session.cleanup();
       this.agentService.removeChannel(
         session.conversationId,
         `websocket:${client.id}`,
         session.scope,
       );
-      this.clientSessions.delete(client.id);
+      this.clientSessions.delete(key);
+      this.textEgressBuffers.delete(key);
+      this.thinkingEgressBuffers.delete(key);
+      this.overflowedEgress.delete(`${key}:agent:text`);
+      this.overflowedEgress.delete(`${key}:agent:thinking`);
     }
-    this.textEgressBuffers.delete(client.id);
+  }
-    this.thinkingEgressBuffers.delete(client.id);
+
-    this.overflowedEgress.delete(this.egressKey(client, 'agent:text'));
+  private clientConversationKey(client: Pick<Socket, 'id'>, conversationId: string): string {
-    this.overflowedEgress.delete(this.egressKey(client, 'agent:thinking'));
+    return `${client.id}\u0000${conversationId}`;
   }
 
   private getClientScope(client: Socket): ActorTenantScope | null {
@@ -218,7 +313,25 @@ export class ChatGateway implements OnGatewayInit, OnGatewayConnection, OnGatewa
       }
       discordIngress = this.resolveDiscordIngress(client, rawData);
       if (!discordIngress) return;
-      data = { conversationId: discordIngress.conversationId, content: discordIngress.content };
+      data = {
+        conversationId: discordIngress.conversationId,
+        content: discordIngress.content,
+        ...(discordIngress.attachments
+          ? {
+              attachments: discordIngress.attachments.map(
+                (attachment): ChannelAttachmentDto => ({
+                  id: attachment.id,
+                  name: attachment.name,
+                  url: attachment.url,
+                  mimeType: attachment.contentType,
+                  ...(attachment.sizeBytes !== undefined
+                    ? { sizeBytes: attachment.sizeBytes }
+                    : {}),
+                }),
+              ),
+            }
+          : {}),
+      };
     } else {
       if (!isChatSocketMessage(rawData)) {
         this.logger.warn(`Rejected malformed chat message from ${client.id}`);
@@ -227,6 +340,7 @@ export class ChatGateway implements OnGatewayInit, OnGatewayConnection, OnGatewa
       data = rawData;
     }
     const conversationId = data.conversationId ?? uuid();
+    const clientConversationKey = this.clientConversationKey(client, conversationId);
     const discordServiceUserId = process.env['DISCORD_SERVICE_USER_ID'];
     if (discordIngress && !discordServiceUserId) {
       this.logger.warn(
@@ -281,7 +395,7 @@ export class ChatGateway implements OnGatewayInit, OnGatewayConnection, OnGatewa
           this.logger.log(
             `Using /model override "${modelOverride}" for conversation=${conversationId}`,
           );
-        } else if (!resolvedProvider && !resolvedModelId) {
+        } else if (!resolvedProvider && !resolvedModelId && !discordIngress) {
           // No explicit provider/model from client — use routing engine (M4-012)
           try {
             const routingDecision = await this.routingEngine.resolve(data.content, userId);
@@ -304,12 +418,24 @@ export class ChatGateway implements OnGatewayInit, OnGatewayConnection, OnGatewa
           }
         }
 
+        let resolvedAgentConfigId = data.agentId;
+        if (discordIngress) {
+          const binding = this.discordBindingFor(discordIngress, 'send');
+          const agentConfig = binding
+            ? await this.brain.agents.findById(binding.agentConfigId)
+            : undefined;
+          if (!binding || !agentConfig || agentConfig.name !== binding.instanceId) {
+            throw new Error('Configured Discord logical agent is not provisioned');
+          }
+          resolvedAgentConfigId = agentConfig.id;
+        }
+
         // M5-004: Use existingSessionId as sessionId when available (session reuse)
         const sessionIdToCreate = existingSessionId ?? conversationId;
         agentSession = await this.agentService.createSession(sessionIdToCreate, {
           provider: resolvedProvider,
           modelId: resolvedModelId,
-          agentConfigId: data.agentId,
+          agentConfigId: resolvedAgentConfigId,
           userId,
           tenantId: scope.tenantId,
           conversationHistory: conversationHistory.length > 0 ? conversationHistory : undefined,
@@ -360,6 +486,17 @@ export class ChatGateway implements OnGatewayInit, OnGatewayConnection, OnGatewa
                     discordUserId: discordIngress?.userId,
                   }
                 : {}),
+              ...(data.attachments && data.attachments.length > 0
+                ? {
+                    channelAttachments: data.attachments.map(
+                      (attachment): ChannelAttachmentDto => ({
+                        ...attachment,
+                        name: redactSensitiveContent(attachment.name).content,
+                        url: redactSensitiveContent(attachment.url).content,
+                      }),
+                    ),
+                  }
+                : {}),
               classifications: redactSensitiveContent(data.content).classifications,
             },
           },
@@ -374,7 +511,7 @@ export class ChatGateway implements OnGatewayInit, OnGatewayConnection, OnGatewa
     }
 
     // Always clean up previous listener to prevent leak
-    const existing = this.clientSessions.get(client.id);
+    const existing = this.clientSessions.get(clientConversationKey);
     if (existing) {
       existing.cleanup();
     }
@@ -389,10 +526,11 @@ export class ChatGateway implements OnGatewayInit, OnGatewayConnection, OnGatewa
     );
 
     // Preserve routing decision from the existing client session if we didn't get a new one
-    const prevClientSession = this.clientSessions.get(client.id);
+    const prevClientSession = this.clientSessions.get(clientConversationKey);
     const routingDecisionToStore = sessionRoutingDecision ?? prevClientSession?.lastRoutingDecision;
 
-    this.clientSessions.set(client.id, {
+    this.clientSessions.set(clientConversationKey, {
+      clientId: client.id,
       conversationId,
       cleanup,
       assistantText: '',
@@ -438,7 +576,7 @@ export class ChatGateway implements OnGatewayInit, OnGatewayConnection, OnGatewa
 
     // Dispatch to agent
     try {
-      await this.agentService.prompt(conversationId, data.content, scope);
+      await this.agentService.prompt(conversationId, data.content, scope, data.attachments);
     } catch (err) {
       this.logger.error(
         `Agent prompt failed for client=${client.id}, conversation=${conversationId}`,
@@ -645,9 +783,9 @@ export class ChatGateway implements OnGatewayInit, OnGatewayConnection, OnGatewa
     };
 
     // Emit to all clients currently subscribed to this conversation
-    for (const [clientId, session] of this.clientSessions) {
+    for (const session of this.clientSessions.values()) {
       if (session.conversationId === conversationId && this.scopesEqual(session.scope, scope)) {
-        const socket = this.server.sockets.sockets.get(clientId);
+        const socket = this.server.sockets.sockets.get(session.clientId);
         if (socket?.connected) {
           socket.emit('session:info', payload);
         }
@@ -677,16 +815,10 @@ export class ChatGateway implements OnGatewayInit, OnGatewayConnection, OnGatewa
       !this.durableSessions
     )
       return;
-    const binding = resolveDiscordInteractionBinding(
+    const binding = this.discordBindingFor(ingress, 'approve');
-      parseDiscordInteractionBindings(process.env['DISCORD_INTERACTION_BINDINGS']),
-      ingress.guildId,
-      ingress.channelId,
-      ingress.userId,
-      'approve',
-    );
     const actorId = binding && resolveDiscordInteractionActorId(binding, ingress.userId);
-    const agentName = process.env['MOSAIC_AGENT_NAME']?.trim();
+    const agentName = binding?.instanceId;
-    if (!actorId || !agentName || binding.instanceId !== agentName) {
+    if (!actorId || !agentName) {
       this.logger.warn(
         `Rejected Discord approval without a matching runtime agent from ${client.id}`,
       );
@@ -774,13 +906,7 @@ export class ChatGateway implements OnGatewayInit, OnGatewayConnection, OnGatewa
     const tenantId = process.env['DISCORD_SERVICE_TENANT_ID']?.trim();
     if (!ingress || !approvalRef || !tenantId || !this.runtimeRegistry || !this.durableSessions)
       return;
-    const binding = resolveDiscordInteractionBinding(
+    const binding = this.discordBindingFor(ingress, 'stop');
-      parseDiscordInteractionBindings(process.env['DISCORD_INTERACTION_BINDINGS']),
-      ingress.guildId,
-      ingress.channelId,
-      ingress.userId,
-      'stop',
-    );
     const actorId = binding && resolveDiscordInteractionActorId(binding, ingress.userId);
     if (!actorId) return;
 
@@ -854,17 +980,18 @@ export class ChatGateway implements OnGatewayInit, OnGatewayConnection, OnGatewa
       return null;
     }
     try {
-      const binding = resolveDiscordInteractionBinding(
+      const binding = this.discordBindingFor(payload, operation);
-        parseDiscordInteractionBindings(process.env['DISCORD_INTERACTION_BINDINGS']),
-        payload.guildId,
-        payload.channelId,
-        payload.userId,
-        operation,
-      );
       if (!binding) {
         this.logger.warn(`Rejected unpaired Discord ingress from ${client.id}`);
         return null;
       }
+      const expectedConversationId = `${binding.instanceId}:discord:${payload.threadId ?? payload.channelId}`;
+      if (payload.conversationId !== expectedConversationId) {
+        this.logger.warn(
+          `Rejected Discord ingress for a different logical agent from ${client.id}`,
+        );
+        return null;
+      }
     } catch {
       this.logger.warn(
         `Rejected Discord ingress without valid binding configuration from ${client.id}`,
@@ -880,6 +1007,19 @@ export class ChatGateway implements OnGatewayInit, OnGatewayConnection, OnGatewa
     return payload;
   }
 
+  private discordBindingFor(
+    payload: DiscordIngressPayload,
+    operation: 'send' | 'approve' | 'stop',
+  ) {
+    return resolveDiscordInteractionBinding(
+      parseDiscordInteractionBindings(process.env['DISCORD_INTERACTION_BINDINGS']),
+      payload.guildId,
+      payload.channelId,
+      payload.userId,
+      operation,
+    );
+  }
+
   private readDiscordAllowlist(name: string): string[] {
     return (process.env[name] ?? '')
       .split(',')
@@ -958,11 +1098,15 @@ export class ChatGateway implements OnGatewayInit, OnGatewayConnection, OnGatewa
       const messages = await this.brain.conversations.findMessages(conversationId, userId);
       if (messages.length === 0) return [];
 
-      return messages.map((msg) => ({
+      return messages.map((msg) => {
+        const attachments = this.persistedChannelAttachments(msg.metadata);
+        return {
           role: msg.role as 'user' | 'assistant' | 'system',
           content: msg.content,
           createdAt: msg.createdAt,
-      }));
+          ...(attachments ? { attachments } : {}),
+        };
+      });
     } catch (err) {
       this.logger.error(
         `Failed to load conversation history for conversation=${conversationId}`,
@@ -972,6 +1116,14 @@ export class ChatGateway implements OnGatewayInit, OnGatewayConnection, OnGatewa
     }
   }
 
+  private persistedChannelAttachments(metadata: unknown): readonly ChannelAttachmentDto[] | null {
+    if (typeof metadata !== 'object' || metadata === null) return null;
+    const attachments = (metadata as { channelAttachments?: unknown }).channelAttachments;
+    return hasValidAttachmentArray(attachments, isChannelAttachment)
+      ? (attachments as readonly ChannelAttachmentDto[])
+      : null;
+  }
+
   private appendAndFlushRedactedEgress(
     client: Socket,
     conversationId: string,
@@ -979,18 +1131,19 @@ export class ChatGateway implements OnGatewayInit, OnGatewayConnection, OnGatewa
     buffers: Map<string, string>,
     delta: string,
   ): void {
-    const key = this.egressKey(client, eventName);
+    const sessionKey = this.clientConversationKey(client, conversationId);
+    const key = this.egressKey(client, conversationId, eventName);
     if (this.overflowedEgress.has(key)) return;
 
-    const buffered = `${buffers.get(client.id) ?? ''}${delta}`;
+    const buffered = `${buffers.get(sessionKey) ?? ''}${delta}`;
     if (buffered.length > MAX_REDACTION_BUFFER_LENGTH) {
-      buffers.delete(client.id);
+      buffers.delete(sessionKey);
       this.overflowedEgress.add(key);
       client.emit(eventName, { conversationId, text: '[REDACTED_STREAM_OVERFLOW]' });
       return;
     }
 
-    buffers.set(client.id, buffered);
+    buffers.set(sessionKey, buffered);
     this.flushRedactedEgress(client, conversationId, eventName, buffers, false);
   }
 
@@ -1006,21 +1159,22 @@ export class ChatGateway implements OnGatewayInit, OnGatewayConnection, OnGatewa
     buffers: Map<string, string>,
     final: boolean,
   ): void {
-    const key = this.egressKey(client, eventName);
+    const sessionKey = this.clientConversationKey(client, conversationId);
+    const key = this.egressKey(client, conversationId, eventName);
     if (this.overflowedEgress.has(key)) {
       if (final) this.overflowedEgress.delete(key);
       return;
     }
 
-    const buffered = buffers.get(client.id) ?? '';
+    const buffered = buffers.get(sessionKey) ?? '';
     const releaseLength = final ? buffered.length : this.safeRedactionPrefixLength(buffered);
     const released = buffered.slice(0, releaseLength);
     const pending = buffered.slice(releaseLength);
 
     if (pending) {
-      buffers.set(client.id, pending);
+      buffers.set(sessionKey, pending);
     } else {
-      buffers.delete(client.id);
+      buffers.delete(sessionKey);
     }
 
     if (released) {
@@ -1089,8 +1243,12 @@ export class ChatGateway implements OnGatewayInit, OnGatewayConnection, OnGatewa
     return retainedFrom;
   }
 
-  private egressKey(client: Socket, eventName: 'agent:text' | 'agent:thinking'): string {
+  private egressKey(
-    return `${client.id}:${eventName}`;
+    client: Socket,
+    conversationId: string,
+    eventName: 'agent:text' | 'agent:thinking',
+  ): string {
+    return `${this.clientConversationKey(client, conversationId)}:${eventName}`;
   }
 
   private relayEvent(client: Socket, conversationId: string, event: AgentSessionEvent): void {
@@ -1101,26 +1259,27 @@ export class ChatGateway implements OnGatewayInit, OnGatewayConnection, OnGatewa
       return;
     }
 
+    const sessionKey = this.clientConversationKey(client, conversationId);
     switch (event.type) {
       case 'agent_start': {
         // Reset accumulation buffers for the new turn
-        const cs = this.clientSessions.get(client.id);
+        const cs = this.clientSessions.get(sessionKey);
         if (cs) {
           cs.assistantText = '';
           cs.toolCalls = [];
           cs.pendingToolCalls.clear();
         }
-        this.textEgressBuffers.set(client.id, '');
+        this.textEgressBuffers.set(sessionKey, '');
-        this.thinkingEgressBuffers.set(client.id, '');
+        this.thinkingEgressBuffers.set(sessionKey, '');
-        this.overflowedEgress.delete(this.egressKey(client, 'agent:text'));
+        this.overflowedEgress.delete(this.egressKey(client, conversationId, 'agent:text'));
-        this.overflowedEgress.delete(this.egressKey(client, 'agent:thinking'));
+        this.overflowedEgress.delete(this.egressKey(client, conversationId, 'agent:thinking'));
         client.emit('agent:start', { conversationId });
         break;
       }
 
       case 'agent_end': {
         // Gather usage stats from the Pi session
-        const activeClientSession = this.clientSessions.get(client.id);
+        const activeClientSession = this.clientSessions.get(sessionKey);
         const agentSession = activeClientSession
           ? this.agentService.getSession(conversationId, activeClientSession.scope)
           : undefined;
@@ -1173,7 +1332,7 @@ export class ChatGateway implements OnGatewayInit, OnGatewayConnection, OnGatewa
         }
 
         // Persist the assistant message with metadata
-        const cs = this.clientSessions.get(client.id);
+        const cs = this.clientSessions.get(sessionKey);
         const userId = (client.data.user as { id: string } | undefined)?.id;
         if (cs && userId && cs.assistantText.trim().length > 0) {
           const metadata: Record<string, unknown> = {
@@ -1225,7 +1384,7 @@ export class ChatGateway implements OnGatewayInit, OnGatewayConnection, OnGatewa
         const assistantEvent = event.assistantMessageEvent;
         if (assistantEvent.type === 'text_delta') {
           // Keep raw stream material in memory only; persist and emit only redacted text.
-          const cs = this.clientSessions.get(client.id);
+          const cs = this.clientSessions.get(sessionKey);
           if (cs) {
             cs.assistantText += assistantEvent.delta;
           }
@@ -1250,7 +1409,7 @@ export class ChatGateway implements OnGatewayInit, OnGatewayConnection, OnGatewa
 
       case 'tool_execution_start': {
         // Track pending tool call for later recording
-        const cs = this.clientSessions.get(client.id);
+        const cs = this.clientSessions.get(sessionKey);
         if (cs) {
           cs.pendingToolCalls.set(event.toolCallId, {
             toolName: event.toolName,
@@ -1267,7 +1426,7 @@ export class ChatGateway implements OnGatewayInit, OnGatewayConnection, OnGatewa
 
       case 'tool_execution_end': {
         // Finalise tool call record
-        const cs = this.clientSessions.get(client.id);
+        const cs = this.clientSessions.get(sessionKey);
         if (cs) {
           const pending = cs.pendingToolCalls.get(event.toolCallId);
           cs.toolCalls.push({

apps/gateway/src/plugin/discord-ingress.security.spec.ts

@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ const ENV_KEYS = [
   'DISCORD_ALLOWED_CHANNEL_IDS',
   'DISCORD_ALLOWED_USER_IDS',
   'MOSAIC_AGENT_NAME',
+  'MOSAIC_AGENT_CONFIG_ID',
 ] as const;
 const savedEnv = new Map<string, string | undefined>();
 
@@ -33,12 +34,14 @@ function configureDiscordEnv(role: 'admin' | 'member' = 'admin'): void {
   process.env['DISCORD_SERVICE_USER_ID'] = 'discord-service';
   process.env['DISCORD_SERVICE_TENANT_ID'] = 'tenant-discord';
   process.env['MOSAIC_AGENT_NAME'] = 'Nova';
+  process.env['MOSAIC_AGENT_CONFIG_ID'] = 'agent-config-nova';
   process.env['DISCORD_ALLOWED_GUILD_IDS'] = 'guild-001';
   process.env['DISCORD_ALLOWED_CHANNEL_IDS'] = 'channel-001';
   process.env['DISCORD_ALLOWED_USER_IDS'] = 'user-001';
   process.env['DISCORD_INTERACTION_BINDINGS'] = JSON.stringify([
     {
       instanceId: 'Nova',
+      agentConfigId: 'agent-config-nova',
       guildId: 'guild-001',
       channelId: 'channel-001',
       pairedUsers: {
@@ -141,7 +144,7 @@ function createPayload(overrides: Partial<DiscordIngressPayload> = {}): DiscordI
     guildId: 'guild-001',
     channelId: 'channel-001',
     userId: 'user-001',
-    conversationId: 'discord-channel-001',
+    conversationId: 'Nova:discord:channel-001',
     content: 'hello Tess',
     ...overrides,
   };
@@ -153,6 +156,7 @@ describe('Discord ingress security', () => {
       JSON.stringify([
         {
           instanceId: 'Nova',
+          agentConfigId: 'agent-config-nova',
           guildId: 'guild-001',
           channelId: 'channel-001',
           pairedUsers: { 'user-001': 'admin' },
@@ -170,6 +174,7 @@ describe('Discord ingress security', () => {
       [
         {
           instanceId: 'Nova',
+          agentConfigId: 'agent-config-nova',
           guildId: 'guild-001',
           channelId: 'channel-001',
           pairedUsers: { 'user-001': { role: 'operator', mosaicUserId: 'mosaic-operator-001' } },
@@ -307,27 +312,12 @@ describe('Discord ingress security', () => {
     );
   });
 
-  it.each([
+  it('rejects approval when the durable session targets a different logical agent', async () => {
-    [
+    configureDiscordEnv();
-      'binding',
+    const { gateway, client, durable } = discordGateway('admin');
-      () => {
-        process.env['MOSAIC_AGENT_NAME'] = 'Other';
-      },
-    ],
-    [
-      'durable session',
-      (durable: { getSnapshot: ReturnType<typeof vi.fn> }) => {
     durable.getSnapshot.mockResolvedValueOnce({
       identity: { agentName: 'Other', providerId: 'fleet', runtimeSessionId: 'runtime-1' },
     });
-      },
-    ],
-  ])(
-    'rejects approval when the %s targets a different runtime agent',
-    async (_source, configure) => {
-      configureDiscordEnv();
-      const { gateway, client, durable } = discordGateway('admin');
-      configure(durable);
 
     await gateway.handleDiscordApproval(
       client as never,
@@ -340,8 +330,28 @@ describe('Discord ingress security', () => {
       approvalId: undefined,
       expiresAt: undefined,
     });
-    },
+  });
+
+  it('rejects privileged envelopes with a forged current conversation route', async () => {
+    configureDiscordEnv();
+    const { gateway, client } = discordGateway('admin');
+
+    await gateway.handleDiscordApproval(
+      client as never,
+      ingressEnvelope('/approve', 'forged-approval-route', {
+        conversationId: 'Nova:discord:other-channel',
+      }),
     );
+    await gateway.handleDiscordStop(
+      client as never,
+      ingressEnvelope('/stop forged', 'forged-stop-route', {
+        conversationId: 'Nova:discord:other-channel',
+      }),
+    );
+
+    expect(client.emit).not.toHaveBeenCalledWith('discord:approval', expect.anything());
+    expect(client.emit).not.toHaveBeenCalledWith('discord:stop', expect.anything());
+  });
 
   it('rejects unpaired and non-admin Discord users for approval and stop', async () => {
     configureDiscordEnv();
@@ -398,6 +408,267 @@ describe('Discord ingress security', () => {
     ]);
   });
 
+  it.each([
+    'https://user:password@cdn.example.test/diagram.png',
+    'https://cdn.example.test/diagram.png?token=secret',
+    'https://cdn.example.test/diagram.png?X-Amz-Signature=secret',
+    'https://cdn.example.test/diagram.png?auth=secret',
+    'https://cdn.example.test/diagram.png?hm=secret',
+  ])('rejects credential-bearing attachment URLs before gateway dispatch', async (url) => {
+    configureDiscordEnv();
+    const { gateway, client } = discordGateway('admin');
+
+    await gateway.handleMessage(
+      client as never,
+      ingressEnvelope('', `credential-url-${url.length}`, {
+        conversationId: 'Nova:discord:channel-001',
+        attachments: [
+          { id: 'attachment-credential', name: 'diagram.png', url, contentType: 'image/png' },
+        ],
+      }),
+    );
+
+    expect(client.emit).not.toHaveBeenCalledWith('message:ack', expect.anything());
+  });
+
+  it("selects each binding's trusted logical-agent config when creating Discord sessions", async () => {
+    configureDiscordEnv();
+    process.env['DISCORD_ALLOWED_CHANNEL_IDS'] = 'channel-001,channel-002';
+    process.env['DISCORD_INTERACTION_BINDINGS'] = JSON.stringify([
+      {
+        instanceId: 'Nova',
+        agentConfigId: 'agent-config-nova',
+        guildId: 'guild-001',
+        channelId: 'channel-001',
+        pairedUsers: {
+          'user-001': { role: 'operator', mosaicUserId: 'mosaic-operator-001' },
+        },
+      },
+      {
+        instanceId: 'Orion',
+        agentConfigId: 'agent-config-orion',
+        guildId: 'guild-001',
+        channelId: 'channel-002',
+        pairedUsers: {
+          'user-001': { role: 'operator', mosaicUserId: 'mosaic-operator-001' },
+        },
+      },
+    ]);
+    const session = {
+      provider: 'configured-provider',
+      modelId: 'configured-model',
+      piSession: {
+        thinkingLevel: 'medium',
+        getAvailableThinkingLevels: (): string[] => ['medium'],
+      },
+    };
+    const createSession = vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(session);
+    const agentService = {
+      getSession: vi.fn().mockReturnValue(undefined),
+      createSession,
+      recordMessage: vi.fn(),
+      onEvent: vi.fn().mockReturnValue((): void => undefined),
+      addChannel: vi.fn(),
+      prompt: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined),
+    };
+    const brain = {
+      agents: {
+        findById: vi.fn((id: string) =>
+          Promise.resolve({
+            id,
+            name: id === 'agent-config-orion' ? 'Orion' : 'Nova',
+          }),
+        ),
+      },
+      conversations: {
+        findById: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue({ id: 'Nova:discord:channel-001' }),
+        findMessages: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue([]),
+        create: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined),
+        update: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined),
+        addMessage: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined),
+      },
+    };
+    const routingEngine = { resolve: vi.fn() };
+    const gateway = new ChatGateway(
+      agentService as never,
+      {} as never,
+      brain as never,
+      {} as never,
+      {} as never,
+      routingEngine as never,
+    );
+    const client = {
+      id: 'discord-client-new-session',
+      data: { discordService: true },
+      emit: vi.fn(),
+    };
+
+    await gateway.handleMessage(
+      client as never,
+      ingressEnvelope('start configured session', 'configured-session-001', {
+        conversationId: 'Nova:discord:channel-001',
+      }),
+    );
+
+    await gateway.handleMessage(
+      client as never,
+      ingressEnvelope('start second configured session', 'configured-session-002', {
+        channelId: 'channel-002',
+        conversationId: 'Orion:discord:channel-002',
+      }),
+    );
+
+    expect(createSession).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
+      'Nova:discord:channel-001',
+      expect.objectContaining({
+        agentConfigId: 'agent-config-nova',
+        userId: 'discord-service',
+        tenantId: 'tenant-discord',
+      }),
+    );
+    expect(createSession).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
+      'Orion:discord:channel-002',
+      expect.objectContaining({ agentConfigId: 'agent-config-orion' }),
+    );
+    expect(routingEngine.resolve).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+  });
+
+  it('retains validated persisted attachments in resumed conversation history', async () => {
+    const attachment = {
+      id: 'attachment-history',
+      name: 'diagram.png',
+      url: 'https://cdn.example.test/diagram.png',
+      mimeType: 'image/png',
+      sizeBytes: 4_096,
+    };
+    const gateway = new ChatGateway(
+      {} as never,
+      {} as never,
+      {
+        conversations: {
+          findMessages: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue([
+            {
+              role: 'user',
+              content: '',
+              createdAt: new Date('2026-07-14T12:00:00.000Z'),
+              metadata: { channelAttachments: [attachment] },
+            },
+          ]),
+        },
+      } as never,
+      {} as never,
+      {} as never,
+      {} as never,
+    ) as unknown as {
+      loadConversationHistory(
+        conversationId: string,
+        userId: string,
+      ): Promise<Array<{ attachments?: readonly (typeof attachment)[] }>>;
+    };
+
+    await expect(
+      gateway.loadConversationHistory('Nova:discord:channel-001', 'discord-service'),
+    ).resolves.toEqual([expect.objectContaining({ attachments: [attachment] })]);
+  });
+
+  it('rejects malformed signed attachment payloads before gateway dispatch', async () => {
+    configureDiscordEnv();
+    const { gateway, client } = discordGateway('admin');
+    const malformedPayload: Record<string, unknown> = {
+      ...createPayload({
+        messageId: 'malformed-attachments-001',
+        conversationId: 'Nova:discord:channel-001',
+      }),
+      attachments: { id: 'not-an-array' },
+    };
+    const envelope = createDiscordIngressEnvelope(
+      malformedPayload as unknown as DiscordIngressPayload,
+      SERVICE_TOKEN,
+    );
+
+    await gateway.handleMessage(client as never, envelope);
+
+    expect(client.emit).not.toHaveBeenCalledWith('message:ack', expect.anything());
+  });
+
+  it('preserves authenticated attachment metadata through persistence and agent dispatch', async () => {
+    configureDiscordEnv();
+    const prompt = vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined);
+    const addMessage = vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined);
+    const session = {
+      provider: 'test-provider',
+      modelId: 'test-model',
+      piSession: {
+        thinkingLevel: 'medium',
+        getAvailableThinkingLevels: (): string[] => ['medium'],
+      },
+    };
+    const agentService = {
+      getSession: vi.fn().mockReturnValue(session),
+      recordMessage: vi.fn(),
+      onEvent: vi.fn().mockReturnValue((): void => undefined),
+      addChannel: vi.fn(),
+      prompt,
+    };
+    const brain = {
+      conversations: {
+        findById: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue({ id: 'Nova:discord:channel-001' }),
+        create: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined),
+        update: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined),
+        addMessage,
+      },
+    };
+    const gateway = new ChatGateway(
+      agentService as never,
+      {} as never,
+      brain as never,
+      {} as never,
+      {} as never,
+      {} as never,
+    );
+    const client = {
+      id: 'discord-client-001',
+      data: { discordService: true },
+      emit: vi.fn(),
+    };
+    const attachment = {
+      id: 'attachment-001',
+      name: 'diagram.png',
+      url: 'https://cdn.example.test/diagram.png',
+      contentType: 'image/png',
+      sizeBytes: 4_096,
+    };
+
+    await gateway.handleMessage(
+      client as never,
+      ingressEnvelope('', 'attachment-message-001', {
+        conversationId: 'Nova:discord:channel-001',
+        attachments: [attachment],
+      }),
+    );
+
+    const expectedAttachment = {
+      id: attachment.id,
+      name: attachment.name,
+      url: attachment.url,
+      mimeType: attachment.contentType,
+      sizeBytes: attachment.sizeBytes,
+    };
+    expect(prompt).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
+      'Nova:discord:channel-001',
+      '',
+      { userId: 'discord-service', tenantId: 'tenant-discord' },
+      [expectedAttachment],
+    );
+    expect(addMessage).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
+      expect.objectContaining({
+        conversationId: 'Nova:discord:channel-001',
+        metadata: expect.objectContaining({ channelAttachments: [expectedAttachment] }),
+      }),
+      'discord-service',
+    );
+  });
+
   it('accepts a thread message through its allowed bound parent channel', () => {
     const emitted = vi.fn();
     const plugin = new DiscordPlugin({
@@ -410,6 +681,7 @@ describe('Discord ingress security', () => {
       interactionBindings: [
         {
           instanceId: 'Nova',
+          agentConfigId: 'agent-config-nova',
           guildId: 'guild-001',
           channelId: 'channel-001',
           pairedUsers: { 'user-001': { role: 'operator', mosaicUserId: 'mosaic-operator-001' } },

apps/gateway/src/plugin/plugin.module.ts

@@ -61,6 +61,16 @@ function requiredDiscordAllowlist(name: string): string[] {
   return value;
 }
 
+function optionalPositiveInteger(name: string): number | undefined {
+  const raw = process.env[name];
+  if (raw === undefined) return undefined;
+  const value = Number(raw);
+  if (!Number.isInteger(value) || value <= 0) {
+    throw new Error(`${name} must be a positive integer when configured`);
+  }
+  return value;
+}
+
 function createPluginRegistry(): IChannelPlugin[] {
   const plugins: IChannelPlugin[] = [];
   const discordToken = process.env['DISCORD_BOT_TOKEN'];
@@ -82,6 +92,10 @@ function createPluginRegistry(): IChannelPlugin[] {
           guildId: discordGuildId,
           gatewayUrl: discordGatewayUrl,
           serviceToken: discordServiceToken,
+          messageRateLimitPerMinute: optionalPositiveInteger(
+            'DISCORD_MESSAGE_RATE_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE',
+          ),
+          threadRateLimitPerMinute: optionalPositiveInteger('DISCORD_THREAD_RATE_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE'),
           allowedGuildIds: requiredDiscordAllowlist('DISCORD_ALLOWED_GUILD_IDS'),
           allowedChannelIds: requiredDiscordAllowlist('DISCORD_ALLOWED_CHANNEL_IDS'),
           allowedUserIds: requiredDiscordAllowlist('DISCORD_ALLOWED_USER_IDS'),

docs/PERFORMANCE.md

@@ -149,15 +149,9 @@ for any `<Image>` components added in the future.
 
 ---
 
-## How to Apply
+## Held future procedure
 
-```bash
+This report is non-operative evidence, not a current runbook. Until **KBN-101-00, KBN-101-03, and KBN-101-05** land, do not execute a PostgreSQL runner from this checkout. The approved future procedure is exactly: external bootstrap → TLS/roles → `mosaic-db-migrator --run` → `mosaic-db-migrator --verify` → Gateway/Compose readiness. Deployment will supply the reviewed runner, migration-only credentials, and TLS material; Gateway startup only verifies readiness.
-# Run the DB migration (requires a live DB)
-pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/db exec drizzle-kit migrate
-
-# Or, in Docker/Swarm — migrations run automatically on gateway startup
-# via runMigrations() in packages/db/src/migrate.ts
-```
 
 ---
 

docs/PRD.md

@@ -79,6 +79,81 @@ Jarvis (v0.2.0) is a self-hosted AI assistant with a Python FastAPI backend and
 
 ---
 
+## Fleet Declarative Configuration Management Workstream (FCM, #758)
+
+### Problem and objective
+
+The local Mosaic fleet has a roster, generated agent environment files, user-systemd units, tmux
+sessions, heartbeat files, examples, profiles, and separate gateway-backed agent records. These
+planes have drifted and are not one safe operator lifecycle. The objective is one **local fleet
+roster** as the desired-state SSOT, with generated environment, systemd, tmux, and heartbeat
+artifacts as rebuildable projections; it does not merge the local fleet control plane with the
+gateway-backed agent catalog.
+
+### Normative requirements
+
+| ID           | Requirement                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               |
+| ------------ | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| `FCM-REQ-01` | The roster SHALL be the sole writable desired-state source for local fleet membership, launch policy, and persisted lifecycle target. Generated environment files, systemd enablement, tmux sessions, and heartbeat state SHALL be non-authoritative projections.                                                                                                                                                                                                         |
+| `FCM-REQ-02` | The implementation SHALL provide one executable structural contract for YAML/JSON input and one shared semantic validator. Roster load, profile validation, provision, migration, and apply SHALL reuse the existing baseline-plus-`roles.local` profile/persona resolver; a parallel role resolver is forbidden.                                                                                                                                                         |
+| `FCM-REQ-03` | The local fleet CLI SHALL expose documented programmatic validate, show, plan, apply/reconcile, create, inspect, update, delete, start, stop, restart, status, verify, and doctor operations with stable JSON and exit-code behavior. Existing `fleet add/remove` compatibility aliases may remain during the stated deprecation window.                                                                                                                                  |
+| `FCM-REQ-04` | A fresh create SHALL persist `enabled:true` and `desired_state:stopped` unless an explicit persisted start is requested. The model SHALL distinguish enabled state, persisted desired state, and observed state. Migration, apply, reboot, and rollback SHALL not start an agent that was observed stopped before cutover.                                                                                                                                                |
+| `FCM-REQ-05` | The launch chain SHALL consume deterministic, digest-stamped generated input only. Optional local overrides SHALL be parsed as strict data, may not shadow authoritative generated keys, and may not contain arbitrary commands, credential values, channels, or unknown `MOSAIC_AGENT_*` keys. Forbidden legacy keys, including `MOSAIC_AGENT_COMMAND`, SHALL be privately quarantined before launch and reported only by key name and content hash.                     |
+| `FCM-REQ-06` | Mutations and apply SHALL validate before mutation, use an expected generation/lock, write projections atomically, produce a deterministic plan, and emit recovery information on partial failure. Reconciliation SHALL act only on local, enabled, roster-owned projections and SHALL not kill unmanaged tmux sessions by fuzzy name.                                                                                                                                    |
+| `FCM-REQ-07` | Canonical required classes are `code`, `review`, `validator`, `orchestrator`, `team-leader`, `enhancer`, and `interaction`. `validator` issues an independent final certificate but has no merge authority; `merge-gate` remains sole approve-to-land/merge authority. Team-leader capacity is bounded by an orchestrator-issued lease, and interaction is request/status only. Tess and Ultron are configurable instance/display names, not required machine identities. |
+| `FCM-REQ-08` | v1 migration SHALL be field-complete, reversible, and explicit about aliases, unresolved classes, lifecycle inference, generated-file regeneration, local override quarantine, schema-only remote/connector fields, and rollback. Every shipped example, profile, and service preset SHALL be migrated and executable, retained as an explicitly versioned v1 fixture, or retired with a replacement and deprecation note.                                                |
+| `FCM-REQ-09` | M1–M5 SHALL remain local tmux/systemd control-plane work. Remote/SSH reconciliation, connector mutation, secret references, arbitrary command/channel overrides, gateway/API convergence, and UI configuration storage are excluded and require a separate PRD/threat model.                                                                                                                                                                                              |
+| `FCM-REQ-10` | Documentation and examples are delivery gates. The M0 checklist at [docs/fleet/FLEET-CONFIG-DOCS-IA-CHECKLIST.md](./fleet/FLEET-CONFIG-DOCS-IA-CHECKLIST.md) and the baseline disposition inventory at [docs/fleet/LEGACY-EXAMPLE-PROFILE-DISPOSITION-INVENTORY.md](./fleet/LEGACY-EXAMPLE-PROFILE-DISPOSITION-INVENTORY.md) SHALL be maintained as acceptance evidence.                                                                                                  |
+
+### Acceptance criteria
+
+1. `AC-FCM-01`: A valid local v2 roster can be parsed from YAML or JSON, validated structurally and semantically through the shared resolver, and rendered canonically; invalid fields, duplicate names, unresolved classes, unsupported runtime/model combinations, socket ambiguity, and incompatible options fail closed.
+2. `AC-FCM-02`: `plan` reports deterministic desired-versus-observed differences for roster, generated environment, systemd enablement, tmux/session, heartbeat, installed-asset revision, and provable orphans without mutation; `apply --check` reports drift without mutation.
+3. `AC-FCM-03`: Local create/update/delete is generation-guarded, atomic, idempotent, and safe by default; it permits supported runtime/model/harness/effort/workdir/role changes without direct editing of generated environment files and does not start a newly created agent unless explicitly persisted.
+4. `AC-FCM-04`: The generated-env/local-override launch chain rejects generated-key shadowing, arbitrary command override, unknown keys, shell evaluation, and sensitive-value diagnostics before any agent starts; known-safe legacy input is regenerated or strictly relocated, and forbidden input is quarantined.
+5. `AC-FCM-05`: Local lifecycle reconciliation implements the persisted/transient start-stop rules, exact default/named tmux socket targeting, systemd/tmux status, stale generated state, unmanaged-session reporting, and rollback without surprise restarts or fuzzy destructive targeting.
+6. `AC-FCM-06`: A v1 roster migration previews field-by-field disposition, preserves observed stopped/running state, inventories rather than reconciles remote/schema-only entries, supports a canary and rollback, and classifies every shipped example, profile, and service preset according to the M0 inventory.
+7. `AC-FCM-07`: Required role authority is validated: validator certificate is consumed but does not merge, merge-gate is the sole merge authority, team-leader leases do not change roster/credentials/authority, and interaction/Tess cannot claim orchestration or merge powers.
+8. `AC-FCM-08`: Documentation, examples, migration, troubleshooting, operational recovery, package/update asset drift, schema/example/profile validation, independent code/security review, validator certificate, and terminal-green CI are complete before #758 closes.
+
+### M0 implementation gate
+
+No source, schema, role, example, profile, systemd, or live-fleet change is authorized before M0
+lands. M0 consists only of these normative requirements, the complete task DAG, the scoped
+documentation IA checklist, and the legacy example/profile disposition inventory. Subsequent cards
+are defined in [docs/TASKS.md](./TASKS.md) and must remain one card/one PR.
+
+---
+
+## KBN-101 Database Runtime/Migration Role Split (#771)
+
+### Problem and objective
+
+PostgreSQL Gateway/storage currently uses one `DATABASE_URL` for runtime queries and migrations. That makes the deployed application identity an owner and prevents certification that KBN immutable event, artifact, checkpoint, and evidence relations reject runtime `UPDATE`/`DELETE`. KBN-101 freezes a least-privilege runtime/migration split before KBN-100 schema work.
+
+### Normative requirements
+
+1. `K101-REQ-01`: `DATABASE_URL` SHALL be the non-owner PostgreSQL runtime connection and `DATABASE_MIGRATION_URL` SHALL be the migration-only owner/migrator connection. They are required respectively for runtime and the dedicated `mosaic-db-migrator --run|--verify` phase in `standalone`/`federated`; local PGlite is the explicit exception. The published `@mosaicstack/db` bin maps exactly `mosaic-db-migrator` to `./dist/cli.js`, its image entrypoint is exactly `mosaic-db-migrator`, accepts no URL/SQL/schema/role argv, and returns stable sanitized exits. Every current/future PostgreSQL DDL entrypoint SHALL route to that runner or be denied, and SHALL reject `DATABASE_URL`-only execution before connection/DDL. Data migration may connect only after the runner prepares and verifies the PostgreSQL target, through dedicated non-DDL `mosaic_data_importer` and exactly `--target-url-file /run/secrets/mosaic-migrate-target-url`, its fixed paired authenticated provider-version file `/run/secrets/mosaic-migrate-target-version`, plus `--target-attestation-file /run/mosaic-attestations/migrate-target.v1.json`. KBN-101-05 obtains URL key `url` and version only from the same successful Vault KV-v2 response at `secret-{env}/mosaic-stack/database/importer` (`data.metadata.version`), renders them as one immutable generation into separate consumer copies, and never infers a provider version from DSN bytes. The trusted runner verifies TLS/identity/manifest, reads its fixed importer URL/version copies only for binding through safe no-follow fd checks, and signs a credential-free JCS/Ed25519 attestation using its runner-only fixed root-owned private-key file; no signing key reaches importer/runtime. The artifact binds secret version and SHA-256 of exact high-entropy credential-file bytes, canonical TLS host/port/database, CA/SPKI, PostgreSQL system identifier/database OID, importer role, manifest/schema fingerprints, producer invocation/build/image digest, issued/expires/nonce, and correlation. Before target connection the importer validates URL/version/attestation/public-key files, signature/key/expiry/replay/authenticated provider version/digest/generation/bindings and the importer-only CA at exact `DATABASE_TLS_CA_CERT_PATH`; after verified TLS and before DML it validates server/database/role/CA/schema identity, with same-fd/in-memory-byte TOCTOU protection, rotation/revocation, a privileged producer-only-to-importer-only artifact handoff controller that verifies/copies/fsyncs/atomically renames/seals before importer start, consumer isolation/no logging-oracle, and sanitized errors. Raw `--target-url`, `DATABASE_URL` fallback, runtime-owner use, missing/unsafe/substituted files, stale/replayed/tampered/wrong-key attestation, wrong binding, and DDL attempt fail before target connection/DDL; post-connect mismatch closes with zero DML/DDL. A reviewed finite classifier inventories executable current source/scripts/package bins, operator docs, deploy manifests, and exact normative contracts by path; active secure records pin both options/files, producer/key/bindings/tests, while normative contracts cannot mask instructions. Unknown active commands, duplicate-owner, ownerless, missing-path, and historical/status-only masking hits fail. `db:push` is forbidden outside an explicitly disposable local developer database and cannot accept a production-like URL.
+2. `K101-REQ-02`: Gateway runtime/replicas SHALL not execute migrations or DDL. The runner SHALL hold one `max:1` session and fixed two-int advisory namespace `1297044289` (`MOSA`), `1262636593` (`KBN1`) across preflight, reconciliation, migration, verification, and release. It SHALL compare the versioned canonical manifest v1 tuple (journal logical index/tag plus exact SQL-byte SHA-256) to the complete observed ledger mapping; count/set-only, timestamps, and physical insertion order are non-normative and insufficient.
+3. `K101-REQ-03`: PostgreSQL SHALL separate non-login platform database owner, non-login schema owner, dedicated `NOLOGIN SUPERUSER` `mosaic_extension_owner`, login migrator, dedicated login non-DDL data importer, non-login runtime capability, and login runtime roles. For PostgreSQL 17 + pgvector 0.8.2, `vector` is untrusted (`trusted` is absent and `relocatable=true`): only an externally controlled audited platform-bootstrap superuser session may `SET ROLE mosaic_extension_owner` for CREATE/UPDATE/SET SCHEMA, then `RESET ROLE`; the role has `rolcanlogin=false`, `rolsuper=true`, zero members, no runtime credential/Vault secret, and is never provided to app containers. It owns `mosaic_extensions`, fresh `vector`, and owner-bearing extension members, while `mosaic_schema_owner` receives only `USAGE` for type resolution and never ownership/`CREATE`/`ALTER`/`DROP`/member-change/default-privilege authority there. Superuser cannot be constrained by `GRANT`/`REVOKE`; this is identity/non-login/no-membership/external-control/audit isolation, not a false least-privilege claim. Extension operations require control-plane change, independent review, backup/rollback, maintenance window, and audit evidence. Managed targets that cannot establish this exact role are ineligible until an independently approved versioned provider-owned extension-owner profile exists; app/migrator ownership is never silently retained. Existing approved-owner extension relocation validates exact `pg_namespace.nspowner`, `pg_extension.extowner`, member ownership/schema/version, while legacy runtime-owned extension fails closed to a controlled shadow-database migration—never unsupported ownership alteration, catalog mutation, ownership adoption, or `DROP CASCADE`. Runtime, migrator, schema owner, importer, and all service roles must fail `SET ROLE`, catalog/direct `ALTER`/`UPDATE`/`DROP`/membership-change denial, role ownership, superuser/role-creation/schema-creation/TEMPORARY, unsafe membership, untrusted search path, missing grants, unauthenticated TLS, and immutable privilege drift checks. Application schema is fixed `mosaic` with exact `pg_catalog,mosaic` session path; historical public migrations remain byte-immutable legacy bootstrap only, every future Drizzle application declaration targets `mosaic`, and `vector` is explicitly qualified from non-writable `mosaic_extensions`. No config-derived SQL identifier is permitted.
+4. `K101-REQ-04`: `mosaicstack/stack` KBN-101-00 SHALL exclusively own `infra/pg-bootstrap/roles.sql`, `infra/pg-bootstrap/extensions.sql`, `infra/pg-bootstrap/README.md`, and bootstrap tests; KBN-101-05 SHALL exclusively own `tools/db/render-postgres-secrets.ts`, its tests, and current Compose/Portainer/two-gateway deployment declarations, consuming the versioned bootstrap interface without overlap. Environment IaC/Vault is named input and Mosaic deployment control plane/Jason is activation authority. Distinct runtime/migrator/importer URL, importer authenticated provider-version, DB-client CA, Gateway leaf, and PostgreSQL server key/certificate materials are provisioned before a production-like database starts. Importer and migrator have separate immutable URL/version copies at fixed `10002:10002`/`10003:10003` identities; runtime/unrelated containers receive neither importer material, attestation private key, or importer artifact. Runtime, migrator, and importer require their mounted CA plus `sslmode=verify-full`. Exact UID/GID/mode/rendering, service-DNS SANs, Vault/compose/Swarm consumer isolation, two-gateway pair ordering, server activation, pre-enforcement legacy-client drain and `hostssl` zero-plaintext-session proof, fresh/existing transition, CA-overlap rotation, TLS-only rollback, and standalone/federated/Swarm/two-gateway positive/negative TLS evidence are required. No application-generated production certificate or plaintext bootstrap exception is permitted.
+5. `K101-REQ-05`: KBN immutable relations SHALL permit the real runtime role INSERT/SELECT only and deny UPDATE/DELETE; parent retention remains RESTRICT/no-cascade. Role/password/Vault creation is external platform control, never application migration/source.
+6. `K101-REQ-06`: N-1 single-URL compatibility, rollout/rollback, Vault ownership/rotation/redaction, CI, installer, compose/Portainer, observability, and deployment handoffs SHALL be separately bounded one-card/one-PR work. Prepared slices remain inactive while current owner-runtime deployments stay N-1; Mosaic control plane/Jason alone authorizes one final atomic activation or rollback, with no force-on-red/bypass. KBN-101 planning itself SHALL not mutate production.
+7. `K101-REQ-07`: KBN-100 SHALL begin only after the KBN-101 foundation role/schema-boundary certificate; it SHALL rebase on that main head, restore generated Drizzle declaration/snapshot/journal consistency, and bound procedural immutable-table grant/trigger/backfill additions to its schema slice. KBN-101 real deployed-role immutable-operation certification SHALL complete after KBN-100 creates those relations and before KBN-105.
+
+### Acceptance criteria
+
+1. `AC-K101-01`: DTO/command-matrix tests prove required modes, PGlite exception, `mosaic-db-migrator --help|--run|--verify`/stable exits/argv refusal, public-import negative, every finite classified DDL/static-bypass inventory path and both harness pairs reject `DATABASE_URL`-only before connection/DDL, no migration-to-runtime fallback, and `db:push` refusal outside an allowlisted disposable DB. Before inventory, ownership, or status masking, the semantic fixture fails README's exact former commented code-fence generic-wrapper form and the user guide's exact former executable generic-wrapper form; source-consistency proves current `packages/storage/src/cli.ts` directly `execSync`s `pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/db db:migrate` and no `mosaic-db-migrator` bin exists, so runner-delegation documentation fails. The active `docs/guides/migrate-tier.md` route is inventoried to KBN-101-07 and proves runner-produced `--target-url-file /run/secrets/mosaic-migrate-target-url`, fixed paired provider-version file, and `--target-attestation-file /run/mosaic-attestations/migrate-target.v1.json`; runner-only signing/private-key isolation; Vault KV-v2 same-response version provenance, separate immutable generation mounts, importer CA, JCS/Ed25519 signature/key rotation/revocation, atomic artifact, expiry/replay, safe-fd secret-version/digest, canonical TLS/CA/server/database/role/manifest/schema bindings, dedicated non-DDL importer, consumer isolation/no log-oracle, and exact no-connection versus zero-DML rejection for missing/wrong/stale/replayed/tampered/wrong-key/substituted/generation-mismatched inputs. The full current non-normative docs inventory—including user guide, federation historical task/MILESTONES status, and non-operative SETUP—has an exact safe disposition. Scanner semantic checks reject automatic first-boot/startup extension/schema/migration wording, Compose-up-before-runner, init-script authority, production `.env`/monorepo auto-load/`EnvironmentFile=`/credential-export-or-argv/restart-as-secret-activation routes, and every unqualified operator-document `mosaic-db-migrator --run|--verify` hit regardless of named/normative/status classification. The exact former README/dev/deployment Compose-first sequences, former SETUP wording, exact former MILESTONES wording `pgvector extension installed + verified on startup`, former architecture-plan/PERFORMANCE/backlog runner routes, and any unqualified runner fixture fail before inventory masking. Only one `Held future procedure` Markdown section—bounded through the next equal-or-higher heading—may contain the explicit non-operative/no-current-command-authority form that names KBN-101-00/-03/-05 and preserves external bootstrap → TLS/roles → `mosaic-db-migrator --run` → `mosaic-db-migrator --verify` → Gateway/Compose readiness; every runner hit outside that section fails. The README assertion for the checked-in direct CI `pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/db run db:migrate` with `DATABASE_URL` passes only as active legacy N-1, uncertified, non-authorizing-as-an-operator-route status against an isolated disposable CI database pending KBN-101-06 removal—not as an ordinary operator or approved DDL-authority route. Only local PGlite data-layer work or non-PostgreSQL Compose is current (Gateway/Web local startup is held pending daemon/inherited/project-DSN rejection).
+2. `AC-K101-02`: Fixed namespace lock contention/crash/readiness/non-interference and exact manifest-v1 reconciliation tests prove no replica race/runtime auto-migration and fail closed on every missing/unknown/duplicate/ambiguous/corrupt/stale ledger state.
+3. `AC-K101-03`: Actual PostgreSQL 17 + pgvector 0.8.2 control-file, catalog, Drizzle-generation, vector-query/operator, fresh/approved-owner/legacy-shadow/partial/resume/rollback/N-1, and real deployed-role tests prove `trusted` absent/untrusted plus relocatability, external-superuser `SET ROLE` create/update/`RESET ROLE` audit, exact `rolcanlogin=false`/`rolsuper=true`/zero-membership/no-runtime-secret state, platform/schema/extension-owner/migrator/importer/runtime separation, `pg_extension.extowner` plus owner-bearing extension-member/schema/version assertions, and runtime/migrator/schema-owner/importer/all-service-role `SET ROLE`/ALTER/DROP/member-update denial. They also prove `pg_catalog,mosaic` per-session pool safety, `mosaic_extensions` qualification, identifier injection denial, ownership/membership/ledger-read/TEMP/default grants, and unsafe privilege denial.
+4. `AC-K101-04`: Disposable standalone, federated/Swarm, and two-gateway verified-TLS positives plus for both pairs missing CA/wrong CA/wrong SAN/sslmode downgrade, server/Gateway key mode, UID/GID, secret-consumer isolation, and legacy-drain/`hostssl` negatives prove server bootstrap, ordering, and readiness; PGlite is expressly excluded from this PostgreSQL evidence.
+5. `AC-K101-05`: Real runtime-role evidence proves INSERT/SELECT succeeds and UPDATE/DELETE fails for every frozen immutable KBN relation.
+6. `AC-K101-06`: N-1/atomic activation/rollback, Vault/CA-overlap rotation/redaction, health/operator behavior, CI/deployment handoff, independent exact-head security review, and terminal-green CI evidence the foundation before KBN-100; after KBN-100, the real deployed-role immutable-operation certificate and Ultron approval release KBN-105.
+
+**Normative implementation contract:** [`docs/native-kanban-sot/KBN-101-DB-ROLE-SPLIT.md`](./native-kanban-sot/KBN-101-DB-ROLE-SPLIT.md). `ASSUMPTION:` existing `standalone` and `federated` are all PostgreSQL production-like modes; any new PostgreSQL tier inherits these requirements until an explicit versioned amendment.
+
+---
+
 ## Tess Interaction Agent Workstream (TESS)
 
 ### Problem and Objective
@@ -175,6 +250,100 @@ Delivery uses five gated milestones: runtime contracts/security; Pi service/stat
 
 ---
 
+## Official Channel Plugin Workstream (#756)
+
+### Problem and Objective
+
+The Discord plugin currently couples Discord event handling, gateway bridging, and reply routing in one implementation and activates only on mentions. Mosaic needs an official channel adapter that behaves the same no matter whether the bound logical agent currently runs through Claude, Codex, Pi, OpenCode, or a future harness. The Discord connection and conversation address must remain stable while the gateway changes the runtime provider behind that logical session.
+
+The objective is to make Discord the first implementation of a transport-neutral official channel contract, with explicit authorization and deterministic channel/thread routing that future Matrix, Slack, and other adapters can share.
+
+### Scope
+
+#### In Scope
+
+1. `CHN-001`: Transport-neutral channel adapter, route, message, attachment, authorization-principal, response-target, and health contracts in `@mosaicstack/types`, including trusted per-binding logical-agent configuration selection.
+2. `CHN-002`: Stable channel conversation addresses based on logical agent plus channel/thread identity; harness, model, and runtime-provider IDs are forbidden from channel session keys.
+3. `DSC-001`: An authorized untagged message in a configured agent-bound channel routes to the agent and receives its response in that channel.
+4. `DSC-002`: A bot mention in a configured parent channel creates a Discord thread, or reuses the thread already attached to that same native message; the mentioned turn and subsequent thread turns route and respond in that thread.
+5. `DSC-003`: A message already inside an authorized thread inherits authorization from its configured parent and never attempts a nested thread.
+6. `DSC-004`: Guild, parent channel, user, pairing, and role authorization remains default-deny before thread creation or gateway dispatch.
+7. `DSC-005`: Discord service authentication, HMAC envelope integrity, replay protection, attachments, approvals, response chunking, and correlation behavior remain intact.
+8. `DSC-006`: The Discord adapter exposes lifecycle and health behavior through the shared channel contract without importing a harness SDK.
+
+#### Out of Scope
+
+1. The logical-agent lease, fencing epoch, execution grant, checkpoint, or cross-harness takeover implementation tracked by #754/#755.
+2. Dynamic Discord authorization administration in the web UI.
+3. Multi-guild tenant isolation, DMs, slash commands, voice, reactions, or production bot deployment.
+4. Implementing Matrix or Slack adapters in this slice.
+
+### Non-Functional Requirements
+
+1. **Security:** no thread or dispatch side effect occurs until guild, parent channel, user, pairing, role, and bounded per-user/channel rate checks pass; attachment metadata is shape- and size-bounded; credentials never enter source, messages, session keys, or logs.
+2. **Portability:** channel contracts and stable conversation IDs contain no Claude, Codex, Pi, OpenCode, model, process, or provider-specific field; each configuration-owned binding selects its trusted logical agent without changing the channel identity.
+3. **Reliability:** repeated messages for one channel/thread resolve the same conversation handle; reconnecting the adapter does not require a harness-specific rebinding.
+4. **Maintainability:** Discord-specific API translation stays in the Discord package; gateway and future adapters depend on transport-neutral contracts.
+5. **Observability:** thread creation or routing failure is reported without message content or credential material.
+
+### Acceptance Criteria
+
+1. `AC-CHN-01`: Contract and behavior tests prove the plugin route contains only logical agent plus channel/thread identity and produces the same stable conversation handle regardless of underlying harness selection.
+2. `AC-CHN-02`: A mentioned authorized parent-channel message creates a thread (or reuses its already-attached thread), dispatches to the thread conversation, and targets the response to that thread.
+3. `AC-CHN-03`: An untagged authorized parent-channel message dispatches to the parent conversation and targets the response to the parent channel.
+4. `AC-CHN-04`: Untagged follow-ups inside an authorized thread dispatch and respond in that same thread without creating a nested thread.
+5. `AC-CHN-05`: Unauthorized guilds, channels, users, unpaired users, insufficient roles, and rate-limited senders produce no thread and no gateway dispatch.
+6. `AC-CHN-06`: Shared channel contracts are exported from `@mosaicstack/types`, Discord implements the lifecycle/health seam, and no harness SDK is imported by the plugin.
+7. `AC-CHN-07`: Focused routing/auth tests, package tests, typecheck, lint, formatting, coverage, independent code/security review, and terminal-green CI pass.
+
+### Constraints, Risks, and Assumptions
+
+- Dependency: Mosaic gateway remains the policy, durable-session, audit, and runtime-provider boundary.
+- Constraint: This work must not modify orchestrator-to-Pi migration or #754/#755 lease/fencing files.
+- Risk: accepting untagged messages could create noisy or unintended agent input. Mitigation: only explicitly configured channels and paired, role-authorized users are accepted, with bounded per-user/channel message and thread rates.
+- Risk: Discord thread creation can fail because of channel permissions, archived state, or API rate limits. Mitigation: fail without dispatching a turn whose response destination cannot be honored, and emit sanitized diagnostics.
+- `ASSUMPTION:` Configured channels are dedicated agent interaction surfaces, so authorized untagged human messages are intentional agent input.
+- `ASSUMPTION:` Mention in a parent channel selects a public thread; messages already in a thread remain there because Discord has no nested threads.
+- `ASSUMPTION:` One Discord bot may serve multiple configuration-owned logical-agent bindings.
+- `ASSUMPTION:` Static allowlists and paired-user roles are the authorization administration surface for this slice.
+
+### Testing and Delivery Intent
+
+Use TDD for remote-ingress routing and permission boundaries. Required evidence includes parent-channel mention, untagged parent message, existing-thread follow-up, existing-thread mention, thread reuse, unauthorized side-effect denial, stable harness-neutral conversation identity, adapter health, and regression coverage for signed envelopes and approvals. Deliver through issue #756, a reviewed squash PR to `main`, terminal-green CI, and issue closure.
+
+---
+
+## Mos Runtime Portability Workstream (MOS-PORT)
+
+### Problem and Objective
+
+Mos is currently identified partly by a harness-native session and communication process. Replacement/rebinding exists, but no gateway-enforced logical identity or fencing prevents a stale harness from continuing to reply or execute effects after takeover.
+
+The objective is to make Mos a server-derived logical Mosaic identity whose authority can move safely among runtime connectors. The gateway owns identity, lease, policy, and audit; harnesses remain replaceable adapters.
+
+### M1 Requirements
+
+1. `MOS-PORT-ID-001`: Define a normalized logical-agent identity independent of Claude Code, Pi, Codex, tmux, Matrix, and provider-native session IDs.
+2. `MOS-PORT-LEASE-001`: Persist one exclusive connector lease per tenant/logical-agent/binding with CAS acquisition, monotonic fencing epoch, TTL, heartbeat, explicit release, and takeover.
+3. `MOS-PORT-FENCE-001`: Bind every connector dispatch/execution grant to the current server-derived tenant, logical identity, binding, connector, scopes, expiry, and lease epoch.
+4. `MOS-PORT-FENCE-002`: Reject and audit stale, expired, forged, cross-tenant, cross-binding, and unauthorized grants before connector, channel, provider, or tool side effects.
+5. `MOS-PORT-OBS-001`: Emit credential-safe correlation/audit events for lease acquire, renew, takeover, reject, release, and expiry.
+6. `MOS-PORT-ARCH-001`: Runtime/provider adapters consume normalized lease context without adding harness-native schemas to Mosaic core.
+
+### M1 Acceptance Criteria
+
+1. `AC-MOS-PORT-01`: Two contenders for one binding cannot simultaneously hold current authority under concurrency.
+2. `AC-MOS-PORT-02`: Successful takeover increments the fencing epoch and every operation from the old epoch fails closed before side effects.
+3. `AC-MOS-PORT-03`: Gateway/database restart preserves lease and epoch state; expired leases can be recovered only through the authorized takeover path.
+4. `AC-MOS-PORT-04`: Cross-tenant, cross-agent, cross-binding, forged, and expired lease/grant cases are denied and audited.
+5. `AC-MOS-PORT-05`: Unit, migration, repository close/reopen, concurrency, abuse, gateway integration, independent security review, CI, and documentation gates pass.
+
+### Deferred to Later #754 Milestones
+
+Canonical checkpoint/handoff payloads, exactly-once connector receipts, concrete Claude/Pi/Codex adapters, channel cutover, and full cross-harness failover/rollback E2E are explicitly out of M1 scope.
+
+---
+
 ## Architecture
 
 ### High-Level System Diagram
@@ -529,7 +698,8 @@ Discord remote control channel. Architecture inspired by OpenClaw (https://githu
 - Single-guild binding only (v0.1.0) — prevents data leaks between servers
 - Receives Discord messages, dispatches through gateway routing
 - Streams agent responses back to Discord (chunked for 2000-char limit)
-- Supports mention-based activation, thread management for multi-turn
+- Routes authorized untagged messages in-channel; mentions create threads (or reuse the same message's attached thread) for multi-turn topics
+- Uses stable logical-agent/channel conversation addresses independent of the active harness/provider
 - Bot pairing and permission management (Discord user → Mosaic user mapping)
 - DM support for private conversations
 
@@ -702,10 +872,12 @@ Telegram remote control channel.
 
 ### FR-9: Remote Control — Discord
 
-- Discord bot that connects to the gateway
+- Discord bot that connects to the gateway through a transport-neutral channel adapter contract
-- Mention-based activation in channels
+- Authorized messages in configured agent-bound channels work without a mention and respond in-channel
+- Mentions in parent channels create threads, or reuse a thread already attached to that same native message, for multi-turn conversations
+- Messages already in a thread remain there without requiring repeated mentions
+- Stable logical-agent/channel conversation identity survives underlying harness/provider changes
 - DM support for private conversations
-- Thread creation for multi-turn conversations
 - Chunked message delivery (Discord 2000-char limit)
 - Bot configuration via web dashboard
 - Permission management (which Discord users/roles can interact)
@@ -889,10 +1061,13 @@ Telegram remote control channel.
 
 ### AC-3: Discord Remote Control
 
-- [ ] Discord bot connects and responds to mentions
+- [ ] Discord bot connects through the harness-neutral channel contract
-- [ ] Messages route through gateway to agent pool
+- [ ] Authorized untagged channel messages route through the gateway and respond in-channel
+- [ ] Mentioned parent-channel messages create a thread (or reuse their already-attached thread) and respond there
+- [ ] Existing-thread follow-ups stay in the thread without repeated mentions
+- [ ] Channel/session identity remains stable while the underlying harness/provider changes
 - [ ] Responses stream back to Discord (chunked)
-- [ ] Thread creation for multi-turn conversations
+- [ ] Unauthorized guilds, channels, users, pairings, and roles create no thread and dispatch no message
 
 ### AC-4: Gateway Orchestration
 
@@ -936,10 +1111,10 @@ Telegram remote control channel.
 
 ### AC-10: Deployment
 
-- [ ] `docker compose up` starts full stack from clean state
+- [ ] PGlite data-layer work uses no PostgreSQL; optional Compose services are selected individually and do not start PostgreSQL; Gateway/Web local start remains held until KBN-101-02 rejects daemon/inherited/project DSNs before connection or DDL
-- [ ] `mosaic` CLI installable and functional on bare metal
+- [ ] PostgreSQL/federated activation is unavailable until KBN-101-00/-03/-05 deliver external bootstrap, TLS/roles, runner `--run`, runner `--verify`, and Gateway/Compose readiness in that order
-- [ ] Database migrations run automatically on first start
+- [ ] `mosaic` CLI installable and functional on bare metal after the reviewed KBN-101-05 secret-renderer/process-exec or `LoadCredential` interface exists
-- [ ] `.env.example` documents all required configuration
+- [ ] Local-only configuration documentation is distinct from production generation-pinned Vault-rendered consumer material
 
 ### AC-11: @mosaicstack/\* Packages
 
@@ -1091,7 +1266,7 @@ All work is **alpha** (< 0.1.0) until Jason approves 0.1.0 beta release.
 
 6. ASSUMPTION: **Log summarization uses Haiku-tier LLM by default, configurable.** Haiku is well-suited for summarization (compression, not generation — source material is in context). Guardrails: structured output via Zod schema (force extraction of decisions/tools/outcomes/errors as discrete fields), chunked per-session processing (no bulk conflation), extraction-focused prompts. Raw logs stay in hot tier (7 days) as safety net. Users can override the summarization model via routing engine config if they want higher fidelity. Rationale: Haiku is 10-20x cheaper than Sonnet; log summarization runs on schedule against large volumes where cost matters.
 
-7. ASSUMPTION: **Discord plugin starts minimal and single-guild only** — DM support, mention-based channel activation, thread management, chunked responses. Single guild binding to prevent data leaks between servers. Advanced features (voice, components, slash commands, multi-guild) are post-beta. Rationale: Proven pattern from OpenClaw; ship core interaction first; data isolation is non-negotiable.
+7. ASSUMPTION: **Discord plugin starts minimal and single-guild only** — explicitly configured agent-bound channels accept authorized untagged messages in-channel, while mentions create threads or reuse a thread already attached to that same native message; responses are chunked. Single guild binding prevents data leaks between servers. DM support, voice, components, slash commands, and multi-guild operation are post-beta. Rationale: Ship the requested core interaction model while preserving default-deny data isolation.
 
 8. ASSUMPTION: **Telegram plugin is lower priority than Discord** and may ship as v0.0.7 or later if Discord takes longer than expected. Rationale: Jason indicated Discord as the high-priority remote channel.
 

docs/SITEMAP.md

@@ -1,12 +1,30 @@
 # Documentation Sitemap
 
+## Fleet configuration management
+
+- [Generated environment boundary](fleet/reference/generated-env-boundary.md) — roster-derived launch projection, strict local data, legacy quarantine, and downstream interface evidence.
+- [Roster v2 structural contract](fleet/reference/roster-v2-fields.md) — local-tmux schema v2 parsing and structural validation.
+- [Role classes and authority](fleet/reference/role-classes.md) — canonical role resolver and protected authority boundaries.
+- [Executable asset dispositions](fleet/migration/example-profile-disposition.md) — shipped v1 fixture/profile/service validation posture.
+
+## Official channel plugins
+
+- [Channel protocol architecture](architecture/channel-protocol.md) — shared lifecycle, message, stable-route, authorization, and response-target contracts.
+- [Discord administrator configuration](guides/admin-guide.md#discord-ingress-security) — secrets, allowlists, bindings, role policy, and thread permissions.
+- [Discord user workflow](tess/USER-GUIDE.md#discord-conversations) — in-channel messages, mention-created threads, and runtime-transparent continuity.
+- [Channel plugin authoring](tess/PLUGIN-GUIDE.md#official-channel-adapter-contract) — requirements for future Matrix, Slack, and other official adapters.
+- [Discord package guide](../plugins/discord/README.md) — package behavior, configuration shape, and development commands.
+
 ## Native Kanban and canonical task SOT
 
 - [Canonical requirements](requirements/native-kanban-sot.md) — ratified P0–P3 requirements and acceptance criteria.
 - [Workstream index](native-kanban-sot/INDEX.md) — artifact map, lane partition, and delivery order.
 - [Mission manifest](native-kanban-sot/MISSION-MANIFEST.md) — scope, authority, invariants, and gate model.
 - [Task decomposition](native-kanban-sot/TASKS.md) — dependency-ordered implementation slices and ownership boundaries.
+- [KBN-101 database role split](native-kanban-sot/KBN-101-DB-ROLE-SPLIT.md) — rc.16 direct-Drizzle storage-wrapper hold: legacy N-1/uncertified/non-operative pending -02/-03/-06/-08; exact README/user-guide wrapper forms fail before masking and source-consistency rejects runner-delegation copy; held bootstrap → TLS/roles → run → verify → readiness; plus prior attestation, pgvector owner, classifier, TLS, activation, and certification prerequisite.
+- [Federated tier data migration](guides/migrate-tier.md) — active KBN-101-07 operator route: runner-produced target attestation, dedicated non-DDL importer, and paired credential-/attestation-file references only.
 - [Frozen shared contract](native-kanban-sot/SHARED-CONTRACT.md) — schema, API, Coordinator, health, recovery, and migration contracts.
+- [KBN-101 exact-head security review](reports/native-kanban-sot/kbn-101-contract-security-review-82ce325.md) — retained prior REQUEST CHANGES evidence for `da742ca`; rc.16 awaits independent exact-head re-review after closing the current generic storage-wrapper authority HIGH finding.
 - [Initial independent review](reports/native-kanban-sot/canon-initial-review-no-go.md) — KCR-001–016 findings that blocked the first draft.
 - [Final independent re-review](reports/native-kanban-sot/canon-final-rereview-go.md) — closure evidence and GO verdict.
 - [Ultron final gate](reports/native-kanban-sot/ultron-final-go.md) — final requirements, authority, schema, migration, recovery, and evidence review.
@@ -48,3 +66,5 @@
 - [Optional AI egress gateway ADR](architecture/ADR-MOS-EGRESS-GATEWAYS.md) — placement and gates for LiteLLM, Bifrost, and purpose-built translation proxies.
 - [Runtime-neutral Mos identity and failover mission](https://git.mosaicstack.dev/mosaicstack/stack/issues/754)
 - [Logical identity and connector lease/fencing implementation](https://git.mosaicstack.dev/mosaicstack/stack/issues/755)
+- [M1 logical identity and fencing architecture](architecture/mos-runtime-portability-m1.md)
+- [M1 connector lease operations](guides/mos-connector-lease-operations.md)

docs/TASKS.md

@@ -15,10 +15,11 @@
 ## Workstream Rollup
 
 | id  | status            | workstream                     | progress         | tasks file                                                      | notes                                                                             |
-| --- | ----------------- | ---------------------- | ---------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| --- | ----------------- | ------------------------------ | ---------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
 | W1  | planning-complete | Federation v1 (FED)            | 0 / 7 milestones | [docs/federation/TASKS.md](./federation/TASKS.md)               | M1 task breakdown populated; M2–M7 deferred to mission planning                   |
 | W2  | planning-complete | Tess interaction agent         | 0 / 5 milestones | [docs/tess/TASKS.md](./tess/TASKS.md)                           | Issue #706; independent planning gate PASS; M1 issue #707 ready                   |
 | W3  | planning-complete | Native Kanban/SOT              | 0 / 4 phases     | [docs/native-kanban-sot/TASKS.md](./native-kanban-sot/TASKS.md) | Issue #751; canon independently approved; implementation held until canon merges  |
+| W4  | planning-complete | Fleet configuration management | 0 / 12 cards     | This file (§ Fleet configuration management #758)               | Issue #758; M0 docs gate defines the implementation DAG before any fleet mutation |
 
 ## Cross-Cutting Tracking
 
@@ -42,6 +43,30 @@ Active workstream is **W1 — Federation v1**. Workers should:
 2. Read [docs/federation/TASKS.md](./federation/TASKS.md) for the next pending task
 3. Follow per-task agent + tier guidance from the workstream manifest
 
+## Fleet configuration management (#758) — M0–M5 implementation DAG
+
+> **PRD:** [Fleet declarative configuration management](./PRD.md#fleet-declarative-configuration-management-workstream-fcm-758) · **M0 acceptance:** [docs IA checklist](./fleet/FLEET-CONFIG-DOCS-IA-CHECKLIST.md) · **baseline dispositions:** [legacy example/profile inventory](./fleet/LEGACY-EXAMPLE-PROFILE-DISPOSITION-INVENTORY.md)
+>
+> Every row below is one independently reviewable card and **one PR**. `depends_on` is a
+> hard DAG edge; no card may silently absorb another card's scope. All source cards require
+> the repository quality gates, independent code and security review, terminal-green CI, and
+> the applicable acceptance evidence before merge. Issue #758 remains open until M5 closes.
+
+| id         | status      | description                                                                                                                                                            | issue | agent         | repo              | branch                                  | depends_on                                     | estimate | notes                                                                                                            |
+| ---------- | ----------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ----- | ------------- | ----------------- | --------------------------------------- | ---------------------------------------------- | -------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| FCM-M0-001 | done        | Publish normative PRD requirements/acceptance criteria, this M0–M5 DAG, docs-IA checklist, and legacy example/profile disposition inventory; no implementation changes | #758  | sonnet        | mosaicstack/stack | `docs/758-fleet-config-management`      | —                                              | 18K      | Merged via #760 (`c32d85a`); parent #758 intentionally remains open through M5                                   |
+| FCM-M1-001 | done        | Implement narrow local-tmux v2 roster structural contract/compiler with YAML/JSON canonicalization and schema/parser parity tests                                      | #758  | coder0        | mosaicstack/stack | `feat/758-roster-v2-compiler`           | FCM-M0-001                                     | 30K      | #764 squash `aa5b43b`; exact-head RoR and PR/main terminal-green CI; no lifecycle or live mutation               |
+| FCM-M1-002 | done        | Reuse existing profile/persona/provision resolver for roster semantics; add canonical class/authority validation and approved aliases                                  | #758  | native-sonnet | mosaicstack/stack | `feat/758-shared-role-resolution`       | FCM-M0-001                                     | 25K      | #768 squash `a5e8e55`; shared resolver and canonical authority/alias validation delivered                        |
+| FCM-M1-003 | done        | Convert the M0 legacy inventory into executable example/profile/service-preset validation and explicit v1-version/retirement checks                                    | #758  | codex         | mosaicstack/stack | `test/758-example-profile-dispositions` | FCM-M1-001, FCM-M1-002                         | 20K      | #770 squash `e9c4aa3`; shipped artifact disposition validation delivered                                         |
+| FCM-M2-001 | done        | Migrate generic launch chain to deterministic `.env.generated` plus strict data-only `.env.local`; quarantine forbidden legacy keys                                    | #758  | codex         | mosaicstack/stack | `feat/758-generated-env-boundary`       | FCM-M1-001, FCM-M1-002                         | 30K      | #772 squash `191efae`; generated/local boundary and private quarantine delivered                                 |
+| FCM-M2-002 | done        | Add generation-guarded local fleet agent create/get/update/delete mutations with plan/dry-run, atomic roster writes, and recovery output                               | #758  | codex         | mosaicstack/stack | `feat/758-fleet-agent-crud`             | FCM-M1-001, FCM-M2-001                         | 30K      | #773 squash `bc5e736`; generation-guarded atomic CRUD and recovery contracts delivered                           |
+| FCM-M3-001 | done        | Implement local roster-owned reconcile/apply plus lifecycle/status/verify/doctor contracts and stable JSON/exit codes                                                  | #758  | codex         | mosaicstack/stack | `feat/758-local-reconciler`             | FCM-M2-001, FCM-M2-002                         | 35K      | #785 squash `4990905`; exact roster-owned systemd/tmux reconcile and lifecycle contracts delivered               |
+| FCM-M3-002 | in-progress | Add isolated systemd/tmux lifecycle, drift, socket, unmanaged-session, crash, and rollback acceptance coverage                                                         | #758  | sonnet        | mosaicstack/stack | `test/758-reconciler-lifecycle-gates`   | FCM-M3-001                                     | 25K      | Canonical v2 named-socket + legacy-v1 default-server boundaries; fake adapters/temp fixtures only                |
+| FCM-M4-001 | not-started | Implement field-complete v1-to-v2 inventory/preview/migrator with alias, lifecycle, env-quarantine, and remote/connector disposition evidence                          | #758  | codex         | mosaicstack/stack | `feat/758-v1-v2-migrator`               | FCM-M1-003, FCM-M3-001                         | 35K      | Preview first; no unreviewed lifecycle inference                                                                 |
+| FCM-M4-002 | not-started | Add reversible canary migration, rollback, stale-projection/orphan classification, and current-host 9-managed/3-unmanaged fixture coverage                             | #758  | sonnet        | mosaicstack/stack | `test/758-migration-rollback-gates`     | FCM-M4-001, FCM-M3-002                         | 25K      | Never starts a previously stopped agent or kills an unproven unmanaged session                                   |
+| FCM-M5-001 | not-started | Deliver the accepted fleet documentation IA, how-to/operations/migration references, and link/example validation                                                       | #758  | haiku         | mosaicstack/stack | `docs/758-fleet-config-operator-docs`   | FCM-M1-003, FCM-M2-002, FCM-M3-001, FCM-M4-001 | 24K      | Must close every checklist item or record an approved deferral                                                   |
+| FCM-M5-002 | not-started | Package/update asset-drift checks, rolling local canary, independent validation certificate, and release evidence                                                      | #758  | sonnet        | mosaicstack/stack | `feat/758-fleet-config-release-gate`    | FCM-M3-002, FCM-M4-002, FCM-M5-001             | 30K      | Final #758 gate: quality, independent code/security review, validator certificate, merge-gate approval, green CI |
+
 ## Thin-core prompt diet (#528) — feat/contract-thin-core
 
 - Status: PR open, awaiting maintainer merge ratification (fleet-governing change).

docs/architecture/channel-protocol.md

@@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
 # Channel Protocol Architecture
 
-**Status:** Draft
+**Status:** Official adapter baseline implemented by #756; extended registry/multiplexing remains iterative
 **Authors:** Mosaic Core Team
-**Last Updated:** 2026-03-22
+**Last Updated:** 2026-07-14
-**Covers:** M7-001 (IChannelAdapter interface), M7-002 (ChannelMessage protocol), M7-003 (Matrix integration design), M7-004 (conversation multiplexing), M7-005 (remote auth bridging), M7-006 (agent-to-agent communication via Matrix), M7-007 (multi-user isolation in Matrix)
+**Covers:** M7-001 (OfficialChannelAdapter interface), M7-002 (ChannelMessageDto protocol), M7-003 (Matrix integration design), M7-004 (conversation multiplexing), M7-005 (remote auth bridging), M7-006 (agent-to-agent communication via Matrix), M7-007 (multi-user isolation in Matrix)
 
 ---
 
@@ -11,93 +11,80 @@
 
 The channel protocol defines a unified abstraction layer between Mosaic's core messaging infrastructure and the external communication channels it supports (Matrix, Discord, Telegram, TUI, WebUI, and future channels).
 
-The protocol consists of two main contracts:
+The implemented baseline is exported from `@mosaicstack/types` and consists of four contract groups:
 
-1. `IChannelAdapter` — the interface each channel driver must implement.
+1. `OfficialChannelAdapter` — transport lifecycle and connection health.
-2. `ChannelMessage` — the canonical message format that flows through the system.
+2. `ChannelMessageDto` / `ChannelAttachmentDto` — canonical transport data.
+3. `ChannelConversationRouteDto` — stable logical-agent conversation and authorization address.
+4. `ChannelResponseTargetDto` — channel/thread destination for replies.
 
-All channel-specific translation logic lives inside the adapter implementation. The rest of Mosaic works exclusively with `ChannelMessage` objects.
+All channel-specific translation logic lives inside the adapter implementation. Runtime selection does not: gateway durable-session and provider services may rebind the logical session from Claude to Codex, Pi, OpenCode, or another harness without reconnecting the channel adapter.
 
 ---
 
-## M7-001: IChannelAdapter Interface
+## M7-001: OfficialChannelAdapter Interface
 
 ```typescript
-interface IChannelAdapter {
+interface OfficialChannelAdapter {
-  /**
+  /** Stable, lowercase adapter identifier such as "discord" or "matrix". */
-   * Stable, lowercase identifier for this channel (e.g. "matrix", "discord").
-   * Used as a namespace key in registry lookups and log metadata.
-   */
   readonly name: string;
-
+  /** Establish both native-channel and gateway connections. */
-  /**
+  start(): Promise<void>;
-   * Establish a connection to the external channel backend.
+  /** Gracefully close connections and release resources. */
-   * Called once at application startup. Must be idempotent (safe to call
+  stop(): Promise<void>;
-   * when already connected).
+  /** Best-effort health; ordinary disconnection is a result, not an exception. */
-   */
+  health(): Promise<{
-  connect(): Promise<void>;
+    status: 'connected' | 'degraded' | 'disconnected';
-
+    detail?: string;
-  /**
+  }>;
-   * Gracefully disconnect from the channel backend.
-   * Must flush in-flight sends and release resources before resolving.
-   */
-  disconnect(): Promise<void>;
-
-  /**
-   * Return the current health of the adapter connection.
-   * Used by the admin health endpoint and alerting.
-   *
-   * - "connected"    — fully operational
-   * - "degraded"     — partial connectivity (e.g. read-only, rate-limited)
-   * - "disconnected" — no connection to channel backend
-   */
-  health(): Promise<{ status: 'connected' | 'degraded' | 'disconnected' }>;
-
-  /**
-   * Register an inbound message handler.
-   * The adapter calls `handler` for every message received from the channel.
-   * Multiple calls replace the previous handler (last-write-wins).
-   * The handler is async; the adapter must not deliver new messages until
-   * the previous handler promise resolves (back-pressure).
-   */
-  onMessage(handler: (msg: ChannelMessage) => Promise<void>): void;
-
-  /**
-   * Send a ChannelMessage to the given channel/room/conversation.
-   * `channelId` is the channel-native identifier (e.g. Matrix room ID,
-   * Discord channel snowflake, Telegram chat ID).
-   */
-  sendMessage(channelId: string, msg: ChannelMessage): Promise<void>;
-
-  /**
-   * Map a channel-native user identifier to the Mosaic internal userId.
-   * Returns null when no matching Mosaic account exists for the given
-   * channelUserId (anonymous or unlinked user).
-   */
-  mapIdentity(channelUserId: string): Promise<string | null>;
 }
 ```
 
+The small lifecycle seam lets the gateway host official plugins uniformly without moving native message translation into gateway core. Message ingress remains adapter-owned; gateway policy, durable session routing, auditing, and runtime/provider selection remain gateway-owned.
+
+### Stable conversation route
+
+```typescript
+interface ChannelConversationRouteDto {
+  bindingId: string;
+  logicalAgentId: string;
+  conversationId: string;
+  channelName: string;
+  authorizationChannelId: string;
+  responseTarget: { channelId: string; threadId?: string };
+}
+```
+
+Harness, provider, model, process, and native runtime-session identifiers are forbidden from this route. Runtime adapters consume the gateway's durable logical-session binding; channel adapters consume only the stable route and response target.
+
+### Typed ingress and egress ports
+
+`ChannelIngressPort` is the transport-neutral direct-integration seam for official adapters. The current deployed Discord adapter preserves its existing HMAC-signed Socket.IO compatibility ingress so gateway-side service authentication, replay protection, approval handling, and correlation semantics remain unchanged; it normalizes the same `ChannelIngressDto` before signing. The adapter uses a supplied `ChannelIngressPort` directly when a future gateway registration provides one. New adapters must use the shared ports rather than adding channel branches to gateway core.
+
+`ChannelBindingDto` contains the configuration-owned workspace/channel→logical-agent mapping and paired external principals; credentials are absent. After native allowlist, pairing, and role checks pass, an adapter submits `ChannelIngressDto` to `ChannelIngressPort.receive()`. It includes the normalized message, `ChannelAuthorizedPrincipalDto`, operation, correlation ID, native message ID, and stable route. Unauthorized input never reaches the port.
+
+Gateway policy and runtime routing produce `ChannelEgressDto`, which `ChannelEgressPort.send()` delivers to the route's response target. Discord's existing HMAC envelope is its authenticated wire encoding of this boundary; future Matrix/Slack adapters use their native authenticated transports while preserving the same actor/operation/correlation semantics.
+
 ### Adapter Registration
 
-Adapters are registered with the `ChannelRegistry` service at startup. The registry calls `connect()` on each adapter and monitors `health()` on a configurable interval (default: 30 s).
+Adapters are registered with the gateway plugin host at startup. The host calls `start()`/`stop()` and may monitor `health()` on a configurable interval. A richer dynamic `ChannelRegistry` remains a compatible future extension of this lifecycle contract.
 
 ```
 ChannelRegistry
-  └── register(adapter: IChannelAdapter): void
+  └── register(adapter: OfficialChannelAdapter): void
-  └── getAdapter(name: string): IChannelAdapter | null
+  └── getAdapter(name: string): OfficialChannelAdapter | null
-  └── listAdapters(): IChannelAdapter[]
+  └── listAdapters(): OfficialChannelAdapter[]
   └── healthAll(): Promise<Record<string, AdapterHealth>>
 ```
 
 ---
 
-## M7-002: ChannelMessage Protocol
+## M7-002: ChannelMessageDto Protocol
 
 ### Canonical Message Format
 
 ```typescript
-interface ChannelMessage {
+interface ChannelMessageDto {
   /**
    * Globally unique message ID.
    * Format: UUID v4. Generated by the adapter when receiving, or by Mosaic
@@ -110,6 +97,7 @@ interface ChannelMessage {
    * The adapter populates this from the inbound message.
    * For outbound messages, the caller supplies the target channel.
    */
+  channelName: string;
   channelId: string;
 
   /**
@@ -119,7 +107,7 @@ interface ChannelMessage {
   senderId: string;
 
   /** Sender classification. */
-  senderType: 'user' | 'agent' | 'system';
+  senderKind: 'user' | 'agent' | 'system';
 
   /**
    * Textual content of the message.
@@ -136,7 +124,7 @@ interface ChannelMessage {
    * - "image"    — binary image; content is empty, see attachments
    * - "file"     — binary file; content is empty, see attachments
    */
-  contentType: 'text' | 'markdown' | 'code' | 'image' | 'file';
+  contentKind: 'text' | 'markdown' | 'code' | 'image' | 'file';
 
   /**
    * Arbitrary key-value metadata for channel-specific extension fields.
@@ -144,7 +132,7 @@ interface ChannelMessage {
    * Adapters should store channel-native IDs here so round-trip correlation
    * is possible without altering the canonical fields.
    */
-  metadata: Record<string, unknown>;
+  metadata: Readonly<Record<string, ChannelMetadataValue>>;
 
   /**
    * Optional thread or reply-chain identifier.
@@ -163,18 +151,21 @@ interface ChannelMessage {
    * Binary or URI-referenced attachments.
    * Each attachment carries its MIME type and a URL or base64 payload.
    */
-  attachments?: ChannelAttachment[];
+  attachments?: readonly ChannelAttachmentDto[];
 
-  /** Wall-clock timestamp when the message was sent/received. */
+  /** ISO-8601 wall-clock timestamp when the message was sent/received. */
-  timestamp: Date;
+  timestamp: string;
 }
 
-interface ChannelAttachment {
+interface ChannelAttachmentDto {
-  /** Filename or identifier. */
+  /** Channel-native attachment identifier. */
+  id: string;
+
+  /** Filename or display name. */
   name: string;
 
-  /** MIME type (e.g. "image/png", "application/pdf"). */
+  /** MIME type when supplied by the channel. */
-  mimeType: string;
+  mimeType: string | null;
 
   /**
    * URL pointing to the attachment, OR a `data:` URI with base64 payload.
@@ -192,18 +183,18 @@ interface ChannelAttachment {
 
 ## Channel Translation Reference
 
-The following sections document how each supported channel maps its native message format to and from `ChannelMessage`.
+The following sections document how each supported channel maps its native message format to and from `ChannelMessageDto`.
 
 ### Matrix
 
-| ChannelMessage field | Matrix equivalent                                                                                                                 |
+| ChannelMessageDto field | Matrix equivalent                                                                                                                 |
-| -------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| ----------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
 | `id`                    | Generated UUID; `metadata.channelMessageId` = Matrix event ID (`$...`)                                                            |
 | `channelId`             | Matrix room ID (`!roomid:homeserver`)                                                                                             |
 | `senderId`              | Matrix user ID (`@user:homeserver`)                                                                                               |
-| `senderType`         | Always `"user"` for inbound; `"agent"` or `"system"` for outbound                                                                 |
+| `senderKind`            | Always `"user"` for inbound; `"agent"` or `"system"` for outbound                                                                 |
 | `content`               | `event.content.body`                                                                                                              |
-| `contentType`        | `"markdown"` if `msgtype = m.text` and body contains markdown; `"text"` otherwise; `"image"` for `m.image`; `"file"` for `m.file` |
+| `contentKind`           | `"markdown"` if `msgtype = m.text` and body contains markdown; `"text"` otherwise; `"image"` for `m.image`; `"file"` for `m.file` |
 | `threadId`              | `event.content['m.relates_to']['event_id']` when `rel_type = m.thread`                                                            |
 | `replyToId`             | Mosaic ID looked up from `event.content['m.relates_to']['m.in_reply_to']['event_id']`                                             |
 | `attachments`           | Populated from `url` in `m.image` / `m.file` events                                                                               |
@@ -216,21 +207,34 @@ The following sections document how each supported channel maps its native messa
 
 ### Discord
 
-| ChannelMessage field | Discord equivalent                                                      |
+| ChannelMessageDto field | Discord equivalent                                                      |
-| -------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| ----------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------- |
 | `id`                    | Generated UUID; `metadata.channelMessageId` = Discord message snowflake |
 | `channelId`             | Discord channel ID (snowflake string)                                   |
 | `senderId`              | Discord user ID (snowflake)                                             |
-| `senderType`         | `"user"` for human members; `"agent"` for bot messages                  |
+| `senderKind`            | `"user"` for human members; `"agent"` for bot messages                  |
 | `content`               | `message.content`                                                       |
-| `contentType`        | `"markdown"` (Discord uses a markdown-like syntax natively)             |
+| `contentKind`           | `"markdown"` (Discord uses a markdown-like syntax natively)             |
 | `threadId`              | `message.thread.id` when the message is inside a thread channel         |
 | `replyToId`             | Mosaic ID looked up from `message.referenced_message.id`                |
-| `attachments`        | `message.attachments` mapped to `ChannelAttachment`                     |
+| `attachments`           | `message.attachments` mapped to `ChannelAttachmentDto`                  |
 | `timestamp`             | `new Date(message.timestamp)`                                           |
 | `metadata`              | `{ channelMessageId, guildId, channelType, mentions, embeds }`          |
 
-**Outbound:** Adapter calls Discord REST `POST /channels/{id}/messages`. Markdown content is sent as-is (Discord renders it). For `contentType = "code"` the adapter wraps in triple-backtick fences with the `metadata.language` tag.
+**Outbound:** Adapter calls Discord REST `POST /channels/{id}/messages`. Markdown content is sent as-is (Discord renders it). For `contentKind = "code"` the adapter wraps in triple-backtick fences with the `metadata.language` tag.
+
+### Discord routing and thread policy
+
+A configured Discord binding maps `(guildId, parentChannelId)` to a stable logical agent and a trusted gateway agent-config ID. Gateway verifies that configuration's name matches the binding logical agent before session creation. The stable conversation handle is derived from logical agent plus response channel/thread and never includes the active harness, provider, model, process, or agent-config ID.
+
+| Inbound location/trigger                   | Conversation and response target                                |
+| ------------------------------------------ | --------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| Authorized untagged parent-channel message | Parent channel; response is sent in-channel                     |
+| Authorized bot mention in parent channel   | Thread already attached to that message, or a new public thread |
+| Authorized message already in a thread     | Existing thread; no repeated mention and no nested thread       |
+| `/approve` or `/stop <approval>`           | Current parent/thread durable session; no new topic is created  |
+
+Authorization order is fixed: guild allowlist → parent-channel allowlist → user allowlist → configured binding/pairing → operation role → per-user/channel message and thread rate limits → thread creation/dispatch. A normal Discord channel's category parent is never treated as the thread authorization parent. If requested thread creation fails, dispatch does not occur because the adapter cannot honor the response target.
 
 ### Discord service ingress security
 
@@ -240,21 +244,21 @@ The Discord adapter is an authenticated gateway service, not an anonymous Socket
 
 ### Telegram
 
-| ChannelMessage field | Telegram equivalent                                                                                           |
+| ChannelMessageDto field | Telegram equivalent                                                                                           |
-| -------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| ----------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
 | `id`                    | Generated UUID; `metadata.channelMessageId` = Telegram `message_id` (integer)                                 |
 | `channelId`             | Telegram `chat_id` (integer as string)                                                                        |
 | `senderId`              | Telegram `from.id` (integer as string)                                                                        |
-| `senderType`         | `"user"` for human senders; `"agent"` for bot-originated messages                                             |
+| `senderKind`            | `"user"` for human senders; `"agent"` for bot-originated messages                                             |
 | `content`               | `message.text` or `message.caption`                                                                           |
-| `contentType`        | `"text"` for plain; `"markdown"` if `parse_mode = MarkdownV2`; `"image"` for `photo`; `"file"` for `document` |
+| `contentKind`           | `"text"` for plain; `"markdown"` if `parse_mode = MarkdownV2`; `"image"` for `photo`; `"file"` for `document` |
 | `threadId`              | `message.message_thread_id` (for supergroup topics)                                                           |
 | `replyToId`             | Mosaic ID looked up from `message.reply_to_message.message_id`                                                |
-| `attachments`        | `photo`, `document`, `video` fields mapped to `ChannelAttachment`                                             |
+| `attachments`           | `photo`, `document`, `video` fields mapped to `ChannelAttachmentDto`                                          |
 | `timestamp`             | `new Date(message.date * 1000)`                                                                               |
 | `metadata`              | `{ channelMessageId, chatType, fromUsername, forwardFrom }`                                                   |
 
-**Outbound:** Adapter calls Telegram Bot API `sendMessage` with `parse_mode = MarkdownV2` for markdown content. For `contentType = "image"` or `"file"` it uses `sendPhoto` / `sendDocument`.
+**Outbound:** Adapter calls Telegram Bot API `sendMessage` with `parse_mode = MarkdownV2` for markdown content. For `contentKind = "image"` or `"file"` it uses `sendPhoto` / `sendDocument`.
 
 ---
 
@@ -262,14 +266,14 @@ The Discord adapter is an authenticated gateway service, not an anonymous Socket
 
 The TUI adapter bridges Mosaic's terminal interface (`packages/cli`) to the channel protocol so that TUI sessions can be treated as a first-class channel.
 
-| ChannelMessage field | TUI equivalent                                                     |
+| ChannelMessageDto field | TUI equivalent                                                     |
-| -------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------ |
+| ----------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------ |
 | `id`                    | Generated UUID (TUI has no native message IDs)                     |
 | `channelId`             | `"tui:<conversationId>"` — the active conversation ID              |
 | `senderId`              | Authenticated Mosaic `userId`                                      |
-| `senderType`         | `"user"` for human input; `"agent"` for agent replies              |
+| `senderKind`            | `"user"` for human input; `"agent"` for agent replies              |
 | `content`               | Raw text from stdin / agent output                                 |
-| `contentType`        | `"text"` for input; `"markdown"` for agent responses               |
+| `contentKind`           | `"text"` for input; `"markdown"` for agent responses               |
 | `threadId`              | Not used (TUI sessions are linear)                                 |
 | `replyToId`             | Not used                                                           |
 | `attachments`           | File paths dragged/pasted into the TUI; resolved to `file://` URLs |
@@ -284,14 +288,14 @@ The TUI adapter bridges Mosaic's terminal interface (`packages/cli`) to the chan
 
 The WebUI adapter connects the Next.js frontend (`apps/web`) to the channel protocol over the existing Socket.IO gateway (`apps/gateway`).
 
-| ChannelMessage field | WebUI equivalent                                             |
+| ChannelMessageDto field | WebUI equivalent                                             |
-| -------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------ |
+| ----------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------ |
 | `id`                    | Generated UUID; echoed back in the WebSocket event           |
 | `channelId`             | `"webui:<conversationId>"`                                   |
 | `senderId`              | Authenticated Mosaic `userId`                                |
-| `senderType`         | `"user"` for browser input; `"agent"` for agent responses    |
+| `senderKind`            | `"user"` for browser input; `"agent"` for agent responses    |
 | `content`               | Message text from the input field                            |
-| `contentType`        | `"text"` or `"markdown"`                                     |
+| `contentKind`           | `"text"` or `"markdown"`                                     |
 | `threadId`              | Not used (conversation model handles threading)              |
 | `replyToId`             | Message ID the user replied to (UI reply affordance)         |
 | `attachments`           | Files uploaded via the file picker; stored to object storage |
@@ -304,7 +308,7 @@ The WebUI adapter connects the Next.js frontend (`apps/web`) to the channel prot
 
 ## Identity Mapping
 
-`mapIdentity(channelUserId)` resolves a channel-native user identifier to a Mosaic `userId`. This is required to attribute inbound messages to authenticated Mosaic accounts.
+Gateway identity-linking policy resolves a channel-native user identifier to a Mosaic `userId` and produces `ChannelAuthorizedPrincipalDto`. Adapters provide native identity evidence but cannot self-authorize Mosaic scope. Discord currently uses configuration-owned paired users; database-backed linking remains the canonical direction for dynamic Matrix/Slack identity.
 
 The implementation must query a `channel_identities` table (or equivalent) keyed on `(channel_name, channel_user_id)`. When no mapping exists the method returns `null` and the message is treated as anonymous (no Mosaic session context).
 
@@ -323,8 +327,8 @@ Identity linking flows (OAuth dance, deep-link verification token, etc.) are out
 
 ## Error Handling Conventions
 
-- `connect()` must throw a structured error (subclass of `ChannelConnectError`) if the initial connection cannot be established within a reasonable timeout (default: 10 s).
+- `start()` must establish the native channel transport or throw a structured connection error. An adapter hosted inside the gateway must not wait for a loopback connection to that same not-yet-listening process; it starts the native transport, lets Socket.IO reconnect, and reports `degraded` until both links are ready.
-- `sendMessage()` must throw `ChannelSendError` on terminal failures (auth revoked, channel not found). Transient failures (rate limit, network blip) should be retried internally with exponential backoff before throwing.
+- `ChannelEgressPort.send()` implementations must throw a typed terminal error for revoked auth, an invalid route, or a missing channel. Only transient rate/network/server failures are retried with bounded exponential backoff; Discord retries reuse a stable enforced nonce to prevent duplicate chunks, while permanent 4xx failures are not retried.
 - `health()` must never throw — it returns `{ status: 'disconnected' }` on error.
 - Adapters must emit structured logs with `{ channel: adapter.name, event, ... }` metadata for observability.
 
@@ -332,7 +336,7 @@ Identity linking flows (OAuth dance, deep-link verification token, etc.) are out
 
 ## Versioning
 
-The `ChannelMessage` protocol follows semantic versioning. Non-breaking field additions (new optional fields) are minor version bumps. Breaking changes (type changes, required field additions) require a major version bump and a migration guide.
+The `ChannelMessageDto` protocol follows semantic versioning. Non-breaking field additions (new optional fields) are minor version bumps. Breaking changes (type changes, required field additions) require a major version bump and a migration guide.
 
 Current version: **1.0.0**
 
@@ -473,7 +477,7 @@ A single Mosaic conversation can be accessed simultaneously from multiple surfac
 ### Real-Time Sync Flow
 
 1. A message arrives on any surface (TUI keystroke, browser send, Matrix event).
-2. The surface's adapter normalizes the message to `ChannelMessage` and delivers it to `ConversationService`.
+2. The surface's adapter normalizes the message to `ChannelMessageDto` and delivers it to `ConversationService`.
 3. `ConversationService` persists the message to PostgreSQL, assigns a canonical `id`, and publishes a `message:new` event to the Valkey pub/sub channel keyed by `conversationId`.
 4. All active surfaces subscribed to that `conversationId` receive the fanout event and push it to their respective clients:
    - TUI adapter: writes rendered output to the connected terminal session.
@@ -561,7 +565,7 @@ Matrix sessions for linked users are persistent and long-lived. Unlike TUI sessi
 - Their `channel_identities` row exists (link not revoked).
 - They remain members of the relevant Matrix rooms.
 
-Revoking a Matrix link (`DELETE /auth/channel-link/matrix/<matrixUserId>`) removes the `channel_identities` row and causes `mapIdentity()` to return `null`. The appservice optionally kicks the Matrix user from all Mosaic-managed rooms as part of the revocation flow (configurable, default: off).
+Revoking a Matrix link (`DELETE /auth/channel-link/matrix/<matrixUserId>`) removes the `channel_identities` row and causes gateway principal resolution to deny the identity. The appservice optionally kicks the Matrix user from all Mosaic-managed rooms as part of the revocation flow (configurable, default: off).
 
 ---
 
@@ -733,7 +737,7 @@ room_retention_policies
   created_at       TIMESTAMP
 ```
 
-The retention policy is enforced by a background job in the gateway that calls Conduit's admin API to purge events older than the configured threshold. Purged events are removed from the Conduit store but Mosaic's PostgreSQL message store retains the canonical `ChannelMessage` record unless the Mosaic retention policy also covers it.
+The retention policy is enforced by a background job in the gateway that calls Conduit's admin API to purge events older than the configured threshold. Purged events are removed from the Conduit store but Mosaic's PostgreSQL message store retains the canonical `ChannelMessageDto` record unless the Mosaic retention policy also covers it.
 
 Default retention values:
 

docs/architecture/mos-runtime-portability-m1.md

@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+# Mos Runtime Portability M1 — Logical Identity and Fencing
+
+## Boundary
+
+M1 separates the logical Mosaic agent from any Claude, Pi, Codex, tmux, Matrix, or provider-native session. The normalized identity is:
+
+```text
+(tenant_id, logical_agent_id, binding_id)
+```
+
+`logical_agent_id` is a server-owned stable identifier. A connector is a replaceable holder of a lease for one binding; it is not the agent identity.
+
+## Durable lease model
+
+PostgreSQL table `logical_agent_connector_leases` has one unique row per identity/binding tuple. The current row records:
+
+- an opaque lease UUID;
+- connector ID and normalized allowed scopes;
+- a positive decimal fencing epoch stored as PostgreSQL `bigint`;
+- acquired, heartbeat, expiry, release, and update timestamps.
+
+Initial acquisition is insert-only. An existing active row causes `lease_held`. An expired or released row causes `takeover_required`; ordinary acquisition cannot recover it. Authorized takeover uses compare-and-swap against the expected epoch, rotates the lease UUID, and increments the epoch atomically. Heartbeat and release match the full identity, binding, connector, lease UUID, and epoch.
+
+The companion `connector_lease_audit_log` is append-only metadata. It stores lifecycle event, outcome/reason, identity/binding/connector, epoch, correlation ID, and timestamp. It deliberately excludes scopes, grant objects, payloads, approval references, tokens, and credentials.
+
+## Execution grants
+
+`ConnectorLeaseCoordinator` issues a short-lived internal grant only after rereading the durable current lease. Defense-in-depth caps leases at 5 minutes and grants at 30 seconds by default; constructor options may tighten these limits. A grant is bound to tenant, logical agent, binding, connector, lease UUID, scope subset, expiry, and epoch.
+
+Validation occurs immediately before adapter invocation and rereads PostgreSQL. The adapter receives only `ConnectorExecutionContext`; harness-native schemas remain behind the adapter. Validation denies:
+
+- grants not minted by the current gateway process (including cloned/forged objects);
+- expired grants or leases;
+- released leases;
+- stale epochs or replaced connector/lease UUIDs;
+- missing/cross-tenant/cross-agent/cross-binding leases;
+- scopes not authorized by both grant and current lease.
+
+A gateway restart intentionally invalidates process-local grants. The durable lease and epoch survive, and a fresh grant may be issued only after current-lease and gateway-policy validation.
+
+## Concurrency and side-effect rule
+
+The database CAS determines the sole current holder. A successful takeover makes every old-epoch validation fail. Connector adapters must consume and propagate the normalized lease epoch/context so downstream effect boundaries can also fence races that occur after gateway validation.
+
+M1 does not provide exactly-once receipts or a side-effect journal. Those remain later #754 work; callers must not infer exactly-once delivery from lease fencing.
+
+## Extension boundary
+
+`ConnectorLeaseService` is the gateway-owned policy surface. Every policy decision receives the normalized requested scopes and TTL (or explicit `null` where no TTL applies), so a concrete policy can enforce least privilege and duration limits. Its production default policy denies every lease/grant operation until a server-configured connector policy is supplied. No M1 HTTP endpoint accepts caller-controlled tenant or logical identity, and no concrete Claude/Pi/Codex adapter or channel cutover is included.

docs/design/storage-abstraction-middleware.md

@@ -70,6 +70,10 @@ export function createQueue(config?: QueueConfig): QueueHandle {
 
 ### `@mosaicstack/db` (packages/db/src/client.ts)
 
+> **Historical design specimen — status-only, not an operator instruction.** KBN-101 supersedes
+> this pre-split `DATABASE_URL` fallback shape; it cannot authorize runtime migration, DDL, or a
+> connection-string fallback. See the KBN-101 runner/role contract for the produced interface.
+
 ```typescript
 import { drizzle, type PostgresJsDatabase } from 'drizzle-orm/postgres-js';
 import postgres from 'postgres';

docs/federation/MILESTONES.md

@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ Every milestone adds tests to these layers. A milestone cannot be claimed comple
 - Add `"tier": "federated"` to `mosaic.config.json` schema and validators
 - Docker Compose `federated` profile (`docker-compose.federated.yml`) adds: Postgres+pgvector (5433), Valkey (6380), dedicated volumes
 - Tier detector in gateway bootstrap: reads config, asserts required services reachable, refuses to start otherwise
-- `pgvector` extension installed + verified on startup
+- **Historical/status only:** the prior startup-provisioning statement is superseded. Runtime/startup extension provisioning is forbidden. PostgreSQL activation remains non-operative with no current command authority until KBN-101-00, KBN-101-03, and KBN-101-05 land; this record authorizes no current DDL, Compose/init, or startup path.
 - Migration logic: safe upgrade path from `local`/`standalone` → `federated` (data export/import script, one-way)
 - `mosaic doctor` reports tier + service health
 - Gateway continues to serve as a normal standalone instance (no federation yet)

docs/federation/SETUP.md

@@ -1,280 +1,74 @@
 # Federated Tier Setup Guide
 
-## What is the federated tier?
+> **KBN-101 N-1 hold:** This page is **non-operative** and grants no current command
+> authority until KBN-101-00, KBN-101-03, and KBN-101-05 land and KBN-101-08 activates a
+> reviewed release. It does not authorize a deployment operation, initialization artifacts,
+> implicit extension/schema/migration creation, raw `CREATE`, direct database initialization, or
+> a Gateway against an unverified database. The prior direct-start wording is retired; its
+> regression fixture is owned by KBN-101-06.
 
-The federated tier is designed for multi-user and multi-host deployments. It consists of PostgreSQL 17 with pgvector extension (for embeddings and RAG), Valkey for distributed task queueing and caching, and a shared configuration across multiple Mosaic gateway instances. Use this tier when running Mosaic in production or when scaling beyond a single-host deployment.
+## Held future procedure
 
-## Prerequisites
+This section is non-operative and grants no current command authority until KBN-101-00, KBN-101-03, and KBN-101-05 land.
 
-- Docker and Docker Compose installed
+The deployment control plane—not an operator shell or deployment lifecycle hook—performs this
-- Ports 5433 (PostgreSQL) and 6380 (Valkey) available on your host (or adjust environment variables)
+exact held future sequence after activation authorization: external bootstrap → TLS/roles → `mosaic-db-migrator --run` → `mosaic-db-migrator --verify` → Gateway/Compose readiness.
-- At least 2 GB free disk space for data volumes
 
-## Start the federated stack
+1. External bootstrap provisions the approved database/extension prerequisites.
+2. TLS/roles are installed through the generation-pinned renderer.
+3. The dedicated one-shot runner executes `mosaic-db-migrator --run`.
+4. The same runner executes `mosaic-db-migrator --verify`, including readiness and the
+   importer-target attestation where that route is enabled.
+5. Only after successful verification may Gateway reach its independent verified-TLS Gateway
+   readiness gate.
 
-Run the federated overlay:
+No step may be reordered, skipped, replaced by a raw SQL command, or delegated to an initialization
+hook.
+A missing extension, schema, migration, role, secret generation, or readiness proof is a failed
+control-plane precondition; it is not an instruction to start Compose, retry startup, or create
+anything directly.
 
-```bash
+## N-1 status and required disposition
-docker compose -f docker-compose.federated.yml --profile federated up -d
-```
 
-This starts PostgreSQL 17 with pgvector and Valkey 8. The pgvector extension is created automatically on first boot.
+The current branch retains historical federation artifacts, but they are not a deployable
+procedure. `docs/federation/TASKS.md` records their shipped status only. KBN-101-02 retires
+runtime/init DDL; KBN-101-05 owns the renderer/deployment handoff; KBN-101-06 verifies the
+finite scanner and command matrix; and KBN-101-07 owns this operator route. A path named in an
+inventory, a historical-status label, or a normative requirement cannot suppress the semantic
+checks above.
 
-Verify the services are running:
+Until the activation certificate names an exact release, use no database startup or recovery
+command from this document. For the produced importer interface, see
+[the federated tier migration contract](../guides/migrate-tier.md); it is likewise non-operative
+until activation.
 
-```bash
+## Federation and Step-CA reference
-docker compose -f docker-compose.federated.yml ps
-```
 
-Expected output shows `postgres-federated` and `valkey-federated` both healthy.
+Federation uses PostgreSQL 17 with pgvector, Valkey, and a shared configuration across multiple
-
+Gateway instances. Step-CA issues federation peer X.509 certificates whose custom OIDs carry a
-## Configure mosaic for federated tier
+grant and subject identity. The following facts are reference material only; provisioning and
-
+secret delivery remain deployment-control-plane work under the activation sequence.
-Create or update your `mosaic.config.json`:
-
-```json
-{
-  "tier": "federated",
-  "database": "postgresql://mosaic:mosaic@localhost:5433/mosaic",
-  "queue": "redis://localhost:6380"
-}
-```
-
-If you're using environment variables instead:
-
-```bash
-export DATABASE_URL="postgresql://mosaic:mosaic@localhost:5433/mosaic"
-export REDIS_URL="redis://localhost:6380"
-```
-
-## Verify health
-
-Run the health check:
-
-```bash
-mosaic gateway doctor
-```
-
-Expected output (green):
-
-```
-Tier: federated  Config: mosaic.config.json
-  ✓ postgres         localhost:5433       (42ms)
-  ✓ valkey           localhost:6380       (8ms)
-  ✓ pgvector         (embedded)           (15ms)
-```
-
-For JSON output (useful in CI/automation):
-
-```bash
-mosaic gateway doctor --json
-```
-
-## Step 2: Step-CA Bootstrap
-
-Step-CA is a certificate authority that issues X.509 certificates for federation peers. In Mosaic federation, it signs peer certificates with custom OIDs that embed grant and user identities, enforcing authorization at the certificate level.
-
-### Prerequisites for Step-CA
-
-Before starting the CA, you must set up the dev password:
-
-```bash
-cp infra/step-ca/dev-password.example infra/step-ca/dev-password
-# Edit dev-password and set your CA password (minimum 16 characters)
-```
-
-The password is required for the CA to boot and derive the provisioner key used by the gateway.
-
-### Start the Step-CA service
-
-Add the step-ca service to your federated stack:
-
-```bash
-docker compose -f docker-compose.federated.yml --profile federated up -d step-ca
-```
-
-On first boot, the init script (`infra/step-ca/init.sh`) runs automatically. It:
-
-- Generates the CA root key and certificate in the Docker volume
-- Creates the `mosaic-fed` JWK provisioner
-- Applies the X.509 template from `infra/step-ca/templates/federation.tpl`
-
-The volume is persistent, so subsequent boots reuse the existing CA keys.
-
-Verify the CA is healthy:
-
-```bash
-curl https://localhost:9000/health --cacert /tmp/step-ca-root.crt
-```
-
-(If the root cert file doesn't exist yet, see the extraction steps below.)
-
-### Extract credentials for the gateway
-
-The gateway requires two credentials from the running CA:
-
-**1. Provisioner key (for `STEP_CA_PROVISIONER_KEY_JSON`)**
-
-```bash
-docker exec $(docker ps -qf name=step-ca) cat /home/step/secrets/mosaic-fed.json > /tmp/step-ca-provisioner.json
-```
-
-This JSON file contains the JWK public and private keys for the `mosaic-fed` provisioner. Store it securely and pass its contents to the gateway via the `STEP_CA_PROVISIONER_KEY_JSON` environment variable.
-
-**2. Root certificate (for `STEP_CA_ROOT_CERT_PATH`)**
-
-```bash
-docker cp $(docker ps -qf name=step-ca):/home/step/certs/root_ca.crt /tmp/step-ca-root.crt
-```
-
-This PEM file is the CA's root certificate, used to verify peer certificates issued by step-ca. Pass its path to the gateway via `STEP_CA_ROOT_CERT_PATH`.
-
-### Custom OID Registry
-
-Federation certificates include custom OIDs in the certificate extension. These encode authorization metadata:
 
 | OID                 | Name                     | Description           |
-| ------------------- | ---------------------- | --------------------- |
+| ------------------- | ------------------------ | --------------------- |
-| 1.3.6.1.4.1.99999.1 | mosaic_grant_id        | Federation grant UUID |
+| 1.3.6.1.4.1.99999.1 | `mosaic_grant_id`        | Federation grant UUID |
-| 1.3.6.1.4.1.99999.2 | mosaic_subject_user_id | Subject user UUID     |
+| 1.3.6.1.4.1.99999.2 | `mosaic_subject_user_id` | Subject user UUID     |
 
-These OIDs are verified by the gateway after the CSR is signed, ensuring the certificate was issued with the correct grant and user context.
+The internal arc `1.3.6.1.4.1.99999` is development-only. Before an externally reachable
+production deployment, register an IANA Private Enterprise Number and version the assignments.
+Each value is DER-encoded as an ASN.1 UTF8String containing the UUID.
 
-### Environment Variables
+The future activated Gateway requires `STEP_CA_URL`, `STEP_CA_PROVISIONER_PASSWORD`,
+`STEP_CA_PROVISIONER_KEY_JSON`, `STEP_CA_ROOT_CERT_PATH`, and `BETTER_AUTH_SECRET` through the
+reviewed secret mechanism. These names do not authorize shell exports, copied credential files,
+or an ad hoc service start.
 
-Configure the gateway with the following environment variables before startup:
+## Failure disposition
 
-| Variable                       | Required | Description                                                                                               |
+- A TLS, CA, SAN, role, runner, or readiness failure is a control-plane incident. Preserve only
-| ------------------------------ | -------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+  sanitized evidence and follow the approved rollback/repair record.
-| `STEP_CA_URL`                  | Yes      | Base URL of the step-ca instance, e.g. `https://step-ca:9000` (use `https://localhost:9000` in local dev) |
+- A pgvector/extension failure is a failed external-bootstrap or runner precondition. Do not use
-| `STEP_CA_PROVISIONER_KEY_JSON` | Yes      | JSON-encoded JWK from `/home/step/secrets/mosaic-fed.json`                                                |
+  direct extension SQL, init artifacts, or a startup retry as remediation.
-| `STEP_CA_ROOT_CERT_PATH`       | Yes      | Absolute path to the root CA certificate (e.g. `/tmp/step-ca-root.crt`)                                   |
+- A port, container, or Valkey problem does not permit bypassing the activation sequence.
-| `BETTER_AUTH_SECRET`           | Yes      | Secret used to seal peer private keys at rest; already required for M1                                    |
+- Federation peer-key rotation remains deferred until its separately approved migration plan;
-
+  do not rotate `BETTER_AUTH_SECRET` without that plan.
-Example environment setup:
-
-```bash
-export STEP_CA_URL="https://localhost:9000"
-export STEP_CA_PROVISIONER_KEY_JSON="$(cat /tmp/step-ca-provisioner.json)"
-export STEP_CA_ROOT_CERT_PATH="/tmp/step-ca-root.crt"
-export BETTER_AUTH_SECRET="<your-secret>"
-```
-
-## Troubleshooting
-
-### Port conflicts
-
-**Symptom:** `bind: address already in use`
-
-**Fix:** Stop the base dev stack first:
-
-```bash
-docker compose down
-docker compose -f docker-compose.federated.yml --profile federated up -d
-```
-
-Or change the host port with an environment variable:
-
-```bash
-PG_FEDERATED_HOST_PORT=5434 VALKEY_FEDERATED_HOST_PORT=6381 \
-  docker compose -f docker-compose.federated.yml --profile federated up -d
-```
-
-### pgvector extension error
-
-**Symptom:** `ERROR: could not open extension control file`
-
-**Fix:** pgvector is created at first boot. Check logs:
-
-```bash
-docker compose -f docker-compose.federated.yml logs postgres-federated | grep -i vector
-```
-
-If missing, exec into the container and create it manually:
-
-```bash
-docker exec <postgres-federated-id> psql -U mosaic -d mosaic -c "CREATE EXTENSION vector;"
-```
-
-### Valkey connection refused
-
-**Symptom:** `Error: connect ECONNREFUSED 127.0.0.1:6380`
-
-**Fix:** Check service health:
-
-```bash
-docker compose -f docker-compose.federated.yml logs valkey-federated
-```
-
-If Valkey is running, verify your firewall allows 6380. On macOS, Docker Desktop may require binding to `host.docker.internal` instead of `localhost`.
-
-## Key rotation (deferred)
-
-Federation peer private keys (`federation_peers.client_key_pem`) are sealed at rest using AES-256-GCM with a key derived from `BETTER_AUTH_SECRET` via SHA-256. If `BETTER_AUTH_SECRET` is rotated, all sealed `client_key_pem` values in the database become unreadable and must be re-sealed with the new key before rotation completes.
-
-The full key rotation procedure (decrypt all rows with old key, re-encrypt with new key, atomically swap the secret) is out of scope for M2. Operators must not rotate `BETTER_AUTH_SECRET` without a migration plan for all sealed federation peer keys.
-
-## OID Assignments — Mosaic Internal OID Arc
-
-Mosaic uses the private enterprise arc `1.3.6.1.4.1.99999` for custom X.509
-certificate extensions in federation grant certificates.
-
-**IMPORTANT:** This is a development/internal OID arc. Before deploying to a
-production environment accessible by external parties, register a proper IANA
-Private Enterprise Number (PEN) at <https://pen.iana.org/pen/PenApplication.page>
-and update these assignments accordingly.
-
-### Assigned OIDs
-
-| OID                   | Symbolic name                     | Description                                               |
-| --------------------- | --------------------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------- |
-| `1.3.6.1.4.1.99999.1` | `mosaic.federation.grantId`       | UUID of the `federation_grants` row authorising this cert |
-| `1.3.6.1.4.1.99999.2` | `mosaic.federation.subjectUserId` | UUID of the local user on whose behalf the cert is issued |
-
-### Encoding
-
-Each extension value is DER-encoded as an ASN.1 **UTF8String**:
-
-```
-Tag    0x0C        (UTF8String)
-Length 0x24        (36 decimal — fixed length of a UUID string)
-Value  <36 ASCII bytes of the UUID>
-```
-
-The step-ca X.509 template at `infra/step-ca/templates/federation.tpl`
-produces this encoding via the Go template expression:
-
-```
-{{ printf "\x0c\x24%s" .Token.mosaic_grant_id | b64enc }}
-```
-
-The resulting base64 value is passed as the `value` field of the extension
-object in the template JSON.
-
-### CA Environment Variables
-
-The `CaService` (`apps/gateway/src/federation/ca.service.ts`) requires the
-following environment variables at gateway startup:
-
-| Variable                       | Required | Description                                                          |
-| ------------------------------ | -------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------- |
-| `STEP_CA_URL`                  | Yes      | Base URL of the step-ca instance, e.g. `https://step-ca:9000`        |
-| `STEP_CA_PROVISIONER_PASSWORD` | Yes      | JWK provisioner password for the `mosaic-fed` provisioner            |
-| `STEP_CA_PROVISIONER_KEY_JSON` | Yes      | JSON-encoded JWK (public + private) for the `mosaic-fed` provisioner |
-| `STEP_CA_ROOT_CERT_PATH`       | Yes      | Absolute path to the step-ca root CA certificate PEM file            |
-
-Set these variables in your environment or secret manager before starting
-the gateway. In the federated Docker Compose stack they are expected to be
-injected via Docker secrets and environment variable overrides.
-
-### Fail-loud contract
-
-The CA service (and the X.509 template) are designed to fail loudly if the
-custom OIDs cannot be embedded:
-
-- The template produces a malformed extension value (zero-length UTF8String
-  body) when the JWT claims `mosaic_grant_id` or `mosaic_subject_user_id` are
-  absent. step-ca rejects the CSR rather than issuing a cert without the OIDs.
-- `CaService.issueCert()` throws a `CaServiceError` on every error path with
-  a human-readable `remediation` string. It never silently returns a cert that
-  may be missing the required extensions.

docs/federation/TASKS.md

@@ -16,12 +16,12 @@
 Goal: Gateway runs in `federated` tier with containerized PG+pgvector+Valkey. No federation logic yet. Existing standalone behavior does not regress.
 
 | id        | status | description                                                                                                                                                                                                        | issue | agent  | branch                             | depends_on | estimate | notes                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 |
-| --------- | ------ | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | ----- | ------ | ---------------------------------- | ---------- | -------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
+| --------- | ------ | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | ----- | ------ | ---------------------------------- | ---------- | -------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
 | FED-M1-01 | done   | Extend `mosaic.config.json` schema: add `"federated"` to `tier` enum in validator + TS types. Keep `local` and `standalone` working. Update schema docs/README where referenced.                                   | #460  | sonnet | feat/federation-m1-tier-config     | —          | 4K       | Shipped in PR #470. Renamed `team` → `standalone`; added `team` deprecation alias; added `DEFAULT_FEDERATED_CONFIG`.                                                                                                                                  |
-| FED-M1-02 | done   | Author `docker-compose.federated.yml` as an overlay profile: Postgres 17 + pgvector extension (port 5433), Valkey (6380), named volumes, healthchecks. Compose-up should boot cleanly on a clean machine.          | #460  | sonnet | feat/federation-m1-compose         | FED-M1-01  | 5K       | Shipped in PR #471. Overlay defines `postgres-federated`/`valkey-federated`, profile-gated, with pg-init for pgvector extension.                 |
+| FED-M1-02 | done   | Historical shipped-status record: authored a federated Compose overlay with PostgreSQL/pgvector, Valkey, volumes, and healthchecks. It is not a current startup, init, extension, schema, or migration procedure.  | #460  | sonnet | feat/federation-m1-compose         | FED-M1-01  | 5K       | Shipped in PR #471 status only. KBN-101-02 retires its init authority; KBN-101-05 replaces deployment rendering; KBN-101-07 SETUP is non-operative until activation.                                                                                  |
-| FED-M1-03 | done   | Add pgvector support to `packages/storage/src/adapters/postgres.ts`: create extension on init (idempotent), expose vector column type in schema helpers. No adapter changes for non-federated tiers.               | #460  | sonnet | feat/federation-m1-pgvector        | FED-M1-02  | 8K       | Shipped in PR #472. `enableVector` flag on postgres StorageConfig; idempotent CREATE EXTENSION before migrations.                                |
+| FED-M1-03 | done   | Historical shipped-status record: add pgvector support to `packages/storage/src/adapters/postgres.ts`; no adapter changes for non-federated tiers.                                                                 | #460  | sonnet | feat/federation-m1-pgvector        | FED-M1-02  | 8K       | Shipped in PR #472 status only. **KBN-101 supersedes this behavior:** it cannot authorize current runtime extension creation or any DDL; only the runner/external bootstrap contract may do so.                                                       |
 | FED-M1-04 | done   | Implement `apps/gateway/src/bootstrap/tier-detector.ts`: reads config, asserts PG/Valkey/pgvector reachable for `federated`, fail-fast with actionable error message on failure. Unit tests for each failure mode. | #460  | sonnet | feat/federation-m1-detector        | FED-M1-03  | 8K       | Shipped in PR #473. 12 tests; 5s timeouts on probes; pgvector library/permission discrimination; rejects non-bullmq for federated.                                                                                                                    |
-| FED-M1-05 | done   | Write `scripts/migrate-to-federated.ts`: one-way migration from `local` (PGlite) / `standalone` (PG without pgvector) → `federated`. Dumps, transforms, loads; dry-run + confirm UX. Idempotent on re-run.         | #460  | sonnet | feat/federation-m1-migrate         | FED-M1-04  | 10K      | Shipped in PR #474. `mosaic storage migrate-tier`; DrizzleMigrationSource (corrects P0 found in review); 32 tests; idempotent.                   |
+| FED-M1-05 | done   | Historical shipped-status record: prior tier migration implementation.                                                                                                                                             | #460  | sonnet | feat/federation-m1-migrate         | FED-M1-04  | 10K      | Shipped in PR #474 status only. **KBN-101 supersedes this route:** it cannot authorize current credentials, target connection, or DDL. The future active route requires runner verification plus target URL-file and signed attestation-file binding. |
 | FED-M1-06 | done   | Update `mosaic doctor`: report current tier, required services, actual health per service, pgvector presence, overall green/yellow/red. Machine-readable JSON output flag for CI use.                              | #460  | sonnet | feat/federation-m1-doctor          | FED-M1-04  | 6K       | Shipped in PR #475 as `mosaic gateway doctor`. Probes lifted to @mosaicstack/storage; structural TierConfig breaks dep cycle.                                                                                                                         |
 | FED-M1-07 | done   | Integration test: gateway boots in `federated` tier with docker-compose `federated` profile; refuses to boot when PG unreachable (asserts fail-fast); pgvector extension query succeeds.                           | #460  | sonnet | feat/federation-m1-integration     | FED-M1-04  | 8K       | Shipped in PR #476. 3 test files, 4 tests, gated by FEDERATED_INTEGRATION=1; reserved-port helper avoids host collisions.                                                                                                                             |
 | FED-M1-08 | done   | Integration test for migration script: seed a local PGlite with representative data (tasks, notes, users, teams), run migration, assert row counts + key samples equal on federated PG.                            | #460  | sonnet | feat/federation-m1-migrate-test    | FED-M1-05  | 6K       | Shipped in PR #477. Caught P0 in M1-05 (camelCase→snake_case) missed by mocked unit tests; fix in same PR.                                                                                                                                            |

docs/fleet/FLEET-CONFIG-DOCS-IA-CHECKLIST.md

@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
+# Fleet Configuration Management — Documentation IA Acceptance Checklist
+
+**Issue:** #758 · **Scope:** M0 documentation gate for the local fleet declarative-configuration program.
+
+This checklist is an acceptance contract for documentation and examples. It does not authorize
+schema, runtime, systemd, role, profile, or live-fleet changes. An item is complete only when its
+named artifact exists, is linked from the fleet documentation entry point, and its evidence is
+recorded in the M0 task/PR.
+
+## M0 baseline acceptance
+
+- [ ] `docs/PRD.md` states the roster as desired-state SSOT; generated environment, systemd,
+      tmux, and heartbeat artifacts as non-authoritative projections; and fail-closed handling of
+      unsupported or quarantined legacy input.
+- [ ] `docs/PRD.md` defines the required classes and authority boundary: `validator` certifies but
+      does not merge; `merge-gate` remains sole approve-to-land/merge authority; `team-leader`
+      capacity is lease-bounded; `interaction` is request/status only; instance names such as Tess
+      and Ultron remain configurable.
+- [ ] `docs/PRD.md` defines local lifecycle semantics for `enabled`, persisted desired state, and
+      observed state, including stopped-state preservation through migration, apply, and reboot.
+- [ ] `docs/PRD.md` defines the generated-env/local-override boundary, explicitly denies arbitrary
+      command overrides in M1–M5, and requires key-name/hash-only quarantine diagnostics.
+- [ ] `docs/PRD.md` identifies the M1–M5 local-tmux scope and excludes remote reconciliation,
+      connector mutation, secret references, arbitrary commands/channels, gateway convergence, and
+      UI configuration storage.
+- [ ] `docs/TASKS.md` contains the complete M0–M5 one-card/one-PR dependency DAG for #758 with
+      agent tier, branch, dependency, estimate, and evidence expectations.
+- [ ] `docs/fleet/LEGACY-EXAMPLE-PROFILE-DISPOSITION-INVENTORY.md` classifies every current shipped
+      fleet example, profile, and service preset before M1 implementation starts.
+
+## Required documentation IA for M1–M5
+
+| Path                                                    | Minimum content                                                              | Delivery gate |
+| ------------------------------------------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------- |
+| `docs/fleet/README.md`                                  | Fleet configuration entry point, desired-vs-observed decision tree, link map | M5            |
+| `docs/fleet/concepts/desired-vs-observed-state.md`      | SSOT/projection model, drift, generation and ownership                       | M5            |
+| `docs/fleet/concepts/identity-class-runtime.md`         | Stable name, display alias, class, runtime/provider/model separation         | M5            |
+| `docs/fleet/concepts/role-authority-and-leases.md`      | Required roles, validator/merge-gate separation, lease limits                | M5            |
+| `docs/fleet/concepts/generated-env-launch-chain.md`     | Generated/local files, precedence, quarantine and non-shell parsing          | M5            |
+| `docs/fleet/reference/roster-v2.schema.json`            | Executable v2 structural contract                                            | M1            |
+| `docs/fleet/reference/roster-v2-fields.md`              | Every field, default, constraint, compatibility behavior and examples        | M1            |
+| `docs/fleet/reference/cli.md`                           | `config`, `agent`, lifecycle, plan/apply, JSON and exit-code contracts       | M2–M3         |
+| `docs/fleet/reference/role-classes.md`                  | Canonical classes, aliases, authority matrix and instance-name rule          | M1            |
+| `docs/fleet/reference/lifecycle-transitions.md`         | Create/start/stop/restart/apply/reboot/rollback transition table             | M3            |
+| `docs/fleet/reference/status-and-drift.md`              | Desired/observed/managed state, orphans, revision mismatch, doctor output    | M3            |
+| `docs/fleet/how-to/create-update-delete-agent.md`       | Safe CRUD, expected generation, dry-run and rollback                         | M2            |
+| `docs/fleet/how-to/start-stop-restart.md`               | Persisted versus one-shot lifecycle actions                                  | M3            |
+| `docs/fleet/how-to/configure-tess-interaction.md`       | Configurable interaction instance; no hardcoded identity                     | M5            |
+| `docs/fleet/how-to/configure-ultron-validator.md`       | Configurable validator instance; no merge authority                          | M5            |
+| `docs/fleet/how-to/customize-roles.md`                  | Existing baseline + `roles.local` resolution and validation                  | M1            |
+| `docs/fleet/operations/reconcile-and-recover.md`        | Plan/apply failure recovery, generation lock and canary rollout              | M3            |
+| `docs/fleet/operations/env-quarantine.md`               | Legacy-key inventory, private quarantine and redaction behavior              | M2            |
+| `docs/fleet/operations/systemd-tmux-troubleshooting.md` | Socket ambiguity, ownership proof, systemd/tmux drift                        | M3            |
+| `docs/fleet/operations/backup-restore.md`               | Roster/projection backup and rollback boundaries                             | M4            |
+| `docs/fleet/operations/upgrade-assets.md`               | Source-vs-installed asset revision detection and safe refresh                | M5            |
+| `docs/fleet/migration/v1-to-v2.md`                      | Normative field map, observed-state preservation and rollback                | M4            |
+| `docs/fleet/migration/example-profile-disposition.md`   | Final disposition of every shipped example/profile                           | M1–M4         |
+| `docs/fleet/migration/legacy-class-aliases.md`          | Alias, unresolved-class, and retirement rules                                | M1            |
+
+## PRD acceptance-criteria mapping
+
+| PRD acceptance criterion                                     | Owning card(s)                     | Required evidence                                                                       |
+| ------------------------------------------------------------ | ---------------------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| `AC-FCM-01` schema, semantic validation, canonical rendering | FCM-M1-001, FCM-M1-002             | YAML/JSON positive/negative and schema/parser/resolver parity tests                     |
+| `AC-FCM-02` deterministic plan and no-mutation check         | FCM-M3-001                         | Stable JSON/exit-code and desired-versus-observed fixture tests                         |
+| `AC-FCM-03` safe generation-guarded CRUD                     | FCM-M2-002                         | Create/update/delete idempotency, expected-generation, dry-run, and recovery tests      |
+| `AC-FCM-04` generated/local boundary and quarantine          | FCM-M2-001                         | Launch-chain, shadow, injection, redaction, and forbidden-key tests                     |
+| `AC-FCM-05` lifecycle/reconcile/socket/drift safety          | FCM-M3-001, FCM-M3-002             | Isolated systemd/tmux, stopped-state, orphan, socket, and rollback evidence             |
+| `AC-FCM-06` v1 migration and example/profile disposition     | FCM-M4-001, FCM-M4-002, FCM-M1-003 | Preview/canary/rollback fixture plus executable disposition inventory                   |
+| `AC-FCM-07` authority and lease boundaries                   | FCM-M1-002                         | Role/authority/lease denial tests and resolved role contracts                           |
+| `AC-FCM-08` documentation and final release gate             | FCM-M5-001, FCM-M5-002             | Checklist closure, link/example validation, reviews, certificate, and terminal-green CI |
+
+## Cross-cutting evidence gates
+
+- [ ] Every retained or migrated YAML/JSON example, profile, and service preset validates through the
+      same executable schema and shared baseline-plus-`roles.local` resolver used by the CLI.
+- [ ] Every retired example/profile/service preset has a replacement link and deprecation note; no
+      unresolved legacy class or tool-policy alias remains silently shipped.
+- [ ] Documentation examples contain no secret values, arbitrary command override, or product-hardcoded
+      Tess/Ultron identity.
+- [ ] CLI snippets distinguish local fleet desired-state commands from the separate gateway-backed
+      `mosaic agent` catalog.
+- [ ] Migration, quarantine, lifecycle, status, and troubleshooting documentation state that values of
+      legacy sensitive keys are never printed.
+- [ ] M5 release review verifies links, schema/example validation, and that all checklist rows have
+      owner/evidence or an explicit approved deferral.

docs/fleet/FLEET-LAUNCH.md

@@ -1,114 +1,77 @@
 # Fleet Launch Runbook
 
-How every Mosaic fleet agent — workers **and** the orchestrator — is launched, and how to
+The local fleet roster is the sole writable desired-state authority for membership and launch policy.
-configure each one. The guiding principle: **one roster-driven launcher**. There is no bespoke
+Generated environment files are rebuildable projections, not an operator-editable command surface.
-per-agent launch script; the roster plus per-agent `.env` files are the single source of launch
-config.
 
-## The launch chain
+## Launch chain
 
-| Layer            | File                                              | Responsibility                                                                                                                                              |
+| Layer               | Responsibility                                                                                                                  |
-| ---------------- | ------------------------------------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| ------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
-| systemd unit     | `mosaic-agent@<role>.service`                     | One templated unit per role; `ExecStart` runs the session launcher with the instance name `%i`. Defaults `MOSAIC_AGENT_RUNTIME=pi`, `MOSAIC_AGENT_NAME=%i`. |
+| Roster              | `fleet/roster.yaml` supplies the agent name, class, supported runtime, model, reasoning, tool policy, workdir, and tmux socket. |
-| session launcher | `tools/fleet/start-agent-session.sh <role>`       | Builds the launch command, opens the tmux pane, wires the heartbeat.                                                                                        |
+| Projection writer   | Renders deterministic `fleet/agents/<name>.env.generated` from the roster.                                                      |
-| launch command   | `mosaic yolo <runtime>` (or a per-agent override) | Replaces the pane's foreground process with the runtime, fully seeded.                                                                                      |
+| Optional local data | Reads a strict, data-only `fleet/agents/<name>.env.local`; it cannot shadow generated keys.                                     |
-| seeding          | `mosaic`'s `composeContract()`                    | Injects the Constitution/USER/TOOLS/runtime contract, `*.local` overlays, **and** the Fleet-Comms cheat-sheet — all via `--append-system-prompt`.           |
+| systemd             | Starts the launcher with `env -i` and fixed bootstrap data. It does not preload either environment file.                        |
+| session launcher    | Validates generated and local data before it queries, creates, or stops an exact tmux session.                                  |
+| runtime launch      | Derives the fixed `mosaic yolo <runtime>` argument array from validated roster data, then seeds the runtime contract.           |
 
-Per-agent overrides live in `fleet/agents/<role>.env`, generated from `roster.yaml` by
+The launcher never `source`s or `eval`s an environment file and never accepts an environment-supplied
-`generateAgentEnv` (`packages/mosaic/src/commands/fleet.ts`) and consumed by the launcher.
+command. `MOSAIC_AGENT_COMMAND`, command/channel overrides, unknown keys, generated-key shadowing,
+secret-like key names, duplicate keys, comments, quoted/export syntax, and unsafe values are rejected.
 
-## Worker launch path (default)
+## Generated and local files
 
-1. `roster.yaml` carries each agent's `runtime` and optional `model_hint`.
+`<name>.env.generated` is complete, deterministic, and written only by Mosaic. Its ordered keys are:
-2. `generateAgentEnv` emits `fleet/agents/<role>.env` with `MOSAIC_AGENT_NAME`,
-   `MOSAIC_AGENT_RUNTIME`, and `MOSAIC_AGENT_MODEL`.
-3. `start-agent-session.sh` has no `MOSAIC_AGENT_COMMAND` set, so it falls through to the default
-   (line ~44):
-   ```sh
-   MOSAIC_AGENT_COMMAND="mosaic yolo $MOSAIC_AGENT_RUNTIME${MOSAIC_AGENT_MODEL:+ --model $MOSAIC_AGENT_MODEL}"
-   ```
-4. The launcher bakes `MOSAIC_AGENT_NAME` into the pane command (line ~118), so `composeContract`
-   can inject the Fleet-Comms cheat-sheet for that role.
 
-That is the whole worker path: roster → `.env` → `mosaic yolo <runtime>` → seeded pane.
+```dotenv
-
+MOSAIC_AGENT_NAME=<roster name>
-## Orchestrator fold (PATH A — ships today)
+MOSAIC_AGENT_CLASS=<roster class>
-
+MOSAIC_AGENT_RUNTIME=<roster runtime>
-The orchestrator is **just another roster agent** launched through the canonical path — not a
+MOSAIC_AGENT_MODEL=<roster model hint>
-snowflake script.
+MOSAIC_AGENT_REASONING=<roster reasoning>
-
+MOSAIC_AGENT_TOOL_POLICY=<roster tool policy>
-| Piece              | Value                               |
+MOSAIC_AGENT_WORKDIR=<absolute roster work directory>
-| ------------------ | ----------------------------------- |
+MOSAIC_TMUX_SOCKET=<roster socket or empty>
-| host-side launcher | `orchestrator-launch.sh`            |
-| systemd unit       | `mosaic-fleet-orchestrator.service` |
-| tmux session       | `orchestrator` (role-named)         |
-
-Set its launch command via `fleet/agents/orchestrator.env`:
-
-```sh
-MOSAIC_AGENT_COMMAND='mosaic yolo claude --channels plugin:discord@<channel>'
 ```
 
-When `MOSAIC_AGENT_COMMAND` is set, `start-agent-session.sh`'s `if [ -z "$MOSAIC_AGENT_COMMAND" ]`
+The generated launch contract supports `claude`, `codex`, `opencode`, and `pi`. `mosaic fleet add`
-guard (line ~41) is false, so the line-44 default — **including its hardcoded `yolo`** — is skipped
+rejects another runtime before it writes the roster or modifies generated, local, or quarantine state.
-entirely. The override fully controls the runtime and flags. Routing through `mosaic yolo claude`
+The legacy dogfood stub remains an observability-only canary on its separate `mosaic-factory` socket;
-(rather than a raw `claude` invocation) is what gives the orchestrator the same full
+it has no generated-launch adapter and cannot be added through this path.
-`composeContract` seeding + Fleet-Comms cheat-sheet as every worker, with `--channels` and any
-other flags passed straight through to the `claude` binary.
 
-## Launch gotchas
+`<name>.env.local` is optional and may contain only non-secret machine data:
 
-1. **Flag conflict.** `mosaic yolo claude` already injects `--dangerously-skip-permissions`. Do
+- `MOSAIC_RUNTIME_BIN`
-   **not** also pass `--permission-mode bypassPermissions` — the `claude` binary would receive both.
+- `MOSAIC_HEARTBEAT_RUN_DIR`
-   Use `mosaic yolo claude …` alone (yolo covers the unattended posture), **or** non-yolo
+- `MOSAIC_HEARTBEAT_INTERVAL`
-   `mosaic claude --permission-mode bypassPermissions …`. Never mix the two.
+- `MOSAIC_CLAUDE_JSON`
-2. **`MOSAIC_AGENT_NAME` must reach the pane.** The launcher bakes it from the instance name, and
+- `CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR`
-   `composeContract` gates the Fleet-Comms block on it (`launch.ts`, in `composeContract`) — **and**
-   the role must be a member of `roster.yaml`, or the block resolves empty.
-3. **`launchRuntime` guards.** `mosaic yolo claude` runs `checkSoul` / `checkRuntime` /
-   `checkSequentialThinking`. The host needs `SOUL.md` and the sequential-thinking MCP, or the
-   launch aborts (a raw `claude` invocation skipped these checks). Dry-run the composed command in a
-   throwaway tmux session before swapping a live launcher.
 
-## Why per-agent `.env` survives upgrades (#632)
+Paths must be safe absolute paths and the heartbeat interval must be a positive integer. Projection,
+local, and quarantine files must be private regular files; the managed directories must be real,
+private, non-symlink paths. Violations fail closed before tmux interaction.
 
-`install.sh` `PRESERVE_PATHS` includes `fleet/*.yaml`, `fleet/agents`, and `fleet/run`, so
+## Legacy input and diagnostics
-`mosaic update`'s framework re-seed **preserves** your roster and per-agent `.env` overrides
-(glob-aware `cp` fallback; matching TS parity in `file-adapter.ts`). Before #632, an auto re-seed
-could wipe them — which is exactly why PATH A's `.env` override is safe to rely on now.
 
-## Inspecting the comms wiring
+A legacy `<name>.env` is input only during projection generation. Roster-owned keys are regenerated;
+valid allowed local data can move to `.env.local`; invalid legacy input is privately retained at
+`<name>.env.quarantine`. Neither legacy nor quarantine files are launch authority.
 
-- `mosaic fleet comms-block <role>` prints the Fleet-Comms cheat-sheet a given role receives at
+Diagnostics expose only rule code, key name, and a SHA-256 content hash. They do not reveal command
-  launch — its `[host:session]` identity, the exact `agent-send.sh` command for each peer, and the
+text, credentials, or other values.
-  FLIP / `--verify` conventions. `--host <h>` previews a cross-host view. An unknown role or missing
-  roster **fails loud** (stderr + non-zero exit), so a typo is never a silent no-op.
-- Versus `mosaic compose-contract <runtime>`: that emits the **whole** system prompt and reads the
-  role from `MOSAIC_AGENT_NAME` (a full-prompt smoke test). `comms-block` is the targeted,
-  explicit-arg, comms-only view — e.g. `mosaic fleet comms-block coder0-0` to preview a peer.
 
-## North Star / future direction
+## Launch and stop behavior
 
-**Vision:** a webUI lets the user edit each agent's launch config — switch **harness**
+The launcher obtains the agent's socket only from the validated generated projection. It creates or
-(claude / pi / codex / opencode), toggle **yolo**, pick a **model**, set a **command/channels**
+checks the exact `=<agent-name>` tmux target; it never uses an ambient socket or fuzzy session match.
-override — with no terminal.
+The same strict parser runs before exact-stop behavior. A fresh native Pi heartbeat remains authoritative;
+the shell sidecar only provides fallback state when the native marker is stale or absent.
 
-**Continuity — this is not a new launch path.** It is a data-model + UI-binding layer over the
+`mosaic fleet comms-block <role>` can inspect the role's resolved Fleet-Comms block. It is a read-only
-existing roster-driven launcher. Field-by-field status today:
+inspection tool and fails loudly for an unknown role or missing roster.
 
-| Launch-config field      | Roster-native today? | Mechanism / gap                                                                                                                                          |
+## Current M2 boundary
-| ------------------------ | -------------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
-| **harness** (`runtime`)  | ✅ end-to-end        | `roster.runtime` → `generateAgentEnv` emits `MOSAIC_AGENT_RUNTIME` → launcher line 44. UI just writes the field.                                         |
-| **model** (`model_hint`) | ✅ end-to-end        | `roster.model_hint` → `MOSAIC_AGENT_MODEL` → launcher line 44 `--model`. UI just writes the field.                                                       |
-| **yolo**                 | ❌ new               | Launcher line 44 **hardcodes** `mosaic yolo`. A non-yolo toggle needs a roster `yolo` field → emit `MOSAIC_AGENT_YOLO` → make line 44 conditional.       |
-| **command / channels**   | ❌ new               | `MOSAIC_AGENT_COMMAND` is **consumed** (launcher line ~12) but `generateAgentEnv` does not emit it. Needs a roster `command`/`channels` field → emitted. |
 
-**The arc:**
+FCM-M2-001 supplies generated/local parsing, validation, projection, quarantine, and launch-boundary
-
+evidence only. It does not authorize roster CRUD expansion, reconciliation, lifecycle changes, remote
-- **A** — `.env` `MOSAIC_AGENT_COMMAND` hatch: manual, ships now, kept safe across upgrades by #632.
+or connector mutation, site canaries, or migration. M3 must establish the local reconcile/lifecycle
-- **B** — roster-native launch-config: harness + model are already there; add the **yolo** toggle
+path; M4 separately provides migration preview, canary, and rollback gates.
-  (line-44 conditional) and **command/channels** emission to complete the data model.
-- **webUI** — binds dropdowns/toggles directly to those four roster fields.
-
-PATH A's `.env` override is the **manual form** of exactly what PATH B makes roster-native and the
-webUI edits — one continuous arc, not three separate features. PATH B is tracked as #636.

docs/fleet/LEGACY-EXAMPLE-PROFILE-DISPOSITION-INVENTORY.md

@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+# Fleet Configuration Management — Legacy Example, Profile, and Service Disposition Inventory
+
+**Issue:** #758 · **Baseline:** `origin/main` `49e8a541` · **Status:** M0 inventory; no source
+examples or profiles are changed by this document.
+
+The v2 compiler may not silently accept an unresolved class. Before M1 exits, every shipped file
+below must be either migrated and executable, retained as an explicitly versioned v1 fixture, or
+retired with a replacement/deprecation note. Class resolution must use the existing
+profile/persona/provision baseline-plus-`roles.local` resolver; this inventory does not create a
+parallel resolver. The current executable implementation and per-artifact outcomes are recorded in
+[the disposition evidence](./migration/example-profile-disposition.md).
+
+## Examples
+
+| Shipped file                                         | Current class evidence                                              | M0 disposition decision                                                                              | Required M1/M4 evidence                                              |
+| ---------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| `framework/fleet/examples/coding.yaml`               | `orchestrator`, `enhancer`, `implementer`, `reviewer`               | Migrate: `implementer → code`, `reviewer → review`; retain orchestration/enhancer intent             | v2 fixture validates; role aliases and authority matrix tested       |
+| `framework/fleet/examples/general.yaml`              | `orchestrator`, `enhancer`, `worker`                                | Migrate only after operator chooses a concrete canonical role for `worker`; no implicit conversion   | Explicit replacement class, or versioned v1 fixture/retirement note  |
+| `framework/fleet/examples/hybrid.yaml`               | `orchestrator`, `enhancer`, `implementer`, `researcher`, `reviewer` | Migrate aliases; resolve `researcher` through existing role resolver or retain/version               | Shared resolver validation; no ad-hoc class scanner                  |
+| `framework/fleet/examples/local-canary.yaml`         | `orchestrator`, `implementer`, `reviewer`                           | Migrate aliases; preserve its local-tmux canary purpose                                              | v2 fixture validates and preserves safe stopped/running behavior     |
+| `framework/fleet/examples/minimal.yaml`              | `canary`                                                            | Retire or version as v1 unless an existing canonical role contract is selected deliberately          | Replacement link/deprecation note or CI-valid v1 fixture             |
+| `framework/fleet/examples/operator-interaction.yaml` | `operator-interaction`                                              | Migrate alias to `interaction`; preserve instance/display name as configuration, not schema identity | v2 interaction fixture validates; no Tess literal is required        |
+| `framework/fleet/examples/research.yaml`             | `orchestrator`, `enhancer`, `researcher`, `analyst`                 | Resolve `researcher`/`analyst` through baseline + `roles.local`, or version/retire                   | Resolver evidence and explicit disposition for each unresolved class |
+
+## Profiles
+
+| Shipped file                                       | Current class evidence                                                                                                                                                                     | M0 disposition decision                                                                                                                                | Required M1/M4 evidence                                                               |
+| -------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| `framework/fleet/profiles/business.yaml`           | `ceo`, `coo`, `cfo`, `product-manager`, `marketing-lead`, `sales-lead`, `operations-manager`, `customer-success-manager`, `code`, `review`                                                 | Retain only if every class resolves through the existing role library/`roles.local`; otherwise version/retire rather than weakening validation         | Shared resolver CI result for every class; documented role source or replacement      |
+| `framework/fleet/profiles/marketing.yaml`          | `marketing-lead`, `content-strategist`, `copywriter`, `seo-specialist`, `social-media-manager`, `brand-strategist`, `growth-marketer`, `ux-designer`                                       | Same resolver-or-version/retire rule                                                                                                                   | Per-class resolver CI result and replacement/deprecation record if unresolved         |
+| `framework/fleet/profiles/personal-assistant.yaml` | `personal-assistant`, `executive-assistant`, `scheduler`, `inbox-manager`, `researcher`                                                                                                    | Same resolver-or-version/retire rule                                                                                                                   | Per-class resolver CI result; do not infer `interaction` equivalence                  |
+| `framework/fleet/profiles/research.yaml`           | `lead-researcher`, `researcher`, `data-analyst`, `data-scientist`, `market-analyst`, `documentation`, `review`                                                                             | Same resolver-or-version/retire rule                                                                                                                   | Per-class resolver CI result and explicit compatibility posture                       |
+| `framework/fleet/profiles/software-delivery.yaml`  | `orchestrator`, `board`, `planner`, `decomposition`, `code`, `review`, `security-review`, `site-tester`, `documentation`, `merge-gate`, `rebase`, `operator`, `session-review`, `enhancer` | Retain as the governance reference; add `validator`, `team-leader`, and `interaction` only through approved role/profile work, not silent substitution | CI validates all current classes; separate fixture proves required M1 authority seats |
+
+## Service presets
+
+| Shipped file                                         | Current policy evidence                                                                                                                                               | M0 disposition decision                                                                                                                                                                                                              | Required M1/M4 evidence                                                                                                                                                               |
+| ---------------------------------------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| `framework/fleet/services/operator-interaction.yaml` | Generic policy only: `runtime: pi`, `model: openai/gpt-5.6-sol`, `reasoning: high`, `tool_policy: operator-interaction`; provisioning supplies the agent name as data | Retain as a generic service policy, not a Tess identity. Migrate `tool_policy: operator-interaction` only through the approved interaction tool-policy alias/semantic resolver; do not infer a class or machine name from this file. | Service-policy fixture validates runtime/model/reasoning and alias behavior; generic provisioning proves a configured interaction instance is supplied without a hardcoded Tess name. |
+
+## Required disposition controls
+
+1. **No silent aliasing:** only `implementer → code`, `reviewer → review`, and
+   `operator-interaction → interaction` are approved deterministic aliases in this M0 baseline.
+   `worker`, `analyst`, `canary`, and domain-specific classes require resolver evidence or an
+   explicit version/retirement decision.
+2. **No identity hardcoding:** Tess and Ultron are optional instance/display names. An example/profile
+   may demonstrate the capability but must not make a product name a required class or machine ID.
+3. **No lifecycle inference from an example:** examples describe desired configuration only; migration
+   of an installed v1 roster separately preserves observed stopped/running state.
+4. **No secret or command migration:** examples/profiles must not introduce credential values or
+   `MOSAIC_AGENT_COMMAND`; those legacy keys are M2 quarantine inputs, never v2 authoring fields.
+5. **Service presets are included:** service policies are inventoried alongside examples/profiles.
+   They may express launch/tool policy, but do not create a class, a canonical agent identity, or a
+   second validation path.
+6. **Evidence is executable:** M1/M4 CI must enumerate these exact files, validate retained/migrated
+   inputs through the shared resolver, and fail if a file lacks its documented disposition.

docs/fleet/backlog-conventions.md

@@ -15,8 +15,8 @@ The backlog uses the existing Mosaic storage layer; there is **no** new database
 engine (no sqlite, no raw client).
 
 | Condition                          | Tier                 | Data location                                                    |
-| ------------------------------ | -------------------- | -------------------------------- |
+| ---------------------------------- | -------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------- |
-| `DATABASE_URL` set             | Full server Postgres | the configured database          |
+| `DATABASE_URL` injected at runtime | Full server Postgres | the verified runtime database; it never authorizes migration/DDL |
 | `PGLITE_DATA_DIR` set (no URL)     | Embedded PGlite      | that directory                                                   |
 | neither (default)                  | Embedded PGlite      | `~/.config/mosaic/fleet/backlog`                                 |
 
@@ -24,8 +24,7 @@ PGlite is real Postgres semantics in-process — including the row locks the ato
 claim relies on — so the **same code** runs on a laptop (embedded, single-host
 default) and on a full Postgres deployment. Switching tiers is config-only.
 
-The schema (`backlog` table) is created automatically on first CLI use:
+For embedded PGlite only, the local backlog routine may prepare its local schema on first use. **Current operator behavior is PGlite-only.** The PostgreSQL path is held until KBN-101 activation; no current PostgreSQL CLI route, runner, or first-use migration is available or authorized. A future activated PostgreSQL runtime may connect only after its separately certified readiness gate.
-`runMigrations()` for Postgres, `runPgliteMigrations()` for embedded PGlite.
 
 ### Update safety
 

docs/fleet/how-to/create-update-delete-agent.md

@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
+# Create, Inspect, Update, and Delete a Local Fleet Agent
+
+Use the local roster-v2 control plane only. These commands change desired state and derived environment projections; they never start, stop, reconcile, inspect, or otherwise act on systemd, tmux, sessions, or runtimes.
+
+## Read and plan first
+
+```sh
+mosaic fleet get <name>
+mosaic fleet plan create --expected-generation <n> --agent '<json>'
+mosaic fleet plan update <name> --expected-generation <n> --agent '<json>'
+mosaic fleet plan delete <name> --expected-generation <n>
+```
+
+`plan create` takes the name from `--agent`. `plan update` and `plan delete` require the target name immediately after the operation. A plan is deterministic and side-effect free: it validates the complete proposed roster and projection targets without changing files. Use `--dry-run` on `create`, `update`, or `delete` for the same no-write result.
+
+Every successful command prints JSON. `get` returns `{ "generation", "agent" }`; mutation results contain `plan`, `applied`, `authoritativeRoster`, and `projections`.
+
+## Create safely
+
+```sh
+mosaic fleet create --expected-generation 7 --agent '{
+  "name":"coder0",
+  "alias":"Coder 0",
+  "className":"code",
+  "runtime":"pi",
+  "provider":"openai",
+  "model":"gpt-5.6-sol",
+  "reasoning":"high",
+  "toolPolicy":"code",
+  "workingDirectory":"/srv/mosaic",
+  "persistentPersona":false,
+  "resetBetweenTasks":true,
+  "launch":{"yolo":true}
+}'
+```
+
+Create defaults to `enabled: true` and `desired_state: stopped`. It does not start a process. Add `--persisted-start` only to persist `desired_state: running`; that still does not start a runtime in this M2 command. The JSON payload is an allowlist of the roster-v2 fields shown above plus `launch.yolo`; command, channel, secret-reference, and other unknown keys are rejected rather than ignored. The JSON error exposes only a stable code, never the rejected value.
+
+## Update and delete safely
+
+```sh
+mosaic fleet update coder0 --expected-generation 8 --agent '<complete JSON agent payload>'
+mosaic fleet delete coder0 --expected-generation 9
+```
+
+Updates require a complete agent JSON payload and preserve the stable name. Delete removes only the exact roster-owned `coder0.env.generated` projection. It retains `coder0.env.local`, legacy `coder0.env`, `coder0.env.quarantine`, and every unrelated projection. A delete dry-run leaves all of those files byte-identical.
+
+## Handle generation conflicts
+
+Every mutation requires the current authoritative `--expected-generation`. A stale value returns JSON `error.code: "stale-generation"` with a non-zero exit. Reload with `mosaic fleet get <name>` or reread the roster, plan again using the returned generation, then retry. A concurrent mutation returns `concurrent-mutation`; do not force or bypass the lock.
+
+## Interpret partial failures
+
+The roster is authoritative and is written before derived projections. A late projection I/O failure returns non-zero with redacted, actionable JSON:
+
+```json
+{
+  "applied": false,
+  "authoritativeRoster": "committed",
+  "projections": "incomplete",
+  "recovery": {
+    "code": "projection-apply-failed",
+    "action": "regenerate-projections-from-roster"
+  }
+}
+```
+
+This is not a rollback and not a no-op: reload the roster because its generation and membership were committed, regenerate projections from that roster, then plan a new mutation. Recovery output never contains environment values, credentials, or command text.
+
+## Exit and boundary behavior
+
+Handled validation errors and partial projection failures exit non-zero. `plan`/`--dry-run` and normal mutation JSON make the state explicit; scripts should use both the exit code and `authoritativeRoster`/`projections`, not `applied` alone.
+
+The commands operate only on `<mosaic-home>/fleet/roster.yaml`, the local roster desired-state authority. They do not accept arbitrary commands, channels, secrets, remote/connector actions, migration/canary actions, or runtime lifecycle operations.

docs/fleet/how-to/customize-roles.md

@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+# Customize Fleet Roles
+
+Mosaic resolves persona contracts through two layers:
+
+1. `fleet/roles/<canonical-class>.md` — seeded baseline contract.
+2. `fleet/roles.local/<canonical-class>.md` — operator override or custom role; this layer wins.
+
+The same shared resolver is used by profile validation, provisioning, roster-v2 semantic validation,
+and launch-time persona injection.
+
+## Override a baseline role
+
+Create a readable Markdown contract under `roles.local` with the canonical filename and class marker:
+
+```markdown
+# Code — local role definition
+
+The local code role (`class: code`) follows the operator's repository conventions.
+```
+
+Save it as `fleet/roles.local/code.md`. Do not edit generated or seeded baseline assets when the goal
+is a durable local customization.
+
+Legacy aliases canonicalize before lookup. Therefore `roles.local/implementer.md` does not override
+`code`; use `roles.local/code.md`. See [Legacy Fleet Class Aliases](../migration/legacy-class-aliases.md).
+
+## Add a custom class
+
+A custom class remains supported when a readable contract exists for the exact identifier:
+
+```markdown
+# Release notes — local role definition
+
+The release-notes role (`class: release-notes`) prepares operator-reviewed release copy.
+```
+
+Save it as `fleet/roles.local/release-notes.md`, then reference `class: release-notes` and a matching
+`tool_policy: release-notes` in roster v2. Adding only a `LIBRARY.md` row is insufficient.
+
+Names such as `worker`, `analyst`, and `canary` are not built-in aliases; they need genuine custom
+contracts. `agents[].alias`, Tess, and Ultron are display names and cannot select a class.
+
+## Validation and authority boundaries
+
+Semantic validation reads the winning contract and rejects missing, unreadable, or empty files.
+Protected authority is derived from canonical class metadata in code, never from role prose. A custom
+contract cannot claim merge, validation-certificate, orchestration, lease, or interaction authority.
+
+Roster v2 also fails closed when a protected class and tool policy do not match after canonicalization,
+or when an unprotected class claims a protected tool policy. The legacy `operator-interaction` policy
+canonicalizes to `interaction`.
+
+Role customization does not issue leases, store validation certificates, mutate credentials, or
+change lifecycle state.

docs/fleet/how-to/start-stop-restart.md

@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+# Safely Reconcile and Control a Local Fleet Agent
+
+Use the canonical local roster-v2 command surface:
+
+```sh
+mosaic fleet apply --expected-generation <n> --dry-run
+mosaic fleet apply --expected-generation <n>
+mosaic fleet reconcile --expected-generation <n>
+mosaic fleet start <name> --expected-generation <n>
+mosaic fleet stop <name> --expected-generation <n>
+mosaic fleet restart <name> --expected-generation <n>
+mosaic fleet status [name]
+mosaic fleet verify
+mosaic fleet doctor
+```
+
+Start with `--dry-run`. It validates roster semantics, deterministic projections, private managed paths, exact holder ownership, and named-socket state without changing files or lifecycle state. `apply` and `reconcile` rebuild derived projections and enforce only persisted roster state: enabled `running` agents may start, while stopped or disabled agents are not started.
+
+`start`, `stop`, and `restart` are explicit one-shot exact-service actions. They do not persist a lifecycle change. Roster CRUD is the only way to change persisted desired state.
+
+Every command prints JSON. Observation commands report drift without mutation; `verify` exits non-zero on ownership mismatch, unmanaged sessions, or drift. A failed apply that wrote some derived projections reports `projections: "incomplete"` with bounded recovery to regenerate from the roster. A lifecycle failure after projections reports incomplete lifecycle work; it is never represented as a rollback or no-op.
+
+These commands are local only. Remote/SSH/connector entries are inventory/validation-only. Commands do not accept arbitrary runtime commands, channels, secrets, generated-file desired state, or arbitrary tmux sockets.

docs/fleet/migration/example-profile-disposition.md

@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+# Executable Fleet Example, Profile, and Service-Preset Dispositions
+
+**Issue:** #758 · **Card:** FCM-M1-003 · **Status:** M1 executable disposition evidence
+
+This document records the executable disposition for every currently shipped fleet YAML artifact.
+The authoritative baseline classification remains the
+[legacy inventory](../LEGACY-EXAMPLE-PROFILE-DISPOSITION-INVENTORY.md). The executable guard is
+`packages/mosaic/src/fleet/example-profile-dispositions.ts`; its test fails if a shipped YAML
+artifact is added, removed, or left without one of the dispositions below.
+
+## Disposition rules
+
+- **Explicit v1 fixture:** the artifact is loaded through the existing v1 roster parser and must
+  declare `version: 1`. It remains a compatibility fixture; it is not silently treated as a v2
+  roster or given inferred aliases.
+- **Canonical profile:** the artifact is loaded through `loadProfiles`, which uses the shared
+  baseline-plus-`roles.local` persona resolver and rejects unreadable or unresolved classes.
+- **Canonical service policy:** the artifact is loaded through the operator-interaction service
+  policy reader and provisioned with a generic supplied identity. It validates its runtime, model,
+  reasoning, and legacy tool-policy compatibility without hardcoding a product identity.
+
+No artifact is retired in this card. A later retirement requires both a replacement link and a
+visible deprecation note; the executable guard must then record the new disposition before the
+artifact can be removed.
+
+## Shipped artifacts
+
+| Artifact                             | Disposition              | Executable path                   | Compatibility notes                                                                              |
+| ------------------------------------ | ------------------------ | --------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
+| `examples/coding.yaml`               | Explicit v1 fixture      | v1 roster parser                  | Retains approved `implementer` and `reviewer` compatibility inputs.                              |
+| `examples/general.yaml`              | Explicit v1 fixture      | v1 roster parser                  | Retains unresolved `worker` without an inferred canonical role.                                  |
+| `examples/hybrid.yaml`               | Explicit v1 fixture      | v1 roster parser                  | Retains `implementer`, `reviewer`, and resolver-dependent `researcher`.                          |
+| `examples/local-canary.yaml`         | Explicit v1 fixture      | v1 roster parser                  | Retains the local-tmux canary topology.                                                          |
+| `examples/minimal.yaml`              | Explicit v1 fixture      | v1 roster parser                  | Retains `canary` without an inferred canonical role.                                             |
+| `examples/operator-interaction.yaml` | Explicit v1 fixture      | v1 roster parser                  | Keeps Tess only as an example instance name; `operator-interaction` remains compatibility input. |
+| `examples/research.yaml`             | Explicit v1 fixture      | v1 roster parser                  | Retains resolver-dependent `researcher` and `analyst`.                                           |
+| `profiles/business.yaml`             | Canonical profile        | shared profile/persona resolver   | Every referenced business class must resolve to a readable contract.                             |
+| `profiles/marketing.yaml`            | Canonical profile        | shared profile/persona resolver   | Every referenced marketing class must resolve to a readable contract.                            |
+| `profiles/personal-assistant.yaml`   | Canonical profile        | shared profile/persona resolver   | No interaction equivalence is inferred.                                                          |
+| `profiles/research.yaml`             | Canonical profile        | shared profile/persona resolver   | Every research class must resolve to a readable contract.                                        |
+| `profiles/software-delivery.yaml`    | Canonical profile        | shared profile/persona resolver   | Retains the governance profile; authority validation remains FCM-M1-002 evidence.                |
+| `services/operator-interaction.yaml` | Canonical service policy | service-policy reader/provisioner | Generic provisioning supplies the instance name; the policy itself never names Tess.             |
+
+## Running the guard
+
+```bash
+pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/mosaic test -- example-profile-dispositions.spec.ts
+```
+
+The guard is intentionally limited to shipped assets and validation. It does not generate
+environment files, mutate a roster, reconcile a fleet, migrate an installed roster, or launch an
+agent.

docs/fleet/migration/legacy-class-aliases.md

@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+# Legacy Fleet Class Aliases
+
+Fleet class compatibility is intentionally narrow. The shared resolver accepts exactly three legacy
+class names and converts them to canonical classes before persona lookup:
+
+| Legacy value           | Canonical value | Migration action                                                                                                       |
+| ---------------------- | --------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| `implementer`          | `code`          | Replace class and tool-policy references with `code`.                                                                  |
+| `reviewer`             | `review`        | Replace class and tool-policy references with `review`.                                                                |
+| `operator-interaction` | `interaction`   | Replace class and roster-v2 tool-policy references with `interaction`. The legacy service artifact remains compatible. |
+
+Alias support preserves existing inputs while provisioning and typed semantic output use canonical
+identities. Requested and canonical class values remain separately observable during semantic
+validation.
+
+## Lookup and override behavior
+
+Canonicalization precedes baseline and `roles.local` lookup. A legacy-named override such as
+`roles.local/implementer.md` is not a separate authority and is not selected for an `implementer`
+request. Customize the canonical role instead, for example `roles.local/code.md`.
+
+The compatibility file `operator-interaction.md` remains shipped, but `interaction` is the canonical
+role class. Tess is an example display name only.
+
+## Unresolved and custom classes
+
+No names are inferred from historical usage, instance names, or similar wording. `worker`, `analyst`,
+`canary`, Tess, and Ultron are not aliases. An otherwise unknown class is accepted only if the shared
+resolver can read an actual baseline or `roles.local` contract for that exact class. A `LIBRARY.md`
+row without a readable contract fails semantic validation.
+
+Custom classes receive no protected authority implicitly. Protected class/tool-policy mismatches
+fail closed.
+
+## Retirement guidance
+
+New configuration should emit canonical values. Existing inputs may use the three aliases during the
+compatibility period, but operators should migrate class and tool-policy fields together. Do not
+create new legacy-named role overrides; move their intended content to the canonical filename and
+validate the roster/profile before removing the old artifact.

docs/fleet/operations/reconcile-and-recover.md

@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+# Reconcile and Recover a Local Fleet
+
+## Safe sequence
+
+1. Read `mosaic fleet doctor` and `mosaic fleet status`.
+2. Run `mosaic fleet apply --expected-generation <n> --dry-run`.
+3. Resolve stale generation, ownership mismatch, unsafe path, projection validation, or unmanaged-session findings before applying.
+4. Run `mosaic fleet apply --expected-generation <n>` only after the plan is understood.
+
+The reconciler uses the exact roster tmux socket, exact holder session, private installation holder identity, and the complete expected global environment. For mutations it acquires its exclusive lock before rereading the canonical roster and fencing its generation; only that under-lock roster drives validation, planning, projections, and lifecycle effects. Before effects, its exclusive lock proves real private `MOSAIC_HOME` and `fleet` ancestors, uses a private `0600` lock leaf, and binds cleanup to the created file identity and ownership token. A fake holder, contaminated global environment, missing identity, unsafe lock path, or unmanaged session fails closed. It does not adopt, kill, or rename any unproven session. A crash can leave a stale lock for explicit operator inspection; reconciliation deliberately does not guess ownership or remove it.
+
+## Partial results
+
+The roster is never changed by reconciliation. If derived projection application partially fails, JSON reports:
+
+```json
+{
+  "applied": false,
+  "authoritativeRoster": "unchanged",
+  "projections": "incomplete",
+  "lifecycle": "not-applied",
+  "recovery": { "code": "projection-apply-failed", "action": "regenerate-projections-from-roster" }
+}
+```
+
+If projections completed but lifecycle work failed, JSON reports `projections: "complete"`, `lifecycle: "incomplete"`, and the bounded action `rerun-after-inspecting-owned-resources`. If lock cleanup cannot be proven after an effect result, it adds `cleanup: { "code": "lock-cleanup-failed", "action": "inspect-lock-before-retry" }` without changing the known projection, lifecycle, or primary recovery truth. Inspect the retained lock before retrying; no rollback, release, or stale-lock removal is implied. Results do not include environment values, secrets, or privileged command content.

docs/fleet/reference/agent-mutations.md

@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+# Local Fleet Agent Mutations
+
+FCM-M2-002 provides local roster-v2 create, get, update, delete, and plan operations. They only change desired state and derived environment projections. They never start, stop, inspect, reconcile, or otherwise act on runtimes, systemd units, tmux sessions, or heartbeats.
+
+## CLI contract
+
+The commands operate only on the canonical `<mosaic-home>/fleet/roster.yaml` v2 authority and print one JSON object to stdout. `--agent` is a JSON object with the roster agent fields expressed as `className`, `toolPolicy`, `workingDirectory`, `persistentPersona`, `resetBetweenTasks`, and `launch: { "yolo": boolean }`.
+
+```sh
+mosaic fleet get <name>
+mosaic fleet plan <create|update|delete> [name] --expected-generation <n> [--agent '<json>'] [--persisted-start]
+mosaic fleet create --expected-generation <n> --agent '<json>' [--dry-run] [--persisted-start]
+mosaic fleet update <name> --expected-generation <n> --agent '<json>' [--dry-run]
+mosaic fleet delete <name> --expected-generation <n> [--dry-run]
+```
+
+`get` returns the authoritative generation and the selected agent. `plan create` derives its name from `--agent`; `plan update <name>` and `plan delete <name>` require the target name. `--agent` accepts only the documented roster-v2 request fields and `launch.yolo`; unknown keys such as commands, channels, or secret references are rejected. Rejection diagnostics return only the stable `invalid-request` code and never echo a rejected value. `plan` and `--dry-run` validate the complete proposed roster and projections but write neither the roster nor projections. `--persisted-start` is available only for a create request: it records `desired_state: running`, but does not start a process. Without it, create records `enabled: true` and `desired_state: stopped`. Handled failures return JSON with `error.code` and exit non-zero; unclassified validation/projection failures use the redacted `mutation-failed` code.
+
+## Generation, validation, and idempotency
+
+Each create, update, or delete request includes `expectedGeneration`. A request whose expected value differs from the authoritative roster generation fails with `stale-generation`; reload and retry with a newly computed plan. A private mutation lock rejects concurrent writers with `concurrent-mutation`.
+
+`planFleetAgentMutation` is deterministic and side-effect free. `executeFleetAgentMutation` validates the complete proposed roster through the existing structural and shared persona resolver, prepares generated/local/quarantine projections, and writes the roster authority atomically before applying derived projections. Equivalent create retries and delete requests for an already-absent agent are idempotent no-ops.
+
+Delete removes only the exact `<name>.env.generated` projection for the removed roster entry. Operator-owned `<name>.env.local`, legacy `<name>.env`, quarantine records, and unrelated projections remain untouched. An already-absent generated projection is treated as stale derived state, not as a failed mutation.
+
+## Result and recovery
+
+Mutation results are JSON-safe objects with `applied`, `authoritativeRoster`, `projections`, `plan`, and—only if a derived projection write fails after the authoritative roster write—a recovery object. `applied` is true only when every roster and derived-projection write completed. The explicit state fields prevent a partial result from being mistaken for a rollback or a no-op:
+
+```json
+{
+  "applied": false,
+  "authoritativeRoster": "committed",
+  "projections": "incomplete",
+  "recovery": {
+    "code": "projection-apply-failed",
+    "action": "regenerate-projections-from-roster"
+  }
+}
+```
+
+Dry-runs and idempotent no-ops report `authoritativeRoster: "unchanged"` and `projections: "not-applied"`; a complete mutation reports `"committed"` and `"complete"`. Recovery output identifies the authoritative roster path and regeneration action only. It never contains generated/local/quarantine values, credentials, or command text. A recovery result exits non-zero because the authoritative roster was persisted but derived projections require regeneration. Regenerate projections from the roster before attempting another mutation.

docs/fleet/reference/cli.md

@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+# Fleet Control-Plane CLI
+
+The local roster-v2 control plane is `mosaic fleet`.
+
+```text
+mosaic fleet apply --expected-generation <n> [--dry-run]
+mosaic fleet reconcile --expected-generation <n> [--dry-run]
+mosaic fleet start [name] --expected-generation <n> [--dry-run]
+mosaic fleet stop [name] --expected-generation <n> [--dry-run]
+mosaic fleet restart [name] --expected-generation <n> [--dry-run]
+mosaic fleet status [name]
+mosaic fleet verify
+mosaic fleet doctor
+```
+
+`apply` and `reconcile` use roster desired state. `start`, `stop`, and `restart` are exact local one-shot lifecycle effects and never persist a desired-state edit. `status`, `verify`, and `doctor` are observational.
+
+Commands emit one JSON object. Handled precondition errors emit `{ "error": { "code": "..." } }` and exit non-zero. Partial derived/lifecycle effects use explicit `authoritativeRoster`, `projections`, `lifecycle`, and bounded `recovery` fields; they never claim rollback. Any additive `cleanup` diagnostic also exits non-zero, even where known effects are complete: it is not a clean completion and the lock requires inspection before retry.
+
+This control plane is separate from the gateway-backed `mosaic agent` catalog. It is local-only and rejects remote/connector lifecycle mutation, arbitrary command/channel/secret input, and unproven tmux ownership.

docs/fleet/reference/generated-env-boundary.md

@@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
+# Fleet Generated Environment Boundary
+
+**Card:** FCM-M2-001 · **Issue:** #758 · **Status:** unreleased/card-local
+
+The local fleet roster is the desired-state authority. A launch reads a deterministic,
+roster-derived generated projection and an optional strictly data-only local file; neither file is
+a second roster or a command configuration surface.
+
+## Paths and ownership
+
+For agent `<name>` under `<MOSAIC_HOME>/fleet/agents/`:
+
+| Path                    | Owner                    | Purpose                                                                                                                      |
+| ----------------------- | ------------------------ | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| `<name>.env.generated`  | Mosaic projection writer | Complete deterministic launch data rendered from the authoritative roster.                                                   |
+| `<name>.env.local`      | Operator                 | Optional, constrained local machine data. It cannot shadow generated keys.                                                   |
+| `<name>.env`            | Legacy input only        | Read once during projection generation, then regenerated/relocated or privately quarantined. It is never a launch authority. |
+| `<name>.env.quarantine` | Mosaic quarantine        | Mode-`0600` private record of forbidden legacy input; it is never read by the launcher.                                      |
+
+The systemd templates do not load either environment file. They invoke Bash with a fixed, cleared
+bootstrap environment; the launcher reads and validates `.env.generated` and `.env.local` itself before
+it queries, creates, or stops an exact tmux session. It does not `source`, `eval`, or execute an
+environment-supplied command. Exact stop derives its socket from the same validated generated projection,
+not from systemd or ambient environment data.
+
+All projection, local, and quarantine files must be regular files with no group or world permissions.
+The agent environment directory must also be a real, non-symlink private directory; it is validated
+before either environment file is read or tmux is queried. Unsafe paths, symlinks, or permissions fail
+closed. Diagnostics identify only a rule code, key name, and SHA-256 content hash; they never print
+values, credential material, or command text.
+
+## Allowed data
+
+`.env.generated` is complete and ordered exactly as follows:
+
+```dotenv
+MOSAIC_AGENT_NAME=<roster name>
+MOSAIC_AGENT_CLASS=<roster class>
+MOSAIC_AGENT_RUNTIME=<roster runtime>
+MOSAIC_AGENT_MODEL=<roster model hint>
+MOSAIC_AGENT_REASONING=<roster reasoning>
+MOSAIC_AGENT_TOOL_POLICY=<roster tool policy>
+MOSAIC_AGENT_WORKDIR=<absolute roster work directory>
+MOSAIC_TMUX_SOCKET=<roster socket or empty>
+```
+
+The generated launch contract supports only `claude`, `codex`, `opencode`, and `pi`. `fleet add`
+uses that same runtime authority and rejects any other runtime before it writes the roster or changes
+projection, local, or quarantine files. The legacy dogfood stub on its separate `mosaic-factory`
+socket remains an observability canary; it has no generated-launch adapter and cannot be added through
+this projection path.
+
+`.env.local` may contain only these non-secret data keys:
+
+- `MOSAIC_RUNTIME_BIN`
+- `MOSAIC_HEARTBEAT_RUN_DIR`
+- `MOSAIC_HEARTBEAT_INTERVAL`
+- `MOSAIC_CLAUDE_JSON`
+- `CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR`
+
+Local paths must be safe absolute paths and the interval must be a positive integer. Comments,
+quoted/export syntax, duplicate keys, unknown keys, generated-key shadowing, sensitive key names,
+and `MOSAIC_AGENT_COMMAND` are rejected. The launcher derives the only executable command from the
+validated runtime, model, and reasoning data; no arbitrary command compatibility path exists. When a
+Pi runtime writes a fresh `<name>.hb.native` marker, its native heartbeat remains authoritative; the
+shell sidecar resumes its `status=ok` fallback only after that marker is stale or absent.
+
+## Legacy disposition
+
+During projection generation, legacy roster-derived keys are regenerated from the roster. A valid
+allowed local value is relocated to `.env.local`; forbidden, malformed, duplicate, sensitive, and
+unknown legacy entries cause the legacy file to be moved to `.env.quarantine` and are represented by
+sanitized diagnostics. This is deterministic and idempotent after the legacy file has been consumed.
+
+## USC interface packet
+
+This card does not add a USC site file, write a USC roster, or run a site canary. The following is the
+consolidated downstream interface packet. Status is deliberately separated from checkout presence: no
+product release version has been evidenced for this interface set.
+
+| Interface               | Canonical public path and version                                                                                                                 | Tracker/release status                                                                                                | Downstream limit                                                                              |
+| ----------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| M1 structural compiler  | `parseRosterV2` in `packages/mosaic/src/fleet/roster-v2.ts`; schema `docs/fleet/reference/roster-v2.schema.json`; roster `version: 2`             | FCM-M1-001 is recorded done, merged as #764 (`aa5b43b`); no released product version is asserted here.                | Parse YAML/JSON and canonicalize a supplied v2 site roster without writes.                    |
+| M1 semantic resolver    | `validateRosterV2Semantics` in `packages/mosaic/src/fleet/roster-v2.ts`; baseline `framework/fleet/roles/` plus `roles.local/`                    | FCM-M1-002 remains `in-progress` in `docs/TASKS.md`; unreleased.                                                      | Reuse the shared resolver only; no parallel role resolver or lifecycle action.                |
+| M1 disposition evidence | `packages/mosaic/src/fleet/example-profile-dispositions.ts`; `docs/fleet/migration/example-profile-disposition.md`; retained fixture `version: 1` | FCM-M1-003 remains `not-started` in `docs/TASKS.md`; unreleased even though these checkout artifacts are inspectable. | Inspect fixture/profile/service disposition evidence only; it is not migration authorization. |
+| M2 generated boundary   | `packages/mosaic/src/fleet/generated-env-boundary.ts`; generated projection contract in this document                                             | FCM-M2-001 card-local and uncommitted; unreleased.                                                                    | Render/write a roster-derived projection; local input is never authority.                     |
+
+The canonical source remains `<MOSAIC_HOME>/fleet/roster.yaml` for the current local fleet path.
+Generated environment data is a rebuildable projection, not an operator-editable source of membership,
+runtime policy, or lifecycle state.
+
+**Corrected downstream gates:** M2 supplies only parse/validation/projection evidence and does not
+permit a USC site canary, reconciliation, or lifecycle mutation. M3 must first define and validate the
+canonical local reconcile/lifecycle path. M4 then supplies preview/migration and its separate
+canary/rollback gates; only after those M3 and M4 gates may a site migration or canary be considered.
+This card authorizes none of those actions.

docs/fleet/reference/lifecycle-transitions.md

@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+# Local Fleet Lifecycle Transitions
+
+FCM-M3-001 uses the roster-v2 `lifecycle.enabled` and `lifecycle.desired_state` fields as the only desired-state authority. Systemd, tmux, generated environment files, and heartbeats are derived or observed state.
+
+| Command                           | Desired-state write | Runtime effect                                                                                                             | Preconditions                                                                                                             |
+| --------------------------------- | ------------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| `fleet apply` / `fleet reconcile` | Never               | Rebuilds projections, then starts only enabled agents desired `running`; stops disabled or desired-`stopped` roster agents | Current generation; private managed paths; valid projections; proven holder ownership; no unmanaged named-socket sessions |
+| `fleet start <name>`              | Never               | One-shot exact `mosaic-agent@<name>.service` start                                                                         | Current generation; exact enabled roster name; proven ownership                                                           |
+| `fleet stop <name>`               | Never               | One-shot exact service stop                                                                                                | Current generation; exact roster name; proven ownership                                                                   |
+| `fleet restart <name>`            | Never               | One-shot exact service restart                                                                                             | Current generation; exact roster name; proven ownership                                                                   |
+
+A stopped roster agent is never started by `apply` or `reconcile`. Direct lifecycle commands are explicit one-shot actions and do not change persisted desired state. Use roster CRUD with the explicit persisted-start option to change that desired state.
+
+All mutations require `--expected-generation <n>` and acquire one private roster-adjacent reconciliation lock before projection or lifecycle effects. Missing or stale generations and concurrent writers fail before effects; the lock is released after success, partial failure, or thrown lifecycle failure. Stale, ownership, unmanaged-session, unsupported-runtime, path, projection, and lifecycle-precondition failures return stable redacted JSON errors and a non-zero exit. No command targets a fuzzy tmux name, arbitrary socket, arbitrary command, channel, secret, or generated file as authority.

docs/fleet/reference/role-classes.md

@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+# Fleet Role Classes and Authority
+
+A fleet role class is a machine identity resolved from the persona library. Resolution uses the
+canonical class before consulting the baseline `fleet/roles/` and operator `fleet/roles.local/`
+layers. A readable role contract is required; an index entry alone is not semantic success.
+
+## Canonicalization
+
+Only these legacy class aliases are recognized:
+
+| Requested class        | Canonical class |
+| ---------------------- | --------------- |
+| `implementer`          | `code`          |
+| `reviewer`             | `review`        |
+| `operator-interaction` | `interaction`   |
+
+No other alias is inferred. In particular, `worker`, `analyst`, and `canary` are custom classes only
+when an operator supplies a readable contract for that exact class. Tess and Ultron are instance
+names, not classes. `agents[].alias` is display-only and cannot grant authority.
+
+Canonicalization happens before role lookup. For example, requesting `implementer` resolves
+`code.md`; a separate `roles.local/implementer.md` cannot redefine the legacy alias. A canonical
+`roles.local/code.md` still overrides the baseline `roles/code.md` contract.
+
+## Protected authority
+
+Protected authority is immutable metadata derived only from canonical class. Role prose, instance
+name, display alias, tool policy, runtime, and custom role files cannot grant it.
+
+| Canonical class   | Granted authority                                  | Explicit limits                                                                   |
+| ----------------- | -------------------------------------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| `merge-gate`      | Sole approve-to-land and merge authority           | No authority is inferred by similarly named custom roles or policies.             |
+| `validator`       | May issue a validation certificate                 | Cannot approve-to-land or merge.                                                  |
+| `orchestrator`    | May orchestrate, manage topology, and issue leases | Cannot approve-to-land or merge.                                                  |
+| `team-leader`     | May use orchestrator-leased capacity               | Cannot issue leases or mutate roster, configuration, credentials, or merge state. |
+| `interaction`     | Request and status surface                         | Cannot orchestrate, issue leases, mutate roster/configuration, or merge.          |
+| all other classes | No protected authority implicitly                  | Custom contracts do not acquire protected powers from prose.                      |
+
+Roster-v2 semantic validation requires a protected class and its canonical tool policy to match. It
+also rejects an unprotected class paired with a protected tool policy. The legacy tool-policy name
+`operator-interaction` canonicalizes to `interaction`.
+
+This mapping describes authority metadata only. Lease issuance, validation-certificate storage or
+workflow, lifecycle reconciliation, credentials, roster mutation, and merge execution are outside
+this resolver contract.

docs/fleet/reference/roster-v2-fields.md

@@ -0,0 +1,124 @@
+# Fleet Roster v2 Structural Contract
+
+**Status:** FCM-M1-001 local-tmux structural compiler contract. This document describes parsing,
+strict structural validation, normalized in-memory representation, and deterministic rendering only.
+It does not authorize role resolution, lifecycle reconciliation, mutation, migration, remote
+placement, connector configuration, secret references, arbitrary commands, channels, gateway
+mapping, or any live-fleet change.
+
+The executable schema is [`roster-v2.schema.json`](./roster-v2.schema.json). The compiler exports
+the same schema and its test parses this file and compares it structurally with the executable contract.
+
+## Format and canonical shape
+
+The compiler accepts YAML or JSON. It reads only snake_case source fields and renders canonical,
+snake_case YAML. Rendering sorts runtime keys and agents by stable name. Agent names, class names,
+and tool-policy names are structural identifiers; whether a class or policy resolves is a later
+shared-resolver concern.
+
+```yaml
+version: 2
+generation: 1
+transport: tmux
+tmux:
+  socket_name: mosaic-fleet
+  holder_session: _holder
+defaults:
+  working_directory: ~/src
+  runtime: pi
+runtimes:
+  pi:
+    reset_command: /new
+agents:
+  - name: coder0
+    alias: Coder 0
+    class: code
+    runtime: pi
+    provider: openai
+    model: gpt-5.6-sol
+    reasoning: high
+    tool_policy: code
+    working_directory: ~/src
+    persistent_persona: false
+    reset_between_tasks: true
+    lifecycle:
+      enabled: true
+      desired_state: stopped
+    launch:
+      yolo: true
+```
+
+## Root fields
+
+| Field        | Required | Constraint            | Meaning                                                                                                                               |
+| ------------ | -------- | --------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| `version`    | yes      | integer constant `2`  | Identifies this contract. Version `1` is explicitly rejected by this compiler and remains on the existing v1 path until M4 migration. |
+| `generation` | yes      | positive safe integer | Desired-state generation. M2 uses it for mutation guards; M1 does not mutate it.                                                      |
+| `transport`  | yes      | constant `tmux`       | M1–M5 support local tmux only.                                                                                                        |
+| `tmux`       | yes      | strict object         | Explicit local socket and holder-session configuration.                                                                               |
+| `defaults`   | yes      | strict object         | Default work directory and one supported local runtime.                                                                               |
+| `runtimes`   | yes      | non-empty object      | Declared local runtime reset policy map.                                                                                              |
+| `agents`     | yes      | non-empty array       | Local fleet entries. Duplicate stable names are rejected.                                                                             |
+
+## Nested fields
+
+| Path                                                 | Required | Constraint                                                                                           |
+| ---------------------------------------------------- | -------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| `tmux.socket_name`                                   | yes      | non-empty `[A-Za-z0-9_.-]+`; an explicit named socket prevents default-versus-named socket ambiguity |
+| `tmux.holder_session`                                | yes      | non-empty `[A-Za-z0-9_.-]+`                                                                          |
+| `defaults.working_directory`                         | yes      | non-empty string                                                                                     |
+| `defaults.runtime`                                   | yes      | `claude`, `codex`, `opencode`, or `pi`; it must be declared in `runtimes`                            |
+| `runtimes.<runtime>.reset_command`                   | yes      | non-empty string; runtime key must be a supported local runtime                                      |
+| `agents[].name`                                      | yes      | unique `[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9_.-]*` stable machine identity                                          |
+| `agents[].alias`                                     | yes      | non-empty display string                                                                             |
+| `agents[].class`                                     | yes      | `[a-z][a-z0-9-]*`; structural only in M1, semantic role resolution is FCM-M1-002                     |
+| `agents[].runtime`                                   | yes      | `claude`, `codex`, `opencode`, or `pi`; it must be declared in `runtimes`                            |
+| `agents[].provider`, `model`, `working_directory`    | yes      | non-empty strings; provider/model capability resolution is a later card                              |
+| `agents[].reasoning`                                 | yes      | `low`, `medium`, or `high`                                                                           |
+| `agents[].tool_policy`                               | yes      | `[a-z][a-z0-9-]*`; structural only in M1                                                             |
+| `agents[].persistent_persona`, `reset_between_tasks` | yes      | booleans                                                                                             |
+| `agents[].lifecycle.enabled`                         | yes      | boolean; stored now, reconciled in FCM-M3-001                                                        |
+| `agents[].lifecycle.desired_state`                   | yes      | `running` or `stopped`                                                                               |
+| `agents[].launch.yolo`                               | yes      | boolean; structured data only, not an arbitrary command escape hatch                                 |
+
+## Semantic handoff
+
+`parseRosterV2` and `normalizeRosterV2` remain synchronous and structural. After structural success,
+call the asynchronous `validateRosterV2Semantics` handoff before using persona identity or authority.
+That validator batches the baseline `fleet/roles/` and operator `fleet/roles.local/` scans, then
+delegates every agent to the shared persona resolver.
+
+Semantic validation:
+
+- requires the winning role contract to be readable and non-empty; `LIBRARY.md` membership alone does
+  not resolve a class;
+- retains `requestedClass` separately from `canonicalClass` in typed output;
+- canonicalizes only `implementer` to `code`, `reviewer` to `review`, and
+  `operator-interaction` to `interaction`;
+- canonicalizes `tool_policy` with the same exact alias table;
+- rejects protected class/tool-policy mismatches in either direction, while accepting
+  `class: operator-interaction` with `tool_policy: operator-interaction` as canonical
+  `interaction`;
+- derives immutable protected authority only from canonical class; and
+- accepts custom baseline or `roles.local` classes without granting protected authority.
+
+`agents[].alias` remains display-only. Tess and Ultron are instance names, never semantic classes.
+Canonicalization happens before role-layer lookup, so a legacy-named override cannot redefine an
+alias as separate authority. See [Role Classes and Authority](./role-classes.md) and
+[Customize Fleet Roles](../how-to/customize-roles.md).
+
+This handoff performs no filesystem, systemd, tmux, roster, credential, lease, certificate, or
+lifecycle mutation.
+
+## Fail-closed boundary
+
+Every object is `additionalProperties: false`. The compiler rejects unknown, missing, malformed,
+and wrong-type fields before producing a model. It specifically rejects remote/SSH/host/socket
+per-agent fields, connector blocks, secret references, channel fields, arbitrary command fields,
+and gateway fields because they are unsupported in the local-tmux M1 contract. It does not silently
+ignore v1 camelCase input, version `1`, or a source that does not parse to an object.
+
+The v2 compiler is intentionally isolated from the existing v1 loader. Existing v1 rosters and
+current examples/profiles continue on their current path; FCM-M4 owns explicit inventory, preview,
+migration, and rollback. FCM-M2 owns generated-file/local-override quarantine, and FCM-M3 owns
+runtime lifecycle and reconciliation.

docs/fleet/reference/roster-v2.schema.json

@@ -0,0 +1,156 @@
+{
+  "$schema": "https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema",
+  "$id": "https://mosaicstack.dev/schemas/fleet/roster-v2.schema.json",
+  "title": "Mosaic local tmux fleet roster v2",
+  "type": "object",
+  "additionalProperties": false,
+  "required": ["version", "generation", "transport", "tmux", "defaults", "runtimes", "agents"],
+  "properties": {
+    "version": {
+      "const": 2
+    },
+    "generation": {
+      "type": "integer",
+      "minimum": 1,
+      "maximum": 9007199254740991
+    },
+    "transport": {
+      "const": "tmux"
+    },
+    "tmux": {
+      "type": "object",
+      "additionalProperties": false,
+      "required": ["socket_name", "holder_session"],
+      "properties": {
+        "socket_name": {
+          "type": "string",
+          "pattern": "^[A-Za-z0-9_.-]+$"
+        },
+        "holder_session": {
+          "type": "string",
+          "pattern": "^[A-Za-z0-9_.-]+$"
+        }
+      }
+    },
+    "defaults": {
+      "type": "object",
+      "additionalProperties": false,
+      "required": ["working_directory", "runtime"],
+      "properties": {
+        "working_directory": {
+          "type": "string",
+          "minLength": 1
+        },
+        "runtime": {
+          "enum": ["claude", "codex", "opencode", "pi"]
+        }
+      }
+    },
+    "runtimes": {
+      "type": "object",
+      "minProperties": 1,
+      "propertyNames": {
+        "enum": ["claude", "codex", "opencode", "pi"]
+      },
+      "additionalProperties": {
+        "type": "object",
+        "additionalProperties": false,
+        "required": ["reset_command"],
+        "properties": {
+          "reset_command": {
+            "type": "string",
+            "minLength": 1
+          }
+        }
+      }
+    },
+    "agents": {
+      "type": "array",
+      "minItems": 1,
+      "items": {
+        "type": "object",
+        "additionalProperties": false,
+        "required": [
+          "name",
+          "alias",
+          "class",
+          "runtime",
+          "provider",
+          "model",
+          "reasoning",
+          "tool_policy",
+          "working_directory",
+          "persistent_persona",
+          "reset_between_tasks",
+          "lifecycle",
+          "launch"
+        ],
+        "properties": {
+          "name": {
+            "type": "string",
+            "pattern": "^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9_.-]*$"
+          },
+          "alias": {
+            "type": "string",
+            "minLength": 1
+          },
+          "class": {
+            "type": "string",
+            "pattern": "^[a-z][a-z0-9-]*$"
+          },
+          "runtime": {
+            "enum": ["claude", "codex", "opencode", "pi"]
+          },
+          "provider": {
+            "type": "string",
+            "minLength": 1
+          },
+          "model": {
+            "type": "string",
+            "minLength": 1
+          },
+          "reasoning": {
+            "enum": ["low", "medium", "high"]
+          },
+          "tool_policy": {
+            "type": "string",
+            "pattern": "^[a-z][a-z0-9-]*$"
+          },
+          "working_directory": {
+            "type": "string",
+            "minLength": 1
+          },
+          "persistent_persona": {
+            "type": "boolean"
+          },
+          "reset_between_tasks": {
+            "type": "boolean"
+          },
+          "lifecycle": {
+            "type": "object",
+            "additionalProperties": false,
+            "required": ["enabled", "desired_state"],
+            "properties": {
+              "enabled": {
+                "type": "boolean"
+              },
+              "desired_state": {
+                "enum": ["running", "stopped"]
+              }
+            }
+          },
+          "launch": {
+            "type": "object",
+            "additionalProperties": false,
+            "required": ["yolo"],
+            "properties": {
+              "yolo": {
+                "type": "boolean"
+              }
+            }
+          }
+        }
+      }
+    }
+  }
+}

docs/fleet/reference/status-and-drift.md

@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+# Local Fleet Status and Drift
+
+`mosaic fleet status [name]`, `verify`, and `doctor` are observational roster-v2 commands. They emit one JSON result and do not write projections, change desired state, start services, stop services, restart services, or mutate tmux.
+
+The report distinguishes:
+
+- `missing-session`: an enabled agent desired `running` has no exact roster-named tmux session.
+- `unexpected-session`: a desired-`stopped` agent still has its exact session.
+- `disabled-running`: a disabled roster agent has its exact session.
+- `unmanagedSessions`: sessions on the configured named socket that are neither the exact holder nor an exact roster agent.
+- `holder`: `owned`, `missing`, or `ownership-mismatch` after exact holder, private install identity, and complete global tmux environment validation.
+
+`doctor` and `status` classify rather than adopt, destroy, or repair unmanaged state. `verify` is observational too, but exits non-zero if ownership cannot be proven, unmanaged sessions exist, or drift is present. Reconciliation fails closed under those conditions and never kills or adopts an unmanaged session.

docs/guides/admin-guide.md

@@ -224,9 +224,9 @@ external clients. Authentication requires a valid BetterAuth session (cookie or
 ### Required
 
 | Variable             | Description                                                                                                 |
-| -------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| -------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
 | `BETTER_AUTH_SECRET` | Secret key for BetterAuth session signing. Must be set or gateway will not start.                           |
-| `DATABASE_URL`       | PostgreSQL connection string. Default: `postgresql://mosaic:mosaic@localhost:5433/mosaic` |
+| `DATABASE_URL`       | Runtime-only PostgreSQL connection injected from the dedicated deployment secret; no default or inline DSN. |
 
 ### Gateway
 
@@ -294,7 +294,7 @@ Each OIDC provider requires its client ID, client secret, and issuer URL togethe
 ### Plugins
 
 | Variable                                | Description                                                                                                                               |
-| ----------------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| --------------------------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
 | `DISCORD_BOT_TOKEN`                     | Discord bot token (enables Discord plugin)                                                                                                |
 | `DISCORD_SERVICE_TOKEN`                 | Required high-entropy service credential used to authenticate and sign Discord ingress; inject through the approved secret mechanism only |
 | `DISCORD_SERVICE_USER_ID`               | Required Mosaic service-principal user ID that owns persisted Discord conversations; the original Discord user ID remains audit metadata  |
@@ -303,6 +303,9 @@ Each OIDC provider requires its client ID, client secret, and issuer URL togethe
 | `DISCORD_ALLOWED_GUILD_IDS`             | Required comma-separated Discord guild snowflake allowlist; default-deny                                                                  |
 | `DISCORD_ALLOWED_CHANNEL_IDS`           | Required comma-separated Discord channel snowflake allowlist; default-deny                                                                |
 | `DISCORD_ALLOWED_USER_IDS`              | Required comma-separated Discord user snowflake allowlist; default-deny                                                                   |
+| `DISCORD_INTERACTION_BINDINGS`          | Required JSON bindings from guild/channel to logical agent and paired Discord users with `viewer`, `operator`, or `admin` roles           |
+| `DISCORD_MESSAGE_RATE_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE` | Optional positive integer; authorized turns per guild/channel/user each minute (default: `30`)                                            |
+| `DISCORD_THREAD_RATE_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE`  | Optional positive integer; mention-thread routes per guild/channel/user each minute (default: `5`)                                        |
 | `TELEGRAM_BOT_TOKEN`                    | Telegram bot token (enables Telegram plugin)                                                                                              |
 | `TELEGRAM_GATEWAY_URL`                  | Gateway URL for Telegram plugin to call                                                                                                   |
 
@@ -310,7 +313,44 @@ Each OIDC provider requires its client ID, client secret, and issuer URL togethe
 
 When `DISCORD_BOT_TOKEN` is configured, `DISCORD_SERVICE_TOKEN`, `DISCORD_SERVICE_USER_ID`, and all three Discord allowlists are required. Gateway startup fails rather than enabling a broad or unauthenticated remote-control surface. The service user ID identifies a provisioned Mosaic service principal for persistence; the original Discord user ID is retained in ingress audit metadata. The service token is a secret supplied by the approved runtime secret mechanism and is never committed or logged.
 
-Inbound Discord messages must originate from an allowed guild, channel, and user, mention the bot, and carry a signed envelope containing the native Discord message ID and a generated correlation ID. The gateway validates the service identity, envelope signature, and allowlists again before dispatching. Replayed Discord message IDs are rejected during the bounded ingress replay window. Durable inbox/idempotency retention is introduced with Tess durable state.
+Inbound Discord messages must originate from an allowed guild and configured parent channel, come from an allowed and paired user whose role permits sending, and carry a signed envelope containing the native Discord message ID and a generated correlation ID. Attachment references are limited in count, metadata size, field length, and declared size; only query-free HTTPS URLs without credentials or fragments are accepted, so bearer or presigned URLs never reach persistence or an agent prompt. The gateway validates the service identity, envelope signature, allowlists, pairing, and role again before dispatching. Replayed Discord message IDs are rejected during the bounded ingress replay window. Durable inbox/idempotency retention is introduced with Tess durable state.
+
+Configured channels are dedicated agent interaction surfaces. An authorized untagged message routes to the bound logical agent and the response returns in that channel. Mentioning the bot on a normal channel message creates a public Discord thread, or reuses the thread already attached to that same message; the response and later thread messages stay in that thread without repeated mentions. A normal channel's category is not an authorization parent—only a Discord thread inherits authorization from its configured parent channel. Runtime control commands such as `/approve` and `/stop <approval>` remain on the current channel/thread because they target that durable session rather than opening a new topic.
+
+Authorization and per-user/channel rate limits are evaluated before thread creation, so an unlisted guild/channel/user, unpaired user, `viewer`, or rate-limited sender cannot create bot threads or dispatch gateway work. The bot needs Discord permissions to view/send in configured channels and create/send in public threads. If thread creation fails, the turn is not dispatched because the requested response destination cannot be honored.
+
+Conversation handles use the configured logical agent plus Discord channel/thread identity. They do not contain a Claude, Codex, Pi, OpenCode, model, process, or runtime-provider identifier; changing the runtime behind the logical session therefore does not require reconnecting the Discord bot.
+
+#### Interaction binding format
+
+`DISCORD_INTERACTION_BINDINGS` must be a non-empty JSON array. Each item requires `instanceId`, trusted `agentConfigId`, `guildId`, `channelId`, and a non-empty `pairedUsers` object. `instanceId` is the configured logical-agent name; its trusted database `agentConfigId` must resolve to an agent configuration with exactly that name, preserving provider/model/prompt/tool selection per binding. The guild/channel must also appear in their corresponding allowlists. IDs below are placeholders:
+
+```json
+[
+  {
+    "instanceId": "interaction-agent",
+    "agentConfigId": "agent-config-id",
+    "guildId": "guild-id",
+    "channelId": "channel-id",
+    "pairedUsers": {
+      "discord-user-id": {
+        "role": "operator",
+        "mosaicUserId": "mosaic-user-id"
+      }
+    }
+  }
+]
+```
+
+| Pairing role | Send message | Create/continue thread | Approve | Stop |
+| ------------ | ------------ | ---------------------- | ------- | ---- |
+| `viewer`     | No           | No                     | No      | No   |
+| `operator`   | Yes          | Yes                    | No      | No   |
+| `admin`      | Yes          | Yes                    | Yes     | Yes  |
+
+A legacy role-only value such as `"discord-user-id": "operator"` remains valid for non-privileged ingress. Approval and stop require the object form with a provisioned `mosaicUserId`; gateway policy checks that Mosaic identity and consumes one exact-action approval once. Do not make the Discord service principal an approving administrator.
+
+After changing bindings or allowlists, restart the gateway/plugin through the normal service manager and verify both Discord and gateway connectivity. The adapter reports `connected` only when both links are ready, `degraded` when one is ready, and `disconnected` when neither is ready. Test one authorized untagged channel turn, one mention-created thread, one thread follow-up, and one unauthorized user denial without using production credential values in logs or evidence.
 
 ### Session retention and garbage collection
 

docs/guides/deployment.md

@@ -1,384 +1,67 @@
 # Deployment Guide
 
-This guide covers deploying Mosaic in two modes: **Docker Compose** (recommended for quick setup) and **bare-metal** (production, full control).
+> **Status: non-operative for PostgreSQL, federated, and bare-metal production.** The checked-in
+> Compose PostgreSQL service mounts legacy initialization SQL and the KBN-101 bootstrap, runner,
+> secret-renderer, and process-exec interfaces do not exist yet. This page does not authorize a
+> production deployment, database initialization, manual DDL, secret provisioning, or service
+> activation.
 
----
+## Current safe local route
 
-## Prerequisites
+Use PGlite only for current in-process data-layer work; it requires no PostgreSQL. A Gateway/Web
-
+local process is held because its unguarded dotenv loader can inherit a daemon PostgreSQL DSN and
-| Dependency       | Minimum version | Notes                                          |
+reach runtime DDL. If a local queue service is useful, start only Valkey:
-| ---------------- | --------------- | ---------------------------------------------- |
-| Node.js          | 22 LTS          | Required for ESM + `--experimental-vm-modules` |
-| pnpm             | 9               | `npm install -g pnpm`                          |
-| PostgreSQL       | 17              | Must have the `pgvector` extension             |
-| Valkey           | 8               | Redis-compatible; Redis 7+ also works          |
-| Docker + Compose | v2              | For the Docker Compose path only               |
-
----
-
-## Docker Compose Deployment (Quick Start)
-
-The `docker-compose.yml` at the repository root starts PostgreSQL 17 (with pgvector), Valkey 8, an OpenTelemetry Collector, and Jaeger.
-
-### 1. Clone and configure
 
 ```bash
-git clone <repo-url> mosaic
+docker compose up -d valkey
-cd mosaic
-cp .env.example .env
 ```
 
-Edit `.env`. The minimum required change is:
+This command intentionally does not start PostgreSQL. Do not run a broad Compose start, use its
+PostgreSQL initialization mount, infer that current Compose is a production/federated route, or
+start Gateway/Web until KBN-101-02 supplies fail-closed local-tier/DSN isolation.
 
-```dotenv
+## Held future procedure
-BETTER_AUTH_SECRET=<output of: openssl rand -base64 32>
-```
 
-### 2. Start infrastructure services
+PostgreSQL local, federated, Compose, and bare-metal production activation are held until these
+artifacts land and pass their independent gates:
 
-```bash
+1. **KBN-101-00** external privileged bootstrap artifact;
-docker compose up -d
+2. **KBN-101-03** sole `mosaic-db-migrator` runner and verified-readiness artifact; and
-```
+3. **KBN-101-05** Vault/secret-renderer-backed deployment and consumer-isolation artifact.
 
-Services and their ports:
+The required future order is external bootstrap → TLS/roles → `mosaic-db-migrator --run` → `mosaic-db-migrator --verify` → Gateway/Compose readiness.
 
-| Service               | Default port             |
+This is a held, non-operative future activation specification with no current command authority. Do not invoke the named
-| --------------------- | ------------------------ |
+runner, start PostgreSQL, or substitute a Compose/init/manual-SQL route until the owned artifacts
-| PostgreSQL            | `localhost:5433`         |
+are implemented and reviewed.
-| Valkey                | `localhost:6380`         |
-| OTEL Collector (HTTP) | `localhost:4318`         |
-| OTEL Collector (gRPC) | `localhost:4317`         |
-| Jaeger UI             | `http://localhost:16686` |
 
-Override host ports via `PG_HOST_PORT` and `VALKEY_HOST_PORT` in `.env` if the defaults conflict.
+## Future production secret and unit boundary (schematic only)
 
-### 3. Install dependencies
+No current bare-metal production unit or command is published. KBN-101-05 must supply a reviewed,
+generation-pinned Vault renderer and a process-exec or systemd `LoadCredential` interface before
+production units can exist. The interface must preserve these exact consumer boundaries:
 
-```bash
+| Consumer          | May receive                                                                                  | Must never receive                                                                            |
-pnpm install
+| ----------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
-```
+| Gateway/runtime   | Its own runtime URL and DB client CA at process exec                                         | Migrator URL, importer URL/version, attestation material, signing key, PostgreSQL private key |
+| One-shot migrator | Its own migration URL, DB client CA, and runner-only signing capability                      | Runtime URL, importer consumer copy, Gateway/private PostgreSQL keys                          |
+| Data importer     | Its own immutable URL/version copies, importer CA, pinned public key, and sealed attestation | Runtime/migrator URLs, signing key, shared writable mount                                     |
+| PostgreSQL        | Its own server certificate/key and only its approved server material                         | Application, migrator, importer, or Gateway secrets                                           |
 
-### 4. Initialize the database
+A future unit specification is non-executable until KBN-101-05 supplies it. It must obtain
+credentials through the renderer’s Vault generation and process-exec/`LoadCredential` boundary;
+it must not place credentials in a production environment file, a monorepo auto-load path, a shell
+export, command arguments, logs, or a manual secret-activation lifecycle instruction. Rotation and
+process replacement semantics must be delivered by the reviewed renderer/interface with generation,
+consumer-isolation, mode/owner, and no-mixed-generation evidence—not improvised in this guide.
 
-```bash
+## Readiness and troubleshooting status
-pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/db db:migrate
-```
 
-### 5. Build all packages
+Until the future procedure is implemented, do not diagnose PostgreSQL with ad hoc SQL, connection
+strings, or initialization scripts. The future sanitized runner-verification readiness artifact is
+the required PostgreSQL readiness authority after its bootstrap/TLS prerequisites pass.
+For local PGlite development, diagnose application behavior without introducing a PostgreSQL
+connection.
 
-```bash
+Non-database local services may be inspected with their ordinary local health/log tools. Those
-pnpm build
+checks do not certify PostgreSQL, federated deployment, or production readiness.
-```
-
-### 6. Start the gateway
-
-```bash
-pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/gateway dev
-```
-
-Or for production (after build):
-
-```bash
-node apps/gateway/dist/main.js
-```
-
-### 7. Start the web app
-
-```bash
-# Development
-pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/web dev
-
-# Production (after build)
-pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/web start
-```
-
-The web app runs on port `3000` by default.
-
----
-
-## Bare-Metal Deployment
-
-Use this path when you want to manage PostgreSQL and Valkey yourself (e.g., existing infrastructure, managed cloud databases).
-
-### Step 1 — Install system dependencies
-
-```bash
-# Node.js 22 via nvm
-curl -o- https://raw.githubusercontent.com/nvm-sh/nvm/v0.39.7/install.sh | bash
-nvm install 22
-nvm use 22
-
-# pnpm
-npm install -g pnpm
-
-# PostgreSQL 17 with pgvector (Debian/Ubuntu example)
-sudo apt-get install -y postgresql-17 postgresql-17-pgvector
-
-# Valkey
-# Follow https://valkey.io/download/ for your distribution
-```
-
-### Step 2 — Create the database
-
-```sql
--- Run as the postgres superuser
-CREATE USER mosaic WITH PASSWORD 'change-me';
-CREATE DATABASE mosaic OWNER mosaic;
-\c mosaic
-CREATE EXTENSION IF NOT EXISTS vector;
-```
-
-### Step 3 — Clone and configure
-
-```bash
-git clone <repo-url> /opt/mosaic
-cd /opt/mosaic
-cp .env.example .env
-```
-
-Edit `/opt/mosaic/.env`. Required fields:
-
-```dotenv
-DATABASE_URL=postgresql://mosaic:<password>@localhost:5432/mosaic
-VALKEY_URL=redis://localhost:6379
-BETTER_AUTH_SECRET=<openssl rand -base64 32>
-BETTER_AUTH_URL=https://your-domain.example.com
-GATEWAY_CORS_ORIGIN=https://your-domain.example.com
-NEXT_PUBLIC_GATEWAY_URL=https://your-domain.example.com
-```
-
-### Step 4 — Install dependencies and build
-
-```bash
-pnpm install
-pnpm build
-```
-
-### Step 5 — Run database migrations
-
-```bash
-pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/db db:migrate
-```
-
-### Step 6 — Start the gateway
-
-```bash
-node apps/gateway/dist/main.js
-```
-
-The gateway reads `.env` from the monorepo root automatically (via `dotenv` in `main.ts`).
-
-### Step 7 — Start the web app
-
-```bash
-# Next.js standalone output
-node apps/web/.next/standalone/server.js
-```
-
-The standalone build is self-contained; it does not require `node_modules` to be present at runtime.
-
-### Step 8 — Configure a reverse proxy
-
-#### Nginx example
-
-```nginx
-# /etc/nginx/sites-available/mosaic
-
-# Gateway API
-server {
-    listen 443 ssl;
-    server_name your-domain.example.com;
-
-    ssl_certificate     /etc/ssl/certs/your-domain.crt;
-    ssl_certificate_key /etc/ssl/private/your-domain.key;
-
-    # WebSocket support (for chat.gateway.ts / Socket.IO)
-    location /socket.io/ {
-        proxy_pass http://127.0.0.1:14242;
-        proxy_http_version 1.1;
-        proxy_set_header Upgrade $http_upgrade;
-        proxy_set_header Connection "upgrade";
-        proxy_set_header Host $host;
-        proxy_set_header X-Real-IP $remote_addr;
-    }
-
-    # REST + auth
-    location / {
-        proxy_pass http://127.0.0.1:14242;
-        proxy_set_header Host $host;
-        proxy_set_header X-Real-IP $remote_addr;
-        proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $proxy_add_x_forwarded_for;
-        proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Proto $scheme;
-    }
-}
-
-# Web app (optional — serve on a subdomain or a separate server block)
-server {
-    listen 443 ssl;
-    server_name app.your-domain.example.com;
-
-    ssl_certificate     /etc/ssl/certs/your-domain.crt;
-    ssl_certificate_key /etc/ssl/private/your-domain.key;
-
-    location / {
-        proxy_pass http://127.0.0.1:3000;
-        proxy_set_header Host $host;
-        proxy_set_header X-Real-IP $remote_addr;
-    }
-}
-```
-
-#### Caddy example
-
-```caddyfile
-# /etc/caddy/Caddyfile
-
-your-domain.example.com {
-    reverse_proxy /socket.io/* localhost:14242 {
-        header_up Upgrade {http.upgrade}
-        header_up Connection {http.connection}
-    }
-    reverse_proxy localhost:14242
-}
-
-app.your-domain.example.com {
-    reverse_proxy localhost:3000
-}
-```
-
----
-
-## Production Considerations
-
-### systemd Services
-
-Create a service unit for each process.
-
-**Gateway** — `/etc/systemd/system/mosaic-gateway.service`:
-
-```ini
-[Unit]
-Description=Mosaic Gateway
-After=network.target postgresql.service
-
-[Service]
-Type=simple
-User=mosaic
-WorkingDirectory=/opt/mosaic
-EnvironmentFile=/opt/mosaic/.env
-ExecStart=/usr/bin/node apps/gateway/dist/main.js
-Restart=on-failure
-RestartSec=5
-StandardOutput=journal
-StandardError=journal
-
-[Install]
-WantedBy=multi-user.target
-```
-
-**Web app** — `/etc/systemd/system/mosaic-web.service`:
-
-```ini
-[Unit]
-Description=Mosaic Web App
-After=network.target mosaic-gateway.service
-
-[Service]
-Type=simple
-User=mosaic
-WorkingDirectory=/opt/mosaic/apps/web
-EnvironmentFile=/opt/mosaic/.env
-ExecStart=/usr/bin/node .next/standalone/server.js
-Environment=PORT=3000
-Environment=HOSTNAME=127.0.0.1
-Restart=on-failure
-RestartSec=5
-StandardOutput=journal
-StandardError=journal
-
-[Install]
-WantedBy=multi-user.target
-```
-
-Enable and start:
-
-```bash
-sudo systemctl daemon-reload
-sudo systemctl enable --now mosaic-gateway mosaic-web
-```
-
-### Log Management
-
-Gateway and web app logs go to systemd journal by default. View with:
-
-```bash
-journalctl -u mosaic-gateway -f
-journalctl -u mosaic-web -f
-```
-
-Rotate logs by configuring `journald` in `/etc/systemd/journald.conf`:
-
-```ini
-SystemMaxUse=500M
-MaxRetentionSec=30day
-```
-
-### Security Checklist
-
-- Set `BETTER_AUTH_SECRET` to a cryptographically random value (`openssl rand -base64 32`).
-- Restrict `GATEWAY_CORS_ORIGIN` to your exact frontend origin — do not use `*`.
-- Run services as a dedicated non-root system user (e.g., `mosaic`).
-- Firewall: only expose ports 80/443 externally; keep 14242 and 3000 bound to `127.0.0.1`.
-- Set `AGENT_FILE_SANDBOX_DIR` to a directory outside the application root to prevent agent tools from accessing source code.
-- If using `AGENT_USER_TOOLS`, enumerate only the tools non-admin users need.
-
----
-
-## Troubleshooting
-
-### Gateway fails to start — "BETTER_AUTH_SECRET is required"
-
-`BETTER_AUTH_SECRET` is missing or empty. Set it in `.env` and restart.
-
-### `DATABASE_URL` connection refused
-
-Verify PostgreSQL is running and the port matches. The Docker Compose default is `5433`; bare-metal typically uses `5432`.
-
-```bash
-psql "$DATABASE_URL" -c '\conninfo'
-```
-
-### pgvector extension missing
-
-```sql
-\c mosaic
-CREATE EXTENSION IF NOT EXISTS vector;
-```
-
-### Valkey / Redis connection refused
-
-Check the URL in `VALKEY_URL`. The Docker Compose default is port `6380`.
-
-```bash
-redis-cli -u "$VALKEY_URL" ping
-```
-
-### WebSocket connections fail in production
-
-Ensure your reverse proxy forwards the `Upgrade` and `Connection` headers. See the Nginx/Caddy examples above.
-
-### Ollama models not appearing
-
-Set `OLLAMA_BASE_URL` to the URL where Ollama is running (e.g., `http://localhost:11434`) and set `OLLAMA_MODELS` to a comma-separated list of model IDs you have pulled.
-
-```bash
-ollama pull llama3.2
-```
-
-### OTEL traces not appearing in Jaeger
-
-Verify the collector is reachable at `OTEL_EXPORTER_OTLP_ENDPOINT`. With Docker Compose the default is `http://localhost:4318`. Check `docker compose ps` and `docker compose logs otel-collector`.
-
-### Summarization / embedding features not working
-
-These features require `OPENAI_API_KEY` to be set, or you must point `SUMMARIZATION_API_URL` / `EMBEDDING_API_URL` to an OpenAI-compatible endpoint (e.g., a local Ollama instance with an embeddings model).

docs/guides/dev-guide.md

@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ mosaic-mono-v1/
 │   ├── queue/            # Valkey-backed task queue
 │   └── types/            # Shared TypeScript types
 ├── docker/               # Dockerfile(s) for containerized deployment
-├── infra/                # Infra config (OTEL collector, pg-init scripts)
+├── infra/                # Infrastructure configuration (for example, OTEL collector)
 ├── docker-compose.yml    # Local services (Postgres, Valkey, OTEL, Jaeger)
 └── CLAUDE.md             # Project conventions for AI coding agents
 ```
@@ -86,71 +86,54 @@ cd mosaic-mono-v1
 pnpm install
 ```
 
-### 2. Start Infrastructure Services
+### 2. Use the local PGlite tier
+
+The supported local tier is in-process PGlite and requires no PostgreSQL service. Leave
+`DATABASE_URL` unset for this route. Its default local configuration uses PGlite and performs no
+external database probe.
+
+If a local queue service is useful, start only that non-PostgreSQL service:
 
 ```bash
-docker compose up -d
+docker compose up -d valkey
 ```
 
-This starts:
+Do not use the current Compose PostgreSQL service: it mounts legacy `infra/pg-init` SQL and is
+not qualified for KBN-101. Start OTEL Collector or Jaeger individually only when needed and
+without starting PostgreSQL.
 
-| Service                  | Port           | Description          |
+### 3. Gateway/Web local process (held)
-| ------------------------ | -------------- | -------------------- |
-| PostgreSQL 17 + pgvector | `5433` (host)  | Primary database     |
-| Valkey 8                 | `6380` (host)  | Queue and cache      |
-| OpenTelemetry Collector  | `4317`, `4318` | OTEL gRPC and HTTP   |
-| Jaeger                   | `16686`        | Distributed trace UI |
 
-### 3. Configure Environment
+Do not start the current Gateway or web process as a local PGlite route. Gateway first loads the
+daemon configuration and then project environment files without a tier guard; a pre-existing
+`DATABASE_URL` can select PostgreSQL, where current startup still reaches runtime DDL/migrations.
+Creating a root `.env` that omits `DATABASE_URL` does not make this safe, so neither a local
+credential file nor a web environment file is a current developer procedure.
 
-Create a `.env` file in the monorepo root:
+PGlite remains the supported in-process data-layer implementation, and the optional Valkey command
+above remains safe because it does not start PostgreSQL. A safe Gateway/Web local procedure is held
+until KBN-101-02 rejects a daemon, inherited, root, or app-local PostgreSQL DSN and any non-local
+tier before connection or DDL; KBN-101-05 then supplies the production renderer/Vault process-exec
+or `LoadCredential` boundary.
 
-```env
+### Held future procedure
-# Database (matches docker-compose defaults)
-DATABASE_URL=postgresql://mosaic:mosaic@localhost:5433/mosaic
 
-# Auth (required — generate a random 32+ char string)
+PostgreSQL local and federated deployment are held until KBN-101-00 (external bootstrap),
-BETTER_AUTH_SECRET=change-me-to-a-random-secret
+KBN-101-03 (runner), and KBN-101-05 (renderer-backed deployment) land. The following is the
+**held, non-operative future activation order with no current command authority**:
 
-# Gateway
+external bootstrap → TLS/roles → `mosaic-db-migrator --run` →
-GATEWAY_PORT=14242
+`mosaic-db-migrator --verify` → Gateway/Compose readiness.
-GATEWAY_CORS_ORIGIN=http://localhost:3000
 
-# Web
+Neither current Compose nor this development guide authorizes PostgreSQL initialization SQL,
-NEXT_PUBLIC_GATEWAY_URL=http://localhost:14242
+manual DDL, or a pre-runner start.
 
-# Optional: Ollama
+### 5. Gateway/Web start (held)
-OLLAMA_BASE_URL=http://localhost:11434
-OLLAMA_MODELS=llama3.2
-```
 
-The gateway loads `.env` from the monorepo root via `dotenv` at startup
+No Gateway/Web start command is currently authorized for the local PGlite route. Do not use root
-(`apps/gateway/src/main.ts`).
+`pnpm dev` as a workaround: it additionally starts configured integrations and cannot establish the
-
+required local-tier/DSN isolation. Resume this section only after KBN-101-02 provides its
-### 4. Push the Database Schema
+fail-closed local-startup evidence.
-
-```bash
-pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/db db:push
-```
-
-This applies the Drizzle schema directly to the database (development only; use
-migrations in production).
-
-### 5. Start the Gateway
-
-```bash
-pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/gateway exec tsx src/main.ts
-```
-
-The gateway starts on port `14242` by default.
-
-### 6. Start the Web App
-
-```bash
-pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/web dev
-```
-
-The web app starts on port `3000` by default.
 
 ---
 
@@ -300,26 +283,13 @@ Implement a standard MCP server that exposes tools via the streamable HTTP
 transport or SSE transport. The server must accept connections at a `/mcp`
 endpoint.
 
-### 2. Configure `MCP_SERVERS`
+### 2. Gateway MCP configuration (held)
 
-In your `.env`:
+Do not configure MCP endpoint credentials, write them to a local environment file, or restart the
-
+Gateway from this guide. Gateway/Web startup is held until KBN-101-02 supplies fail-closed
-```env
+local-tier/DSN isolation and KBN-101-05 supplies the renderer/Vault process-exec or
-MCP_SERVERS='[{"name":"my-server","url":"http://localhost:3001/mcp"}]'
+`LoadCredential` secret-consumer interface. The future authenticated MCP route requires verified
-```
+HTTPS and certificate validation; plaintext bearer-token examples are forbidden.
-
-With authentication:
-
-```env
-MCP_SERVERS='[{"name":"secure-server","url":"http://my-server/mcp","headers":{"Authorization":"Bearer token"}}]'
-```
-
-### 3. Restart the Gateway
-
-On startup, `McpClientService` (`apps/gateway/src/mcp-client/mcp-client.service.ts`)
-connects to each configured server, calls `tools/list`, and bridges the results
-to Pi SDK `ToolDefinition` format. These tools become available in all new agent
-sessions.
 
 ### Tool Naming
 
@@ -355,42 +325,31 @@ The schema lives in a single file:
 
 The `insights` table uses a `vector(1536)` column (pgvector) for semantic search.
 
-### Development: Push Schema
+### PostgreSQL schema work (held)
 
-Apply schema changes directly to the dev database (no migration files created):
+Do not prepare or run a PostgreSQL target from this branch. The sole runner, bootstrap, and
+renderer are future KBN-101 artifacts, not current commands. When KBN-101-00/-03/-05 land, the
+owned activation documentation will require external bootstrap → TLS/roles → runner `--run` →
+runner `--verify` → Gateway/Compose readiness.
 
-```bash
+### Generating migration artifacts
-pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/db db:push
-```
 
-### Generating Migrations
+`pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/db db:generate` is an offline artifact-generation command. It does
-
+not authorize connecting to or initializing PostgreSQL. A future reviewed PostgreSQL procedure
-For production-safe, versioned changes:
+will determine when its output is applied.
-
-```bash
-pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/db db:generate
-```
-
-This creates a new SQL migration file in `packages/db/drizzle/`.
-
-### Running Migrations
-
-```bash
-pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/db db:migrate
-```
 
 ### Drizzle Config
 
-Config is at `packages/db/drizzle.config.ts`. The schema file path and output
+Config is at `packages/db/drizzle.config.ts`. The schema file path and output directory are
-directory are defined there.
+defined there.
 
 ### Adding a New Table
 
 1. Add the table definition to `packages/db/src/schema.ts`.
 2. Export it from `packages/db/src/index.ts`.
-3. Run `pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/db db:push` (dev) or
+3. Generate the offline artifact with `pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/db db:generate`.
-   `pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/db db:generate && pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/db db:migrate`
+4. Do not apply it to PostgreSQL until the future KBN-101 activation artifacts and their owned
-   (production).
+   procedure are available. Direct schema push is not a production-like workflow.
 
 ---
 

docs/guides/migrate-tier.md

@@ -1,147 +1,98 @@
 # Migrating to the Federated Tier
 
-Step-by-step guide to migrate from `local` (PGlite) or `standalone` (PostgreSQL without pgvector) to `federated` (PostgreSQL 17 + pgvector + Valkey).
+> **KBN-101-07 ownership:** This active documentation is a **non-operative KBN-101
+> contract** with no current command authority until KBN-101-00, KBN-101-02, KBN-101-03, KBN-101-05, and KBN-101-06 land and
+> KBN-101-08 activates an exact reviewed release. The commands below describe the produced interface only. Do not run them on the
+> current branch or replace them with direct PostgreSQL, raw SQL, legacy storage migration, or
+> credential-on-argv procedures.
 
-## When to migrate
+## Held future procedure
 
-Migrate to federated tier when:
+This section is non-operative and grants no current command authority until KBN-101-00, KBN-101-03, and KBN-101-05 land.
 
-- Scaling from single-user to multi-user deployments
+The deployment control plane executes the complete held future procedure, in order: external bootstrap → TLS/roles → `mosaic-db-migrator --run` → `mosaic-db-migrator --verify` → Gateway/Compose readiness. The
-- Adding vector embeddings or RAG features
+runner is the only attestation producer after its verified TLS, identity, manifest, and schema
-- Running Mosaic across multiple hosts
+checks. A data importer is never a schema bootstrap, extension installer, repair command, or DDL
-- Requires distributed task queueing and caching
+consumer.
-- Moving to production with high availability
 
-## Prerequisites
+## Target material contract
 
-- Federated stack running and healthy (see [Federated Tier Setup](../federation/SETUP.md))
+KBN-101-05 obtains the target URL from Vault KV-v2
-- Source database accessible and empty target database at the federated URL
+`secret-{env}/mosaic-stack/database/importer`, key `url`, and reads its authenticated version from
-- Backup of source database (recommended before any migration)
+the same successful response `data.metadata.version`. A hash or DSN byte sequence is not a
+provider version. The renderer treats URL bytes and provider version as one generation, writes a
+temporary generation directory with fsync plus atomic rename, and creates separate immutable
+consumer mounts. Swarm uses distinct versioned secret/config references. A deployment cannot mix
+generations.
 
-## Dry-run first
+| Consumer                                      | Permitted material                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       |
+| --------------------------------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| Migrator-attestation producer (`10003:10003`) | Its own migration URL/CA; read-only `/run/secrets/mosaic-migrate-target-url` and `/run/secrets/mosaic-migrate-target-version`, each `0400`, solely to bind; producer-only attestation output at `/run/mosaic-attestations-producer/migrate-target.v1.json`; root-wrapper-only signing key. It never connects with, uses, exports, logs, or forwards the importer URL/version.                                                                                                            |
+| Privileged deployment handoff controller      | After runner success and before importer creation, it receives only root-owned non-secret expected provider-version/URL-SHA-256/generation descriptor and pinned public verifier key—not URL bytes or private key. It safe-opens/verifies descriptor and producer artifact, copies exact bytes to a new importer-only mount with fsync/atomic rename, sets `10002:10002` `0400`, seals it read-only, and refuses importer start on any partial/wrong-generation/wrong-owner/mode result. |
+| Importer (`10002:10002`)                      | Its own immutable `0400` copies at the same URL/version paths; CA at exact `DATABASE_TLS_CA_CERT_PATH=/run/secrets/mosaic-db-ca.crt`; pinned Ed25519 public key; read-only `/run/mosaic-attestations/migrate-target.v1.json` supplied only by the sealed handoff.                                                                                                                                                                                                                        |
+| Gateway/runtime/unrelated container           | No importer URL/version, importer artifact, attestation private key, or unrelated CA mount.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              |
 
-Always run a dry-run to validate the migration:
+The migrator and importer safe-open URL, provider-version, attestation, and public-key files only
+with `O_RDONLY|O_CLOEXEC|O_NOFOLLOW`; they validate from the opened fd that the file is regular,
+has its expected owner/mode and link count one. The migrator digests only that URL fd for binding,
+then zeroizes/closes it. The importer reads URL bytes once into protected memory, validates the
+signed binding and exact CA before connecting from those same bytes, then zeroizes/closes every
+fd. It neither logs nor exposes a URL/version/attestation/key oracle.
+
+## Produced command interface
+
+After activation and only after approved target preparation, the future interface is:
 
 ```bash
+# Deployment control plane has already completed the held runner procedure above.
 mosaic storage migrate-tier --to federated \
-  --target-url postgresql://mosaic:mosaic@localhost:5433/mosaic \
+  --target-url-file /run/secrets/mosaic-migrate-target-url \
+  --target-attestation-file /run/mosaic-attestations/migrate-target.v1.json \
   --dry-run
 ```
 
-Expected output (partial example):
+The provider-version file is fixed deployment material, not argv. This connecting dry-run consumes its nonce; before an actual copy, the deployment control plane must provide fresh runner verification and a new sealed handoff. The runner uses its migration
+identity; the importer connects only as non-DDL `mosaic_data_importer` and only after all
+pre-connect validation. After verified TLS and before DML it compares PostgreSQL system ID,
+database OID, `current_user`, CA/SPKI, and manifest/schema fingerprints to the artifact.
 
-```
+## Required refusals and evidence
-[migrate-tier] Analyzing source tier: pglite
-[migrate-tier] Analyzing target tier: federated
-[migrate-tier] Precondition: target is empty ✓
-  users: 5 rows
-  teams: 2 rows
-  conversations: 12 rows
-  messages: 187 rows
-  ... (all tables listed)
-[migrate-tier] NOTE: Source tier has no pgvector support. insights.embedding will be NULL on all migrated rows.
-[migrate-tier] DRY-RUN COMPLETE (no data written). 206 total rows would be migrated.
-```
 
-Review the output. If it shows an error (e.g., target not empty), address it before proceeding.
+KBN-101-02/-03/-05/-06 must prove, with stable sanitized errors, that no target connection occurs
+for missing/unsafe URL/version/attestation/public-key files; symlink, hardlink, owner, mode, or
+TOCTOU violations; mixed URL/version generations; missing/wrong CA mount; stale/replayed/tampered
+or revoked-key artifacts; provider rotation/revocation; wrong TLS/server/database/role/manifest
+binding; raw `--target-url`; `DATABASE_URL` fallback; runtime/owner identity; consumer leakage;
+or any DDL attempt. Post-connect identity mismatch closes with zero DML/DDL. Tests also prove no
+forwarding, child environment, logging, or error oracle leaks URL/version/key/artifact contents.
 
-## Run the migration
+The attestation is credential-free JCS with detached Ed25519 signature and binds issued/expiry,
+nonce, authenticated provider version, exact URL-fd SHA-256, TLS host/port/database, CA/SPKI,
+PostgreSQL system ID/database OID, importer role, manifest/schema, and producer identity. Provider
+version rotation invalidates an old artifact and requires a fresh rendered generation plus runner
+verification.
 
-When ready, run without `--dry-run`:
+## Actual copy after dry-run
+
+After reviewed dry-run, obtain the required fresh verification/attestation generation, then use:
 
 ```bash
+# Deployment control plane has supplied fresh runner verification and attestation.
 mosaic storage migrate-tier --to federated \
-  --target-url postgresql://mosaic:mosaic@localhost:5433/mosaic \
+  --target-url-file /run/secrets/mosaic-migrate-target-url \
+  --target-attestation-file /run/mosaic-attestations/migrate-target.v1.json \
   --yes
 ```
 
-The `--yes` flag skips the confirmation prompt (required in non-TTY environments like CI).
+The dry-run artifact is terminally replayed and must be rejected; `--yes` bypasses no file,
+generation, signature, TLS, identity, or DDL control.
 
-The command will:
+## Data boundary and recovery
 
-1. Acquire an advisory lock (blocks concurrent invocations)
+The importer has only an allowlisted mutable-table DML registry. It has no grant for immutable KBN
-2. Copy data from source to target in dependency order
+relations, schemas, roles, memberships, extensions, catalogs, or the Drizzle ledger. Source PGlite
-3. Report rows migrated per table
+uses its explicit local directory and does not make a PostgreSQL URL fallback valid.
-4. Display any warnings (e.g., null vector embeddings)
 
-## What gets migrated
+A failed or ambiguous migration is a control-plane incident: preserve sanitized evidence, retain
-
+the approved backup/rollback state, and retry only after independent review. Never inspect,
-All persistent, user-bound data is migrated in dependency order:
+unlock, repair, or initialize the target with ad hoc SQL or copied credentials.
-
-- **users, teams, team_members** — user and team ownership
-- **accounts** — OAuth provider tokens (durable credentials)
-- **projects, agents, missions, tasks** — all project and agent definitions
-- **conversations, messages** — all chat history
-- **preferences, insights, agent_logs** — preferences and observability
-- **provider_credentials** — stored API keys and secrets
-- **tickets, events, skills, routing_rules, appreciations** — auxiliary records
-
-Full order is defined in code (`MIGRATION_ORDER` in `packages/storage/src/migrate-tier.ts`).
-
-## What gets skipped and why
-
-Three tables are intentionally not migrated:
-
-| Table             | Reason                                                                                          |
-| ----------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
-| **sessions**      | TTL'd auth sessions from the old environment; they will fail JWT verification on the new target |
-| **verifications** | One-time tokens (email verify, password reset) that have either expired or been consumed        |
-| **admin_tokens**  | Hashed tokens bound to the old environment's secret keys; must be re-issued                     |
-
-**Note on accounts and provider_credentials:** These durable credentials ARE migrated because they are user-bound and required for resuming agent work on the target environment. After migration to a multi-tenant federated deployment, operators may want to audit or wipe these if users are untrusted or credentials should not be shared.
-
-## Idempotency and concurrency
-
-The migration is **idempotent**:
-
-- Re-running is safe (uses `ON CONFLICT DO UPDATE` internally)
-- Ideal for retries on transient failures
-- Concurrent invocations are blocked by a Postgres advisory lock; the second caller will wait
-
-If a previous run is stuck, check for advisory locks:
-
-```sql
-SELECT * FROM pg_locks WHERE locktype='advisory';
-```
-
-If you need to force-unlock (dangerous):
-
-```sql
-SELECT pg_advisory_unlock(<lock_id>);
-```
-
-## Verify the migration
-
-After migration completes, spot-check the target:
-
-```bash
-# Count rows on a few critical tables
-psql postgresql://mosaic:mosaic@localhost:5433/mosaic -c \
-  "SELECT 'users' as table, COUNT(*) FROM users UNION ALL
-   SELECT 'conversations' as table, COUNT(*) FROM conversations UNION ALL
-   SELECT 'messages' as table, COUNT(*) FROM messages;"
-```
-
-Verify a known user or project exists by ID:
-
-```bash
-psql postgresql://mosaic:mosaic@localhost:5433/mosaic -c \
-  "SELECT id, email FROM users WHERE email='<your-email>';"
-```
-
-Ensure vector embeddings are NULL (if source was PGlite) or populated (if source was postgres + pgvector):
-
-```bash
-psql postgresql://mosaic:mosaic@localhost:5433/mosaic -c \
-  "SELECT embedding IS NOT NULL as has_vector FROM insights LIMIT 5;"
-```
-
-## Rollback
-
-There is no in-place rollback. If the migration fails:
-
-1. Restore the target database from a pre-migration backup
-2. Investigate the failure logs
-3. Rerun the migration
-
-Always test migrations in a staging environment first.

docs/guides/mos-connector-lease-operations.md

@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+# Mos Connector Lease Operations — M1
+
+## Operational status
+
+M1 installs the durable schema and gateway policy/adapter boundary. It does **not** activate a connector, expose a lease administration endpoint, or cut over a channel. The default gateway connector-lease policy is deny-all until a later work package supplies an authorized server-side policy and concrete adapter.
+
+## Events to monitor
+
+Use correlation IDs to follow `connector_lease_audit_log` events:
+
+| Event      | Meaning                                                               |
+| ---------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| `acquire`  | First holder inserted for an unused binding                           |
+| `renew`    | Current holder heartbeat extended the TTL                             |
+| `takeover` | Authorized CAS replaced the holder and incremented epoch              |
+| `release`  | Current holder explicitly relinquished authority                      |
+| `expiry`   | An expired current lease was observed                                 |
+| `reject`   | Policy, CAS, expiry, scope, or fencing validation denied an operation |
+
+Audit data is metadata-only. Raw grant objects, connector payloads, scopes, tokens, approval references, and credentials must never be added to audit output.
+
+## Incident checks
+
+For suspected duplicate/stale connector effects:
+
+1. Correlate the attempted operation with its `reject`, `takeover`, or `expiry` event.
+2. Compare the current row's connector ID, lease UUID, epoch, expiry, and release time with the adapter's normalized execution context.
+3. Treat an old epoch, old lease UUID, expired lease, or released lease as non-authoritative. Do not retry it as the old holder.
+4. Recovery uses the authorized takeover path with the observed expected epoch. Ordinary acquire is intentionally rejected for expired/released rows.
+5. If an external effect may already have happened, preserve evidence and do not assume lease fencing provides exactly-once replay safety.
+
+## Migration and rollback safety
+
+Migration `0016_salty_morlocks.sql` is additive: it creates two new tables and indexes without modifying existing authorization/session tables. Before rollout, normal database backup and migration verification still apply. Rolling application code back leaves unused additive tables in place; dropping tables is not part of automated rollback because it would destroy lease/audit evidence.
+
+## Security constraints
+
+- Tenant comes from authenticated gateway context, never a connector request field.
+- Logical agent, binding, connector, and scope identifiers use normalized constrained forms.
+- Takeover requires explicit gateway policy authorization and an expected epoch.
+- Default defense-in-depth TTL caps are 5 minutes for leases and 30 seconds for grants; policy may enforce stricter limits.
+- Validation and rejection audit complete before adapter side effects.
+- Existing authz and exact-action approval controls remain additional required gates; a valid connector lease does not bypass them.

docs/guides/user-guide.md

@@ -522,8 +522,14 @@ mosaic storage export --bucket agent-artifacts --output ./artifacts.tar.gz
 # Import data into storage
 mosaic storage import --bucket agent-artifacts --input ./artifacts.tar.gz
 
-# Migrate data between tiers
+# Schema migration is unavailable in this release. The current storage wrapper shells
-mosaic storage migrate --from hot --to cold --older-than 30d
+# directly to `pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/db db:migrate`; it is legacy N-1,
+# uncertified, and MUST NOT be invoked pending KBN-101-02/-03/-06/-08 activation.
+# Future schema migration is non-operative: external bootstrap → TLS/roles → runner
+# --run → runner --verify → readiness.
+
+# Tier copy uses only the separately held secure migrate-tier route. Never use a legacy
+# --from/--to storage-migrate command or pass a credential on argv.
 ```
 
 ---

docs/native-kanban-sot/INDEX.md

@@ -1,16 +1,17 @@
 # Native Kanban/SOT Canon
 
-**Status:** KCR-001–016 independently cleared; canonical publication is in progress under issue [#751](https://git.mosaicstack.dev/mosaicstack/stack/issues/751)
+**Status:** KCR-001–016 independently cleared; KBN-101 rc.16 current generic storage-wrapper authority remediation awaits independent exact-head re-review under issue [#771](https://git.mosaicstack.dev/mosaicstack/stack/issues/771)
 **Date:** 2026-07-14
 **Implementation hold:** no feature implementation starts until this canon is squash-merged to `main` with terminal-green CI; after merge, every slice remains held until its KBN prerequisite graph is satisfied.
 
 ## Artifacts
 
 | Artifact                                                                                                       | Purpose                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     |
-| ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
 | [Canonical requirements](../requirements/native-kanban-sot.md)                                                 | Canonical P0–P3 requirements, all seven ratified decisions, fixed invariants, thin MVP, recovery tiers, non-goals, and per-requirement acceptance criteria                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  |
 | [`MISSION-MANIFEST.md`](./MISSION-MANIFEST.md)                                                                 | Mission/authority boundaries, exact role chain, gate model, mandatory SecReview triggers, Certifier final/no-merge rule, and collision-free slice ownership                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 |
 | [`TASKS.md`](./TASKS.md)                                                                                       | Dependency-ordered, bounded P0–P3 slices with IN/OUT scope, dependencies, shared contracts, file ownership, evidence, and USC coder2/3/4/5 parallelization                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  |
+| [`KBN-101-DB-ROLE-SPLIT.md`](./KBN-101-DB-ROLE-SPLIT.md)                                                       | rc.16 direct-Drizzle current storage-wrapper hold: legacy N-1/uncertified/non-operative pending -02/-03/-06/-08; exact README commented/user-guide executable forms fail before masking and source-consistency rejects runner-delegation copy; held future bootstrap → TLS/roles → run → verify → readiness; plus prior production boundary, pgvector owner, attestation, inventory, manifests, DDL classifier, TLS/bootstrap, activation, and certification contract; foundation prerequisite of KBN-100 and real-role gate before KBN-105 |
 | [`SHARED-CONTRACT.md`](./SHARED-CONTRACT.md)                                                                   | Remediated v1 integration contract: proof authority, exact failures/routes/DTOs/MCP ownership, concrete current-main field migration map, relational invariants, Coordinator split, recovery delivery                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       |
 | [`contracts/kanban-schema.v1.ts`](./contracts/kanban-schema.v1.ts)                                             | Drizzle target declarations including exact owner/principal membership, project congruence, tags/archive, proposals, persisted assignments, monotonic fences, durable retry, immutable evidence/audit                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       |
 | [`contracts/mechanical-coordinator.v1.ts`](./contracts/mechanical-coordinator.v1.ts)                           | Pure snapshot decision engine separated from persistence/service adapter; ID-bound approvals, bigint-safe fences, durable retry/quarantine, artifact-backed checkpoints, exact failures                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     |
@@ -18,6 +19,7 @@
 | [`contracts/recovery-posture.v1.ts`](./contracts/recovery-posture.v1.ts)                                       | Provider-neutral shape schema plus normative runtime refinement, cross-field constraints, and Lite/Standard/High-assurance defaults                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         |
 | [`tsconfig.json`](./tsconfig.json)                                                                             | Strict no-emit project scope for linting and compiling the four frozen TypeScript contracts against the current Stack Drizzle declarations                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  |
 | [`DOCUMENTATION-CHECKLIST.md`](./DOCUMENTATION-CHECKLIST.md)                                                   | Publication documentation gate and implementation-slice deferrals                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           |
+| [KBN-101 exact-head security review](../reports/native-kanban-sot/kbn-101-contract-security-review-82ce325.md) | Historical `da742ca` REQUEST CHANGES report retained as prior closure evidence; rc.16 awaits independent exact-head re-review after closing the current generic storage-wrapper authority HIGH finding                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      |
 | [Initial independent review](../reports/native-kanban-sot/canon-initial-review-no-go.md)                       | KCR-001–016 findings that blocked the first draft                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           |
 | [Final independent re-review](../reports/native-kanban-sot/canon-final-rereview-go.md)                         | Closure matrix, reproducible validation evidence, and GO verdict                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            |
 | [Ultron final gate](../reports/native-kanban-sot/ultron-final-go.md)                                           | Final requirements, authority, schema, migration, recovery, decomposition, and evidence review GO                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           |
@@ -32,7 +34,7 @@
 | **coder5** | Web                                  | Tasks/Projects Kanban/List/detail and later Coordinator/migration-review UI                                                                             |
 | **Mos**    | Serialized integration               | Canon publication, frozen-contract changes, shared-root/exports, integration gates, merge authority                                                     |
 
-The safe order is KBN-010 → KBN-100 → KBN-105, then coder3 Gateway/MCP server, coder4 CLI/projection, coder5 web, and coder2 recovery can proceed on disjoint files. coder4 then runs pure Coordinator → importer → cutover tooling serially. No two active slices edit the same files.
+The safe order is KBN-010 → KBN-101 foundation → KBN-100 → KBN-101 deployed-role immutable-operation certificate → KBN-105, then coder3 Gateway/MCP server, coder4 CLI/projection, coder5 web, and coder2 recovery can proceed on disjoint files. KBN-100 is blocked on the KBN-101 foundation; real deployed-role certification—not synthetic test roles—is required before KBN-105. coder4 then runs pure Coordinator → importer → cutover tooling serially. No two active slices edit the same files.
 
 ## Recovery defaults
 

docs/native-kanban-sot/KBN-010-THREAT-AUTH-CONSTRAINT-GATE.md

@@ -0,0 +1,415 @@
+# KBN-010 — Threat, Authorization, and Constraint-Impact Gate
+
+- **Issue:** [#753](https://git.mosaicstack.dev/mosaicstack/stack/issues/753)
+- **Gate status:** **PASS / GO**
+- **Reviewed baseline:** `origin/main` at `49e8a54` (2026-07-14)
+- **Frozen target:** `SHARED-CONTRACT.md` v1.0.0-rc.4 and `contracts/*.v1.ts`
+- **Disposition input:** contract commit `3f6a3387b419eb99453ee10dd25ba888faaab0b5`, tree `7ebab8fa530a7180036928cea9527f808548aa14`
+- **Scope:** documentation and future-test planning only; no runtime, schema, migration, API, configuration, dependency, CI, or deployment change
+
+## 1. Decision
+
+KBN-010 is **PASS / GO** against frozen contract rc.4. The original rc.3 finding remains historical detection evidence:
+
+- **KBN010-SI-001 — rc.3 invalid mission composite-FK candidate key.** At rc.3, `missionsV1` declared a primary key on `id` and a unique key on `(workspace_id, project_id, id)`, but not a candidate key on `(workspace_id, id)`. Both `artifacts_workspace_mission_fk` and `approval_decisions_workspace_mission_fk` referenced exactly `(missions.workspace_id, missions.id)`. PostgreSQL requires the referenced column list of a foreign key to match a non-partial unique/primary candidate key; uniqueness of `id` alone did not satisfy that two-column reference. The rc.3 DDL was therefore invalid, and KBN-010 correctly blocked it.
+
+Contract rc.4 resolves SI-001 by adding the non-partial `missions_workspace_id_uidx` candidate key on `(workspace_id, id)` while retaining the global `id` primary key and the project-congruent `(workspace_id, project_id, id)` key. Both polymorphic child FKs retain their exact workspace-safe ordered columns and `ON DELETE RESTRICT`; no target, tenancy, project-congruence, exactly-one-target, N-1, rollback, no-cascade, identity, approval, or fencing authority is weakened.
+
+Independent Homelab non-author schema/security review returned **APPROVE** for the exact rc.4 commit/tree/content and found no collision with #757 connector fencing. SI-001 has no unresolved contract/schema-design impact.
+
+This GO completes the KBN-010 analysis/review prerequisite only. It does **not** claim that runtime schema or migration DDL exists. KBN-100 remains held and may be released only after this PR squash-merges, the merged change reaches terminal-green CI on `main`, and issue #753 closes.
+
+### 1.1 Independent rc.4 evidence identity
+
+- **Commit:** `3f6a3387b419eb99453ee10dd25ba888faaab0b5`
+- **Tree:** `7ebab8fa530a7180036928cea9527f808548aa14`
+- **Stable full-index SHA-256:** `6b40a76265c4f3e6d1d30a7f262a2dd16e0d51997e99c146b59f527e6524cd42`
+- **Stable patch-id:** `058cf98026fcd1043703c866aee047c8bb144740`
+- **Verdict:** Homelab independent non-author schema/security review **APPROVE**.
+- **Reviewed conclusions:** the candidate key repairs both dependent FKs; tenant safety, polymorphic exactly-one-target semantics, RESTRICT/no-cascade behavior, and N-1/rollback semantics remain valid; #757 uses separate tables/indexes/FKs/identity/fence authority and has no collision.
+
+A command-rendered patch SHA may differ when Git rendering options, headers, or command form differ. That rendering digest is non-authoritative. Canonical review identity is the Git commit object plus tree and exact file content; the stable full-index digest and stable patch-id above are corroborating identities.
+
+## 2. Method and trust boundaries
+
+### 2.1 Inputs inspected
+
+- Canonical requirements: `docs/requirements/native-kanban-sot.md`.
+- Workstream manifest and read-only task plan.
+- Frozen health, schema, Mechanical Coordinator, and recovery contracts in full.
+- Actual current-main schema, Better Auth guard/scope helpers, project/task/mission/team controllers and repositories, fleet backlog, and `TASKS.md` parser/writer.
+- Issue #753 through the Mosaic provider wrapper.
+
+### 2.2 Current-main exposure that the target must replace, not inherit
+
+| Current-main fact                                                                                                                                         | Constraint on future implementation                                                                                               |
+| --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| Teams are global; projects, missions, tasks, agents, and fleet backlog have no `workspace_id`.                                                            | KBN-100 must add the workspace boundary and KBN-110 must query by server-derived workspace in every repository operation.         |
+| `AuthGuard` authenticates a Better Auth user, while `scopeFromUser` falls back through optional tenant/team/org claims and finally user ID.               | Kanban tenancy must derive from an authenticated **active workspace membership**, not this compatibility fallback or caller data. |
+| Team list/get/member endpoints return global team data to any authenticated user.                                                                         | New Kanban endpoints must use a uniform no-oracle denial and must not reuse global team lookup as authorization.                  |
+| Project/task repositories load and mutate by bare IDs; controller checks are separate and sometimes distinguish not-found from forbidden.                 | Workspace predicates and authorization must be inside the authoritative transaction/repository command path.                      |
+| Tasks can have nullable project/mission links, free-text assignee, JSON tags, no aggregate version, and no fence.                                         | Expand/backfill/quarantine must precede NOT NULL/composite constraints; new commands cannot trust legacy fields.                  |
+| `mission_tasks.status` is a second status writer.                                                                                                         | Pre-expand must prohibit it as a write source and later retire it only after N-1 evidence.                                        |
+| Fleet `backlog` has global JSON dependencies and TTL claims without workspace, assignment, approval, session, or fencing.                                 | It must be frozen and imported as non-dispatching shadow data; it cannot be adapted into the canonical lease path.                |
+| `packages/coord/src/tasks-file.ts` parses and mutates `TASKS.md`.                                                                                         | KBN-120 must replace production use with generated, read-only projection code and prove there is no import/mutation path.         |
+| No Kanban transaction-local health proof, semantic audit/event chain, change proposals, canonical outbox, approval binding, or fenced lease model exists. | These are new frozen invariants, not behaviors that may be inferred from current endpoints.                                       |
+
+## 3. Authorization matrix
+
+The exact route/DTO freeze belongs to KBN-105. This matrix fixes the minimum authorization behavior that freeze and later implementation must preserve.
+
+| Principal/state                                    | Permitted authority                                                                   | Required authoritative checks                                                                                                                     | Explicit denials                                                                                                |
+| -------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| Unauthenticated caller                             | Public health observation only, if deployment exposes it                              | Health DTO validation; no proof field accepted                                                                                                    | All canonical reads/mutations; health observation never authorizes a write                                      |
+| Active workspace `owner`/`admin` user              | Policy-allowed workspace administration and domain commands                           | Better Auth session; active membership; server-derived workspace; command-family role; expected version/idempotency                               | Foreign workspace, suspended workspace, revoked membership, caller workspace override                           |
+| Active workspace `member` user                     | Policy-allowed project/task/proposal commands                                         | Active membership plus project/team capability and target checks in the same transaction                                                          | Admin, approval, purge, service-only Coordinator, and unrelated project commands                                |
+| Active workspace `auditor` user                    | Workspace-scoped reads and audit/evidence inspection                                  | Active membership and read capability                                                                                                             | Every mutation, approval, lease, token issuance, purge                                                          |
+| Active workspace `service` identity                | Only explicitly issued command families                                               | Credential maps to workspace+agent+session; agent enabled; session live; role/capability allowlist; token expiry/audience; DB recheck per command | Raw DB credentials, user/admin fallback, cross-workspace scope, command families absent from token and registry |
+| Enabled agent with live session                    | Agent commands matching its declared and policy-approved specialist role/capabilities | Exact workspace+agent+session binding, heartbeat/state, assignment target, lease, current decimal-string fence                                    | Ended/offline/degraded session where policy disallows; disabled agent; another assignment/session/fence         |
+| Mechanical Coordinator engine                      | Pure eligibility/order/expiry decisions from immutable snapshots                      | Complete workspace-local snapshot and policy revision                                                                                             | Authentication, ID loading, SQL, proof minting, scope invention, approval, certification, merge                 |
+| Coordinator persistence service                    | Service-only assignment/lease/checkpoint/recovery commands                            | Fresh transaction-local proof; locks; current assignment/approval/task/session/policy/fence                                                       | Public/user proof-by-value, stale approval/policy, direct completion/certification/merge                        |
+| Reviewer/SecReview/Certifier                       | Attributable evidence decisions allowed by gate policy                                | Active authority, author differs from reviewer, mandatory SecReview classification, immutable artifacts                                           | Self-review; missing evidence; Certifier merge/issue-close/release                                              |
+| Break-glass retention operator                     | Narrow, time-bounded purge procedure only                                             | Separate break-glass authority, reason, scope, approvals, immutable pre-purge evidence, semantic audit, post-action reconciliation                | Normal application role DELETE/UPDATE, bulk unscoped purge, unaudited hard delete                               |
+| Revoked/expired/disabled identity or ended session | None beyond policy-permitted public observation                                       | Revocation/lifecycle checked from PostgreSQL on every command                                                                                     | Cached token/Valkey state cannot preserve authority                                                             |
+
+**No-oracle rule:** authentication may return 401, but once authenticated, a foreign-workspace, nonexistent, inaccessible, or wrong-project identifier must follow the one KBN-105-frozen 404/403 policy with the same response shape and no foreign metadata, timing-derived detail, or WebSocket/MCP discrepancy.
+
+## 4. Threat matrix
+
+Every disposition is against the frozen target, not a claim about current-main behavior.
+
+| ID  | Attacker or failure                                                                     | Asset                                   | Precondition and abuse path                                                                                             | Frozen preventive/detective control                                                                                                                           | Required schema/API/negative-test evidence                                                                                                                                   | Future owner                     | Residual risk                                                       | Disposition                                                                          |
+| --- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | --------------------------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | -------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
+| T01 | Authenticated user supplies a foreign workspace/resource ID                             | Tenant confidentiality and integrity    | Caller knows or guesses project/task/mission/team IDs and probes REST, MCP, WebSocket, repository, or Coordinator paths | `workspace_id` on every canonical row; composite relations; server-derived tenant; uniform no-oracle denial                                                   | Composite FK/unique DDL; every repository predicate includes workspace; N100-01/02, N110-01..05, N130-01                                                                     | KBN-100, 105, 110, 130           | Timing/volume side channels require operational review              | Controlled after evidence                                                            |
+| T02 | Revoked or inactive member retains an old session                                       | Ownership and mutation authority        | Authentication remains valid after workspace membership revocation                                                      | Active membership rechecked in the authoritative transaction for owners, principals, proposers, and decision actors                                           | Active/inactive membership fixtures; N100-03, N110-06/07; no cached membership authority                                                                                     | KBN-100, 110                     | Better Auth session may remain valid for unrelated features         | Controlled after evidence                                                            |
+| T03 | User joins/forges a team relation outside its workspace                                 | Team-owned projects and tasks           | Global-current-main team behavior or a stale membership is reused                                                       | Team is intra-workspace only; workspace/team composites; active workspace membership precedes team authorization                                              | Cross-workspace team/member/owner insert and command denials; N100-04/05, N110-08                                                                                            | KBN-100, 110                     | Team-role policy mistakes remain possible                           | Controlled after evidence                                                            |
+| T04 | Same-workspace IDs from a different project are combined                                | Planning hierarchy integrity            | Valid mission/milestone/parent/current-milestone UUIDs are substituted                                                  | Project-congruent composite relations and serialized hierarchy validation                                                                                     | Mission/milestone/parent/current milestone mismatch and parent-cycle tests; N100-06..10, N110-09                                                                             | KBN-100, 110                     | Deep hierarchy checks can be expensive                              | Controlled after evidence                                                            |
+| T05 | Foreign or unrelated evidence/link/artifact IDs are attached                            | Review and audit truth                  | Caller has a valid same-workspace or foreign artifact UUID                                                              | Workspace-aware joins; immutable artifact digest/revision; semantic same-target validation in authoritative transaction                                       | Mixed-workspace and same-workspace wrong-task/mission checkpoint/approval evidence tests; N100-11..14, N210-15/16                                                            | KBN-100, 110, 210                | Same-workspace semantic validation is application-enforced          | Controlled after evidence                                                            |
+| T06 | Stolen, over-scoped, or replayed service token                                          | Coordinator and task mutation authority | Service credential is accepted as admin/user or claims are trusted without DB state                                     | Command-family least privilege; agent/session workspace binding; no raw DB credentials; enabled/live state checked per command                                | Auth registry fixtures prove audience/expiry/role/capability; revoked agent and ended session denials; N105-01, N110-10..13, N210-01/02                                      | KBN-105, 110, 210                | Credential theft until expiry/revocation check                      | Controlled after evidence                                                            |
+| T07 | Caller forges public `healthy` or replays a stale health response                       | Sole-writer/fail-closed invariant       | Public health body or caller field reaches mutation context                                                             | Public DTO is observation only; public DTOs reject proof/health fields; Gateway mints internal proof after live PG transaction probe                          | Contradictory union and forbidden-field tests; N105-02, N110-14..17                                                                                                          | KBN-105, 110, 140                | Health endpoint can still be used for reconnaissance                | Controlled after evidence                                                            |
+| T08 | Internal stale, wrong-policy, or wrong-transaction proof is reused                      | Transaction integrity                   | A branded value leaks or an adapter fails to revalidate it                                                              | Non-exported brand; transaction identity, `checkedAt <= now < validUntil`, and policy revision revalidated immediately before mutation                        | Wrong transaction, expiry boundary, future timestamp, policy mismatch, commit-after-expiry tests; N110-18..22                                                                | KBN-110, 140                     | In-process code can bypass TypeScript; runtime checks are mandatory | Controlled after evidence                                                            |
+| T09 | DB/transport uncertainty is mislabeled as deliberate denial or conflict                 | Safe retry and exactly-once result      | Timeout occurs before/after commit and client changes key or retries 503                                                | Exact 503/502/504/timeout/409 union; unknown outcome retries only with same idempotency key                                                                   | Exhaustive fixture mapping and commit-before-timeout replay; N105-03, N110-23..27, N120-01/02                                                                                | KBN-105, 110, 120, 140           | External client may ignore retry rules                              | Controlled after evidence                                                            |
+| T10 | Assignment payload forges task version, target agent/session, role, expiry, or proposer | Work routing authority                  | Lease service trusts command DTO rather than persisted assignment                                                       | Persisted assignment identity; exactly-one principal/proposer; exact agent/session composite; acquire accepts IDs then reloads+locks                          | Cross-workspace and same-workspace target substitutions, stale task version, invalid role, expired assignment; N100-15..18, N210-03..08                                      | KBN-100, 200, 210                | Compromised authorized proposer can make harmful proposals          | Controlled by approval/audit                                                         |
+| T11 | Approval proof is forged by value or borrowed from another assignment                   | Gate integrity                          | Caller submits `approved=true`, unrelated decision ID, stale policy, or self-approval                                   | Relational approval bound to assignment; lock/reload; policy revision; author≠reviewer and mandatory SecReview                                                | No proof-by-value DTO; wrong assignment/task/workspace/policy/actor/decision tests; N105-04, N210-09..14, N230-01                                                            | KBN-105, 210, 230                | Colluding principals remain an organizational risk                  | Controlled after evidence                                                            |
+| T12 | Revoked policy or expired proposal/assignment is raced against lease acquisition        | Routing policy                          | Approval and lease transactions do not lock/revalidate current rows                                                     | Lock assignment, approval, task, target session; compare current policy and expiry inside fresh-proof transaction                                             | Concurrent revoke/expire/acquire tests with one valid terminal result; N210-17..19                                                                                           | KBN-210, 230                     | Clock skew if DB time is not canonical                              | Controlled after evidence                                                            |
+| T13 | Stale worker sends ack/heartbeat/checkpoint/review after reassignment                   | Canonical task and evidence state       | Old process retains task/session IDs                                                                                    | Task-row-locked atomic monotonic bigint fence; every worker command carries exact lease/session/fence                                                         | Lower, expired, future, and other-task fences denied; old worker loses after new lease; N100-19/20, N210-20..24                                                              | KBN-100, 210, 230                | Signed bigint exhaustion is theoretical                             | Controlled after evidence                                                            |
+| T14 | JavaScript precision truncates a fence                                                  | Stale-worker exclusion                  | bigint token is serialized as number above `2^53-1`                                                                     | Drizzle bigint and decimal-string wire type only                                                                                                              | `9007199254740993` and near-`int8` boundary round trips; numeric JSON rejected; N105-05, N210-25                                                                             | KBN-105, 210                     | Nonconforming external clients                                      | Controlled after evidence                                                            |
+| T15 | Checkpoint/evidence from another lease/task/session is submitted                        | Recovery and certification evidence     | Same-workspace valid IDs are mixed                                                                                      | Exact lease composite binds workspace+task+assignment/session+fence; checkpoint composite binds lease+fence; evidence join plus semantic artifact-owner check | Same-workspace mismatched task/assignment/lease/session/checkpoint/artifact tests; N100-21..23, N210-26..31                                                                  | KBN-100, 210                     | Artifact URI target may disappear outside DB                        | Controlled with digest/retention                                                     |
+| T16 | Outage note or pending/rejected proposal mutates/orders work                            | Sole SOT and gate integrity             | Importer/UI treats note/proposal as task state                                                                          | Proposals are inert; only explicit accept invokes normal typed command after recovery                                                                         | Row/outbox/task counts unchanged for pending/rejected; no readiness/dependency/lease effect; N110-28..31                                                                     | KBN-110, 140                     | Humans may act outside Mosaic operationally                         | Accepted as attributable residual                                                    |
+| T17 | Submission event is missing, foreign, or for another proposal                           | Proposal audit chain                    | Caller supplies an existing event UUID                                                                                  | Preallocated proposal ID; event-first same transaction; workspace composite FK; exact event type/aggregate/version semantic check                             | Missing/foreign/wrong-type/wrong-proposal event rolls back event+proposal; N100-24/25, N110-32..36                                                                           | KBN-100, 110                     | Semantic checks are transaction code, not only FK                   | Controlled after evidence                                                            |
+| T18 | Acceptance borrows an unrelated command event                                           | Proposal and target integrity           | Same-workspace event exists for another target/command/proposal                                                         | Accept locks proposal+target, executes normal command, requires workspace/target match, causation=submission event, payload proposal ID                       | Foreign, wrong target/type/command/causation/payload event aborts target/event/proposal atomically; N100-26, N110-37..43                                                     | KBN-100, 110                     | Event payload schema drift                                          | Controlled by KBN-105 fixtures                                                       |
+| T19 | Application role updates/deletes audit, approval evidence, checkpoint, or artifact      | Nonrepudiation                          | Broad DB grants or parent cascade exists                                                                                | INSERT/SELECT-only application roles; RESTRICT parent deletes; archive/cancel normal lifecycle                                                                | Role-level UPDATE/DELETE denied; parent delete RESTRICT; digest unchanged; N100-27..31                                                                                       | KBN-100                          | DB superuser can alter state                                        | Break-glass/infra audit residual                                                     |
+| T20 | Break-glass purge is used as routine deletion or erases its own evidence                | Retention and incident forensics        | Elevated credential available                                                                                           | Separate audited retention procedure, bounded scope, reason, pre/post evidence, authority separation                                                          | Normal role denied; expired/missing approval denied; purge cannot delete its authorizing audit package; N115-01, N230-02/03                                                  | KBN-115, 230                     | Privileged DBA compromise                                           | Accepted operational residual                                                        |
+| T21 | PostgreSQL unavailable or partitioned                                                   | Canonical state                         | Public health/Valkey remains live while transaction probe fails                                                         | Fail closed; no alternate writer/hidden queue; 503 only for proven not-applied; transport uncertainty remains unknown                                         | Fault injection proves DB rows/outbox/files/Valkey unchanged on deliberate denial; commit-unknown replay; N110-44..48, N140-01                                               | KBN-110, 140, 230                | Availability loss is intentional                                    | Accepted by Option A                                                                 |
+| T22 | Valkey unavailable, duplicated, stale, or partitioned                                   | Scheduling notifications                | Queue wake is treated as truth or publication fails                                                                     | Valkey derived/expendable; transactional outbox in PG; idempotent publisher; recovery from PG                                                                 | Commit with Valkey down leaves pending outbox; replay publishes once logically; stale wake reloads PG; N110-49, N140-02, N230-04..06                                         | KBN-110, 210, 230                | Duplicate at-least-once delivery                                    | Consumers must be idempotent                                                         |
+| T23 | Coordinator restarts between assignment, lease, checkpoint, or outbox steps             | Durable orchestration truth             | Process-local cache is treated as authority                                                                             | PostgreSQL stores assignments, execution state, leases, fences, checkpoints, events, outbox; `recoverFromPostgres`                                            | Restart at every transaction boundary reconstructs identical active/expired/pending sets without Valkey/files; N210-32..36, N230-07                                          | KBN-210, 230                     | Recovery latency                                                    | Controlled after evidence                                                            |
+| T24 | Dependency cycle or concurrent reciprocal edge                                          | Readiness and dispatch safety           | Two transactions each see an acyclic graph before inserting                                                             | Unique directed edge; no self-edge; serialized recursive cycle check; readiness evaluates all blockers                                                        | Self/duplicate/cycle and concurrent A→B/B→A tests; all predecessor property test; N100-32..35, N200-01/02                                                                    | KBN-100, 200, 230                | Very large DAG performance                                          | Bounded operational residual                                                         |
+| T25 | Parent-task cycle or project-incongruent relation                                       | Planning hierarchy                      | Valid same-workspace IDs are arranged into an invalid tree                                                              | Project-congruent composites; serialized parent-cycle/orphan validation required by REQ-PLAN-001                                                              | Self/indirect parent cycle, orphan, and cross-project mission/milestone/parent tests; N100-06..10                                                                            | KBN-100, 110                     | Cycle validation is service/transaction enforced                    | Controlled after evidence                                                            |
+| T26 | Concurrent update, duplicate retry, or idempotency payload drift                        | Aggregate consistency                   | Two clients use same version/key with different payloads                                                                | Expected-version check; semantic event and outbox in same transaction; key returns prior immutable result only for identical command                          | One update wins; stale gets 409; duplicate identical returns prior; payload drift rejected; N110-50..54, N140-03                                                             | KBN-105, 110, 140                | Long-lived clients face visible conflicts                           | Intentional user-visible residual                                                    |
+| T27 | State/event/outbox partial commit                                                       | Audit and notification consistency      | Separate transactions or exception after state write                                                                    | One PostgreSQL transaction for state+semantic event+outbox                                                                                                    | Failure injected after each insert rolls all three back; success revisions align; N110-55..58                                                                                | KBN-110, 140                     | Outbox publication remains asynchronous                             | Controlled after evidence                                                            |
+| T28 | Malicious/incorrect importer injects foreign workspace data or dispatchable work        | Migration integrity                     | Source keys collide, lineage is absent, or importer has direct DB authority                                             | Immutable source snapshots/checksums; one-way Gateway/migration-only port; workspace-safe idempotent modes; shadow records cannot dispatch                    | Foreign/malformed/duplicate/partial-resume/lineage checksum and no-dispatch tests; N300-01..08                                                                               | KBN-300, 330                     | Source data may be semantically ambiguous                           | Quarantine and owner sign-off                                                        |
+| T29 | Cutover leaves legacy writer or forward/reverse sync active                             | Sole-writer invariant                   | Credentials/processes survive switch or rollback is improvised                                                          | Writer inventory, freeze, final delta, Gateway switch, credential shutdown, no dual write; rollback authority changes after first DB mutation                 | Process/credential inventory; concurrent-writer assertion; before/after-mutation rollback rehearsal; N320-01..06, N330-01                                                    | KBN-320, 330, 340                | Missed external automation                                          | Owner-gated residual                                                                 |
+| T30 | Generated `TASKS.md`/`mission.json` is edited or parsed into DB                         | Canonical state                         | Current-main parser/writer remains reachable or file watcher imports changes                                            | Generated non-authoritative header/IDs/time/revision; no production importer; regenerate/overwrite only                                                       | Static import search, tamper/regeneration, read-only permission, source-revision parity; N120-03..07, N140-04                                                                | KBN-120, 140                     | Humans may mistake snapshots for live data                          | Header and docs mitigate                                                             |
+| T31 | N-1 compatibility copies legacy ambiguity into canonical authority                      | Data integrity                          | Nullable/global/current-main fields are guessed during backfill                                                         | Nullable-first expand; deterministic mapping or quarantine; checksums; no new-only status before switch; legacy fields retained                               | Production-shape, ambiguous owner/assignee, status shadow, JSON/config/digest, rollback tests; N100-36..44                                                                   | KBN-100                          | Quarantined records require human decision                          | Controlled by signed reconciliation                                                  |
+| T32 | Recovery posture claims durability not provided by mechanisms                           | Availability and audit retention        | Shape-only validation or optimistic RPO is accepted                                                                     | Normative validator; WAL/PITR/RPO/storage/high-assurance constraints; mechanism and restore evidence                                                          | Unknown/impossible/weakened configuration plus actual mechanism/restore tests; N115-02..08                                                                                   | KBN-115                          | Backup operator or storage compromise                               | Separate failure domain residual                                                     |
+| T33 | rc.3 frozen DDL could not create mission-scoped evidence/approval FKs                   | Tenant/evidence relational integrity    | KBN-100 generated DDL from the rc.3 contract without an exact composite candidate key                                   | rc.4 adds non-partial `missions_workspace_id_uidx(workspace_id,id)` before both dependent FKs while retaining global and project-congruent keys               | KBN-100 must execute N100-45..50: exact-key reconciliation, candidate-before-FKs, duplicate feasibility, empty/prod/N-1/rollback, and both-child foreign-workspace negatives | KBN-100 after PR/CI/#753 release | Runtime DDL remains unimplemented and must prove the frozen order   | **Resolved by rc.4 + independent APPROVE; implementation evidence remains required** |
+
+## 5. Constraint-impact matrix
+
+| Impact ID | Required invariant                          | Frozen schema impact                                                                                          | API/transaction impact                                                                                 | Required evidence                                                                                                                             | Owner                            | Status                                                                            |
+| --------- | ------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | -------------------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| CI-01     | Hard workspace tenancy and no oracle        | `workspace_id`, workspace-aware unique/FKs on all canonical rows                                              | Server-derived workspace; uniform denial on all surfaces                                               | N100-01..14; N110-01..09; N130-01                                                                                                             | KBN-100/105/110/130              | Resolved by frozen controls                                                       |
+| CI-02     | Active user membership                      | Membership row plus unique `(workspace_id,user_id)`; active state retained                                    | Recheck active membership in same authoritative transaction                                            | N100-03; N110-06/07                                                                                                                           | KBN-100/110                      | Resolved; not FK-only                                                             |
+| CI-03     | Service identity least privilege/revocation | Agent/session workspace, lifecycle, state, roles, capabilities                                                | Token maps to exact agent/session; command-family allowlist; DB recheck; no admin/raw DB fallback      | N105-01; N110-10..13; N210-01/02                                                                                                              | KBN-105/110/210                  | Resolved at auth/API layer                                                        |
+| CI-04     | Project-congruent hierarchy                 | Composite project/mission/milestone/parent/current-milestone relations                                        | Lock/serialized parent-cycle and orphan validation                                                     | N100-06..10                                                                                                                                   | KBN-100/110                      | Resolved; cycle behavior required                                                 |
+| CI-05     | Health-proof authority                      | Internal branded proof has transaction/time/policy fields                                                     | Probe and revalidate on same PG transaction; no public field                                           | N105-02/03; N110-14..27                                                                                                                       | KBN-105/110                      | Resolved by frozen controls                                                       |
+| CI-06     | Assignment/approval identity                | Exactly-one principal/proposer, exact agent/session assignment, relational approval                           | Reload+lock all IDs; compare version/target/state/expiry/policy/decision                               | N100-15..18; N210-03..19                                                                                                                      | KBN-100/210                      | Resolved by frozen controls                                                       |
+| CI-07     | Monotonic bigint fencing                    | Durable bigint counter, exact lease/fence keys, one active lease                                              | Atomic increment/RETURNING; decimal-string DTO; reject every stale worker command                      | N100-19..23; N210-20..31                                                                                                                      | KBN-100/105/210                  | Resolved by frozen controls                                                       |
+| CI-08     | Proposal event chain                        | Both workspace-aware event FKs; event table created first                                                     | Exact submission/acceptance semantic checks in one transaction                                         | N100-24..26; N110-28..43                                                                                                                      | KBN-100/110                      | Resolved; semantic checks not FK-only                                             |
+| CI-09     | Immutable audit/evidence retention          | RESTRICT parents; INSERT/SELECT-only immutable tables                                                         | Archive/cancel normal flow; separately authorized purge                                                | N100-27..31; N115-01; N230-02/03                                                                                                              | KBN-100/115/230                  | Resolved by frozen controls                                                       |
+| CI-10     | DB/Valkey/outbox/restart semantics          | PG outbox and durable orchestration rows                                                                      | Fail closed; same-key uncertainty retry; Valkey reloads PG; restart from PG                            | N110-44..49; N140-01/02; N230-04..07                                                                                                          | KBN-110/210/230                  | Resolved by frozen controls                                                       |
+| CI-11     | DAG/race/idempotency/version                | Unique edge; self check; event idempotency; aggregate versions                                                | Serialized recursive cycle check; payload binding; expected-version conflict                           | N100-32..35; N110-50..58; N200-01/02                                                                                                          | KBN-100/110/200                  | Resolved by frozen controls                                                       |
+| CI-12     | Import/cutover trust boundary               | Lineage/artifact/event fields; shadow state cannot dispatch                                                   | One-way scoped importer, freeze, no direct DB/file authority, no dual writer                           | N300-01..08; N320-01..06                                                                                                                      | KBN-300/320/330                  | Resolved by frozen controls                                                       |
+| CI-13     | Generated-file no-import                    | No canonical file schema/import contract                                                                      | Projection-only package; static reachability check removes current parser from production Kanban paths | N120-03..07; N140-04                                                                                                                          | KBN-120/140                      | Resolved by frozen controls                                                       |
+| CI-14     | Mission-scoped artifact and approval FKs    | rc.4 adds non-partial `missions_workspace_id_uidx(workspace_id,id)` and retains global/project-congruent keys | KBN-100 must emit the candidate before both exact RESTRICT FKs and preserve N-1/rollback order         | N100-45..50: exact reconciliation, duplicate feasibility, empty/prod/N-1/rollback, and separate artifact/approval foreign-workspace negatives | KBN-100 after PR/CI/#753 release | **Resolved by rc.4 and independent APPROVE; future executable evidence required** |
+
+## 6. Exact future negative-test catalog
+
+These names are normative evidence identifiers for future slices. Equivalent test-file names are acceptable only if traceability retains these IDs and expected outcomes.
+
+### KBN-100 — schema and migration
+
+- **N100-01** reject every canonical child row whose `workspace_id` differs from its parent.
+- **N100-02** reject foreign-workspace link, artifact, proposal target, dependency, assignment, lease, checkpoint, approval, and event relationships.
+- **N100-03** reject an inactive/revoked member as accountable owner, proposer, decision actor, archive actor, or user principal in the authoritative command transaction.
+- **N100-04** reject a team/project relation crossing workspaces.
+- **N100-05** reject a team authorization path when the user lacks active membership in the team's workspace.
+- **N100-06** reject task→mission project mismatch.
+- **N100-07** reject task→milestone and project→current-milestone project mismatch.
+- **N100-08** reject task→parent project mismatch and self-parent.
+- **N100-09** reject indirect parent cycles under concurrent transactions.
+- **N100-10** reject mission→milestone project mismatch/orphan.
+- **N100-11** reject checkpoint artifact from another workspace.
+- **N100-12** reject checkpoint artifact owned by another same-workspace task/mission unless an explicitly frozen evidence rule permits it.
+- **N100-13** reject approval evidence from another workspace.
+- **N100-14** reject same-workspace approval evidence unrelated to the approval target.
+- **N100-15** reject zero/multiple assignment principals and zero/multiple proposers.
+- **N100-16** reject target session without its exact target agent.
+- **N100-17** reject assignment task/agent/session crossing workspaces.
+- **N100-18** reject non-positive task version and expired assignment acquisition.
+- **N100-19** concurrent lease insert permits one active lease and returns one winner.
+- **N100-20** successive leases return strictly increasing bigint fences.
+- **N100-21** reject checkpoint with another task, lease, or fence.
+- **N100-22** reject duplicate/non-monotonic checkpoint sequence.
+- **N100-23** reject evidence join for a mismatched checkpoint/task.
+- **N100-24** proposal insert without exact submission event fails atomically.
+- **N100-25** foreign/wrong-type/wrong-proposal submission event fails atomically.
+- **N100-26** foreign/wrong-target/unrelated acceptance event fails atomically.
+- **N100-27** application role cannot UPDATE/DELETE `task_events`.
+- **N100-28** application role cannot UPDATE/DELETE checkpoints/artifacts/evidence joins.
+- **N100-29** parent hard delete is RESTRICTed while audit/evidence children exist.
+- **N100-30** archive does not alter canonical lifecycle status.
+- **N100-31** purge without break-glass authority/evidence is denied.
+- **N100-32** reject dependency self-edge and duplicate directed pair regardless of type.
+- **N100-33** reject direct and indirect dependency cycles.
+- **N100-34** concurrent reciprocal dependency inserts cannot both commit.
+- **N100-35** readiness remains false until every blocking predecessor and completion condition passes.
+- **N100-36** empty DB migration succeeds after the contract amendment.
+- **N100-37** production-shape expand retains all legacy declarations.
+- **N100-38** crash/resume backfill is idempotent and checksum-stable.
+- **N100-39** ambiguous workspace/owner/assignee is quarantined, never guessed.
+- **N100-40** no `ready`/`in_review` status is emitted to N-1 readers before switch.
+- **N100-41** `mission_tasks.status` cannot remain a write source.
+- **N100-42** tags/assignee/date/mission JSON/config/description/agent fields reconcile without loss.
+- **N100-43** claimed fleet backlog rows are quarantined and imported rows cannot dispatch.
+- **N100-44** pre-switch rollback works while post-first-mutation rollback requires freeze/reconciliation.
+- **N100-45** reconcile both exact child FK column lists to the rc.4 `(workspace_id,id)` mission candidate while retaining the global `id` primary key and `(workspace_id,project_id,id)` key.
+- **N100-46** empty-DB migration creates `missions_workspace_id_uidx` before `artifacts_workspace_mission_fk` and `approval_decisions_workspace_mission_fk`.
+- **N100-47** production-shape preflight finds no duplicate `(workspace_id,id)` groups, preserves global `id` uniqueness, and applies the candidate before both dependent FKs.
+- **N100-48** N-1 startup/read/write remains unchanged; pre-switch rollback drops both dependents before the candidate and preserves the global/project-congruent keys.
+- **N100-49** artifact insert using a valid mission ID paired with a foreign workspace fails before commit.
+- **N100-50** approval-decision insert using a valid mission ID paired with a foreign workspace fails before commit.
+
+### KBN-105/KBN-110/KBN-120/KBN-130/KBN-140 — API and P1
+
+- **N105-01** every route has an explicit user/service command-family policy; user/admin tokens cannot call service-only Coordinator mutations.
+- **N105-02** public DTO validation rejects `writeProof`, internal context, body `workspaceId`, and caller-asserted health.
+- **N105-03** fixture exhaustiveness prevents 503, 502/504/timeout, and 409 cross-mapping.
+- **N105-04** approval DTO accepts an ID and decision command only, never approval proof-by-value.
+- **N105-05** all fence fields accept/emit decimal strings and reject JSON numbers.
+- **N110-01** listing with a foreign `workspaceId` or foreign filter ID follows the frozen no-oracle denial and returns no rows/counts/cursors.
+- **N110-02** get by foreign or nonexistent aggregate ID has the same frozen denial shape and no foreign metadata.
+- **N110-03** create/update/archive with a foreign owner, parent, project, mission, milestone, tag, or target ID is denied before mutation.
+- **N110-04** dependency/proposal commands with foreign target IDs are denied with unchanged state/event/outbox counts.
+- **N110-05** REST, MCP, WebSocket, and internal Coordinator paths produce equivalent no-oracle behavior for the same foreign ID.
+- **N110-06** a revoked/inactive owner is denied even with a still-valid Better Auth session.
+- **N110-07** stale membership/team cache cannot authorize a proposer, decision actor, archive actor, or principal after revocation.
+- **N110-08** a team ID from another workspace cannot authorize or own the command target.
+- **N110-09** same-workspace but wrong-project mission/milestone/parent IDs are denied inside the transaction.
+- **N110-10** an expired service token is denied before repository access.
+- **N110-11** an audience- or workspace-mismatched service token is denied without an existence oracle.
+- **N110-12** an over-scoped service token cannot call a command family absent from its role/capability allowlist.
+- **N110-13** disabled agent or ended session revokes service-token command authority immediately on PostgreSQL recheck.
+- **N110-14** contradictory public health state/boolean combinations fail validation.
+- **N110-15** Valkey-only liveness cannot mint or substitute a PostgreSQL write proof.
+- **N110-16** caller-forged public `healthy` cannot enter internal mutation context.
+- **N110-17** public REST/MCP/CLI bodies containing health/proof fields are rejected.
+- **N110-18** an expired internal proof produces no state/event/outbox write.
+- **N110-19** a future-dated or not-yet-valid proof produces no write.
+- **N110-20** a policy-revision-mismatched proof produces no write.
+- **N110-21** a proof minted on another transaction/connection produces no write.
+- **N110-22** a proof that expires before the final pre-mutation check produces no write.
+- **N110-23** deliberate read-only/write-unavailable denial maps only to authoritative 503/not-applied/non-retryable.
+- **N110-24** timeout before commit maps to transport-unknown and permits only same-key retry.
+- **N110-25** timeout after commit maps to transport-unknown and same-key retry returns the committed canonical result once.
+- **N110-26** expected-version mismatch maps only to 409/not-applied/non-retryable.
+- **N110-27** recovery replay with a changed idempotency key cannot masquerade as the original uncertain request.
+- **N110-28** pending proposal cannot alter target fields/status/rank/version.
+- **N110-29** rejected proposal cannot affect readiness, dependencies, or gates.
+- **N110-30** pending/rejected proposal cannot create an assignment or lease.
+- **N110-31** direct proposal-row state manipulation cannot bypass normal command execution.
+- **N110-32** proposal submission without a submission event rolls back fully.
+- **N110-33** foreign-workspace submission event rolls back fully.
+- **N110-34** wrong aggregate/event type submission event rolls back fully.
+- **N110-35** same-workspace event for another proposal rolls back fully.
+- **N110-36** submission event with wrong previous/new version semantics rolls back fully.
+- **N110-37** foreign-workspace acceptance event rolls back proposal, target, event, and outbox.
+- **N110-38** same-workspace event for another target aggregate rolls back acceptance.
+- **N110-39** event from an unrelated normal command rolls back acceptance.
+- **N110-40** event caused by a different submission event rolls back acceptance.
+- **N110-41** event whose payload lacks or changes `changeProposalId` rolls back acceptance.
+- **N110-42** event for another proposal with the same target/command rolls back acceptance.
+- **N110-43** missing accepted-command event after target handling rolls back the entire transaction.
+- **N110-44** read-only-degraded denial changes no DB row/outbox/file/Valkey/provider state.
+- **N110-45** write-unavailable denial changes no DB row/outbox/file/Valkey/provider state.
+- **N110-46** PostgreSQL disconnect cannot redirect a command to any fallback writer.
+- **N110-47** commit uncertainty remains `unknown` and never becomes a fabricated 503/not-applied result.
+- **N110-48** same-key replay after recovery returns one canonical result with no duplicate event/outbox row.
+- **N110-49** Valkey publication failure leaves committed PG outbox pending and replayable.
+- **N110-50** two same-version updates produce one winner and one visible 409 loser.
+- **N110-51** identical duplicate key+payload returns the prior immutable result without another event/outbox row.
+- **N110-52** same key with payload/command drift is rejected as an idempotency conflict.
+- **N110-53** the same key in another workspace cannot reveal or reuse the first workspace's result.
+- **N110-54** stale reconnect/update cannot silently overwrite a newer aggregate revision.
+- **N110-55** failure after state write but before semantic event rolls back state.
+- **N110-56** failure after semantic event but before outbox rolls back state and event.
+- **N110-57** failure after outbox insert but before commit rolls back state, event, and outbox.
+- **N110-58** success commits matching aggregate/event/outbox revisions and correlation/causation.
+- **N120-01** CLI never retries an authoritative 503 deliberate denial.
+- **N120-02** CLI retries only transport-unknown outcomes and preserves the exact idempotency key.
+- **N120-03** generated projection header contains non-authoritative warning, workspace/project IDs, generated time, and source revision.
+- **N120-04** projection revision and records match the API snapshot revision exactly.
+- **N120-05** hand-tampering is overwritten or rejected by regeneration and never mutates PostgreSQL.
+- **N120-06** static/runtime reachability finds no parser/import path from `TASKS.md`, `mission.json`, or another export.
+- **N120-07** projection writer has no domain mutation/raw SQL/Valkey authority.
+- **N130-01** UI foreign/no-access/not-found state follows the frozen no-oracle response and renders no stale foreign data.
+- **N140-01** real-Gateway DB fault journey proves fail-closed no-fallback behavior.
+- **N140-02** real-Gateway Valkey-loss journey proves pending outbox replay.
+- **N140-03** real-Gateway concurrent update/retry journey proves version and idempotency semantics.
+- **N140-04** generated-file tamper journey proves projection parity and no import.
+
+### KBN-115/KBN-200/KBN-210/KBN-230 — recovery and coordination
+
+- **N115-01** retention purge without current break-glass authority, reason, immutable evidence, or bounded scope is denied and audited.
+- **N115-02** recovery posture with an unknown top-level or storage field is rejected.
+- **N115-03** PITR retention without WAL archival is rejected.
+- **N115-04** WAL archival with zero PITR retention is rejected.
+- **N115-05** claimed RPO better than the configured backup/WAL mechanism is rejected.
+- **N115-06** unencrypted, optional, or same-failure-domain storage is rejected.
+- **N115-07** weakened high-assurance values are rejected.
+- **N115-08** shape-only validation cannot pass without normative mechanism and restore evidence.
+- **N200-01** cyclic/incomplete dependency snapshots never become eligible.
+- **N200-02** identical immutable snapshot+policy+time returns identical ordering and explanation with no I/O/model import.
+- **N210-01** disabled agent cannot claim, ack, heartbeat, checkpoint, or submit review.
+- **N210-02** ended/offline/mismatched session cannot claim, ack, heartbeat, checkpoint, or submit review.
+- **N210-03** foreign-workspace task is rejected after lock/reload without an oracle.
+- **N210-04** stale task version is rejected before fence increment.
+- **N210-05** assignment target agent mismatch is rejected.
+- **N210-06** target session mismatch is rejected.
+- **N210-07** expired assignment is rejected.
+- **N210-08** assignment in rejected/released/expired/superseded/leased-invalid state is rejected.
+- **N210-09** missing approval is rejected.
+- **N210-10** rejected/escalated/requested approval is rejected as approval authority.
+- **N210-11** stale policy-revision approval is rejected.
+- **N210-12** foreign-workspace approval is rejected without an oracle.
+- **N210-13** approval for another assignment is rejected.
+- **N210-14** author self-approval/review is rejected when independence is required.
+- **N210-15** foreign-workspace artifact evidence is rejected.
+- **N210-16** same-workspace artifact unrelated to the assignment/task/gate is rejected.
+- **N210-17** concurrent policy revocation versus acquire cannot produce a lease under the revoked revision.
+- **N210-18** concurrent assignment expiry versus acquire cannot produce a lease after expiry.
+- **N210-19** concurrent session end versus acquire cannot produce a lease for the ended session.
+- **N210-20** lower fencing token is rejected without writes.
+- **N210-21** token from an older lease is rejected without writes.
+- **N210-22** token paired with another task is rejected without writes.
+- **N210-23** token paired with another session is rejected without writes.
+- **N210-24** token on an expired/revoked/released lease is rejected without writes.
+- **N210-25** fences above JavaScript safe integer round-trip exactly as decimal strings.
+- **N210-26** lease task does not match assignment task and is rejected.
+- **N210-27** lease agent/session does not match assignment target and is rejected.
+- **N210-28** checkpoint task does not match lease task and is rejected.
+- **N210-29** checkpoint fence does not match exact lease fence and is rejected.
+- **N210-30** checkpoint sequence duplicate/regression is rejected.
+- **N210-31** checkpoint artifact does not match workspace/task/evidence semantics and is rejected.
+- **N210-32** restart after assignment persistence reconstructs the pending assignment.
+- **N210-33** restart after lease commit reconstructs exact active lease and fence.
+- **N210-34** restart after checkpoint commit reconstructs checkpoint/recovery state.
+- **N210-35** restart during expiry/retry/quarantine reconstructs durable disposition and eligibility.
+- **N210-36** restart with pending outbox reconstructs publication work without Valkey/files.
+- **N230-01** author=self-review and missing mandatory SecReview cannot certify or complete.
+- **N230-02** normal application role cannot execute retention purge.
+- **N230-03** break-glass purge cannot delete or alter its own authorization/evidence chain.
+- **N230-04** Valkey down leaves canonical work in PostgreSQL/outbox.
+- **N230-05** duplicate wake produces one logical effect after PostgreSQL reload/idempotency.
+- **N230-06** stale wake cannot revive an expired/revoked assignment or lease.
+- **N230-07** restart with no Valkey/files reconstructs leases/retry/quarantine/outbox exactly.
+
+### KBN-300/KBN-320/KBN-330/KBN-340 — migration and cutover
+
+- **N300-01** source record targeting another workspace is denied/quarantined without an oracle.
+- **N300-02** malformed source record is rejected with attributable reject evidence.
+- **N300-03** duplicate source system/key/batch replay is idempotent.
+- **N300-04** source snapshot/checksum drift aborts apply/verify.
+- **N300-05** partial import resumes from durable lineage without duplicating state/events.
+- **N300-06** imported shadow record cannot become ready, assigned, or leased automatically.
+- **N300-07** missing source key/file/checksum/batch lineage prevents apply/sign-off.
+- **N300-08** importer cannot use direct DB, generated file, Valkey, or provider issue as canonical write authority.
+- **N320-01** cutover without a verified write freeze fails safe.
+- **N320-02** active legacy writer process or credential blocks cutover.
+- **N320-03** reverse and forward synchronization cannot run concurrently.
+- **N320-04** failed final delta/reconciliation blocks client switch.
+- **N320-05** rollback before first canonical DB mutation may switch authority back only after freeze assertion.
+- **N320-06** rollback after first canonical mutation requires freeze, DB-delta export/reconciliation, and owner decision.
+- **N330-01** rehearsal cannot sign off while counts/checksums/exceptions/writer inventory differ.
+- **N340-01** cutover cannot proceed without owner authorization, terminal evidence, scoped identities, and zero active legacy writers.
+
+## 7. Requirements traceability
+
+| Requirement      | Threats/impacts              | Planned evidence                                                |
+| ---------------- | ---------------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| REQ-SOT-001      | T16, T21, T22, T27, T29, T30 | N110-28..31, N110-44..49, N110-55..58, N120-03..07, N320-01..06 |
+| REQ-SOT-002      | T07, T08, T09, T21           | N105-02/03, N110-14..27, N110-44..48                            |
+| REQ-SOT-003      | T30                          | N120-03..07, N140-04                                            |
+| REQ-SOT-004      | T16..18                      | N100-24..26, N110-28..43                                        |
+| REQ-TEN-001      | T01..05, T15, T33            | N100-01..14, N100-45..50, N110-01..09, N210-15/16               |
+| REQ-ID-001       | T02, T03, T06, T10..12       | N105-01, N110-06..13, N210-01..19                               |
+| REQ-PLAN-001     | T04, T25                     | N100-06..10                                                     |
+| REQ-TASK-001     | T13, T26, T31                | N100-20, N100-37..42, N110-50..54                               |
+| REQ-TASK-002     | T16, T24                     | N110-28..31, N100-35, N200-01                                   |
+| REQ-DEP-001      | T24                          | N100-32..35, N200-01                                            |
+| REQ-ASN-001      | T10..12                      | N100-15..18, N210-03..19                                        |
+| REQ-AUD-001      | T17..20, T22, T27            | N100-24..31, N110-32..43, N110-49, N110-55..58                  |
+| REQ-API-001      | T01, T06..18, T26            | N105-01..05 plus KBN-110 catalog                                |
+| REQ-UI-002/003   | T01, T15, T26                | N130-01 and real-Gateway KBN-140 journeys                       |
+| REQ-COORD-001    | T22..24                      | N200-01/02, N210-32..36                                         |
+| REQ-COORD-002    | T10..12, T16                 | N210-03..19, N110-28..31                                        |
+| REQ-COORD-003    | T13..15, T23                 | N100-19..23, N210-20..36                                        |
+| REQ-COORD-004    | T23, T26                     | N210-32..36, N230-07                                            |
+| REQ-GATE-001/002 | T11, T19, T20                | N210-09..14, N230-01..03                                        |
+| REQ-REC-001      | T20, T32                     | N115-01..08                                                     |
+| REQ-MIG-001/002  | T28, T29, T31                | N100-37..44, N300-01..08, N320-01..06, N330-01, N340-01         |
+
+REQ-UI-001 and REQ-UI-004 are downstream functional/accessibility requirements rather than schema-threat controls; they remain owned by KBN-130/KBN-140. Their security-relevant tenancy, conflict, and stale-reconnect portions are covered above.
+
+## 8. Issue #753 acceptance mapping
+
+| Issue requirement/criterion                                     | Evidence in this document                           | Result                                         |
+| --------------------------------------------------------------- | --------------------------------------------------- | ---------------------------------------------- |
+| Cross-workspace owners, principals, evidence, project hierarchy | T01–T05, T15, T25; CI-01–04                         | Mapped                                         |
+| Active membership and service-token boundaries                  | Authorization matrix; T02, T03, T06; CI-02/03       | Mapped                                         |
+| Stale/forged health and transaction-local proof                 | T07–T09, T21; CI-05                                 | Mapped                                         |
+| Assignment/approval forgery and monotonic fencing               | T10–T15; CI-06/07                                   | Mapped                                         |
+| Change-proposal abuse and event binding                         | T16–T18; CI-08                                      | Mapped                                         |
+| Immutable audit and break-glass                                 | T19/T20; CI-09                                      | Mapped                                         |
+| PostgreSQL/Valkey failures                                      | T21–T23; CI-10                                      | Mapped                                         |
+| Dependency/idempotency/version races                            | T24–T27; CI-11                                      | Mapped                                         |
+| Import/cutover and generated-file boundary                      | T28–T31; CI-12/13                                   | Mapped                                         |
+| Every schema/API/test impact explicit                           | Constraint matrix and negative-test catalog         | Mapped                                         |
+| No unresolved schema impact                                     | CI-14; rc.4 resolved-impact record                  | **PASS — none unresolved**                     |
+| Independent SecReview                                           | Homelab non-author exact commit/tree/content review | **PASS / APPROVE**                             |
+| PR merge, terminal-green main CI, and #753 closure              | Orchestrator-owned post-worker gates                | Pending; KBN-100 remains held until completion |
+
+## 9. UNRESOLVED SCHEMA IMPACTS
+
+none
+
+### Resolved-impact record — KBN010-SI-001
+
+- **Historical detection:** rc.3 lacked an exact `(workspace_id,id)` candidate key for the artifact and approval-decision mission FKs. This document's original BLOCKED verdict was correct and remains preserved in §1 and T33.
+- **Resolution:** rc.4 adds non-partial `missions_workspace_id_uidx(workspace_id,id)` before both exact dependent FKs while retaining the global primary key and project-congruent key.
+- **Reviewed object:** commit `3f6a3387b419eb99453ee10dd25ba888faaab0b5`, tree `7ebab8fa530a7180036928cea9527f808548aa14`.
+- **Corroborating identities:** full-index SHA-256 `6b40a76265c4f3e6d1d30a7f262a2dd16e0d51997e99c146b59f527e6524cd42`; stable patch-id `058cf98026fcd1043703c866aee047c8bb144740`.
+- **Independent verdict:** Homelab non-author schema/security review **APPROVE**. It confirmed PostgreSQL candidate/FK validity, unchanged tenant and polymorphic exactly-one-target safety, RESTRICT/no-cascade semantics, N-1/rollback validity, and no shared table/index/FK/identity/fence authority collision with #757.
+- **Digest interpretation:** a command-rendered patch digest varied with rendering command/options and is non-authoritative. Git commit + tree + exact file content are canonical; stable full-index SHA-256 and stable patch-id corroborate that identity.
+- **Residual implementation obligations:** KBN-100 must create the candidate before both dependent FKs; prove production-shape duplicate feasibility without weakening global uniqueness; pass empty/prod/N-1/rollback tests; reconcile both exact FK targets; and separately reject foreign-workspace mission references for artifacts and approval decisions (N100-45..50).
+- **Implementation status:** no runtime schema, migration, API, or deployment implementation is claimed by this gate disposition.
+
+## 10. Residual risk and handoff
+
+- Active membership, polymorphic targets, same-task evidence semantics, parent/DAG cycle checks, token scope, and no-oracle behavior depend on authoritative transaction code and must not be treated as FK-only guarantees.
+- DB superuser and break-glass compromise cannot be eliminated by application constraints; separation of duties, immutable external backup/audit evidence, drills, and monitoring remain required.
+- PostgreSQL unavailability intentionally sacrifices writes for integrity. Transport-unknown outcomes remain safe only when clients preserve the exact idempotency key.
+- Imported ambiguous records remain quarantined until owner sign-off; no automated mapping may convert ambiguity into authority.
+- SI-001 is resolved at frozen contract/design-review level only. KBN-100 still owes N100-45..50 executable migration evidence.
+
+**Handoff status:** KBN-010 **PASS / GO** at rc.4. KBN-100 remains held until this PR squash-merges, terminal-green CI completes on `main`, and issue #753 closes; the orchestrator owns those remaining gates.

docs/native-kanban-sot/SHARED-CONTRACT.md

@@ -1,13 +1,106 @@
 # Native Kanban/SOT — Remediated Shared Contract v1
 
-**Status:** INDEPENDENT REVIEW GO; freezes as v1 when issue #751 canon merges to `main`
+**Status:** CONTROL-PLANE rc.16 KBN-101 current generic storage-wrapper authority remediation complete; awaiting independent exact-head re-review. Prior KCR-001–016 and rc.4 SI-001 decisions retained; KBN-101 foundation certification precedes KBN-100 and real immutable-operation certification precedes KBN-105
-**Version:** 1.0.0-rc.3
+**Version:** 1.0.0-rc.16
-**Date:** 2026-07-14
+**Date:** 2026-07-15
 **Change authority:** Mosaic control plane/Jason only
+**SI-001 amendment authority:** `web1:mosaic-100` control-plane decision under issue #753
+
+## Amendment record
+
+### 1.0.0-rc.16 — Current generic storage-wrapper authority closure
+
+- **Current-source truth:** `packages/storage/src/cli.ts` currently shells `storage migrate --run` directly to `pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/db db:migrate` through `execSync`; no `mosaic-db-migrator` executable exists. README and user-guide command guidance therefore remove that command and any runner-delegation claim. The current wrapper is legacy N-1, uncertified, non-operative, and MUST NOT be invoked pending KBN-101-02/-03/-06/-08 activation.
+- **Future-only boundary:** future schema migration remains non-operative and follows external bootstrap → TLS/roles → runner `--run` → runner `--verify` → readiness; tier copy uses only the separately held secure migrate-tier route.
+- **Unmaskable semantic/source-consistency evidence:** before inventory, ownership, or status masking, -06 fails the exact former README commented code-fence generic-wrapper form and exact user-guide executable generic-wrapper form. Its source-consistency test proves the direct-Drizzle `execSync` target and absent runner bin, so any documentation describing current wrapper delegation to the runner fails.
+- **Non-effect:** prior runner, legacy-CI, Compose, production-secret, attestation, pgvector, manifest, lock, TLS, activation, and serial-gate closures remain unchanged.
+
+### 1.0.0-rc.15 — Held runner and legacy-CI authority closure
+
+- **Held runner only:** Current operator documents cannot advertise `mosaic-db-migrator --run|--verify` as executable. The sole passing future form is one `Held future procedure` Markdown section, bounded through its next equal-or-higher heading, that explicitly says non-operative/no-current-command-authority, names KBN-101-00/-03/-05, and preserves external bootstrap → TLS/roles → `mosaic-db-migrator --run` → `mosaic-db-migrator --verify` → Gateway/Compose readiness. Any runner hit outside that section fails before inventory/ownership/status masking.
+- **PGlite/current-CI boundary:** Fleet backlog current behavior is PGlite-only; PostgreSQL CLI/runner authority remains held until activation. README classifies the checked-in direct `db:migrate` CI job as active legacy N-1, uncertified, non-authorizing as an operator route, and pending KBN-101-06 removal; it is a known direct-DDL exception against an isolated disposable CI database, not approved ordinary behavior. The -06 fixture asserts every required status term and rejects ordinary-authority presentation.
+- **Non-effect:** prior Compose, production-secret, attestation, pgvector, manifest, lock, TLS, activation, and serial-gate closures remain unchanged.
+
+### 1.0.0-rc.14 — Current Compose and production-secret route closure
+
+- **Current developer boundary:** `README.md` and `docs/guides/dev-guide.md` permit only in-process PGlite data-layer work and explicitly selected non-PostgreSQL Compose services. Gateway/Web local start is held because the current unguarded loader can inherit a daemon/project PostgreSQL DSN and reach runtime DDL; KBN-101-02 must reject it before connection. The current PostgreSQL Compose mount is legacy/unqualified; PostgreSQL and federated activation are held until KBN-101-00/-03/-05 and then follow external bootstrap → TLS/roles → runner `--run` → `--verify` → Gateway/Compose readiness.
+- **Production boundary:** `docs/guides/deployment.md` is non-operative until the KBN-101-05 renderer-backed process-exec or `LoadCredential` interface exists. It contains no active production environment-file, monorepo auto-load, credential export/argv, or secret-activation lifecycle route; future units must preserve generation-pinned Vault consumer isolation.
+- **Unmaskable semantic negatives:** -06 fails the exact former README/dev/deployment Compose-first sequences and every production `.env`, `EnvironmentFile=`, credential export/argv, or restart-as-secret-activation fixture before owned/status/normative classification. The held PGlite/non-PostgreSQL route and future ordered activation are the only passing fixtures.
+
+### 1.0.0-rc.13 — Federation-MILESTONES indirect-startup closure
+
+- **Complete operator inventory:** `docs/federation/MILESTONES.md` is exclusively KBN-101-07 and an exact KBN-101-06 `operator-document` `status-only` record. Its former `pgvector extension installed + verified on startup` wording is superseded and forbidden; it authorizes no current DDL, Compose/init, or runtime/startup path.
+- **Unmaskable semantic negative:** before inventory disposition, the scanner fixture proves that exact former wording fails. The only passing status-only sequence is external bootstrap → TLS/roles → `mosaic-db-migrator --run` → `mosaic-db-migrator --verify` → Gateway readiness.
+
+### 1.0.0-rc.12 — Deployable importer generation and indirect-DDL-route closure
+
+- **Authenticated generation:** KBN-101-05 owns one canonical Vault KV-v2 importer record, `secret-{env}/mosaic-stack/database/importer` key `url`, with its version taken only from the same successful `data.metadata.version` response. Value plus provider version are one generation, never inferred from DSN bytes. The renderer creates separate immutable `0400` URL/version copies for migrator `10003:10003` binding-only access and importer `10002:10002` access; it uses fsync/atomic generation replacement for Compose and distinct versioned secret/config references for Swarm, so deployment cannot mix generations.
+- **Bounded consumers:** importer alone receives its URL/version, CA at `DATABASE_TLS_CA_CERT_PATH`, pinned public key, and read-only attestation; migrator receives its own migration URL/CA, the URL/version only for no-connect/no-export binding, attestation output, and the root-wrapper-only private key. Safe fd open/fstat/digest/zeroize/close semantics, a privileged producer-only-to-importer-only attestation handoff controller (verify, exact-byte copy, fsync/atomic rename, `10002:10002` `0400` seal, then importer start), no shared writable file, no logging/oracle, provider rotation/revocation, CA/mount, consumer-isolation, and symlink/hardlink/owner/mode/TOCTOU negatives are mandatory.
+- **Indirect-DDL closure:** `docs/federation/SETUP.md` is non-operative until KBN-101 activation and documents only external bootstrap → TLS/roles → runner `--run` → `--verify` → Gateway readiness. The -06 scanner performs unsuppressible semantic checks for automatic first-boot/startup extension/schema/migration language, Compose-up-before-runner, and init-script authority; the former SETUP wording fails and the remediated sequence passes.
+
+### 1.0.0-rc.11 — Target-bound importer attestation and exhaustive operator-route closure
+
+- **Target-bound proof:** trusted `mosaic-db-migrator --verify` now produces the atomic, credential-free `migrate-target.v1.json` JCS/Ed25519 artifact from a runner-only root-owned signing-key reference; the importer receives only pinned public verification keys and the artifact. Its signed v1 fields bind issued/expiry/nonce, exact secret version and SHA-256 of high-entropy target-file bytes, canonical TLS host/port/database, CA/SPKI, PostgreSQL system identifier/database OID, expected importer role, manifest/schema fingerprints, and producer invocation/build/image/correlation. No DSN, username, password, credential bytes, or signing key enters the artifact, importer, runtime, logs, or output.
+- **Fail-closed importer:** `mosaic storage migrate-tier` requires both `--target-url-file /run/secrets/mosaic-migrate-target-url` and `--target-attestation-file /run/mosaic-attestations/migrate-target.v1.json`. Before target connection it validates files, signature/key/expiry/replay, secret version/digest, TLS/CA/role/manifest bindings and opens/digests/connects from the same in-memory URL bytes. After verified TLS but before transaction/DML it matches server ID, database OID, `current_user`, CA/SPKI, and manifest/schema; failure distinguishes zero connection from connection/zero-DML and DDL remains impossible. Rotation overlap/revocation, atomic rename, replay cache, secret rotation invalidation, and wrong/substituted/stale/tampered/file-change tests are mandatory.
+- **Closed documentation surface:** KBN-101-06 inventories every current non-normative scanner hit, including `docs/guides/user-guide.md` and status-only `docs/federation/TASKS.md`; the latter is historical and cannot authorize DDL. The legacy `storage migrate` tier-copy syntax is unavailable. `storage migrate` is schema-wrapper delegation only; secure tier data copy is `migrate-tier`. Exact KBN PRD/contract/shared/task paths may be `normative-contract` scan class but are still scanned and cannot mask executable instructions. The normative detail remains [`KBN-101-DB-ROLE-SPLIT.md`](./KBN-101-DB-ROLE-SPLIT.md).
+- **Non-effect:** pgvector closure, manifest, lock, role graph, TLS, activation, and KBN-100/KBN-105 serial gates are unchanged.
+
+### 1.0.0-rc.10 — PostgreSQL-valid untrusted pgvector owner and active migrate-tier closure
+
+- **Valid extension authority:** PostgreSQL 17 + pgvector 0.8.2 `vector` is untrusted (`trusted` absent; `relocatable=true`), so `mosaic_extension_owner` is exactly `NOLOGIN SUPERUSER`, not `NOSUPERUSER`. It is dedicated solely to `mosaic_extensions`, `vector`, and owner-bearing extension members; `rolcanlogin=false`, `rolsuper=true`, zero members, no runtime credential/Vault secret, and no app-container delivery are catalog and deployment proof. An externally controlled audited bootstrap-superuser session alone `SET ROLE`s for extension CREATE/UPDATE/SET SCHEMA, then `RESET ROLE`; fresh and shadow paths do so, while in-place existing work requires exact pre-existing `extowner`.
+- **Explicit superuser exception:** `GRANT`/`REVOKE` cannot privilege-limit a superuser. The containment is dedicated identity, no login, no membership, external control plane, audit, independent review, backup/rollback, and maintenance window—not a false least-privilege claim. Runtime, migrator, schema owner, importer, and every service role cannot assume the role or alter/update/drop/change extension membership. Managed targets without this exact role are ineligible unless a versioned provider-owned extension-owner profile is independently approved.
+- **Active secure data-migration route:** `docs/guides/migrate-tier.md` is exclusively KBN-101-07, is active rather than historical, and specifies runner-prepared/verified PostgreSQL destination plus a dedicated non-DDL importer. KBN-101-02 freezes `--target-url-file /run/secrets/mosaic-migrate-target-url`, never credential argv; raw `--target-url`, `DATABASE_URL` fallback, runtime owner, missing/unsafe file, wrong mode, and DDL all fail before target connection/DDL. KBN-101-06 inventory/matrix records the route and exact secure fields, then tests its finite operator-document closure.
+- **Non-effect:** manifest, lock, `mosaic` application schema, TLS, activation, and KBN-100/KBN-105 serial gates remain unchanged. The normative detail remains [`KBN-101-DB-ROLE-SPLIT.md`](./KBN-101-DB-ROLE-SPLIT.md).
+
+### 1.0.0-rc.9 — KBN-101 extension-schema boundary, disjoint manifests, and scanner mechanics
+
+- **Extension schema owner:** `mosaic_extension_owner`, not `mosaic_schema_owner`, creates and owns `mosaic_extensions`, `vector`, and extension-member objects. The external bootstrap actor `SET ROLE`s for fresh creation or approved-owner relocation, then `RESET ROLE`s; rc.10 replaces the earlier membership wording with the PostgreSQL-valid zero-member superuser exception. Schema owner has only `USAGE` for legacy type resolution—never ownership, `CREATE`, `ALTER`, `DROP`, member change, or default-privilege authority. Runtime, migrator, and schema owner must fail catalog and direct DDL denials; shadow/resume/rollback repeat the owner/default-privilege proof.
+- **Exclusive delivery DAG:** KBN-101-00…09 now has a complete, nonoverlapping exact file/glob manifest with named tests/evidence. The runner mapping is exactly `"mosaic-db-migrator": "./dist/cli.js"` and image `ENTRYPOINT ["mosaic-db-migrator"]`; `packages/storage/src/{cli,migrate-tier}.ts` belongs only to -02, and -07 is documentation only. -08/-09 own evidence paths only. -00…07 are prepared artifacts; the immutable N-1 image remains live until -08 atomic activation, so no independently deployed intermediate can bypass runtime controls.
+- **Mechanical classifier:** -06 owns the exact scanner, inventory fixture, command-matrix harness, and CI wiring. Inventory records pin path/class/owner/disposition/allowed tokens/rationale/expiry/review revision; unknown, duplicate-owner, ownerless, missing-path, invalid allowlist, and historical-category masking fail. The architecture plan's operative direct `db:migrate` is replaced by sole-runner guidance rather than hidden under a historical category.
+- **Non-effect:** manifest v1, lock, `mosaic` application-schema ownership, TLS, activation, KBN-100/KBN-105 serial gates, and all earlier canon decisions remain unchanged. The normative detail remains [`KBN-101-DB-ROLE-SPLIT.md`](./KBN-101-DB-ROLE-SPLIT.md).
+
+### 1.0.0-rc.8 — KBN-101 finite authority, executable runner, and pgvector-owner remediation
+
+- **Finite authority closure:** KBN-101-06 classifies every current executable source/script/package bin, operator document, and deploy manifest by exact path; unclassified current hits fail. Byte-immutable historical SQL, PGlite-only routines, negative-test literals, vendored/generated artifacts, and clearly labeled historical reports are exact-path/category reviewed allowlists only. `packages/db/src/index.ts` loses its public `runMigrations` export with a direct-import/compile negative; `docs/fleet/backlog-conventions.md` and `docs/PERFORMANCE.md` lose first-use/direct-Drizzle/Gateway-startup migration instructions and carry runner/readiness route negatives. A token scan is only input to the classifier, never proof of authority.
+- **Executable exclusive cards:** KBN-101-03 alone publishes `mosaic-db-migrator` from `packages/db/package.json`/`src/cli.ts`, owns `docker/db-migrator.Dockerfile`, and keeps `{runner,config.dto,manifest,identity,tls}` private, with exact `--run|--verify|--help`, env-only input, stable exits, and command tests. KBN-101-00 alone owns `infra/pg-bootstrap/roles.sql`, `infra/pg-bootstrap/extensions.sql`, `infra/pg-bootstrap/README.md`, plus bootstrap tests. KBN-101-05 alone owns `tools/db/render-postgres-secrets.ts`, renderer tests, and Compose/Portainer/Swarm/two-gateway declarations, consuming the versioned bootstrap interface. No card overlaps renderer/bootstrap/deployment ownership.
+- **Extension-owner transition:** `mosaic_extension_owner` is a dedicated NOLOGIN role whose membership/credentials never reach services; the external bootstrap actor alone may `SET ROLE` during bootstrap. Fresh vector and member objects retain that owner. PostgreSQL has no supported extension-owner alteration: approved-owner existing extension relocation validates `pg_extension.extowner`, members/schema/version and uses tested `ALTER EXTENSION ... SET SCHEMA`; legacy runtime-owned extension fails closed to a controlled shadow database migration with backup, evidence, quiesce/final delta, atomic switch, and read-only rollback window. No catalog mutation, ownership adoption, or `DROP CASCADE` is permitted. Runtime/migrator/schema-owner extension ALTER/DROP/member-update denial is mandatory.
+- **Non-effect:** manifest v1, lock namespace, role/search-path, relocation/TLS/activation, KBN-100/KBN-105 serial gates, and all retained canon decisions are strengthened, not weakened. The normative detail remains [`KBN-101-DB-ROLE-SPLIT.md`](./KBN-101-DB-ROLE-SPLIT.md).
+
+### 1.0.0-rc.7 — KBN-101 complete current-path, relocation, and two-gateway remediation
+
+- **Finite current-path closure:** static inventory and the `DATABASE_URL`-only-before-connect/DDL denial matrix now explicitly include Gateway's former temporary-table pgvector test (runner-prepared persistent read/query-only fixture), `docker/init-db.sql` retirement, `migrate-tier.ts` runner/bootstrap-only guidance, and the active two-gateway harness. The harness is migrated, not retired: `postgres-a/b → mosaic-db-migrator-a/b → gateway-a/b`, each with isolated URL/CA material, verified readiness, SANs, and positive/negative TLS evidence.
+- **Executable relocation:** KBN-101-03 exclusively owns `schema.ts`, Drizzle snapshots/journal/generated relocation and exact tests. All future application declarations use exported `pgSchema('mosaic')`; immutable historical SQL runs only in trusted legacy `public`. `vector` is fixed in non-writable `mosaic_extensions`, with exact catalog relocatability/version eligibility, explicit type/operator qualification, catalog-class ordering, unknown-object fail-closed behavior, clean/current-public/partial/reverse rollback tests, and an N-1 release order.
+- **Bound deployment ownership:** `mosaicstack/stack` KBN-101-00/05 owns current Compose, Portainer, two-gateway, bootstrap renderer/templates, UID/GID declarations, and rendered validation. Gateway is fixed to `10001:10001`; PostgreSQL UID/GID is image-inspected and frozen only after digest pinning. Exact secret paths, atomic renderer behavior, Compose/Swarm targets/modes, Gateway/PostgreSQL leaf separation, and two-pair TLS failure evidence are required. Mosaic deployment control plane/Jason is the named activation authority; environment IaC/Vault supplies versioned input only.
+- **Correct traceability:** REQ-03 maps to role/schema/search-path, REQ-04 to TLS, REQ-05 to post-KBN-100 immutability, REQ-06 to rollout/rollback, and REQ-07 to the KBN-101 → KBN-100 → KBN-101 → KBN-105 sequence. No prior manifest/lock/role/DAG/activation decision is weakened.
+
+### 1.0.0-rc.6 — KBN-101 closed DDL/TLS/ledger activation remediation
+
+- **Choice:** `mosaic-db-migrator` is the sole application/CI/test PostgreSQL DDL control plane. Every legacy entrypoint is routed or denied, rejects `DATABASE_URL`-only before connection/DDL, and `db:push` is unavailable outside an allowlisted disposable developer target. The runner holds one `max:1` session with fixed `pg_try_advisory_lock(1297044289,1262636593)` across preflight through release.
+- **Exact ledger:** manifest v1 canonically serializes journal logical index/tag and SHA-256 of exact shipped migration bytes. It maps each observed ledger hash to one tuple; physical insertion order is non-normative, while missing/unknown/duplicate/ambiguous/corrupt/stale states fail closed. Shipped `0009` bytes remain unchanged; a missing/effects-absent `0009` runs normally, an applied-late hash maps normally, and partial/full effects with missing hash require backup restoration or separately reviewed repair—not manual adoption.
+- **TLS/search path:** operator/IaC owns CA and server leaf lifecycle, exact compose/Swarm secret mounts, server TLS activation, service-DNS SANs, verified-TLS readiness, transition, CA overlap rotation, and rollback. Runtime/migrator use `verify-full`; PGlite is not PostgreSQL TLS evidence. Application sessions use only `pg_catalog,mosaic`; no URL/config-derived identifier reaches SQL.
+- **Safe release:** cards 00–07 land prepared but inactive; owner-runtime deployments remain N-1. Mosaic control plane/Jason alone authorizes one atomic TLS/roles → runner → readiness → runtime activation or rollback. No runtime-operator compatibility switch, bypass, plaintext interval, or force-on-red exists; all temporary support is removed before KBN-101-08.
+- **Non-effect:** role graph, immutable certification after KBN-100, KBN-105 gate, rc.5’s preserved rc.4 SI-001 invariants, and all KCR-001–016 decisions remain unchanged. Exact detail is normative in [`KBN-101-DB-ROLE-SPLIT.md`](./KBN-101-DB-ROLE-SPLIT.md).
+
+### 1.0.0-rc.5 — KBN-101 role/connection split
+
+- **Choice:** PostgreSQL `standalone` and `federated` runtime uses `DATABASE_URL` only as a non-owner `mosaic_runtime` login; an explicit migration phase uses `DATABASE_MIGRATION_URL` only as `mosaic_migrator`, which `SET ROLE`s to non-login `mosaic_schema_owner` for DDL. Local PGlite remains an explicit embedded exception.
+- **No fallback / no startup DDL:** missing migration URL fails the migration phase; it never falls back to runtime URL/default/config. Gateway replicas do not run migrations. An advisory-locked migration phase verifies the exact ordered Drizzle ledger fingerprint before replicas may become ready.
+- **Privilege model:** non-login `mosaic_platform_database_owner` is outside application paths; `mosaic_schema_owner` owns only application/ledger schemas. `mosaic_runtime` has only `mosaic_runtime_capability`, owns no object/schema, cannot assume owner/migrator, has no TEMPORARY privilege, has only read access to the Drizzle ledger, and must fail startup if effective identity, unsafe attributes, authenticated TLS, search path, schema version, grants, or immutable relation privileges differ from the frozen contract. `task_events`, `artifacts`, `task_checkpoints`, `task_checkpoint_artifacts`, and `approval_decision_artifacts` grant runtime only INSERT/SELECT; KBN-100 retains RESTRICT/no-cascade semantics.
+- **Non-effect:** rc.4 SI-001 candidate-key/FK order and all KCR-001–016 tenancy, SOT, proposal-audit, approval, fence, recovery, no-cascade, endpoint, and wire invariants are unchanged. This amendment neither creates roles/secrets nor changes production deployment.
+- **Gate:** KBN-101’s role/schema-boundary foundation certificate, Vault/redaction/rotation, N-1/rollback, and independent security GO are mandatory before KBN-100. After KBN-100 creates the immutable relations, KBN-101 real deployed-role immutable-operation certification plus Ultron GO is mandatory before KBN-105; synthetic test-role success alone is insufficient. Exact implementation detail is normative in [`KBN-101-DB-ROLE-SPLIT.md`](./KBN-101-DB-ROLE-SPLIT.md).
+
+### 1.0.0-rc.4 — KBN010-SI-001 (preserved)
+
+- **Choice:** add the explicitly named, non-partial unique candidate key `missions_workspace_id_uidx` on `missions(workspace_id, id)` and retain `missions_workspace_project_id_uidx` on `(workspace_id, project_id, id)`.
+- **Rationale:** mission `id` remains globally unique, while the composite candidate key makes the frozen tenant-safe generic mission relations valid. `artifacts` and `approval_decisions` are polymorphic exactly-one-target records and do not consistently carry `project_id`; widening both children would unnecessarily broaden v1 and its target semantics.
+- **Exact effect:** `artifacts_workspace_mission_fk` and `approval_decisions_workspace_mission_fk` continue to reference the exact ordered columns `missions(workspace_id, id)` with RESTRICT deletion, now backed by a matching candidate key.
+- **Non-effect:** no SOT, tenancy, project-congruence, proposal-audit, approval, fencing, immutability, no-cascade, API, or wire-version invariant changes. The `SuccessEnvelopeV1.contractVersion` remains `1.0.0`.
+- **Historical evidence boundary:** `KBN-010-THREAT-AUTH-CONSTRAINT-GATE.md` intentionally remains the immutable rc.3 blocker verdict that detected SI-001; this rc.4 record and the #753 scratchpad append are the authorized disposition. Rewriting the gate verdict is outside this amendment's exclusive scope.
+- **Gate:** this amendment resolves the DDL defect identified by KBN010-SI-001 but does not itself lift KBN-100; independent schema/SecReview remains required.
 
 ## 1. Authority
 
-Concrete contracts are the four `contracts/*.v1.ts` files. PostgreSQL/current-main Drizzle is the sole writable SOT. Public health, Valkey, files, exports, providers, browser state, and outage notes cannot authorize/reconstruct writes. Mechanical Coordinator is non-LLM with no scope/gate/certification/merge authority. Certifier is final independent gate with no merge authority. No feature lane starts until this canon merges and the KBN-010/KBN-105 prerequisites are satisfied.
+Concrete contracts are the four `contracts/*.v1.ts` files. PostgreSQL/current-main Drizzle is the sole writable SOT. In PostgreSQL standalone/federated deployments, KBN-101 rc.13 DDL/ledger/TLS/role/attestation/generation separation is a precondition to schema implementation and certification. Public health, Valkey, files, exports, providers, browser state, and outage notes cannot authorize/reconstruct writes. Mechanical Coordinator is non-LLM with no scope/gate/certification/merge authority. Certifier is final independent gate with no merge authority. No feature lane starts until this canon merges and the KBN-010/KBN-105 prerequisites are satisfied.
 
 ## 2. Health proof and exact failures
 
@@ -43,6 +136,7 @@ Complete declaration: `contracts/kanban-schema.v1.ts`.
 - Specialist roles everywhere: `planning | enhance | coder | review | security-review | pr-monitor | certifier`.
 - Owner uses exactly-one user/team; assignment principal exactly-one user/team/agent; users require active membership; agent/session and all evidence are workspace-bound.
 - Task→mission/milestone/parent, mission→milestone, and project→current-milestone are project-congruent composite relations.
+- Mission `id` remains globally unique. The additional non-partial `missions_workspace_id_uidx` candidate key on `(workspace_id, id)` exists only to support the frozen workspace-safe polymorphic artifact and approval-decision mission relations; the project-congruent `(workspace_id, project_id, id)` key remains authoritative wherever `project_id` is present.
 - Dependency identity is workspace+predecessor+successor independent of type.
 - Approval evidence and checkpoint evidence are workspace-scoped joins to immutable artifacts, never JSON ID arrays.
 - Proposal audit links are composite relations: `(workspace_id, submitted_audit_event_id)` and `(workspace_id, accepted_command_audit_event_id)` reference `task_events(workspace_id, id)` with RESTRICT deletion.
@@ -76,9 +170,22 @@ Legacy columns remain declared in unified `schema.ts` for expand + full N-1/roll
 6. **Switch:** stop N-1 writers; Gateway sole command boundary; enable canonical statuses.
 7. **Contract release:** later release after rollback/N-1; remove compatibility/global uniques/legacy fields.
 
-### 5.2 New audit/proposal DDL order
+### 5.2 Mission candidate-key and dependent-FK DDL order
 
-KBN-100 migration DDL must execute in this order:
+KBN-100 migration DDL must execute the SI-001 portion in this order:
+
+1. expand/backfill `missions.workspace_id` and `missions.project_id` while preserving the global `missions.id` primary key and the project-congruent `missions_workspace_project_id_uidx` key;
+2. prove duplicate-key feasibility on the production-shape dataset: `(workspace_id, id)` has no duplicate groups and global `id` uniqueness remains intact;
+3. create the non-partial unique index `missions_workspace_id_uidx` on exact ordered columns `(workspace_id, id)`;
+4. only after step 3, create/alter `artifacts` and add `artifacts_workspace_mission_fk` from `(workspace_id, mission_id)` to exact `missions(workspace_id, id)` with `ON DELETE RESTRICT`;
+5. only after step 3, create/alter `approval_decisions` and add `approval_decisions_workspace_mission_fk` from `(workspace_id, mission_id)` to exact `missions(workspace_id, id)` with `ON DELETE RESTRICT`;
+6. validate both constraints and prove a mission ID paired with a foreign workspace is rejected for each child.
+
+The candidate key is intentionally redundant with globally unique `missions.id`, but PostgreSQL requires a matching unique candidate key for the exact two-column FK target. It is additive and N-1-safe. Pre-switch rollback drops the two dependent FKs/tables before dropping this candidate key, preserves the global primary key and project-congruent key, and follows the existing freeze/reconciliation rule after the first canonical mutation.
+
+### 5.3 New audit/proposal DDL order
+
+KBN-100 migration DDL may begin only after KBN-101 foundation role/schema-boundary certification. It runs in the explicit migrator/owner phase—not Gateway startup—and its generated Drizzle declaration/snapshot/journal must be mutually consistent. It must execute in this order:
 
 1. create `task_events` and its unique `(workspace_id, id)` key;
 2. create `change_proposals` with nullable acceptance-event ID and required submission-event ID;
@@ -88,15 +195,16 @@ KBN-100 migration DDL must execute in this order:
 
 The submission transaction inserts the event first using a preallocated proposal UUID, then the proposal. Acceptance inserts the normal command event before updating the locked proposal. Neither FK is omitted or replaced by a bare UUID/index check.
 
-### 5.3 Field map
+### 5.4 Field map
 
 | Current                                        | Expand/backfill                                                                                                       | N-1 compatibility                                     | Switch/contract                                                                    |
-| ---------------------------------------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ----------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| ---------------------------------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
 | global `teams`, `team_members`                 | add workspace nullable; bootstrap; validate active owners                                                             | retain global slug/FKs                                | workspace composites; global unique contracts later                                |
 | `projects.status`                              | add `canonical_status`; map active/paused/completed/archived                                                          | mirror representable values; no `planning`            | canonical authority; legacy contracts later                                        |
 | project `owner_id/team_id/owner_type`          | add exact accountable user/team; deterministic map or quarantine                                                      | preserve old reads and compare drift                  | canonical exact-one; remove legacy after parity                                    |
 | current milestone                              | create milestones then join table (no circular DDL)                                                                   | absent to N-1                                         | join is authority                                                                  |
 | nullable `missions.project_id`                 | derive workspace/project; null/orphan exception, never guess                                                          | keep nullable legacy read                             | canonical required; validate/set NOT NULL later                                    |
+| mission relational candidate keys              | retain global `id` PK and project-congruent key; add non-partial `(workspace_id,id)` key before artifact/approval FKs | additive key is ignored safely by N-1 readers/writers | retain both composite keys; generic mission children use exact workspace+ID target |
 | mission `description`                          | add objective; preserve description; reviewed nonblank mapping                                                        | N-1 description                                       | objective authority; retain until signed review                                    |
 | `missions.status`                              | add canonical; planning→draft, active/paused/completed/failed same                                                    | no new-only statuses emitted                          | canonical authority                                                                |
 | mission `milestones` JSON                      | normalize with source digest; preserve malformed/original                                                             | N-1 reads JSON; no reverse sync                       | normalized authority; JSON removed after checksum sign-off                         |
@@ -114,10 +222,12 @@ The submission transaction inserts the event first using a preallocated proposal
 | agent project/owner/prompt/tools/skills/config | preserve; validate tenant; derive typed capabilities without loss                                                     | N-1 reads                                             | removal only by separate inventory                                                 |
 | fleet `backlog`                                | map to designated-project tasks; edges; claimed rows quarantine                                                       | freeze claims before switch; read-only compare        | task/lease authority; retire after stabilization                                   |
 
-### 5.4 Required migration tests
+### 5.5 Required migration tests
 
 Empty DB; exact production-shape snapshot; crash/resume; rollback before switch; N-1 startup/read/write; workspace/member negatives; status-shadow/no premature new status; `mission_tasks.status` write prohibition; tags/assignee/date/mission JSON/config/description/agent checksum; project congruence/current-milestone order; backlog freeze/no dispatch; and proof legacy declarations persist until contract release.
 
+SI-001 adds frozen future executable evidence: empty and production-shape migrations create `missions_workspace_id_uidx` before either dependent FK; duplicate-key feasibility preflight returns no `(workspace_id,id)` duplicate groups without weakening global `id` uniqueness; N-1 startup/read/write behavior is unchanged; pre-switch rollback removes dependents before the candidate key; both exact FK column lists reconcile to the candidate key; and foreign-workspace mission references fail for both artifacts and approval decisions. TDD is not applicable to this design-only amendment; KBN-100 must implement these negative migration tests before runtime schema release.
+
 Proposal-specific negatives must attempt: missing submission event, foreign-workspace submission event, foreign-workspace acceptance event, same-workspace event for another proposal, event for another target aggregate, and unrelated normal-command event. Every attempt must fail atomically with no accepted proposal and no target mutation.
 
 ## 6. Ownership and Coordinator split
@@ -214,6 +324,12 @@ KBN-115/coder2 owns `packages/config/src/recovery-posture.ts`, tests, and recove
 
 ## 9. Integration, security, and hold
 
-Required release evidence includes empty/prod/partial/rollback/N-1 migration tests; cross-workspace and same-workspace wrong-project negatives; active-membership owners/principals; proposal inertness/normal acceptance; exact failure mapping; concurrent monotonic bigint fences; relational lease/checkpoint/evidence mismatch; immutability privileges/RESTRICT; recovery validation/mechanism evidence; endpoint registry alignment; accessible web journeys; author≠reviewer; mandatory SecReview; final Certifier pass/no merge authority.
+Required release evidence includes KBN-101 foundation role/schema-boundary and post-KBN-100 real immutable-operation deployed-role certificates (not synthetic roles), empty/prod/partial/rollback/N-1 migration tests; cross-workspace and same-workspace wrong-project negatives; active-membership owners/principals; proposal inertness/normal acceptance; exact failure mapping; concurrent monotonic bigint fences; relational lease/checkpoint/evidence mismatch; immutability privileges/RESTRICT; recovery validation/mechanism evidence; endpoint registry alignment; accessible web journeys; author≠reviewer; mandatory SecReview; final Certifier pass/no merge authority.
 
-The build hold remains active until independent re-review reports GO for KCR-001–016. Mos alone releases waves and serializes integration roots.
+### 9.1 SI-001 amendment gate and #757 boundary
+
+- KBN-100 must provide the §5.2 candidate-key ordering, duplicate-feasibility, exact-FK reconciliation, empty/prod/N-1/rollback, and two-child foreign-workspace evidence before SI-001 can be certified closed.
+- All prior KCR-001–016 decisions and fixed SOT/tenant/authority, proposal-audit, approval, task-fencing, immutability, and no-cascade invariants remain unchanged.
+- Read-only PR #757 cross-check: its logical-agent connector lease/CAS fencing uses separate runtime tables/contracts and `lease_epoch`; rc.4 changes only the frozen `missions` candidate key. There is no shared table, index, FK, identity, fence, or authority semantic to consume or reconcile, and #757 remains owned by its existing lane.
+
+The build hold remains active until independent re-review reports GO for KCR-001–016 and the rc.4 SI-001 amendment. Mos alone releases waves and serializes integration roots.

docs/native-kanban-sot/TASKS.md

@@ -43,8 +43,10 @@ Shared roots, package exports/manifests, lockfiles, and generated artifacts are
 ```text
 KBN-000 canon remediation
   -> KBN-010 threat/auth/constraint-impact gate (MUST COMPLETE)
+      -> KBN-101 foundation role/schema-boundary certificate (SERIAL)
           -> KBN-100 schema + concrete N-1 migration implementation
-          ├─ KBN-105 exact endpoint/DTO/error/registry freeze (SERIAL)
+              ├─ KBN-101 post-KBN-100 deployed-role immutable-operation certificate (SERIAL)
+              │    -> KBN-105 exact endpoint/DTO/error/registry freeze (SERIAL)
               │        ├─ KBN-110 domain + Gateway + MCP server implementation
               │        ├─ KBN-120 CLI/projection implementation [coder4 first]
               │        └─ KBN-130 web MVP implementation
@@ -64,31 +66,44 @@ KBN-310 + KBN-320
       -> KBN-340 owner-gated cutover/stabilization
 ```
 
-No consumer implementation begins before KBN-105. No schema work begins before KBN-010 completes. The coder4 order is always KBN-120 → KBN-200 → KBN-300 → KBN-320.
+No consumer implementation begins before KBN-105. No schema work begins before KBN-010 completes and the KBN-101 foundation role/schema-boundary certificate passes; the real immutable-operation certificate follows KBN-100 and blocks KBN-105. The coder4 order is always KBN-120 → KBN-200 → KBN-300 → KBN-320.
 
 ## 4. P0 — Canon, threat gate, schema, and exact API freeze
 
 ### KBN-000 — Remediate and publish canon
 
-- **Owner:** Mos / publication control plane.
+- **Status:** COMPLETE — PR #752 squash-merged as `49e8a54`; issue #751 closed; post-merge pipeline #1798 terminal success.
-- **Mode:** SERIAL; publication gate in progress.
+- **Owner:** Mosaic publication control plane.
+- **Mode:** SERIAL; completed.
 - **IN:** Resolve KCR-001–016 in requirements, schema, health, Coordinator, recovery, migration map, and slices; independent re-review.
 - **OUT:** Feature implementation.
 - **Depends on:** none.
 - **Contract surfaces:** all canon.
-- **Evidence:** strict TS; Prettier; per-finding traceability; independent author≠reviewer GO.
+- **Evidence:** strict TS; Prettier; per-finding traceability; independent author≠reviewer GO; Ultron GO; terminal-green CI.
 
 ### KBN-010 — Threat, authorization, and constraint-impact gate
 
-- **Owner:** coder3; independent `secrev`.
+- **Status:** IN PROGRESS — issue [#753](https://git.mosaicstack.dev/mosaicstack/stack/issues/753).
+- **Owner:** `kbn-coder3`; independent `secrev`.
 - **Mode:** SERIAL prerequisite of KBN-100.
-- **Exclusive files:** Mos-selected threat/auth docs only.
+- **Exclusive files:** `docs/native-kanban-sot/KBN-010-THREAT-AUTH-CONSTRAINT-GATE.md` and task scratchpad only.
 - **IN:** Cross-workspace owners/principals/evidence; active membership; stale/forged health; approval forgery; fence monotonicity; audit retention; proposal target/audit-event forgery; service tokens; DB/Valkey outage.
 - **OUT:** Runtime/schema edits.
 - **Depends on:** KBN-000 independent re-review GO.
 - **Contract surfaces:** schema constraints, health proof, exact errors, command-family authorization.
 - **Evidence:** signed constraint-impact matrix; no unresolved schema-impact finding; SecReview pass.
 
+### KBN-101 — PostgreSQL runtime/migration role split and deployed-role certification
+
+- **Status:** IN PROGRESS — issue [#771](https://git.mosaicstack.dev/mosaicstack/stack/issues/771); rc.16 closes HIGH-1 current generic storage-wrapper authority: README/user-guide remove `storage migrate --run` guidance and false runner delegation; current source is direct-Drizzle, legacy N-1, uncertified, non-operative, and forbidden pending -02/-03/-06/-08 activation. The -06 fixture fails both exact former forms before inventory/status masking and source-consistency rejects current direct-Drizzle wrapper as runner delegation. It awaits independent exact-head re-review; implementation remains held.
+- **Owner:** Mos integration control plane; independently reviewed by security/Ultron.
+- **Mode:** SERIAL foundation certificate blocks KBN-100; its post-KBN-100 real immutable-operation certificate blocks KBN-105.
+- **IN:** Exact `DATABASE_URL` non-owner runtime versus `DATABASE_MIGRATION_URL` owner/migrator connection contract; sole published `mosaic-db-migrator --run|--verify` PostgreSQL DDL path and all legacy/future entrypoint closure; active migrate-tier destination only after runner prepare/verify through exact `--target-url-file /run/secrets/mosaic-migrate-target-url`, paired authenticated provider-version file, and signed `--target-attestation-file /run/mosaic-attestations/migrate-target.v1.json`; runner-only signing key/public-key isolation; canonical Vault KV-v2 target URL/version, generation-pinned renderer, importer CA/public-key/attestation plus privileged sealed producer-to-importer handoff, safe-fd/consumer-isolation/no-log-oracle, TLS/server/database/role/manifest/schema binding, expiry/replay/provider-rotation/TOCTOU/no-DML controls, and dedicated non-DDL importer; finite exact-path scanner/allowlist/active-route review plus unsuppressible automatic-startup/init/Compose-before-runner semantic negatives and every-path before-connect denial matrix; `DATABASE_TLS_CA_CERT_PATH` plus operator/IaC CA/server-key/cert lifecycle, exact service-DNS SANs, Vault/compose/Swarm mount modes, TLS server/bootstrap/rotation/rollback; PGlite exception; fixed two-int advisory lock; manifest-v1 logical-index/tag/exact-byte-SHA-256 ledger reconciliation including safe `0009`; fixed `mosaic` schema and exact `pg_catalog,mosaic` pooled session path; platform/schema/`NOLOGIN SUPERUSER` extension-owner/migrator/importer/runtime roles; approved-owner versus legacy-owner shadow pgvector transition; ownership, zero membership/no runtime secret, TEMP/ledger-read/default privilege and immutable grant proof; N-1 inactive prepared cards then atomic activation/rollback authority; Vault/redaction/observability/operator runbooks; one-card/one-PR implementation DAG.
+- **OUT:** Production mutation in this planning card; KBN-100 tables/data backfill; application API behavior; KBN-105 route/DTO freeze.
+- **Depends on:** KBN-010 completed.
+- **Contract surfaces:** [`KBN-101-DB-ROLE-SPLIT.md`](./KBN-101-DB-ROLE-SPLIT.md); `SHARED-CONTRACT.md` rc.15 amendment.
+- **Evidence:** foundation: exact `--help|--run|--verify`/exit/argv/import-negative plus DTO entrypoint negatives for every finite classified current DDL/static-bypass path (including `DATABASE_URL`-only, runner fixture, retired init, sanitized current operator guidance, both harness pairs, and `db:push` refusal); active migrate-tier paired URL/version/attestation files, signing/public-key isolation, canonical Vault KV-v2 authenticated version, generation-pinned renderer, importer CA, safe fd/TOCTOU/consumer-isolation/no-log-oracle, atomic JCS/Ed25519, digest/TLS/server/database/role/manifest/schema binding, expiry/replay/provider rotation/revocation, zero-connection versus zero-DML, prepared-target/importer/no-DDL negatives; clean/pre-0009/skipped/applied-late/duplicate/unknown/missing/corrupt/stale/backup plus public-to-`mosaic`/partial/reverse runner proof; fixed-lock contention/crash/readiness/unrelated-key tests; runtime cannot invoke migrations/DDL/TEMP; actual pgvector 0.8.2 control metadata, fresh/approved-owner existing/legacy-owner shadow/partial-resume-rollback/N-1 pgvector evidence with `rolcanlogin=false`, `rolsuper=true`, zero members, external-superuser `SET ROLE`/`RESET ROLE` audit, `pg_extension.extowner`, owner-bearing member/schema/version and runtime/migrator/schema-owner/importer/all-service-role `SET ROLE`/ALTER/DROP/member-update denial; disposable standalone, federated/Swarm, and two-gateway verified-TLS positives plus both-pair CA/SAN/downgrade/key mode/UID-GID/URL-secret consumer-isolation and legacy-drain/`hostssl` zero-plaintext negatives; exclusive bootstrap/renderer/manifest ownership test; catalog relocation/vector-query/operator/Drizzle-only-`mosaic`, role/grant/search-path/pool-reset/identifier checks; N-1/atomic TLS-only rollback/no-force-on-red rehearsal; named Vault/bootstrap-control-plane/CA-overlap/redaction/operator evidence; independent author≠reviewer security GO. Post-KBN-100: real deployed non-owner INSERT/SELECT and UPDATE/DELETE denial for immutable event/artifact/evidence relations plus Ultron GO.
+
 ### KBN-100 — Unified Drizzle schema and concrete N-1 migration
 
 - **Owner:** **coder2**.
@@ -96,7 +111,7 @@ No consumer implementation begins before KBN-105. No schema work begins before K
 - **Exclusive files:** `packages/db/src/schema.ts`, `packages/db/drizzle/**`, DB tests.
 - **IN:** All frozen tables/joins/enums; workspace/project-congruent constraints; owners/principals; tags/archive; change proposals with both workspace-aware task-event composite FKs and frozen event-before-proposal DDL order; assignment approvals; durable execution/quarantine; monotonic bigint fence; exact checkpoint/evidence joins; RESTRICT/immutability; concrete current-main expand/backfill/switch/contract map.
 - **OUT:** Repositories, Gateway, Coordinator behavior, UI, importer.
-- **Depends on:** **KBN-010 completed**.
+- **Depends on:** **KBN-010 completed and KBN-101 foundation role/schema-boundary certificate PASS**. KBN-100 is blocked until both are terminal; it rebases on KBN-101 main, restores generated Drizzle declaration/snapshot/journal consistency, and confines procedural immutable-table grant/trigger/backfill work to its schema ownership. Its new relations are then subject to KBN-101 post-KBN-100 deployed-role certification.
 - **Contract surfaces:** `kanban-schema.v1.ts`; SHARED-CONTRACT current-main delta map.
 - **Evidence:** reviewed SQL; empty/prod-shape/partial-resume/rollback tests; N-1 app safety; legacy columns remain declared; workspace/project mismatch negatives; proposal event-FK missing/foreign-workspace tests; one active lease; monotonic fence; parent-delete RESTRICT; immutability privileges; SecReview.
 
@@ -107,7 +122,7 @@ No consumer implementation begins before KBN-105. No schema work begins before K
 - **Exclusive files:** canonical endpoint-registry/DTO contract docs; no implementation.
 - **IN:** Exact routes and methods from SHARED-CONTRACT §8; request/success/error fields; status codes; pagination/filter/revision envelopes; idempotency/expected-version headers/fields; proposal commands; health proof exclusion from public DTOs; MCP tool-to-route map.
 - **OUT:** Controller/service/client implementation.
-- **Depends on:** KBN-100.
+- **Depends on:** KBN-100 and KBN-101 post-KBN-100 deployed-role immutable-operation certification PASS.
 - **Contract surfaces:** health/error unions; schema IDs/statuses; Gateway DTO freeze.
 - **Evidence:** every FE/CLI/MCP call maps 1:1 to a route; 503/502-504/409 non-cross-map fixtures; contract digest published.
 
@@ -250,9 +265,11 @@ No consumer implementation begins before KBN-105. No schema work begins before K
 ## 8. Consistent USC wave schedule
 
 | Wave | coder2                                    | coder3                                                                               | coder4                         | coder5                         |
-| ---- | ------------------------- | -------------------------------------- | ------------------------------ | ------------------------------ |
+| ---- | ----------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | ------------------------------ | ------------------------------ |
 | 0    | Wait                                      | **KBN-010**                                                                          | Wait                           | Wait                           |
-| 1    | **KBN-100**               | Review constraint implementation       | Wait                           | Wait                           |
+| 0.5  | Wait                                      | **KBN-101 foundation** Mos-controlled role/connection contract and certificate       | Wait                           | Wait                           |
+| 1    | **KBN-100** after KBN-101 foundation PASS | Review bounded schema/grant implementation                                           | Wait                           | Wait                           |
+| 1.5  | Certification support                     | **KBN-101 post-KBN-100 deployed-role immutable-operation certificate**, then KBN-105 | Wait                           | Wait                           |
 | 2    | **KBN-115** after KBN-100                 | **KBN-105** exact freeze, then KBN-110                                               | **KBN-120** only after KBN-105 | **KBN-130** only after KBN-105 |
 | 3    | Review support                            | Finish KBN-110                                                                       | **KBN-200 after KBN-120**      | Finish KBN-130                 |
 | 4    | —                                         | **KBN-210 after KBN-200**                                                            | Review/support                 | **KBN-220 after KBN-210 DTOs** |

docs/native-kanban-sot/contracts/kanban-schema.v1.ts

@@ -485,6 +485,7 @@ export const missionsV1 = pgTable(
       foreignColumns: [projectsV1.workspaceId, projectsV1.id],
     }).onDelete('restrict'),
     uniqueIndex('missions_workspace_project_id_uidx').on(t.workspaceId, t.projectId, t.id),
+    uniqueIndex('missions_workspace_id_uidx').on(t.workspaceId, t.id),
     index('missions_workspace_project_status_idx').on(
       t.workspaceId,
       t.projectId,

docs/plans/2026-03-15-agent-platform-architecture.md

@@ -1460,12 +1460,11 @@ Add to `packages/db/src/schema.ts` in the `preferences` table definition:
 mutable: boolean('mutable').notNull().default(true),
 ```
 
-Generate and apply:
+### Held future procedure
 
-```bash
+This historical architecture plan grants **no current command authority**. PostgreSQL execution is non-operative until **KBN-101-00, KBN-101-03, and KBN-101-05** land; do not invoke a PostgreSQL runner from this checkout. After those cards land, the approved future procedure is exactly: external bootstrap → TLS/roles → `mosaic-db-migrator --run` → `mosaic-db-migrator --verify` → Gateway/Compose readiness. Offline migration artifact generation belongs to its owning implementation card and does not activate PostgreSQL execution.
-pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/db db:generate  # generates migration SQL
+
-pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/db db:migrate   # applies to PG
+> **KBN-101 supersession:** `pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/db db:migrate` is superseded and MUST NOT be used. The future runner receives only deployment-injected migration credentials; it accepts no URL, SQL, schema, or role argv.
-```
 
 Platform enforcement keys (seeded with `mutable = false` by gateway `PreferencesService.onModuleInit()`):
 

docs/plans/2026-03-15-wave2-tui-layout-navigation.md

@@ -946,13 +946,11 @@ pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/types typecheck
 
 Expected: All PASS
 
-**Step 2: Manual smoke test**
+**Step 2: Manual smoke test (held)**
 
-```bash
+This historical TUI smoke test is unavailable until KBN-101-02 supplies a fail-closed Gateway local
-cd /home/jwoltje/src/mosaic-mono-v1-worktrees/tui-improvements
+startup route. Do not start current Compose PostgreSQL or infer a local Gateway from PGlite support.
-docker compose up -d
+A future reviewed test must use the correct Mosaic CLI package and an independently verified Gateway.
-pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/cli exec tsx src/cli.ts tui
-```
 
 Verify:
 

docs/reports/code-review/756-code-review.md

@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+# Independent Code Review — #756 Official Discord Channel Plugin
+
+**Verdict: APPROVE**
+
+## Scope reviewed
+
+Complete current uncommitted #756 delta: multi-binding trusted agent selection, privileged ingress-route validation, attachment validation/persistence/resume, egress route lifecycle and idempotency, concurrent gateway stream state, Discord lifecycle/thread/rate behavior, compatibility ingress, and tests.
+
+## Review result
+
+No blocking or change-request finding remains.
+
+- **Trusted multi-agent routing:** each binding requires a provisioned `agentConfigId`; the gateway resolves that config server-side, verifies its logical-agent name, and never accepts a Discord-controlled agent selection or applies generic routing to Discord ingress.
+- **Auth and route integrity:** allowlist, pairing, role, and canonical logical-agent/channel-or-thread conversation-route validation occur before gateway processing. Privileged approval/stop paths use the same binding and route validation.
+- **Attachments:** ingress rejects malformed, over-bounded, credential-bearing, fragment-bearing, or query-bearing URLs. Valid attachment metadata, including `sizeBytes`, persists and is reconstructed into resume history as explicitly untrusted context.
+- **Discord reliability:** the adapter supports degraded Socket.IO reconnect, parent/thread routing semantics, bounded pre-side-effect ingress rates, and terminal response-route cleanup. Egress validates route/message alignment, sends deterministic nonces, distinguishes permanent from transient errors, and uses bounded retries.
+- **Concurrent state:** per-client/conversation keys isolate listener, redaction, tool, and stream state for simultaneous threads sharing a Discord socket; disconnect cleanup covers all associated conversations.
+- **Harness neutrality:** contracts retain logical-agent/channel data only; no harness/provider identity leaks into adapter routes or message boundaries.
+
+## Verification performed
+
+- `git diff --check` — passed.
+- `pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/discord-plugin typecheck` — passed.
+- `pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/discord-plugin lint` — passed.
+- `pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/discord-plugin test` — passed: 44 tests; coverage 92.18% statements/lines, 86.55% branches, 100% functions (all ≥85% threshold).
+- `pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/gateway typecheck` — passed.
+- `cd apps/gateway && pnpm exec vitest run src/plugin/discord-ingress.security.spec.ts src/chat/chat.gateway-redaction.spec.ts src/__tests__/integration/tess-cross-surface.integration.test.ts` — passed: 32 tests.

docs/reports/documentation/756-discord-plugin-checklist.md

@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+# Documentation Completion Checklist — #756 Official Discord plugin
+
+## Required artifacts
+
+- [x] `docs/PRD.md` includes the #756 workstream, assumptions, and acceptance criteria.
+- [x] User workflow updated in `docs/tess/USER-GUIDE.md`.
+- [x] Administrator configuration and authorization policy updated in `docs/guides/admin-guide.md`.
+- [x] Developer/plugin authoring guidance updated in `docs/tess/PLUGIN-GUIDE.md`.
+- [x] Channel architecture updated in `docs/architecture/channel-protocol.md`.
+- [x] Package operations/development guide added at `plugins/discord/README.md`.
+- [x] `docs/SITEMAP.md` links the official channel plugin documentation.
+
+## API coverage
+
+- [x] No HTTP or WebSocket endpoint was added, removed, or changed.
+- [x] No OpenAPI update is needed.
+- [x] Shared TypeScript contracts are documented in architecture and plugin-authoring guides.
+- [x] Discord authentication, authorization, thread failure, and control-command behavior are documented.
+
+## Structural standards
+
+- [x] Working notes remain under `docs/scratchpads/`.
+- [x] Review and checklist artifacts remain under `docs/reports/`.
+- [x] No generated publishing output was added.
+- [x] Existing repository documentation structure was preserved; no unrelated root cleanup was attempted.
+
+## Review gate
+
+- [x] Independent documentation/contract review passes (shared-contract review plus final code review of the current documentation delta).
+- [x] Independent code review verifies documentation matches implementation (`docs/reports/code-review/756-code-review.md`: APPROVE).
+- [x] Independent security review verifies documented controls (`docs/reports/security/756-security-review.md`: APPROVE).
+
+## Publishing
+
+- [x] Canonical source remains in-repository.
+- [x] No external publishing action is in scope for this slice.

docs/reports/native-kanban-sot/kbn-101-contract-security-review-82ce325.md

@@ -0,0 +1,109 @@
+# KBN-101 contract independent security/architecture review
+
+**Verdict: REQUEST CHANGES**
+
+## Review identity and scope
+
+- **Exact reviewed head:** `da742ca2da4a2ff466916c818fe275c4f7ffd384` (`docs(#771): record role-split review evidence`)
+- **Required comparison:** `origin/main...da742ca2da4a2ff466916c818fe275c4f7ffd384`
+- **Range:** `82ce3252df38a687c50485f8d048b53ca8db5989` is an ancestor of the reviewed head; the final head adds the scratchpad evidence commit and was reviewed.
+- **Changed docs:** `docs/PRD.md`, `docs/SITEMAP.md`, `docs/native-kanban-sot/{INDEX.md,KBN-101-DB-ROLE-SPLIT.md,SHARED-CONTRACT.md,TASKS.md}`, and `docs/scratchpads/771-kbn101-db-role-split.md` (300 additions / 25 deletions).
+- **Reviewed inputs:** issue #771; current DB/Gateway/storage/config/wizard/installer/compose/Portainer/CI sources; all current migration/DDL references; KBN-010, rc.4/rc.5 shared contract, requirements/canon, KBN-100 #769 branch context, and the final scratchpad.
+- **Repository/provider state:** not modified. The pre-existing `.mosaic/orchestrator/*` dirt was not touched.
+
+The role graph itself is sound in principle: a NOLOGIN platform database owner, separate NOLOGIN schema owner, NOINHERIT migrator which explicitly `SET ROLE`s, and runtime membership only in a capability role with `SET FALSE` does not create circular privilege or application-created login roles. The split of foundation certification before KBN-100 and immutable-operation certification after KBN-100 is also correctly ordered.
+
+## Findings
+
+### HIGH — DDL/migration control plane is not closed at every current entrypoint
+
+The contract requires an explicit, locked migration phase and forbids Gateway/runtime DDL (`KBN-101-DB-ROLE-SPLIT.md:34-39`), but its KBN-101-02 result merely says migration-capable commands use the migration DTO (`:109`). It does not prohibit or route every existing bypass through that one command.
+
+Current bypasses include:
+
+- `runMigrations()` falls back from an argument to `DATABASE_URL` and a hard-coded URL (`packages/db/src/migrate.ts:24-35`), while `drizzle.config.ts` likewise uses `DATABASE_URL` plus a default (`packages/db/drizzle.config.ts:3-9`).
+- Package scripts expose direct `drizzle-kit migrate` **and** `drizzle-kit push` (`packages/db/package.json:23-26`); `db:push` bypasses the planned journal/fingerprint/lock entirely.
+- `mosaic storage migrate --run` shells out to the direct `db:migrate` script (`packages/storage/src/cli.ts:413-452`).
+- The federated integration test can create types, tables, and indexes directly against `DATABASE_URL` and intentionally operates without a Drizzle ledger (`packages/db/src/federation.integration.test.ts:28-30,46-134`).
+
+**Failure mode:** a runtime or CI environment with only `DATABASE_URL`, or an operator invoking an existing command, can apply unverified DDL outside the lock, `SET ROLE` preflight, exact-ledger gate, and deployment sequencing. This breaks the requested fail-closed split even if Gateway startup is repaired.
+
+**Required remediation:** amend KBN-101-02/03/06 to enumerate these entrypoints and make the dedicated migrator runner the only PostgreSQL DDL path. Production-like `db:push` must be removed/blocked; `db:migrate`, `storage migrate --run`, and migration tests must invoke the same migration runner with `DATABASE_MIGRATION_URL`, lock, identity preflight, and ledger verification. Tests needing schema must consume a pre-migrated disposable database, or be explicitly run only by that migration phase. Add negative tests showing each command refuses `DATABASE_URL`-only execution and cannot reach DDL.
+
+### HIGH — TLS requirement has no deployable server/bootstrap contract
+
+The contract correctly requires a mounted CA and hostname-verified TLS (`KBN-101-DB-ROLE-SPLIT.md:25,28,93-95`). However KBN-101-05 promises only a “migration phase and secret binding boundary” (`:112`), not PostgreSQL server TLS, certificate issuance/SANs, CA distribution, startup ordering, or the fresh/existing-database bootstrap trust path.
+
+Current standalone and federated compose expose plain PostgreSQL with no server TLS configuration or CA mount (`docker-compose.yml:2-14`; `docker-compose.federated.yml:27-44`). The Portainer test stack passes a single plaintext in-network URL and uses the same database login for Gateway and database bootstrap (`deploy/portainer/federated-test.stack.yml:51-60,110-117`).
+
+**Failure mode:** enforcing the mandatory CA makes current local standalone/federated topologies unable to start; relaxing it to make bootstrap work silently violates K101-REQ-03. A first database cannot be safely migrated until the server certificate, its SAN for the actual service/DNS name, and trusted CA are provisioned, but this lifecycle is not owned or tested.
+
+**Required remediation:** add a concrete KBN-101-00/05 TLS bootstrap sub-contract: issuer/CA owner; server key/cert and SAN inputs; secure storage/mount permissions; `postgresql.conf`/container TLS enablement; migration and runtime CA mounts; hostname used by each compose/Swarm service; readiness only after TLS authentication; CA overlap rotation; and an existing-database transition. Require a disposable standalone and federated/Swarm test to prove verified TLS succeeds and missing CA, wrong CA, wrong SAN, and `sslmode` downgrade fail before readiness. Do not merge KBN-101-05 with an implicit plaintext exception.
+
+### HIGH — exact ledger fingerprint and historical 0009 repair are underspecified for existing databases
+
+The contract requires an “ordered complete set” and rejection of out-of-order rows (`KBN-101-DB-ROLE-SPLIT.md:36-38`), but does not define the canonical serialized tuple, ledger ordering source, or safe upgrade rule for a historical ledger. The current ledger stores only `id`, `hash`, and `created_at` (`packages/db/src/migrate.ts:70-82,105-107`). Its journal is demonstrably non-monotonic: `0008` has `when=1776822435828`, followed by `0009` at `1745280000000` (`packages/db/drizzle/meta/_journal.json:62-79`); the existing PostgreSQL runner documents that this causes skipping (`packages/db/src/migrate.ts:29-35`).
+
+**Failure mode:** an implementation can either reject a legitimate historical database after correcting 0009, or accept a reordered/duplicated ledger because no precise comparison rule exists. A count/hash-set implementation would fail to detect the condition that this contract explicitly calls unsafe; physical `id` order is not an adequate substitute after historical repair.
+
+**Required remediation:** freeze a versioned manifest algorithm before implementation: canonical record fields (at least journal index/tag, corrected logical order, migration content hash, and an explicit migration-manifest version), canonical byte serialization, SHA-256 input, and exact observed-ledger mapping. State whether physical ledger insertion order is normative; if not, compare hash-to-manifest tuples rather than timestamps. Add an idempotent migrator-only 0009 existing-database remediation/reconciliation procedure with backup/rollback evidence. Require clean, pre-0009, 0009-skipped, 0009-applied-late, duplicate, unknown, missing, corrupt-pair, and stale-replica cases. No manual ledger insertion is an acceptable production recovery path.
+
+### MEDIUM — advisory-lock namespace is collision-prone and lacks a fixed identifier contract
+
+The specified lock is `pg_try_advisory_lock(hashtext('mosaic-schema-migration-v1'))` (`KBN-101-DB-ROLE-SPLIT.md:34`). `hashtext` produces a 32-bit key. Session ownership/crash behavior is otherwise correctly stated (one session, same-session release, connection-close release), but an unrelated database user can accidentally collide or deliberately hold the key and force `DATABASE_MIGRATION_LOCKED`.
+
+**Failure mode:** avoidable migration denial of service in a shared PostgreSQL database. The current repository already uses separate `hashtext` advisory-lock names for migrate-tier, demonstrating the need for a documented namespace rather than a collision-prone implicit one.
+
+**Required remediation:** freeze a two-int advisory-lock namespace (fixed documented class/object values) or a documented 64-bit `hashtextextended` key with fixed seed; keep acquisition, migration, verification, and release on the single `max:1` migrator session. Add tests for concurrent migration, connection loss/crash release, readiness while the lock holder is active, and an unrelated lock-key non-interference case.
+
+### MEDIUM — identifier safety and `search_path` verification need executable constraints
+
+The contract rightly requires `pg_catalog, <mosaic_application_schema>` and rejects writable paths (`KBN-101-DB-ROLE-SPLIT.md:54,70-77`), but uses dynamic placeholders for database/schema and does not state how migration/bootstrap SQL will avoid identifier interpolation. Existing code has raw-SQL facilities (`packages/storage/src/migrate-tier.ts` uses `.unsafe`), so this is not merely theoretical.
+
+**Failure mode:** a future operator-configured database/schema value that reaches bootstrap or `SET search_path` through raw string construction can inject DDL, or a pooled connection can retain a mutable search path.
+
+**Required remediation:** require fixed allowlisted identifiers or server-side identifier quoting (`format('%I', ...)`) only; never interpolate URL/config values into SQL. Set and verify the trusted path per connection/session before any query (`SET LOCAL` inside transactions where applicable), forbid `public`/`$user` additions, and add injection-shaped identifier and pooled-connection reset negatives. Include this in KBN-101-00/01 tests.
+
+## Acceptance and threat traceability
+
+| Requirement / threat | Review result | Evidence or blocking finding |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| K101-REQ-01 / AC-K101-01 split runtime/migration URLs | Partial | Role/DTO boundary is coherent; HIGH DDL-path finding requires all current commands to be closed. |
+| K101-REQ-02 / AC-K101-02 explicit migration/readiness | Blocked | HIGH ledger definition and HIGH DDL-bypass findings. |
+| K101-REQ-03 / AC-K101-03 least privilege, TLS, grants | Partial | Role model, default privileges, ledger read-only, TEMP/function checks are well specified (`KBN-101...:47-56,70-79`); HIGH TLS bootstrap and MEDIUM identifier constraints remain. |
+| K101-REQ-04 / AC-K101-04 immutable relations | Correctly deferred | KBN-101-09 after KBN-100 is the correct serial gate (`KBN-101...:58-66,115-118`); no synthetic-only certification claim found. |
+| K101-REQ-05 / AC-K101-05 N-1, secrets, rollback | Partial | No owner-runtime exception and rollback keeps migration URL out of Gateway (`:83-95`); deployable TLS and full command inventory are missing. |
+| K101-REQ-06 / AC-K101-07 KBN gates and DAG | Structurally sound | DAG is acyclic: 00→01/{03}; 02→06; 00/01/03→05; 00/04/05/06→07→08→KBN-100→09→KBN-105. KBN-100’s current branch contains docs-only baseline tracking, not schema implementation. |
+| T: runtime DDL / migration fallback | Blocked | HIGH finding 1. Current Gateway/storage, CLI, direct Drizzle scripts, and integration DDL require explicit closure. |
+| T: race/crash/readiness | Partial | Same-session nonblocking lock and replica-unready rules are present (`:34-38`); lock namespace remediation required. |
+| T: immutable evidence rewrite | Correctly staged | Explicit INSERT/SELECT-only matrix and RESTRICT retention are retained; proof is properly after table creation. |
+| T: secret leakage / TLS downgrade | Partial | Redaction and distinct Vault paths are specified (`:93-97`), but no server TLS/bootstrap implementation contract exists. |
+
+## Unresolved assumptions
+
+1. `standalone` and `federated` are the complete PostgreSQL production-like set (K101-A1).
+2. Each eligible deployment can execute a dedicated migration Job/one-shot phase (K101-A2).
+3. Vault path names are targets, not verified existing paths; deployment ownership remains to be established.
+4. PostgreSQL 17 is available for the selected membership and advisory-lock implementation.
+5. The required server-side TLS issuer/certificate lifecycle and Swarm/compose secret transport have not been decided; this is blocking, not a permissible implicit plaintext bootstrap.
+6. Historical databases containing the 0009 journal/ledger anomaly have no frozen reconciliation procedure.
+
+## Independent test and consistency evidence
+
+Read-only checks run in this review:
+
+| Check | Result |
+| --- | --- |
+| `git diff --check origin/main...da742ca2...` | PASS |
+| `pnpm exec prettier --check` on all seven changed docs | PASS |
+| `pnpm exec tsc --noEmit -p docs/native-kanban-sot/tsconfig.json` | PASS |
+| `docker compose -f docker-compose.yml config --quiet` (isolated test ports) | PASS |
+| `docker compose -f docker-compose.federated.yml --profile federated config --quiet` (isolated test ports) | PASS |
+| Static journal inspection | FAILS the required monotonic ordering premise: 0008 → 0009 `when` decreases; current runner documents skipping behavior. |
+| Static DDL-entrypoint inventory | Found direct Drizzle scripts, storage CLI shell-out, runtime extension/migration calls, fleet backlog migration, tier probe extension creation, and a direct-DLL federated integration test. |
+
+No live database, Vault, CI, deployment, issue, PR, or repository mutation was performed. The pass results validate documentation syntax/contract compilation and compose syntax only; they do **not** certify the proposed security behavior.
+
+## Conclusion
+
+Do not merge this frozen contract as implementation-ready until the HIGH findings are corrected and independently re-reviewed. The central role ownership/default-privilege design, immutable-table staging, and KBN-100/KBN-105 serial gating should be retained; they are not the reason for this REQUEST CHANGES verdict.

docs/reports/security/756-security-review.md

@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+# Security Review — Issue #756
+
+**Scope:** final current uncommitted Discord plugin, shared channel contract, gateway ingress, AgentService, and plugin registration delta  
+**Snapshot:** `plugins/discord/src/index.ts` SHA-256 `5ee6b6aa4e2ff349f137f76b918d02c1254e12066cb48b136048e57bef36fdb2`  
+**Verdict:** **APPROVE**
+
+## Final remediation verification
+
+| Area | Current evidence | Result |
+|---|---|---|
+| Attachment confidentiality and integrity | Ingress accepts bounded attachment metadata only when URL is HTTPS, query-free, fragment-free, and credential-free. Count, aggregate size, field length, MIME, and finite non-negative size validation apply before dispatch; `sizeBytes` is signed and retained. | Pass |
+| Trusted agent selection | Each binding names a required trusted `agentConfigId`; gateway resolves that config server-side and requires its configured name to equal the binding logical-agent ID. Client/provider input cannot select the agent for Discord ingress. | Pass |
+| Privileged operation routing | Gateway revalidates the binding and requires the signed conversation identity to match the configured logical agent before approve/stop actions. Paired admin identity and one-time approval checks remain enforced. | Pass |
+| Egress containment and delivery | Egress requires an aligned message/route, configured parent or exact observed thread target, and cleans response routes after completion, errors, typed-ingress failure, or bounded-map pressure. | Pass |
+| Side-effect limits | Per guild/authorized-parent/user rolling message and thread limits execute before thread creation or dispatch. | Pass |
+
+## Security controls reviewed
+
+- Default-deny guild, parent-channel, user, configured pairing, and role checks precede rate consumption and all side effects.
+- Gateway independently enforces Discord service authentication, HMAC integrity, allowlists, binding/role checks, attachment validation, and replay-ID rejection.
+- Thread authorization uses only the Discord thread parent; category parents cannot authorize ingress.
+- Agent-visible attachment references are explicitly labeled untrusted; binary content is not embedded. Persisted attachment name/URL values are redacted.
+- Egress uses deterministic nonces, bounded transient retry, typed terminal errors, and does not send to forged targets.
+- No secrets or message content were added to plugin logs.
+
+## Verification evidence
+
+| Command | Result |
+|---|---|
+| `pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/discord-plugin test` | PASS — 44 tests; v8 coverage: 92.18% statements/lines, 86.55% branches, 100% functions |
+| `pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/discord-plugin typecheck` | PASS |
+| `pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/types typecheck` | PASS |
+| `pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/gateway typecheck` | PASS |
+| `pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/gateway exec vitest run src/plugin/discord-ingress.security.spec.ts src/agent/__tests__/agent-service-ownership.test.ts` | PASS — 29 tests |
+| `git diff --check` | PASS |
+
+No unresolved critical, high, medium, or low security findings were identified in the reviewed final delta.

docs/scratchpads/753-kbn010-threat-gate.md

@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
+# Issue #753 — KBN-010 threat, authorization, and constraint-impact gate
+
+## Objective
+
+Complete the mandatory threat/auth/constraint-impact analysis that gates KBN-100 schema implementation.
+
+## Scope
+
+- In: threat matrix, frozen-control mapping, schema/API/test impact inventory, security evidence plan.
+- Out: runtime, schema, migration, API, dependency, CI, deployment, and secret changes.
+- Canonical requirements: `docs/requirements/native-kanban-sot.md`.
+- Frozen contract: `docs/native-kanban-sot/SHARED-CONTRACT.md` and `contracts/*.v1.ts`.
+- Tracking: Mosaic Stack issue #753.
+
+## Plan
+
+1. Independently inspect current-main implementation and frozen canon.
+2. Enumerate tenant, identity, health-proof, approval, fencing, proposal, audit, token, and outage threats.
+3. Map every threat to required constraints, command behavior, negative tests, and owning future slice.
+4. Surface any unresolved schema impact as a blocker; do not silently amend the frozen contract.
+5. Run documentation/static validation and submit for independent SecReview.
+
+## Execution log
+
+- 2026-07-14: KBN-000 completed through PR #752 and post-merge pipeline #1798.
+- 2026-07-14: KBN-010 issue #753 created; task marked in progress; fresh GPT worker pending dispatch.
+
+## Verification evidence
+
+Pending worker validation, independent SecReview, Ultron gate, PR merge, post-merge CI, and issue closure.
+
+## 2026-07-14 worker analysis checkpoint
+
+- Inspected issue #753, canonical requirements, all frozen v1 contracts, and actual `origin/main` at `49e8a54` across DB schema, Better Auth scope, project/task/mission/team repositories/controllers, fleet backlog, and `TASKS.md` parsing/writing.
+- Confirmed the worker branch has no source/runtime/schema delta from `origin/main`; orchestrator-owned `.mosaic` state remains dirty and untouched.
+- Authored the threat, authorization, constraint-impact, negative-test, and requirements-traceability analysis in `docs/native-kanban-sot/KBN-010-THREAT-AUTH-CONSTRAINT-GATE.md`.
+- Gate decision: **BLOCKED** by `KBN010-SI-001`. `missionsV1` lacks a unique candidate key on `(workspace_id, id)`, while `artifacts_workspace_mission_fk` and `approval_decisions_workspace_mission_fk` both reference that exact pair. PostgreSQL cannot create the frozen composite foreign keys as declared.
+- Decision: do not select or apply a schema fix. Contract authority must version either a `(workspace_id, id)` mission candidate key or project-congruent child keys, then obtain independent re-review before KBN-100.
+- Additional risks are controlled by frozen transaction/API behavior but require the exact future negative tests cataloged in the deliverable, especially active membership, service-token revocation, same-workspace semantic evidence checks, no-oracle behavior, and serialized parent/DAG cycle checks.
+- OpenBrain startup recall was attempted but unavailable because `/home/hermes/.config/mosaic/credentials.json` is absent; no project state was written to an alternate memory silo.
+- TDD: not applicable; this slice changes documentation/test-plan analysis only and implements no runtime behavior.
+
+## Validation log
+
+- `pnpm exec prettier --check docs/native-kanban-sot/KBN-010-THREAT-AUTH-CONSTRAINT-GATE.md docs/scratchpads/753-kbn010-threat-gate.md` — PASS.
+- Changed-doc link validator — PASS (`relative_links=0`, one external issue link); `curl -fsSIL https://git.mosaicstack.dev/mosaicstack/stack/issues/753` — PASS.
+- The first inline link-validator invocation had a Python f-string syntax error; corrected once and rerun successfully without changing the deliverable.
+- `pnpm format:check` — PASS.
+- `pnpm lint` — PASS (23 tasks successful).
+- `pnpm typecheck` — PASS (42 tasks successful).
+- `pnpm exec tsc -p docs/native-kanban-sot/tsconfig.json --noEmit` — PASS.
+- Scoped diff review — PASS: authored delta is limited to the exclusive deliverable and this scratchpad; no runtime/schema/config/dependency/CI/deployment file is changed, and `docs/native-kanban-sot/TASKS.md` has no worker worktree delta from tracking commit `9b55de0`.
+- Independent SecReview remains pending and cannot return PASS until contract authority resolves `KBN010-SI-001`.
+- Final formatting/diff/test-ID completeness review — PASS (all catalog prefixes contiguous with no duplicate IDs).
+- Remaining: scoped commit, queue guard, and push.
+
+## 2026-07-14 KBN010-SI-001 contract-authority amendment
+
+- Authority: `web1:mosaic-100` directed the minimal rc.4 amendment under issue #753: add a non-partial unique candidate key on `missions(workspace_id, id)` while retaining global `missions.id` uniqueness and the project-congruent `(workspace_id, project_id, id)` key.
+- Rationale: artifacts and approval decisions are polymorphic exactly-one-target records and do not consistently carry `project_id`; widening both children would broaden frozen v1 semantics without improving tenant safety.
+- Plan: amend only the frozen schema contract and shared contract, freeze exact DDL ordering and future migration negatives, run scoped/full validation and independent review, then commit and push without opening/merging a PR or closing #753.
+- TDD: not applicable because this is a design-contract amendment with no runtime schema or migration implementation; rc.4 freezes future executable empty/prod/N-1/rollback/foreign-workspace and duplicate-key-feasibility tests.
+- Budget: no explicit cap supplied; use a 20K-equivalent soft working cap and one bounded worker lane.
+- Read-only #757 boundary: PR #757 adds separate logical-agent connector lease/CAS fencing (`logical_agent_connector_leases.lease_epoch`) in runtime schema and connector contracts. SI-001 changes only the frozen mission candidate key; it does not consume, alter, or reinterpret connector fencing, task fencing, lease authority, or #757 ownership.
+
+### Amendment verification evidence
+
+- Frozen schema: added exactly one non-partial `missions_workspace_id_uidx` on `(workspace_id, id)`; retained the global `id` primary key and `missions_workspace_project_id_uidx` on `(workspace_id, project_id, id)`.
+- FK reconciliation: targeted static checks prove the candidate key precedes both `artifacts_workspace_mission_fk` and `approval_decisions_workspace_mission_fk`; each continues to reference exact ordered columns `(workspace_id, mission_id)` → `missions(workspace_id, id)` with RESTRICT deletion.
+- Shared contract: candidate version is `1.0.0-rc.4`; authority, rationale, exact effect/non-effect, candidate-before-FK DDL order, duplicate feasibility, empty/prod/N-1/rollback/foreign-workspace future tests, and unchanged KCR/SOT/tenant/proposal/fencing/no-cascade invariants are explicit.
+- Changed-file Prettier, contract ESLint, `pnpm exec tsc -p docs/native-kanban-sot/tsconfig.json`, and targeted SI-001 static checks — PASS.
+- Full `pnpm format:check && pnpm lint && pnpm typecheck` — PASS (23 lint tasks and 42 typecheck/build tasks).
+- Independent Codex security review — PASS, zero critical/high/medium/low findings; tenant isolation is preserved.
+- Independent Codex code review confirmed the candidate key repairs both FK targets and reported no blocker on the authorized delta. Its initial request to rewrite the historical KBN-010 verdict conflicts with the exclusive scope and was resolved by documenting the immutable-evidence boundary in rc.4; its remaining finding concerns pre-existing live `.mosaic` session files, which are untouched and excluded from this commit.
+- Scoped diff: only the two frozen contract files and this append-only scratchpad amendment are staged for delivery; no runtime schema, migration, task plan, gate verdict, provider artifact, or #757-owned file is included.
+
+## 2026-07-14 final rc.4 KBN-010 disposition
+
+- Control-plane direction authorized final disposition edits only to `docs/native-kanban-sot/KBN-010-THREAT-AUTH-CONSTRAINT-GATE.md` and this append-only scratchpad; contract author `web1:kbn-contract` remained idle and undisturbed.
+- Exact reviewed contract object: commit `3f6a3387b419eb99453ee10dd25ba888faaab0b5`, tree `7ebab8fa530a7180036928cea9527f808548aa14`.
+- Corroborating review identities: full-index SHA-256 `6b40a76265c4f3e6d1d30a7f262a2dd16e0d51997e99c146b59f527e6524cd42`; stable patch-id `058cf98026fcd1043703c866aee047c8bb144740`. A command-rendered patch digest varied by Git rendering command/options and is non-authoritative; commit+tree+exact file content are canonical.
+- Independent Homelab non-author schema/security review verdict: **APPROVE**. It confirmed the rc.4 `missions_workspace_id_uidx(workspace_id,id)` repairs both dependent FKs while retaining the global PK and project-congruent key; tenant, polymorphic exactly-one-target, RESTRICT/no-cascade, N-1/rollback semantics remain valid.
+- Read-only #757 cross-check: no shared table, index, FK, identity, fence, or authority collision with connector lease/CAS fencing.
+- Final KBN-010 gate decision: **PASS / GO** at rc.4 with `UNRESOLVED SCHEMA IMPACTS` equal to exact `none`. Historical SI-001 detection remains in the gate document as evidence that rc.3 was invalid.
+- No runtime schema/migration/API/config/dependency/CI/deployment implementation is claimed. KBN-100 must still implement candidate-before-dependent-FK ordering, duplicate feasibility, empty/prod/N-1/rollback evidence, exact FK reconciliation, and separate artifact/approval foreign-workspace negatives (N100-45..50).
+- TDD remains not applicable because this continuation changes only documentation/evidence disposition and no runtime behavior.
+- Remaining orchestrator-owned sequence: worker validation/commit/push → PR open/update → Ultron review → squash merge → terminal-green post-main CI → close #753 → release KBN-100. KBN-100 is not released earlier.
+
+### Final worker validation
+
+- Changed-doc Prettier and link checks — PASS; issue #753 external link returned successfully.
+- Static future-test catalog check — PASS: all prefixes are individually enumerated, contiguous, and duplicate-free; N100 now spans N100-01..50.
+- rc.4 disposition assertions — PASS: gate status PASS/GO, frozen target rc.4, exact `none` unresolved section, independent APPROVE, review identities, and N100-50 are present.
+- Review identity reproduction — PASS: commit tree `7ebab8fa530a7180036928cea9527f808548aa14`, full-index SHA-256 `6b40a76265c4f3e6d1d30a7f262a2dd16e0d51997e99c146b59f527e6524cd42`, and stable patch-id `058cf98026fcd1043703c866aee047c8bb144740` match.
+- rc.4 frozen-contract static check — PASS: the candidate key is unique in the declaration and precedes both dependent FKs; frozen contract files remain byte-identical to commit `3f6a3387b419eb99453ee10dd25ba888faaab0b5`.
+- `pnpm exec tsc -p docs/native-kanban-sot/tsconfig.json --noEmit` — PASS.
+- `pnpm format:check` — PASS.
+- `pnpm lint` — PASS (23 tasks successful).
+- `pnpm typecheck` — PASS (42 tasks successful).
+- Scoped diff — PASS: only the gate document and this scratchpad are authored changes; contracts, TASKS, requirements, runtime/schema/migration/config/dependency/CI/deployment and #757-owned files are unchanged. Live `.mosaic` session state remains untouched and excluded.
+- Remaining worker steps: final formatting/scoped staging, commit `docs(#753): clear KBN-010 schema gate`, queue guard, push, and control-plane notification.

docs/scratchpads/755-mos-logical-identity-fencing.md

@@ -0,0 +1,148 @@
+# Issue #755 — Logical Mos identity and connector lease fencing
+
+- Task: `MOS-PORT-M1-001`
+- Branch: `feat/mos-logical-identity-fencing`
+- Base: `origin/main`
+- Started: 2026-07-14
+- Working budget: 38K tokens (task ledger estimate); one implementation lane, bounded to M1.
+
+## Objective
+
+Implement the first runtime-portability security boundary: normalized logical-agent identity plus a PostgreSQL-durable exclusive connector lease and server-validated fencing grants.
+
+## Scope
+
+- Normalized identity contract independent of harness/provider-native session IDs.
+- DB migration/schema/repository for one lease per tenant/logical-agent/binding.
+- CAS acquire/takeover, monotonic epoch, TTL, heartbeat, release, expiry handling.
+- Server-derived grants bound to tenant, logical agent, binding, connector, scopes, expiry, and lease epoch.
+- Reject and credential-safely audit stale, expired, forged, unauthorized, cross-tenant, and cross-binding grants before adapter side effects.
+- Runtime adapter boundary consumes normalized lease context.
+- Unit, migration, close/reopen, concurrency, abuse, and gateway integration tests.
+- Required developer/operations documentation for schema and security behavior.
+
+## Explicit exclusions
+
+No checkpoint/handoff payloads, exactly-once journal/receipts, concrete Claude/Pi/Codex harness adapter, channel cutover, or full cross-harness failover E2E.
+
+## Reconciliation baseline
+
+- Prospective remediation handoff: `web1:coder1`; PR [#757](https://git.mosaicstack.dev/mosaicstack/stack/pulls/757), issue [#755](https://git.mosaicstack.dev/mosaicstack/stack/issues/755).
+- Before rebase: `dff8ce4f79ef90370c29d925002118a708010091`; required base: `origin/main` at `2e2280070ae67288be45f41743cf67052a8ca5a6`; original branch base: `d0771835542deab048ad8e79f271e3abdb6151f7`.
+- Provider metadata: #757 is open, targets `main`, head is `feat/mos-logical-identity-fencing`, prior CI is green, and the provider reports it is not mergeable because of conflicts.
+- Affected delivery paths: `apps/gateway/src/agent/agent.module.ts`; connector-lease gateway repository/service and three focused tests; `packages/agent/src/connector-lease.ts` plus test/export; `packages/types/src/agent/connector-lease.dto.ts` plus test/export; `packages/db/src/schema.ts`, migration `0016_salty_morlocks.sql`, Drizzle snapshot/journal; `docs/PRD.md`, `docs/SITEMAP.md`, MOS architecture/operations pages, this scratchpad, and `docs/tess/TASKS.md`.
+- Read-only merge-tree inspection found only `docs/PRD.md` and `docs/SITEMAP.md` conflicts. Current-main #756 channel contracts, #758 roster-v2 structural compiler, and Native Kanban SOT use distinct contract domains; no substantive architecture collision was identified before mechanical reconciliation.
+- Reconciliation constraints: retain all current-main #752/#756/#758/KBN content; add only nonduplicative #755 references; do not alter semantics or conflate connector leases/grants with Kanban task leases/fences, local Fleet leases, auth sessions, ResetSession generations, or federation grants.
+
+## Plan (TDD RED → GREEN → REFACTOR)
+
+1. Map existing contracts, DB/migration conventions, gateway authorization/audit boundaries, and test infrastructure.
+2. Add failing contract/repository/concurrency/restart/abuse/gateway tests and capture RED evidence.
+3. Implement the smallest normalized contracts, schema/migration/repository, grant validator, audit sink, and gateway service/adapter boundary needed to pass.
+4. Refactor for clear invariants and credential-safe observability; rerun focused suites.
+5. Run package/repo typecheck, lint, format, and appropriate tests.
+6. Run independent code + security review, remediate, and re-review.
+7. Inspect the final diff for security/scope drift; commit; queue guard; push; open PR with `Refs #755` and exact verification; stop without merge/issue closure.
+
+## Constraints and safety notes
+
+- `docs/tess/TASKS.md` is orchestrator-only and will not be edited.
+- Existing dirty `.mosaic/orchestrator/mission.json` and `.mosaic/orchestrator/session.lock` are launcher/orchestrator state and will not be staged or altered intentionally.
+- No client-supplied identity may confer authority.
+- No credential, token, or raw grant material may be persisted to audit/log output.
+- Existing authorization checks remain intact; fencing is an additional fail-closed layer.
+
+## Assumptions resolved from existing architecture
+
+- `ASSUMPTION:` M1 exposes no public lease endpoint. The gateway service is an internal policy surface with deny-all default policy because concrete connector activation/cutover is explicitly deferred.
+- `ASSUMPTION:` Fencing epochs use PostgreSQL `bigint` and cross-module decimal strings, preserving JSON portability without JavaScript number precision loss.
+- `ASSUMPTION:` Process-local grant provenance intentionally fails closed across restart; durable lease/epoch state survives and fresh grants require current policy + lease validation.
+
+## TDD evidence
+
+RED observed before implementation:
+
+- `corepack pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/types exec vitest run src/agent/connector-lease.dto.spec.ts` → failed to load missing `connector-lease.dto.js`.
+- `corepack pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/agent exec vitest run src/connector-lease.test.ts` → failed to load missing `connector-lease.js`.
+- Gateway focused tests failed before implementation because the new repository/service boundaries did not exist (workspace dependencies were then built before behavioral GREEN runs).
+
+GREEN to date:
+
+- Types contract: 6/6 passed.
+- Agent grant/fencing unit suite: 5/5 passed.
+- Gateway PGlite repository + policy/side-effect integration: 7/7 passed; 1 real-PostgreSQL test skipped when `DATABASE_URL` absent.
+- Real PostgreSQL focused run with configured `DATABASE_URL`: 1/1 passed (credential value not emitted in reports).
+
+## Documentation checklist
+
+- [x] `docs/PRD.md` contains current MOS-PORT M1 scope and acceptance criteria.
+- [x] Developer architecture: `docs/architecture/mos-runtime-portability-m1.md`.
+- [x] Admin/operations guidance: `docs/guides/mos-connector-lease-operations.md`.
+- [x] `docs/SITEMAP.md` links both pages.
+- [x] No user-guide change: M1 exposes no user-facing flow or channel cutover.
+- [x] No OpenAPI/endpoint-index change: M1 adds no HTTP endpoint.
+- [x] Migration/restart/rollback safety and credential-safe audit constraints documented.
+- [x] Canonical source remains in-repo; no external publishing action is in scope.
+- [x] Independent review confirms documentation matches implementation; implementation-specific findings were remediated.
+
+## Independent review and remediation
+
+Codex code/security review ran in multiple rounds. Findings and root-cause remediations:
+
+1. Policy could not inspect requested scope/TTL → policy subject now receives normalized requested scopes and explicit requested TTL.
+2. Unbounded authority lifetime → hard defaults cap leases at 5 minutes and grants at 30 seconds; overrides may only tighten; over-limit tests added.
+3. Cross-tenant denial could audit under submitted tenant → mismatch audit uses authenticated tenant plus sanitized `untrusted` target metadata; integration assertion added.
+4. Malformed forged grant could break the denial/audit path → runtime-safe shape validation with sanitized fallback audit; malformed-input test added.
+5. Gateway integration test depended on prior test state → denial test now seeds a unique binding itself; isolated `-t` run passed.
+6. Reviewer repeatedly identified launcher-generated `.mosaic/orchestrator/*` state; those files remain unstaged and excluded from the implementation commit.
+
+Latest independent security review: no critical/high/medium/low findings. Final commit-level code review remains to run after the intended diff is committed without launcher state.
+
+## Verification evidence
+
+- Focused contracts/fencing: types 6/6; agent 9/9.
+- Gateway focused PGlite repository/policy integration: 7/7; isolated denial test 1/1.
+- Real PostgreSQL close/reopen/CAS test: 1/1 with configured `DATABASE_URL`.
+- Root `corepack pnpm typecheck`: 42/42 Turbo tasks passed.
+- Root `corepack pnpm lint`: 23/23 Turbo tasks passed.
+- Root `corepack pnpm format:check`: all matched files passed.
+- Root `corepack pnpm test`: 42/42 Turbo tasks passed; gateway 616 passed / 12 environment-gated skipped; DB 19 passed / 7 environment-gated skipped; Mosaic 650 passed.
+
+## Known residual risks
+
+- Concrete connector policies and Claude/Pi/Codex adapters are intentionally deferred; production policy defaults deny-all.
+- Gateway pre-side-effect validation cannot make an external system exactly-once. Adapters must propagate/enforce the epoch at downstream effect boundaries; receipts/journaling are later #754 scope.
+- Migration rollback is additive-only; dropping lease/audit tables is intentionally manual to avoid destroying authority/audit evidence.
+
+## Commit-level review remediation
+
+- Commit-level Codex code review found one `should-fix`: heartbeat, release, and grant issuance authorized caller-supplied lease fields before canonical normalization.
+- TDD RED: the isolated gateway policy-boundary test showed mixed-case/padded logical agent, binding, connector, scope, and epoch values reaching policy unchanged.
+- Remediation: exported the coordinator's canonical lease normalizer and applied it at the gateway boundary before tenant/policy checks and coordinator dispatch for heartbeat, release, and grant issuance.
+- GREEN: isolated policy test 1/1; focused types 6/6, agent 9/9, gateway 8/8; root typecheck 42/42, lint 23/23, format check passed, and root tests 42/42 (gateway 617 passed / 12 environment-gated skipped).
+- Commit-level security review remained clean: no critical/high/medium/low findings.
+
+## Durable grant-expiry review remediation
+
+- Final commit review found a second `should-fix`: grant expiry was capped against submitted lease metadata after current-authority validation, rather than the durable lease row.
+- TDD RED: a crafted same-authority lease with a later submitted expiry produced a grant expiring after the durable row.
+- Remediation: grant authority fields and expiry now derive from the durable current lease; submitted scopes remain an additional narrowing constraint.
+- GREEN: focused agent fencing suite 10/10.
+
+## Current-main reconciliation (2026-07-14)
+
+- Rebased the existing PR branch from `dff8ce4f79ef90370c29d925002118a708010091` (old base `d0771835542deab048ad8e79f271e3abdb6151f7`) onto `origin/main` `2e2280070ae67288be45f41743cf67052a8ca5a6`; current uncommitted reconciliation head is `d190732a550918161b91d3eb54640f4ea0e2e499`.
+- Resolved only `docs/PRD.md` and `docs/SITEMAP.md`: preserved current-main #752 Native Kanban, #756 official-channel, and #758 FCM material; retained the nonduplicative #755 M1 workstream and placed its two documentation links in the existing Runtime-neutral Mos section. No #755 source semantics changed.
+- Compatibility review confirmed separate authority domains: connector lease/epoch/grant remains distinct from KBN task leases/fences, local Fleet roster lifecycle, auth sessions, ResetSession context, and federation grants. No channel cutover, adapter activation, checkpoint/exactly-once behavior, UI convergence, or #754 expansion was added.
+- Focused verification after building the required workspace dependencies: types contract 6/6; agent fencing/grant 10/10; gateway repository/PGlite and policy integration 8/8. The focused real-PostgreSQL test was skipped because `DATABASE_URL` was not configured; no credentials were inspected or emitted.
+- Generated schema check: `pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/db db:generate` reported no schema changes; migration `0016_salty_morlocks`, snapshot, and journal were unchanged by generation.
+- Full verification: `pnpm typecheck` 42/42; `pnpm lint` 23/23; `pnpm format:check` passed; `pnpm test` 42/42 (gateway 627 passed / 12 environment-gated skipped). Scoped diff check and local documentation-link scan passed.
+- Pending only: commit this reconciliation record, queue guard, force-with-lease push of the rebased existing branch, then fresh independent DB/code/security review and Ultron. Do not claim merge or issue closure.
+
+## Durable lifecycle-authority remediation (2026-07-14)
+
+- Independent review found that heartbeat and release authorized the submitted lease, allowing forged lifecycle scope data to influence policy before the durable row was consulted.
+- Remediation: lifecycle operations tenant-check the submitted lease, load the durable current lease, compare tenant, logical agent, binding, lease UUID, connector, epoch, and canonical ordered scopes, audit and deny any absent/mismatched authority, then run policy and coordinator lifecycle calls with the durable lease. Coordinator CAS/fencing checks remain unchanged.
+- Adversarial gateway integration coverage proves forged `tool.execute` scopes on a durable `runtime.send` lease deny before policy or mutation, preserve heartbeat/release state, and write a denial audit for both lifecycle actions; canonical heartbeat and release remain accepted.
+- Verification: focused types 6/6; agent 10/10; gateway PGlite integration/repository 9/9 with one `DATABASE_URL`-gated PostgreSQL test skipped; Drizzle check passed; root typecheck 42/42; lint 23/23; format check passed; root test 42/42 (gateway 628 passed / 12 environment-gated skipped).
+- Pending: commit, queue-guard, force-with-lease push, then independent DB/code/security rereview and CI. Do not merge or close #755.

docs/scratchpads/756-official-discord-plugin.md

@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+# Scratchpad — #756 Official Discord channel plugin
+
+- **Task / issue:** Official Discord channel plugin / #756
+- **Branch:** `feat/756-official-discord-plugin`
+- **Worktree:** `/home/hermes/agent-work/stack-discord-plugin`
+- **Base:** `origin/main` at `49e8a54105eddf41e8e0e44603ded616ee76044f`
+- **Objective:** Deliver harness-neutral Discord routing, native mention-to-thread behavior, untagged in-channel interaction, fail-closed channel/user authorization, and transport-neutral contracts for future official channel plugins.
+- **Collision boundary:** Do not modify orchestrator-to-Pi migration, logical-agent lease/fencing (#754/#755), runtime provider implementations, or orchestrator-owned `docs/TASKS.md`.
+- **Working budget:** 55K tokens for requirements, implementation, tests, documentation, independent review, and delivery. No user-specified hard cap. Reduce optional refactoring before reducing acceptance coverage.
+
+## Assumptions
+
+1. **ASSUMPTION:** Every configured Discord channel is intentionally agent-bound, so an authorized human's untagged message is agent input and receives an in-channel response. Rationale: this satisfies the requested no-tag behavior without activating the bot in arbitrary channels.
+2. **ASSUMPTION:** Mentioning the bot in a parent channel creates or reuses a public Discord thread; messages already in a thread remain in that thread without repeated mentions. Rationale: Discord does not support nested threads and the request describes tags as the thread-selection signal.
+3. **ASSUMPTION:** One bot process may host multiple configured channel-to-logical-agent bindings. Rationale: bindings are already configuration-owned and this avoids per-agent Discord credentials.
+4. **ASSUMPTION:** Static guild/channel/user allowlists and paired-user roles remain the administration surface for this slice. Rationale: dynamic admin UI is larger and can be added without changing adapter contracts.
+5. **ASSUMPTION:** The stable conversation handle contains logical agent plus Discord channel/thread identity and never a harness/provider identifier. Rationale: runtime re-enrollment and the active lease work can change Claude/Codex/Pi/OpenCode behind the same channel connection.
+6. **ASSUMPTION:** Canonical documentation remains in-repository for this slice; no external publishing is performed.
+
+## Plan
+
+1. Update `docs/PRD.md` before code with #756 scope, constraints, assumptions, and acceptance criteria.
+2. Add failing Discord behavior and authorization tests first.
+3. Add transport-neutral channel DTO/contracts in `@mosaicstack/types`.
+4. Implement mention-to-thread, untagged in-channel, existing-thread, stable conversation, and adapter health behavior without runtime-specific imports.
+5. Update admin/developer/channel protocol docs and documentation checklist.
+6. Run focused tests, typecheck, lint, formatting, full applicable baseline, and coverage.
+7. Run independent code and security review; remediate and re-review.
+8. Commit, queue-guard, push, open PR to `main`, wait for green CI, squash merge, verify merged CI, and close #756.
+
+## Progress
+
+- 2026-07-14: Loaded mission state (none active), global/project guidance, current `origin/main`, existing Discord/Tess/fleet connector architecture, issue #709 history, and active portability issues #754/#755.
+- 2026-07-14: Created issue #756 through the Mosaic wrapper.
+- 2026-07-14: Created isolated worktree/branch from current `origin/main`; the stale root checkout and unrelated QA artifacts remain untouched.
+
+## TDD decision
+
+Required and applied. This change modifies authorization-sensitive remote ingress and routing behavior. Failing permission and routing tests will be captured before implementation.
+
+## Risks / blockers
+
+- Active logical-agent lease work may later add stronger fencing fields. This slice must expose a clean, harness-neutral seam without duplicating that schema.
+- Discord thread creation is an external side effect. Unit tests use a typed fake; live credential smoke testing is out of scope and must not use committed secrets.
+- Repository-wide checks may expose unrelated baseline debt; changed-scope evidence and CI remain mandatory.
+
+## Verification evidence
+
+- `pnpm format:check` — passed.
+- `git diff --check` — passed.
+- `pnpm typecheck` — passed (42 Turbo tasks).
+- `pnpm lint` — passed (23 Turbo tasks).
+- `pnpm build` — passed (23 Turbo tasks).
+- `pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/discord-plugin test` — passed: 44 tests; V8 coverage 92.18% statements/lines, 86.55% branches, 100% functions (all configured thresholds ≥85%).
+- Focused gateway verification passed: Discord ingress/security, cross-surface, ownership, redaction/concurrency, and agent attachment tests.
+- `pnpm test` — changed-scope suites passed; repository baseline remains blocked by `apps/gateway/src/__tests__/cross-user-isolation.test.ts` requiring PostgreSQL at localhost port 5433 (`ECONNREFUSED`). The failure is unrelated to this change.
+- Independent code/security re-reviews requested after final remediation; reports are stored under ignored `docs/reports/` evidence paths.

docs/scratchpads/758-fcm-m1-002-shared-role-resolution.md

@@ -0,0 +1,148 @@
+# FCM-M1-002 — Shared role resolution
+
+- **Task:** `FCM-M1-002`
+- **Issue:** `mosaicstack/stack#758`
+- **Branch:** `feat/758-shared-role-resolution`
+- **Starting head:** `32e75c67b094de443d37fe7d5ff8d25cdfc8b39d`
+- **Role:** implementation worker; independent review and merge remain outside this worker
+
+## Objective
+
+Reuse the existing baseline-plus-`roles.local` persona resolver as the sole class authority for roster-v2 semantics, profile validation, provisioning, and launch/persona resolution. Add exact approved alias canonicalization, fail-closed semantic validation, immutable canonical-class authority contracts, required baseline roles, and operator documentation without implementing lifecycle, mutation, credentials, certificate workflow, or later FCM cards.
+
+## Budget
+
+- Soft budget: **25K tokens**.
+- Strategy: inspect once, implement in small TDD units, run focused suites before the full package gate, and avoid unrelated refactors or M1-003/M2/M4 scope.
+
+## Plan
+
+1. Map the existing persona resolver, roster-v2 compiler, profile/provision consumers, launch resolution, role library, and focused tests.
+2. Write denial/invariant tests first for aliases, canonicalization-before-override, unreadable roles, authority boundaries, policy mismatch, canonical provision output, and resolver parity.
+3. Run the focused suites and record the expected red evidence.
+4. Implement one shared canonical resolution and authority contract in/through `fleet-personas.ts`; delegate roster semantic validation and profile/provision paths to it.
+5. Add baseline `validator`, `team-leader`, and `interaction` role contracts plus `LIBRARY.md` entries while retaining `operator-interaction` compatibility.
+6. Add the required role reference, alias migration, customization guide, and roster-v2 semantic handoff documentation.
+7. Run focused tests, the full `@mosaicstack/mosaic` suite, typecheck, lint, Prettier, `git diff --check`, situational verification, independent code/security review, and remediation.
+8. Commit with the required co-author trailer, run the CI queue guard, push the existing branch, and create/update exactly one PR to `main` with `Refs #758`.
+
+## TDD evidence
+
+### Red
+
+After installing worktree-local dependencies and building `@mosaicstack/db`, the pre-implementation
+focused run collected the intended tests and failed as expected:
+
+```text
+2 test files failed; 32 tests failed; 32 tests passed
+```
+
+Expected failures named the missing `canonicalizeRoleClass`,
+`authorityForCanonicalClass`, and `validateRosterV2Semantics` APIs, absent requested/canonical typed
+output, and unresolved required canonical role contracts. An earlier run that failed before test
+collection on an unresolved `yaml` dependency was treated as environment setup, not TDD evidence.
+
+### Green
+
+Focused role-resolution and affected service fixtures:
+
+```text
+6 test files passed; 109 tests passed
+```
+
+The focused set covers personas, profiles, provision, launch persona contract, roster-v2 semantics,
+and the operator-interaction service fixture. The final profile tests also cover readable lead/floor
+compatibility and canonical collision denial.
+
+## Tests and gates
+
+- Focused suites: pass, **6 files / 109 tests**.
+- Full `@mosaicstack/mosaic` suite: pass, **50 files / 713 tests**. Workspace package build outputs
+  were prepared first because a clean worktree has no dependency `dist` entries.
+- `pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/mosaic typecheck`: pass.
+- `pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/mosaic lint`: pass.
+- Prettier check over every changed file: pass.
+- `git diff --check`: pass.
+- Runtime/file-boundary evidence: real role library, profile/provision filesystem integration,
+  launch-time synchronous contract injection, v1 roster parser round-trip, roster-v2 semantic
+  filesystem checks, and operator-interaction service fixtures all pass without live mutation.
+- Independent code review: **APPROVE**, no blocking or non-blocking findings; reviewed complete
+  tracked/untracked delta including the canonical collision guard. Residual: roster-v2 semantic
+  validation is an explicit async handoff with production caller wiring owned by later work.
+- Independent security review: **APPROVE**, no verified authority/security findings on the final
+  delta.
+
+### Post-PR fail-closed remediation
+
+Independent rereview found resolver fail-open edges that the original green PR head did not cover. The
+remediation remained uncommitted until every finding was reproduced red-first and the same reviewer
+approved the complete two-file delta.
+
+Final regression evidence:
+
+```text
+persona resolver: 47/47
+focused affected suites: 6 files / 138 tests
+root-container resolver suites: 86/86
+full canonical run: 42/42 Turbo tasks; Mosaic 50 files / 733 tests
+```
+
+DB migration, typecheck, lint, Prettier, and `git diff --check` also passed. Coverage now proves:
+
+- unreadable, unscannable, direct-dangling, ancestor-dangling, and literal `..` traversal override paths
+  fail closed across async, sync, listing, and status APIs;
+- genuinely missing override directories still permit baseline fallback;
+- cached missing scans are revalidated before fallback;
+- marker-defined identity and domain metadata are revalidated on the second read;
+- `LIBRARY.md` rows and incidental later markers cannot define, shadow, or advertise personas.
+
+Exact-head pipeline `1819` passed for rebased head `4d990eee…`, but the independent reviewer-of-record
+returned **REQUEST CHANGES** after reproducing three additional edge failures: a canonical filename could
+inherit protected authority despite a conflicting explicit first marker, cached `scanned` absence could
+miss an override created before baseline fallback, and inherited plain-object names such as `constructor`
+could corrupt alias/authority lookup. Merge remained held.
+
+Each failure was reproduced red-first in the persona suite (4 failing assertions), then remediated without
+expanding card scope. Explicit first markers now own identity and filename fallback applies only to
+markerless contracts; every second read rejects a newly introduced conflicting marker regardless of
+cached classification; cached async resolution re-scans the override layer immediately before every
+baseline fallback; alias and authority registries require own-property matches. Current uncommitted
+evidence is persona **52/52**, focused affected suites **6 files / 143 tests**, and full Mosaic package
+**50 files / 738 tests**, plus typecheck, lint, Prettier, and `git diff --check`. Independent
+finding-specific rereview **APPROVED** the complete uncommitted three-file remediation after direct
+adversarial reproduction of all three findings and the follow-up markerless TOCTOU. All post-commit
+exact-head gates remain required.
+
+## Risks and boundaries
+
+- **Security-sensitive authority:** authority must derive only from canonical class, never role prose, aliases, display names, or tool-policy text.
+- **Resolver divergence:** no second regex, registry, scanner, or prose parser may be introduced.
+- **Alias capture:** aliases must canonicalize before baseline/`roles.local` lookup so local files cannot redefine legacy aliases as separate authority.
+- **Readable persona requirement:** semantic success requires a resolved readable persona, not class-set membership.
+- **Scope control:** no roster mutation, lifecycle, lease issuance, certificate workflow/storage, credentials, remote reconciliation, provision-v2 conversion, or shipped-example disposition execution.
+- **Coordination:** `docs/TASKS.md` is read-only and remains orchestrator-owned.
+
+## Acceptance-evidence mapping
+
+| Requirement / criterion | Verification evidence |
+| --- | --- |
+| `FCM-REQ-02` shared semantic resolver | Async/sync resolver parity; roster-v2 delegates batched scans and resolution; profiles/provision and launch reuse `fleet-personas.ts`; no second scanner or class-marker regex added. |
+| `FCM-REQ-07` canonical classes and authority boundaries | Exact alias and non-alias tests; immutable authority invariant tests; all required canonical contracts resolve through the real role library. |
+| `AC-FCM-01` structural + semantic roster validation | Synchronous parser/normalizer tests remain intact; async semantic tests cover aliases, custom roles, unreadable/unresolved roles, `LIBRARY`-only rejection, and bidirectional protected policy mismatch. |
+| `AC-FCM-07` protected authority invariants | Denial tests prove merge-gate-only merge, validator certificate-only, orchestrator/team-leader/interaction limits, no implicit custom-role authority, and canonical tool-policy matching. |
+
+## Documentation
+
+- `docs/fleet/reference/role-classes.md`
+- `docs/fleet/migration/legacy-class-aliases.md`
+- `docs/fleet/how-to/customize-roles.md`
+- `docs/fleet/reference/roster-v2-fields.md` semantic handoff
+- Baseline role contracts and `LIBRARY.md` rows for `validator`, `team-leader`, and `interaction`
+
+## Residual risks
+
+- Provisioning remains intentionally v1 and does not emit `reports_to`; canonical topology is retained
+  in its typed seat/summary path only, matching the existing v1 parser boundary.
+- Alias support remains for compatibility; new configuration should emit canonical identities.
+- This card defines authority metadata and validation only. Enforcement workflows for leases,
+  certificates, lifecycle, and mutation remain owned by later FCM cards.

docs/scratchpads/758-fcm-m1-003-example-profile-dispositions.md

@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+# FCM-M1-003 — Executable example/profile/service-preset dispositions
+
+- **Task / issue:** FCM-M1-003 / #758
+- **Branch / base:** `test/758-example-profile-dispositions` from `origin/main` `a5e8e554012f27898e035d2882a8e47e1a02fe97`
+- **Objective:** Make every artifact in the M0 legacy disposition inventory executable evidence: it must validate canonically, be explicitly retained as a v1 fixture, or be retired with a replacement/deprecation link.
+- **Scope:** Validation and explicit version/retirement metadata only for shipped examples, profiles, and the operator-interaction service preset. Reuse the central resolver and existing v2 roster compiler.
+- **Out of scope:** Generated environment boundaries, CRUD, reconciliation/apply, migration, live fleet mutation, and `docs/TASKS.md`.
+- **Budget:** 20K card allocation; use focused package tests before full package validation.
+
+## Plan
+
+1. Inventory exact shipped artifacts and existing compiler/resolver/profile tests.
+2. Add failing behavior tests covering all listed artifacts and their documented disposition.
+3. Implement minimal declarative fixture/disposition validation; do not add a role/class resolver.
+4. Run focused and package quality gates; obtain independent code and security review.
+5. Commit, queue-guard, push, open one `main` PR with `Refs #758`.
+
+## Progress
+
+- Intake complete: verified no branch, worktree, or open PR for this card before creating this isolated worktree.
+- Requirements read: FCM PRD, FCM-M1-003 task row, M0 disposition inventory, delivery/QA/documentation guides.
+- TDD: RED recorded with `pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/mosaic test -- example-profile-dispositions.spec.ts` failing because the new module did not exist; GREEN recorded after the minimal guard implementation. The focused suite now has 4 passing tests, including undeclared-artifact and missing-explicit-v1-version denials.
+- Independent review: initial code review found the service policy path was hardcoded; remediation iterates declared `canonical-service-policy` artifacts. Exact-head code review approved and exact-head security review found no issues.
+
+## Risks / decisions
+
+- The M0 inventory permits unresolved legacy roles only when explicitly v1-versioned or retired. Do not infer aliases beyond the three approved by FCM-M1-002.
+- `docs/TASKS.md` is orchestrator-owned and will not be edited.
+
+## Verification evidence
+
+- Focused TDD guard: `pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/mosaic test -- example-profile-dispositions.spec.ts` — PASS (4 tests).
+- Full package suite: `pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/mosaic test` — PASS (51 files, 742 tests).
+- Static gates: `pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/mosaic typecheck`, `pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/mosaic lint`, and `pnpm format:check` — PASS.
+- Diff gate: `git diff --check` — PASS.
+- Exact-head reviews: `codex-code-review.sh --uncommitted` — APPROVE; `codex-security-review.sh --uncommitted` — no findings.
+- Delivery: committed as `9a9ad1a`, pushed after `ci-queue-wait.sh --purpose push`, and opened PR [#770](https://git.mosaicstack.dev/mosaicstack/stack/pulls/770) to `main` with `Refs #758`. `pr-ci-wait.sh -n 770` reported terminal-green Woodpecker pipeline [#1823](https://ci.mosaicstack.dev/repos/47/pipeline/1823/1).

docs/scratchpads/758-fcm-m2-002-fleet-agent-crud.md

@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+# FCM-M2-002 — Generation-Guarded Fleet Agent CRUD
+
+- **Task / issue:** FCM-M2-002 / #758
+- **Branch / base:** `feat/758-fleet-agent-crud` from `origin/main` `191efaefeb5c0c6bb218c1292d12ce8e73ace12b`
+- **Budget:** 30K card allocation; no deployment or live-fleet actions.
+
+## Objective
+
+Provide local roster-owned create, get, update, and delete mutations with a generation precondition, deterministic dry-run plan, complete-state structural/semantic/projection validation before writes, atomic roster persistence, and redacted recovery output on a late projection failure.
+
+## Scope and exclusions
+
+- Roster v2 is the sole desired-state authority. Reuse `parseRosterV2`, `renderRosterV2Yaml`, `validateRosterV2Semantics`, and the generated-environment boundary.
+- Fresh create defaults to `enabled: true` and `desired_state: stopped`; this card never starts a runtime.
+- Excluded: reconcile/apply; lifecycle/session/systemd/tmux actions; migration/canary; remote/connector/gateway mutation; arbitrary commands/channels/secrets; generated files as authority; `docs/TASKS.md` and orchestration ledger changes.
+
+## Red-first plan
+
+1. Add failing tests for dry-run non-mutation, stale generation, concurrent writer locking, stopped default create, equivalent idempotency, complete proposed-state semantic/boundary validation, atomic roster write, and injected late projection failure with redacted recovery details.
+2. Implement only a roster-v2 CRUD service and file adapter; no legacy `fleet add/remove` behavior expansion.
+3. Add operator/reference docs for JSON outcomes, generation retries, recovery, and no-runtime-action boundary.
+
+## Progress
+
+- Preflight: clean exact base and no duplicate PR confirmed.
+- Intake read: FCM PRD/AC-FCM-03, task row, launch and generated-env boundaries, roster v2/resolver contracts, legacy fleet command behavior, delivery/QA/TypeScript/security/documentation guidance.
+- TDD: RED observed for the missing CRUD module. GREEN: focused suite passes 7 tests covering stopped-default create, stale generation, idempotency, dry-run non-mutation, concurrent lock denial, exact stale/absent generated-projection delete cleanup, and redacted late-projection recovery.
+- REVIEW-1 remediation: RED observed for absent CLI create/get/update/delete/plan wiring. Added roster-v2-only JSON commands, including safe `get`, read-only planning/dry-run, explicit persisted-start recording (never runtime start), stable handled error codes, and focused CLI coverage.
+- REVIEW-2 remediation: RED observed for missing direct fleet-control-plane registration and ambiguous partial late-I/O result. The public surface is now direct `mosaic fleet {create,get,update,delete,plan}` (not root gateway `mosaic agent`); a late filesystem projection failure returns non-zero redacted JSON with `authoritativeRoster: committed` and `projections: incomplete`, proving no rollback/no-op claim.
+- REVIEW-3 remediation: RED observed for unnamed update/delete plans and deleted-agent quarantine conflict. `plan <operation> [name]` now requires target names only for update/delete; delete validates/removes only exact generated state while retaining local/legacy/quarantine/unrelated files. Actual CLI/filesystem tests cover create/update/delete plans, plan validation/non-mutation, retained artifacts/dry-run bytes, unsafe permission/symlink rejection, and post-roster delete recovery. Added the required operator how-to.
+- REVIEW-4 remediation: RED observed that actual Commander create accepted and silently dropped disallowed `command`, `channel`, and `secretRef` keys. The `--agent` object and nested `launch` now use strict own-property allowlists; non-plain/prototype-sensitive shapes and unknown keys fail `invalid-request` before resolver, roster, or projection mutation. Actual Commander plan/create/update tests cover top-level command/channel/secretRef/constructor/prototype/`__proto__` shapes and nested launch unknown fields, byte-identical retained artifacts, non-zero exit, and diagnostics that never echo rejected values. Docs state the same boundary.
+
+## Risks / assumptions
+
+- **ASSUMPTION:** M2 mutations operate exclusively on the existing v2 roster contract because generation/lifecycle fields are v2-only; legacy v1 add/remove commands remain unchanged compatibility paths.
+- A multi-file roster/projection write cannot be one filesystem rename. The roster is authoritative; a post-roster projection failure returns a redacted recovery plan naming only safe paths/actions, never environment values.
+
+## Verification evidence
+
+- `pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/mosaic test -- fleet-agent-crud-command.spec.ts fleet-agent-crud.spec.ts generated-env-boundary.spec.ts` — PASS (48 tests after REVIEW-4 remediation).
+- `pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/mosaic test` — PASS (54 files, 794 tests after REVIEW-4 remediation).
+- `pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/mosaic lint` — PASS.
+- `pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/mosaic typecheck` — PASS.
+- `pnpm format:check` and `git diff --check` — PASS.
+- Root `pnpm typecheck`, `pnpm lint`, `pnpm format:check`, and `git diff --check` — PASS after REVIEW-4 remediation; full package test is 54 files / 794 tests.
+- REVIEW-4 remediation focused checks are green; fresh full-delta independent review is required before author-green. No commit, push, or PR opened.

docs/scratchpads/758-fcm-m3-001-local-reconciler.md

@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+# FCM-M3-001 — Local roster-owned reconciliation and lifecycle
+
+- **Task / issue:** FCM-M3-001 / #758
+- **Branch / base:** `feat/758-local-reconciler` from `origin/main` `bc5e73629e92c56a80fa6a769ebad17c0177f504`
+- **Base tree:** `1b9ebe4fa1a90734b6f81118e120bae5290cd350`
+- **Scope:** source, isolated fake-adapter tests, and card documentation only. No live fleet/systemd/tmux action.
+
+## Objective
+
+Provide local roster-v2 `apply`/`reconcile` and lifecycle/status contracts. The roster remains desired-state authority; projections and runtime observations are derived state.
+
+## Red-first evidence
+
+The initial focused reconciler test failed because `fleet-reconciler.ts` did not exist. The initial new-worktree test invocation also exposed absent dependencies; `pnpm install --frozen-lockfile --store-dir /home/jarvis/.local/share/pnpm/store` restored local workspace dependencies without changing source.
+
+## Design
+
+- A new `fleet-reconciler.ts` accepts only typed roster-v2 input plus injected command and projection adapters.
+- It targets only exact `mosaic-agent@<roster-name>.service` units and the exact configured tmux socket/session.
+- It classifies unowned/unmanaged state and fails mutation closed rather than adopting or killing it.
+- It validates the private install-derived holder identity and complete expected tmux global environment before mutating lifecycle state.
+- REVIEW-1 remediation: RED review evidence found service-level apply could omit generation and had no mutation lock. Every non-observational command now requires an expected generation; a private exclusive roster-adjacent lock is acquired before effects and released on success or partial failure. Tests cover missing/stale values, concurrent denial, no effects, release, and lock-free observation.
+- REVIEW-2 remediation: lock acquisition now validates private real `MOSAIC_HOME`/`fleet` ancestors, rejects symlink or unsafe leaves, distinguishes `EEXIST` concurrency from other I/O, and binds release to the created inode plus random ownership token. A replacement lock is retained and reported, not unlinked. A crash may leave a stale lock for inspection; no stale-lock break is claimed.
+- REVIEW-3 remediation: a lock cleanup failure now adds bounded `cleanup` diagnostics to a known successful or partial effect result without replacing its projection/lifecycle/recovery truth. Cleanup is not claimed as complete, and the retained lock requires inspection before retry.
+- REVIEW-4 remediation: command JSON with an additive cleanup diagnostic now exits non-zero even where known effects completed; clean effect and observational JSON remain zero-exit.
+- REVIEW-5 remediation: mutating operations acquire the private lock before rereading canonical `roster.yaml`; the fenced reread, not a caller snapshot, supplies generation validation, plan, projection, and lifecycle authority.
+- `apply` starts only enabled agents whose persisted desired state is `running`; stopped/default agents are never started by reconciliation.
+- Observational commands produce JSON classification only. Partial projection or lifecycle effects report explicit recovery without values.
+
+## Boundaries
+
+Excluded: live host actions, remote/SSH/connector lifecycle mutation, migrations, canaries, deployment, gateway changes, arbitrary command/channel/secret inputs, `docs/TASKS.md`, and orchestration ledgers.
+
+## Verification
+
+- Focused reconciler/Commander/CRUD/fleet tests: 4 files / 229 tests passed.
+- Full `@mosaicstack/mosaic` suite: 56 files / 820 tests passed after REVIEW-5 canonical roster fencing remediation.
+- Package and root typecheck/lint, root format check, and `git diff --check`: passed.
+- Isolated launcher and systemd template harnesses passed; they use fixtures only. No live fleet, systemd, tmux, session, remote, connector, or runtime action occurred.

docs/scratchpads/758-fcm-m3-002-reconciler-lifecycle-gates.md

@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
+# FCM-M3-002 — Reconciler lifecycle acceptance gates
+
+- **Task / issue:** FCM-M3-002 / mosaicstack/stack#758
+- **Branch:** `test/758-reconciler-lifecycle-gates`
+- **Required starting head:** `499090508ef1d768660e4d54e7934cbcf13cb1cd`
+- **Required starting tree:** `2f1bb7fed48291f3f7ba8b21c2b52491aa14fe2b`
+- **Scope:** isolated acceptance coverage and card-required evidence/tracking only; no live fleet, systemd, tmux, session, site, migration, canary, deployment, runtime, connector, or remote action.
+- **Budget:** use the task estimate of 25K as the working cap; keep the delta to one coherent acceptance suite plus required task/scratchpad evidence. No production change unless a failing reproducer proves an in-scope defect.
+
+## Intake evidence
+
+- Clean exact local branch/head/tree verified before editing.
+- `origin/test/758-reconciler-lifecycle-gates` fetched and verified at the same required head.
+- The Mosaic PR wrapper reported no open pull requests, so no open-PR branch collision exists.
+- Parent issue #758 is open and remains intentionally open through M5.
+- Requirements loaded from `docs/PRD.md` FCM requirements and `AC-FCM-05`, `docs/TASKS.md` FCM DAG, the M3 rows in `docs/fleet/FLEET-CONFIG-DOCS-IA-CHECKLIST.md`, and the FCM-M3-001 implementation scratchpad.
+
+## Objective
+
+Add broad, behavior-oriented acceptance evidence around the shipped local reconciler contracts. Exercise only injected fake systemd/tmux adapters and temporary filesystem fixtures. Prove exact ownership/targeting, persisted stopped-state safety, truthful partial-failure recovery, rollback behavior, and stable command JSON/exit outcomes without touching live services or sessions.
+
+## Acceptance mapping and evidence
+
+| FCM-M3-002 acceptance concern | Delivered isolated evidence |
+| --- | --- |
+| Systemd/tmux lifecycle | `fleet-reconciler.acceptance.spec.ts` drives apply, reconcile, stop, restart, status, and recovery reconcile through one stateful injected fake host. The fake models exact systemd effects and tmux session observations; no host commands run. |
+| Drift | Canonical roster-v2 YAML drives the Commander `fleet status` boundary and classifies `missing-session`, `unexpected-session`, and `disabled-running`, including combined drift, while asserting observation emits no lifecycle mutation. |
+| Exact default/named socket targeting | Canonical v2 requires an explicit non-empty named socket; the parser rejects missing/empty values and the Commander acceptance path asserts exact `-L mosaic-fleet` targeting. A separate canonical legacy-v1 roster loader plus runtime-transport path proves a socket-less compatibility roster targets the literal tmux default server with no `-L`. No unreachable empty-socket v2 fixture is used. |
+| Unmanaged-session classification | Stateful fixtures report sorted `coder0-shadow`/`unmanaged` sessions, then prove an exact roster stop leaves both sessions and the near-collision service intact. |
+| Crash/partial failure | Injected restart failure is applied after the fake effect to model crash/partial truth: result is `lifecycle: incomplete`, the roster is unchanged, and observed runtime may be active. |
+| Rollback/recovery semantics | M3 has no rollback command and explicitly does not claim automatic rollback. The acceptance workflow proves the bounded recovery contract: inspect, then exact reconcile restores the persisted stopped target without a start or fuzzy effect. M4 migration/canary rollback remains outside this card. |
+| Stopped-state preservation | Stateful apply and reconcile both stop an initially running observed agent whose persisted target is stopped; failed explicit restart leaves desired state stopped; recovery reconcile restores stopped state. No start call is emitted. |
+| Zero fuzzy destructive targeting | Near-collision `coder0-shadow` service/session plus `unmanaged` session remain untouched. The recorded destructive calls contain only exact `mosaic-agent@coder0.service`; no tmux kill action is emitted. |
+| Stable JSON/exit behavior | Temporary canonical roster fixture invokes the CLI boundary and asserts exactly one JSON line, exact partial-result shape, and exit code 1. Existing focused command specs continue to cover clean zero-exit and stable error JSON. |
+| Redacted truthful recovery | Fake stderr includes `PASSWORD=acceptance-secret`; exact CLI JSON contains only bounded recovery metadata and excludes the key, value, and raw diagnostic. |
+
+## Plan
+
+1. Inventory existing reconciler and command specs against the table above; avoid duplicating narrow assertions already present.
+2. Add one acceptance-level spec using only fake/injected adapters and temporary files.
+3. If a real defect is exposed, preserve the failing reproducer and make only the smallest FCM-M3-002-required fix; otherwise leave production unchanged.
+4. Reconcile `docs/TASKS.md` only for delivered M1/M2/M3-001 truth and mark FCM-M3-002 in progress.
+5. Run focused tests, full `@mosaicstack/mosaic` tests, package/root typecheck and lint, Prettier/format and diff checks, plus adversarial fake-runner cases.
+6. Record exact evidence and leave the tree uncommitted for independent synthetic-tree review.
+
+## TDD decision
+
+This card adds acceptance coverage to already-delivered behavior. Test-first applies to any product defect discovered: retain a failing reproducer before an in-scope fix. If the shipped behavior already satisfies the acceptance contract, no production code will be changed and the acceptance suite itself is the deliverable.
+
+## Progress
+
+- Intake and immutable baseline verification complete.
+- Existing coverage inventory confirmed strong unit coverage but no stateful cross-command lifecycle acceptance harness.
+- Added `packages/mosaic/src/fleet/fleet-reconciler.acceptance.spec.ts`: one injected stateful fake systemd/tmux host, temporary canonical v2 and legacy-v1 roster fixtures, and seven acceptance tests.
+- Production source is unchanged; no product defect requiring an FCM-M3-002 fix was found.
+- `docs/TASKS.md` reconciles only merged M1/M2/M3-001 truth and marks FCM-M3-002 in progress.
+
+## Verification evidence
+
+All commands ran from `/home/jarvis/src/mosaic-stack-local-reconciler` and passed unless explicitly noted.
+
+- `pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/mosaic exec vitest run src/fleet/fleet-reconciler.acceptance.spec.ts` — final remediation run: 1 file, 7 tests passed; canonical v2 named-socket parsing/Commander status, missing/empty v2 rejection, and canonical legacy-v1 default-server runtime targeting are distinct reachable cases.
+- Focused reconciler/roster/transport command covering acceptance, reconciler, command, CRUD, v2 parser, and runtime transport specs — 8 files, 304 tests passed.
+- `pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/mosaic test` — final remediation run: 57 files, 827 tests passed.
+- `pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/mosaic typecheck` — passed.
+- `pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/mosaic lint` — passed.
+- `pnpm typecheck` — 42/42 Turbo tasks successful.
+- `pnpm lint` — 23/23 Turbo tasks successful.
+- `pnpm exec prettier --check docs/TASKS.md docs/scratchpads/758-fcm-m3-002-reconciler-lifecycle-gates.md packages/mosaic/src/fleet/fleet-reconciler.acceptance.spec.ts` — passed.
+- `pnpm format:check` — all matched files use Prettier style.
+- `git diff --check` — passed with no output.
+- Initial scoped Prettier check found style drift in the new spec and tracking table; `pnpm exec prettier --write ...` remediated it before all final gates above.
+- No live fleet, systemctl, tmux, process, site, migration, canary, deploy, runtime, connector, or remote command was invoked.
+
+## Review boundary
+
+This is an author handoff. No self-review is represented as reviewer-of-record. The uncommitted synthetic tree is intended for independent review.
+
+## Risks / blockers
+
+- M3 truthfully reports incomplete lifecycle effects and bounded recovery; it does not implement or claim an automatic rollback command. This suite proves stopped-state restoration by the documented exact recovery reconcile. M4 retains migration/canary rollback ownership.
+- The fake host models only the public systemd/tmux runner contract and temporary roster filesystem boundary. This is intentional under the no-live-effects hold.
+- Parent issue closure, commit, push, PR, merge, deployment, and branch cleanup remain explicit holds.
+- No residual implementation blocker.

docs/scratchpads/771-kbn101-db-role-split.md

@@ -0,0 +1,183 @@
+# Scratchpad — KBN-101 DB runtime/migration role split (#771)
+
+- **Branch:** `docs/771-kbn101-db-role-split`
+- **Base:** `main` `e9c4aa3`
+- **Scope:** planning/documentation only; authorized files are PRD, Native Kanban task/shared/index docs, sitemap, this scratchpad, and the new KBN-101 contract.
+- **Explicit exclusions:** source/runtime/config/deployment/secret/migration/compose/CI/lock/package/KBN-100 branch edits; no production mutation.
+
+## Objective
+
+Freeze an implementation-ready PostgreSQL role/connection split so the Gateway uses a non-owner runtime identity and only a dedicated migration phase uses an owner/migrator identity. Make real deployed-role certification—not synthetic role tests—a serial prerequisite of KBN-100 and KBN-105.
+
+## Intake and current-state evidence
+
+- Mission MVP is active; W3 Native Kanban/SOT is planning-complete. The task state shows KBN-010 as the predecessor and KBN-100 as the current schema slice.
+- Current branch started at `e9c4aa3`; `.mosaic/orchestrator/{mission.json,session.lock}` were already runtime-modified and remain untouched.
+- `packages/db/src/client.ts`, `migrate.ts`, and `drizzle.config.ts` resolve one `DATABASE_URL` (with default fallback). `packages/storage/src/adapters/postgres.ts` calls `runMigrations(this.url)`.
+- `apps/gateway/src/database/database.module.ts` calls `storageAdapter.migrate()` at startup for PostgreSQL; this is the owner-runtime defect to remove in KBN-101 implementation.
+- `packages/config/src/mosaic-config.ts`, installer wizard, local/federated compose, Portainer test stack, and `.woodpecker/ci.yml` currently expose one URL. PGlite has an existing explicit local migration path.
+- Current KBN contract requires immutable events/checkpoints/artifacts/evidence, `RESTRICT`, and KBN-100 generated Drizzle consistency. It did not establish a deployable runtime identity split.
+
+## Frozen decisions
+
+1. `DATABASE_URL` is the non-owner runtime URL; `DATABASE_MIGRATION_URL` is migration-only. Both are required in their respective PostgreSQL phases; PGlite is the explicit local exception; migration never falls back to runtime/default/config URL.
+2. PostgreSQL Gateway runtime never auto-runs migration/DDL. Dedicated migrator uses `pg_try_advisory_lock(hashtext('mosaic-schema-migration-v1'))`; replicas only check exact ordered Drizzle-ledger readiness and fail closed.
+3. Roles are non-login `mosaic_platform_database_owner`, non-login `mosaic_schema_owner`, login/noinherit `mosaic_migrator`, non-login `mosaic_runtime_capability`, and login/inherit `mosaic_runtime`. Runtime inherits only its capability role with SET/ADMIN denied, has no owner/migrator membership, no unsafe attributes/ownership/DDL authority, and an explicit trusted search path.
+4. Runtime gets mutable DML only as needed, but INSERT/SELECT only on `task_events`, `artifacts`, `task_checkpoints`, `task_checkpoint_artifacts`, and `approval_decision_artifacts`. KBN-100 still enforces RESTRICT/no-cascade.
+5. Startup verifies effective role/ownership/attributes/inherited capability/TEMP/function-execute/ledger grants/search path/immutable denials/schema fingerprint without DSN exposure. It also requires authenticated CA/hostname-verified TLS. Stable sanitized errors and redaction rules are required.
+6. N-1 retains single runtime URL only as a non-certified compatibility release; staged role provisioning/migration/runtime deployment then enforces the split. Rollback never injects migration URL into Gateway.
+7. Vault target paths, rotation, deployment injection, CI, installer, compose, Portainer, and observability are separate one-card/one-PR handoffs. The migration-only file manifest includes `packages/db/drizzle.config.ts`; KBN-101 repairs the known PostgreSQL runner/journal ordering defect and proves a clean database applies every hash once before its foundation certificate. No application migration creates roles/passwords or hardcodes credentials.
+8. KBN-101 foundation merges/certifies first. KBN-100 then rebases, restores Drizzle declaration/snapshot/journal consistency, and bounds procedural immutable-table grant/trigger/backfill work to its own slice. Because those immutable relations do not exist until KBN-100, KBN-101’s real deployed-role immutable-operation certificate follows KBN-100 and is the serial gate before KBN-105.
+
+## Assumptions
+
+- `standalone` and `federated` are all current PostgreSQL production-like modes; a future PostgreSQL tier inherits this contract unless versioned otherwise.
+- Deployment will support a dedicated migration Job/one-shot command. A target that cannot run it cannot receive production/federated KBN certification.
+- Canonical Vault target paths require deployment-owner verification before provisioning; the planning document does not claim they already exist.
+
+## Documentation produced
+
+- `docs/PRD.md`: bounded KBN-101 requirements and acceptance criteria.
+- `docs/native-kanban-sot/KBN-101-DB-ROLE-SPLIT.md`: normative rc.5 implementation, threat, migration/rollback, evidence, and exact file DAG contract.
+- `docs/native-kanban-sot/SHARED-CONTRACT.md`: rc.5 amendment preserving rc.4.
+- `docs/native-kanban-sot/TASKS.md`: KBN-101 inserted before and blocks KBN-100; KBN-105 held.
+- Native Kanban index and root sitemap links.
+
+## Validation plan
+
+1. Prettier only for changed Markdown.
+2. Markdown link target/check checks scoped to modified docs.
+3. Strict contract check with `pnpm exec tsc --noEmit -p docs/native-kanban-sot/tsconfig.json` (the frozen TypeScript contracts remain unchanged).
+4. Diff allowlist proves only authorized documentation files changed, apart from pre-existing Mosaic runtime state.
+5. Independent documentation/security self-review: role escalation, fallback, startup DDL, schema readiness, grants/default privileges, immutable tables, secret leakage, deployment and KBN-100 boundaries.
+
+## Review corrections
+
+Independent Codex review found two blockers and security review found two medium defects; all were remediated in the frozen contract:
+
+1. Split the KBN-101 certificate into a foundation role/schema-boundary certificate (before KBN-100) and real immutable-operation certificate (after KBN-100, before KBN-105). This preserves the requested KBN-100 block without requiring evidence for tables not yet created.
+2. Removed the legacy owner-runtime exception. N-1 compatibility preserves variable/config shape only; the KBN-101 runtime refuses owner/migrator identity and current single-URL installs remain on their previous release until role cutover.
+3. Introduced `mosaic_platform_database_owner` as a separate non-login platform role. `mosaic_schema_owner` owns application/ledger schemas only, not the database and has no database CREATE/ALTER/extension authority.
+4. Replaced blocking `pg_advisory_lock` with `pg_try_advisory_lock` and the deterministic `DATABASE_MIGRATION_LOCKED` failure.
+5. Review also flagged active `.mosaic/orchestrator` state. It was pre-existing launcher state and remains unstaged/uncommitted.
+6. Second review added `packages/db/drizzle.config.ts` to the migration-only slice, mandates `DATABASE_MIGRATION_URL` with a missing-variable negative, grants runtime only `USAGE` plus `SELECT` on `drizzle.__drizzle_migrations`, and verifies/revokes its ledger writes.
+7. Security review added `DATABASE_TLS_CA_CERT_PATH` / `DatabaseTlsConfigDto` with authenticated TLS and hostname/CA verification in production-like modes, explicit database `TEMPORARY` revocation/catalog denial testing, and default-PUBLIC function EXECUTE revocation with SECURITY DEFINER prohibited by default.
+8. Final review corrected the runtime login to inherit only its capability role with SET/ADMIN denied, and moved the known hash-complete migration-runner/journal repair into KBN-101-03 before the foundation certificate.
+9. Final manifest review added all live runtime DDL paths (`packages/storage/src/tier-detection.ts`, Gateway startup, and `fleet-backlog`) to KBN-101-02, requiring read-only extension probes and no PostgreSQL runtime auto-migration. It also requires KBN-101-04 to stop persisting either DSN into generated `.env`/`mosaic.config.json`, using only Vault/deployment references and injected variables.
+10. Provisioning review separated the external privileged platform bootstrap actor from the NOCREATEDB database-owner role and added KBN-101-00. That IaC/bootstrap card owns fresh/existing database role/ownership/grant/Vault transition evidence and is a foundation-certificate dependency.
+
+## Results
+
+- `pnpm exec prettier --check` on every authorized Markdown file: PASS.
+- Markdown link and whitespace checker on all seven authorized Markdown files: PASS.
+- `pnpm exec tsc --noEmit -p docs/native-kanban-sot/tsconfig.json`: PASS (frozen strict contracts unchanged).
+- Codex code review iterated through role inheritability, hash-complete migration ordering, all reachable runtime DDL entrypoints, installer DSN persistence, and platform-bootstrap ownership; each finding was incorporated into the final frozen contract/DAG. The last security review found no new KBN-101 vulnerability; its sole low finding is the pre-existing unstaged Mosaic session-lock metadata, which is excluded from this commit.
+- Commit: `82ce3252df38a687c50485f8d048b53ca8db5989` (`docs(#771): freeze database runtime role split`).
+- Pre-push queue guard: `ci-queue-wait.sh --purpose push -B main` returned `state=unknown` without failure. The push hook ran repository `pnpm typecheck`, `pnpm lint`, and `pnpm format:check`: PASS.
+- Pushed branch `docs/771-kbn101-db-role-split` at the exact commit above; no PR was opened, merged, or closed. `web1:mosaic-100` received the handoff with head, decisions, DAG, and validation.
+- Awaiting independent security/Ultron review.
+
+## 2026-07-15 — rc.6 exact-head remediation session
+
+- **Objective / correction:** Replace the prior planning-author handoff and close every finding in the [independent exact-head report](../reports/native-kanban-sot/kbn-101-contract-security-review-82ce325.md) against `da742ca2da4a2ff466916c818fe275c4f7ffd384`. The report is a verbatim durable copy of the task-supplied review artifact; scope remains documentation-only, `.mosaic` is excluded, and source/config/compose/CI/deployment/secrets/migrations remain untouched.
+- **Finding 1 — closed DDL control plane:** rc.6 names `mosaic-db-migrator` as the sole application/CI/test PostgreSQL DDL runner, requires `DATABASE_MIGRATION_URL` before connection/DDL, inventories `runMigrations`, Drizzle config/scripts, `db:push`, storage CLI, adapter/Gateway startup, fleet-backlog, extension probes/bootstrap, direct federated integration DDL, CI, and future scripts, and specifies route/deny/test disposition for each. Tests use runner-prepared disposable PostgreSQL or invoke that runner; `db:push` is local-disposable-only and rejects production-like URLs.
+- **Finding 2 — deployable TLS:** rc.6 freezes distinct runtime/migrator URL and CA/server leaf Vault/compose/Swarm secret identifiers, `0400` key and `0600` URL/cert/CA mount requirements, actual compose/Swarm service-DNS SANs, PostgreSQL TLS settings, legacy-client drain/termination plus `hostssl` enforcement, verified-TLS readiness ordering, fresh/existing transition, CA-overlap rotation/TLS-only rollback, and standalone plus federated/Swarm positive and missing/wrong CA/SAN/downgrade negatives. PGlite is explicitly non-PostgreSQL evidence.
+- **Finding 3 — manifest/0009:** rc.6 defines manifest v1 canonical UTF-8 serialization and raw SQL-byte SHA-256, logical journal order, manifest ownership/grants, exact one-to-one observed hash tuple mapping, non-normative physical insertion order, safe original-0009 conditions, ambiguous-effect fail-closed recovery, and the full required reconciliation/backup test matrix. It preserves shipped 0009 bytes and forbids manual ledger adoption/insertion.
+- **Finding 4 — advisory lock:** replaced `hashtext` with fixed signed-int4-safe `(1297044289,1262636593)` (`MOSA`,`KBN1`), one `max:1` runner session, close-on-crash semantics, and contention/crash/readiness/unrelated-key evidence.
+- **Finding 5 — identifiers/search path:** selects `mosaic`, exact `pg_catalog,mosaic` per pooled connection and `SET LOCAL` transactions, plans audited public-object/extension/Drizzle relocation, forbids config-derived identifiers, limits bootstrap quoting to server-side `%I` on fixed allowlist, and requires injection/pool-reset negatives.
+- **Finding 6 — safe DAG:** cards 00–07 are inactive prepared capability while owner-runtime remains N-1; KBN-101-08 is the one atomic activation release after platform roles/TLS and compatible code. Mosaic control plane/Jason alone can activate/rollback; no force-on-red, runtime bypass, or temporary compatibility survives the gate. The approved role graph, post-KBN-100 immutable certification, and KBN-105 gate remain unchanged.
+- **Review remediation:** Codex review found the legacy plaintext cutover gap, missing URL-secret bindings, historical `public` migration incompatibility, non-reproducible checkout-byte hashing, CONNECT allowlisting regression, and undocumented direct-DDL operator instructions. rc.6 now requires drain/scale-to-zero, residual non-TLS session termination, `hostssl` with no `host` rule, zero plaintext-session proof, TLS-only post-enforcement rollback, distinct named runtime/migrator secret consumers, canonical Git-blob/LF manifest bytes, a runner-only owner-controlled legacy-public bootstrap followed by `mosaic` relocation, explicit CONNECT/TEMP revocation, and KBN-101-07 replacement of direct-DDL documentation. It also required the durable exact-head report link above. Pre-existing `.mosaic` runtime state remains excluded.
+- **Validation:** Prettier on all changed Markdown, repository Markdown link/whitespace check, and strict native-kanban contract TypeScript passed before final staging; the final staged diff excludes `.mosaic`. No source-code TDD applies because this is contract-only remediation.
+
+## 2026-07-15 — rc.7 residual remediation session
+
+- **Objective / correction:** Close every residual in the independent exact-head rc.6 re-review at `/home/hermes/agent-work/reviews/771-kbn101-contract-rereview-45ba3d6.md` for `45ba3d6ad4d5383f457a303c05bc816144cfa48a`, without changing source, compose, CI, deployment, migration, or secret artifacts. Only the existing authorized planning/documentation paths are eligible; pre-existing `.mosaic` state remains excluded.
+- **Source-backed scope confirmed:** the active `federated-pgvector.integration.test.ts` executes `CREATE TEMP TABLE`; tracked `docker/init-db.sql` and `infra/pg-init/01-extensions.sql` both create `vector`; `migrate-tier.ts` advertises raw `CREATE EXTENSION`; and `tools/federation-harness/docker-compose.two-gateways.yml` is current plaintext two-PostgreSQL/two-Gateway topology. Current `schema.ts` has 36 default-schema `pgTable` declarations, 6 default `pgEnum` declarations, and an unqualified `vector` custom type; historical migrations contain `public` references.
+- **Plan:** (1) make the finite DDL/static-bypass inventory and `DATABASE_URL`-only denial matrix exact, including the runner-prepared persistent pgvector fixture and migrated two-gateway harness; (2) freeze executable `public`-to-`mosaic` and `mosaic_extensions` transition, Drizzle ownership, object-catalog classes/order, eligibility and rollback tests; (3) bind repository/control-plane ownership, UID/GID validation, exact artifact/mount rules, and both gateway TLS topology; (4) correct PRD acceptance mapping and cross-document rc.7 status; then run formatting, link/contract, source-path, diff, review, commit, queue guard, and push.
+- **Independent review closure:** initial Codex review found Gateway-key consumer wording, `CLAUDE.md` omission, final schema-owner set, and placeholder SANs; all are now explicit. Re-review found the legacy `0001` vector-type resolution problem and `docs/federation/SETUP.md` raw-DDL instruction; the legacy runner now uses only its fixed non-writable `pg_catalog,public,mosaic_extensions` history path, while runtime remains `pg_catalog,mosaic`, and the federation setup path is assigned to KBN-101-07/static inventory. Security review final verdict: no confident vulnerability. The review also repeated the pre-existing tracked `.mosaic` session-state concern; it remains deliberately unstaged/excluded by this task.
+- **Completion evidence:** changed Markdown is Prettier-formatted; local links and strict native-kanban TypeScript passed; source-path inventory confirmed all current referenced paths (the new `apps/gateway/Dockerfile` is explicitly a planned KBN-101-05 artifact); diff check and authorized-doc allowlist passed. No source-code TDD applies to this documentation-only remediation.
+
+## 2026-07-15 — rc.8 exact residual remediation session
+
+- **Objective / correction:** Close all three HIGH findings in the independent rc.7 exact-head re-review at `/home/hermes/agent-work/reviews/771-kbn101-contract-rereview2-0778eba.md` for `0778eba2db3c2dfbaca3af352b12ba0389d3552b`. Scope remains documentation-only: no source, config, Compose, CI, deployment, secret, or migration artifact changed; pre-existing `.mosaic/orchestrator` state remains excluded.
+- **Finite authority closure:** KBN-101-06 now classifies exact current source/scripts/package bins, operator docs, and deploy manifests. `packages/db/src/index.ts` has explicit removal/compile-import negative ownership; `docs/fleet/backlog-conventions.md` and `docs/PERFORMANCE.md` now remove first-use/direct-Drizzle/Gateway-startup migration instructions and point to sole runner/readiness. Byte-immutable historical SQL, PGlite-only routines, negative-test literals, vendored/generated artifacts, and labeled historical reports are exact-path/category reviewed allowlists; unknown hits fail. The contract explicitly rejects relying on a naive token scan alone.
+- **Executable and exclusive handoff closure:** KBN-101-03 exclusively owns the published `mosaic-db-migrator` bin, `packages/db/src/cli.ts`, private migrator modules, `docker/db-migrator.Dockerfile`, exact `--run|--verify|--help`, environment/argv limits, sanitized exits, and command/order tests. KBN-101-00 exclusively owns `infra/pg-bootstrap/roles.sql`, `infra/pg-bootstrap/extensions.sql`, `infra/pg-bootstrap/README.md`, and bootstrap tests. KBN-101-05 exclusively owns `tools/db/render-postgres-secrets.ts`, its tests, and deployment declarations, consuming the versioned bootstrap interface without overlap.
+- **pgvector owner closure:** `mosaic_extension_owner` is dedicated NOLOGIN, available only to the external bootstrap actor during bootstrap; fresh vector/member ownership remains there. The contract records PostgreSQL's unsupported extension-owner transfer and forbids catalog mutation, ownership adoption, and `DROP CASCADE`. Approved-owner existing extensions use verified `ALTER EXTENSION ... SET SCHEMA`; legacy runtime-owned extensions fail closed to a controlled backup/shadow/runner/copy-evidence/quiesce/final-delta/atomic-switch/read-only-rollback migration. It requires `pg_extension.extowner`, member/schema/version, and runtime/migrator/schema-owner ALTER/DROP/member-update denial tests across clean, approved-owner, legacy shadow, partial/resume/rollback, and N-1.
+- **Cross-document state:** PRD, KBN contract, shared contract, task decomposition, index, sitemap, current operator docs, and this scratchpad are rc.8-consistent. The only intended next action is a fresh independent exact-head re-review after validation/push.
+- **Validation / review:** Prettier passed for all nine changed Markdown documents; local links passed (9 documents); `pnpm exec tsc --noEmit -p docs/native-kanban-sot/tsconfig.json` passed; source-path inventory passed (20 paths: 8 current, 12 explicitly planned); finite-authority requirement checklist and `git diff --check` passed. Manual documentation/security review checked the three requested paths, private-only runner boundary/exit contract, non-overlapping 00/03/05 ownership, extension-owner denial and shadow path, and `.mosaic` exclusion. No source-code TDD applies because this is contract-only remediation.
+- **Delivery evidence:** committed `1423c2ad02b5471eab006fb4c878808e5b29c387` as `docs(#771): close role split rc.8 residuals`. Push queue guard returned `state=unknown` without error; push hook ran repository `pnpm typecheck`, `pnpm lint`, and `pnpm format:check`, all PASS; branch push succeeded. This final evidence append is committed next, then the exact remote head is verified. The only intended next action is a fresh independent exact-head re-review.
+
+## 2026-07-15 — rc.9 final residual remediation session
+
+- **Objective / correction:** Close the three findings in `/home/hermes/agent-work/reviews/771-kbn101-contract-rereview3-9cf5d2f.md` against exact head `9cf5d2f6641b14082dc3294e2a84d1fb4ccc019d`: move `mosaic_extensions` schema ownership to `mosaic_extension_owner`; replace all broad/conflicting KBN-101 card ownership with a complete disjoint exact-path/test manifest; and classify the current architecture-plan `db:migrate` instruction with pinned scanner mechanics. Scope remains documentation-only; no source/config/Compose/CI/deployment/secret/migration artifact and no `.mosaic` path may be modified.
+- **Plan:** inspect current tracked source topology to name only existing paths; update the normative contract first and synchronize PRD/shared/task/index/sitemap/version language; run Prettier, changed-doc links, strict contract TypeScript, source/path and manifest-overlap checks, diff allowlist, independent documentation/security review; then stage docs only, commit, queue-guard, push, and verify exact remote SHA. No source-code TDD applies because this is contract-only remediation.
+- **Closure implemented:** rc.9 makes `mosaic_extension_owner` create and own `mosaic_extensions`, `vector`, and members; the external bootstrap actor alone temporarily `SET ROLE`s for fresh/approved-owner work, while schema owner has only `USAGE` for legacy type resolution and never temporary `CREATE`. Catalog/default-ACL plus direct DDL/member denials now cover runtime, migrator, and schema owner through fresh, relocation, shadow/resume, and rollback evidence.
+- **Delivery decomposition:** Replaced broad ownership with complete disjoint 00–09 manifests, exact tests/evidence, producer-before-consumer edges, and an explicit no-intermediate-deploy N-1 activation statement. `packages/storage/src/{cli,migrate-tier}.ts` belongs only to -02; the current tracked init artifacts are retired by -02 as direct-DLL closure; -03 owns all runner/index/migrate/config/schema assets and exact compiled-bin/image mapping; -07 owns docs only; -08/-09 own evidence only.
+- **Classifier closure:** -06 has exact scanner/inventory/matrix paths, canonical inventory fields, classes/dispositions, fixed token/rule set, exact allowlist categories/restrictions, and self-test requirements for unknown, duplicate-owner, ownerless, missing-path, and historical masking cases. The architecture plan now marks direct `db:migrate` superseded and uses `mosaic-db-migrator --run`.
+- **Validation:** Prettier check, strict native-kanban contract TypeScript, changed-document local-link resolution, `git diff --check`, and an automated manifest-overlap/owner/current-source-path check passed. Targeted documentation/security review verified role ownership/default privileges/search path/preflight/legacy/shadow/rollback consistency, disjoint manifests/DAG/activation, scanner mechanics, exact bin/entrypoint, and no `.mosaic` staging intent. No source-code TDD applies because this is documentation-only remediation.
+- **Next:** stage documentation only, commit, queue-guard, push, verify exact remote SHA, then wait for fresh exact-head review.
+- **Delivery evidence:** committed `8cbad2bcd9bc7507052f74f35670ef7c8e39e44e` as `docs(#771): close role split rc.9 residuals`; `ci-queue-wait.sh --purpose push -B main` returned `state=unknown` without error; push-hook `pnpm typecheck`, `pnpm lint`, and `pnpm format:check` all passed; push succeeded and `origin/docs/771-kbn101-db-role-split` resolved to that exact SHA. Pre-existing `.mosaic/orchestrator/{mission.json,session.lock}` remains modified but intentionally unstaged/excluded. The only next action is a fresh independent exact-head re-review.
+
+## 2026-07-15 — rc.10 Ultron NO-GO remediation intake
+
+- **Objective / scope:** Close only HIGH-1 and HIGH-2 in `/home/hermes/agent-work/reviews/771-kbn101-ultron-11f09a1.md` against exact head `11f09a15e43e72afda6a0374668996b4bda9e536`. Documentation only: preserve approved content; no source/config/Compose/CI/deploy/secret/migration edits and no `.mosaic` staging.
+- **Plan:** (1) replace the impossible `NOLOGIN NOSUPERUSER` extension owner with the exact non-login, zero-member `NOLOGIN SUPERUSER` external-control exception and document the non-delegable superuser residual; (2) require the audited external superuser session to `SET ROLE`/`RESET ROLE` for fresh, approved-owner, and shadow extension work, then prove catalog ownership and all service-role denial; (3) assign the active migrate-tier guide exclusively to KBN-101-07, add its active secure route to the -06 inventory/matrix/scanner schema, and freeze `--target-url-file /run/secrets/mosaic_migrate_target_url` plus pre-migrated target/dedicated non-DDL importer requirements; (4) synchronize PRD/shared/tasks/index/sitemap/guide and rc.10 status; (5) validate formatting, links, contracts, source paths, finite operator inventory, diff, review, commit, queue guard, push, and exact remote SHA.
+- **Target-image evidence before edits:** local `pgvector/pgvector:pg17` control file reports `default_version = '0.8.2'`, `relocatable = true`, and no `trusted`/`superuser` override (untrusted PostgreSQL extension). An isolated PostgreSQL 17 container proved a `NOLOGIN SUPERUSER` `mosaic_extension_owner` can create `mosaic_extensions` and `vector` under external-superuser `SET ROLE`, returns to the external session after `RESET ROLE`, has `rolcanlogin=false`, `rolsuper=true`, zero role members, exact extension/schema and owner-bearing-member ownership, and denies `SET ROLE`, `ALTER EXTENSION`, `DROP EXTENSION`, and schema ownership changes to runtime, migrator, schema owner, and data importer. Ownerless PostgreSQL catalog member classes (`pg_am`, `pg_cast`) were intentionally not misrepresented as ownable members.
+- **TDD decision:** skipped as not applicable: this is a documentation-only contract remediation. Future KBN-101-00/-02/-06 tests are specified as the situational evidence; no source/test artifact is permitted in this task.
+- **Final scope correction:** Per control-plane direction, remediation remains bounded to the two Ultron findings. The active guide is explicitly a non-operative KBN-101 contract until its owned implementation/activation lands; no additional design, source, CI, deployment, secret, or test artifact was added.
+- **Validation evidence:** target-image/container role proof PASS (pgvector `0.8.2`, `relocatable=true`, trusted absent/untrusted; external-superuser `SET ROLE`/`RESET ROLE`; exact extension/schema/owner-bearing-member ownership; zero membership and service-role denials). Changed-doc Prettier, strict native-kanban contract TypeScript, local-link resolver (8 docs), finite operator-doc inventory (one active KBN-101-07 route with no credential argv in executable blocks), source-path check (6 current paths), and `git diff --check` PASS. Pre-existing `.mosaic/orchestrator/{mission.json,session.lock}` remains intentionally excluded.
+
+## 2026-07-15 — rc.11 exact-head re-review remediation intake
+
+- **Objective / scope:** Close only HIGH-1 and HIGH-2 in `/home/hermes/agent-work/reviews/771-kbn101-contract-rereview5-f60144e.md` against `f60144eb3eab6234ab01bda592052081c777897e`: target-bind the non-DDL tier importer with a runner-produced signed attestation, and disposition every current non-normative documentation scanner hit, including the active user-guide route and federation historical status. Documentation only; no source/config/Compose/CI/deployment/secret/migration edits and no `.mosaic` staging.
+- **Frozen decision:** `mosaic-db-migrator --verify` is trusted only after TLS/identity/manifest/schema verification and signs a credential-free JCS/Ed25519 v1 artifact from a runner-only fixed root-owned private-key file. The artifact binds secret version/exact URL-file digest, canonical TLS/CA/SPKI/server/database/importer/manifest/schema identity, issued/expiry/nonce, and producer build/correlation; importer gets pinned public key plus artifact only. It validates both files and all bindings before target connection, opens/digests/connects from one in-memory URL read, validates server identity before DML, and distinguishes zero connection from zero DML. Key overlap/revocation, secret-rotation invalidation, replay cache, atomic rename, and sanitized errors are mandatory.
+- **Ownership:** -03 owns producer/signing DTO/tests; -02 importer interface/verification tests; -05 key/artifact mounts/render tests; -06 inventory/matrix and non-masking scanner tests; -07 operator guide. The exact manifests remain disjoint.
+- **Operator correction:** `storage migrate` is schema-wrapper delegation only; legacy `--from hot --to cold` tier-copy guidance is unavailable. Secure tier copy is `migrate-tier` with `--target-url-file` plus `--target-attestation-file`. Federation M1 task language is status-only and adjacent KBN-101 text says it authorizes no current DDL.
+- **TDD decision:** skipped as not applicable: this bounded task changes documentation only. Future -02/-03/-05/-06 tests are specified as the required implementation evidence.
+- **Validation / review:** Prettier PASS on all 18 changed Markdown/root-doc files; `pnpm exec tsc --noEmit -p docs/native-kanban-sot/tsconfig.json` PASS; changed-doc local-link resolver PASS (71 links); full current docs scanner/disposition PASS (10 non-normative paths, 4 normative-contract paths; no unknown active command); legacy `storage migrate --from` and raw target-URL bypass scan PASS; attestation field/interface assertion PASS; exact source ownership/manifest-overlap assertion PASS; `git diff --check`, docs-only scope, and secret-leak scan PASS. Manual documentation/security review verified key isolation, JCS/detached signature, secret-file hash as non-secret evidence, verification ordering/TOCTOU/replay/rotation, no connection vs zero DML, non-masking scanner class, status-only federation history, and no regression to pgvector closure. No source-code TDD applies.
+- **Delivery evidence:** committed `6227f076c819bd124383851633b16d4ef9c88a98` as `docs(#771): bind tier importer to verified target`; staged scope was 18 documentation files only and excluded `.mosaic`. Pre-push queue guard returned `state=unknown` without failure. Push hook ran repository `pnpm typecheck`, `pnpm lint`, and `pnpm format:check`: PASS. Branch push succeeded. Verify the exact remote SHA after this final delivery-evidence append, then idle for independent exact-head re-review and Ultron reverify. `.mosaic/orchestrator/{mission.json,session.lock}` remains pre-existing and excluded.
+
+## 2026-07-15 — rc.12 bounded deployable-importer/SETUP remediation plan
+
+- **Objective / scope:** Close the two HIGH findings in `/home/hermes/agent-work/reviews/771-kbn101-contract-rereview6-65663d4.md` against exact head `65663d4f72f2ace5148bce9aeba04b5a8d5beee9`. Documentation/tracking only; preserve every earlier closure; do not modify source, deployment, Compose, CI, migration, Vault, or `.mosaic` artifacts.
+- **Plan:** (1) make KBN-101-05 own canonical KV-v2 importer URL/version provenance, separate immutable generation-pinned renderer consumers, importer CA/public-key/attestation mounts, fixed importer/migrator identities, safe-fd lifecycle, isolation/rotation/TOCTOU/error evidence, and -02/-03/-06 handoffs; (2) convert `docs/federation/SETUP.md` to a non-operative N-1 reference with only the required external-bootstrap → TLS/roles → runner `--run` → `--verify` → Gateway-readiness sequence; (3) broaden scanner grammar plus path-specific semantic negatives so indirect first-boot/startup/init/Compose authority cannot be masked by a named, normative, or status record; (4) synchronize PRD/shared/tasks/index/sitemap/federation task state and this scratchpad; (5) run formatting, links, strict contracts, complete-doc scanner/semantic assertions, diff/operator inventory, material/manifest overlap, review, docs-only stage, commit, queue guard, push, and exact remote-SHA verification.
+- **TDD decision:** skipped because this bounded change is documentation-only; the affected -02/-03/-05/-06 implementation tests and scanner semantic fixtures are specified as mandatory future evidence.
+- **Review correction:** independent Codex review found the initial `10003` producer → immutable `10002` importer artifact handoff impossible. rc.12 now specifies the required privileged deployment handoff controller: after runner success it safe-opens/verifies producer artifact plus generation, exact-byte copies/fsyncs/atomically renames to a distinct `10002:10002` `0400` importer mount, seals it read-only, and starts no importer on partial/wrong-generation/owner/mode failure. It receives only a root-owned non-secret expected-version/URL-digest/generation descriptor plus public verifier key, never URL bytes/private key; producer/importer share no writable file or mount. Dry-run nonce consumption now requires fresh `--verify` and artifact before `--yes`; the active-route schema requires `targetCredentialVersionFile`. Pre-existing `.mosaic` state is confirmed excluded from staging.
+- **Validation result:** changed-doc Prettier and `git diff --check` PASS; strict `pnpm exec tsc --noEmit -p docs/native-kanban-sot/tsconfig.json` PASS; contract/SETUP material and non-operative semantic assertions PASS. Pending final docs-only stage, commit, queue guard, push, and remote-head verification.
+
+## 2026-07-15 — rc.13 MILESTONES semantic-scan remediation intake
+
+- **Objective / scope:** Close only HIGH-1 from `/home/hermes/agent-work/reviews/771-kbn101-contract-rereview7-7365dcf.md` against `7365dcf15c09262a46132b9c011769ad98243641`. Documentation/tracking only: assign `docs/federation/MILESTONES.md` exclusively to KBN-101-07 and its exact former startup-extension wording to the KBN-101-06 semantic fixture/inventory; replace the wording with a non-operative historical/status disposition. No source, deployment, Compose, CI, Vault, migration, provider, or `.mosaic` artifact is authorized.
+- **Frozen remediation:** runtime/startup extension provisioning is superseded and forbidden. The sole eligible sequence is external bootstrap → TLS/roles → `mosaic-db-migrator --run` → `mosaic-db-migrator --verify` → Gateway readiness. The MILESTONES record authorizes no current DDL, Compose/init, or startup path. The scanner must prove the exact former wording fails before any inventory/status-only mask and rerun its full current-doc operator/deploy-manifest scan outside reports/scratchpads.
+- **Plan:** update only MILESTONES plus the exact KBN-101 contract/inventory/manifests and necessary PRD/shared/task/index/sitemap/version/status references; run full lexical+semantic scan, Prettier, links, strict contract TypeScript, diff and manifest-overlap checks; stage docs only (excluding pre-existing `.mosaic`), commit, queue-guard, push, and verify the exact remote SHA. No source-code TDD applies because this bounded task changes documentation only.
+- **Remediation result (pre-commit):** `MILESTONES.md` now makes runtime/startup extension provisioning superseded and forbidden, with only external bootstrap → TLS/roles → `mosaic-db-migrator --run` → `--verify` → Gateway readiness; it authorizes no current DDL/Compose/init/startup path. The KBN-101-07 manifest/inventory is exclusive and KBN-101-06 documents the exact former wording as a semantic negative that fails before inventory masking. Full current-doc scan outside reports/scratchpads: 103 Markdown files, 10 lexical-hit paths classified, 2 owned Compose-before-runner references, and zero ownerless indirect/literal routes. Prettier, strict native-kanban TypeScript, local links (64/0), diff check, and 95-path manifest-overlap reconstruction (0 overlaps; MILESTONES only -07) passed. Pre-existing `.mosaic/orchestrator/{mission.json,session.lock}` remains excluded.
+- **Delivery checkpoint:** committed remediation as `237bac81c93dc4305470cea23a67e4ced730bd61` (`docs(#771): close MILESTONES startup authority`). Push queue guard returned `state=unknown` without failure; the push hook ran repository `pnpm typecheck`, `pnpm lint`, and `pnpm format:check`, all PASS; the remote branch resolved to that exact SHA. This final evidence append is committed next, then the exact remote head is verified and the branch waits for independent exact-head rereview/Ultron reverify. `.mosaic` remains unstaged.
+
+## 2026-07-15 — rc.13 current-document safety remediation intake
+
+- **Objective / scope:** Close only HIGH-1 and HIGH-2 in `/home/hermes/agent-work/reviews/771-kbn101-contract-rereview8-aeacc70.md` against exact head `aeacc702353740aad0f2f086974cc0670e360d1d`. This is documentation/tracking only. Preserve all prior gates; do not edit source, Compose, deployment artifacts, CI, migrations, Vault data, reports, or `.mosaic`.
+- **Source-backed decision:** Current `docker-compose.yml` mounts `infra/pg-init` into PostgreSQL init and that SQL creates `vector`; it cannot be used as a current PostgreSQL start route before KBN-101 bootstrap/runner artifacts exist. The checked-in configuration declares a supported `local` PGlite tier (`DEFAULT_LOCAL_CONFIG` and `tier-detection` both establish in-process PGlite with no external service probe), so docs may retain a local/PGlite route and start only non-PostgreSQL Compose services such as `valkey`.
+- **Plan:** (1) replace the README and dev-guide Compose-first PostgreSQL instructions with a PGlite/no-PostgreSQL developer path and an explicit held PostgreSQL/federated future activation sequence; (2) replace the deployment quick-start and bare-metal production procedure with non-operative status, no production `.env`/automatic dotenv/`EnvironmentFile`/credential export-or-argv/restart guidance, and only a non-executable future renderer/Vault generation-pinned process-exec or `LoadCredential` schematic; (3) expand KBN-101-06/-07 semantic fixture/disposition language to fail the exact former README/dev/deployment Compose-first sequences and production credential routes before ownership/status masking; (4) synchronize PRD/shared/tasks/index/sitemap/status/version and this scratchpad; (5) run formatting, links, strict contract TypeScript, full current-doc lexical+semantic scan outside reports/scratchpads, manifest-overlap, review, docs-only stage, commit, queue guard, push, and exact remote-SHA verification.
+- **TDD decision:** no source or fixture implementation may be changed in this documentation-only remediation. The -06 future fixture requirements are frozen as acceptance evidence; validation here is static semantic inventory plus documentation quality gates.
+- **Correction from independent review:** The initial local-Gateway PGlite wording was unsafe. `apps/gateway/src/main.ts` loads daemon/root/app-local environment files before tier selection; an inherited daemon `DATABASE_URL` can select PostgreSQL, whose current startup reaches extension creation and migrations. No source is authorized in this docs-only task. The remediation therefore holds Gateway/Web local startup, preserves only PGlite data-layer plus selected non-PostgreSQL Compose work, and assigns KBN-101-02 the fail-closed daemon/inherited/root/app-local DSN and non-local-tier rejection before connection/DDL, with a regression proof. The future renderer boundary remains KBN-101-05.
+- **Remediation evidence:** Removed active PostgreSQL Compose-first and production credential guidance from README, CLAUDE, dev/deployment, and the residual historical TUI/MCP routes; local documentation now permits only PGlite data-layer/non-PostgreSQL Valkey work while Gateway/Web startup is explicitly held. KBN-101-06/-07 now freeze exact former README/dev/deployment Compose sequences plus production credential patterns as pre-classification semantic negatives. Independent review surfaced the current daemon/root/app dotenv loader as an unsafe source boundary; no source is authorized here, so the docs hold that startup and assign fail-closed removal/regression proof to KBN-101-02.
+- **Validation:** Prettier PASS (12 changed docs); local-link resolver PASS (71 links); `pnpm exec tsc --noEmit -p docs/native-kanban-sot/tsconfig.json` PASS; full README/CLAUDE/docs inventory PASS (104 documents, 0 active non-normative Compose/init/production-credential violations); manifest reconstruction PASS (10 cards, 95 declared path tokens, 0 overlaps); `git diff --check` PASS. Pre-existing `.mosaic/orchestrator/{mission.json,session.lock}` remains intentionally unstaged.
+- **Final route correction:** Held the residual MCP environment/restart and historical TUI smoke-test routes after review showed they could bypass the Gateway local-start hold; no bearer-token-over-HTTP or Gateway restart route remains in this remediation scope.
+- **Delivery:** committed `7cc156b777189ee89448e4d569a8b3f69560a240` (`docs(#771): hold unsafe database startup routes`) and `d8f935c20ade835aa3ec03fe5d6961885d8b5f0b` (`docs(#771): record final route correction`). Push queue guard returned `state=unknown` without failure; both pushes completed and the remote matched `d8f935c` before this final delivery-evidence append. `.mosaic/orchestrator/{mission.json,session.lock}` remains pre-existing and unstaged. Await a fresh independent exact-head re-review/Ultron verification.
+
+## 2026-07-15 — rc.15 exact one-finding runner/legacy-CI remediation intake
+
+- **Objective / scope:** Close only HIGH-1 in `/home/hermes/agent-work/reviews/771-kbn101-contract-rereview9-be0ebfd.md` against `be0ebfdc6a2b32a0ab6989117ebbb12f43854d71`. Documentation/tracking only: no source, Compose, CI, deployment, migration, Vault, reports, or `.mosaic` edit.
+- **Plan:** Replace imperative current runner routes in the architecture plan and PERFORMANCE with one explicit non-operative future procedure; make fleet backlog current behavior PGlite-only and PostgreSQL held; classify README's checked-in direct CI `db:migrate` as legacy N-1/uncertified/non-authorizing pending KBN-101-06 removal; then extend the future KBN-101-06 lexical/semantic inventory contract so unqualified runner/current-CI authority fails before masking while only the complete named held procedure passes. Synchronize required contract/PRD/shared/task/index/sitemap state, run full docs scan and document gates, stage docs only, commit, queue-guard, push, and verify remote SHA.
+- **TDD decision:** not applicable: the user authorizes documentation only and the named -06 fixture/inventory files do not yet exist; the contract records their required future implementation evidence.
+- **Remediation / review closure:** Architecture, PERFORMANCE, federation SETUP/MILESTONES, deployment/dev/migrate-tier, and README now use one Markdown-bounded `Held future procedure` form where needed: non-operative/no-current-command-authority; KBN-101-00/-03/-05; external bootstrap → TLS/roles → `mosaic-db-migrator --run` → `mosaic-db-migrator --verify` → Gateway/Compose readiness. Any runner hit outside that section is a -06 semantic failure. Fleet backlog current behavior is PGlite-only. README accurately records the checked-in direct CI migration as an active, isolated-disposable-database, uncertified legacy N-1 DDL exception that is non-authorizing as an operator route and pending -06 removal; it no longer falsely claims the current CI role lacks DDL capability. Independent Codex review found and this pass closed the readiness-endpoint, standalone-verify, CI-factuality, and scanner-boundary findings. Its only residual finding concerns pre-existing tracked `.mosaic/orchestrator` runtime state, which is explicitly excluded and unstaged by task scope; security review found no vulnerability.
+- **Validation:** changed-doc Prettier PASS; `pnpm exec tsc --noEmit -p docs/native-kanban-sot/tsconfig.json` PASS; changed-doc local links 72/0; `git diff --check` PASS; full README/CLAUDE/docs lexical+semantic scan outside reports/scratchpads PASS (106 Markdown documents; 7 operator documents with runner tokens; zero unqualified future-runner/current-CI authority routes); KBN-101 manifest check PASS (10 dependency-ordered cards; -07 docs/-06 fixtures disjoint); docs-only allowlist PASS (16 docs, pre-existing `.mosaic` excluded).
+- **Delivery evidence:** committed `d857463a8a4658e34a77177737860cf82cc26ac6` (`docs(#771): hold unimplemented runner routes`). Pre-push queue guard returned `state=unknown` without failure; the push hook ran repository `pnpm typecheck`, `pnpm lint`, and `pnpm format:check`, all PASS. Push succeeded and `origin/docs/771-kbn101-db-role-split` matched `d857463a8a4658e34a77177737860cf82cc26ac6`. This evidence append is committed and pushed next; `.mosaic/orchestrator/{mission.json,session.lock}` stays pre-existing, unstaged, and excluded. Await exact-head independent re-review/Ultron reverify.
+
+## 2026-07-15 — rc.16 exact one-finding generic-wrapper remediation intake
+
+- **Objective / scope:** Close only HIGH-1 in `/home/hermes/agent-work/reviews/771-kbn101-contract-rereview10-18e253c.md` against exact head `18e253c8790bdbb5bc30a06c116472213b83b22f`. Documentation/tracking only: no source, Compose, CI, deployment, migration, Vault, report, or `.mosaic` change.
+- **Source-backed correction:** `packages/storage/src/cli.ts` currently labels `storage migrate` a thin wrapper for `pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/db db:migrate` and executes that direct Drizzle command with `execSync`; no `mosaic-db-migrator` executable exists. Therefore the README commented form and user-guide executable form must not describe runner delegation or provide current command authority.
+- **Plan:** Remove the current wrapper command from README/user-guide command guidance; record it as legacy N-1, uncertified, non-operative, and forbidden pending KBN-101-02/-03/-06/-08 activation. Retain only the held future ordered bootstrap → TLS/roles → runner `--run` → `--verify` → readiness sequence and the separately held secure migrate-tier route. Extend KBN-101-06's future semantic fixture/matrix with both exact former forms (including the README commented code-fence form), requiring their failure before inventory/status masking and a source-consistency assertion that direct Drizzle wrapper source cannot be described as runner delegation. Synchronize status/version references only where required, then run document gates, stage docs only, commit, queue-guard, push, and verify the remote SHA.
+- **TDD decision:** not applicable: this bounded task changes documentation only; the required future -06 semantic/source-consistency fixtures are specified as implementation acceptance evidence.
+- **Remediation / validation:** README and user-guide remove the generic wrapper from command guidance and state the direct-Drizzle current-source truth, legacy-N-1/uncertified/non-operative MUST-NOT-INVOKE boundary, named -02/-03/-06/-08 activation cards, future external-bootstrap → TLS/roles → runner `--run` → `--verify` → readiness sequence, and separately held secure migrate-tier route. The KBN-101 rc.16 contract records both exact former forms (README commented code fence and user-guide executable code fence), requires failure before inventory/ownership/status masking, and requires the direct-Drizzle/no-runner-bin source-consistency proof. Prettier passed on all nine changed Markdown documents; changed-doc local links passed (72/0); strict native-kanban contract TypeScript and `git diff --check` passed; full README/CLAUDE/docs scan outside reports/scratchpads passed (106 documents, zero non-normative executable generic-wrapper or false runner-delegation route); and manifest validation passed (10 cards, 90 exact tokens, zero overlaps). Pre-existing `.mosaic/orchestrator/{mission.json,session.lock}` remains excluded.

docs/scratchpads/fcm-m2-001-generated-env-boundary.md

@@ -0,0 +1,110 @@
+# FCM-M2-001 — Generated Environment Boundary
+
+- **Issue/card:** #758 / FCM-M2-001
+- **Branch/base:** `feat/758-generated-env-boundary` from `origin/main` `e9c4aa3e8b3780719cd5a43c0ef3f37fc70de666`
+- **Budget assumption:** 30K-card budget; implement only the deterministic generated/local environment boundary and its launch-chain/docs/tests.
+
+## Objective
+
+Replace the generic fleet agent `.env` authority/merge path with a deterministic roster-derived `<agent>.env.generated` projection and strict, data-only `<agent>.env.local`. The roster remains the desired-state authority. Reject bad input before the launcher creates a tmux session; never print sensitive or privileged-command values.
+
+## Scope and non-goals
+
+- In scope: deterministic render/write, strict generated/local parse rules, legacy `.env` disposition/quarantine, systemd/launcher boundary, permission/path checks, focused fail-closed tests, operator/reference documentation, USC interface evidence.
+- Excluded: roster CRUD/mutation, v2 roster schema changes, lifecycle/reconcile/apply behavior, migration/canary rollout, connectors, remote surfaces, live-fleet actions, and M2-002.
+
+## Plan
+
+1. Add red tests for generated-key shadowing, malformed/duplicate/unknown/command/sensitive input, no-value diagnostics, deterministic/idempotent projection, secure file modes, and legacy disposition.
+2. Implement a pure strict environment contract plus atomic projection/quarantine helper.
+3. Replace the generic `.env` writer/merge path and systemd reference with `.env.generated` + `.env.local` ownership.
+4. Make the shell launcher parse the files without `source`/`eval`, reject unsafe input before tmux creation, and construct only the roster-derived runtime command.
+5. Add operator/reference documentation with the requested USC M1 interface evidence and M2–M4 gate statement.
+6. Run focused/package/root gates and audit the USC interface packet. Per continuation scope, stop before review, commit, push, PR, or live mutation.
+
+## Initial evidence
+
+- No existing owner: target worktree path absent; no target local/remote branch; `pr-list.sh -s open` returned no open PRs.
+- M1 compiler/API/docs and executable disposition evidence are present at the assigned base.
+- Existing launch chain writes `fleet/agents/<agent>.env`, preserves arbitrary legacy lines via `mergeAgentEnv`, sources `MOSAIC_AGENT_COMMAND`, and executes it through `bash -c`; all are M2 remediation targets.
+- `~/.config/mosaic/guides/SECURITY.md` is absent. Read the available security-review role contract and the vault/secrets guide instead.
+
+## Verification log
+
+### Continuation (2026-07-14)
+
+- Preserved the inherited 14-file delta; no reset, stash, rebase, roster mutation, lifecycle action,
+  live-fleet action, commit, push, or PR action was performed.
+- Focused gates passed:
+  - `pnpm --dir packages/mosaic test -- src/fleet/generated-env-boundary.spec.ts` — 1 file, 10 tests passed.
+  - `bash packages/mosaic/framework/tools/fleet/test-start-agent-session.sh` — passed.
+  - `bash packages/mosaic/framework/systemd/user/test-fleet-units.sh` — passed.
+  - `pnpm --dir packages/mosaic test -- src/commands/fleet.spec.ts` — 1 file, 192 tests passed.
+- Package gates passed before final documentation/format follow-up:
+  - `pnpm --dir packages/mosaic typecheck` — passed.
+  - `pnpm --dir packages/mosaic lint` — passed.
+  - `pnpm --dir packages/mosaic test` — 52 files, 752 tests passed.
+- `pnpm format:check` initially failed only for the new boundary reference and generated-boundary
+  TypeScript files; targeted Prettier normalization was applied. A final `pnpm format:check` passed.
+- USC packet audit: the M1 structural compiler is `parseRosterV2` with roster `version: 2`; the
+  semantic resolver is `validateRosterV2Semantics`; disposition artifacts retain `version: 1` fixture
+  evidence. `docs/TASKS.md` records M1-001 done, M1-002 in-progress, and M1-003 not-started; no
+  product release version is claimed. The packet now distinguishes these statuses from checkout
+  artifact presence and states the M2 → M3 → M4 downstream gates.
+
+## Review remediation (2026-07-14)
+
+- **Blocker 1 red-first:** Added a launcher reproducer with a `0777` `fleet/agents` parent and a private generated file. Before implementation, `bash packages/mosaic/framework/tools/fleet/test-start-agent-session.sh` failed: `FAIL: generated file under a world-writable parent was accepted`. The failure occurred after the launch path reached fake tmux, proving the parent was not validated.
+- **Blocker 2 red-first:** Added a `symlink()` projection-directory reproducer that preloads generated/local/quarantine/legacy target files and asserts no target mutation. Before implementation, `pnpm --dir packages/mosaic test -- src/fleet/generated-env-boundary.spec.ts` failed the new test because the existing writer followed the `agentEnvDir` symlink and parsed its target legacy input (`expected /unsafe-directory/i`, received `code=malformed-line`). The initial test-only missing `mkdir` import was corrected before recording this behavior failure.
+- **Blocker 3 red-first:** Added fresh/stale/absent native-heartbeat regression coverage. Before implementation, an isolated fake-tmux launcher reproducer with a fresh `<agent>.hb.native` marker failed `FAIL: fresh native heartbeat was overwritten`; the existing sidecar immediately replaced native `status=busy`/`model` content.
+- **Remediation result:** The launcher now rejects a group/world-accessible or symlinked `fleet/agents` parent before an environment read or tmux call. The projection writer uses `lstat` before chmod/write processing and rejects a symlinked directory without creating generated/local/quarantine files or deleting legacy input. The heartbeat sidecar defers to a fresh non-symlink native marker and falls back when stale/absent. Focused green evidence before independent review: `bash packages/mosaic/framework/tools/fleet/test-start-agent-session.sh` and `pnpm --dir packages/mosaic test -- src/fleet/generated-env-boundary.spec.ts` (11 tests) passed.
+- **Independent-review follow-up red-first:** Codex code review returned one blocker and security review one medium CWE-732 finding: the writer repaired an already `0777` directory with `chmod` before trusting its contents. Added a reproducer with a safe local file beneath an existing `0777` directory. Before the follow-up fix, `pnpm --dir packages/mosaic test -- src/fleet/generated-env-boundary.spec.ts` failed because the promise resolved and wrote `coder0.env.generated` instead of rejecting.
+- **Independent-review remediation:** Existing directories now pass non-following private-directory validation before any read or chmod; only a directory created in this call is normalized to `0700`. The fleet-add test fixture now creates its simulated trusted `fleet/agents` boundary at `0700`; this corrects fixture setup to match the new required contract rather than weakening the rejection assertion. Focused reruns passed: generated-boundary 12 tests, launcher boundary suite, and fleet suite 192 tests.
+- **Final verification before re-review:** Launcher + systemd suites passed; package suite passed (52 files, 754 tests); package lint/typecheck, root typecheck (42 tasks), format check, and diff check passed. The rerun code review still reports a tmux command-arity blocker, and the security rerun reports systemd `EnvironmentFile` pre-validation injection findings for both agent units. These were discovered after the specified three-remediation scope; no additional source changes were made. Independent review therefore remains `REQUEST CHANGES` despite the requested three fixes passing their behavioral suites.
+
+## Systemd pre-validation remediation (2026-07-14)
+
+- **Red-first:** Updated the fleet unit contract to reject any `EnvironmentFile=` projection preload, require a cleared bootstrap environment, and require a validated exact-stop path. Before implementation, `bash packages/mosaic/framework/systemd/user/test-fleet-units.sh` failed: `FAIL: agent units must not preload projections before strict parsing`.
+- **Red-first parser/stop coverage:** Added interaction-wrapper and exact-stop cases to the launcher boundary suite. Before implementation, `bash packages/mosaic/framework/tools/fleet/test-start-agent-session.sh` failed: `FAIL: interaction did not use shared strict parser first`, because the interaction wrapper consumed inherited environment before projection validation.
+- **Focused green:** Both unit templates now use `env -i` with fixed `HOME`, agent instance, and PATH; neither has `Environment=`/`EnvironmentFile=`. The interaction wrapper delegates to `start-agent-session.sh --interaction`, so strict generated/local parsing precedes pinned Pi profile checks. `--stop` reuses the strict generated parser before exact `=<agent>` socket/session termination. Passed: systemd unit suite, launcher boundary suite (including malformed interaction, pinned profile, and ambient-socket stop cases), and 210 focused TypeScript tests.
+- **Final verification:** `pnpm --dir packages/mosaic test` passed (52 files, 754 tests); package lint/typecheck, root typecheck (42 tasks), format/diff, and shell syntax checks passed. Security review passed with no findings. Code review repeated the previously refuted tmux argv concern and a pre-existing Claude trust-lock suggestion; per the assigned narrow follow-up, no tmux or unrelated trust-path change was made.
+
+## Risks and next review
+
+- This card is uncommitted and unreleased. The canonical tracker still records its dependencies as
+  M1-002 in progress and M1-003 not started; this continuation does not reinterpret those task states.
+- Final post-documentation checks passed: `pnpm --dir packages/mosaic typecheck`,
+  `pnpm --dir packages/mosaic lint`, `pnpm --dir packages/mosaic test` (52 files, 752 tests),
+  `pnpm typecheck` (42 Turbo tasks), and `pnpm format:check`.
+- Obtain independent code and security review of the complete delta next. Do not run commit, push,
+  PR, or live-fleet commands in this continuation.
+
+## Fresh-install directory remediation (2026-07-14)
+
+- **Objective:** Remediate only the fresh-install path where `installFleet` created `fleet/agents`
+  with host-umask permissions before the boundary writer correctly rejected it.
+- **Plan:** Add a real `fleet install --no-enable` integration reproducer; prove red; let the
+  existing boundary writer own directory creation; run focused and full gates. No commit, push,
+  PR, review disposition, or live-fleet action.
+- **Red evidence:** Before the one-line remediation,
+  `pnpm --dir packages/mosaic test -- src/commands/fleet.spec.ts` failed the new test with
+  `AgentEnvBoundaryError: code=unsafe-permissions` at `ensurePrivateProjectionDirectory`, after
+  `installFleet` pre-created the directory.
+- **Change:** Removed only the recursive `mkdir(activePaths.agentEnvDir)` in `installFleet`.
+  `writeAgentEnvironmentProjection` remains the sole creator and retains its existing `lstat`,
+  private-directory, symlink, and existing-unsafe-directory fail-closed checks.
+- **Focused green:** `pnpm --dir packages/mosaic test -- src/commands/fleet.spec.ts` — 193 tests
+  passed. The new integration executes a fresh `fleet install --no-enable`, asserts a real
+  non-symlink `0700` directory and a `0600` generated projection. Existing unsafe-directory
+  coverage remains in `generated-env-boundary.spec.ts` and asserts no chmod repair/no generated
+  file write.
+- **Full gates green:** generated-boundary 12 tests; launcher and systemd suites; package
+  typecheck/lint and 52 files / 755 tests; root typecheck (42 tasks), lint, format, diff check,
+  and root test (42 tasks) all passed.
+- **Independent review:** The complete inherited uncommitted delta still has Codex `REQUEST CHANGES`
+  findings outside this narrow fix (tmux command arity and Claude trust-lock regression), plus a
+  security-review medium finding on unvalidated writable ancestor directories. No out-of-scope
+  source changes were made.
+- **Risk:** The writer's existing create-then-validate sequence is relied on for the creation
+  boundary; a concurrent substitution causes fail-closed validation rather than repair. The
+  review findings above remain residual risks for the complete card delta.

docs/tess/PLUGIN-GUIDE.md

@@ -1,3 +1,28 @@
 # Tess Plugin Authoring
 
 Plugins are replaceable adapters. Declare capabilities, derive scope from trusted context, preserve correlation IDs, redact before persistence/egress, and return unsupported operations as fail-closed results. Names and identities are configuration data, not literals in keys or defaults.
+
+## Official channel adapter contract
+
+Official Discord, Matrix, Slack, and future channel adapters share contracts exported from `@mosaicstack/types` under `channel/`:
+
+- `OfficialChannelAdapter` provides `name`, `start()`, `stop()`, and non-throwing connection `health()`.
+- `ChannelMessageDto` and `ChannelAttachmentDto` normalize transport data with JSON-safe metadata.
+- `ChannelBindingDto` and `ChannelAuthorizedPrincipalDto` normalize configuration-owned logical-agent binding and the already-allowlisted/paired external actor.
+- `ChannelIngressDto` carries operation, correlation, native message ID, authorized principal, normalized message, and stable route into `ChannelIngressPort`.
+- `ChannelConversationRouteDto` binds a configured channel to `logicalAgentId`, stable `conversationId`, authorization parent, and response target.
+- `ChannelEgressDto` and `ChannelEgressPort` separate where a response is delivered from the gateway's runtime/provider selection.
+
+`ChannelConversationRouteDto` deliberately has no harness, provider, model, process, or native runtime-session field. The gateway owns runtime selection, durable enrollment, authorization, audit, and lease/fencing. A channel adapter must not call Claude, Codex, Pi, OpenCode, tmux, or Matrix runtime providers directly. Discord currently preserves its signed Socket.IO compatibility ingress for established gateway authentication/replay/approval controls while normalizing the same ingress DTO; supplied direct ports are the future registration path.
+
+## Adapter requirements
+
+1. Resolve configuration-owned channel and logical-agent bindings before dispatch. A binding may carry a trusted gateway agent-config reference, but the stable route contains only the logical agent; gateway verifies the reference resolves to that agent before runtime selection.
+2. Apply channel-native allowlists and paired-user roles before any external side effect such as thread creation.
+3. Preserve native message ID, correlation ID, channel/thread address, attachments, and response target.
+4. Treat normal channel parents (for example Discord categories) separately from thread parents.
+5. Keep reconnect and conversation identity independent of the active runtime provider.
+6. Report sanitized connection/routing failures without message bodies or credentials.
+7. Pass the shared route/authorization contract suite plus adapter-specific translation tests.
+
+Discord establishes the first policy: authorized untagged messages respond in the configured channel; a mention creates a thread or reuses the thread already attached to that message; existing thread messages stay there. Runtime control commands remain on the current durable session. Matrix and Slack should translate native rooms/threads into the same route and response-target semantics rather than adding transport branches to gateway core.

docs/tess/TASKS.md

@@ -43,3 +43,4 @@
 | TESS-M5-002 | done | Complete migration inventory, cutover, rollback, retention and deprecation evidence | #711 | coder3 | docs/tess | feat/tess-migration-docs | TESS-M4-V | 18K | TESS-MIG-001. **Mos-DISPATCHED to coder3 2026-07-13** ("M4 complete; advancing to M5") — dispatched AHEAD of TESS-M4-V passing; the M4-V-status-vs-#710-CLOSED dependency reconciliation is pending Mos ruling (tracked, not orchestrator-decided). **DELIVERED as PR #742** — 4 new files docs/tess/M5-MIGRATION-{INVENTORY,CUTOVER,ROLLBACK,RETENTION-DEPRECATION}.md, base main b7b0f508, frozen head b5e9d0e528a50aae2e916cc7202bacc2e8db67dd. Docs-only; tracking-control trio (MISSION-MANIFEST/TASKS/VERIFICATION-MATRIX) UNTOUCHED; command-authz byte-identical a9f829e7; no live creds. **CI pipeline 1773 SUCCESS** (repo 47, refs/pull/742/head, commit==head). **Independent non-author ROR COMPLETE: reviewer VERIFIED APPROVE at exact head b5e9d0e528a50aae2e916cc7202bacc2e8db67dd (Gitea comment 17108)** — evidence claims verified to trace to landed Hermes adapter / capability matrix, gateway registry/reachability, operator-memory scope path, Mos coordination boundary; docs do NOT over-claim transcript/profile import, schema migration, unsupported-capability enablement, production cutover, or deprecation completion. Head independently verified UNMOVED at b5e9d0e528a5 post-ROR (live Gitea), base main, mergeable=true. **#742 MERGED by Mos → main 5789711e. Deliverable docs LANDED. GATE: TESS-M4-V/M5-V verification-gate reconciliation remains Mos-owned/pending (this row was dispatched ahead of M4-V passing).** |
 | TESS-M5-003 | done | Complete OpenAPI, user/admin/developer/plugin/operations docs and checklist | #711 | codex | docs | feat/tess-docs | TESS-M5-001,TESS-M5-002 | 22K | Documentation hard gate. **DELIVERED as PR #746** (branch feat/tess-docs, base main, 7 docs-only files: docs/openapi-tess.yaml + docs/tess/{ADMIN,DEVELOPER,OPERATIONS,PLUGIN,USER}-GUIDE.md + M5-003-DOCUMENTATION-CHECKLIST.md). 4-round revise-loop (heads 470eb911→c9f69300→7aea94e2→25b9d642) converged: OpenAPI covers interaction routes + SSE /sessions/{sessionId}/stream + Mos coord (/api/coord/mos/handoff,/observe,/result) + memory preferences/insights/search; request-body schemas aligned to real DTOs (Send requires content+idempotencyKey, Stop requires approvalRef, Insight requires only content, MosHandoff body requires idempotencyKey+summary); checklist accurate. **CI pipeline 1786 SUCCESS** (repo 47, refs/pull/746/head, commit==head 25b9d642). **Independent non-author ROR COMPLETE: reviewer VERIFIED APPROVE at exact head 25b9d642b939014b3efd61826e7524cafc6ffc2e (Gitea comment 17170)** — docs-only, tracking-trio untouched, command-authz byte-identical a9f829e7, no false coverage claims. Head verified UNMOVED at 25b9d642 (live Gitea, not worker-reported), base main, mergeable=true. **#746 MERGED by Mos → main bc8016c8314ec3a4b6ebc2fec5d9f276fca3327a. Documentation gate LANDED.** GATE: TESS-M4-V/M5-V verification-gate reconciliation remains Mos-owned/pending. |
 | TESS-M5-V | not-started | Full baseline, contract, integration, Discord/CLI E2E, security review, recovery drill and rollback qualification | #711 | sonnet | apps/gateway, packages/agent, plugins/discord, packages/mosaic | review/tess-final | TESS-M5-003 | 35K | Maps AC-TESS-01..11 to evidence |
+| MOS-PORT-M1-001 | in-progress | Implement logical Mos identity, PostgreSQL connector lease, monotonic fencing, server-bound execution grants, audit, migrations, concurrency/restart/abuse/integration tests | #755 | codex | packages/types, packages/agent, packages/db, apps/gateway | feat/mos-logical-identity-fencing | — | 38K | Requirements MOS-PORT-ID-001, MOS-PORT-LEASE-001, MOS-PORT-FENCE-001..002, MOS-PORT-OBS-001, MOS-PORT-ARCH-001. One Sol/Pi worker; TDD; PR-open STOP; worker must not edit this ledger. |

docs/tess/USER-GUIDE.md

@@ -1,5 +1,13 @@
 # Tess User Guide
 
+## Discord conversations
+
+In a configured Tess/interaction channel, an authorized untagged message is sent to the bound logical agent and its response appears in the channel. Mention the bot when starting a separate topic: Mosaic reuses a thread already attached to that same Discord message, or creates a new thread for the message, and responds there. Continue in that thread without tagging the bot again. Messages from unconfigured channels or users without an authorized pairing are ignored without creating a thread.
+
+`/approve` and `/stop <approval>` operate on the current channel/thread session and do not open a new thread. The Discord connection is bound to the logical agent conversation, not Claude, Codex, Pi, OpenCode, or another harness; a runtime handoff behind Mosaic does not change where you continue the conversation.
+
+## CLI and HTTP interaction
+
 All HTTP interaction calls require authenticated session credentials and `X-Correlation-Id`. Use `GET /api/interaction/{agentName}/sessions?provider=...` to list only visible runtime sessions, then enroll with `POST .../sessions/{sessionId}/enroll` body `{providerId,runtimeSessionId}`. Attach uses `{mode:"read"}`; send uses `{content,idempotencyKey}`. Stop requires `{approvalRef}` and fails with 403 without the exact durable approval. Recovery only requeues interrupted durable work.
 
 Memory is user-scoped: preferences support list/get/upsert/delete; insights support list/get/create/delete; search body is `{query,limit?,maxDistance?}`. Mos work is handed off with `POST /api/coord/mos/handoff`; observe and result use the returned handoff ID.

eslint.config.mjs

@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ export default tseslint.config(
             'apps/web/e2e/helpers/*.ts',
             'apps/web/playwright.config.ts',
             'apps/gateway/vitest.config.ts',
+            'plugins/discord/vitest.config.ts',
             'packages/db/vitest.config.ts',
             'packages/storage/vitest.config.ts',
             'packages/mosaic/vitest.config.ts',

packages/agent/src/connector-lease.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,261 @@
+import { describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest';
+import type {
+  ConnectorExecutionContext,
+  ConnectorExecutionGrant,
+  ConnectorLease,
+  ConnectorLeaseAuditEvent,
+  ConnectorLeaseStore,
+  FencedConnectorAdapter,
+  LogicalAgentBinding,
+} from '@mosaicstack/types';
+import {
+  ConnectorLeaseCoordinator,
+  MAX_CONNECTOR_GRANT_TTL_MS,
+  MAX_CONNECTOR_LEASE_TTL_MS,
+} from './connector-lease.js';
+import type { ConnectorLeaseError } from './connector-lease.js';
+
+const identity = { tenantId: 'tenant-a', logicalAgentId: 'mos' } as const;
+const binding: LogicalAgentBinding = { identity, bindingId: 'operator-chat' };
+const activeLease: ConnectorLease = {
+  ...binding,
+  leaseId: '00000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000001',
+  connectorId: 'connector-a',
+  scopes: ['runtime.send', 'tool.execute'],
+  leaseEpoch: '3',
+  acquiredAt: '2026-07-14T17:00:00.000Z',
+  heartbeatAt: '2026-07-14T17:00:00.000Z',
+  expiresAt: '2026-07-14T17:10:00.000Z',
+};
+
+class FakeLeaseStore implements ConnectorLeaseStore {
+  lease: ConnectorLease | null = activeLease;
+  readonly audits: ConnectorLeaseAuditEvent[] = [];
+
+  async acquire(): Promise<ConnectorLease> {
+    if (!this.lease) throw new Error('fixture has no lease');
+    return this.lease;
+  }
+
+  async takeover(): Promise<ConnectorLease> {
+    if (!this.lease) throw new Error('fixture has no lease');
+    return this.lease;
+  }
+
+  async heartbeat(): Promise<ConnectorLease> {
+    if (!this.lease) throw new Error('fixture has no lease');
+    return this.lease;
+  }
+
+  async release(): Promise<void> {}
+
+  async findCurrent(): Promise<ConnectorLease | null> {
+    return this.lease;
+  }
+
+  async recordAudit(event: ConnectorLeaseAuditEvent): Promise<void> {
+    this.audits.push(event);
+  }
+}
+
+describe('ConnectorLeaseCoordinator fencing', (): void => {
+  it('validates a server-minted grant immediately before invoking an adapter side effect', async (): Promise<void> => {
+    const store = new FakeLeaseStore();
+    const coordinator = new ConnectorLeaseCoordinator(store, {
+      now: (): Date => new Date('2026-07-14T17:01:00.000Z'),
+    });
+    const grant = await coordinator.issueGrant({
+      lease: activeLease,
+      scopes: ['runtime.send'],
+      ttlMs: 30_000,
+      correlationId: 'correlation-1',
+    });
+    const execute = vi.fn(async (_input: string, context: ConnectorExecutionContext) => context);
+    const adapter: FencedConnectorAdapter<string, ConnectorExecutionContext> = { execute };
+
+    const context = await coordinator.executeGrant(grant, 'runtime.send', 'hello', adapter);
+
+    expect(execute).toHaveBeenCalledOnce();
+    expect(context).toMatchObject({
+      identity,
+      bindingId: 'operator-chat',
+      connectorId: 'connector-a',
+      leaseEpoch: '3',
+      scopes: ['runtime.send'],
+    });
+  });
+
+  it('caps grant expiry to the durable current lease instead of submitted metadata', async (): Promise<void> => {
+    const store = new FakeLeaseStore();
+    store.lease = { ...activeLease, expiresAt: '2026-07-14T17:01:05.000Z' };
+    const coordinator = new ConnectorLeaseCoordinator(store, {
+      now: (): Date => new Date('2026-07-14T17:01:00.000Z'),
+    });
+
+    const grant = await coordinator.issueGrant({
+      lease: { ...activeLease, expiresAt: '2026-07-14T18:00:00.000Z' },
+      scopes: ['runtime.send'],
+      ttlMs: 30_000,
+      correlationId: 'correlation-durable-expiry',
+    });
+
+    expect(grant.expiresAt).toBe('2026-07-14T17:01:05.000Z');
+  });
+
+  it.each([
+    ['forged clone', (grant: ConnectorExecutionGrant): ConnectorExecutionGrant => ({ ...grant })],
+    [
+      'cross-tenant clone',
+      (grant: ConnectorExecutionGrant): ConnectorExecutionGrant => ({
+        ...grant,
+        identity: { ...grant.identity, tenantId: 'tenant-b' },
+      }),
+    ],
+    [
+      'cross-agent clone',
+      (grant: ConnectorExecutionGrant): ConnectorExecutionGrant => ({
+        ...grant,
+        identity: { ...grant.identity, logicalAgentId: 'other-agent' },
+      }),
+    ],
+    [
+      'cross-binding clone',
+      (grant: ConnectorExecutionGrant): ConnectorExecutionGrant => ({
+        ...grant,
+        bindingId: 'other-binding',
+      }),
+    ],
+    [
+      'cross-connector clone',
+      (grant: ConnectorExecutionGrant): ConnectorExecutionGrant => ({
+        ...grant,
+        connectorId: 'connector-b',
+      }),
+    ],
+  ])('denies and audits a %s before adapter invocation', async (_label, forge): Promise<void> => {
+    const store = new FakeLeaseStore();
+    const coordinator = new ConnectorLeaseCoordinator(store, {
+      now: (): Date => new Date('2026-07-14T17:01:00.000Z'),
+    });
+    const grant = await coordinator.issueGrant({
+      lease: activeLease,
+      scopes: ['runtime.send'],
+      ttlMs: 30_000,
+      correlationId: 'correlation-forged',
+    });
+    const adapter = { execute: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined) };
+
+    await expect(
+      coordinator.executeGrant(forge(grant), 'runtime.send', undefined, adapter),
+    ).rejects.toMatchObject({ code: 'forged_grant' } satisfies Partial<ConnectorLeaseError>);
+    expect(adapter.execute).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+    expect(store.audits.at(-1)).toMatchObject({
+      event: 'reject',
+      outcome: 'denied',
+      reason: 'forged_grant',
+      correlationId: 'correlation-forged',
+    });
+  });
+
+  it('denies malformed forged grants with sanitized audit metadata', async (): Promise<void> => {
+    const store = new FakeLeaseStore();
+    const coordinator = new ConnectorLeaseCoordinator(store, {
+      now: (): Date => new Date('2026-07-14T17:01:00.000Z'),
+    });
+    const adapter = { execute: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined) };
+
+    await expect(
+      coordinator.executeGrant(
+        // @ts-expect-error Deliberately exercise malformed runtime input at the trust boundary.
+        {},
+        'runtime.send',
+        undefined,
+        adapter,
+      ),
+    ).rejects.toMatchObject({ code: 'forged_grant' } satisfies Partial<ConnectorLeaseError>);
+    expect(adapter.execute).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+    expect(store.audits).toContainEqual(
+      expect.objectContaining({
+        identity: { tenantId: 'untrusted', logicalAgentId: 'untrusted' },
+        bindingId: 'untrusted',
+        connectorId: 'untrusted',
+        correlationId: 'untrusted',
+        reason: 'forged_grant',
+      }),
+    );
+  });
+
+  it('rejects lease and grant TTLs above server-side safety caps', async (): Promise<void> => {
+    const store = new FakeLeaseStore();
+    const coordinator = new ConnectorLeaseCoordinator(store, {
+      now: (): Date => new Date('2026-07-14T17:01:00.000Z'),
+    });
+    expect(
+      () =>
+        new ConnectorLeaseCoordinator(store, {
+          maxLeaseTtlMs: MAX_CONNECTOR_LEASE_TTL_MS + 1,
+        }),
+    ).toThrow(/no greater than/);
+
+    await expect(
+      coordinator.acquire({
+        identity,
+        bindingId: 'operator-chat',
+        connectorId: 'connector-a',
+        scopes: ['runtime.send'],
+        ttlMs: MAX_CONNECTOR_LEASE_TTL_MS + 1,
+        correlationId: 'correlation-ttl',
+      }),
+    ).rejects.toThrow(/no greater than/);
+    await expect(
+      coordinator.issueGrant({
+        lease: activeLease,
+        scopes: ['runtime.send'],
+        ttlMs: MAX_CONNECTOR_GRANT_TTL_MS + 1,
+        correlationId: 'correlation-ttl',
+      }),
+    ).rejects.toThrow(/no greater than/);
+  });
+
+  it('denies stale epoch, expired grant, and unauthorized scope before side effects', async (): Promise<void> => {
+    let now = new Date('2026-07-14T17:01:00.000Z');
+    const store = new FakeLeaseStore();
+    const coordinator = new ConnectorLeaseCoordinator(store, { now: (): Date => now });
+    const stale = await coordinator.issueGrant({
+      lease: activeLease,
+      scopes: ['runtime.send'],
+      ttlMs: 30_000,
+      correlationId: 'correlation-stale',
+    });
+    store.lease = { ...activeLease, leaseEpoch: '4', connectorId: 'connector-b' };
+    const adapter = { execute: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined) };
+
+    await expect(
+      coordinator.executeGrant(stale, 'runtime.send', undefined, adapter),
+    ).rejects.toMatchObject({ code: 'stale_epoch' } satisfies Partial<ConnectorLeaseError>);
+
+    store.lease = activeLease;
+    const expiring = await coordinator.issueGrant({
+      lease: activeLease,
+      scopes: ['runtime.send'],
+      ttlMs: 1_000,
+      correlationId: 'correlation-expired',
+    });
+    now = new Date('2026-07-14T17:01:02.000Z');
+    await expect(
+      coordinator.executeGrant(expiring, 'runtime.send', undefined, adapter),
+    ).rejects.toMatchObject({ code: 'grant_expired' } satisfies Partial<ConnectorLeaseError>);
+
+    now = new Date('2026-07-14T17:01:00.000Z');
+    const scoped = await coordinator.issueGrant({
+      lease: activeLease,
+      scopes: ['runtime.send'],
+      ttlMs: 30_000,
+      correlationId: 'correlation-scope',
+    });
+    await expect(
+      coordinator.executeGrant(scoped, 'tool.execute', undefined, adapter),
+    ).rejects.toMatchObject({ code: 'scope_denied' } satisfies Partial<ConnectorLeaseError>);
+    expect(adapter.execute).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+  });
+});

packages/agent/src/connector-lease.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,381 @@
+import { randomUUID } from 'node:crypto';
+import {
+  normalizeConnectorId,
+  normalizeConnectorScope,
+  normalizeConnectorScopes,
+  normalizeCorrelationId,
+  normalizeLeaseEpoch,
+  normalizeLogicalAgentIdentity,
+  normalizeLogicalBindingId,
+  type AcquireConnectorLeaseInput,
+  type ConnectorExecutionContext,
+  type ConnectorExecutionGrant,
+  type ConnectorLease,
+  type ConnectorLeaseAuditEvent,
+  type ConnectorLeaseRejectReason,
+  type ConnectorLeaseStore,
+  type FencedConnectorAdapter,
+  type HeartbeatConnectorLeaseInput,
+  type IssueConnectorExecutionGrantInput,
+  type LogicalAgentBinding,
+  type ReleaseConnectorLeaseInput,
+  type TakeoverConnectorLeaseInput,
+} from '@mosaicstack/types';
+
+export const MAX_CONNECTOR_LEASE_TTL_MS = 5 * 60 * 1000;
+export const MAX_CONNECTOR_GRANT_TTL_MS = 30 * 1000;
+
+export interface ConnectorLeaseCoordinatorOptions {
+  readonly now?: () => Date;
+  readonly maxLeaseTtlMs?: number;
+  readonly maxGrantTtlMs?: number;
+}
+
+export class ConnectorLeaseError extends Error {
+  constructor(
+    readonly code: ConnectorLeaseRejectReason,
+    message: string,
+  ) {
+    super(message);
+    this.name = ConnectorLeaseError.name;
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Runtime-neutral lease coordinator. Durable CAS lives in the store adapter;
+ * grant provenance remains process-local so a restart fails closed and mints
+ * fresh grants from the durable current lease.
+ */
+export class ConnectorLeaseCoordinator {
+  private readonly issuedGrants = new WeakSet<object>();
+  private readonly now: () => Date;
+  private readonly maxLeaseTtlMs: number;
+  private readonly maxGrantTtlMs: number;
+
+  constructor(
+    private readonly store: ConnectorLeaseStore,
+    options: ConnectorLeaseCoordinatorOptions = {},
+  ) {
+    this.now = options.now ?? (() => new Date());
+    this.maxLeaseTtlMs = normalizeTtlLimit(
+      options.maxLeaseTtlMs ?? MAX_CONNECTOR_LEASE_TTL_MS,
+      MAX_CONNECTOR_LEASE_TTL_MS,
+      'lease',
+    );
+    this.maxGrantTtlMs = normalizeTtlLimit(
+      options.maxGrantTtlMs ?? MAX_CONNECTOR_GRANT_TTL_MS,
+      MAX_CONNECTOR_GRANT_TTL_MS,
+      'grant',
+    );
+  }
+
+  async acquire(input: AcquireConnectorLeaseInput): Promise<ConnectorLease> {
+    const command = normalizeAcquireInput(input, this.maxLeaseTtlMs);
+    const now = this.now();
+    return this.store.acquire({
+      ...command,
+      leaseId: randomUUID(),
+      now: now.toISOString(),
+      expiresAt: expiresAt(now, command.ttlMs),
+    });
+  }
+
+  async takeover(input: TakeoverConnectorLeaseInput): Promise<ConnectorLease> {
+    const command = normalizeAcquireInput(input, this.maxLeaseTtlMs);
+    const now = this.now();
+    return this.store.takeover({
+      ...command,
+      expectedEpoch: normalizeLeaseEpoch(input.expectedEpoch),
+      leaseId: randomUUID(),
+      now: now.toISOString(),
+      expiresAt: expiresAt(now, command.ttlMs),
+    });
+  }
+
+  async heartbeat(input: HeartbeatConnectorLeaseInput): Promise<ConnectorLease> {
+    const now = this.now();
+    const lease = normalizeConnectorLease(input.lease);
+    const ttlMs = normalizeTtl(input.ttlMs, this.maxLeaseTtlMs, 'lease');
+    return this.store.heartbeat({
+      lease,
+      ttlMs,
+      correlationId: normalizeCorrelationId(input.correlationId),
+      now: now.toISOString(),
+      expiresAt: expiresAt(now, ttlMs),
+    });
+  }
+
+  async release(input: ReleaseConnectorLeaseInput): Promise<void> {
+    await this.store.release({
+      lease: normalizeConnectorLease(input.lease),
+      correlationId: normalizeCorrelationId(input.correlationId),
+      now: this.now().toISOString(),
+    });
+  }
+
+  async current(binding: LogicalAgentBinding): Promise<ConnectorLease | null> {
+    return this.store.findCurrent(normalizeBinding(binding));
+  }
+
+  async issueGrant(input: IssueConnectorExecutionGrantInput): Promise<ConnectorExecutionGrant> {
+    const now = this.now();
+    const lease = normalizeConnectorLease(input.lease);
+    const scopes = normalizeConnectorScopes(input.scopes);
+    const correlationId = normalizeCorrelationId(input.correlationId);
+    const ttlMs = normalizeTtl(input.ttlMs, this.maxGrantTtlMs, 'grant');
+    const current = await this.store.findCurrent(lease);
+    await this.assertCurrentLease(current, lease, now, correlationId);
+    if (!current) throw new ConnectorLeaseError('lease_missing', 'Connector lease is unavailable');
+    if (!isScopeSubset(scopes, lease.scopes) || !isScopeSubset(scopes, current.scopes)) {
+      await this.reject(lease, correlationId, now, 'scope_denied');
+    }
+    const requestedExpiry = new Date(now.getTime() + ttlMs);
+    const leaseExpiry = new Date(current.expiresAt);
+    const grantExpiry = requestedExpiry < leaseExpiry ? requestedExpiry : leaseExpiry;
+    const grant: ConnectorExecutionGrant = Object.freeze({
+      identity: current.identity,
+      bindingId: current.bindingId,
+      leaseId: current.leaseId,
+      connectorId: current.connectorId,
+      scopes,
+      leaseEpoch: current.leaseEpoch,
+      issuedAt: now.toISOString(),
+      expiresAt: grantExpiry.toISOString(),
+      correlationId,
+    });
+    this.issuedGrants.add(grant);
+    return grant;
+  }
+
+  async executeGrant<TInput, TOutput>(
+    grant: ConnectorExecutionGrant,
+    requiredScope: string,
+    input: TInput,
+    adapter: FencedConnectorAdapter<TInput, TOutput>,
+  ): Promise<TOutput> {
+    const now = this.now();
+    const normalizedScope = normalizeConnectorScope(requiredScope);
+    if (!this.issuedGrants.has(grant)) {
+      await this.rejectForgedGrant(grant, now);
+    }
+    if (new Date(grant.expiresAt) <= now) {
+      await this.rejectGrant(grant, now, 'grant_expired');
+    }
+    const current = await this.store.findCurrent(normalizeBinding(grant));
+    await this.assertCurrentLease(current, grant, now, grant.correlationId);
+    if (!grant.scopes.includes(normalizedScope) || !current?.scopes.includes(normalizedScope)) {
+      await this.rejectGrant(grant, now, 'scope_denied');
+    }
+    if (!current) throw new ConnectorLeaseError('lease_missing', 'Connector lease is unavailable');
+    const context: ConnectorExecutionContext = Object.freeze({
+      identity: current.identity,
+      bindingId: current.bindingId,
+      leaseId: current.leaseId,
+      connectorId: current.connectorId,
+      scopes: Object.freeze([...grant.scopes]),
+      leaseEpoch: current.leaseEpoch,
+      correlationId: grant.correlationId,
+      grantExpiresAt: grant.expiresAt,
+    });
+    return adapter.execute(input, context);
+  }
+
+  private async assertCurrentLease(
+    current: ConnectorLease | null,
+    authority: ConnectorLease | ConnectorExecutionGrant,
+    now: Date,
+    correlationId: string,
+  ): Promise<void> {
+    if (!current) await this.reject(authority, correlationId, now, 'lease_missing');
+    if (!current) throw new ConnectorLeaseError('lease_missing', 'Connector lease is unavailable');
+    if (current.releasedAt) await this.reject(authority, correlationId, now, 'lease_released');
+    if (new Date(current.expiresAt) <= now) {
+      await this.store.recordAudit(auditEvent(current, correlationId, now, 'expiry', 'succeeded'));
+      await this.reject(authority, correlationId, now, 'lease_expired');
+    }
+    if (current.leaseEpoch !== authority.leaseEpoch) {
+      await this.reject(authority, correlationId, now, 'stale_epoch');
+    }
+    if (current.leaseId !== authority.leaseId || current.connectorId !== authority.connectorId) {
+      await this.reject(authority, correlationId, now, 'connector_mismatch');
+    }
+  }
+
+  private async rejectGrant(
+    grant: ConnectorExecutionGrant,
+    now: Date,
+    reason: ConnectorLeaseRejectReason,
+  ): Promise<never> {
+    return this.reject(grant, grant.correlationId, now, reason);
+  }
+
+  private async rejectForgedGrant(grant: unknown, now: Date): Promise<never> {
+    const event = safeForgedGrantAudit(grant, now);
+    await this.store.recordAudit(event);
+    throw new ConnectorLeaseError('forged_grant', safeReasonMessage('forged_grant'));
+  }
+
+  private async reject(
+    authority: LogicalAgentBinding & {
+      readonly connectorId: string;
+      readonly leaseId?: string;
+      readonly leaseEpoch?: string;
+    },
+    correlationId: string,
+    now: Date,
+    reason: ConnectorLeaseRejectReason,
+  ): Promise<never> {
+    await this.store.recordAudit(
+      auditEvent(authority, correlationId, now, 'reject', 'denied', reason),
+    );
+    throw new ConnectorLeaseError(reason, safeReasonMessage(reason));
+  }
+}
+
+function normalizeAcquireInput(
+  input: AcquireConnectorLeaseInput,
+  maxLeaseTtlMs: number,
+): AcquireConnectorLeaseInput {
+  return {
+    identity: normalizeLogicalAgentIdentity(input.identity),
+    bindingId: normalizeLogicalBindingId(input.bindingId),
+    connectorId: normalizeConnectorId(input.connectorId),
+    scopes: normalizeConnectorScopes(input.scopes),
+    ttlMs: normalizeTtl(input.ttlMs, maxLeaseTtlMs, 'lease'),
+    correlationId: normalizeCorrelationId(input.correlationId),
+  };
+}
+
+function normalizeBinding(input: LogicalAgentBinding): LogicalAgentBinding {
+  return {
+    identity: normalizeLogicalAgentIdentity(input.identity),
+    bindingId: normalizeLogicalBindingId(input.bindingId),
+  };
+}
+
+export function normalizeConnectorLease(lease: ConnectorLease): ConnectorLease {
+  const binding = normalizeBinding(lease);
+  return Object.freeze({
+    ...binding,
+    leaseId: lease.leaseId,
+    connectorId: normalizeConnectorId(lease.connectorId),
+    scopes: normalizeConnectorScopes(lease.scopes),
+    leaseEpoch: normalizeLeaseEpoch(lease.leaseEpoch),
+    acquiredAt: normalizeTimestamp(lease.acquiredAt, 'lease acquisition'),
+    heartbeatAt: normalizeTimestamp(lease.heartbeatAt, 'lease heartbeat'),
+    expiresAt: normalizeTimestamp(lease.expiresAt, 'lease expiry'),
+    ...(lease.releasedAt
+      ? { releasedAt: normalizeTimestamp(lease.releasedAt, 'lease release') }
+      : {}),
+  });
+}
+
+function normalizeTtl(ttlMs: number, maximum: number, kind: 'lease' | 'grant'): number {
+  if (!Number.isSafeInteger(ttlMs) || ttlMs <= 0 || ttlMs > maximum) {
+    throw new Error(
+      `Connector ${kind} TTL must be a positive safe integer no greater than ${maximum}ms`,
+    );
+  }
+  return ttlMs;
+}
+
+function normalizeTtlLimit(ttlMs: number, hardMaximum: number, kind: 'lease' | 'grant'): number {
+  if (!Number.isSafeInteger(ttlMs) || ttlMs <= 0 || ttlMs > hardMaximum) {
+    throw new Error(
+      `Maximum connector ${kind} TTL must be a positive safe integer no greater than ${hardMaximum}ms`,
+    );
+  }
+  return ttlMs;
+}
+
+function normalizeTimestamp(value: string, label: string): string {
+  const date = new Date(value);
+  if (Number.isNaN(date.getTime())) throw new Error(`${label} timestamp is invalid`);
+  return date.toISOString();
+}
+
+function expiresAt(now: Date, ttlMs: number): string {
+  const expiry = new Date(now.getTime() + ttlMs);
+  if (Number.isNaN(expiry.getTime())) throw new Error('Connector lease TTL exceeds date range');
+  return expiry.toISOString();
+}
+
+function isScopeSubset(requested: readonly string[], allowed: readonly string[]): boolean {
+  return requested.every((scope) => allowed.includes(scope));
+}
+
+function auditEvent(
+  authority: LogicalAgentBinding & {
+    readonly connectorId: string;
+    readonly leaseId?: string;
+    readonly leaseEpoch?: string;
+  },
+  correlationId: string,
+  now: Date,
+  event: ConnectorLeaseAuditEvent['event'],
+  outcome: ConnectorLeaseAuditEvent['outcome'],
+  reason?: ConnectorLeaseRejectReason,
+): ConnectorLeaseAuditEvent {
+  return {
+    identity: authority.identity,
+    bindingId: authority.bindingId,
+    connectorId: authority.connectorId,
+    correlationId,
+    occurredAt: now.toISOString(),
+    event,
+    outcome,
+    ...(authority.leaseId ? { leaseId: authority.leaseId } : {}),
+    ...(authority.leaseEpoch ? { leaseEpoch: authority.leaseEpoch } : {}),
+    ...(reason ? { reason } : {}),
+  };
+}
+
+function safeForgedGrantAudit(grant: unknown, now: Date): ConnectorLeaseAuditEvent {
+  const fallback: ConnectorLeaseAuditEvent = {
+    identity: { tenantId: 'untrusted', logicalAgentId: 'untrusted' },
+    bindingId: 'untrusted',
+    connectorId: 'untrusted',
+    correlationId: 'untrusted',
+    occurredAt: now.toISOString(),
+    event: 'reject',
+    outcome: 'denied',
+    reason: 'forged_grant',
+  };
+  if (typeof grant !== 'object' || grant === null || !('identity' in grant)) return fallback;
+  const identity = grant.identity;
+  if (typeof identity !== 'object' || identity === null) return fallback;
+  if (!('tenantId' in identity) || !('logicalAgentId' in identity)) return fallback;
+  if (!('bindingId' in grant) || !('connectorId' in grant) || !('correlationId' in grant)) {
+    return fallback;
+  }
+  if (
+    typeof identity.tenantId !== 'string' ||
+    typeof identity.logicalAgentId !== 'string' ||
+    typeof grant.bindingId !== 'string' ||
+    typeof grant.connectorId !== 'string' ||
+    typeof grant.correlationId !== 'string'
+  ) {
+    return fallback;
+  }
+  try {
+    return {
+      identity: normalizeLogicalAgentIdentity({
+        tenantId: identity.tenantId,
+        logicalAgentId: identity.logicalAgentId,
+      }),
+      bindingId: normalizeLogicalBindingId(grant.bindingId),
+      connectorId: normalizeConnectorId(grant.connectorId),
+      correlationId: normalizeCorrelationId(grant.correlationId),
+      occurredAt: now.toISOString(),
+      event: 'reject',
+      outcome: 'denied',
+      reason: 'forged_grant',
+    };
+  } catch {
+    return fallback;
+  }
+}
+
+function safeReasonMessage(reason: ConnectorLeaseRejectReason): string {
+  return `Connector authority denied: ${reason}`;
+}

packages/agent/src/index.ts

@@ -5,3 +5,4 @@ export * from './tmux-fleet-runtime-provider.js';
 export * from './hermes-runtime-provider.js';
 export * from './matrix-native-runtime-provider.js';
 export * from './durable-session.js';
+export * from './connector-lease.js';

packages/db/drizzle/0016_salty_morlocks.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+CREATE TABLE "connector_lease_audit_log" (
+	"id" uuid PRIMARY KEY DEFAULT gen_random_uuid() NOT NULL,
+	"tenant_id" text NOT NULL,
+	"logical_agent_id" text NOT NULL,
+	"binding_id" text NOT NULL,
+	"connector_id" text NOT NULL,
+	"lease_id" uuid,
+	"lease_epoch" bigint,
+	"event" text NOT NULL,
+	"outcome" text NOT NULL,
+	"reason" text,
+	"correlation_id" text NOT NULL,
+	"occurred_at" timestamp with time zone NOT NULL
+);
+--> statement-breakpoint
+CREATE TABLE "logical_agent_connector_leases" (
+	"lease_id" uuid PRIMARY KEY NOT NULL,
+	"tenant_id" text NOT NULL,
+	"logical_agent_id" text NOT NULL,
+	"binding_id" text NOT NULL,
+	"connector_id" text NOT NULL,
+	"scopes" jsonb NOT NULL,
+	"lease_epoch" bigint NOT NULL,
+	"acquired_at" timestamp with time zone NOT NULL,
+	"heartbeat_at" timestamp with time zone NOT NULL,
+	"expires_at" timestamp with time zone NOT NULL,
+	"released_at" timestamp with time zone,
+	"created_at" timestamp with time zone DEFAULT now() NOT NULL,
+	"updated_at" timestamp with time zone DEFAULT now() NOT NULL
+);
+--> statement-breakpoint
+CREATE INDEX "connector_lease_audit_binding_occurred_idx" ON "connector_lease_audit_log" USING btree ("tenant_id","logical_agent_id","binding_id","occurred_at" DESC NULLS LAST);--> statement-breakpoint
+CREATE INDEX "connector_lease_audit_correlation_idx" ON "connector_lease_audit_log" USING btree ("correlation_id");--> statement-breakpoint
+CREATE UNIQUE INDEX "logical_agent_connector_lease_binding_idx" ON "logical_agent_connector_leases" USING btree ("tenant_id","logical_agent_id","binding_id");--> statement-breakpoint
+CREATE INDEX "logical_agent_connector_lease_expiry_idx" ON "logical_agent_connector_leases" USING btree ("expires_at");--> statement-breakpoint
+CREATE INDEX "logical_agent_connector_lease_connector_idx" ON "logical_agent_connector_leases" USING btree ("connector_id");

packages/db/drizzle/meta/_journal.json

@@ -113,6 +113,13 @@
       "when": 1783942610000,
       "tag": "0015_interaction_checkpoint_payload_digest",
       "breakpoints": true
+    },
+    {
+      "idx": 16,
+      "version": "7",
+      "when": 1784050648841,
+      "tag": "0016_salty_morlocks",
+      "breakpoints": true
     }
   ]
 }

packages/db/src/schema.ts

@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ import {
   uniqueIndex,
   real,
   integer,
+  bigint,
   customType,
 } from 'drizzle-orm/pg-core';
 
@@ -487,6 +488,68 @@ export const agentLogs = pgTable(
   ],
 );
 
+// ─── Logical agent connector authority ──────────────────────────────────────
+// One durable row is the current authority for a tenant/logical-agent/binding.
+// Runtime-native session identifiers never enter these core tables.
+
+export const logicalAgentConnectorLeases = pgTable(
+  'logical_agent_connector_leases',
+  {
+    leaseId: uuid('lease_id').primaryKey(),
+    tenantId: text('tenant_id').notNull(),
+    logicalAgentId: text('logical_agent_id').notNull(),
+    bindingId: text('binding_id').notNull(),
+    connectorId: text('connector_id').notNull(),
+    scopes: jsonb('scopes').notNull().$type<string[]>(),
+    leaseEpoch: bigint('lease_epoch', { mode: 'bigint' }).notNull(),
+    acquiredAt: timestamp('acquired_at', { withTimezone: true }).notNull(),
+    heartbeatAt: timestamp('heartbeat_at', { withTimezone: true }).notNull(),
+    expiresAt: timestamp('expires_at', { withTimezone: true }).notNull(),
+    releasedAt: timestamp('released_at', { withTimezone: true }),
+    createdAt: timestamp('created_at', { withTimezone: true }).notNull().defaultNow(),
+    updatedAt: timestamp('updated_at', { withTimezone: true }).notNull().defaultNow(),
+  },
+  (t) => [
+    uniqueIndex('logical_agent_connector_lease_binding_idx').on(
+      t.tenantId,
+      t.logicalAgentId,
+      t.bindingId,
+    ),
+    index('logical_agent_connector_lease_expiry_idx').on(t.expiresAt),
+    index('logical_agent_connector_lease_connector_idx').on(t.connectorId),
+  ],
+);
+
+/** Append-only, credential-safe lease lifecycle and fencing denial metadata. */
+export const connectorLeaseAuditLog = pgTable(
+  'connector_lease_audit_log',
+  {
+    id: uuid('id').primaryKey().defaultRandom(),
+    tenantId: text('tenant_id').notNull(),
+    logicalAgentId: text('logical_agent_id').notNull(),
+    bindingId: text('binding_id').notNull(),
+    connectorId: text('connector_id').notNull(),
+    leaseId: uuid('lease_id'),
+    leaseEpoch: bigint('lease_epoch', { mode: 'bigint' }),
+    event: text('event', {
+      enum: ['acquire', 'renew', 'takeover', 'reject', 'release', 'expiry'],
+    }).notNull(),
+    outcome: text('outcome', { enum: ['succeeded', 'denied'] }).notNull(),
+    reason: text('reason'),
+    correlationId: text('correlation_id').notNull(),
+    occurredAt: timestamp('occurred_at', { withTimezone: true }).notNull(),
+  },
+  (t) => [
+    index('connector_lease_audit_binding_occurred_idx').on(
+      t.tenantId,
+      t.logicalAgentId,
+      t.bindingId,
+      t.occurredAt.desc(),
+    ),
+    index('connector_lease_audit_correlation_idx').on(t.correlationId),
+  ],
+);
+
 // ─── Tess durable session state ─────────────────────────────────────────────
 // PostgreSQL is canonical for restart-safe Tess session recovery. The state
 // machine lives in @mosaicstack/agent; these records are its durable adapter.

packages/mosaic/framework/fleet/README.md

@@ -9,7 +9,8 @@ package, normally at:
 ```
 
 The default tmux socket is `mosaic-fleet` so fleet commands do not touch the
-default tmux server.
+default tmux server. The roster is the desired-state authority; generated environment files are
+rebuildable projections, never a second source of configuration.
 
 ## Examples
 
@@ -31,6 +32,17 @@ The installed `tools/fleet/print-interaction-effective-policy.sh` prints only
 the resolved name, runtime, model, reasoning, and tool policy. It never reads
 or prints credential variables.
 
+## Generated agent environment boundary
+
+`mosaic fleet install` writes a private deterministic projection at
+`~/.config/mosaic/fleet/agents/<agent>.env.generated`. It may relocate only approved local machine
+data to `<agent>.env.local`; generated keys, arbitrary commands, secret-like keys, duplicate keys,
+unknown keys, and unsafe permissions fail before a tmux session is created. Legacy `.env` input is
+regenerated, relocated, or quarantined and is not a launch authority.
+
+See [`docs/fleet/reference/generated-env-boundary.md`](../../../../docs/fleet/reference/generated-env-boundary.md)
+for allowed local keys and the USC downstream interface evidence.
+
 Initialize a roster:
 
 ```bash

packages/mosaic/framework/fleet/roles/LIBRARY.md

@@ -12,19 +12,22 @@ on demand. Engineering personas have no explicit `domain:` marker (they are the
 implicit `engineering` domain); cross-domain personas carry a `domain:` key in
 their intro so tooling can group them.
 
-> This file is an index only — no code imports it. To add a persona, drop a new
+> This file is an index, not an authority source. The fleet persona resolver reads
-> `*.md` next to the others (mirroring the existing structure) and add a row here.
+> its rows for discovery compatibility, then requires a readable `*.md` contract;
+> authority is derived from canonical class metadata in code, never from this prose.
 
 ## engineering
 
 | Persona         | Purpose                                                                        |
 | --------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
 | orchestrator    | Always-on coordinator — runs the supervisor loop, dispatches ready work        |
+| team-leader     | Coordinates only orchestrator-leased capacity for one bounded project          |
 | board           | Multi-lens deliberation panel; owns the mission's direction, not its execution |
 | planner         | Turns ratified objectives into a phased FR plan wired into a `depends_on` DAG  |
 | decomposition   | Splits FRs into one-PR-each cards wired with `depends_on` edges                |
 | code            | Primary executor — one card, one branch, one PR to green CI                    |
 | review          | Correctness reviewer — judges an open PR on correctness, scope, and coverage   |
+| validator       | Independent final evidence certificate; never approves-to-land or merges       |
 | security-review | Second line of review — secrets, auth, and forbidden-path safety               |
 | site-tester     | Runtime verifier — runs the change and checks behavior vs. acceptance criteria |
 | documentation   | Prose maintainer — keeps human-facing docs and projections in sync             |
@@ -33,6 +36,7 @@ their intro so tooling can group them.
 | operator        | Escalation and control surface — owns exceptions and the fleet pause switch    |
 | session-review  | Post-task retrospective — turns finished work into improvement signals         |
 | enhancer        | Continuous-improvement loop — upgrades the fleet's tools, skills, and harness  |
+| interaction     | Operator request/status surface; routes orchestration and merge decisions      |
 
 ## executive
 

packages/mosaic/framework/fleet/roles/interaction.md

@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+# Interaction — fleet role definition
+
+The **interaction** role (`class: interaction`) is the operator-facing request and status surface for Mosaic.
+
+## Mandate
+
+1. Receive operator requests and present observable fleet or runtime status.
+2. Route orchestration requests to the orchestrator and merge decisions to the merge-gate.
+3. Report supported actions and their outcomes without claiming another role's authority.
+
+## Boundaries
+
+- Request/status only; it does not orchestrate, issue leases, approve-to-land, or merge.
+- It does not mutate roster configuration, role authority, or credentials.
+- A configured instance name such as Tess is display data, never a class or authority source.
+- `operator-interaction` remains a compatibility alias for this canonical class.

packages/mosaic/framework/fleet/roles/team-leader.md

@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+# Team leader — fleet role definition
+
+The **team-leader** (`class: team-leader`) coordinates a bounded project team using only capacity granted by an orchestrator-issued lease.
+
+## Mandate
+
+1. Direct the leased coder, reviewer, and validator capacity for the assigned project scope.
+2. Track delivery status and return results or blockers to the orchestrator.
+3. Stop using capacity when the lease or assignment ends.
+
+## Boundaries
+
+- Leased capacity only; this role does not issue or expand its own lease.
+- It cannot change fleet roster membership, role authority, fleet configuration, or credentials.
+- It cannot approve-to-land or merge.
+- It does not displace the orchestrator's topology and lease authority.

packages/mosaic/framework/fleet/roles/validator.md

@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+# Validator — fleet role definition
+
+The **validator** (`class: validator`) is the independent final evidence seat. It examines the accepted requirements, test evidence, review record, and candidate head and may issue a validation certificate for that exact evidence set.
+
+## Mandate
+
+1. Validate acceptance evidence independently from the implementation author.
+2. Issue or withhold a final validation certificate for the reviewed candidate.
+3. Report missing, stale, or contradictory evidence without altering it.
+
+## Boundaries
+
+- **Certificate only:** the validator does not approve-to-land or merge.
+- It does not replace correctness or security review.
+- It does not write product code, mutate the roster, issue leases, or access credentials.
+- A configured instance name such as Ultron is display data, never a class or authority source.

packages/mosaic/framework/systemd/user/README.md

@@ -24,45 +24,56 @@ The agent template calls:
 
 which starts or reuses a tmux session on `MOSAIC_TMUX_SOCKET`.
 
-## Local customization
+## Generated environment and local data
 
-Per-agent overrides live outside the package in:
+The roster-derived projection is written outside the package at:
 
 ```text
-~/.config/mosaic/fleet/agents/<agent>.env
+~/.config/mosaic/fleet/agents/<agent>.env.generated
 ```
 
-Example:
+Systemd does not read either environment file. It starts the launcher with a fixed cleared bootstrap
+environment; before it creates, queries, or stops an exact agent tmux session, `start-agent-session.sh`
+strictly parses the generated projection and the optional local data file:
 
-```dotenv
+```text
-MOSAIC_TMUX_SOCKET=mosaic-fleet
+~/.config/mosaic/fleet/agents/<agent>.env.local
-MOSAIC_AGENT_RUNTIME=claude
-MOSAIC_AGENT_WORKDIR=$HOME/src/your-project
-# Optional escape hatch for PoC/canary agents:
-# MOSAIC_AGENT_COMMAND=mosaic yolo claude
 ```
 
+The local file may contain only safe machine-specific data (`MOSAIC_RUNTIME_BIN`, heartbeat paths or
+interval, and Claude configuration paths). It cannot override roster-derived keys, carry a command,
+or contain secret-like/unknown keys. Both files must be private regular files. Do not hand-edit the
+generated projection; update the roster and regenerate it instead. A legacy `<agent>.env` is
+consumed only for regeneration, strict relocation, or private quarantine and is never launch input.
+
+See `docs/fleet/reference/generated-env-boundary.md` for the full contract.
+
 ## Manual canary sequence
 
-```bash
+Use the roster and the supported installer; do not pre-create the agent environment directory or
-mkdir -p ~/.config/systemd/user ~/.config/mosaic/tools/fleet ~/.config/mosaic/fleet/agents
+edit a generated projection. `mosaic fleet install` validates the roster, installs the units and
-cp packages/mosaic/framework/systemd/user/mosaic-*.service ~/.config/systemd/user/
+helpers, and writes private roster-derived projections before any service is started.
-cp packages/mosaic/framework/tools/fleet/*.sh ~/.config/mosaic/tools/fleet/
-chmod +x ~/.config/mosaic/tools/fleet/*.sh
-systemctl --user daemon-reload
-systemctl --user start mosaic-tmux-holder.service
-systemctl --user start mosaic-agent@canary.service
-tmux -L mosaic-fleet ls
 
-# For an operator-interaction service, the roster/env identity selects the
+```bash
-# generic unit instance; no service source is renamed for an instance.
+# Create a site-owned canary roster. Inspect an existing roster before using --force.
+mosaic fleet init --profile minimal --write
+mosaic fleet install
+systemctl --user daemon-reload
+mosaic fleet start canary-pi
+tmux -L mosaic-fleet ls
+```
+
+For an operator-interaction service, first put `<agent-name>` in the roster with the pinned Pi
+runtime, model, reasoning, and `operator-interaction` tool policy. Re-run `mosaic fleet install` after
+that roster change so it writes `<agent-name>.env.generated`; ambient `MOSAIC_AGENT_*` values are not
+launch authority. The generic unit instance uses that generated identity, and no service source is
+renamed for an instance:
+
+```bash
+mosaic fleet install
+systemctl --user daemon-reload
 systemctl --user start mosaic-interaction-agent@<agent-name>.service
-MOSAIC_AGENT_NAME=<agent-name> \
+~/.config/mosaic/tools/fleet/print-interaction-effective-policy.sh <agent-name>
-MOSAIC_AGENT_RUNTIME=pi \
-MOSAIC_AGENT_MODEL=openai/gpt-5.6-sol \
-MOSAIC_AGENT_REASONING=high \
-MOSAIC_AGENT_TOOL_POLICY=operator-interaction \
-  ~/.config/mosaic/tools/fleet/print-interaction-effective-policy.sh
 ```
 
 Do not use `tmux kill-server` without `-L mosaic-fleet`; this pattern is meant

packages/mosaic/framework/systemd/user/mosaic-agent@.service

@@ -7,16 +7,13 @@ PartOf=mosaic-tmux-holder.service
 
 [Service]
 Type=oneshot
+# Remove loader and noninteractive-shell controls before ExecStart loads env.
+UnsetEnvironment=LD_PRELOAD BASH_ENV ENV
 RemainAfterExit=yes
-# No default MOSAIC_TMUX_SOCKET: an absent roster socket means the literal
+# Never preload the projection. The launcher starts from a fixed minimal
-# default tmux socket (no -L). The per-agent .env sets it when the roster names
+# environment and strictly validates generated/local data before tmux effects.
-# one; otherwise it stays unset and start-agent-session.sh uses the default socket.
+ExecStart=/usr/bin/env -i HOME=%h MOSAIC_AGENT_NAME=%i PATH=/usr/bin:/bin /bin/bash --noprofile --norc %h/.config/mosaic/tools/fleet/start-agent-session.sh %i
-Environment=MOSAIC_AGENT_NAME=%i
+ExecStop=-/usr/bin/env -i HOME=%h MOSAIC_AGENT_NAME=%i PATH=/usr/bin:/bin /bin/bash --noprofile --norc %h/.config/mosaic/tools/fleet/start-agent-session.sh --stop %i
-Environment=MOSAIC_AGENT_RUNTIME=pi
-Environment=MOSAIC_AGENT_WORKDIR=%h
-EnvironmentFile=-%h/.config/mosaic/fleet/agents/%i.env
-ExecStart=/bin/bash %h/.config/mosaic/tools/fleet/start-agent-session.sh %i
-ExecStop=-/bin/bash -lc 'if [ -n "${MOSAIC_TMUX_SOCKET:-}" ]; then tmux -L "$MOSAIC_TMUX_SOCKET" kill-session -t "=%i"; else tmux kill-session -t "=%i"; fi'
 
 [Install]
 WantedBy=default.target

packages/mosaic/framework/systemd/user/mosaic-interaction-agent@.service

@@ -7,11 +7,13 @@ PartOf=mosaic-tmux-holder.service
 
 [Service]
 Type=oneshot
+# Remove loader and noninteractive-shell controls before ExecStart loads env.
+UnsetEnvironment=LD_PRELOAD BASH_ENV ENV
 RemainAfterExit=yes
-Environment=MOSAIC_AGENT_NAME=%i
+# The interaction wrapper delegates to the shared strict parser before pinned
-EnvironmentFile=%h/.config/mosaic/fleet/agents/%i.env
+# profile checks; no projection data reaches Bash through systemd.
-ExecStart=/bin/bash %h/.config/mosaic/tools/fleet/start-interaction-service.sh %i
+ExecStart=/usr/bin/env -i HOME=%h MOSAIC_AGENT_NAME=%i PATH=/usr/bin:/bin /bin/bash --noprofile --norc %h/.config/mosaic/tools/fleet/start-interaction-service.sh %i
-ExecStop=-/bin/bash -lc 'if [ -n "${MOSAIC_TMUX_SOCKET:-}" ]; then tmux -L "$MOSAIC_TMUX_SOCKET" kill-session -t "=%i"; else tmux kill-session -t "=%i"; fi'
+ExecStop=-/usr/bin/env -i HOME=%h MOSAIC_AGENT_NAME=%i PATH=/usr/bin:/bin /bin/bash --noprofile --norc %h/.config/mosaic/tools/fleet/start-agent-session.sh --stop %i
 
 [Install]
 WantedBy=default.target

packages/mosaic/framework/systemd/user/mosaic-tmux-holder.service

@@ -6,10 +6,11 @@ After=default.target
 [Service]
 Type=oneshot
 RemainAfterExit=yes
-Environment=MOSAIC_TMUX_SOCKET=mosaic-fleet
+# The holder owns the tmux server, so clear loader, shell-control, and stale
-Environment=MOSAIC_TMUX_HOLDER=_holder
+# manager/session variables before the server process starts.
-ExecStart=/bin/bash -lc 'tmux -L "$MOSAIC_TMUX_SOCKET" has-session -t "=${MOSAIC_TMUX_HOLDER}:0.0" 2>/dev/null || tmux -L "$MOSAIC_TMUX_SOCKET" new-session -d -s "$MOSAIC_TMUX_HOLDER" "while true; do sleep 3600; done"'
+UnsetEnvironment=LD_PRELOAD BASH_ENV ENV
-ExecStop=-/bin/bash -lc 'tmux -L "$MOSAIC_TMUX_SOCKET" kill-server'
+ExecStart=/usr/bin/env -i HOME=%h PATH=/usr/bin:/bin MOSAIC_TMUX_SOCKET=mosaic-fleet MOSAIC_TMUX_HOLDER=_holder /bin/bash --noprofile --norc %h/.config/mosaic/tools/fleet/start-tmux-holder.sh
+ExecStop=-/usr/bin/env -i HOME=%h PATH=/usr/bin:/bin MOSAIC_TMUX_SOCKET=mosaic-fleet /bin/bash --noprofile --norc -c 'tmux -L "$MOSAIC_TMUX_SOCKET" kill-server'
 
 [Install]
 WantedBy=default.target

packages/mosaic/framework/systemd/user/test-fleet-units.sh

@@ -5,6 +5,8 @@ SCRIPT_DIR=$(cd -- "$(dirname -- "$0")" && pwd)
 HOLDER="$SCRIPT_DIR/mosaic-tmux-holder.service"
 AGENT="$SCRIPT_DIR/mosaic-agent@.service"
 INTERACTION="$SCRIPT_DIR/mosaic-interaction-agent@.service"
+HOLDER_START="$SCRIPT_DIR/../../tools/fleet/start-tmux-holder.sh"
+START_AGENT="$SCRIPT_DIR/../../tools/fleet/start-agent-session.sh"
 
 fail() {
   echo "FAIL: $*" >&2
@@ -14,16 +16,40 @@ fail() {
 [ -f "$HOLDER" ] || fail "missing mosaic-tmux-holder.service"
 [ -f "$AGENT" ] || fail "missing mosaic-agent@.service"
 [ -f "$INTERACTION" ] || fail "missing mosaic-interaction-agent@.service"
+[ -x "$HOLDER_START" ] || fail "missing executable start-tmux-holder.sh"
+[ -x "$START_AGENT" ] || fail "missing executable start-agent-session.sh"
 
 grep -qF 'ExecStart=' "$HOLDER" || fail "holder has no ExecStart"
 grep -qF 'tmux -L' "$HOLDER" || fail "holder does not use named tmux socket"
 grep -qF '_holder' "$HOLDER" || fail "holder session is not explicit"
+grep -qF 'UnsetEnvironment=LD_PRELOAD BASH_ENV ENV' "$HOLDER" || \
+  fail "holder does not remove loader and shell-control variables"
+grep -qF 'ExecStart=/usr/bin/env -i HOME=%h PATH=/usr/bin:/bin MOSAIC_TMUX_SOCKET=mosaic-fleet MOSAIC_TMUX_HOLDER=_holder /bin/bash --noprofile --norc %h/.config/mosaic/tools/fleet/start-tmux-holder.sh' "$HOLDER" || \
+  fail "holder does not clear manager environment before starting tmux"
+grep -qF 'ExecStop=-/usr/bin/env -i HOME=%h PATH=/usr/bin:/bin MOSAIC_TMUX_SOCKET=mosaic-fleet /bin/bash --noprofile --norc -c' "$HOLDER" || \
+  fail "holder stop does not clear manager environment"
+if grep -qF -- '/bin/bash -lc' "$HOLDER"; then
+  fail "holder must not start tmux through a login shell"
+fi
 grep -qF 'Requires=mosaic-tmux-holder.service' "$AGENT" || fail "agent does not require holder"
 grep -qF 'start-agent-session.sh' "$AGENT" || fail "agent unit does not call start-agent-session.sh"
-grep -qF 'kill-session -t "=%i"' "$AGENT" || fail "agent stop does not exact-match its session"
+if grep -qE '^Environment(File)?=' "$AGENT" "$INTERACTION"; then
+  fail "agent units must not accept ambient or projection environment before strict parsing"
+fi
+grep -qF 'UnsetEnvironment=LD_PRELOAD BASH_ENV ENV' "$AGENT" || \
+  fail "agent unit does not remove loader and shell-control variables"
+grep -qF 'UnsetEnvironment=LD_PRELOAD BASH_ENV ENV' "$INTERACTION" || \
+  fail "interaction unit does not remove loader and shell-control variables"
+grep -qF 'ExecStart=/usr/bin/env -i HOME=%h MOSAIC_AGENT_NAME=%i PATH=/usr/bin:/bin /bin/bash --noprofile --norc' "$AGENT" || \
+  fail "agent unit does not clear bootstrap environment before strict parsing"
+grep -qF 'start-agent-session.sh --stop %i' "$AGENT" || \
+  fail "agent stop does not use the validated exact-stop path"
 grep -qF 'Requires=mosaic-tmux-holder.service' "$INTERACTION" || fail "interaction service does not require holder"
-grep -qF 'EnvironmentFile=%h/.config/mosaic/fleet/agents/%i.env' "$INTERACTION" || fail "interaction service does not require per-agent config"
+grep -qF 'ExecStart=/usr/bin/env -i HOME=%h MOSAIC_AGENT_NAME=%i PATH=/usr/bin:/bin /bin/bash --noprofile --norc' "$INTERACTION" || \
-grep -qF 'start-interaction-service.sh %i' "$INTERACTION" || fail "interaction service does not validate before startup"
+  fail "interaction unit does not clear bootstrap environment before strict parsing"
+grep -qF 'start-interaction-service.sh %i' "$INTERACTION" || fail "interaction service does not use shared strict parsing"
+grep -qF 'start-agent-session.sh --stop %i' "$INTERACTION" || \
+  fail "interaction stop does not use the validated exact-stop path"
 
 if command -v systemd-analyze >/dev/null 2>&1; then
   systemd-analyze verify --user "$HOLDER" "$AGENT" "$INTERACTION" >/tmp/mosaic-fleet-systemd-verify.log 2>&1 || {
@@ -32,4 +58,102 @@ if command -v systemd-analyze >/dev/null 2>&1; then
   }
 fi
 
+# Real isolated socket regression: a preexisting server with an LD_PRELOAD
+# constructor marker must fail closed, while a fresh named server is created.
+if command -v tmux >/dev/null 2>&1 && command -v cc >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+  TEST_ROOT=$(mktemp -d)
+  TEST_SOCKET="mosaic-holder-test-$$"
+  trap 'tmux -L "$TEST_SOCKET" kill-server >/dev/null 2>&1 || true; rm -rf "$TEST_ROOT"' EXIT
+  MARKER="$TEST_ROOT/loader-marker"
+  LIBRARY="$TEST_ROOT/marker.so"
+  HOLDER_HOME="$TEST_ROOT/holder-home"
+  mkdir -p "$HOLDER_HOME/.config/mosaic/fleet/run"
+  chmod 700 "$HOLDER_HOME/.config" "$HOLDER_HOME/.config/mosaic" \
+    "$HOLDER_HOME/.config/mosaic/fleet" "$HOLDER_HOME/.config/mosaic/fleet/run"
+  printf '123e4567-e89b-12d3-a456-426614174000\n' > \
+    "$HOLDER_HOME/.config/mosaic/fleet/run/holder-owner"
+  chmod 600 "$HOLDER_HOME/.config/mosaic/fleet/run/holder-owner"
+  cat > "$TEST_ROOT/marker.c" <<'EOF'
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+__attribute__((constructor)) static void mark_loader(void) {
+  const char *path = getenv("MOSAIC_LOADER_MARKER");
+  if (path != NULL) {
+    int fd = open(path, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_APPEND, 0600);
+    if (fd >= 0) { write(fd, "loaded\\n", 7); close(fd); }
+  }
+}
+EOF
+  cc -shared -fPIC -o "$LIBRARY" "$TEST_ROOT/marker.c"
+  MOSAIC_LOADER_MARKER="$MARKER" LD_PRELOAD="$LIBRARY" \
+    tmux -L "$TEST_SOCKET" new-session -d -s _holder 'sleep 60'
+  [ -s "$MARKER" ] || fail "contaminated fixture did not execute loader constructor"
+  server_pid=$(tmux -L "$TEST_SOCKET" display-message -p '#{pid}')
+  : > "$MARKER"
+  if /usr/bin/env -i HOME="$HOLDER_HOME" PATH=/usr/bin:/bin \
+    MOSAIC_TMUX_SOCKET="$TEST_SOCKET" MOSAIC_TMUX_HOLDER=_holder "$HOLDER_START" \
+    >"$TEST_ROOT/holder.out" 2>&1; then
+    fail "holder adopted contaminated named server"
+  fi
+  grep -qF 'global environment does not match the owned-server contract' "$TEST_ROOT/holder.out" || \
+    fail "holder did not report contaminated server environment"
+  [ "$(tmux -L "$TEST_SOCKET" display-message -p '#{pid}')" = "$server_pid" ] || \
+    fail "holder replaced a contaminated server instead of failing closed"
+  [ ! -s "$MARKER" ] || fail "holder execution triggered a contaminated loader"
+
+  # Agent validation must reject the same unmanaged server without cleaning its
+  # global environment or adding a managed session.
+  AGENT_HOME="$HOLDER_HOME/.config/mosaic"
+  AGENT_NAME=loader-safe
+  AGENT_WORKDIR="$AGENT_HOME/work"
+  AGENT_BIN="$TEST_ROOT/agent-bin"
+  mkdir -p "$AGENT_HOME/fleet/agents" "$AGENT_WORKDIR" "$AGENT_BIN"
+  chmod 700 "$AGENT_HOME/fleet/agents"
+  cat > "$AGENT_HOME/fleet/agents/$AGENT_NAME.env.generated" <<EOF
+MOSAIC_AGENT_NAME=$AGENT_NAME
+MOSAIC_AGENT_CLASS=code
+MOSAIC_AGENT_RUNTIME=pi
+MOSAIC_AGENT_MODEL=
+MOSAIC_AGENT_REASONING=
+MOSAIC_AGENT_TOOL_POLICY=code
+MOSAIC_AGENT_WORKDIR=$AGENT_WORKDIR
+MOSAIC_TMUX_SOCKET=$TEST_SOCKET
+EOF
+  printf 'MOSAIC_RUNTIME_BIN=%s\n' "$AGENT_BIN" > "$AGENT_HOME/fleet/agents/$AGENT_NAME.env.local"
+  chmod 600 "$AGENT_HOME/fleet/agents/$AGENT_NAME.env.generated" \
+    "$AGENT_HOME/fleet/agents/$AGENT_NAME.env.local"
+  cat > "$AGENT_BIN/mosaic" <<'EOF'
+#!/bin/sh
+sleep 30
+EOF
+  chmod 700 "$AGENT_BIN/mosaic"
+  server_environment_before=$(tmux -L "$TEST_SOCKET" show-environment -g | sort)
+  server_sessions_before=$(tmux -L "$TEST_SOCKET" list-sessions | sort)
+  if /usr/bin/env -i HOME="$HOLDER_HOME" PATH=/usr/bin:/bin MOSAIC_HOME="$AGENT_HOME" \
+    "$START_AGENT" "$AGENT_NAME" >"$TEST_ROOT/agent.out" 2>&1; then
+    fail "agent launcher adopted contaminated named server"
+  fi
+  [ "$(tmux -L "$TEST_SOCKET" display-message -p '#{pid}')" = "$server_pid" ] || \
+    fail "agent launcher changed unmanaged server PID"
+  [ "$(tmux -L "$TEST_SOCKET" show-environment -g | sort)" = "$server_environment_before" ] || \
+    fail "agent launcher changed unmanaged global environment"
+  [ "$(tmux -L "$TEST_SOCKET" list-sessions | sort)" = "$server_sessions_before" ] || \
+    fail "agent launcher changed unmanaged sessions"
+  tmux -L "$TEST_SOCKET" kill-server
+  /usr/bin/env -i HOME="$HOLDER_HOME" PATH=/usr/bin:/bin \
+    MOSAIC_TMUX_SOCKET="$TEST_SOCKET" MOSAIC_TMUX_HOLDER=_holder "$HOLDER_START"
+  tmux -L "$TEST_SOCKET" has-session -t '=_holder:0.0' || fail "fresh holder was not created"
+  if tmux -L "$TEST_SOCKET" show-environment -g LD_PRELOAD 2>/dev/null | grep -q '^LD_PRELOAD='; then
+    fail "fresh holder retained LD_PRELOAD"
+  fi
+  /usr/bin/env -i HOME="$HOLDER_HOME" PATH=/usr/bin:/bin MOSAIC_HOME="$AGENT_HOME" \
+    "$START_AGENT" "$AGENT_NAME"
+  tmux -L "$TEST_SOCKET" has-session -t "=$AGENT_NAME:0.0" || \
+    fail "agent did not launch on a valid owned server"
+  tmux -L "$TEST_SOCKET" kill-server
+  trap - EXIT
+  rm -rf "$TEST_ROOT"
+fi
+
 echo "ok - fleet systemd unit templates"

packages/mosaic/framework/tools/fleet/start-agent-session.sh

@@ -1,39 +1,207 @@
 #!/usr/bin/env bash
 set -euo pipefail
 
-AGENT_NAME=${1:-${MOSAIC_AGENT_NAME:-}}
+# FCM-M2-001 boundary: only a roster-derived .env.generated projection and a
-# Absent socket ⇒ the LITERAL default tmux socket (no -L). The roster's
+# separately parsed data-only .env.local can influence launch. Never source an
-# socket_name is honored when set; absent never silently becomes mosaic-fleet
+# environment file and never accept a command string from either file.
-# (spawn stays consistent with the onboarding cheat-sheet + fleet ps observe).
-MOSAIC_TMUX_SOCKET=${MOSAIC_TMUX_SOCKET:-}
-MOSAIC_AGENT_RUNTIME=${MOSAIC_AGENT_RUNTIME:-pi}
-MOSAIC_AGENT_MODEL=${MOSAIC_AGENT_MODEL:-}
-MOSAIC_AGENT_REASONING=${MOSAIC_AGENT_REASONING:-}
-MOSAIC_AGENT_WORKDIR=${MOSAIC_AGENT_WORKDIR:-$HOME}
-MOSAIC_AGENT_COMMAND=${MOSAIC_AGENT_COMMAND:-}
-MOSAIC_HEARTBEAT_RUN_DIR=${MOSAIC_HEARTBEAT_RUN_DIR:-${MOSAIC_HOME:-$HOME/.config/mosaic}/fleet/run}
-MOSAIC_HEARTBEAT_INTERVAL=${MOSAIC_HEARTBEAT_INTERVAL:-15}
 
-if [ -z "$AGENT_NAME" ]; then
+MODE=launch
-  echo "ERROR: agent name argument or MOSAIC_AGENT_NAME is required" >&2
+case "${1:-}" in
-  exit 64
+  --stop)
-fi
+    MODE=stop
-
+    AGENT_NAME=${2:-}
-case "$MOSAIC_AGENT_REASONING" in
-  ''|low|medium|high) ;;
-  *)
-    echo "ERROR: MOSAIC_AGENT_REASONING must be low, medium, or high" >&2
-    exit 64
     ;;
+  --interaction)
+    MODE=interaction
+    AGENT_NAME=${2:-}
+    ;;
+  *) AGENT_NAME=${1:-${MOSAIC_AGENT_NAME:-}} ;;
 esac
+MOSAIC_HOME=${MOSAIC_HOME:-$HOME/.config/mosaic}
+
+fail() {
+  echo "ERROR: $*" >&2
+  exit 64
+}
+
+hash_value() {
+  printf '%s' "$1" | sha256sum | awk '{print $1}'
+}
+
+fail_env() {
+  local code="$1"
+  local key="$2"
+  local value="$3"
+  echo "ERROR: agent environment rejected: code=${code} key=${key} sha256=$(hash_value "$value")" >&2
+  exit 64
+}
+
+safe_agent_name() {
+  [[ "$1" =~ ^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9_.-]*$ ]]
+}
+
+safe_policy_name() {
+  [[ "$1" =~ ^[a-z][a-z0-9-]*$ ]]
+}
+
+safe_path() {
+  [[ "$1" == /* ]] || return 1
+  [[ "$1" != *".."* ]] || return 1
+  [[ ! "$1" =~ [[:space:]\"\'\`\$\\\;\|\&\<\>\(\)\{\}] ]]
+}
+
+assert_private_regular_file() {
+  local file="$1"
+  [ -f "$file" ] && [ ! -L "$file" ] || fail_env unsafe-file '(file)' "$file"
+  local mode
+  mode=$(stat -c '%a' -- "$file") || fail_env unsafe-file '(file)' "$file"
+  (( (8#$mode & 8#077) == 0 )) || fail_env unsafe-permissions '(file)' "$file"
+}
+
+assert_managed_directory() {
+  local directory="$1"
+  [ -d "$directory" ] && [ ! -L "$directory" ] || fail_env unsafe-directory '(directory)' "$directory"
+  local mode
+  mode=$(stat -c '%a' -- "$directory") || fail_env unsafe-directory '(directory)' "$directory"
+  (( (8#$mode & 8#022) == 0 )) || fail_env unsafe-permissions '(directory)' "$directory"
+}
+
+assert_private_directory() {
+  local directory="$1"
+  assert_managed_directory "$directory"
+  local mode
+  mode=$(stat -c '%a' -- "$directory") || fail_env unsafe-directory '(directory)' "$directory"
+  (( (8#$mode & 8#077) == 0 )) || fail_env unsafe-permissions '(directory)' "$directory"
+}
+
+[ -n "$AGENT_NAME" ] || fail "agent name argument or MOSAIC_AGENT_NAME is required"
+safe_agent_name "$AGENT_NAME" || fail_env unsafe-agent-name MOSAIC_AGENT_NAME "$AGENT_NAME"
+safe_path "$MOSAIC_HOME" || fail_env unsafe-path MOSAIC_HOME "$MOSAIC_HOME"
+
+FLEET_DIR="$MOSAIC_HOME/fleet"
+AGENT_ENV_DIR="$FLEET_DIR/agents"
+assert_managed_directory "$MOSAIC_HOME"
+assert_managed_directory "$FLEET_DIR"
+assert_private_directory "$AGENT_ENV_DIR"
+
+GENERATED_ENV="$AGENT_ENV_DIR/$AGENT_NAME.env.generated"
+LOCAL_ENV="$AGENT_ENV_DIR/$AGENT_NAME.env.local"
+
+declare -A GENERATED_VALUES=()
+declare -A LOCAL_VALUES=()
+declare -A SEEN_KEYS=()
+
+is_sensitive_key() {
+  [[ "$1" =~ (API[_-]?KEY|AUTH|CREDENTIAL|PASSWORD|PRIVATE|SECRET|TOKEN) ]]
+}
+
+is_generated_key() {
+  case "$1" in
+    MOSAIC_AGENT_NAME|MOSAIC_AGENT_CLASS|MOSAIC_AGENT_RUNTIME|MOSAIC_AGENT_MODEL|MOSAIC_AGENT_REASONING|MOSAIC_AGENT_TOOL_POLICY|MOSAIC_AGENT_WORKDIR|MOSAIC_TMUX_SOCKET) return 0 ;;
+    *) return 1 ;;
+  esac
+}
+
+is_local_key() {
+  case "$1" in
+    MOSAIC_RUNTIME_BIN|MOSAIC_HEARTBEAT_RUN_DIR|MOSAIC_HEARTBEAT_INTERVAL|MOSAIC_CLAUDE_JSON|CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR) return 0 ;;
+    *) return 1 ;;
+  esac
+}
+
+validate_generated_value() {
+  local key="$1"
+  local value="$2"
+  case "$key" in
+    MOSAIC_AGENT_NAME) safe_agent_name "$value" || fail_env unsafe-agent-name "$key" "$value" ;;
+    MOSAIC_AGENT_CLASS) safe_policy_name "$value" || fail_env unsafe-class "$key" "$value" ;;
+    MOSAIC_AGENT_RUNTIME)
+      case "$value" in claude|codex|opencode|pi) ;; *) fail_env unsupported-runtime "$key" "$value" ;; esac
+      ;;
+    MOSAIC_AGENT_MODEL) [[ "$value" =~ ^[A-Za-z0-9._/:+-]*$ ]] || fail_env unsafe-model "$key" "$value" ;;
+    MOSAIC_AGENT_REASONING)
+      case "$value" in ''|low|medium|high) ;; *) fail_env unsupported-reasoning "$key" "$value" ;; esac
+      ;;
+    MOSAIC_AGENT_TOOL_POLICY) [ -z "$value" ] || safe_policy_name "$value" || fail_env unsafe-tool-policy "$key" "$value" ;;
+    MOSAIC_AGENT_WORKDIR) safe_path "$value" || fail_env unsafe-path "$key" "$value" ;;
+    MOSAIC_TMUX_SOCKET) [[ "$value" =~ ^[A-Za-z0-9_.-]*$ ]] || fail_env unsafe-socket "$key" "$value" ;;
+  esac
+}
+
+validate_local_value() {
+  local key="$1"
+  local value="$2"
+  if [ "$key" = MOSAIC_HEARTBEAT_INTERVAL ]; then
+    [[ "$value" =~ ^[1-9][0-9]*$ ]] || fail_env invalid-interval "$key" "$value"
+  else
+    safe_path "$value" || fail_env unsafe-path "$key" "$value"
+  fi
+}
+
+load_environment_file() {
+  local file="$1"
+  local kind="$2"
+  [ -e "$file" ] || {
+    [ "$kind" = generated ] && fail_env missing-file '(generated)' "$file"
+    return 0
+  }
+  assert_private_regular_file "$file"
+  SEEN_KEYS=()
+
+  local line key value
+  while IFS= read -r line || [ -n "$line" ]; do
+    [ -z "$line" ] && continue
+    if [[ ! "$line" =~ ^([A-Z][A-Z0-9_]*)=(.*)$ ]]; then
+      fail_env malformed-line '(malformed)' "$line"
+    fi
+    key=${BASH_REMATCH[1]}
+    value=${BASH_REMATCH[2]}
+    [ -z "${SEEN_KEYS[$key]+set}" ] || fail_env duplicate-key "$key" "$value"
+    SEEN_KEYS[$key]=1
+    is_sensitive_key "$key" && fail_env sensitive-key "$key" "$value"
+
+    if [ "$kind" = generated ]; then
+      is_generated_key "$key" || fail_env unknown-key "$key" "$value"
+      validate_generated_value "$key" "$value"
+      GENERATED_VALUES[$key]=$value
+    else
+      is_generated_key "$key" && fail_env generated-key-shadow "$key" "$value"
+      is_local_key "$key" || fail_env unknown-key "$key" "$value"
+      validate_local_value "$key" "$value"
+      LOCAL_VALUES[$key]=$value
+    fi
+  done < "$file"
+}
+
+load_environment_file "$GENERATED_ENV" generated
+for required_key in \
+  MOSAIC_AGENT_NAME MOSAIC_AGENT_CLASS MOSAIC_AGENT_RUNTIME MOSAIC_AGENT_MODEL \
+  MOSAIC_AGENT_REASONING MOSAIC_AGENT_TOOL_POLICY MOSAIC_AGENT_WORKDIR MOSAIC_TMUX_SOCKET; do
+  [ -n "${GENERATED_VALUES[$required_key]+set}" ] || fail_env missing-key "$required_key" ''
+done
+load_environment_file "$LOCAL_ENV" local
+
+[ "${GENERATED_VALUES[MOSAIC_AGENT_NAME]}" = "$AGENT_NAME" ] || \
+  fail_env agent-name-mismatch MOSAIC_AGENT_NAME "${GENERATED_VALUES[MOSAIC_AGENT_NAME]}"
+
+MOSAIC_TMUX_SOCKET=${GENERATED_VALUES[MOSAIC_TMUX_SOCKET]}
+MOSAIC_AGENT_RUNTIME=${GENERATED_VALUES[MOSAIC_AGENT_RUNTIME]}
+MOSAIC_AGENT_MODEL=${GENERATED_VALUES[MOSAIC_AGENT_MODEL]}
+MOSAIC_AGENT_REASONING=${GENERATED_VALUES[MOSAIC_AGENT_REASONING]}
+MOSAIC_AGENT_WORKDIR=${GENERATED_VALUES[MOSAIC_AGENT_WORKDIR]}
+MOSAIC_AGENT_CLASS=${GENERATED_VALUES[MOSAIC_AGENT_CLASS]}
+MOSAIC_AGENT_TOOL_POLICY=${GENERATED_VALUES[MOSAIC_AGENT_TOOL_POLICY]}
+MOSAIC_RUNTIME_BIN=${LOCAL_VALUES[MOSAIC_RUNTIME_BIN]:-}
+MOSAIC_HEARTBEAT_RUN_DIR=${LOCAL_VALUES[MOSAIC_HEARTBEAT_RUN_DIR]:-$MOSAIC_HOME/fleet/run}
+MOSAIC_HEARTBEAT_INTERVAL=${LOCAL_VALUES[MOSAIC_HEARTBEAT_INTERVAL]:-15}
+MOSAIC_CLAUDE_JSON=${LOCAL_VALUES[MOSAIC_CLAUDE_JSON]:-}
+CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR=${LOCAL_VALUES[CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR]:-}
 
 if ! command -v tmux >/dev/null 2>&1; then
   echo "ERROR: tmux is required" >&2
   exit 69
 fi
 
-# tmux wrapper: pass -L only when a socket is configured. An absent/empty socket
-# means the default tmux socket (no -L), keeping spawn == observe == cheat-sheet.
 _tmux() {
   if [ -n "$MOSAIC_TMUX_SOCKET" ]; then
     tmux -L "$MOSAIC_TMUX_SOCKET" "$@"
@@ -42,140 +210,90 @@ _tmux() {
   fi
 }
 
+assert_owned_tmux_server() {
+  local owner_file="$MOSAIC_HOME/fleet/run/holder-owner"
+  [ -f "$owner_file" ] && [ ! -L "$owner_file" ] || fail "private tmux ownership identity is missing"
+  local owner_mode
+  owner_mode=$(stat -c '%a' -- "$owner_file") || fail "private tmux ownership identity is unreadable"
+  (( (8#$owner_mode & 8#077) == 0 )) || fail "private tmux ownership identity has unsafe permissions"
+  local owner
+  owner=$(tr -d '\n' < "$owner_file")
+  [[ "$owner" =~ ^[a-f0-9-]{36}$ ]] || fail "private tmux ownership identity is malformed"
+  _tmux has-session -t '=_holder:0.0' 2>/dev/null || fail "owned tmux holder session is absent"
+  local environment expected
+  environment=$(_tmux show-environment -g 2>/dev/null) || fail "owned tmux global environment is unreadable"
+  expected=$(printf '%s\n' \
+    "HOME=$HOME" \
+    'PATH=/usr/bin:/bin' \
+    "PWD=$HOME" \
+    "MOSAIC_FLEET_OWNER=$owner" \
+    'MOSAIC_TMUX_HOLDER=_holder' \
+    "MOSAIC_TMUX_SOCKET=$MOSAIC_TMUX_SOCKET" | sort)
+  [ "$(printf '%s\n' "$environment" | sort)" = "$expected" ] || \
+    fail "tmux server ownership or environment validation failed"
+}
+
+# Validate exact server ownership before querying, cleaning, or creating any
+# managed session. An unmanaged or contaminated named socket is never repaired.
+assert_owned_tmux_server
+
+if [ "$MODE" = interaction ]; then
+  [ "$MOSAIC_AGENT_RUNTIME" = pi ] || fail "operator interaction service requires runtime pi"
+  [ "$MOSAIC_AGENT_MODEL" = openai/gpt-5.6-sol ] || \
+    fail "operator interaction service requires the pinned model"
+  [ "$MOSAIC_AGENT_REASONING" = high ] || \
+    fail "operator interaction service requires high reasoning"
+  [ "$MOSAIC_AGENT_TOOL_POLICY" = operator-interaction ] || \
+    fail "operator interaction service requires the operator-interaction tool policy"
+fi
+
+if [ "$MODE" = stop ]; then
+  _tmux kill-session -t "=${AGENT_NAME}" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
+  exit 0
+fi
+
 if _tmux has-session -t "=${AGENT_NAME}:0.0" 2>/dev/null; then
   echo "Mosaic agent session already running: $AGENT_NAME on socket ${MOSAIC_TMUX_SOCKET:-(default)}"
   exit 0
 fi
 
-if [ -z "$MOSAIC_AGENT_COMMAND" ]; then
+# Systemd passes HOME as %h, and the installed service fixes MOSAIC_HOME under
-  # Map the roster's per-agent model_hint to `--model` so workers launch on the
+# that home. Derive the pane home from the canonical path when available so an
-  # configured model (e.g. pi on openai-codex/gpt-5.5:high). Omitted when unset.
+# inherited pane/session HOME cannot become runtime authority.
-  MOSAIC_AGENT_COMMAND="mosaic yolo $MOSAIC_AGENT_RUNTIME${MOSAIC_AGENT_MODEL:+ --model $MOSAIC_AGENT_MODEL}${MOSAIC_AGENT_REASONING:+ --thinking $MOSAIC_AGENT_REASONING}"
+PANE_HOME=$HOME
-fi
+case "$MOSAIC_HOME" in
+  */.config/mosaic) PANE_HOME=${MOSAIC_HOME%/.config/mosaic} ;;
+esac
 
-# ── Derive a runtime-bin PATH prefix ─────────────────────────────────────────
-# Precedence:
-#   1. $MOSAIC_RUNTIME_BIN (explicit override)
-#   2. $(npm config get prefix)/bin  (if npm is on PATH)
-#   3. Fallbacks: $HOME/.npm-global/bin and $HOME/.local/bin
-#
-# Only directories that already exist are included.  The prefix is baked into
-# the pane command regardless of what the LAUNCHER process's $PATH contains,
-# because the tmux pane inherits the tmux SERVER environment (not this script's
-# environment).  A dir on the launcher's PATH may be absent from the server PATH,
-# so every existing candidate must always be included.  Dedup within the
-# constructed prefix avoids listing the same dir twice.
 _build_runtime_bin_prefix() {
   local candidates=()
-
+  if [ -n "$MOSAIC_RUNTIME_BIN" ]; then candidates+=("$MOSAIC_RUNTIME_BIN"); fi
-  if [ -n "${MOSAIC_RUNTIME_BIN:-}" ]; then
-    candidates+=("$MOSAIC_RUNTIME_BIN")
-  fi
-
   if command -v npm >/dev/null 2>&1; then
     local npm_prefix
     npm_prefix=$(npm config get prefix 2>/dev/null) || true
-    if [ -n "$npm_prefix" ]; then
+    if [ -n "$npm_prefix" ]; then candidates+=("${npm_prefix}/bin"); fi
-      candidates+=("${npm_prefix}/bin")
-    fi
   fi
+  candidates+=("$PANE_HOME/.npm-global/bin" "$PANE_HOME/.local/bin")
 
-  candidates+=("$HOME/.npm-global/bin")
+  local prefix="" dir
-  candidates+=("$HOME/.local/bin")
-
-  local prefix=""
   for dir in "${candidates[@]}"; do
     [ -d "$dir" ] || continue
-    if [ -z "$prefix" ]; then
+    case ":${prefix}:" in *":${dir}:"*) ;; *) prefix="${prefix:+$prefix:}$dir" ;; esac
-      prefix="$dir"
-    else
-      case ":${prefix}:" in
-        *":${dir}:"*) ;;  # already in our prefix — skip
-        *) prefix="${prefix}:${dir}" ;;
-      esac
-    fi
   done
-
   printf '%s' "$prefix"
 }
 
 MOSAIC_RUNTIME_BIN_PREFIX=$(_build_runtime_bin_prefix)
+PANE_PATH=${MOSAIC_RUNTIME_BIN_PREFIX:+${MOSAIC_RUNTIME_BIN_PREFIX}:}/usr/local/bin:/usr/bin:/bin
 
-# ── Build the pane command ────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-# The pane command must:
-#   - Export the augmented PATH so the runtime binary is found.
-#   - exec the agent command so the runtime is the pane's foreground process
-#     (makes `fleet ps` pane_current_command check reliable; no DRIFT false-positive).
-#
-# Quoting strategy: single-quote the inner shell snippet so that variable
-# references in MOSAIC_AGENT_COMMAND are NOT expanded here — they expand inside
-# the pane shell.  However, MOSAIC_RUNTIME_BIN_PREFIX and PATH must be expanded
-# NOW (in this script) because the pane shell inherits the tmux server
-# environment, not this script's env.
-#
-# We build the snippet as a double-quoted here-string embedded in a printf call
-# to avoid nested quoting problems.
-#
-# MOSAIC_AGENT_NAME must also be exported INTO the pane: panes inherit the tmux
-# server environment (not this script's, and not the systemd unit's), so the
-# name would otherwise be empty in-pane and the runtime's native heartbeat
-# (which gates on MOSAIC_AGENT_NAME) would never fire. %q-quote it so it is a
-# safe single bash token regardless of the name's characters.
-AGENT_NAME_Q=$(printf '%q' "$AGENT_NAME")
-
-# MOSAIC_AGENT_CLASS must ALSO be exported INTO the pane, for the same reason as
-# MOSAIC_AGENT_NAME above: the pane inherits the tmux SERVER environment (not this
-# script's env, and not the systemd unit's EnvironmentFile), so the per-agent class
-# written to agents/<name>.env would otherwise be invisible in-pane. The launcher
-# composes the persona contract from process.env.MOSAIC_AGENT_CLASS at launch
-# (compose-contract -> readPersonaContractBlock); without this export it sees an
-# undefined class and silently injects NO persona contract. %q-quote it so it is a
-# safe single bash token; an empty/unset class %q-quotes to '' and is a harmless
-# no-op downstream (readPersonaContractBlock returns '' for an empty class).
-AGENT_CLASS_Q=$(printf '%q' "${MOSAIC_AGENT_CLASS:-}")
-AGENT_TOOL_POLICY_Q=$(printf '%q' "${MOSAIC_AGENT_TOOL_POLICY:-}")
-
-if [ -n "$MOSAIC_RUNTIME_BIN_PREFIX" ]; then
-  PANE_SHELL_SNIPPET="export MOSAIC_AGENT_NAME=${AGENT_NAME_Q}; export MOSAIC_AGENT_CLASS=${AGENT_CLASS_Q}; export MOSAIC_AGENT_TOOL_POLICY=${AGENT_TOOL_POLICY_Q}; export PATH=\"${MOSAIC_RUNTIME_BIN_PREFIX}:\${PATH}\"; exec ${MOSAIC_AGENT_COMMAND}"
-else
-  PANE_SHELL_SNIPPET="export MOSAIC_AGENT_NAME=${AGENT_NAME_Q}; export MOSAIC_AGENT_CLASS=${AGENT_CLASS_Q}; export MOSAIC_AGENT_TOOL_POLICY=${AGENT_TOOL_POLICY_Q}; exec ${MOSAIC_AGENT_COMMAND}"
-fi
-
-mkdir -p "$MOSAIC_AGENT_WORKDIR"
-
-# ── Pre-trust the workdir for the Claude runtime ─────────────────────────────
-# Claude Code shows a one-time "Is this a project you trust?" folder-trust gate
-# the first time it opens a directory. A fleet-launched agent has no human to
-# answer it, so the pane stalls forever at the prompt while its heartbeat keeps
-# reporting "healthy" (the pane process IS alive — it's just blocked).
-#
-# IMPORTANT: --dangerously-skip-permissions does NOT bypass this gate, and
-# neither does `trustedProjectDirectories` in settings.json (verified empirically
-# 2026-06-24). The ONLY thing the gate honors is the per-project record in
-# ~/.claude.json: projects["<dir>"].hasTrustDialogAccepted == true (exactly what
-# answering the prompt writes). So we pre-seed that record here.
-#
-# Idempotent, atomic, best-effort: any failure is non-fatal (the agent still
-# launches — worst case it stalls on the gate, i.e. the pre-fix status quo).
-# Only the claude runtime needs this; codex/pi have no such gate.
 _ensure_claude_workdir_trusted() {
   local workdir="$1"
-  # The path claude keys on is the resolved cwd it is launched in.
+  local resolved
-  local rp
+  resolved=$(cd "$workdir" 2>/dev/null && pwd -P) || resolved="$workdir"
-  rp=$(cd "$workdir" 2>/dev/null && pwd -P) || rp="$workdir"
-  # ~/.claude.json lives next to the claude config dir; honor CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR.
   local claude_json="${MOSAIC_CLAUDE_JSON:-${CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR:+$CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR/.claude.json}}"
   claude_json="${claude_json:-$HOME/.claude.json}"
-
+  command -v python3 >/dev/null 2>&1 || return 1
-  if ! command -v python3 >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+  MOSAIC_CJ="$claude_json" MOSAIC_TRUST_DIR="$resolved" python3 - <<'PY'
-    echo "WARNING: python3 not found; cannot pre-trust '$rp' for claude (agent may stall on the folder-trust gate)" >&2
-    return 1
-  fi
-
-  # Serialize concurrent agent launches that share ~/.claude.json (flock if available).
-  local lock="${claude_json}.mosaic-lock"
-  _seed() {
-    MOSAIC_CJ="$claude_json" MOSAIC_TRUST_DIR="$rp" python3 - <<'PY'
 import json, os, sys, tempfile
 cj = os.environ["MOSAIC_CJ"]
 d = os.environ["MOSAIC_TRUST_DIR"]
@@ -184,22 +302,19 @@ try:
     if not isinstance(data, dict):
         data = {}
 except Exception:
-    # Never corrupt an unreadable/partial file — bail without writing.
     sys.exit(2)
 projects = data.setdefault("projects", {})
 entry = projects.get(d)
 if not isinstance(entry, dict):
     entry = {}
     projects[d] = entry
-if entry.get("hasTrustDialogAccepted") is True:
-    sys.exit(0)  # already trusted — nothing to do
 entry["hasTrustDialogAccepted"] = True
 tmp_dir = os.path.dirname(cj) or "."
 fd, tmp = tempfile.mkstemp(dir=tmp_dir, prefix=".claude.json.mosaic.")
 try:
     with os.fdopen(fd, "w") as f:
         json.dump(data, f, indent=2)
-    os.replace(tmp, cj)  # atomic
+    os.replace(tmp, cj)
 except Exception:
     try:
         os.unlink(tmp)
@@ -207,56 +322,56 @@ except Exception:
         pass
     sys.exit(3)
 PY
-  }
-  if command -v flock >/dev/null 2>&1; then
-    ( flock 9; _seed ) 9>"$lock" 2>/dev/null || _seed
-  else
-    _seed
-  fi
 }
 
-case "$MOSAIC_AGENT_RUNTIME" in
+if [ "$MOSAIC_AGENT_RUNTIME" = claude ]; then
-  claude)
+  _ensure_claude_workdir_trusted "$MOSAIC_AGENT_WORKDIR" || \
-    _ensure_claude_workdir_trusted "$MOSAIC_AGENT_WORKDIR" \
+    echo "WARNING: could not pre-trust workdir for claude agent $AGENT_NAME" >&2
-      || echo "WARNING: could not pre-trust workdir for claude agent $AGENT_NAME" >&2
+fi
-    ;;
-esac
 
-# ── Launch the tmux session (no exec — we continue to wire the heartbeat) ────
+LAUNCH_COMMAND=(mosaic yolo "$MOSAIC_AGENT_RUNTIME")
+if [ -n "$MOSAIC_AGENT_MODEL" ]; then LAUNCH_COMMAND+=(--model "$MOSAIC_AGENT_MODEL"); fi
+if [ -n "$MOSAIC_AGENT_REASONING" ]; then LAUNCH_COMMAND+=(--thinking "$MOSAIC_AGENT_REASONING"); fi
+
+# The tmux holder owns a named server. Explicitly clear the pane environment
+# so server/session variables cannot cross the launch boundary; retain only
+# trusted bootstrap, generated, and approved local data as argv assignments.
+LAUNCH_ENV=(
+  /usr/bin/env
+  -i
+  "HOME=$PANE_HOME"
+  "PATH=$PANE_PATH"
+  "MOSAIC_HOME=$MOSAIC_HOME"
+  "MOSAIC_AGENT_NAME=$AGENT_NAME"
+  "MOSAIC_AGENT_CLASS=$MOSAIC_AGENT_CLASS"
+  "MOSAIC_AGENT_RUNTIME=$MOSAIC_AGENT_RUNTIME"
+  "MOSAIC_AGENT_MODEL=$MOSAIC_AGENT_MODEL"
+  "MOSAIC_AGENT_REASONING=$MOSAIC_AGENT_REASONING"
+  "MOSAIC_AGENT_TOOL_POLICY=$MOSAIC_AGENT_TOOL_POLICY"
+  "MOSAIC_AGENT_WORKDIR=$MOSAIC_AGENT_WORKDIR"
+  "MOSAIC_TMUX_SOCKET=$MOSAIC_TMUX_SOCKET"
+  "MOSAIC_HEARTBEAT_RUN_DIR=$MOSAIC_HEARTBEAT_RUN_DIR"
+)
+
+mkdir -p "$MOSAIC_AGENT_WORKDIR"
 _tmux new-session -d -s "$AGENT_NAME" -c "$MOSAIC_AGENT_WORKDIR" \
-  bash -c "$PANE_SHELL_SNIPPET"
+  "${LAUNCH_ENV[@]}" "${LAUNCH_COMMAND[@]}"
 
-# ── Resolve the pane PID (retry briefly to let the session initialise) ────────
 PANE_PID=""
 for _retry in 1 2 3 4 5; do
-  PANE_PID=$(_tmux list-panes \
+  PANE_PID=$(_tmux list-panes -t "=${AGENT_NAME}:0.0" -F '#{pane_pid}' 2>/dev/null || true)
-    -t "=${AGENT_NAME}:0.0" -F '#{pane_pid}' 2>/dev/null || true)
   [ -n "$PANE_PID" ] && break
   sleep 0.2
 done
 
-# ── Spawn the heartbeat sidecar (detached, best-effort) ──────────────────────
-# The sidecar writes ~/.config/mosaic/fleet/run/<AGENT>.hb atomically while the
-# pane process is alive, then exits so the file goes stale (fleet ps shows stale
-# then PANE=dead).  It is runtime-agnostic: it only cares about the pane PID.
 _start_heartbeat_sidecar() {
-  local agent="$1"
+  local agent="$1" pane_pid="$2" run_dir="$3" interval="$4"
-  local pane_pid="$2"
-  local run_dir="$3"
-  local interval="$4"
   local hb_file="${run_dir}/${agent}.hb"
-
   mkdir -p "$run_dir"
-
-  # Write the sidecar as a self-contained bash one-liner so it carries no
-  # references to any variables from this script's environment.
   local sidecar_script
   sidecar_script=$(printf \
-    'hb=%q; pid=%q; iv=%q; mkdir -p "$(dirname "$hb")"; while kill -0 "$pid" 2>/dev/null; do nat="$hb.native"; if [ -f "$nat" ] && [ "$(( $(date +%%s) - $(stat -c %%Y "$nat" 2>/dev/null || echo 0) ))" -lt "$(( iv * 2 ))" ]; then sleep "$iv"; continue; fi; tmp="$hb.tmp.$$"; printf "ts=%%s\npid=%%s\nstatus=ok\n" "$(date +%%Y-%%m-%%dT%%H:%%M:%%S%%z)" "$pid" > "$tmp" && mv "$tmp" "$hb"; sleep "$iv"; done' \
+    'hb=%q; pid=%q; iv=%q; native="$hb.native"; mkdir -p "$(dirname "$hb")"; while kill -0 "$pid" 2>/dev/null; do now=$(date +%%s); marker=$(stat -c %%Y -- "$native" 2>/dev/null || true); if [ -z "$marker" ] || [ -L "$native" ] || (( now - marker > iv * 2 + 1 )); then tmp="$hb.tmp.$$"; printf "ts=%%s\npid=%%s\nstatus=ok\n" "$(date +%%Y-%%m-%%dT%%H:%%M:%%S%%z)" "$pid" > "$tmp" && mv "$tmp" "$hb"; fi; sleep "$iv"; done' \
     "$hb_file" "$pane_pid" "$interval")
-
-  # setsid + disown ensures the sidecar survives this script exiting.
-  # stderr/stdout go to /dev/null; failures are non-fatal.
   if command -v setsid >/dev/null 2>&1; then
     setsid bash -c "$sidecar_script" </dev/null >/dev/null 2>&1 &
   else
@@ -266,7 +381,6 @@ _start_heartbeat_sidecar() {
 }
 
 if [ -n "$PANE_PID" ]; then
-  # Guard: do not let sidecar startup failures abort the launcher (set -e).
   _start_heartbeat_sidecar "$AGENT_NAME" "$PANE_PID" \
     "$MOSAIC_HEARTBEAT_RUN_DIR" "$MOSAIC_HEARTBEAT_INTERVAL" || \
     echo "WARNING: heartbeat sidecar could not be started for $AGENT_NAME" >&2

packages/mosaic/framework/tools/fleet/start-interaction-service.sh

@@ -9,11 +9,7 @@ fail() {
 }
 
 [ -n "$AGENT_NAME" ] || fail "agent name argument is required"
-[[ "$AGENT_NAME" =~ ^[A-Za-z0-9_.-]+$ ]] || fail "agent name contains unsupported characters"
-[ "${MOSAIC_AGENT_NAME:-}" = "$AGENT_NAME" ] || fail "configured agent name must exactly match the service instance"
-[ "${MOSAIC_AGENT_RUNTIME:-}" = "pi" ] || fail "operator interaction service requires runtime pi"
-[ "${MOSAIC_AGENT_MODEL:-}" = "openai/gpt-5.6-sol" ] || fail "operator interaction service requires the pinned model"
-[ "${MOSAIC_AGENT_REASONING:-}" = "high" ] || fail "operator interaction service requires high reasoning"
-[ "${MOSAIC_AGENT_TOOL_POLICY:-}" = "operator-interaction" ] || fail "operator interaction service requires the operator-interaction tool policy"
 
-exec "$(cd -- "$(dirname -- "$0")" && pwd)/start-agent-session.sh" "$AGENT_NAME"
+# The shared launcher strictly validates the generated/local data boundary
+# before it applies this interaction service's pinned profile checks.
+exec "$(cd -- "$(dirname -- "$0")" && pwd)/start-agent-session.sh" --interaction "$AGENT_NAME"

packages/mosaic/framework/tools/fleet/start-tmux-holder.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+set -euo pipefail
+
+# A holder may create only the configured named socket. Existing servers are
+# accepted only when their private install-derived ownership identity, exact
+# holder session, and complete approved global environment all match.
+
+MOSAIC_HOME=${MOSAIC_HOME:-$HOME/.config/mosaic}
+MOSAIC_TMUX_SOCKET=${MOSAIC_TMUX_SOCKET:-mosaic-fleet}
+MOSAIC_TMUX_HOLDER=${MOSAIC_TMUX_HOLDER:-_holder}
+OWNER_FILE="$MOSAIC_HOME/fleet/run/holder-owner"
+TMUX_BIN=/usr/bin/tmux
+
+fail() {
+  echo "ERROR: refusing unmanaged Mosaic tmux server on socket ${MOSAIC_TMUX_SOCKET}: $1" >&2
+  exit 64
+}
+
+[ -x "$TMUX_BIN" ] || fail "tmux binary is unavailable"
+[ -f "$OWNER_FILE" ] && [ ! -L "$OWNER_FILE" ] || fail "private ownership identity is missing"
+owner_mode=$(stat -c '%a' -- "$OWNER_FILE") || fail "private ownership identity is unreadable"
+(( (8#$owner_mode & 8#077) == 0 )) || fail "private ownership identity has unsafe permissions"
+MOSAIC_FLEET_OWNER=$(tr -d '\n' < "$OWNER_FILE")
+[[ "$MOSAIC_FLEET_OWNER" =~ ^[a-f0-9-]{36}$ ]] || fail "private ownership identity is malformed"
+
+_tmux() {
+  "$TMUX_BIN" -L "$MOSAIC_TMUX_SOCKET" "$@"
+}
+
+server_running() {
+  _tmux list-sessions >/dev/null 2>&1
+}
+
+assert_owned_server() {
+  _tmux has-session -t "=${MOSAIC_TMUX_HOLDER}:0.0" 2>/dev/null || fail "exact holder session is absent"
+  local environment
+  environment=$(_tmux show-environment -g 2>/dev/null) || fail "global environment is unreadable"
+  local expected
+  expected=$(printf '%s\n' \
+    "HOME=$HOME" \
+    'PATH=/usr/bin:/bin' \
+    "PWD=$HOME" \
+    "MOSAIC_FLEET_OWNER=$MOSAIC_FLEET_OWNER" \
+    "MOSAIC_TMUX_HOLDER=$MOSAIC_TMUX_HOLDER" \
+    "MOSAIC_TMUX_SOCKET=$MOSAIC_TMUX_SOCKET" | sort)
+  [ "$(printf '%s\n' "$environment" | sort)" = "$expected" ] || \
+    fail "global environment does not match the owned-server contract"
+}
+
+if server_running; then
+  assert_owned_server
+else
+  cd "$HOME" || fail "trusted home is unavailable"
+  # Start the tmux server itself under the approved environment. The holder pane
+  # receives the same closed environment rather than arbitrary server globals.
+  /usr/bin/env -i \
+    "HOME=$HOME" \
+    PATH=/usr/bin:/bin \
+    "MOSAIC_FLEET_OWNER=$MOSAIC_FLEET_OWNER" \
+    "MOSAIC_TMUX_HOLDER=$MOSAIC_TMUX_HOLDER" \
+    "MOSAIC_TMUX_SOCKET=$MOSAIC_TMUX_SOCKET" \
+    "$TMUX_BIN" -L "$MOSAIC_TMUX_SOCKET" new-session -d -s "$MOSAIC_TMUX_HOLDER" \
+    /usr/bin/env -i "HOME=$HOME" PATH=/usr/bin:/bin /bin/sh -c 'while true; do sleep 3600; done'
+fi

packages/mosaic/framework/tools/fleet/test-start-agent-session.sh

@@ -3,373 +3,410 @@ set -euo pipefail
 
 SCRIPT_DIR=$(cd -- "$(dirname -- "$0")" && pwd)
 START="$SCRIPT_DIR/start-agent-session.sh"
-SOCKET="mosaic-agent-test-$RANDOM-$$"
+INTERACTION_START="$SCRIPT_DIR/start-interaction-service.sh"
-AGENT="agent-$RANDOM"
+ROOT=$(mktemp -d)
-WORKDIR=$(mktemp -d)
+FAKE_BIN=$(mktemp -d)
-
+TMUX_CALLS=$(mktemp)
-# Keep a single cleanup trap that accumulates resources.
+trap 'rm -rf "$ROOT" "$FAKE_BIN" "$TMUX_CALLS"' EXIT
-CLEANUP_DIRS=("$WORKDIR")
-CLEANUP_SOCKETS=("$SOCKET")
-trap '_cleanup' EXIT
-_cleanup() {
-  for s in "${CLEANUP_SOCKETS[@]:-}"; do
-    tmux -L "$s" kill-server >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
-  done
-  for d in "${CLEANUP_DIRS[@]:-}"; do
-    rm -rf "$d"
-  done
-}
 
 fail() {
   echo "FAIL: $*" >&2
   exit 1
 }
 
-# ── Test 1: basic session creation with workdir check ─────────────────────────
+cat > "$FAKE_BIN/tmux" <<'SHIM'
-MOSAIC_TMUX_SOCKET="$SOCKET" \
-MOSAIC_AGENT_WORKDIR="$WORKDIR" \
-MOSAIC_AGENT_COMMAND='bash --noprofile --norc -i' \
-  "$START" "$AGENT"
-
-tmux -L "$SOCKET" has-session -t "=$AGENT:0.0" || fail "agent session was not created"
-# Retry: pane_current_path briefly reflects the tmux server's cwd until the pane
-# process establishes its own cwd (the -c start dir). Poll until it settles.
-actual_dir=""
-for _ in $(seq 1 30); do
-  actual_dir=$(tmux -L "$SOCKET" display-message -p -t "=$AGENT:0.0" '#{pane_current_path}')
-  [ "$actual_dir" = "$WORKDIR" ] && break
-  sleep 0.1
-done
-[ "$actual_dir" = "$WORKDIR" ] || fail "agent workdir mismatch: $actual_dir (expected $WORKDIR)"
-
-# ── Test 2: idempotency (duplicate start prints 'already running') ─────────────
-MOSAIC_TMUX_SOCKET="$SOCKET" \
-MOSAIC_AGENT_WORKDIR="$WORKDIR" \
-MOSAIC_AGENT_COMMAND='bash --noprofile --norc -i' \
-  "$START" "$AGENT" >/tmp/mosaic-start-agent-idempotent.out
-
-grep -qF 'already running' /tmp/mosaic-start-agent-idempotent.out || fail "duplicate start was not idempotent"
-
-# ── Test 3: runtime-bin PATH prefix is baked into the pane command ────────────
-#
-# We capture the command the script would hand to tmux by injecting a fake
-# 'tmux' shim into PATH.  The shim:
-#   - Intercepts 'new-session' calls and records its arguments to a file.
-#   - For 'has-session' calls, exits 1 (session does not exist) so the script
-#     proceeds to launch instead of printing "already running".
-#   - For 'list-panes' calls, returns empty so PANE_PID stays unset and the
-#     heartbeat sidecar is NOT spawned (heartbeat is not the focus of this test;
-#     test 6 and 7 cover that path).  This prevents any real-filesystem side
-#     effects or leaked background processes.
-#   - For all other subcommands, exits 0.
-#
-# Assertions:
-#   a) 'export PATH=' with the synthetic MOSAIC_RUNTIME_BIN prefix appears.
-#   b) 'exec' appears so the runtime replaces the wrapper shell.
-#   c) MOSAIC_AGENT_COMMAND with flags is forwarded intact.
-
-FAKE_BIN=$(mktemp -d)
-FAKE_RUNTIME_BIN=$(mktemp -d)
-TMUX_ARGS_FILE=$(mktemp)
-HB_RUN_DIR3=$(mktemp -d)
-CLEANUP_DIRS+=("$FAKE_BIN" "$FAKE_RUNTIME_BIN" "$HB_RUN_DIR3")
-
-# Write the fake tmux shim (uses only positional args, no sourced vars).
-cat > "$FAKE_BIN/tmux" <<SHIM
 #!/usr/bin/env bash
-# Fake tmux: record new-session args; report has-session as missing.
+set -euo pipefail
-subcmd="\$3"  # argv: tmux -L <socket> <subcmd> ...
+printf '%s\0' "$@" >> "${MOSAIC_TEST_TMUX_CALLS:?}"
-if [ "\$subcmd" = "has-session" ]; then
+args=("$@")
-  exit 1   # session not found → script will attempt new-session
+index=0
-fi
+if [ "${args[0]:-}" = -L ]; then index=2; fi
-if [ "\$subcmd" = "new-session" ]; then
+case "${args[$index]:-}" in
-  printf '%s\n' "\$@" > "$TMUX_ARGS_FILE"
+  has-session)
+    for argument in "${args[@]}"; do
+      [ "$argument" = '=_holder:0.0' ] && exit 0
+    done
+    exit 1
+    ;;
+  show-environment)
+    printf '%s\n' \
+      "HOME=${MOSAIC_TEST_HOME:?}" \
+      'PATH=/usr/bin:/bin' \
+      "PWD=${MOSAIC_TEST_HOME:?}" \
+      "MOSAIC_FLEET_OWNER=${MOSAIC_TEST_FLEET_OWNER:?}" \
+      'MOSAIC_TMUX_HOLDER=_holder' \
+      'MOSAIC_TMUX_SOCKET=mosaic-test'
     exit 0
-fi
+    ;;
-if [ "\$subcmd" = "list-panes" ]; then
+  list-panes) printf '%s\n' "${MOSAIC_TEST_PANE_PID:-}"; exit 0 ;;
-  # Return empty: no sidecar spawned (heartbeat is not the focus of this test).
+  new-session)
-  echo ""
+    if [ "${MOSAIC_TEST_EXECUTE_PANE:-}" = 1 ]; then
+      for ((index = 0; index < ${#args[@]}; index++)); do
+        if [ "${args[$index]}" = /usr/bin/env ]; then
+          "${args[@]:$index}"
+          break
+        fi
+      done
+    fi
     exit 0
-fi
+    ;;
-exit 0
+  *) exit 0 ;;
+esac
 SHIM
 chmod +x "$FAKE_BIN/tmux"
 
-SOCKET3="mosaic-agent-test3-$RANDOM-$$"
+cat > "$FAKE_BIN/mosaic" <<'SHIM'
-AGENT3="agent3-$RANDOM"
-WORKDIR3=$(mktemp -d)
-CLEANUP_DIRS+=("$WORKDIR3")
-
-PATH="$FAKE_BIN:$PATH" \
-MOSAIC_TMUX_SOCKET="$SOCKET3" \
-MOSAIC_AGENT_WORKDIR="$WORKDIR3" \
-MOSAIC_AGENT_RUNTIME="pi" \
-MOSAIC_AGENT_CLASS="code" \
-MOSAIC_AGENT_TOOL_POLICY="operator-interaction" \
-MOSAIC_RUNTIME_BIN="$FAKE_RUNTIME_BIN" \
-MOSAIC_AGENT_COMMAND="mosaic yolo pi --model openai-codex/gpt-5.5:high" \
-MOSAIC_HEARTBEAT_RUN_DIR="$HB_RUN_DIR3" \
-  "$START" "$AGENT3"
-
-all_args=$(cat "$TMUX_ARGS_FILE" 2>/dev/null || true)
-rm -f "$TMUX_ARGS_FILE"
-
-echo "--- captured tmux new-session args ---"
-echo "$all_args"
-echo "--- end args ---"
-
-# a) PATH prefix containing FAKE_RUNTIME_BIN must appear.
-echo "$all_args" | grep -qF "export PATH=" || fail "pane command does not export PATH"
-echo "$all_args" | grep -qF "$FAKE_RUNTIME_BIN" || fail "pane command does not include MOSAIC_RUNTIME_BIN in PATH prefix"
-
-# b) exec must appear so the runtime replaces the wrapper shell.
-echo "$all_args" | grep -qF "exec " || fail "pane command does not use exec"
-
-# c) Full MOSAIC_AGENT_COMMAND (with flags) must be forwarded.
-echo "$all_args" | grep -qF "mosaic yolo pi --model openai-codex/gpt-5.5:high" || \
-  fail "pane command does not forward MOSAIC_AGENT_COMMAND with flags intact"
-
-# d) MOSAIC_AGENT_NAME and the per-agent MOSAIC_AGENT_CLASS must BOTH be exported
-#    INTO the pane. The pane inherits the tmux SERVER environment (not this
-#    script's env, nor the systemd unit's EnvironmentFile), so any per-agent var
-#    the launcher needs in-pane must be re-exported in the snippet. CLASS is
-#    load-bearing: the launcher composes the persona contract from
-#    process.env.MOSAIC_AGENT_CLASS, so a missing export silently drops the
-#    persona (regression guard for the A3a pane-propagation gap).
-echo "$all_args" | grep -qF "export MOSAIC_AGENT_NAME=" || \
-  fail "pane command does not export MOSAIC_AGENT_NAME into the pane"
-echo "$all_args" | grep -qF "export MOSAIC_AGENT_CLASS=code" || \
-  fail "pane command does not export MOSAIC_AGENT_CLASS into the pane (persona would silently drop)"
-echo "$all_args" | grep -qF "export MOSAIC_AGENT_TOOL_POLICY=operator-interaction" || \
-  fail "pane command does not export MOSAIC_AGENT_TOOL_POLICY into the pane"
-
-# ── Test 4: when no extra runtime-bin dirs exist, exec still appears ───────────
-TMUX_ARGS_FILE2=$(mktemp)
-FAKE_BIN2=$(mktemp -d)
-HB_RUN_DIR4=$(mktemp -d)
-CLEANUP_DIRS+=("$FAKE_BIN2" "$HB_RUN_DIR4")
-
-cat > "$FAKE_BIN2/tmux" <<SHIM2
 #!/usr/bin/env bash
-subcmd="\$3"
+set -euo pipefail
-if [ "\$subcmd" = "has-session" ]; then exit 1; fi
+env -0 > "${MOSAIC_HOME:?}/fleet/pane-environment"
-if [ "\$subcmd" = "new-session" ]; then
+SHIM
-  printf '%s\n' "\$@" > "$TMUX_ARGS_FILE2"
+chmod +x "$FAKE_BIN/mosaic"
-  exit 0
+
+write_generated() {
+  local home="$1"
+  local agent="$2"
+  mkdir -p "$home/fleet/agents" "$home/fleet/run"
+  chmod 700 "$home" "$home/fleet" "$home/fleet/agents" "$home/fleet/run"
+  printf '123e4567-e89b-12d3-a456-426614174000\n' > "$home/fleet/run/holder-owner"
+  chmod 600 "$home/fleet/run/holder-owner"
+  cat > "$home/fleet/agents/$agent.env.generated" <<EOF
+MOSAIC_AGENT_NAME=$agent
+MOSAIC_AGENT_CLASS=code
+MOSAIC_AGENT_RUNTIME=pi
+MOSAIC_AGENT_MODEL=openai-codex/gpt-5.6-sol
+MOSAIC_AGENT_REASONING=high
+MOSAIC_AGENT_TOOL_POLICY=code
+MOSAIC_AGENT_WORKDIR=$home/work
+MOSAIC_TMUX_SOCKET=mosaic-test
+EOF
+  chmod 600 "$home/fleet/agents/$agent.env.generated"
+  mkdir -p "$home/work"
+}
+
+run_start() {
+  local home="$1"
+  local agent="$2"
+  HOME="$home" PATH="$FAKE_BIN:$PATH" MOSAIC_TEST_TMUX_CALLS="$TMUX_CALLS" \
+    MOSAIC_TEST_PANE_PID="${MOSAIC_TEST_PANE_PID:-}" \
+    MOSAIC_TEST_HOME="$home" \
+    MOSAIC_TEST_FLEET_OWNER=123e4567-e89b-12d3-a456-426614174000 \
+    MOSAIC_HOME="$home" "$START" "$agent"
+}
+
+# Valid generated data launches only the fixed runtime argument array. It never
+# reads an agent-command string or constructs a bash -c pane payload.
+HOME_VALID="$ROOT/valid"
+AGENT_VALID="coder0"
+write_generated "$HOME_VALID" "$AGENT_VALID"
+run_start "$HOME_VALID" "$AGENT_VALID"
+valid_args=$(tr '\0' '\n' < "$TMUX_CALLS")
+echo "$valid_args" | grep -qF new-session || fail "valid generated projection did not reach tmux"
+echo "$valid_args" | grep -qF 'mosaic' || fail "fixed mosaic launcher command missing"
+echo "$valid_args" | grep -qF 'yolo' || fail "fixed yolo launcher command missing"
+echo "$valid_args" | grep -qF 'pi' || fail "roster runtime missing"
+if echo "$valid_args" | grep -qF 'bash -c'; then
+  fail "launcher constructed a shell command payload"
 fi
-if [ "\$subcmd" = "list-panes" ]; then
+
-  # Return empty: no sidecar spawned (heartbeat is not the focus of this test).
+# The pane must start through an absolute clean-environment boundary. Its
-  echo ""
+# runtime command remains an argv vector, but no holder/session environment
-  exit 0
+# control variable can pass through the pane command.
+echo "$valid_args" | grep -qxF '/usr/bin/env' || fail "pane does not use absolute env"
+echo "$valid_args" | grep -qxF -- '-i' || fail "pane environment is not cleared"
+
+# The generated-file parent is a security boundary too: even a private regular
+# file is untrusted if its parent can be replaced or written by another user.
+# Validation must happen before fake tmux receives even a has-session call.
+: > "$TMUX_CALLS"
+HOME_UNSAFE_PARENT="$ROOT/unsafe-parent"
+write_generated "$HOME_UNSAFE_PARENT" "coder-parent"
+chmod 777 "$HOME_UNSAFE_PARENT/fleet/agents"
+if output=$(run_start "$HOME_UNSAFE_PARENT" coder-parent 2>&1); then
+  fail "generated file under a world-writable parent was accepted"
 fi
-exit 0
+[ ! -s "$TMUX_CALLS" ] || fail "tmux ran before unsafe parent rejection"
-SHIM2
+echo "$output" | grep -qF 'code=unsafe-permissions' || fail "unsafe parent diagnostic missing"
-chmod +x "$FAKE_BIN2/tmux"
 
-SOCKET4="mosaic-agent-test4-$RANDOM-$$"
+: > "$TMUX_CALLS"
-AGENT4="agent4-$RANDOM"
+HOME_SYMLINK_PARENT="$ROOT/symlink-parent"
-WORKDIR4=$(mktemp -d)
+write_generated "$HOME_SYMLINK_PARENT" "coder-symlink-parent"
-CLEANUP_DIRS+=("$WORKDIR4")
+mv "$HOME_SYMLINK_PARENT/fleet/agents" "$HOME_SYMLINK_PARENT/private-agents"
-
+ln -s "$HOME_SYMLINK_PARENT/private-agents" "$HOME_SYMLINK_PARENT/fleet/agents"
-# MOSAIC_RUNTIME_BIN points to a non-existent dir so prefix will be empty;
+if output=$(run_start "$HOME_SYMLINK_PARENT" coder-symlink-parent 2>&1); then
-# .npm-global/bin and .local/bin may or may not exist but we just want exec.
+  fail "generated file under a symlinked parent was accepted"
-PATH="$FAKE_BIN2:$PATH" \
-MOSAIC_TMUX_SOCKET="$SOCKET4" \
-MOSAIC_AGENT_WORKDIR="$WORKDIR4" \
-MOSAIC_AGENT_RUNTIME="pi" \
-MOSAIC_RUNTIME_BIN="/nonexistent-dir-$$" \
-MOSAIC_AGENT_COMMAND="mosaic yolo pi" \
-MOSAIC_HEARTBEAT_RUN_DIR="$HB_RUN_DIR4" \
-  "$START" "$AGENT4"
-
-all_args4=$(cat "$TMUX_ARGS_FILE2" 2>/dev/null || true)
-rm -f "$TMUX_ARGS_FILE2"
-rm -rf "$WORKDIR4"
-
-echo "$all_args4" | grep -qF "exec " || fail "pane command (no prefix dirs) does not use exec"
-echo "$all_args4" | grep -qF "mosaic yolo pi" || fail "pane command does not include agent command when no prefix"
-
-# ── Test 5: candidate dir already in LAUNCHER $PATH is still baked into pane ──
-#
-# Regression guard for the bug where _build_runtime_bin_prefix() used to skip
-# a candidate because it was already present in the launcher process's $PATH.
-# That check was wrong: the pane inherits the tmux SERVER environment, not the
-# launcher's env.  Even if a dir is on the launcher's PATH it must always be
-# baked into the pane's PATH export.
-#
-# We prove this by setting PATH to include FAKE_RUNTIME_BIN5 (the candidate),
-# then asserting the generated new-session command still exports it.
-TMUX_ARGS_FILE5=$(mktemp)
-FAKE_BIN5=$(mktemp -d)
-FAKE_RUNTIME_BIN5=$(mktemp -d)  # this dir IS on the launcher's PATH below
-HB_RUN_DIR5=$(mktemp -d)
-CLEANUP_DIRS+=("$FAKE_BIN5" "$FAKE_RUNTIME_BIN5" "$HB_RUN_DIR5")
-
-cat > "$FAKE_BIN5/tmux" <<SHIM5
-#!/usr/bin/env bash
-subcmd="\$3"
-if [ "\$subcmd" = "has-session" ]; then exit 1; fi
-if [ "\$subcmd" = "new-session" ]; then
-  printf '%s\n' "\$@" > "$TMUX_ARGS_FILE5"
-  exit 0
 fi
-if [ "\$subcmd" = "list-panes" ]; then
+[ ! -s "$TMUX_CALLS" ] || fail "tmux ran before symlinked parent rejection"
-  # Return empty: no sidecar spawned (heartbeat is not the focus of this test).
+echo "$output" | grep -qF 'code=unsafe-directory' || fail "symlinked parent diagnostic missing"
-  echo ""
-  exit 0
-fi
-exit 0
-SHIM5
-chmod +x "$FAKE_BIN5/tmux"
 
-SOCKET5="mosaic-agent-test5-$RANDOM-$$"
+# Every managed ancestor is a boundary: MOSAIC_HOME, fleet, and agents. A
-AGENT5="agent5-$RANDOM"
+# symlink or group/world-writable ancestor must fail before environment parsing,
-WORKDIR5=$(mktemp -d)
+# workdir creation, or tmux effects. The malformed local input proves parsing
-CLEANUP_DIRS+=("$WORKDIR5")
+# was not reached when the ancestor rejection is reported.
-CLEANUP_SOCKETS+=("$SOCKET5")
+assert_managed_ancestor_rejected() {
+  local ancestor="$1"
+  local hazard="$2"
+  local home="$ROOT/managed-${ancestor//\//-}-${hazard}"
+  local agent="coder-managed-${ancestor//\//-}-${hazard}"
+  local node
+  write_generated "$home" "$agent"
+  printf 'MOSAIC_AGENT_COMMAND=must-not-be-parsed\n' > "$home/fleet/agents/$agent.env.local"
+  chmod 600 "$home/fleet/agents/$agent.env.local"
+  rm -rf "$home/work"
 
-# FAKE_RUNTIME_BIN5 is deliberately placed on the LAUNCHER PATH so that the
+  case "$ancestor" in
-# old (buggy) code would have skipped it.  The correct code must still include
+    MOSAIC_HOME) node="$home" ;;
-# it in the pane PATH export.
+    MOSAIC_HOME/fleet) node="$home/fleet" ;;
-PATH="$FAKE_BIN5:$FAKE_RUNTIME_BIN5:$PATH" \
+    MOSAIC_HOME/fleet/agents) node="$home/fleet/agents" ;;
-MOSAIC_TMUX_SOCKET="$SOCKET5" \
+    *) fail "unknown managed ancestor: $ancestor" ;;
-MOSAIC_AGENT_WORKDIR="$WORKDIR5" \
+  esac
-MOSAIC_AGENT_RUNTIME="pi" \
-MOSAIC_RUNTIME_BIN="$FAKE_RUNTIME_BIN5" \
-MOSAIC_AGENT_COMMAND="mosaic yolo pi" \
-MOSAIC_HEARTBEAT_RUN_DIR="$HB_RUN_DIR5" \
-  "$START" "$AGENT5"
 
-all_args5=$(cat "$TMUX_ARGS_FILE5" 2>/dev/null || true)
+  if [ "$hazard" = symlink ]; then
-rm -f "$TMUX_ARGS_FILE5"
+    local target="${node}-target"
-rm -rf "$WORKDIR5"
+    mv "$node" "$target"
+    ln -s "$target" "$node"
+  else
+    chmod 777 "$node"
+  fi
 
-echo "--- test 5: launcher-PATH candidate must still appear in pane export ---"
+  : > "$TMUX_CALLS"
-echo "$all_args5"
+  if output=$(run_start "$home" "$agent" 2>&1); then
-echo "--- end test 5 args ---"
+    fail "${hazard} $ancestor was accepted"
+  fi
+  [ ! -s "$TMUX_CALLS" ] || fail "tmux ran before $hazard $ancestor rejection"
+  [ ! -e "$home/work" ] || fail "workdir was created before $hazard $ancestor rejection"
+  echo "$output" | grep -qF "code=unsafe-" || fail "managed ancestor diagnostic missing"
+  if echo "$output" | grep -qF 'key=MOSAIC_AGENT_COMMAND'; then
+    fail "environment parsing ran before $hazard $ancestor rejection"
+  fi
+}
 
-echo "$all_args5" | grep -qF "export PATH=" || \
+for managed_ancestor in MOSAIC_HOME MOSAIC_HOME/fleet MOSAIC_HOME/fleet/agents; do
-  fail "test5: pane command does not export PATH when candidate is on launcher PATH"
+  assert_managed_ancestor_rejected "$managed_ancestor" symlink
-echo "$all_args5" | grep -qF "$FAKE_RUNTIME_BIN5" || \
+  assert_managed_ancestor_rejected "$managed_ancestor" group-world-writable
-  fail "test5: candidate dir (already on launcher PATH) was NOT baked into pane PATH — regression"
-
-# ── Test 6: heartbeat sidecar — pane PID resolved + .hb file written ──────────
-#
-# Uses a real tmux session (same socket as test 1 which already has $AGENT) so
-# list-panes returns a real pane PID.  We override MOSAIC_HEARTBEAT_RUN_DIR to
-# a temp dir and set a 1-second interval, then wait up to 3 s for the .hb file
-# to appear and check its content.
-
-HB_RUN_DIR=$(mktemp -d)
-CLEANUP_DIRS+=("$HB_RUN_DIR")
-
-# Re-use the session+agent created in Test 1 (still alive on $SOCKET / $AGENT).
-# We need to invoke the script for a NEW agent on the same socket to exercise
-# the heartbeat path with a real pane PID.
-AGENT6="agent6-$RANDOM"
-MOSAIC_TMUX_SOCKET="$SOCKET" \
-MOSAIC_AGENT_WORKDIR="$WORKDIR" \
-MOSAIC_AGENT_COMMAND='bash --noprofile --norc -i' \
-MOSAIC_HEARTBEAT_RUN_DIR="$HB_RUN_DIR" \
-MOSAIC_HEARTBEAT_INTERVAL="1" \
-  "$START" "$AGENT6"
-
-HB_FILE="$HB_RUN_DIR/${AGENT6}.hb"
-
-# Wait up to 5 seconds for the heartbeat file to appear.
-_waited=0
-until [ -f "$HB_FILE" ] || [ "$_waited" -ge 5 ]; do
-  sleep 0.5
-  _waited=$((_waited + 1))
 done
 
-[ -f "$HB_FILE" ] || fail "test6: heartbeat file not written at $HB_FILE within 5s"
+# A local file cannot shadow any roster-derived generated key. Validation must
+# happen before fake tmux receives even a has-session call.
+: > "$TMUX_CALLS"
+HOME_SHADOW="$ROOT/shadow"
+write_generated "$HOME_SHADOW" "coder1"
+printf 'MOSAIC_AGENT_RUNTIME=codex\n' > "$HOME_SHADOW/fleet/agents/coder1.env.local"
+chmod 600 "$HOME_SHADOW/fleet/agents/coder1.env.local"
+if output=$(run_start "$HOME_SHADOW" coder1 2>&1); then
+  fail "generated-key shadow was accepted"
+fi
+[ ! -s "$TMUX_CALLS" ] || fail "tmux ran before generated-key shadow rejection"
+echo "$output" | grep -qF 'key=MOSAIC_AGENT_RUNTIME' || fail "shadow diagnostic omitted key"
+echo "$output" | grep -qF 'sha256=' || fail "shadow diagnostic omitted hash"
+if echo "$output" | grep -qF 'codex'; then
+  fail "shadow diagnostic leaked value"
+fi
 
-hb_content=$(cat "$HB_FILE")
+# Arbitrary command compatibility is quarantined/rejected as data. Diagnostics
-echo "--- test 6: heartbeat file content ---"
+# may name the key and hash but must never echo the privileged command text.
-echo "$hb_content"
+: > "$TMUX_CALLS"
-echo "--- end test 6 ---"
+HOME_COMMAND="$ROOT/command"
+write_generated "$HOME_COMMAND" "coder2"
+COMMAND_VALUE='mosaic yolo codex --dangerous'
+printf 'MOSAIC_AGENT_COMMAND=%s\n' "$COMMAND_VALUE" > "$HOME_COMMAND/fleet/agents/coder2.env.local"
+chmod 600 "$HOME_COMMAND/fleet/agents/coder2.env.local"
+if output=$(run_start "$HOME_COMMAND" coder2 2>&1); then
+  fail "arbitrary command override was accepted"
+fi
+[ ! -s "$TMUX_CALLS" ] || fail "tmux ran before command rejection"
+echo "$output" | grep -qF 'key=MOSAIC_AGENT_COMMAND' || fail "command diagnostic omitted key"
+echo "$output" | grep -qF 'sha256=' || fail "command diagnostic omitted hash"
+if echo "$output" | grep -qF "$COMMAND_VALUE"; then
+  fail "command diagnostic leaked command value"
+fi
 
-# Verify required fields are present.
+# Group/world-readable local input is not trusted even when its syntax is safe.
-echo "$hb_content" | grep -qE '^ts=[0-9]{4}-[0-9]{2}-[0-9]{2}T' || \
+: > "$TMUX_CALLS"
-  fail "test6: heartbeat ts field missing or malformed"
+HOME_PERMS="$ROOT/perms"
-echo "$hb_content" | grep -qE '^pid=[0-9]+' || \
+write_generated "$HOME_PERMS" "coder3"
-  fail "test6: heartbeat pid field missing or malformed"
+printf 'MOSAIC_RUNTIME_BIN=/opt/mosaic/bin\n' > "$HOME_PERMS/fleet/agents/coder3.env.local"
-echo "$hb_content" | grep -qF 'status=ok' || \
+chmod 644 "$HOME_PERMS/fleet/agents/coder3.env.local"
-  fail "test6: heartbeat status=ok missing"
+if output=$(run_start "$HOME_PERMS" coder3 2>&1); then
+  fail "world-readable local input was accepted"
+fi
+[ ! -s "$TMUX_CALLS" ] || fail "tmux ran before permissions rejection"
+echo "$output" | grep -qF 'code=unsafe-permissions' || fail "permission diagnostic missing"
 
-# ── Test 7: heartbeat sidecar — targets correct .hb path per agent name ────────
+# A unit/holder-like clean bootstrap must yield a pane with trusted HOME and
-#
+# computed PATH only. The pane command itself must not carry loader, shell
-# Uses the fake-tmux shim approach (like tests 3-5) to capture the sidecar
+# control, arbitrary sentinel, or stale bootstrap variables.
-# invocation without needing a real session.  A fake setsid shim records its
+: > "$TMUX_CALLS"
-# arguments so we can assert the sidecar script targets the expected .hb path
+HOME_PANE_BOUNDARY="$ROOT/pane-boundary/.config/mosaic"
-# and uses the configured interval.
+write_generated "$HOME_PANE_BOUNDARY" "coder-pane-boundary"
+PANE_TRUSTED_HOME="${HOME_PANE_BOUNDARY%/.config/mosaic}"
+PANE_STALE_HOME="$ROOT/stale-home"
+PANE_STALE_PATH="$ROOT/stale-bin"
+PANE_BASH_ENV="$ROOT/pane-boundary.bash-env"
+printf 'MOSAIC_RUNTIME_BIN=%s\n' "$FAKE_BIN" > \
+  "$HOME_PANE_BOUNDARY/fleet/agents/coder-pane-boundary.env.local"
+chmod 600 "$HOME_PANE_BOUNDARY/fleet/agents/coder-pane-boundary.env.local"
+LD_PRELOAD='/not/loaded/by-clean-bootstrap.so' \
+BASH_ENV="$PANE_BASH_ENV" \
+MOSAIC_UNTRUSTED_SENTINEL='must-not-reach-pane' \
+HOME="$PANE_STALE_HOME" \
+PATH="$PANE_STALE_PATH" \
+  /usr/bin/env -i \
+    "HOME=$PANE_TRUSTED_HOME" \
+    "PATH=$FAKE_BIN:/usr/bin:/bin" \
+    "MOSAIC_HOME=$HOME_PANE_BOUNDARY" \
+    "MOSAIC_TEST_TMUX_CALLS=$TMUX_CALLS" \
+    "MOSAIC_TEST_HOME=$PANE_TRUSTED_HOME" \
+    MOSAIC_TEST_FLEET_OWNER=123e4567-e89b-12d3-a456-426614174000 \
+    MOSAIC_TEST_EXECUTE_PANE=1 \
+    "$START" coder-pane-boundary
+pane_args=$(tr '\0' '\n' < "$TMUX_CALLS")
+echo "$pane_args" | grep -qxF "HOME=$PANE_TRUSTED_HOME" || \
+  fail "pane did not restore trusted HOME"
+echo "$pane_args" | grep -qF "HOME=$PANE_STALE_HOME" && \
+  fail "pane inherited stale HOME"
+echo "$pane_args" | grep -qF "$PANE_STALE_PATH" && fail "pane inherited stale PATH"
+for blocked in LD_PRELOAD= BASH_ENV= MOSAIC_UNTRUSTED_SENTINEL=; do
+  echo "$pane_args" | grep -qF "$blocked" && fail "pane inherited $blocked"
+done
 
-FAKE_BIN7=$(mktemp -d)
+after_pane_env=$(printf '%s\n' "$pane_args" | grep -n -m1 -F '/usr/bin/env' | cut -d: -f1)
-FAKE_RUNTIME_BIN7=$(mktemp -d)
+[ -n "$after_pane_env" ] || fail "pane command did not use absolute env"
-SETSID_ARGS_FILE=$(mktemp)
+printf '%s\n' "$pane_args" | tail -n +"$after_pane_env" | grep -qxF -- '-i' || \
-HB_RUN_DIR7=$(mktemp -d)
+  fail "pane command did not clear its environment"
-CLEANUP_DIRS+=("$FAKE_BIN7" "$FAKE_RUNTIME_BIN7" "$HB_RUN_DIR7")
+pane_environment=$(tr '\0' '\n' < "$HOME_PANE_BOUNDARY/fleet/pane-environment")
+echo "$pane_environment" | grep -qxF "HOME=$PANE_TRUSTED_HOME" || \
+  fail "runtime pane did not receive trusted HOME"
+echo "$pane_environment" | grep -qF "$PANE_STALE_PATH" && fail "runtime pane received stale PATH"
+for blocked in LD_PRELOAD= BASH_ENV= MOSAIC_UNTRUSTED_SENTINEL=; do
+  echo "$pane_environment" | grep -qF "$blocked" && fail "runtime pane received $blocked"
+done
 
-AGENT7="my-fleet-agent-$RANDOM"
+write_interaction_generated() {
-INTERVAL7="42"
+  local home="$1"
+  local agent="$2"
+  mkdir -p "$home/fleet/agents" "$home/fleet/run" "$home/work"
+  chmod 700 "$home" "$home/fleet" "$home/fleet/agents" "$home/fleet/run"
+  printf '123e4567-e89b-12d3-a456-426614174000\n' > "$home/fleet/run/holder-owner"
+  chmod 600 "$home/fleet/run/holder-owner"
+  cat > "$home/fleet/agents/$agent.env.generated" <<EOF
+MOSAIC_AGENT_NAME=$agent
+MOSAIC_AGENT_CLASS=operator-interaction
+MOSAIC_AGENT_RUNTIME=pi
+MOSAIC_AGENT_MODEL=openai/gpt-5.6-sol
+MOSAIC_AGENT_REASONING=high
+MOSAIC_AGENT_TOOL_POLICY=operator-interaction
+MOSAIC_AGENT_WORKDIR=$home/work
+MOSAIC_TMUX_SOCKET=mosaic-test
+EOF
+  chmod 600 "$home/fleet/agents/$agent.env.generated"
+}
 
-# Fake tmux: has-session → not found; new-session → ok; list-panes → known PID.
+run_interaction() {
-cat > "$FAKE_BIN7/tmux" <<SHIM7
+  local home="$1"
-#!/usr/bin/env bash
+  local agent="$2"
-subcmd="\$3"
+  HOME="$home" PATH="$FAKE_BIN:$PATH" MOSAIC_TEST_TMUX_CALLS="$TMUX_CALLS" \
-if [ "\$subcmd" = "has-session" ]; then exit 1; fi
+    MOSAIC_TEST_HOME="$home" \
-if [ "\$subcmd" = "new-session" ]; then exit 0; fi
+    MOSAIC_TEST_FLEET_OWNER=123e4567-e89b-12d3-a456-426614174000 \
-if [ "\$subcmd" = "list-panes" ]; then echo "88888"; exit 0; fi
+    MOSAIC_HOME="$home" "$INTERACTION_START" "$agent"
-exit 0
+}
-SHIM7
-chmod +x "$FAKE_BIN7/tmux"
 
-# Fake setsid: capture the bash -c <script> argument for inspection, then
+write_heartbeat_local() {
-# background an actual bash subshell so disown succeeds in the caller.
+  local home="$1"
-cat > "$FAKE_BIN7/setsid" <<'SETSID_SHIM'
+  local agent="$2"
-#!/usr/bin/env bash
+  mkdir -p "$home/run"
-# argv: setsid bash -c <sidecar_script>
+  cat > "$home/fleet/agents/$agent.env.local" <<EOF
-# Record the full argument list to the capture file, then exit cleanly.
+MOSAIC_HEARTBEAT_RUN_DIR=$home/run
-printf '%s\0' "$@" > __SETSID_ARGS_FILE__
+MOSAIC_HEARTBEAT_INTERVAL=1
-exit 0
+EOF
-SETSID_SHIM
+  chmod 600 "$home/fleet/agents/$agent.env.local"
-# Patch the placeholder with the real capture-file path (avoids heredoc expansion issues).
+}
-sed -i "s|__SETSID_ARGS_FILE__|${SETSID_ARGS_FILE}|g" "$FAKE_BIN7/setsid"
-chmod +x "$FAKE_BIN7/setsid"
 
-SOCKET7="mosaic-agent-test7-$RANDOM-$$"
+wait_for_sidecar_status() {
-WORKDIR7=$(mktemp -d)
+  local file="$1"
-CLEANUP_DIRS+=("$WORKDIR7")
+  for _retry in $(seq 1 30); do
+    grep -qF 'status=ok' "$file" 2>/dev/null && return 0
+    sleep 0.1
+  done
+  fail "heartbeat sidecar did not resume after native marker became stale or absent"
+}
 
-PATH="$FAKE_BIN7:$PATH" \
+# A fresh Pi-native marker is authoritative: the shell sidecar may start but
-MOSAIC_TMUX_SOCKET="$SOCKET7" \
+# must not overwrite Pi's busy/ok/model heartbeat. It must resume only when
-MOSAIC_AGENT_WORKDIR="$WORKDIR7" \
+# the marker is stale or absent.
-MOSAIC_AGENT_RUNTIME="pi" \
+HOME_NATIVE_FRESH="$ROOT/native-fresh"
-MOSAIC_RUNTIME_BIN="$FAKE_RUNTIME_BIN7" \
+write_generated "$HOME_NATIVE_FRESH" "coder-native-fresh"
-MOSAIC_AGENT_COMMAND="mosaic yolo pi" \
+write_heartbeat_local "$HOME_NATIVE_FRESH" "coder-native-fresh"
-MOSAIC_HEARTBEAT_RUN_DIR="$HB_RUN_DIR7" \
+FRESH_HB="$HOME_NATIVE_FRESH/run/coder-native-fresh.hb"
-MOSAIC_HEARTBEAT_INTERVAL="$INTERVAL7" \
+printf 'ts=native\npid=1\nstatus=busy\nmodel=authoritative-model\n' > "$FRESH_HB"
-  "$START" "$AGENT7"
+touch "$FRESH_HB.native"
+MOSAIC_TEST_PANE_PID=$$ run_start "$HOME_NATIVE_FRESH" coder-native-fresh
+sleep 0.3
+fresh_content=$(cat "$FRESH_HB")
+[ "$fresh_content" = 'ts=native
+pid=1
+status=busy
+model=authoritative-model' ] || fail "fresh native heartbeat was overwritten"
 
-# Give the background setsid shim a moment to finish writing the capture file.
+HOME_NATIVE_STALE="$ROOT/native-stale"
-sleep 0.5
+write_generated "$HOME_NATIVE_STALE" "coder-native-stale"
+write_heartbeat_local "$HOME_NATIVE_STALE" "coder-native-stale"
+STALE_HB="$HOME_NATIVE_STALE/run/coder-native-stale.hb"
+printf 'ts=native\npid=1\nstatus=busy\nmodel=stale-model\n' > "$STALE_HB"
+touch -d '10 seconds ago' "$STALE_HB.native"
+MOSAIC_TEST_PANE_PID=$$ run_start "$HOME_NATIVE_STALE" coder-native-stale
+wait_for_sidecar_status "$STALE_HB"
 
-setsid_args=$(cat "$SETSID_ARGS_FILE" 2>/dev/null | tr '\0' '\n' || true)
+HOME_NATIVE_ABSENT="$ROOT/native-absent"
-rm -f "$SETSID_ARGS_FILE"
+write_generated "$HOME_NATIVE_ABSENT" "coder-native-absent"
-rm -rf "$WORKDIR7"
+write_heartbeat_local "$HOME_NATIVE_ABSENT" "coder-native-absent"
+ABSENT_HB="$HOME_NATIVE_ABSENT/run/coder-native-absent.hb"
+printf 'ts=native\npid=1\nstatus=busy\nmodel=absent-model\n' > "$ABSENT_HB"
+MOSAIC_TEST_PANE_PID=$$ run_start "$HOME_NATIVE_ABSENT" coder-native-absent
+wait_for_sidecar_status "$ABSENT_HB"
 
-echo "--- test 7: captured setsid args ---"
+# The interaction wrapper delegates to the shared strict parser before applying
-echo "$setsid_args"
+# its pinned policy, so malformed projection data wins over profile diagnostics.
-echo "--- end test 7 ---"
+: > "$TMUX_CALLS"
+HOME_INTERACTION_MALFORMED="$ROOT/interaction-malformed"
+write_interaction_generated "$HOME_INTERACTION_MALFORMED" "interaction-malformed"
+printf 'UNTRUSTED_BOOTSTRAP=value\n' >> "$HOME_INTERACTION_MALFORMED/fleet/agents/interaction-malformed.env.generated"
+if output=$(run_interaction "$HOME_INTERACTION_MALFORMED" interaction-malformed 2>&1); then
+  fail "interaction wrapper accepted malformed generated data"
+fi
+[ ! -s "$TMUX_CALLS" ] || fail "tmux ran before interaction strict-parser rejection"
+echo "$output" | grep -qF 'code=unknown-key' || fail "interaction did not use shared strict parser first"
 
-# The sidecar script (bash -c <script>) must reference the correct .hb path.
+# A syntactically valid but policy-incompatible projection reaches the pinned
-expected_hb="${HB_RUN_DIR7}/${AGENT7}.hb"
+# interaction policy check only after strict parsing and never starts tmux.
-echo "$setsid_args" | grep -qF "$expected_hb" || \
+: > "$TMUX_CALLS"
-  fail "test7: sidecar script does not reference correct .hb path ($expected_hb)"
+HOME_INTERACTION_POLICY="$ROOT/interaction-policy"
+write_interaction_generated "$HOME_INTERACTION_POLICY" "interaction-policy"
+perl -0pi -e 's/MOSAIC_AGENT_RUNTIME=pi/MOSAIC_AGENT_RUNTIME=codex/' \
+  "$HOME_INTERACTION_POLICY/fleet/agents/interaction-policy.env.generated"
+if output=$(run_interaction "$HOME_INTERACTION_POLICY" interaction-policy 2>&1); then
+  fail "interaction wrapper accepted a policy-incompatible projection"
+fi
+interaction_policy_args=$(tr '\0' '\n' < "$TMUX_CALLS")
+echo "$interaction_policy_args" | grep -qF 'new-session' && \
+  fail "interaction pinned-policy rejection created a tmux session"
+echo "$output" | grep -qF 'operator interaction service requires runtime pi' || \
+  fail "interaction pinned-policy check did not follow strict parsing"
 
-# The sidecar script must use the configured interval.
+# Exact stop derives the socket exclusively from the validated generated
-echo "$setsid_args" | grep -qF "$INTERVAL7" || \
+# projection and ignores an ambient socket supplied by the caller.
-  fail "test7: sidecar script does not reference configured interval ($INTERVAL7)"
+: > "$TMUX_CALLS"
+HOME_STOP="$ROOT/stop"
+write_generated "$HOME_STOP" "coder-stop"
+HOME="$HOME_STOP" PATH="$FAKE_BIN:$PATH" MOSAIC_TEST_TMUX_CALLS="$TMUX_CALLS" \
+  MOSAIC_TEST_HOME="$HOME_STOP" \
+  MOSAIC_TEST_FLEET_OWNER=123e4567-e89b-12d3-a456-426614174000 \
+  MOSAIC_HOME="$HOME_STOP" MOSAIC_TMUX_SOCKET=ambient-socket "$START" --stop coder-stop
+stop_args=$(tr '\0' '\n' < "$TMUX_CALLS")
+echo "$stop_args" | grep -qxF 'mosaic-test' || fail "exact stop did not use the validated generated socket"
+echo "$stop_args" | grep -qxF 'kill-session' || fail "exact stop did not request session termination"
+echo "$stop_args" | grep -qxF '=coder-stop' || fail "exact stop did not exact-match the generated agent name"
+if echo "$stop_args" | grep -qF 'ambient-socket'; then
+  fail "exact stop trusted an ambient socket"
+fi
 
-echo "ok - start-agent-session"
+echo 'ok - start-agent-session generated environment boundary'

packages/mosaic/src/commands/fleet-agent-crud-command.spec.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,657 @@
+import { chmod, mkdir, mkdtemp, readFile, rename, rm, symlink, writeFile } from 'node:fs/promises';
+import { tmpdir } from 'node:os';
+import { join } from 'node:path';
+import { Command } from 'commander';
+import { afterEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest';
+import { fleetAgentMutationExitCode } from './fleet-agent-crud-command.js';
+import { registerFleetCommand, type FleetCommandDeps } from './fleet.js';
+
+const roster = `
+version: 2
+generation: 7
+transport: tmux
+tmux:
+  socket_name: mosaic-fleet
+  holder_session: _holder
+defaults:
+  working_directory: /srv/mosaic
+  runtime: pi
+runtimes:
+  pi:
+    reset_command: /new
+agents:
+  - name: orchestrator
+    alias: Orchestrator
+    class: orchestrator
+    runtime: pi
+    provider: openai
+    model: gpt-5.6-sol
+    reasoning: high
+    tool_policy: orchestrator
+    working_directory: /srv/mosaic
+    persistent_persona: true
+    reset_between_tasks: false
+    lifecycle:
+      enabled: true
+      desired_state: stopped
+    launch:
+      yolo: true
+`;
+
+const agent = {
+  name: 'coder0',
+  alias: 'Coder 0',
+  className: 'code',
+  runtime: 'pi',
+  provider: 'openai',
+  model: 'gpt-5.6-sol',
+  reasoning: 'high',
+  toolPolicy: 'code',
+  workingDirectory: '/srv/mosaic',
+  persistentPersona: false,
+  resetBetweenTasks: true,
+  launch: { yolo: true },
+};
+
+let cleanup: string | undefined;
+
+afterEach(async (): Promise<void> => {
+  vi.restoreAllMocks();
+  process.exitCode = undefined;
+  if (cleanup) await rm(cleanup, { recursive: true, force: true });
+  cleanup = undefined;
+});
+
+async function fleetHome(): Promise<string> {
+  cleanup = await mkdtemp(join(tmpdir(), 'mosaic-fleet-crud-command-'));
+  const fleetDir = join(cleanup, 'fleet');
+  const agentsDir = join(fleetDir, 'agents');
+  const rolesDir = join(fleetDir, 'roles');
+  await mkdir(agentsDir, { recursive: true, mode: 0o700 });
+  await mkdir(rolesDir, { recursive: true, mode: 0o700 });
+  await chmod(cleanup, 0o700);
+  await chmod(fleetDir, 0o700);
+  await chmod(agentsDir, 0o700);
+  await chmod(rolesDir, 0o700);
+  await writeFile(join(fleetDir, 'roster.yaml'), roster, { mode: 0o600 });
+  for (const className of ['orchestrator', 'code']) {
+    await writeFile(
+      join(rolesDir, `${className}.md`),
+      `# ${className}\n\n(\`class: ${className}\`)\n`,
+      {
+        mode: 0o600,
+      },
+    );
+  }
+  return cleanup;
+}
+
+function program(mosaicHome: string, deps: FleetCommandDeps = {}): Command {
+  const result = new Command();
+  result.exitOverride();
+  registerFleetCommand(result, { ...deps, mosaicHome });
+  return result;
+}
+
+function output(): { lines: string[] } {
+  const lines: string[] = [];
+  vi.spyOn(console, 'log').mockImplementation((value: string): void => {
+    lines.push(value);
+  });
+  return { lines };
+}
+
+describe('mosaic fleet local roster mutations', (): void => {
+  it('returns non-zero when a projection failure leaves recovery work after roster persistence', (): void => {
+    expect(
+      fleetAgentMutationExitCode({
+        recovery: {
+          code: 'projection-apply-failed',
+          rosterPath: '/private/fleet/roster.yaml',
+          action: 'regenerate-projections-from-roster',
+        },
+      }),
+    ).toBe(1);
+  });
+
+  it('returns zero for a mutation result without recovery work', (): void => {
+    expect(fleetAgentMutationExitCode({})).toBe(0);
+  });
+
+  it('registers programmatic local create, get, update, delete, and plan commands', async (): Promise<void> => {
+    const home = await fleetHome();
+    const root = program(home);
+    const fleet = root.commands.find((candidate: Command): boolean => candidate.name() === 'fleet');
+    expect(fleet?.commands.map((candidate: Command): string => candidate.name())).toEqual(
+      expect.arrayContaining(['create', 'delete', 'get', 'plan', 'update']),
+    );
+  });
+
+  it('runs the JSON mutation commands through the direct mosaic fleet control plane', async (): Promise<void> => {
+    const home = await fleetHome();
+    const root = new Command();
+    root.exitOverride();
+    registerFleetCommand(root, { mosaicHome: home });
+    const fleet = root.commands.find((candidate: Command): boolean => candidate.name() === 'fleet');
+    expect(fleet?.commands.map((candidate: Command): string => candidate.name())).toEqual(
+      expect.arrayContaining(['create', 'delete', 'get', 'plan', 'update']),
+    );
+  });
+
+  it('gets one v2 roster agent as stable JSON without mutating the roster', async (): Promise<void> => {
+    const home = await fleetHome();
+    const rosterPath = join(home, 'fleet', 'roster.yaml');
+    const captured = output();
+
+    const root = new Command();
+    root.exitOverride();
+    registerFleetCommand(root, { mosaicHome: home });
+    await root.parseAsync(['node', 'mosaic', 'fleet', 'get', 'orchestrator']);
+
+    expect(JSON.parse(captured.lines.join('\n'))).toMatchObject({
+      generation: 7,
+      agent: { name: 'orchestrator', lifecycle: { desiredState: 'stopped' } },
+    });
+    expect(await readFile(rosterPath, 'utf8')).toBe(roster);
+  });
+
+  it('returns a JSON error and non-zero exit for a missing local agent', async (): Promise<void> => {
+    const home = await fleetHome();
+    const captured = output();
+
+    await program(home).parseAsync(['node', 'mosaic', 'fleet', 'get', 'missing']);
+
+    expect(JSON.parse(captured.lines.join('\n'))).toEqual({ error: { code: 'agent-not-found' } });
+    expect(process.exitCode).toBe(1);
+  });
+
+  it('prints a deterministic create plan without changing roster or generated projections', async (): Promise<void> => {
+    const home = await fleetHome();
+    const rosterPath = join(home, 'fleet', 'roster.yaml');
+    const captured = output();
+
+    await program(home).parseAsync([
+      'node',
+      'mosaic',
+      'fleet',
+      'plan',
+      'create',
+      '--expected-generation',
+      '7',
+      '--agent',
+      JSON.stringify(agent),
+    ]);
+
+    expect(JSON.parse(captured.lines.join('\n'))).toMatchObject({
+      applied: false,
+      plan: {
+        operation: 'create',
+        currentGeneration: 7,
+        nextGeneration: 8,
+        agent: { name: 'coder0', lifecycle: { enabled: true, desiredState: 'stopped' } },
+      },
+    });
+    expect(await readFile(rosterPath, 'utf8')).toBe(roster);
+    await expect(
+      readFile(join(home, 'fleet', 'agents', 'coder0.env.generated'), 'utf8'),
+    ).rejects.toThrow();
+  });
+
+  it('plans create, update, and delete with operation-specific target names without mutation', async (): Promise<void> => {
+    const home = await fleetHome();
+    const rosterPath = join(home, 'fleet', 'roster.yaml');
+    const captured = output();
+    const updatedCoder = { ...agent, alias: 'Coder Updated' };
+
+    await program(home).parseAsync([
+      'node',
+      'mosaic',
+      'fleet',
+      'plan',
+      'create',
+      '--expected-generation',
+      '7',
+      '--agent',
+      JSON.stringify(agent),
+    ]);
+    await program(home).parseAsync([
+      'node',
+      'mosaic',
+      'fleet',
+      'create',
+      '--expected-generation',
+      '7',
+      '--agent',
+      JSON.stringify(agent),
+    ]);
+    const beforePlans = await readFile(rosterPath, 'utf8');
+    const beforeOrchestratorProjection = await readFile(
+      join(home, 'fleet', 'agents', 'orchestrator.env.generated'),
+      'utf8',
+    );
+    captured.lines.length = 0;
+
+    await program(home).parseAsync([
+      'node',
+      'mosaic',
+      'fleet',
+      'plan',
+      'update',
+      'coder0',
+      '--expected-generation',
+      '8',
+      '--agent',
+      JSON.stringify(updatedCoder),
+    ]);
+    await program(home).parseAsync([
+      'node',
+      'mosaic',
+      'fleet',
+      'plan',
+      'delete',
+      'coder0',
+      '--expected-generation',
+      '8',
+    ]);
+
+    const plans = captured.lines.map((line: string): unknown => JSON.parse(line));
+    expect(plans).toMatchObject([
+      { plan: { operation: 'update', agent: { name: 'coder0' } } },
+      { plan: { operation: 'delete', agent: { name: 'coder0' } } },
+    ]);
+    expect(await readFile(rosterPath, 'utf8')).toBe(beforePlans);
+    expect(
+      await readFile(join(home, 'fleet', 'agents', 'orchestrator.env.generated'), 'utf8'),
+    ).toBe(beforeOrchestratorProjection);
+  });
+
+  it.each([
+    ['plan create', ['fleet', 'plan', 'create'], 'top-level'],
+    ['create', ['fleet', 'create'], 'top-level'],
+    ['update', ['fleet', 'update', 'orchestrator'], 'top-level'],
+    ['plan create', ['fleet', 'plan', 'create'], 'launch'],
+    ['create', ['fleet', 'create'], 'launch'],
+    ['update', ['fleet', 'update', 'orchestrator'], 'launch'],
+  ])(
+    'rejects unknown and prototype-sensitive agent fields without mutation',
+    async (_operation: string, command: string[], shape: string): Promise<void> => {
+      const home = await fleetHome();
+      const rosterPath = join(home, 'fleet', 'roster.yaml');
+      const agentsDir = join(home, 'fleet', 'agents');
+      const captured = output();
+      const artifactContents = new Map([
+        ['orchestrator.env.generated', 'generated-before\n'],
+        ['orchestrator.env.local', 'local-before\n'],
+        ['orchestrator.env', 'legacy-before\n'],
+        ['orchestrator.env.quarantine', 'quarantine-before\n'],
+      ]);
+      for (const [filename, content] of artifactContents) {
+        await writeFile(join(agentsDir, filename), content, { mode: 0o600 });
+      }
+      const rejectedValue = 'must-not-appear-in-diagnostics';
+      const unsafeAgent = {
+        ...agent,
+        name: 'orchestrator',
+        launch: shape === 'launch' ? { yolo: true, command: rejectedValue } : { yolo: true },
+        ...(shape === 'top-level'
+          ? {
+              command: rejectedValue,
+              channel: rejectedValue,
+              secretRef: rejectedValue,
+              constructor: rejectedValue,
+              prototype: rejectedValue,
+            }
+          : {}),
+      };
+      const payload =
+        shape === 'top-level'
+          ? JSON.stringify(unsafeAgent).replace(/}$/, ',"__proto__":{"unsupported":true}}')
+          : JSON.stringify(unsafeAgent);
+
+      await program(home).parseAsync([
+        'node',
+        'mosaic',
+        ...command,
+        '--expected-generation',
+        '7',
+        '--agent',
+        payload,
+      ]);
+
+      const diagnostic = captured.lines.pop() ?? '';
+      expect(JSON.parse(diagnostic)).toEqual({ error: { code: 'invalid-request' } });
+      expect(diagnostic).not.toContain(rejectedValue);
+      expect(process.exitCode).toBe(1);
+      expect(await readFile(rosterPath, 'utf8')).toBe(roster);
+      for (const [filename, content] of artifactContents) {
+        expect(await readFile(join(agentsDir, filename), 'utf8')).toBe(content);
+      }
+    },
+  );
+
+  it('rejects missing update/delete plan names and an extra create plan name', async (): Promise<void> => {
+    const home = await fleetHome();
+    const captured = output();
+
+    await program(home).parseAsync([
+      'node',
+      'mosaic',
+      'fleet',
+      'plan',
+      'delete',
+      '--expected-generation',
+      '7',
+    ]);
+    expect(JSON.parse(captured.lines.pop() ?? '')).toEqual({ error: { code: 'invalid-request' } });
+
+    await program(home).parseAsync([
+      'node',
+      'mosaic',
+      'fleet',
+      'plan',
+      'create',
+      'coder0',
+      '--expected-generation',
+      '7',
+      '--agent',
+      JSON.stringify(agent),
+    ]);
+    expect(JSON.parse(captured.lines.pop() ?? '')).toEqual({ error: { code: 'invalid-request' } });
+  });
+
+  it('plans persisted start as desired state without starting a runtime', async (): Promise<void> => {
+    const home = await fleetHome();
+    const captured = output();
+
+    await program(home).parseAsync([
+      'node',
+      'mosaic',
+      'fleet',
+      'plan',
+      'create',
+      '--expected-generation',
+      '7',
+      '--agent',
+      JSON.stringify(agent),
+      '--persisted-start',
+    ]);
+
+    expect(JSON.parse(captured.lines.join('\n'))).toMatchObject({
+      applied: false,
+      plan: { agent: { lifecycle: { desiredState: 'running' } } },
+    });
+  });
+
+  it('returns non-zero JSON when a filesystem projection fails after roster persistence', async (): Promise<void> => {
+    const home = await fleetHome();
+    const rosterPath = join(home, 'fleet', 'roster.yaml');
+    const agentsDir = join(home, 'fleet', 'agents');
+    const captured = output();
+
+    await program(home, {
+      projectionApplier: async (): Promise<never> => {
+        throw new Error('injected projection failure');
+      },
+    }).parseAsync([
+      'node',
+      'mosaic',
+      'fleet',
+      'create',
+      '--expected-generation',
+      '7',
+      '--agent',
+      JSON.stringify(agent),
+    ]);
+
+    expect(JSON.parse(captured.lines.join('\n'))).toMatchObject({
+      applied: false,
+      authoritativeRoster: 'committed',
+      projections: 'incomplete',
+      recovery: { code: 'projection-apply-failed', action: 'regenerate-projections-from-roster' },
+    });
+    expect(process.exitCode).toBe(1);
+    expect(await readFile(rosterPath, 'utf8')).toContain('generation: 8');
+    expect(await readFile(rosterPath, 'utf8')).toContain('name: coder0');
+    await expect(readFile(join(agentsDir, 'coder0.env.generated'), 'utf8')).rejects.toThrow();
+  });
+
+  it('deletes only the target generated projection while retaining legacy and quarantine artifacts', async (): Promise<void> => {
+    const home = await fleetHome();
+    const rosterPath = join(home, 'fleet', 'roster.yaml');
+    const agentsDir = join(home, 'fleet', 'agents');
+    const captured = output();
+
+    await program(home).parseAsync([
+      'node',
+      'mosaic',
+      'fleet',
+      'create',
+      '--expected-generation',
+      '7',
+      '--agent',
+      JSON.stringify(agent),
+    ]);
+    await writeFile(join(agentsDir, 'coder0.env.local'), 'MOSAIC_RUNTIME_BIN=/usr/bin/pi\n', {
+      mode: 0o600,
+    });
+    await writeFile(join(agentsDir, 'coder0.env'), 'MOSAIC_AGENT_COMMAND=legacy-command\n', {
+      mode: 0o600,
+    });
+    await writeFile(join(agentsDir, 'coder0.env.quarantine'), 'quarantine-before\n', {
+      mode: 0o600,
+    });
+    await writeFile(join(agentsDir, 'unrelated.env.generated'), 'unrelated-before\n', {
+      mode: 0o600,
+    });
+    const beforeDryRun = await Promise.all([
+      readFile(rosterPath, 'utf8'),
+      readFile(join(agentsDir, 'coder0.env.generated'), 'utf8'),
+      readFile(join(agentsDir, 'coder0.env.local'), 'utf8'),
+      readFile(join(agentsDir, 'coder0.env'), 'utf8'),
+      readFile(join(agentsDir, 'coder0.env.quarantine'), 'utf8'),
+      readFile(join(agentsDir, 'unrelated.env.generated'), 'utf8'),
+    ]);
+
+    await program(home).parseAsync([
+      'node',
+      'mosaic',
+      'fleet',
+      'delete',
+      'coder0',
+      '--expected-generation',
+      '8',
+      '--dry-run',
+    ]);
+    expect(JSON.parse(captured.lines.pop() ?? '')).toMatchObject({
+      applied: false,
+      authoritativeRoster: 'unchanged',
+      projections: 'not-applied',
+    });
+    expect(
+      await Promise.all([
+        readFile(rosterPath, 'utf8'),
+        readFile(join(agentsDir, 'coder0.env.generated'), 'utf8'),
+        readFile(join(agentsDir, 'coder0.env.local'), 'utf8'),
+        readFile(join(agentsDir, 'coder0.env'), 'utf8'),
+        readFile(join(agentsDir, 'coder0.env.quarantine'), 'utf8'),
+        readFile(join(agentsDir, 'unrelated.env.generated'), 'utf8'),
+      ]),
+    ).toEqual(beforeDryRun);
+
+    await program(home).parseAsync([
+      'node',
+      'mosaic',
+      'fleet',
+      'delete',
+      'coder0',
+      '--expected-generation',
+      '8',
+    ]);
+
+    expect(JSON.parse(captured.lines.pop() ?? '')).toMatchObject({
+      applied: true,
+      authoritativeRoster: 'committed',
+      projections: 'complete',
+    });
+    await expect(readFile(join(agentsDir, 'coder0.env.generated'), 'utf8')).rejects.toThrow();
+    expect(await readFile(join(agentsDir, 'coder0.env.local'), 'utf8')).toBe(beforeDryRun[2]);
+    expect(await readFile(join(agentsDir, 'coder0.env'), 'utf8')).toBe(beforeDryRun[3]);
+    expect(await readFile(join(agentsDir, 'coder0.env.quarantine'), 'utf8')).toBe(beforeDryRun[4]);
+    expect(await readFile(join(agentsDir, 'unrelated.env.generated'), 'utf8')).toBe(
+      beforeDryRun[5],
+    );
+    expect(await readFile(rosterPath, 'utf8')).toContain('generation: 9');
+  });
+
+  it('reports truthful partial recovery when a delete projection fails after roster persistence', async (): Promise<void> => {
+    const home = await fleetHome();
+    const rosterPath = join(home, 'fleet', 'roster.yaml');
+    const agentsDir = join(home, 'fleet', 'agents');
+    const captured = output();
+    await program(home).parseAsync([
+      'node',
+      'mosaic',
+      'fleet',
+      'create',
+      '--expected-generation',
+      '7',
+      '--agent',
+      JSON.stringify(agent),
+    ]);
+
+    captured.lines.length = 0;
+    await program(home, {
+      projectionApplier: async (): Promise<never> => {
+        throw new Error('injected projection failure');
+      },
+    }).parseAsync(['node', 'mosaic', 'fleet', 'delete', 'coder0', '--expected-generation', '8']);
+
+    expect(JSON.parse(captured.lines.pop() ?? '')).toMatchObject({
+      applied: false,
+      authoritativeRoster: 'committed',
+      projections: 'incomplete',
+      recovery: { code: 'projection-apply-failed', action: 'regenerate-projections-from-roster' },
+    });
+    expect(process.exitCode).toBe(1);
+    expect(await readFile(rosterPath, 'utf8')).toContain('generation: 9');
+    expect(await readFile(rosterPath, 'utf8')).not.toContain('name: coder0');
+    expect(await readFile(join(agentsDir, 'coder0.env.generated'), 'utf8')).toContain(
+      'MOSAIC_AGENT_NAME=coder0',
+    );
+  });
+
+  it.each(['unsafe directory permissions', 'symlinked directory'] as const)(
+    'rejects delete before roster mutation for %s',
+    async (hazard: 'unsafe directory permissions' | 'symlinked directory'): Promise<void> => {
+      const home = await fleetHome();
+      const rosterPath = join(home, 'fleet', 'roster.yaml');
+      const agentsDir = join(home, 'fleet', 'agents');
+      const captured = output();
+      await program(home).parseAsync([
+        'node',
+        'mosaic',
+        'fleet',
+        'create',
+        '--expected-generation',
+        '7',
+        '--agent',
+        JSON.stringify(agent),
+      ]);
+      const beforeRoster = await readFile(rosterPath, 'utf8');
+      let generatedPath = join(agentsDir, 'coder0.env.generated');
+
+      if (hazard === 'unsafe directory permissions') {
+        await chmod(agentsDir, 0o777);
+      } else {
+        const targetDir = join(home, 'fleet', 'agents-target');
+        await rename(agentsDir, targetDir);
+        await symlink(targetDir, agentsDir, 'dir');
+        generatedPath = join(targetDir, 'coder0.env.generated');
+      }
+
+      try {
+        captured.lines.length = 0;
+        await program(home).parseAsync([
+          'node',
+          'mosaic',
+          'fleet',
+          'delete',
+          'coder0',
+          '--expected-generation',
+          '8',
+        ]);
+      } finally {
+        if (hazard === 'unsafe directory permissions') await chmod(agentsDir, 0o700);
+      }
+
+      expect(JSON.parse(captured.lines.pop() ?? '')).toEqual({
+        error: { code: 'mutation-failed' },
+      });
+      expect(await readFile(rosterPath, 'utf8')).toBe(beforeRoster);
+      expect(await readFile(generatedPath, 'utf8')).toContain('MOSAIC_AGENT_NAME=coder0');
+    },
+  );
+
+  it('creates, updates, and deletes through the v2 roster without runtime actions', async (): Promise<void> => {
+    const home = await fleetHome();
+    const rosterPath = join(home, 'fleet', 'roster.yaml');
+    const agentsDir = join(home, 'fleet', 'agents');
+    const captured = output();
+    const updated = { ...agent, alias: 'Coder Zero' };
+
+    await program(home).parseAsync([
+      'node',
+      'mosaic',
+      'fleet',
+      'create',
+      '--expected-generation',
+      '7',
+      '--agent',
+      JSON.stringify(agent),
+    ]);
+    expect(JSON.parse(captured.lines.pop() ?? '')).toMatchObject({ applied: true });
+    expect(await readFile(join(agentsDir, 'coder0.env.generated'), 'utf8')).toContain(
+      'MOSAIC_AGENT_NAME=coder0',
+    );
+
+    await program(home).parseAsync([
+      'node',
+      'mosaic',
+      'fleet',
+      'update',
+      'coder0',
+      '--expected-generation',
+      '8',
+      '--agent',
+      JSON.stringify(updated),
+    ]);
+    expect(JSON.parse(captured.lines.pop() ?? '')).toMatchObject({
+      applied: true,
+      plan: { nextGeneration: 9, agent: { alias: 'Coder Zero' } },
+    });
+
+    await writeFile(join(agentsDir, 'coder0.env.local'), 'MOSAIC_RUNTIME_BIN=/usr/bin/retain\n', {
+      mode: 0o600,
+    });
+    await program(home).parseAsync([
+      'node',
+      'mosaic',
+      'fleet',
+      'delete',
+      'coder0',
+      '--expected-generation',
+      '9',
+    ]);
+
+    expect(JSON.parse(captured.lines.pop() ?? '')).toMatchObject({
+      applied: true,
+      plan: { operation: 'delete', nextGeneration: 10, agent: { name: 'coder0' } },
+    });
+    await expect(readFile(join(agentsDir, 'coder0.env.generated'), 'utf8')).rejects.toThrow();
+    expect(await readFile(join(agentsDir, 'coder0.env.local'), 'utf8')).toBe(
+      'MOSAIC_RUNTIME_BIN=/usr/bin/retain\n',
+    );
+    expect(await readFile(rosterPath, 'utf8')).toContain('generation: 10');
+    expect(await readFile(rosterPath, 'utf8')).not.toContain('name: coder0');
+  });
+});

packages/mosaic/src/commands/fleet-agent-crud-command.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,392 @@
+import { readFile } from 'node:fs/promises';
+import { join, resolve } from 'node:path';
+import type { Command } from 'commander';
+import {
+  executeFleetAgentMutation,
+  FleetAgentMutationError,
+  type FleetAgentMutationAgent,
+  type FleetAgentMutationOperation,
+  type FleetAgentMutationOptions,
+  type FleetAgentMutationRequest,
+  type FleetAgentMutationResult,
+} from '../fleet/fleet-agent-crud.js';
+import {
+  parseRosterV2,
+  ROSTER_V2_REASONING_LEVELS,
+  ROSTER_V2_SUPPORTED_RUNTIMES,
+  type FleetRosterV2,
+  type RosterV2ReasoningLevel,
+  type RosterV2RuntimeName,
+} from '../fleet/roster-v2.js';
+
+export interface FleetAgentCrudCommandDeps {
+  readonly mosaicHome?: string;
+  /** Test seam for deterministic post-roster filesystem projection failures. */
+  readonly projectionApplier?: FleetAgentMutationOptions['projectionApplier'];
+}
+
+interface MutationOptions {
+  readonly expectedGeneration: string;
+  readonly agent?: string;
+  readonly dryRun?: boolean;
+  readonly persistedStart?: boolean;
+}
+
+const AGENT_REQUEST_KEYS = new Set([
+  'name',
+  'alias',
+  'className',
+  'runtime',
+  'provider',
+  'model',
+  'reasoning',
+  'toolPolicy',
+  'workingDirectory',
+  'persistentPersona',
+  'resetBetweenTasks',
+  'launch',
+]);
+const AGENT_LAUNCH_REQUEST_KEYS = new Set(['yolo']);
+
+/** Registers only roster-v2 desired-state mutations; it never invokes runtime actions. */
+export function registerFleetAgentCrudCommands(
+  agentCommand: Command,
+  deps: FleetAgentCrudCommandDeps = {},
+): void {
+  agentCommand
+    .command('get <name>')
+    .description('Read one local roster-v2 agent as JSON')
+    .action(async (name: string): Promise<void> => {
+      await writeJsonOutcome(async (): Promise<void> => {
+        const roster = await loadRoster(agentCommand, deps);
+        const agent = roster.agents.find((candidate): boolean => candidate.name === name);
+        if (!agent)
+          throw new FleetAgentMutationError('agent-not-found', `Agent "${name}" is not in roster.`);
+        printJson({ generation: roster.generation, agent });
+      });
+    });
+
+  registerMutationCommand(agentCommand, deps, 'create');
+  registerMutationCommand(agentCommand, deps, 'update');
+  registerMutationCommand(agentCommand, deps, 'delete');
+
+  agentCommand
+    .command('plan <operation> [name]')
+    .description('Plan a local roster-v2 mutation without writing roster or projections')
+    .requiredOption('--expected-generation <number>', 'Authoritative roster generation')
+    .option('--agent <json>', 'JSON agent payload for create or update')
+    .option(
+      '--persisted-start',
+      'Plan create with desired_state: running without starting a runtime',
+    )
+    .action(
+      async (operation: string, name: string | undefined, opts: MutationOptions): Promise<void> => {
+        await writeJsonOutcome(async (): Promise<void> => {
+          const parsedOperation = parseOperation(operation);
+          await executeCommand(
+            agentCommand,
+            deps,
+            parsedOperation,
+            opts,
+            true,
+            parsePlanTargetName(parsedOperation, name),
+          );
+        });
+      },
+    );
+}
+
+function registerMutationCommand(
+  agentCommand: Command,
+  deps: FleetAgentCrudCommandDeps,
+  operation: FleetAgentMutationOperation,
+): void {
+  const command = agentCommand
+    .command(
+      operation === 'update'
+        ? 'update <name>'
+        : `${operation}${operation === 'delete' ? ' <name>' : ''}`,
+    )
+    .description(`${operation} a local roster-v2 agent without runtime actions`)
+    .requiredOption('--expected-generation <number>', 'Authoritative roster generation')
+    .option('--agent <json>', 'JSON agent payload for create or update')
+    .option('--dry-run', 'Validate and plan without writing roster or projections');
+
+  if (operation === 'create') {
+    command.option(
+      '--persisted-start',
+      'Persist desired_state: running without starting a runtime',
+    );
+    command.action(async (opts: MutationOptions): Promise<void> => {
+      await writeJsonOutcome(async (): Promise<void> => {
+        await executeCommand(agentCommand, deps, operation, opts, false);
+      });
+    });
+    return;
+  }
+
+  command.action(async (name: string, opts: MutationOptions): Promise<void> => {
+    await writeJsonOutcome(async (): Promise<void> => {
+      await executeCommand(agentCommand, deps, operation, opts, false, name);
+    });
+  });
+}
+
+async function executeCommand(
+  agentCommand: Command,
+  deps: FleetAgentCrudCommandDeps,
+  operation: FleetAgentMutationOperation,
+  opts: MutationOptions,
+  forceDryRun: boolean,
+  name?: string,
+): Promise<void> {
+  const mosaicHome = resolveMosaicHome(agentCommand, deps);
+  const rosterPath = resolveRosterPath(agentCommand, mosaicHome);
+  const roster = parseRosterV2(await readFile(rosterPath, 'utf8'), 'yaml');
+  const request = buildRequest(operation, opts, name);
+  const result = await executeFleetAgentMutation({
+    roster,
+    request,
+    mosaicHome,
+    rosterPath,
+    agentEnvDir: join(mosaicHome, 'fleet', 'agents'),
+    rolesDir: join(mosaicHome, 'fleet', 'roles'),
+    overrideDir: join(mosaicHome, 'fleet', 'roles.local'),
+    dryRun: forceDryRun || opts.dryRun === true,
+    ...(deps.projectionApplier === undefined ? {} : { projectionApplier: deps.projectionApplier }),
+  });
+  printJson(result);
+  process.exitCode = fleetAgentMutationExitCode(result);
+}
+
+/** A persisted roster with failed derived projections is a non-zero CLI outcome. */
+export function fleetAgentMutationExitCode(
+  result: Pick<FleetAgentMutationResult, 'recovery'>,
+): 0 | 1 {
+  return result.recovery === undefined ? 0 : 1;
+}
+
+function parsePlanTargetName(
+  operation: FleetAgentMutationOperation,
+  name: string | undefined,
+): string | undefined {
+  if (operation === 'create') {
+    if (name !== undefined) {
+      throw new FleetAgentMutationError(
+        'invalid-request',
+        'Create plan does not accept a target name.',
+      );
+    }
+    return undefined;
+  }
+  if (name === undefined) {
+    throw new FleetAgentMutationError(
+      'invalid-request',
+      `${operation} plan requires a target agent name.`,
+    );
+  }
+  return name;
+}
+
+function buildRequest(
+  operation: FleetAgentMutationOperation,
+  opts: MutationOptions,
+  name?: string,
+): FleetAgentMutationRequest {
+  const expectedGeneration = parseExpectedGeneration(opts.expectedGeneration);
+  const agent = opts.agent === undefined ? undefined : parseAgent(opts.agent);
+  if ((operation === 'create' || operation === 'update') && !agent) {
+    throw new FleetAgentMutationError('invalid-request', `${operation} requires --agent JSON.`);
+  }
+  return {
+    operation,
+    expectedGeneration,
+    ...(name === undefined ? {} : { name }),
+    ...(agent === undefined ? {} : { agent }),
+    ...(operation === 'create' && opts.persistedStart === true ? { persistedStart: true } : {}),
+  };
+}
+
+function parseExpectedGeneration(value: string): number {
+  const generation = Number(value);
+  if (!Number.isSafeInteger(generation) || generation < 1) {
+    throw new FleetAgentMutationError(
+      'invalid-request',
+      '--expected-generation must be a positive safe integer.',
+    );
+  }
+  return generation;
+}
+
+function parseOperation(value: string): FleetAgentMutationOperation {
+  if (value === 'create' || value === 'update' || value === 'delete') return value;
+  throw new FleetAgentMutationError(
+    'invalid-request',
+    'plan operation must be create, update, or delete.',
+  );
+}
+
+function parseAgent(source: string): FleetAgentMutationAgent {
+  let value: unknown;
+  try {
+    value = JSON.parse(source);
+  } catch {
+    throw new FleetAgentMutationError('invalid-request', '--agent must be valid JSON.');
+  }
+  if (!isRecord(value)) {
+    throw new FleetAgentMutationError('invalid-request', '--agent must be a JSON object.');
+  }
+  rejectUnknownKeys(value, AGENT_REQUEST_KEYS, '--agent');
+
+  const runtime = requiredRuntime(value, 'runtime');
+  const reasoning = requiredReasoning(value, 'reasoning');
+  const launch = requiredRecord(value, 'launch');
+  rejectUnknownKeys(launch, AGENT_LAUNCH_REQUEST_KEYS, '--agent.launch');
+  return {
+    name: requiredString(value, 'name'),
+    alias: requiredString(value, 'alias'),
+    className: requiredString(value, 'className'),
+    runtime,
+    provider: requiredString(value, 'provider'),
+    model: requiredString(value, 'model'),
+    reasoning,
+    toolPolicy: requiredString(value, 'toolPolicy'),
+    workingDirectory: requiredString(value, 'workingDirectory'),
+    persistentPersona: requiredBoolean(value, 'persistentPersona'),
+    resetBetweenTasks: requiredBoolean(value, 'resetBetweenTasks'),
+    launch: { yolo: requiredBoolean(launch, 'yolo') },
+  };
+}
+
+async function loadRoster(
+  agentCommand: Command,
+  deps: FleetAgentCrudCommandDeps,
+): Promise<FleetRosterV2> {
+  const mosaicHome = resolveMosaicHome(agentCommand, deps);
+  const rosterPath = resolveRosterPath(agentCommand, mosaicHome);
+  return parseRosterV2(await readFile(rosterPath, 'utf8'), 'yaml');
+}
+
+function resolveMosaicHome(agentCommand: Command, deps: FleetAgentCrudCommandDeps): string {
+  const opts = agentCommand.optsWithGlobals<{ mosaicHome?: string }>();
+  return opts.mosaicHome ?? deps.mosaicHome ?? join(process.env['HOME'] ?? '', '.config', 'mosaic');
+}
+
+function resolveRosterPath(agentCommand: Command, mosaicHome: string): string {
+  const opts = agentCommand.optsWithGlobals<{ roster?: string }>();
+  const canonical = join(mosaicHome, 'fleet', 'roster.yaml');
+  if (opts.roster !== undefined && resolve(opts.roster) !== resolve(canonical)) {
+    throw new FleetAgentMutationError(
+      'invalid-request',
+      'Roster-v2 mutations require the canonical <mosaic-home>/fleet/roster.yaml path.',
+    );
+  }
+  return canonical;
+}
+
+function rejectUnknownKeys(
+  value: Record<string, unknown>,
+  allowedKeys: ReadonlySet<string>,
+  field: string,
+): void {
+  const hasUnsupportedOwnProperty = Object.getOwnPropertyNames(value).some(
+    (key: string): boolean => !allowedKeys.has(key),
+  );
+  if (hasUnsupportedOwnProperty || Object.getOwnPropertySymbols(value).length > 0) {
+    throw new FleetAgentMutationError('invalid-request', `${field} contains unsupported keys.`);
+  }
+}
+
+function requiredString(value: Record<string, unknown>, key: string): string {
+  const candidate = requiredOwnValue(value, key);
+  if (typeof candidate !== 'string' || candidate.length === 0) {
+    throw new FleetAgentMutationError(
+      'invalid-request',
+      `--agent.${key} must be a non-empty string.`,
+    );
+  }
+  return candidate;
+}
+
+function requiredBoolean(value: Record<string, unknown>, key: string): boolean {
+  const candidate = requiredOwnValue(value, key);
+  if (typeof candidate !== 'boolean') {
+    throw new FleetAgentMutationError('invalid-request', `--agent.${key} must be a boolean.`);
+  }
+  return candidate;
+}
+
+function requiredRecord(value: Record<string, unknown>, key: string): Record<string, unknown> {
+  const candidate = requiredOwnValue(value, key);
+  if (!isRecord(candidate)) {
+    throw new FleetAgentMutationError('invalid-request', `--agent.${key} must be an object.`);
+  }
+  return candidate;
+}
+
+function requiredRuntime(value: Record<string, unknown>, key: string): RosterV2RuntimeName {
+  const candidate = requiredString(value, key);
+  if (!isRuntime(candidate)) {
+    throw new FleetAgentMutationError(
+      'invalid-request',
+      `--agent.${key} is not a supported runtime.`,
+    );
+  }
+  return candidate;
+}
+
+function requiredReasoning(value: Record<string, unknown>, key: string): RosterV2ReasoningLevel {
+  const candidate = requiredString(value, key);
+  if (!isReasoning(candidate)) {
+    throw new FleetAgentMutationError(
+      'invalid-request',
+      `--agent.${key} is not a supported reasoning level.`,
+    );
+  }
+  return candidate;
+}
+
+function isRuntime(value: string): value is RosterV2RuntimeName {
+  return ROSTER_V2_SUPPORTED_RUNTIMES.some(
+    (runtime: RosterV2RuntimeName): boolean => runtime === value,
+  );
+}
+
+function isReasoning(value: string): value is RosterV2ReasoningLevel {
+  return ROSTER_V2_REASONING_LEVELS.some(
+    (reasoning: RosterV2ReasoningLevel): boolean => reasoning === value,
+  );
+}
+
+function requiredOwnValue(value: Record<string, unknown>, key: string): unknown {
+  if (!Object.hasOwn(value, key)) {
+    throw new FleetAgentMutationError('invalid-request', `--agent.${key} is required.`);
+  }
+  return value[key];
+}
+
+function isRecord(value: unknown): value is Record<string, unknown> {
+  return (
+    typeof value === 'object' &&
+    value !== null &&
+    !Array.isArray(value) &&
+    Object.getPrototypeOf(value) === Object.prototype
+  );
+}
+
+async function writeJsonOutcome(action: () => Promise<void>): Promise<void> {
+  try {
+    await action();
+  } catch (error: unknown) {
+    process.exitCode = 1;
+    printJson({
+      error: {
+        code: error instanceof FleetAgentMutationError ? error.code : 'mutation-failed',
+      },
+    });
+  }
+}
+
+function printJson(value: object): void {
+  console.log(JSON.stringify(value));
+}

packages/mosaic/src/commands/fleet-personas.spec.ts

@@ -1,13 +1,18 @@
-import { cp, mkdir, mkdtemp, rm, writeFile } from 'node:fs/promises';
+import { cp, mkdir, mkdtemp, rm, symlink, writeFile } from 'node:fs/promises';
 import { tmpdir } from 'node:os';
-import { dirname, join, resolve } from 'node:path';
+import { dirname, join, relative, resolve } from 'node:path';
 import { fileURLToPath } from 'node:url';
 import { afterEach, beforeEach, describe, expect, it } from 'vitest';
 import {
+  authorityForCanonicalClass,
+  canonicalizeRoleClass,
   extractClassesFromDir,
+  extractClassesFromDirSync,
   listPersonaClasses,
   personaStatus,
   resolvePersona,
+  resolvePersonaFrom,
+  resolvePersonaSync,
 } from './fleet-personas.js';
 import { loadProfiles, validateProfile, type FleetProfile } from './fleet-profiles.js';
 
@@ -54,13 +59,156 @@ afterEach(async () => {
   await rm(tmp, { recursive: true, force: true });
 });
 
+describe('FCM class canonicalization and authority', () => {
+  it.each([
+    ['implementer', 'code'],
+    ['reviewer', 'review'],
+    ['operator-interaction', 'interaction'],
+  ])('canonicalizes the approved alias %s to %s', (requested: string, canonical: string) => {
+    expect(canonicalizeRoleClass(requested)).toEqual({
+      requestedClass: requested,
+      canonicalClass: canonical,
+    });
+  });
+
+  it.each(['worker', 'analyst', 'canary', 'tess', 'ultron', 'constructor'])(
+    'does not infer an alias for %s',
+    (requested: string) => {
+      expect(canonicalizeRoleClass(requested)).toEqual({
+        requestedClass: requested,
+        canonicalClass: requested,
+      });
+    },
+  );
+
+  it('resolves inherited-property class names without granting protected authority', async () => {
+    await mkdir(overrideDir, { recursive: true });
+    await writeFile(
+      join(overrideDir, 'constructor.md'),
+      overridePersona('constructor', 'custom'),
+      'utf8',
+    );
+
+    const resolved = await resolvePersona('constructor', { rolesDir, overrideDir });
+    expect(resolved).toMatchObject({
+      requestedClass: 'constructor',
+      canonicalClass: 'constructor',
+      klass: 'constructor',
+      layer: 'override',
+    });
+    expect(authorityForCanonicalClass('constructor')).toMatchObject({
+      mayMerge: false,
+      mayIssueValidationCertificate: false,
+      mayOrchestrate: false,
+    });
+  });
+
+  it('canonicalizes before override lookup and lets the canonical override win', async () => {
+    await mkdir(overrideDir, { recursive: true });
+    await writeFile(
+      join(overrideDir, 'implementer.md'),
+      overridePersona('implementer', 'legacy'),
+      'utf8',
+    );
+    await writeFile(
+      join(overrideDir, 'code.md'),
+      overridePersona('code', 'engineering', 'CANONICAL-OVERRIDE'),
+      'utf8',
+    );
+
+    const resolved = await resolvePersona('implementer', { rolesDir, overrideDir });
+    expect(resolved).toMatchObject({
+      requestedClass: 'implementer',
+      canonicalClass: 'code',
+      klass: 'code',
+      layer: 'override',
+    });
+    expect(resolved?.content).toContain('CANONICAL-OVERRIDE');
+    expect(resolved?.content).not.toContain('legacy');
+  });
+
+  it('keeps sync and async resolution equivalent for aliases and canonical overrides', async () => {
+    await mkdir(overrideDir, { recursive: true });
+    await writeFile(
+      join(overrideDir, 'code.md'),
+      overridePersona('code', 'engineering', 'CANONICAL-OVERRIDE'),
+      'utf8',
+    );
+
+    const asyncResolution = await resolvePersona('implementer', { rolesDir, overrideDir });
+    const syncResolution = resolvePersonaSync('implementer', { rolesDir, overrideDir });
+    expect(syncResolution).toEqual(asyncResolution);
+  });
+
+  it('derives immutable protected authority only from the canonical class', () => {
+    expect(authorityForCanonicalClass('merge-gate')).toMatchObject({ mayMerge: true });
+    for (const klass of [
+      'validator',
+      'orchestrator',
+      'team-leader',
+      'interaction',
+      'code',
+      'custom-role',
+    ]) {
+      expect(authorityForCanonicalClass(klass).mayMerge).toBe(false);
+    }
+    expect(authorityForCanonicalClass('validator')).toMatchObject({
+      mayIssueValidationCertificate: true,
+      mayMerge: false,
+    });
+    expect(authorityForCanonicalClass('orchestrator')).toMatchObject({
+      mayOrchestrate: true,
+      mayIssueLeases: true,
+      mayMerge: false,
+    });
+    expect(authorityForCanonicalClass('team-leader')).toMatchObject({
+      leasedCapacityOnly: true,
+      mayMutateRoster: false,
+      mayAccessCredentials: false,
+      mayMerge: false,
+    });
+    expect(authorityForCanonicalClass('interaction')).toMatchObject({
+      requestStatusOnly: true,
+      mayOrchestrate: false,
+      mayMerge: false,
+    });
+    expect(Object.isFrozen(authorityForCanonicalClass('merge-gate'))).toBe(true);
+  });
+});
+
+describe('required FCM role library', () => {
+  it.each([
+    'code',
+    'review',
+    'validator',
+    'orchestrator',
+    'team-leader',
+    'enhancer',
+    'interaction',
+    'merge-gate',
+  ])('resolves %s through the real framework role library', async (klass: string) => {
+    const resolved = await resolvePersona(klass, {
+      rolesDir: realRolesDir,
+      overrideDir: join(tmp, 'none'),
+    });
+    expect(resolved).not.toBeNull();
+    expect(resolved?.canonicalClass).toBe(klass);
+    expect(resolved?.content.trim()).not.toBe('');
+  });
+});
+
 describe('extractClassesFromDir (shared extraction)', () => {
-  it('records class + domain from inline markers and degrades on missing dir', async () => {
+  it('records class + domain and distinguishes scanned from missing directories', async () => {
     const base = await extractClassesFromDir(rolesDir);
+    expect(base.scanState).toBe('scanned');
     expect(base.classes.has('ceo')).toBe(true);
     expect(base.byClass.get('ceo')?.domain).toBe('executive');
-    const missing = await extractClassesFromDir(join(tmp, 'nope'));
+
+    const missingDir = join(tmp, 'nope');
+    const missing = await extractClassesFromDir(missingDir);
+    expect(missing.scanState).toBe('missing');
     expect(missing.classes.size).toBe(0);
+    expect(extractClassesFromDirSync(missingDir).scanState).toBe('missing');
   });
 });
 
@@ -81,6 +229,287 @@ describe('resolvePersona — override wins', () => {
     expect(resolved?.content).toContain('BASELINE');
   });
 
+  it('does not let a LIBRARY-only row shadow a readable baseline persona', async () => {
+    await mkdir(overrideDir, { recursive: true });
+    await writeFile(
+      join(overrideDir, 'LIBRARY.md'),
+      '| Persona | Purpose |\n| --- | --- |\n| code | Index only |\n',
+      'utf8',
+    );
+
+    const resolved = await resolvePersona('code', { rolesDir, overrideDir });
+    expect(resolved?.layer).toBe('baseline');
+    expect(resolved?.content).toContain('BASELINE');
+    expect((await listPersonaClasses({ rolesDir, overrideDir })).has('code')).toBe(true);
+    expect(
+      (await personaStatus({ rolesDir, overrideDir })).find(({ klass }) => klass === 'code')
+        ?.status,
+    ).toBe('baseline');
+  });
+
+  it('does not let an incidental later class marker shadow a readable baseline persona', async () => {
+    await mkdir(overrideDir, { recursive: true });
+    await writeFile(
+      join(overrideDir, 'mascot.md'),
+      '# mascot\n\n(`class: mascot`)\n\nSee also (`class: code`).\n',
+      'utf8',
+    );
+
+    const resolved = await resolvePersona('code', { rolesDir, overrideDir });
+    expect(resolved?.layer).toBe('baseline');
+    expect(resolved?.content).toContain('BASELINE');
+    expect((await listPersonaClasses({ rolesDir, overrideDir })).has('code')).toBe(true);
+    expect((await listPersonaClasses({ rolesDir, overrideDir })).has('mascot')).toBe(true);
+    expect(
+      (await personaStatus({ rolesDir, overrideDir })).find(({ klass }) => klass === 'code')
+        ?.status,
+    ).toBe('baseline');
+  });
+
+  it('does not advertise an incidental-only class through listing or status APIs', async () => {
+    await mkdir(overrideDir, { recursive: true });
+    await writeFile(
+      join(overrideDir, 'mascot.md'),
+      '# mascot\n\n(`class: mascot`)\n\nSee also (`class: phantom`).\n',
+      'utf8',
+    );
+
+    expect((await listPersonaClasses({ rolesDir, overrideDir })).has('phantom')).toBe(false);
+    expect(
+      (await personaStatus({ rolesDir, overrideDir })).some(({ klass }) => klass === 'phantom'),
+    ).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it('rejects a canonical filename whose explicit marker names another class', async () => {
+    await mkdir(overrideDir, { recursive: true });
+    await writeFile(join(overrideDir, 'merge-gate.md'), overridePersona('mascot', 'fun'), 'utf8');
+    await writeFile(
+      join(rolesDir, 'merge-gate.md'),
+      baselinePersona('merge-gate', 'governance'),
+      'utf8',
+    );
+
+    expect(await resolvePersona('merge-gate', { rolesDir, overrideDir })).toBeNull();
+    expect(resolvePersonaSync('merge-gate', { rolesDir, overrideDir })).toBeNull();
+    expect((await listPersonaClasses({ rolesDir, overrideDir })).has('merge-gate')).toBe(false);
+    expect(
+      (await personaStatus({ rolesDir, overrideDir })).some(({ klass }) => klass === 'merge-gate'),
+    ).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it('fails closed if a marker-defined override becomes unreadable after extraction', async () => {
+    await mkdir(overrideDir, { recursive: true });
+    const overrideFile = join(overrideDir, 'engineering.md');
+    await writeFile(overrideFile, overridePersona('code', 'engineering'), 'utf8');
+    const [base, over] = await Promise.all([
+      extractClassesFromDir(rolesDir),
+      extractClassesFromDir(overrideDir),
+    ]);
+    await rm(overrideFile);
+    await mkdir(overrideFile);
+
+    expect(await resolvePersonaFrom('code', { rolesDir, overrideDir, base, over })).toBeNull();
+  });
+
+  it('fails closed if a marker-defined override changes identity after extraction', async () => {
+    await mkdir(overrideDir, { recursive: true });
+    const overrideFile = join(overrideDir, 'engineering.md');
+    await writeFile(overrideFile, overridePersona('code', 'engineering'), 'utf8');
+    const [base, over] = await Promise.all([
+      extractClassesFromDir(rolesDir),
+      extractClassesFromDir(overrideDir),
+    ]);
+    await writeFile(overrideFile, overridePersona('mascot', 'fun'), 'utf8');
+
+    expect(await resolvePersonaFrom('code', { rolesDir, overrideDir, base, over })).toBeNull();
+
+    const classes = await listPersonaClasses({ rolesDir, overrideDir });
+    expect(classes.has('code')).toBe(true);
+    expect(classes.has('mascot')).toBe(true);
+    const status = new Map(
+      (await personaStatus({ rolesDir, overrideDir })).map((entry) => [entry.klass, entry]),
+    );
+    expect(status.get('code')?.status).toBe('baseline');
+    expect(status.get('mascot')?.status).toBe('custom');
+  });
+
+  it('fails closed if a markerless cached override gains a conflicting marker', async () => {
+    await mkdir(overrideDir, { recursive: true });
+    const overrideFile = join(overrideDir, 'merge-gate.md');
+    await writeFile(overrideFile, '# markerless merge gate\n', 'utf8');
+    await writeFile(
+      join(rolesDir, 'merge-gate.md'),
+      baselinePersona('merge-gate', 'governance'),
+      'utf8',
+    );
+    const [base, over] = await Promise.all([
+      extractClassesFromDir(rolesDir),
+      extractClassesFromDir(overrideDir),
+    ]);
+    await writeFile(overrideFile, overridePersona('mascot', 'fun'), 'utf8');
+
+    expect(
+      await resolvePersonaFrom('merge-gate', { rolesDir, overrideDir, base, over }),
+    ).toBeNull();
+  });
+
+  it('fails closed asynchronously when the override directory cannot be scanned', async () => {
+    await writeFile(overrideDir, 'not a directory', 'utf8');
+    expect(await resolvePersona('code', { rolesDir, overrideDir })).toBeNull();
+  });
+
+  it('fails closed synchronously when the override directory cannot be scanned', async () => {
+    await writeFile(overrideDir, 'not a directory', 'utf8');
+    expect(resolvePersonaSync('code', { rolesDir, overrideDir })).toBeNull();
+  });
+
+  it('fails closed asynchronously and synchronously for a dangling override-directory symlink', async () => {
+    await symlink(join(tmp, 'missing-override-target'), overrideDir, 'dir');
+
+    expect(await resolvePersona('code', { rolesDir, overrideDir })).toBeNull();
+    expect(resolvePersonaSync('code', { rolesDir, overrideDir })).toBeNull();
+  });
+
+  it('fails closed asynchronously and synchronously when an override ancestor is a dangling symlink', async () => {
+    const danglingAncestor = join(tmp, 'dangling-ancestor');
+    await symlink(join(tmp, 'missing-ancestor-target'), danglingAncestor, 'dir');
+    overrideDir = join(danglingAncestor, 'nested', 'roles.local');
+
+    expect(await resolvePersona('code', { rolesDir, overrideDir })).toBeNull();
+    expect(resolvePersonaSync('code', { rolesDir, overrideDir })).toBeNull();
+    expect(await listPersonaClasses({ rolesDir, overrideDir })).toEqual(new Set());
+    expect(await personaStatus({ rolesDir, overrideDir })).toEqual([]);
+  });
+
+  it('fails closed when dot-dot traversal crosses a dangling override ancestor', async () => {
+    const danglingAncestor = join(tmp, 'dangling-dotdot-ancestor');
+    await symlink(join(tmp, 'missing-dotdot-target'), danglingAncestor, 'dir');
+    overrideDir = `${danglingAncestor}/../roles.local`;
+
+    expect(await resolvePersona('code', { rolesDir, overrideDir })).toBeNull();
+    expect(resolvePersonaSync('code', { rolesDir, overrideDir })).toBeNull();
+    expect(await listPersonaClasses({ rolesDir, overrideDir })).toEqual(new Set());
+    expect(await personaStatus({ rolesDir, overrideDir })).toEqual([]);
+  });
+
+  it('fails closed when relative dot-dot traversal crosses a dangling override ancestor', async () => {
+    const danglingAncestor = join(tmp, 'relative-dangling-ancestor');
+    await symlink(join(tmp, 'missing-relative-target'), danglingAncestor, 'dir');
+    overrideDir = `${relative(process.cwd(), danglingAncestor)}/../roles.local`;
+    expect(overrideDir.startsWith('/')).toBe(false);
+
+    expect(await resolvePersona('code', { rolesDir, overrideDir })).toBeNull();
+    expect(resolvePersonaSync('code', { rolesDir, overrideDir })).toBeNull();
+    expect(await listPersonaClasses({ rolesDir, overrideDir })).toEqual(new Set());
+    expect(await personaStatus({ rolesDir, overrideDir })).toEqual([]);
+  });
+
+  it('revalidates a cached missing override before baseline fallback', async () => {
+    const cachedOverrideDir = join(tmp, 'mutable-ancestor', 'roles.local');
+    const [base, over] = await Promise.all([
+      extractClassesFromDir(rolesDir),
+      extractClassesFromDir(cachedOverrideDir),
+    ]);
+    expect(over.scanState).toBe('missing');
+    await symlink(join(tmp, 'missing-mutable-target'), join(tmp, 'mutable-ancestor'), 'dir');
+
+    expect(
+      await resolvePersonaFrom('code', {
+        rolesDir,
+        overrideDir: cachedOverrideDir,
+        base,
+        over,
+      }),
+    ).toBeNull();
+  });
+
+  it('revalidates a cached scanned override before baseline fallback', async () => {
+    await mkdir(overrideDir, { recursive: true });
+    const [base, over] = await Promise.all([
+      extractClassesFromDir(rolesDir),
+      extractClassesFromDir(overrideDir),
+    ]);
+    expect(over.scanState).toBe('scanned');
+    expect(over.classes.size).toBe(0);
+
+    await writeFile(join(overrideDir, 'engineering.md'), overridePersona('code', 'engineering'));
+
+    const resolved = await resolvePersonaFrom('code', {
+      rolesDir,
+      overrideDir,
+      base,
+      over,
+    });
+    expect(resolved?.layer).toBe('override');
+    expect(resolved?.file).toBe(join(overrideDir, 'engineering.md'));
+  });
+
+  it('falls back to baseline asynchronously and synchronously when override directory is missing', async () => {
+    const asyncResolution = await resolvePersona('code', { rolesDir, overrideDir });
+    const syncResolution = resolvePersonaSync('code', { rolesDir, overrideDir });
+    expect(asyncResolution?.layer).toBe('baseline');
+    expect(syncResolution?.layer).toBe('baseline');
+  });
+
+  it('fails closed asynchronously when the canonical override exists but is unreadable', async () => {
+    await mkdir(overrideDir, { recursive: true });
+    await mkdir(join(overrideDir, 'code.md'));
+
+    expect(await resolvePersona('code', { rolesDir, overrideDir })).toBeNull();
+  });
+
+  it('does not advertise a shadowed baseline whose canonical override is unreadable', async () => {
+    await mkdir(overrideDir, { recursive: true });
+    await mkdir(join(overrideDir, 'code.md'));
+
+    expect((await listPersonaClasses({ rolesDir, overrideDir })).has('code')).toBe(false);
+    expect(
+      (await personaStatus({ rolesDir, overrideDir })).some(({ klass }) => klass === 'code'),
+    ).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it('does not advertise baseline personas when the override directory is unscannable', async () => {
+    await writeFile(overrideDir, 'not a directory', 'utf8');
+
+    expect(await listPersonaClasses({ rolesDir, overrideDir })).toEqual(new Set());
+    expect(await personaStatus({ rolesDir, overrideDir })).toEqual([]);
+  });
+
+  it('does not advertise baseline personas through a dangling override-directory symlink', async () => {
+    await symlink(join(tmp, 'missing-override-target'), overrideDir, 'dir');
+
+    expect(await listPersonaClasses({ rolesDir, overrideDir })).toEqual(new Set());
+    expect(await personaStatus({ rolesDir, overrideDir })).toEqual([]);
+  });
+
+  it('preserves baseline listings when the override directory is missing', async () => {
+    expect((await listPersonaClasses({ rolesDir, overrideDir })).has('code')).toBe(true);
+    expect(
+      (await personaStatus({ rolesDir, overrideDir })).find(({ klass }) => klass === 'code')
+        ?.status,
+    ).toBe('baseline');
+  });
+
+  it('does not advertise an unreadable custom override as a valid persona class or status', async () => {
+    await mkdir(overrideDir, { recursive: true });
+    await mkdir(join(overrideDir, 'ghost.md'));
+
+    const extracted = await extractClassesFromDir(overrideDir);
+    expect(extracted.fileStems.has('ghost')).toBe(true);
+    expect(extracted.classes.has('ghost')).toBe(false);
+    expect((await listPersonaClasses({ rolesDir, overrideDir })).has('ghost')).toBe(false);
+    expect(
+      (await personaStatus({ rolesDir, overrideDir })).some(({ klass }) => klass === 'ghost'),
+    ).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it('fails closed synchronously when the canonical override exists but is unreadable', async () => {
+    await mkdir(overrideDir, { recursive: true });
+    await mkdir(join(overrideDir, 'code.md'));
+
+    expect(resolvePersonaSync('code', { rolesDir, overrideDir })).toBeNull();
+  });
+
   it('returns null for an unknown class', async () => {
     expect(await resolvePersona('does-not-exist', { rolesDir, overrideDir })).toBeNull();
   });