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Author SHA1 Message Date
Hermes Agent c09392e0c4 fix(guard): classify Git option grammar
ci/woodpecker/pr/ci Pipeline was successful
Replace finite clone/worktree boolean allowlists with the closed separate-value grammar, including Git's accepted long abbreviations and bundled short options. Keep placement operands distinct from HOME-valued sources, metadata, commit-ish values, and rule-generated --no-* flags while preserving separate-git-dir and later-command traps.

Canonicalize shell-known HOME spellings, dot aliases, and existing symlink parents before placement comparison. Expand the hermetic suite from 242 to 292 fixtures and document the requirements and review evidence.

Deliberate residuals: a future unclassified value-taking clone placement option can fail open, and a future worktree value option can shift the inferred path; defaulting it to flag grammar avoids present-day over-blocking of Git's non-enumerable boolean family. PreToolUse symlink canonicalization is non-atomic against replacement after inspection; architectural closure is tracked by #1199.
2026-08-13 06:46:25 -05:00
Hermes Agent 91cc37bcf6 fix(guard): inspect checkout placement operands
ci/woodpecker/pr/ci Pipeline was successful
Classify git clone and worktree add operands so HOME-valued environment assignments, sources, references, templates, and metadata do not impersonate checkout destinations. Preserve both forms of clone --separate-git-dir as real placement targets and distinguish shell words, command boundaries, and redirections in the existing quote-aware normalized stream.

Deliberate fail-closed residual: unknown future Git options with a separate following word are not adjudicated as source-only. Their value remains a possible placement, so a HOME-shaped value blocks rather than silently creating a bypass. Relative destinations whose effective path depends on cwd remain out of scope in #1197.
2026-08-13 05:55:33 -05:00
Hermes Agent 20d86e392b fix(guard): end the home match at a shell word boundary, not at whitespace
ci/woodpecker/pr/ci Pipeline was successful
Rounds 8 and 9 of the same class, in the two halves of one line.

The path arm required the home token to be followed by `/`. That silently
made `$HOME` itself -- the exact target the rule names -- legal: `git worktree
add $HOME` cleared a guard whose message is "this checks a repository out
under $HOME". Reachability is not theoretical; the command succeeds against an
empty home directory. Trailing `/` was then admitted, and with it every
terminator that is not whitespace: `$HOME;`, `$HOME&&`, `$HOME|`, `$HOME&`
and end-of-string all cleared, 25 shapes in all.

The fix that did not happen is worth recording, because it was mine. The brief
for this round prescribed a closed continuation class, `([^A-Za-z0-9_.-]|$)`,
on the reasoning that terminator sets are open and continuation sets are
closed. That is true of some axes and false of this one: `+ @ , : = %` all
continue a FILENAME, so `$HOME+bak/wt` and five siblings like it would have
been refused -- a new over-block traded for a closed bypass, which is not a
trade. The implementer measured the six counterexamples and declined the brief
rather than pick between two acceptance conditions that cannot both hold. They
are now permanent fixtures; a rejected over-block that nothing pins comes back.

The axis that IS closed is word termination, and it is closed by specification
rather than by anyone's imagination: POSIX fixes the unquoted metacharacter set
at space, tab, newline, and | & ; ( ) < >. So the path normalizer marks those
as an internal word boundary, in the same state machine and by the same
mechanism as the existing literal-dollar and literal-tilde markers, which is
what lets a QUOTED or escaped metacharacter stay word content: `"$HOME;bak"`
is one word and must be allowed. A raw marker byte arriving in the input is
encoded first, so input cannot forge or suppress a boundary. The home token
must now be preceded by start, `=`, or a boundary, and followed by a boundary,
`/` for a descendant, or end.

Verified by oracle rather than against the brief -- `bash -c "printf '%s' WORD"`
performs expansion and quote removal without executing, so the expected verdict
comes from the shell instead of from the reading that has now been wrong once.
Fixtures 198 -> 230; the new ones are red at both prior heads (15 failing at
4b8eba95, 21 at 3d0a882a), so they measure the change rather than passing on it.

Known and deliberately not addressed here: a checkout target that never names
$HOME at all. A relative target resolves against the cwd, and every agent seat
on this host runs with a cwd under $HOME, so `git clone URL` with no target at
all lands in $HOME and is invisible to a rule that matches home spellings.
That is a different rule -- it needs the effective cwd, which `cd` inside the
command can move -- and it is filed separately rather than becoming round ten
in this file.
2026-08-13 05:08:01 -05:00
Hermes Agent 4b8eba95a3 fix(guard): apply word normalization to the path arm, not just the name arm
The quote/escape handling added over rounds 1-6 was wired into the command
NAME reading only. The PATH reading one line below it still matched the raw
text, so every spelling the name arm had learned to see was invisible to the
checkout check: `"$HOME"/wt`, `${HOME}/wt`, `"${HOME}"/wt` and a quoted
literal home path all cleared a guard whose entire purpose is to refuse them.
An identifier is not one spelling, and this file has now proven that seven
times; the arms of the rule were audited one at a time, and the class survived
in the arm nobody looked at.

The two readings need the same quote and escape handling but differ in one
respect, so this is one state machine with two modes rather than a copy:
substitution flattening is correct for a name and wrong for a path, where an
expansion-capable `$HOME` must stay visible. In path mode a shell-LITERAL
dollar or tilde -- single-quoted, escaped, or a quoted tilde -- becomes an
internal nonmatching marker, so quote removal cannot manufacture a home
spelling the shell would never expand, and `"~/wt"` is no longer refused.

`home_re` treats the braces as the pair they are. `$HOME}` expands HOME and
appends a literal brace; `${HOME` is not an expansion at all. Admitting either
as `${HOME}` would invent a home path the shell never resolves.

Verified by oracle rather than by assertion: for each spelling, `printf` under
bash performs expansion and quote removal without executing, and the resulting
path decides the expected verdict. 24 spellings, 0 mismatched here; 6
mismatched at 3d0a882a, which is what makes this a fix and not a rewrite.
Fixtures 184 -> 198.
2026-08-13 04:38:44 -05:00
Hermes Agent 3d0a882a63 wrapper-guard: model quote removal and escaping as separate operations
ci/woodpecker/pr/ci Pipeline was successful
Round six of the same class: a program NAME is not one SPELLING. Two findings,
and the second is one this change's own predecessor introduced.

A FOURTH name consumer never went through the shared site. Checkout detection
still recognized git by a raw whole-command regex, so `g"it" clone`, `g'it'
clone` and `g\it clone` into $HOME were all allowed. `/usr/bin/git` blocked only
because the raw text still happened to contain contiguous `git` — the same
passing presentation that established nothing during the curl rounds. It now
uses CMD_NAMES and NAME_PREFIX like the other three, so all four consumers
share one definition of what a name looks like.

Routing it through NAME_PREFIX also repaired an over-block the arm had carried
from the start: the old regex found `git` INSIDE a longer word, so `mygit clone`
and `gitfoo clone` were refused at every previous head. That is the mycurl and
curl-wrapper class, and refusing it is how a guard gets routed around instead
of repaired.

The normalization itself was creating names the shell never runs. It deleted
every backslash regardless of quote context, but a backslash inside single
quotes is literal, so `'cu\rl' --config` names a program called cu\rl and was
refused. The same holds inside double quotes before any character other than
$, `, " or backslash. Both were false positives, and both were regressions —
the pre-PR head allowed them.

Quote removal and escape handling are different operations that were sharing
one context-blind deletion pass. They are now a small state machine that
follows the actual rule: outside quotes a backslash escapes the next character;
inside single quotes everything is literal; inside double quotes a backslash is
special only before $, `, " or backslash. Quote characters drop without
splitting the word, and the substitution flattening that makes `$(which curl)`
resolve to a bare name is unchanged.

An over-block is not the safe direction. A guard that refuses legitimate work
gets routed around rather than fixed, which is the same outcome as a bypass and
arrives faster.

Unchanged and still disclosed: names absent from the literal text — assembled
from braces or variables — remain invisible to text matching, and `$((curl))`
is over-matched at every head including the pre-PR one.

Fixtures: 173 -> 184. Every one added here discriminates against the previous
head 1c3e79a9 (8 fail there: 3 git bypasses, 5 over-blocks), and the positives
also fail at the pre-PR head df83a9ee. Suite green at head, bash -n and
shellcheck clean, enumeration gate 55/38/18.
2026-08-13 04:10:59 -05:00
Hermes Agent 1c3e79a9ed wrapper-guard tests: cover the shapes I had only reasoned about
ci/woodpecker/pr/ci Pipeline was successful
Test-only. No change to the guard; every case below already behaves
correctly at 46f52eed. They are committed because reasoning that a shape was
already covered is exactly what produced rounds four and five, and an
unmeasured belief about a security control is worth nothing.

Three fail at df83a9ee and pass here, so they discriminate:

    \curl --config /tmp/w.cfg              escaping the leading character
    cur"l" --config /tmp/w.cfg             the quote at a different offset
    g"h" api -X POST "repos/a/b/$EP" …     both halves dressed at once

`\curl` is the ordinary way to bypass a shell alias. It is a thing people
type, which makes it the least hypothetical entry in the file, and it was
not covered by any of the eight fixtures added in the previous commit.

The last one is the case I would have bet on breaking: the name gate reads
the normalized copy while the unreadable-endpoint tail reads RAW text, so
dressing BOTH halves at once is the input where those two readings are most
likely to disagree. They do not — the tail matches through the quote — but
the previous commit's message asserted that from reading the regex rather
than running it, and one round earlier the same kind of assertion was wrong.

Four negatives pass at BOTH heads and are here as regression guards: a
quoted read, an ordinary download, `gh --version` with no api subcommand,
and the word curl inside a string with no flag. Over-blocking is a real
failure and not a safe direction — a guard that refuses legitimate work gets
routed around instead of repaired, which costs more than the bypass it was
protecting against.

Suite 173/173.
2026-08-13 03:40:41 -05:00
Hermes Agent 46f52eedfe wrapper-guard: remove quotes instead of splitting on them; last name consumer
ci/woodpecker/pr/ci Pipeline was canceled
Round-five remediation of both blockers gate-ultron-01 raised on df83a9ee.
Measured against that head first; all eight returned rc=0 and each executes
the program the check exists to recognize:

    cu"rl" --config /tmp/w.cfg               -> allowed
    cu'rl' --config /tmp/w.cfg               -> allowed
    /usr/bin/cu\rl --config /tmp/w.cfg       -> allowed
    g"h" api -X POST repos/a/b/issues …      -> allowed
    /usr/bin/g\h api -X POST repos/a/b/… …   -> allowed
    curl --con"fig" /tmp/w.cfg               -> allowed
    /usr/bin/gh api -X POST repos/a/b/$EP …  -> allowed
    g"h" api -X POST repos/a/b/$EP …         -> allowed

BLOCKER 1. The previous commit said names are recognized "after quote
removal" and did not do that. It replaced quote characters with whitespace,
which is token SEPARATION: a shell removes a quote WITHOUT splitting the
word around it, so `cu"rl"` is one word naming curl, while whitespace made
it two words naming neither. `"/usr/bin/curl"` blocked under that version
only because the inserted space happened to land after a slash — a passing
case that established nothing about quote removal, and I read it as
confirmation. The characters are now DELETED, which is what quote removal
is. Backslashes go with them, because escaping is ordinary word formation
too. Deletion still handles substitution: `$(which curl)` becomes
`which curl`, where the name is a word on its own.

The flag is read from the same normalized copy for the same reason —
`--con"fig"` is one word spelling --config. No review raised that; the name
was simply the easier half to reach, and reading both halves the same way
is the entire point of having one normalization.

BLOCKER 2. A THIRD name consumer never went through the shared site: the
unreadable-endpoint arm kept a private bare-name copy of the scope gate's
regex against raw $CMD. A caller could be admitted by the repaired gate and
then go unrecognized by the fail-closed refinement — a gate and its own
refinement disagreeing about who the caller is, which is the defect one
layer downstream.

Fixing that surfaced the same mistake a third time inside this very edit:
my first version left the NAME in the refinement's tail regex, so the name
gate recognized `g"h" api` while the tail still demanded the undressed
spelling, and the two halves disagreed exactly as before. Caught by the
fixture, not by reading. Each half now asks one question: the name gate
asks WHO, from the normalized copy; the tail asks whether the ENDPOINT is
readable, from the raw text — deliberately raw, because the expansion
markers that make an endpoint unreadable are the characters the normalized
copy removes, and reading the tail from it would erase the evidence.

Controls: the 8 positive fixtures FAIL at df83a9ee and pass here; the
negatives — mycurl, curl-wrapper, mygh, mygh with an assembled endpoint, an
absolute-path read, and -K on a non-curl — pass at BOTH heads. Suite
166/166.

Unchanged and still stated in the comment rather than this message: a name
ABSENT from the text, assembled from variables or reached through a wrapper
script that execs the program, is invisible to any of this.
2026-08-13 03:36:42 -05:00
Hermes Agent df83a9eec2 wrapper-guard: recognize program names after quote removal, in one place
ci/woodpecker/pr/ci Pipeline was successful
Round-four remediation of both blockers gate-ultron-01 raised on d99ff57e.
Measured against that head before anything was touched; all seven returned
rc=0, and each executes the program the check exists to recognize:

    "/usr/bin/curl" --config /tmp/w.cfg          -> allowed
    './curl' --config /tmp/w.cfg                 -> allowed
    $(which curl) --config /tmp/w.cfg            -> allowed
    `which curl` --config /tmp/w.cfg             -> allowed
    /usr/bin/gh api -X POST repos/a/b/issues …   -> allowed
    ./gh api -X POST repos/a/b/issues …          -> allowed
    /usr/local/bin/tea api -X POST repos/a/b/… … -> allowed

This is the third appearance of one defect, and the shape is worth stating
plainly because the first two repairs each fixed an INSTANCE and left the
class: the check matched the bare word, then it matched the unquoted
basename. Both were models of one TEXTUAL PRESENTATION of a shell word
rather than of the word, so the first repair was defeated by an absolute
path and the second by two quote characters. Recognizing a name is either
done after quote removal or it is caller-name parsing wearing a longer
regex.

The second blocker is the same defect sitting untouched in the API SCOPE
gate the whole time, while the curl arm was repaired twice beside it. That
one is worse than it looks: the scope gate decides whether write detection
runs AT ALL, so failing to admit `/usr/bin/gh api -X POST` is not a missed
match, it is an allow. No URL marker rescued those commands either —
provider CLI endpoints are spelled `repos/…` with no leading slash, so
`/repos/` never matched them.

Fix, and the reason it is one fix rather than two:

  - $CMD_NAMES — a second reading of the same command with quote and
    substitution punctuation turned into whitespace. Names are read from it.
  - $NAME_PREFIX — the one place the shape of a program name is written
    down. Both callers use it, so the next fix to this class lands in a
    single location instead of whichever arm review happened to probe. That
    is the actual lesson of finding this defect twice in one file.

The prefix still must end at a slash. `mycurl` and `curl-wrapper` are
different programs and blocking them is the over-block that gets a guard
routed around instead of repaired; both remain negative fixtures, and
`mygh` and an absolute-path READ join them.

The cost is the one this file already chose and documented for the payload
check: quoting an example does not exempt it, so writing one of these
commands inside quotes on a Bash line is refused too. Applying that rule to
the name arms makes the file coherent — the alternative is a guard where
the payload arm treats quotes as text and the name arms treat them as
armour.

Still open, stated rather than left to be found: a name absent from the
text — assembled from variables, or reached through a wrapper script that
execs the program — is invisible here. That is a limit of inspecting a
command string, not something a pattern closes.

Controls: the 7 positive fixtures FAIL at d99ff57e and pass here; the 4
negative fixtures pass at BOTH heads, so they measure over-blocking rather
than decorate the diff. Suite 157/157.
2026-08-13 03:12:39 -05:00
Hermes Agent d99ff57e14 wrapper-guard: match curl by basename, not by bare word
ci/woodpecker/pr/ci Pipeline was successful
Round-three remediation of the single blocker gate-ultron-01 raised on
06046f76. Confirmed by measurement before being touched: all three spellings
returned rc=0 against that head.

    /usr/bin/curl --config /tmp/provider-write.cfg      -> allowed
    env /usr/bin/curl -K/tmp/provider-write.cfg         -> allowed
    ./curl --config /tmp/provider-write.cfg             -> allowed

The config file still owned the URL, method, body and headers in every one of
them, so each executed exactly the wrapped raw provider write the previous
commit was written to refuse, while the guard reported clean.

The mistake is worth naming precisely, because it is the one this file already
exists to refuse and I reintroduced it: recognizing the unqualified name only is
CALLER-NAME PARSING. `/usr/bin/curl` is not a different program from `curl`, and
a control that can be defeated by typing the absolute path is not a control. The
match is now on curl as a BASENAME — an optional prefix that must end at a
slash — so a path spelling costs the caller nothing and buys them nothing.

The prefix must end at a slash deliberately: `mycurl` and `curl-wrapper` are
different programs, and blocking them would be the over-block that gets a guard
routed around instead of fixed. Both are negative fixtures.

Still open and stated rather than left to be discovered: a wrapper script that
execs curl on the operator's behalf is invisible here, because neither the name
nor the request appears in the command text. That is a limit of inspecting a
command string, not something this regex can close, and it is now written in the
comment above the check.

Controls: the three bypass fixtures FAIL against 06046f76 and pass at this head;
the two over-block fixtures pass against both. Suite 148/148.
2026-08-13 02:36:51 -05:00
Hermes Agent 06046f7675 wrapper-guard: close three fail-opens the last round left, and enumerate the large-repo test
ci/woodpecker/pr/ci Pipeline was successful
Round-two remediation of the four blockers gate-ultron-01 raised on f8d04d1b. All
four were confirmed by my own measurement before being touched; none is taken on
the reviewer's word.

1. The --config/-K refusal never ran. It sat nested inside `if API_SHAPED`, and
   API_SHAPED is a test for a provider URL in the command text — which is exactly
   what a config file removes. The check was guarded by the condition that the
   capability it guards against defeats, so `curl --config /tmp/write.cfg` walked
   past it. It now keys on curl itself, ahead of the URL gate, and covers the
   attached (`-K/tmp/f`) and bundled (`-sK`) spellings a space-separated test
   cannot see.

2. Percent-encoded endpoints are a live route, not a theoretical one. Measured
   against the provider: `…/issues/1174` and `…/iss%75es/1174` both return HTTP
   200 for the same object. A write carrying any percent-escape is now refused
   rather than decoded — a decoder has to be exactly right about depth
   (%2569 -> %69 -> i) and about the provider's own normalisation, and being
   approximately right there is indistinguishable from not checking. Scoped to
   writes: a read is never this hook's business and a query string carrying %20
   is an ordinary URL.

3. HOME was still expanded unguarded at the `W=` fallback, which runs before any
   of the new HOME adjudication — so a guard deployed without its siblings still
   died on an unset HOME, upstream of the fix that was supposed to survive it.
   Moving a fail-open earlier in the file is not closing it. HOME is now resolved
   once, above every use, and every later site reads the resolved value.

   The existing harness could not have caught this: it runs the guard beside its
   siblings, so `[ -x "$W/pr-review.sh" ]` always succeeded and the fallback was
   never reached. A test's blind spot can be a property of the harness rather
   than of the code. The new lone_case() block copies the guard alone into an
   empty directory and re-asserts the four behaviours there.

4. test-mosaic-worktree-large-repo.sh shipped at mode 100644 and appeared in no
   CI step, so the enumeration guard (#1017) redded pipeline 2386 — correctly.
   Committed mode is now 100755 and the test is enumerated in the sanitization
   step. My own process miss: I verified the CI queue before pushing and never
   verified terminal CI after.

Controls: the 25 fixtures added here all FAIL against 029af418 (rc 0 or 1 where 2
is required) and all pass at this head, 143/143.
2026-08-13 02:18:35 -05:00
Hermes Agent f8d04d1bf4 wrapper-guard: decide allows on the shell's reading, not on the whole command text
ci/woodpecker/pr/ci Pipeline failed
Four blockers from adversarial review, and three are one defect wearing three
hats: a test over the WHOLE command text deciding an ALLOW. That is the
fail-open shape this file keeps rediscovering, and it had reached the
break-glass itself.

- Break-glass read POSITIONALLY. `case $CMD in *MOSAIC_WRAPPER_OVERRIDE=1*)`
  cleared the entire command if that string appeared anywhere in it, so quoting
  the override in a note, naming a variable after it, or writing =10 disabled
  the guard for the call sitting beside it. Now only leading NAME=value
  assignments count, exactly where the shell would honour one. Cost, pinned as a
  fixture: an override after `&&` no longer arms.

- $HOME resolved once, and unset / empty / "/" refused. This was filed as a
  checkout-arm defect and is larger: under `set -u` the old file died at line 62
  on EVERY command with HOME unset, exit 1, before the API arms or the APPROVE
  trap ran. A seat with no HOME (systemd unit, container, env -i) had no guard at
  all. A checkout whose question cannot be asked now blocks; the blast radius is
  asserted to be that one command shape and not the session.

- Subresource refinement inverted. It asked whether a subresource appears
  anywhere in the command, so `gh api -X PATCH .../issues/1 -f body=cf-/pulls/2/files`
  was cleared on the strength of text in its own body. It now clears only when
  EVERY numbered-object occurrence carries a subresource.

- -K/--config refused. curl reads the method, body, headers and URL from that
  file, so none of them are in the command: every write test read 0 and the call
  went through. An unreadable request is not a cleared one.

mosaic-worktree: never close a git pipe early

resolve_repo took the first porcelain line with `awk ... exit`, which closes the
read end while git is still writing. git takes SIGPIPE, pipefail returns 141, and
the function aborts SILENTLY — no message, no path, exit 141. It fires as a
function of REPO SIZE: fine on three worktrees, reliable on seventy. Measured at
73 worktrees (10 KB of porcelain): rc=141, no output. The file already removed a
`head -200` for this exact reason; the rule is now uniform.

Evidence — every new case run against 029af418, the tree before these fixes:

  test-wrapper-guard.sh              130/130 pass here; 15 FAIL against 029af418
  test-mosaic-worktree-large-repo.sh   2/2 pass here;  2 FAIL against 029af418
                                       (got rc=141 and empty output, the signature)

No pre-existing fixture changed behaviour on the old guard, so the new cases are
the whole delta. The size dependence is stubbed out rather than inherited: a test
that ran against whatever repo it sits in would have PASSED on the broken tree.
2026-08-13 01:57:07 -05:00
Hermes Agent 029af418f0 wrapper-guard: name the marker every forge API shares, not one dialect's
ci/woodpecker/pr/ci Pipeline was successful
The scope gate asked for a scheme URL, a `/api/v[0-9]` path, or a provider-CLI
`api` subcommand. `/api/v[0-9]` is Gitea's spelling. GitHub's API carries no
version segment at all -- `api.github.com/repos/a/b/issues` -- so the schemeless
Gitea write was in scope and the schemeless GitHub one was not:

    curl -X POST -d x api.github.com/repos/a/b/issues              rc 0
    curl -X POST -d x api.github.com/repos/a/b/issues/1/comments   rc 0
    host=api.github.com; curl -X POST -d x ${host}/repos/a/b/issues rc 0

A gate calibrated to one provider's spelling rather than to what identifies a
provider API. `/repos/` is the marker both dialects share -- every forge API
addresses a repository through it -- so the gate now names both.

This is SPAN a third time, and the third layer it has appeared on. Round 8: a
block message named a wrapper that could not make the call. Round 9: a map
claimed a span its wrapper did not cover. Round 10: a control claimed a surface
it did not measure. Here the scope gate itself claimed a class of API and
recognised one member of it. Same question each time -- does this thing SPAN
what it claims -- and it has now been the answer four rounds running, which is
the argument for asking it of every arm rather than of the reported one.

Widening a scope gate can only make the guard stricter. Downstream a block still
requires a body flag AND either a mapped endpoint or an unreadable one, so this
widens what is CONSIDERED, not what is refused. The three fixtures asserting that
-- a schemeless GitHub read, an unwrapped GitHub endpoint, and a read past `--`
-- exist to hold that claim to account rather than state it.

Also: the provider-CLI arm's option scanner required a letter after the dashes,
so `gh api -X POST -- ${p}${q} -f title=x` walked its endpoint straight past.
The end-of-options marker is the one option not spelled like one, and a scanner
that skips options had to be told so.

Because the new endpoints are READABLE, each blocked fixture asserts the wrapper
its message must name. A rc-only fixture here would have passed on the unreadable
arm and proved nothing -- which is the failure mode this suite caught in itself
last round.

Evidence: 110/110 fixtures (was 101) locally and in ci-base. Negative-controlled
per change, not in aggregate: dropping `/repos/` from the gate fails exactly the
five GitHub fixtures; dropping the `--` alternative fails exactly one; neither
disturbs a pre-existing fixture. 18-command sweep unchanged (same three round-6
flips, nothing new); 12-command ordinary-work sweep 0 blocked. shellcheck clean
at warning+. CI 2374 on the previous head was green across all nine steps.

Residual, stated rather than implied: a caller who splits `/repos/` itself in a
schemeless GitHub URL leaves no literal marker anywhere and is out of scope --
the same boundary as splitting the hostname, and no longer a mistake anyone
makes by accident.

Round 11, addressing rev0 review 154.
2026-08-12 19:07:44 -05:00
Hermes Agent 51746f44eb wrapper-guard: fail closed on an unreadable endpoint in every shape the scope gate admits
ci/woodpecker/pr/ci Pipeline was successful
Round-9 review found the fail-closed rule narrower than the block it guards.
The scope gate admits three shapes — a scheme URL, a schemeless /api/vN path,
and a provider CLI's `api` subcommand — but the unreadable-endpoint test asked
only for https?://. So a split endpoint token in the other two shapes was in
scope to be blocked, produced no readable endpoint, and fell through to ALLOW,
while the identical split behind a literal scheme blocked.

Four writes reaching the provider unexamined, one of them a review verdict:

  p=repos/a/b/iss;              q=ues;     gh api -X POST ${p}${q} -f title=x
  p=repos/a/b/issues/1/comm;    q=ents;    gh api -X POST ${p}${q} -f body=x
  p=repos/a/b/pulls/1/rev;      q=iews;    gh api -X POST ${p}${q} -f event=APPROVED
  p=/api/v1/repos/a/b/iss;      q=ues;     curl -X POST -d x host${p}${q}

This is the same defect class as the milestone arm one round earlier, one layer
up: there the map claimed a span its wrapper did not cover, here a control
claimed a surface it did not measure. A control is only as wide as its narrowest
arm, and widening the scope gate without widening the fail-closed rule left the
gap exactly where the gate had just been extended.

Three arms now, one per admitted shape: a scheme URL token carrying an
expansion; a schemeless token carrying both a forge fragment and an expansion,
in either order; and the endpoint argument of a provider-CLI api call, read
positionally. Limits are stated in the source rather than implied — a caller who
splits the hostname as well, and an endpoint pushed past an option whose value
contains whitespace, are both outside what this measures.

An expansion in a BODY is explicitly not unreadable. Passing a payload in a
variable is the safe practice and leaves the endpoint fully legible; blocking it
would have been a control punishing the behaviour it wants.

101/101 fixtures, up from 92. Each arm is negative-controlled separately:
removing the schemeless arm fails exactly the two schemeless fixtures, removing
the provider-CLI arm fails exactly the four CLI fixtures, and neither disturbs
any pre-existing fixture. One added fixture was rewritten after it passed for
the wrong reason — its endpoint was readable, so it blocked on the endpoint map
and never exercised the arm it was written for.

Evidence: 101/101 locally and in ci-base; shellcheck clean at warning+; a
12-command sweep of ordinary forge work — reads with split endpoints, bodies in
variables, unwrapped endpoints, an artifact PUT — blocks none of them; the
18-command sweep still blocks the same three round-six flips and nothing new.
2026-08-12 18:53:25 -05:00
Hermes Agent 1bfd0ddd71 wrapper-guard: an arm may only claim the span its wrapper actually covers
ci/woodpecker/pr/ci Pipeline was successful
Round eight replaced an absence-driven allow with an endpoint inventory, and
review found the inventory answered the wrong question. It recorded which
wrapper TOUCHES an endpoint, when the sound question is whether the wrapper
SPANS it. A PATCH to a numbered milestone blocked with "use milestone-close.sh".
That wrapper takes only -t <title> and sends state=closed on both the gh and tea
paths, so it cannot express a title, description or due-date edit. The block was
correct and the advice was not — the same remediation-accuracy defect as the
round-seven subresource arm, one step quieter, because a wrapper was rounded up
from owning a slice to owning the endpoint.

The treatment already existed two arms away: /pulls/{n} named pr-close.sh for
state and said in the message that a PR title/body edit is a real wrapper gap.
So this was a consistency failure rather than a missing idea, which is why the
fix is not just the reported arm. Auditing every arm for span against the flags
each script accepts found a second bad one that review had not reached:
/pulls/{n}/requested_reviewers was mapped to pr-review.sh, and pr-review.sh
takes -a <action> -c <comment> and files a verdict. Nothing in this tree adds a
requested reviewer, so that arm was advertising a wrapper that cannot make the
call. It is unowned and now flows through, like a comment edit.

Changes:
  - /milestones/{n} keeps blocking, and the message states that milestone-close.sh
    owns the close only while title/description/due-date is a wrapper gap.
  - /pulls/{n}/requested_reviewers becomes residue, above the reviews arm so it
    cannot be refused with "use pr-review.sh".
  - /issues/{n} now also names issue-assign.sh, which owns the assignee field;
    issue-edit.sh has no assignee flag, so the old advice was short by one wrapper
    for a PATCH that sets one.
  - The map comment carries a span column, so a future arm has to state what its
    wrapper covers rather than imply all of it.

Fixtures assert the span language, not just the wrapper name: the milestone edit
must say it owns the close only, and a PATCH setting an assignee must name
issue-assign.sh. Negative-controlled — reverting each of the three behaviours
fails that fixture and only that fixture.

92/92 (was 89), locally and in ci-base. shellcheck clean at warning+. The
18-command ordinary sweep blocks the same three round-six flips and nothing new.

Gates: fixtures 92/92 in ci-base, shellcheck clean at warning+.
2026-08-12 18:36:23 -05:00
Hermes Agent a3cacac7fb wrapper-guard: make subresource ownership an inventory, and check the advice
ci/woodpecker/pr/ci Pipeline was canceled
Round seven fixed "wrong wrapper advice" by letting every path under a numbered
issue or PR flow through, on the stated reasoning that no wrapper owned any of
them. Review checked that reasoning against the directory and it was false:

  gh api -X PATCH repos/a/b/issues/1 -f title=x
  curl -X PATCH -d @b https://host/api/v1/repos/a/b/issues/1
  gh api -X PATCH repos/a/b/issues/1/labels -f labels[]=bug
  gh api -X POST  repos/a/b/issues/1/assignees -f assignees[]=u

issue-edit.sh takes --title/--body/--labels/--milestone and issue-assign.sh
takes assignee/labels/milestone, so all four are wrapped calls and all four
returned 0. The guard answered "allow" because wrapper ownership had been
ASSUMED absent rather than looked up — the same absence-driven allow this file
exists to remove, committed inside the fix for it. I withdraw the round-seven
departure: the reviewer's position was right on the evidence, and my argument
for it was sound reasoning applied to a fact I never checked.

The endpoint map is now an inventory read off tools/git/*.sh and their flags:
assignees to issue-assign.sh, labels to issue-edit.sh (naming issue-assign.sh
alongside it, since both set them), a numbered issue to issue-edit.sh (naming
issue-close.sh/issue-reopen.sh for state), a numbered PR to pr-close.sh (with
the PR title/body gap stated in the message rather than papered over), and
/milestones/{n} to milestone-close.sh instead of the create wrapper.

The residue is defined by SUBTRACTION, not by listing provider API surface:
everything a wrapper owns is consumed by an arm above, so a numbered path that
reaches the end is owned by nothing and still flows through — times, stopwatch,
reactions, a comment edit at /issues/comments/{id}. A list would rot the moment
a provider adds an endpoint, and rot in the blocking direction with wrong advice.

That residue test is a regex, deliberately. `case` globs cannot express a path
SEGMENT, so the natural allow arm *"/issues/"[0-9]*"/"* clears

  gh api -X PATCH repos/a/b/issues/1 -f body="see /docs"

on the strength of a slash inside the body. An allow decided by a glob over the
whole command is the fail-open shape again; the regex pins the segment to the
number, and that command is pinned as a fixture.

Also: `-f labels[]=bug` was not read as a body at all, because the key class
stopped at the bracket. The array spelling is what the provider CLIs use for
repeated fields, so an implicit POST carrying only array fields was invisible.

And the reason six rounds of this were invisible: the harness read the exit code
and nothing else, so a block naming the WRONG wrapper passed every run. Fixtures
may now state the wrapper the message must name, and the wrapped ones do. The
assertion was negative-controlled — pointing one fixture at the wrong wrapper
fails that fixture and only that fixture.

89/89 (was 79), locally and in ci-base. All eight sanitization commands green
in-image. The 18-command ordinary sweep blocks the same three round-six flips
and nothing new, so the tighter map cost nothing on ordinary work.

Gates: sanitization (all eight green in ci-base), shellcheck clean at warning+.
2026-08-12 18:25:13 -05:00
Hermes Agent b4578dcd0a wrapper-guard: close the absence shape at the new boundary; stop giving wrong advice
ci/woodpecker/pr/ci Pipeline was successful
Round six deleted the code/data parser and scoped what remained on `https?://`.
Review found the failure class had not been eliminated, only relocated: a raw
provider CLI carries no scheme, so the scope gate answered "not my business"
because the URL was ABSENT — the same shape, at the new boundary.

  gh api -X POST repos/a/b/issues -f title=x -f body=y
  gh api -X POST repos/a/b/pulls/1/reviews -f event=APPROVE
  tea api -X POST repos/a/b/issues/1/comments -f body=x
  curl -X POST -d x git.example.invalid/api/v1/repos/a/b/issues

All four were real writes to endpoints a wrapper owns, and all four passed.
Constitution gate 7 names raw provider CLIs explicitly, so they are in scope
rather than something to narrow the docs around. The scope gate now also
triggers on `/api/v{n}` and on the `api` subcommand of the provider CLIs, and
`-f key=value` joins curl's `-d` as an implicit POST. Adding triggers to a scope
gate can only make it stricter — it cannot open a new hole — which is why this
is a list of shapes rather than a model of any one caller.

The boundary is stated in the file rather than left to be discovered: provider
PORCELAIN (`tea pulls create`) is NOT covered, because catching it means
modelling every CLI's verb grammar, which is the parser mistake wearing a new
costume. That is a wrapper-and-review gap, not a thing this hook can hold.

Second finding, and the one I had flagged as my own worry: the endpoint `case`
was prefix-greedy, so `/issues/1/labels` blocked with "use issue-create.sh" —
the wrong wrapper for that call. A block an agent cannot comply with is worse
than no block, because it teaches that the hook is broken and the override is
routine, and an override that is routine is a guard that is off. Issue and PR
subresources now flow through, exactly as /releases and every other endpoint no
wrapper owns already does. This hook enforces "use the wrapper"; where there is
no wrapper it has nothing to enforce, and the gap belongs in the wrapper set.

I am departing from the review on that one deliberately: the review held that
blocking is correct there and only the remediation wrong. Naming a wrapper gap
in a refusal keeps gate-7 pressure, but it makes the override the normal path
for every labels and assignees call, which spends the override's meaning on the
cases where it is least needed.

Also: the APPROVE trap now catches the provider-CLI spelling `-f event=APPROVE`
alongside the JSON body, and still never matches the correct value APPROVED.

79/79 fixtures, locally and inside the CI image, with both blockers pinned in
both directions — the four repros block and name the right wrapper, while a
provider-CLI read, an unwrapped endpoint reached through one, porcelain, and the
`rm -f`/`grep -f` collisions all still pass. The 18-command ordinary sweep
blocks the same three round-six flips and nothing new, so the broader gate cost
nothing on ordinary work. Second over-block documented rather than found: prose
carrying `.post(` near a wrapped URL is refused, which follows from judging the
payload and is now stated next to the quoted-curl cost.

Gates: sanitization (all eight commands green in ci-base), shellcheck clean.
2026-08-12 18:10:19 -05:00
Hermes Agent b1254f52f3 wrapper-guard: judge the payload, not the caller — delete the code/data parser
ci/woodpecker/pr/ci Pipeline was canceled
Round-five review found command substitution executing inside the very quoted
spans the skeleton was discarding as prose:

  echo "$(curl -d@b .../issues/1/comments)"
  msg="$(curl -d@b .../issues/1/comments)"

The unquoted and process-substitution forms already blocked, so the same call
was refused or allowed depending on a quote character. That makes it a
classification defect rather than another spelling, and it is the nineteenth
write to reach execution through this file by the same route: the client was
ABSENT from the skeleton, so the guard allowed.

The reviewer's judgement, which I asked for and accept: this is fitting to the
test set. Answering "code or data" from shell text with sed and awk is not a
hard problem, it is the wrong problem.

It was also not portable. CI has been red at `sanitization` since round four,
and the log says why: under the image's busybox awk the octal escape in the
quote-stripping regex does not bite, every quoted span survives into the
skeleton, and the guard began refusing ordinary prose. Five allow-direction
fixtures failed in CI that pass under GNU awk. A control that reverses its
verdict with the awk on the host is not a control.

So the client detection is gone — the skeleton, the invoker list, the prefix
list, the option-value skipping, all of it. What remains asks two questions of
the text: is this a write, and does it name an endpoint a wrapper owns. It
cannot fail open by hiding the caller because it never looks for one, and it
now catches clients it was never taught: `python -c ... requests.post(...)` and
`wget --post-data` are both fixtures.

The cost is stated in the file and pinned in both directions: QUOTING one of
these calls on a Bash command line is refused as well. Ten fixtures that used
to assert "discussing a call is not making one" now assert the opposite, and
the boundary that stops this becoming block-everything is asserted just as
hard — a quoted READ, an endpoint named without a body flag, a quoted write to
an UNWRAPPED endpoint, and the wrapper's own body flag all still pass. The
18-command ordinary-work sweep blocks none.

The rule an agent can hold without a parser: do not put a raw write to a
wrapped forge endpoint on a Bash command line, not even inside quotes. Write
the example with a file-writing tool.

60/60 fixtures, verified inside the CI image (busybox) as well as locally.
Gates: sanitization, resident budget, test enumeration, tools-index (self-test
4/4, git suite 100%), issue-close, prettier.
2026-08-12 17:59:14 -05:00
Hermes Agent 2a2a87251a wrapper-guard: read the command the shell will run, and stop losing the client behind option values
ci/woodpecker/pr/ci Pipeline failed
Round-four review, three more absence-driven allows.

1. The guard read the command as TYPED. A backslash before a newline is removed
   before anything else happens, so an endpoint token split across the join
   (`.../iss\` + newline + `ues/1/comments`) executed the comments endpoint while
   the literal token never appeared in the text. Continuations are now joined
   before every check, because the joined form IS the command. This is the same
   defect as the split-across-variables case, minus the excuse: there the token
   genuinely does not exist until the shell expands it, here it was sitting in
   the input the whole time and the guard chose the wrong reading of it.

2. Transparent prefixes take option VALUES. `sudo -u root curl` hid a live write
   because `root` was a word the prefix list did not know. Enumerating option
   grammars per prefix is the wrong game, so what is skipped is an option and at
   most one value for it, plus a bare duration for `timeout` — never an
   arbitrary word. `xargs echo curl ...` therefore stays ALLOWED, because there
   the command is echo and the client is its argument.

3. `find -exec` runs the client. It opens command position the same way an
   operator does, and now reads that way.

All seven reviewer repros are fixtures, each with its counter-case in the
allowed direction: a continuation inside a heredoc document stays a document,
`xargs echo curl` stays allowed, `sudo apt-get install curl` stays allowed, a
prefixed READ stays allowed. 48/48, and the 18-command ordinary sweep still
blocks none.

Gates: sanitization, resident budget, test enumeration, tools-index (self-test
4/4, git suite 100%), prettier.
2026-08-12 17:46:25 -05:00
Hermes Agent e6a881a795 wrapper-guard: judge command position on prefixes and on what a shell will execute
ci/woodpecker/pr/ci Pipeline failed
Round-three review found two more absence-driven allows, both in the skeleton
introduced by round two, and fixing them exposed a third the reviewer had not
reached yet.

1. A word in front of a command does not displace the command. `env VAR=v curl`,
   `command curl`, `timeout 10 curl` and `/usr/bin/curl` were all real writes at
   execution position that a bare-name match could not see. The `env` form is the
   one that matters: it is what an agent reaches for to keep a credential out of
   the global environment, so the careful spelling was the invisible one.

2. Quoted data stops being data when a shell is about to execute it, and the
   first version knew only `bash -c`, `sh <<` and `eval`. It did not know the
   pipe, which is the form people actually use: `printf ... | sh`, `cat <<EOF | sh`,
   `sh -s <<EOF` each made a live call vanish from the skeleton while still
   running.

3. Found while testing the fix: that decision was made for the WHOLE command, so
   a single unrelated `docker run ... sh -c 'echo hi'` promoted every other
   quoted span on every other line to code. It blocked its own author for the
   second time in a day. A shell on one line does not execute a string on another
   line, and over-blocking is not the safe direction — a guard that blocks
   ordinary work gets switched off, and a guard that is off permits everything.
   The skeleton is now built per line, and a heredoc body is code only when the
   line that opened it fed a shell.

All seven reviewer repros are pinned as fixtures, each with a counter-fixture in
the allowed direction: `echo timeout 10 curl ...` is not a call, a pipe to `wc`
is not execution, an unrelated shell on another line changes nothing. Fixtures
40/40, and a sweep of 18 ordinary commands blocks none of them.

Gates: sanitization, resident budget, test enumeration, tools-index (self-test
4/4, git suite 100%), prettier.
2026-08-12 17:39:05 -05:00
Hermes Agent 7962e4302f guard: judge command position on the code, not on the text
ci/woodpecker/pr/ci Pipeline was canceled
The position test added an hour ago blocked its own author. The message being
sent quoted one of the fixtures, so the quoted text contained an operator
followed by a client, and an operator inside a string is not an operator. That
is the reported over-blocking defect one level in, and it landed within an hour
of shipping the fix for the reported one — which is the argument for pinning
both directions as fixtures rather than reasoning about them.

Position is now judged against a SKELETON: the command with its data spans
(quoted strings, heredoc bodies) removed. Endpoint, URL and body detection keep
running against the full text, because real calls quote their URLs and a
skeleton would be blind to them.

The exception is what makes quotes data in the first place. If something is
about to EXECUTE the quoted text — `bash -c`, `sh <<EOF`, `eval` — the quotes
hold code, and the skeleton keeps them as command separators so the client
inside is still at command position, one interpreter down.

Three fixtures: an operator inside a quoted string, a heredoc body, and
`bash -c` making the same text code again. 30/30.
2026-08-12 17:29:33 -05:00
Hermes Agent 8a901cc19a guard: read command position, refuse unreadable URLs, survive pipefail
ci/woodpecker/pr/ci Pipeline was canceled
Round two of the same independent review. Three findings, all real, and the
first two share a root cause: the guard was reading command TEXT as though it
were a command.

1. Splitting the endpoint token itself defeats fragment matching outright —
   `a=/api/v1/repos/o/r/iss; b=ues/1/comments` leaves no fragment contiguous.
   Round one fixed one spelling of this and the reviewer produced the general
   form immediately. It is not winnable by more fragments: the endpoint does
   not exist until the shell expands it, and this hook runs first. So the guard
   stops pretending to read it. A write whose URL contains an expansion, on a
   visibly forge-shaped command, is now BLOCKED as unreadable — because "I
   could not find an endpoint" must not mean "there is no endpoint". Opaque
   URLs that are not forge-shaped (webhooks, artifact stores) still pass.

2. The broadened body detection false-blocked ordinary work: `grep -R "curl -d
   https://.../issues" docs/`, `echo "curl -d ..." > note.txt`, printing an
   example from python. Talking about a call is not making one, and this is the
   direction that actually kills a control — an over-blocking hook gets turned
   off, and an off hook permits everything. The client must now appear at
   COMMAND POSITION: line start or after a shell operator, optionally behind
   VAR=value. In every false positive it sat behind a quote instead. Quotes are
   deliberately NOT stripped before matching; real calls quote their URLs.

3. `wt_precious()` aborted `cmd_rm` under `set -euo pipefail`: `grep -v` exits 1
   when it filters everything out, which is exactly the disposable-only case,
   so a SAFE worktree failed to remove with no message. Fixed, and the same
   defect was latent one step upstream in `wt_dirty()`, where `head -200`
   SIGPIPEs git on any worktree with 201 changed files. The cap is gone —
   counting is cheap and the cap only ever truncated output that is no longer
   printed.

Seven new fixtures pin all of it, in both directions. 27/27.
2026-08-12 17:26:09 -05:00
Hermes Agent 8b7ac5b51e guard: close four fail-open holes found by independent review
ci/woodpecker/pr/ci Pipeline was canceled
An independent reviewer broke all three new controls before they shipped.
Every finding is reproduced as a fixture or a repro, because the class is
recurring rather than incidental: each hole was a case where the answer was
"allow" because something was ABSENT rather than because it was CHECKED.

1. wrapper-guard read only the spellings it knew. `curl -d@body` (no space),
   `--request=POST` (equals form), and a URL path assembled from shell
   variables each carried a real provider write straight through. Write
   detection now covers every body and method form curl accepts, and the
   endpoint match no longer anchors on a literal host path that a variable
   can dissolve.

2. wrapper-guard blocked only when the wrapper FILE existed. A host with a
   broken or partial install therefore permitted exactly the raw writes the
   guard exists to stop. Blocking is now on the endpoint; a missing wrapper
   changes the remedy text, not the verdict — a broken install is not
   permission to bypass gate 7.

3. mosaic-worktree read a worktree's safety from two questions, and a clean,
   fully-pushed tree holding a gitignored `local.secret` answered both with
   zero. `git worktree remove` then deleted the one copy in existence. A file
   is gitignored precisely so nothing else holds it, so ignored-but-not-
   disposable files are now a third evidence question. Build junk
   (node_modules, .venv, dist, caches, *.pyc) stays disposable, so the common
   case still reads SAFE.

4. check-tools-index counted a documented tool as discoverable at mode 0644.
   Every caller tests `[ -x ]`, so a non-executable tool is a missing tool;
   it now fails the gate with its own message.

Local gates green: sanitization, resident budget, test enumeration,
tools-index (4/4 self-test, 100% on the enforced git suite), and
wrapper-guard 20/20.
2026-08-12 17:20:11 -05:00
Hermes Agent 96609bdade framework: prove the wrapper guard both ways, and resolve its wrappers relatively
ci/woodpecker/pr/ci Pipeline failed
Two defects found by running the guard rather than reading it.

1. The guard resolved its sibling wrappers through a hardcoded
   $HOME/.config/mosaic/tools/git. On a host with no installed mosaic home — a
   CI container, a bare checkout — every wrapper lookup missed, `[ -x ]` failed,
   and the guard fell through allowing the raw API write it exists to block. It
   failed OPEN, silently, in exactly the environment least likely to notice.
   It now resolves relative to its own path, so it names the wrappers from the
   install it was launched from, with $HOME as the fallback.

2. There was no test. Adding one surfaced the guard's other sharp edge
   immediately: it matches the literal text of the Bash command, so a harness
   that embeds a blocked pattern inline trips the guard on itself rather than on
   the fixture. That is the correct fail-closed posture and it is now recorded in
   the test's own comments, because the next person will hit it too.

test-wrapper-guard.sh asserts twelve fixtures and asserts the ALLOWED cases as
hard as the blocked ones. A guard that over-blocks gets routed around and a guard
that under-blocks is decoration; only pinning both edges keeps it useful. It is
hermetic — no network, no credentials, no repository — so it joins the CI
sanitization step directly rather than the exclusions file.
2026-08-12 16:54:18 -05:00
Hermes Agent e3a0ee87b3 framework: make tool discoverability, workspace placement and model tiering mechanical
An undocumented tool is, from inside an agent session, indistinguishable from a
tool that was never written. The framework shipped 26 git wrappers and named 6 of
them in its resident index docs — 23% discoverability, with pr-review.sh among the
missing. The observable consequence was an agent obeying Constitution gate 7 as
best it could see it, reaching for raw curl, sending GitHub's APPROVE to a Gitea
host, and getting HTTP 200 with the review silently filed PENDING. Three times.
That is not a discipline failure and no amount of prose fixes it.

Four changes, each converting a rule that decayed into a mechanism that cannot:

- check-tools-index.sh (new, CI-blocking): every tool in an enforced suite must be
  named in a resident index doc, and every tool an index names must exist. The git
  suite is enforced now; other suites report coverage without failing, so the
  ratchet tightens one reviewed PR at a time instead of landing as one sweep. The
  enforced list is framework-owned rather than a marker inside operator-owned
  TOOLS.md — a doc marker would let an operator silence the gate on exactly the
  host where it matters most. Carries --self-test, because a checker that only
  ever passes is indistinguishable from one that is not running.

- TOOLS-REFERENCE.md: complete 28-entry git index, plus the APPROVED/APPROVE
  dialect note that explains why pr-review.sh is not a formality.

- mosaic-worktree.sh + wrapper-guard.sh (upstreamed): the rule "big work goes on a
  work filesystem" already existed in prose, and 255 GB accumulated in $HOME across
  842 directories anyway, under five simultaneous placement conventions on one
  host. The helper therefore exposes no placement decision — given a branch name,
  every path is derived from `git worktree list --porcelain`. Worktrees rather than
  clones because enumerability is the only thing that makes reclaim safe, and
  reclaim is by evidence (clean tree + no unpushed commits), never by size or age.
  The guard blocks three mechanically-detectable mistakes and nothing else:
  a checkout into $HOME, a raw provider-API write to an endpoint that has a
  wrapper, and the literal APPROVE event. Reads pass untouched.

- STANDARDS.md: model tiering as a standard, named by capability class so it
  survives a model generation. Start cheapest, escalate on evidence, benchmark
  before demoting a task class, and keep the class->model binding in operator
  config with the DB-backed config service as the end state.

Registering the guard in runtime/claude/settings.json is the point of upstreaming
it: ~/.claude/settings.json is a framework-managed copy, so a hand-added hook there
is destroyed by the next upgrade. In the template it survives, and it reaches every
host instead of one.
2026-08-12 16:51:17 -05:00
mos-dt-0 ec260e678f Merge pull request 'fix(git): accept http/https as one scheme class in comment URL verification (#991)' (#1022) from fix/991-comment-url-scheme-normalise into main
ci/woodpecker/push/publish Pipeline was successful
ci/woodpecker/push/ci Pipeline was successful
2026-08-12 01:11:09 +00:00
Jason Woltje b590a5c3d8 fix(git): accept http/https as one scheme class in comment URL verification (#991)
ci/woodpecker/pr/ci Pipeline was successful
issue-comment.sh and pr-review.sh verify a durable write by pinning the
provider-returned object URL's origin and full path. The origin included the
SCHEME verbatim. On a Gitea whose ROOT_URL is configured `http://` while every
client reaches it over `https://`, the provider returns `http://` object URLs,
so the comparison rejects the provider's own truthful answer about a write that
LANDED. The failure is deterministic, not intermittent: every comment, every
time, on such a deployment.

The scheme was never what the check defends. The forgeries it exists to catch —
look-alike host, decoy path prefix, wrong owner/repo/kind/number — all vary the
HOST or the PATH. Both stay strict. `http` and `https` now collapse to one
scheme class; any other scheme (file:, ftp:, javascript:) stays distinguishing,
and an EXPLICIT non-default port still distinguishes, because a different port
is a different service on the same host.

Consequences of the bug, both observed:

- The wrapper reports failure on a comment that is durably on the issue/PR, and
  attributes it to #865 ("no durable comment created"). The write landed; the
  citation is wrong. Reproduced here: the harness's persisted state contains the
  record while the wrapper exits 1.
- pr-review.sh's comment path is worse. On a host where no seat can create a
  review OBJECT, comment-form is the only gate-16 review record obtainable, and
  this check refuses all of it.

Test gap this closes: every URL fixture in both harnesses was `https://`, and
every negative case varied only host or path. The one axis that fails in
production had zero coverage — the fixtures encoded the assumption that breaks.
Added, in both suites:

- scheme-downgrade (http vs https, otherwise correct) — must be ACCEPTED. Fails
  against the unmodified wrappers, passes against the fixed ones; verified in
  both directions, and the negative control's captured output is the #865
  misattribution above.
- explicit non-default port (`:8443`) — must stay REJECTED.
- non-web scheme (`ftp://`) — must stay REJECTED.

Also fixes test-issue-comment-readback.sh hermeticity (#1007), without which the
suite cannot run on any seat that has a per-agent Gitea token: detect-platform's
step-0 identity lookup reads ~/.config/mosaic/gitea-tokens/<identity>, outside
both XDG_CONFIG_HOME and MOSAIC_CREDENTIALS_FILE, so the suite resolved a
PRODUCTION credential and died at HTTP 401 before case 1. Same two-part fix
already merged for test-pr-review-gitea-comment.sh in #1006: a sandboxed HOME
plus an empty REPO-LOCAL mosaic.gitIdentity to shadow the global. Note the
env-var route does NOT work — detect-platform.sh reads `${MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY:-}`
and `:-` treats set-but-empty identically to unset.

The owner-side half of #991 (setting the deployment's Gitea ROOT_URL to https)
is not in scope here and is not made unnecessary by this change; this makes the
wrappers correct against a deployment that returns either scheme.
2026-08-11 19:00:31 -05:00
mos-dt-0 540ec5b6ef Merge pull request 'fix(git): #1007 suite hermeticity — pin repo-local mosaic.gitIdentity in five test suites' (#1024) from fix/1007-suite-hermeticity into main
ci/woodpecker/push/publish Pipeline was successful
ci/woodpecker/push/ci Pipeline failed
2026-08-11 23:19:49 +00:00
mos-dt-0 563d1ac053 Merge pull request 'fix(shell): remove wake validation pipe hazards' (#1107) from fix/1099-pipefail-wake into main
ci/woodpecker/push/publish Pipeline was canceled
ci/woodpecker/push/ci Pipeline was canceled
2026-08-11 23:19:45 +00:00
mos-dt-0 722163671f feat(pi): add persistent Mosaic /goal controller (#1152)
ci/woodpecker/push/publish Pipeline was successful
ci/woodpecker/push/ci Pipeline was successful
2026-08-10 22:54:43 +00:00
f10-coder f158be8003 fix(shell): remove wake validation pipe hazards
ci/woodpecker/pr/ci Pipeline was successful
2026-08-07 06:13:47 -05:00
f10-coderandMos b0f7d26dd9 fix(shell): remove test harness pipe hazards (#1106)
ci/woodpecker/push/publish Pipeline failed
ci/woodpecker/push/ci Pipeline was successful
ci/woodpecker/manual/ci-image Pipeline failed
ci/woodpecker/manual/publish Pipeline failed
ci/woodpecker/manual/ci Pipeline was successful
Co-authored-by: f10-coder <[email protected]>
2026-08-07 11:12:17 +00:00
f10-coderandMos 3a1203b2f8 fix(shell): remove runtime early-exit pipe hazards (#1105)
ci/woodpecker/push/publish Pipeline failed
ci/woodpecker/push/ci Pipeline was successful
Co-authored-by: f10-coder <[email protected]>
2026-08-07 09:38:37 +00:00
be-coder-08 df4c591ab4 fix(fleet): make framework shell assertions SIGPIPE-safe (#1100)
ci/woodpecker/push/publish Pipeline was successful
ci/woodpecker/push/ci Pipeline was successful
2026-08-07 08:21:20 +00:00
be-coder-06andMos 4fa2768962 fix(fleet): propagate roster git identity (#1073)
ci/woodpecker/push/publish Pipeline was successful
ci/woodpecker/push/ci Pipeline was successful
Co-authored-by: be-coder-06 <[email protected]>
2026-08-07 07:07:45 +00:00
Mos aa0a7b5fa2 fix(tools/git): issue-close.sh silently dropped the closing comment (#1085)
ci/woodpecker/push/publish Pipeline was successful
ci/woodpecker/push/ci Pipeline was successful
2026-08-07 05:59:12 +00:00
Mos 42ac19af48 test(gateway): size the enrollment clamp tolerance to CI jitter, not to a fast machine (closes #1090) (#1094)
ci/woodpecker/push/publish Pipeline failed
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2026-08-07 05:33:38 +00:00
Mos f744f32214 feat(tools/git): explain tea's misleading user does not exist error (stale token, not a missing account) (#1086)
ci/woodpecker/push/publish Pipeline was successful
ci/woodpecker/push/ci Pipeline was successful
2026-08-07 05:07:40 +00:00
Mos 8ff7aac0ca fix(tools/git): detect-platform died silently outside a repo, taking every wrapper with it (#1089)
ci/woodpecker/push/publish Pipeline was successful
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2026-08-07 04:26:36 +00:00
be-coder-08andMos 80a45b1e1c feat(pr-merge): preserve linked authors in squash messages (#1066)
ci/woodpecker/push/publish Pipeline was successful
ci/woodpecker/push/ci Pipeline was successful
Co-authored-by: be-coder-08 <[email protected]>
2026-08-06 05:36:59 +00:00
be-coder-08andMos 85d2108e4e fix(ci): remove upgrade rollback signal race (#1060)
ci/woodpecker/push/publish Pipeline was successful
ci/woodpecker/push/ci Pipeline was successful
Co-authored-by: be-coder-08 <[email protected]>
2026-08-05 22:14:15 +00:00
be-coder-08andMos 16f91157a1 test(ci): make queue guard harness deterministic (#1062)
ci/woodpecker/push/publish Pipeline was successful
ci/woodpecker/push/ci Pipeline was successful
Co-authored-by: be-coder-08 <[email protected]>
2026-08-05 21:49:44 +00:00
Jason Woltje 2fa6bcd576 fix(git): #1007 — test-issue-comment-readback is a FIFTH affected suite (second census correction)
ci/woodpecker/pr/ci Pipeline was successful
My previous commit said four. It is five. `test-issue-comment-readback.sh` has
the same defect and is fixed the same way, and I had already looked straight at
it and filed it as an *unrelated* silent failure. Correcting that here rather
than folding it in quietly.

WHY IT WAS MISSED — the general lesson, not the excuse. `run_comment()` sends
the wrapper's stdout AND stderr to `$OUTPUT_FILE`, and the `EXIT` trap deletes
`$WORK_DIR`. The suite therefore exits 1 with ZERO bytes on stdout and stderr,
and the one line that says what went wrong —

    Error: Gitea authenticated-identity read failed with HTTP 401

— lives only inside a directory that no longer exists when anyone looks. Every
oracle I had swept the family with greps for a SYMPTOM in surviving output, so
against this suite all of them returned "nothing found", which I read as "clean"
in the first sweep and as "unrelated pre-existing failure" in the second. A
suite that discards or deletes its own evidence converts a post-hoc assay into a
non-measurement, and I wrote that sentence into the previous commit while it was
already false about a file in the same directory.

HOW IT WAS ACTUALLY FOUND. Intercept the identity read at its SOURCE instead of
grepping for its consequence: a PATH shim over `git` that logs every
`mosaic.gitIdentity` read — args, rc, and resolved value — to a file OUTSIDE any
suite's work dir, then execs the real git. Deletion-proof by construction, and
it measures the defect's cause rather than one of its symptoms. Sweeping all 16
suites with it under an ordinary invocation:

  resolves a REAL identity (`mos-dt-0`) before the fix:
    test-issue-comment-readback          1 read   rc=1 (RED on every seat)
    test-pr-review-repo-host-override    6 reads  rc=0
    test-ci-queue-wait-branch-absent     3 reads  rc=0
  the four fixed in the previous commit now read empty; the rest never read at all.

The latter two are NOT affected and are deliberately left alone: under a seat
replica (identity set, no per-slot token) neither reaches `get_gitea_token`'s
fail-loud branch, and under a canary HOME neither carries the canary credential
into any surviving artifact. They read the identity and never enter a credential
path. That residual is structural and belongs to the wrapper half of #1007 —
scoping the read with `git -C "$repo"` removes it for everyone at once.

An earlier version of that sweep reported the four fixed suites as still
resolving a real identity. That was my grep, not the suites: `value=\[..*\]` is
satisfied by `value=[] args=[…]`, because `.*` runs past the empty pair and
matches the closing bracket of the NEXT one. `value=\[[^]]` is the correct test.
Recorded because the wrong pattern failed in the direction that would have sent
me re-fixing four already-correct files.

VERIFICATION of this suite, four HOME arms, all rc=0 with zero non-empty
identity reads and the pass line on stdout: real HOME, seat replica, canary
HOME, and an empty HOME with no identity at all. Full 16-suite sweep after the
change: every suite rc=0.

CONSEQUENCE FOR THE FINDING LIST IN THE PREVIOUS COMMIT: item 2 there — the
"silently red, unrelated to #1007" suite — is withdrawn. It was #1007 all along.
Item 1 (`pr-metadata.sh:89-92`, the anonymous fallback that reports an HTTP 200
carrying valid JSON as "unknown API error") stands and is still unfixed here.

Refs #1007
2026-07-31 07:27:10 -05:00
Jason Woltje 1afe2b36dc fix(git): #1007 suite hermeticity — pin repo-local mosaic.gitIdentity in four test suites
CENSUS CORRECTION: FOUR suites, not the three my own #1007 audit named. The
fourth (test-pr-metadata-gitea.sh) was outside the candidate set that audit
worked from and was found only by sweeping the discriminator across all 16
tools/git/test-*.sh suites. Recording that as a correction to my finding, not
as part of the original claim.

THE DEFECT. get_gitea_token() (detect-platform.sh:502-599) resolves a per-agent
identity at STEP 0, from `git config --get mosaic.gitIdentity`, BEFORE both the
Mosaic credential loader (step 1) and the GITEA_TOKEN env check (step 2). On a
provisioned agent seat that value is set GLOBALLY in ~/.gitconfig and is
inherited by any freshly-`git init`ed repo, so step 0 reads a REAL per-slot
token out of $HOME and returns it without ever consulting the suite's own
MOSAIC_CREDENTIALS_FILE / GITEA_TOKEN fixtures. The suites were running against
production credentials, and the fixture credential each one carefully
constructs was inert.

THE FIX: an empty repo-local `mosaic.gitIdentity`. An empty local value shadows
the global one and reads back empty at rc=0, so step 0 declines. The env route
does NOT work: detect-platform.sh reads "${MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY:-}", and `:-`
treats set-but-empty identically to unset.

OPERATIVE vs CONTAINMENT — the two mechanisms are not interchangeable and the
comment in each suite says so. The pin is operative: it prevents the resolution.
The sandboxed HOME each suite now also gets is containment: it bounds a failure
the pin should already have prevented. Conflating them is how this class stays
invisible, because a decoy HOME REMOVES the trigger (~/.gitconfig is where the
global identity lives), so any suite audited under one reads clean however
vulnerable it is. To MEASURE, replicate a seat: a decoy HOME whose .gitconfig
sets mosaic.gitIdentity with no per-slot token, so step 0 reaches its fail-loud
branch. That note is in each file for the next auditor.

SECOND, INDEPENDENT DEFECT in test-pr-metadata-gitea.sh. Applying the pin alone
turned that suite RED — and a control at baseline 826a8b3 under a plain HOME
reproduced the same failure, so it is pre-existing, not introduced. Its
`GITEA_TOKEN="stub-token"` / `GITEA_URL="https://git.example.test"` pair can
never satisfy step 2, because step 2 accepts GITEA_TOKEN only when GITEA_URL
matches the remote host and this repo's origin is git.uscllc.com. The suite had
therefore only ever passed by resolving a REAL credential — step 0 on a seat, or
step 1 from the operator's own credentials.json. A MOSAIC_CREDENTIALS_FILE
fixture is added rather than leaning on the sandboxed HOME making step 1 find
nothing: a test that passes because production configuration is ABSENT fails the
moment it is present. Shipping the pin without this would have moved the failure
rather than removed it.

NO CI ARM. .woodpecker/ci.yml does not run these suites; packages/mosaic/
package.json:28 (test:framework-shell) runs an ENUMERATED list that excludes all
four. They run only by hand — i.e. exclusively on a provisioned seat, the one
environment where the defect is live. "Passes in CI, fails on a seat" does not
apply here; there is no CI observation at all.

VERIFICATION (seat replica = decoy HOME with mosaic.gitIdentity set, no per-slot
token; canary = same plus a marked non-credential at both per-slot paths; plain
= empty HOME; real = ordinary invocation):
  - bash -n clean on all four.
  - Sweep of all 16 suites at baseline 826a8b3 under the seat replica:
    test-gitea-login-resolution rc=1 REACHES-STEP0; test-issue-create-
    interactive-auth rc=1 REACHES-STEP0; test-pr-merge-gitea-empty-uid rc=1
    REACHES-STEP0; test-pr-metadata-gitea rc=1 REACHES-STEP0.
  - Same sweep after: every row rc=0 with step0 absent.
  - test-gitea-token-identity flags REACHES-STEP0 in BOTH arms and is NOT a
    defect: it runs under `env -i HOME="$FAKE_HOME"` (line 77) and its hit is
    its own deliberate assert_failloud fixtures (lines 158-171). The fail-loud
    grep matches the intended behaviour as well as the defect, so it needs the
    second discriminator; recorded here so the next sweep does not re-file it.
  - Durable-argv assay (a PATH shim that tees argv out of each suite's own mock
    curl, because test-pr-merge-gitea-empty-uid truncates its log between phases
    and its EXIT trap removes the sandbox — a post-hoc read of that suite is a
    non-measurement, and "no trace" there is not a clearance):
      test-pr-merge-gitea-empty-uid  before: canary token in argv, fixture never
        used. after: fixture token in argv, canary absent. 5 curl calls both arms.
      test-pr-metadata-gitea         before: canary in argv. after: both calls
        carry the fixture token against git.uscllc.com.
  - test-pr-metadata-gitea across seat/canary/plain HOMEs after the fix: rc=0,
    rc=0, rc=0.
  - All four under the real HOME: rc=0. No regression to ordinary invocation.

The comment block is duplicated across the four files rather than pointing at a
shared note. Deliberate, and matching the merged #1006 precedent
(test-pr-review-gitea-comment.sh:87-95): the reader who needs it is auditing one
file.

TWO FINDINGS DELIBERATELY NOT FIXED HERE (out of this branch's scope, to be
filed):
  1. pr-metadata.sh:89-92 — the anonymous curl fallback does not check ^2, so an
     HTTP 200 carrying valid JSON is reported as "unknown API error" at rc=1.
  2. test-issue-comment-readback.sh exits 1 with ZERO bytes on stdout AND
     stderr, dying at its first seed_state python3 heredoc. Reproduces at
     baseline 826a8b3 under both a seat replica and the real HOME. Silently red
     at main for everyone; unrelated to #1007.

Refs #1007
2026-07-31 07:13:13 -05:00
186 changed files with 8977 additions and 8699 deletions
+22
View File
@@ -46,6 +46,28 @@ steps:
# [0] of the pnpm chain, so severing that chain would silence it together
# with everything it guards; this direct line keeps one instrument running.
- bash packages/mosaic/framework/tools/quality/scripts/check-test-enumeration.sh
# Tool-index gate: a shipped wrapper that appears in no resident index doc
# is undiscoverable from inside a session, and an agent that cannot learn a
# wrapper exists reaches for raw curl instead — which is how a Gitea review
# got filed PENDING three times. Ships-and-documented is one commit, or red.
- bash packages/mosaic/framework/tools/quality/scripts/check-tools-index.sh --self-test
- bash packages/mosaic/framework/tools/quality/scripts/check-tools-index.sh
# Hermetic regression for issue-close.sh (#1081): mocks tea/curl onto PATH
# and sandboxes a throwaway git repo, so it resolves no real credentials and
# joins CI directly rather than the exclusions file.
- bash packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/test-issue-close-fail-closed.sh
# Hermetic behavioural regression for the PreToolUse wrapper guard: proves
# it still blocks the three mistakes AND still lets reads, unwrapped
# endpoints and ordinary commands through. Both directions are asserted —
# a guard that over-blocks gets routed around, which fails just as hard.
- bash packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/test-wrapper-guard.sh
# Hermetic regression for mosaic-worktree.sh at fleet scale: stubs git onto
# PATH so `list` faces ~450 KB of porcelain. The defect it pins is invisible
# at small size — `git … | awk '…exit'` gives the producer SIGPIPE, which
# under `set -euo pipefail` aborts the caller silently with rc=141 and no
# output. A repo only reaches that once it has enough worktrees, so the
# stub supplies the scale instead of the host's own checkout.
- bash packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/test-mosaic-worktree-large-repo.sh
# Blocking gate (#791): a framework upgrade must never write or delete an
# operator-owned path. The HARD GATE proves an unanticipated operator sentinel
+5 -104
View File
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
# Build, publish npm packages, and push Docker images
# Runs on main for stable publishes and on next for integration-line prereleases/images
# Runs only on main branch push/tag
variables:
# Pre-baked CI base (see .woodpecker/ci-image.yml): node:24-alpine +
@@ -23,21 +23,9 @@ variables:
- 'docs/**'
- '**/*.md'
- '.woodpecker/**'
- event: [push, manual]
branch: next
- &main_image_build_when
- event: tag
- event: [push, manual]
branch: main
path:
exclude:
- 'packages/mosaic/**'
- 'docs/**'
- '**/*.md'
- '.woodpecker/**'
when:
- branch: [main, next]
- branch: [main]
event: [push, manual, tag]
steps:
@@ -115,84 +103,6 @@ steps:
depends_on:
- build
publish-next-npm:
image: *node_image
# Durable @next integration-line publish. Runs only on next; never writes
# the latest dist-tag and never commits the computed prerelease versions.
when:
- event: [push, manual]
branch: next
environment:
NPM_TOKEN:
from_secret: gitea_token
CI_COMMIT_BRANCH: ${CI_COMMIT_BRANCH}
CI_PIPELINE_NUMBER: ${CI_PIPELINE_NUMBER}
commands:
- *enable_pnpm
- |
if [ "$CI_COMMIT_BRANCH" != "next" ]; then
echo "[publish-next] FATAL: publish-next-npm may only run on next (got '$CI_COMMIT_BRANCH')" >&2
exit 1
fi
if [ -z "$CI_PIPELINE_NUMBER" ]; then
echo "[publish-next] FATAL: CI_PIPELINE_NUMBER is required for prerelease versioning" >&2
exit 1
fi
echo "//git.mosaicstack.dev/api/packages/mosaicstack/npm/:_authToken=$NPM_TOKEN" > ~/.npmrc
echo "@mosaicstack:registry=https://git.mosaicstack.dev/api/packages/mosaicstack/npm/" >> ~/.npmrc
DIST_TAGS_JSON="$(npm view @mosaicstack/mosaic dist-tags --registry https://git.mosaicstack.dev/api/packages/mosaicstack/npm/ --json)"
DIST_TAGS_JSON="$DIST_TAGS_JSON" node -e 'const tags = JSON.parse(process.env.DIST_TAGS_JSON || "{}"); if (!tags || typeof tags !== "object" || !Object.hasOwn(tags, "latest")) { throw new Error("Gitea npm registry did not return a usable dist-tags object"); } console.log("[publish-next] registry dist-tags OK: latest=" + tags.latest);'
node <<'NODE'
const fs = require('node:fs');
const path = require('node:path');
const pipelineNumber = process.env.CI_PIPELINE_NUMBER;
const roots = ['apps', 'packages', 'plugins'];
const updated = [];
function walk(dir) {
if (!fs.existsSync(dir)) return;
for (const entry of fs.readdirSync(dir, { withFileTypes: true })) {
if (entry.name === 'node_modules' || entry.name === 'dist' || entry.name === '.turbo') continue;
const fullPath = path.join(dir, entry.name);
if (entry.isDirectory()) {
const packagePath = path.join(fullPath, 'package.json');
if (fs.existsSync(packagePath)) updatePackage(packagePath);
walk(fullPath);
}
}
}
function updatePackage(packagePath) {
const manifest = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(packagePath, 'utf8'));
if (!manifest.name?.startsWith('@mosaicstack/') || manifest.private) return;
const stableMatch = /^(\d+)\.(\d+)\.(\d+)(?:[-+].*)?$/.exec(manifest.version);
if (!stableMatch) {
throw new Error(manifest.name + " has unsupported semver version '" + manifest.version + "'");
}
const [, major, minor, patch] = stableMatch;
const oldVersion = manifest.version;
manifest.version = major + '.' + minor + '.' + (Number(patch) + 1) + '-next.' + pipelineNumber;
fs.writeFileSync(packagePath, JSON.stringify(manifest, null, 2) + '\n');
updated.push(manifest.name + ' ' + oldVersion + ' -> ' + manifest.version);
}
for (const root of roots) walk(root);
if (updated.length === 0) throw new Error('No publishable @mosaicstack/* packages found');
console.log('[publish-next] computed prerelease versions for ' + updated.length + ' packages:');
for (const line of updated) console.log('[publish-next] ' + line);
NODE
pnpm --filter "@mosaicstack/*" --filter "!@mosaicstack/web" --filter "!@mosaicstack/mosaic-as" publish --no-git-checks --access public --tag next
EXPECTED_VERSION="$(node -p "require('./packages/mosaic/package.json').version")"
RESOLVED_VERSION="$(npm view @mosaicstack/mosaic@next version --registry https://git.mosaicstack.dev/api/packages/mosaicstack/npm/)"
if [ "$RESOLVED_VERSION" != "$EXPECTED_VERSION" ]; then
echo "[publish-next] FATAL: @mosaicstack/mosaic@next resolved '$RESOLVED_VERSION', expected '$EXPECTED_VERSION'" >&2
exit 1
fi
echo "[publish-next] @mosaicstack/mosaic@next resolves to $RESOLVED_VERSION"
depends_on:
- build
# TODO: Uncomment when ready to publish to npmjs.org
# publish-npmjs:
# image: *node_image
@@ -224,17 +134,8 @@ steps:
- echo "{\"auths\":{\"git.mosaicstack.dev\":{\"username\":\"$REGISTRY_USER\",\"password\":\"$REGISTRY_PASS\"}}}" > /kaniko/.docker/config.json
- |
DESTINATIONS="--destination git.mosaicstack.dev/mosaicstack/stack/gateway:sha-${CI_COMMIT_SHA:0:7}"
if [ "$CI_COMMIT_BRANCH" = "next" ]; then
if [ -n "$CI_COMMIT_TAG" ]; then
echo "[publish] FATAL: next gateway publish must be sha-only; refusing tag '$CI_COMMIT_TAG'" >&2
exit 1
fi
echo "[publish] next gateway publish is sha-only"
elif [ "$CI_COMMIT_BRANCH" = "main" ]; then
if [ "$CI_COMMIT_BRANCH" = "main" ]; then
DESTINATIONS="$DESTINATIONS --destination git.mosaicstack.dev/mosaicstack/stack/gateway:latest"
elif [ -z "$CI_COMMIT_TAG" ]; then
echo "[publish] FATAL: gateway image publish may only run for main, next, or tag events" >&2
exit 1
fi
if [ -n "$CI_COMMIT_TAG" ]; then
DESTINATIONS="$DESTINATIONS --destination git.mosaicstack.dev/mosaicstack/stack/gateway:$CI_COMMIT_TAG"
@@ -245,7 +146,7 @@ steps:
build-appservice:
image: gcr.io/kaniko-project/executor:debug
when: *main_image_build_when
when: *image_build_when
environment:
REGISTRY_USER:
from_secret: gitea_username
@@ -271,7 +172,7 @@ steps:
build-web:
image: gcr.io/kaniko-project/executor:debug
when: *main_image_build_when
when: *image_build_when
environment:
REGISTRY_USER:
from_secret: gitea_username
+9 -13
View File
@@ -30,16 +30,6 @@ This installs both components:
| **Framework** | Bash launcher, guides, runtime configs, tools, skills | `~/.config/mosaic/` |
| **@mosaicstack/mosaic** | Unified `mosaic` CLI — TUI, gateway client, wizard, auto-updater | `~/.npm-global/bin/` |
### Install lanes
| Lane | Command | Use when | Source |
| ------------------------ | ------------------------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| Stable | `bash tools/install.sh` | You want the released Mosaic CLI/framework | npm registry `@mosaicstack/mosaic@latest` + framework archive at `main` |
| Prerelease integration | `bash tools/install.sh --next` | You want the current `next` integration branch | Build-from-source at `next` |
| Contributor/source build | `bash tools/install.sh --dev --ref X` | You are testing a branch before release; `--ref` wins | Build-from-source at the requested ref |
`--next` is shorthand for the prerelease integration lane: it enables source-build mode and uses `next` unless an explicit `--ref` or `MOSAIC_REF` is provided.
After install, the wizard runs automatically or you can invoke it manually:
```bash
@@ -70,6 +60,14 @@ The launcher verifies your config, checks for `SOUL.md`, injects your `AGENTS.md
Pi launches default to a token-lean skill posture: `mosaic pi` passes `--no-skills` so Pi does not preload every global skill description into the system prompt. Use `MOSAIC_PI_SKILL_MODE=all mosaic pi` for the legacy all-skills catalog, or `MOSAIC_PI_SKILL_MODE=discover mosaic pi` to let Pi use its native settings/project skill discovery.
Mosaic also loads its Pi extensions from `~/.config/mosaic/runtime/pi/`. Inside Pi,
`/goal set <statement>` starts a bounded persistent loop that checks every turn and successful
compaction, requires two evidence-bearing completion reports, and can be inspected or stopped with
`/goal status`, `/goal pause`, `/goal resume`, and `/goal cancel`. Controller-owned goal-state
entries redact common credential shapes, but Pi's model/tool-call history is separate, so goals and
evidence must never contain secrets or raw sensitive output. Mosaic does not install this extension
into `~/.pi/agent/extensions/`.
### TUI & Gateway
```bash
@@ -371,9 +369,7 @@ The CLI also performs a background update check on every invocation (cached for
bash tools/install.sh --check # Version check only
bash tools/install.sh --framework # Framework only (skip npm CLI)
bash tools/install.sh --cli # npm CLI only (skip framework)
bash tools/install.sh --next # Prerelease lane: source build from next
bash tools/install.sh --dev # Contributor lane: source build at --ref/main
bash tools/install.sh --ref v1.0 # Install from a specific git ref (--ref wins over --next)
bash tools/install.sh --ref v1.0 # Install from a specific git ref
bash tools/install.sh --yes # Non-interactive, accept all defaults
bash tools/install.sh --no-auto-launch # Skip auto-launch of wizard
```
@@ -1,519 +0,0 @@
/**
* Federation M3 single-gateway integration tests (FED-M3-10).
*
* Covers MILESTONES.md M3 acceptance:
* - #6: malformed certificate OIDs fail with 401; valid cert + revoked grant fails with 403.
* - #7: max_rows_per_query caps list results.
*
* Strategy:
* - Real PostgreSQL via @mosaicstack/db.
* - Mocked TLS context/Fastify request shim for FederationAuthGuard.
* - Direct controller calls using the real POST /api/federation/v1/list/:resource contract.
*
* Run:
* FEDERATED_INTEGRATION=1 pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/gateway test -- \
* src/__tests__/integration/federation-m3-list.integration.test.ts
*/
import 'reflect-metadata';
import * as crypto from 'node:crypto';
import type { ExecutionContext } from '@nestjs/common';
import { Test, type TestingModule } from '@nestjs/testing';
import type { FastifyReply, FastifyRequest } from 'fastify';
import {
and,
createDb,
eq,
federationGrants,
federationPeers,
inArray,
missionTasks,
missions,
projects,
tasks,
teamMembers,
teams,
type Db,
type DbHandle,
users,
} from '@mosaicstack/db';
import { afterAll, beforeAll, describe, expect, it } from 'vitest';
import { DB } from '../../database/database.module.js';
import { GrantsService } from '../../federation/grants.service.js';
import { FederationAuthGuard } from '../../federation/server/federation-auth.guard.js';
import { FederationScopeService } from '../../federation/server/scope.service.js';
import { FederationListQueryService } from '../../federation/server/verbs/list-query.service.js';
import { ListController } from '../../federation/server/verbs/list.controller.js';
import {
makeMosaicIssuedCert,
makeSelfSignedCert,
} from '../../federation/__tests__/helpers/test-cert.js';
const run = process.env['FEDERATED_INTEGRATION'] === '1';
const PG_URL = process.env['DATABASE_URL'] ?? 'postgresql://mosaic:mosaic@localhost:5433/mosaic';
const RUN_ID = `fed-m3-10-${crypto.randomUUID()}`;
const CERT_SERIAL_HEX = crypto.randomUUID().replace(/-/g, '').toUpperCase();
interface TestIds {
readonly subjectUserId: string;
readonly otherUserId: string;
readonly peerId: string;
readonly revokedPeerId: string;
readonly activeGrantId: string;
readonly revokedGrantId: string;
readonly subjectProjectId: string;
readonly subjectMissionId: string;
readonly otherProjectId: string;
readonly teamId: string;
readonly unauthorizedTeamId: string;
readonly teamProjectId: string;
readonly taskIds: readonly string[];
readonly excludedTaskIds: readonly string[];
readonly subjectNoteId: string;
readonly otherUserNoteId: string;
}
function pemToDer(pem: string): Buffer {
return Buffer.from(
pem
.replace(/-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----/, '')
.replace(/-----END CERTIFICATE-----/, '')
.replace(/\s+/g, ''),
'base64',
);
}
function makeFederationRequest(certPem: string): FastifyRequest {
return {
raw: {
socket: {
getPeerCertificate: () => ({
raw: pemToDer(certPem),
serialNumber: CERT_SERIAL_HEX,
}),
},
},
} as unknown as FastifyRequest;
}
function makeGuardContext(request: FastifyRequest): {
readonly context: ExecutionContext;
readonly sent: { statusCode?: number; payload?: unknown };
} {
const sent: { statusCode?: number; payload?: unknown } = {};
const reply = {
status: (statusCode: number) => {
sent.statusCode = statusCode;
return {
header: () => ({
send: (payload: unknown) => {
sent.payload = payload;
},
}),
};
},
} as unknown as FastifyReply;
const context = {
switchToHttp: () => ({
getRequest: () => request,
getResponse: () => reply,
}),
} as unknown as ExecutionContext;
return { context, sent };
}
async function insertUser(db: Db, id: string, label: string): Promise<void> {
await db.insert(users).values({
id,
name: `${RUN_ID}-${label}`,
email: `${RUN_ID}-${label}@federation-test.invalid`,
emailVerified: false,
});
}
async function seedFixtures(db: Db): Promise<TestIds> {
const subjectUserId = `${RUN_ID}-subject`;
const otherUserId = `${RUN_ID}-other`;
const peerId = crypto.randomUUID();
const revokedPeerId = crypto.randomUUID();
const activeGrantId = crypto.randomUUID();
const revokedGrantId = crypto.randomUUID();
const subjectProjectId = crypto.randomUUID();
const subjectMissionId = crypto.randomUUID();
const otherProjectId = crypto.randomUUID();
const teamId = crypto.randomUUID();
const unauthorizedTeamId = crypto.randomUUID();
const teamProjectId = crypto.randomUUID();
const taskIds = [crypto.randomUUID(), crypto.randomUUID(), crypto.randomUUID()] as const;
const excludedTaskIds = [crypto.randomUUID(), crypto.randomUUID()] as const;
const subjectNoteId = crypto.randomUUID();
const otherUserNoteId = crypto.randomUUID();
await insertUser(db, subjectUserId, 'subject');
await insertUser(db, otherUserId, 'other');
await db.insert(teams).values([
{
id: teamId,
name: `${RUN_ID} allowed team`,
slug: `${RUN_ID}-allowed-team`,
ownerId: subjectUserId,
managerId: subjectUserId,
},
{
id: unauthorizedTeamId,
name: `${RUN_ID} unauthorized team`,
slug: `${RUN_ID}-unauthorized-team`,
ownerId: otherUserId,
managerId: otherUserId,
},
]);
await db.insert(teamMembers).values([
{ teamId, userId: subjectUserId, role: 'member' },
{ teamId: unauthorizedTeamId, userId: subjectUserId, role: 'member' },
]);
await db.insert(projects).values([
{
id: subjectProjectId,
name: `${RUN_ID} subject personal project`,
ownerType: 'user',
ownerId: subjectUserId,
},
{
id: otherProjectId,
name: `${RUN_ID} other personal project`,
ownerType: 'user',
ownerId: otherUserId,
},
{
id: teamProjectId,
name: `${RUN_ID} unauthorized team project`,
ownerType: 'team',
teamId: unauthorizedTeamId,
},
]);
await db.insert(missions).values({
id: subjectMissionId,
name: `${RUN_ID} subject mission`,
projectId: subjectProjectId,
userId: subjectUserId,
});
await db.insert(tasks).values([
{
id: taskIds[0],
title: `${RUN_ID} visible task 1`,
missionId: subjectMissionId,
createdAt: new Date('2026-06-25T03:00:00.000Z'),
updatedAt: new Date('2026-06-25T03:00:00.000Z'),
},
{
id: taskIds[1],
title: `${RUN_ID} visible task 2`,
projectId: subjectProjectId,
createdAt: new Date('2026-06-25T02:00:00.000Z'),
updatedAt: new Date('2026-06-25T02:00:00.000Z'),
},
{
id: taskIds[2],
title: `${RUN_ID} visible task 3`,
projectId: subjectProjectId,
createdAt: new Date('2026-06-25T01:00:00.000Z'),
updatedAt: new Date('2026-06-25T01:00:00.000Z'),
},
{
id: excludedTaskIds[0],
title: `${RUN_ID} other user task`,
projectId: otherProjectId,
createdAt: new Date('2026-06-25T04:00:00.000Z'),
updatedAt: new Date('2026-06-25T04:00:00.000Z'),
},
{
id: excludedTaskIds[1],
title: `${RUN_ID} unauthorized team task`,
projectId: teamProjectId,
createdAt: new Date('2026-06-25T05:00:00.000Z'),
updatedAt: new Date('2026-06-25T05:00:00.000Z'),
},
]);
await db.insert(missionTasks).values([
{
id: subjectNoteId,
missionId: subjectMissionId,
userId: subjectUserId,
notes: `${RUN_ID} subject visible note`,
createdAt: new Date('2026-06-25T03:30:00.000Z'),
updatedAt: new Date('2026-06-25T03:30:00.000Z'),
},
{
id: otherUserNoteId,
missionId: subjectMissionId,
userId: otherUserId,
notes: `${RUN_ID} other user note on subject mission`,
createdAt: new Date('2026-06-25T04:30:00.000Z'),
updatedAt: new Date('2026-06-25T04:30:00.000Z'),
},
]);
await db.insert(federationPeers).values([
{
id: peerId,
commonName: `${RUN_ID}-active-peer`,
displayName: `${RUN_ID} Active Peer`,
certPem: '-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\nMOCK\n-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n',
certSerial: CERT_SERIAL_HEX,
certNotAfter: new Date(Date.now() + 86_400_000),
state: 'active',
},
{
id: revokedPeerId,
commonName: `${RUN_ID}-revoked-peer`,
displayName: `${RUN_ID} Revoked Peer`,
certPem: '-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\nMOCK\n-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n',
certSerial: `${CERT_SERIAL_HEX}${RUN_ID.replace(/-/g, '').slice(0, 8).toUpperCase()}`,
certNotAfter: new Date(Date.now() + 86_400_000),
state: 'active',
},
]);
await db.insert(federationGrants).values([
{
id: activeGrantId,
peerId,
subjectUserId,
status: 'active',
scope: {
resources: ['tasks', 'notes'],
excluded_resources: [],
filters: {
tasks: { include_personal: true, include_teams: [] },
notes: { include_personal: true, include_teams: [] },
},
max_rows_per_query: 2,
},
},
{
id: revokedGrantId,
peerId,
subjectUserId,
status: 'revoked',
revokedAt: new Date(),
revokedReason: `${RUN_ID} revoked grant fixture`,
scope: {
resources: ['tasks'],
excluded_resources: [],
max_rows_per_query: 2,
},
},
]);
return {
subjectUserId,
otherUserId,
peerId,
revokedPeerId,
activeGrantId,
revokedGrantId,
subjectProjectId,
subjectMissionId,
otherProjectId,
teamId,
unauthorizedTeamId,
teamProjectId,
taskIds,
excludedTaskIds,
subjectNoteId,
otherUserNoteId,
};
}
async function cleanupFixtures(db: Db, ids: TestIds | undefined): Promise<void> {
if (!ids) {
return;
}
await db
.delete(missionTasks)
.where(inArray(missionTasks.id, [ids.subjectNoteId, ids.otherUserNoteId]))
.catch(() => {});
await db
.delete(tasks)
.where(inArray(tasks.id, [...ids.taskIds, ...ids.excludedTaskIds]))
.catch(() => {});
await db
.delete(missions)
.where(eq(missions.id, ids.subjectMissionId))
.catch(() => {});
await db
.delete(projects)
.where(inArray(projects.id, [ids.subjectProjectId, ids.otherProjectId, ids.teamProjectId]))
.catch(() => {});
await db
.delete(teamMembers)
.where(
and(
eq(teamMembers.userId, ids.subjectUserId),
inArray(teamMembers.teamId, [ids.teamId, ids.unauthorizedTeamId]),
),
)
.catch(() => {});
await db
.delete(teams)
.where(inArray(teams.id, [ids.teamId, ids.unauthorizedTeamId]))
.catch(() => {});
await db
.delete(federationGrants)
.where(inArray(federationGrants.id, [ids.activeGrantId, ids.revokedGrantId]))
.catch(() => {});
await db
.delete(federationPeers)
.where(inArray(federationPeers.id, [ids.peerId, ids.revokedPeerId]))
.catch(() => {});
await db
.delete(users)
.where(inArray(users.id, [ids.subjectUserId, ids.otherUserId]))
.catch(() => {});
}
describe.skipIf(!run)('federation M3 list verb — single-gateway integration', () => {
let handle: DbHandle;
let db: Db;
let moduleRef: TestingModule;
let guard: FederationAuthGuard;
let listController: ListController;
let ids: TestIds | undefined;
beforeAll(async () => {
handle = createDb(PG_URL);
db = handle.db;
ids = await seedFixtures(db);
moduleRef = await Test.createTestingModule({
controllers: [ListController],
providers: [
{ provide: DB, useValue: db },
GrantsService,
FederationAuthGuard,
FederationScopeService,
FederationListQueryService,
],
}).compile();
guard = moduleRef.get(FederationAuthGuard);
listController = moduleRef.get(ListController);
}, 30_000);
afterAll(async () => {
await moduleRef?.close().catch((e: unknown) => console.error('[fed-m3-10 cleanup]', e));
await cleanupFixtures(db, ids).catch((e: unknown) => console.error('[fed-m3-10 cleanup]', e));
await handle?.close().catch((e: unknown) => console.error('[fed-m3-10 cleanup]', e));
});
it('#6 — rejects a client cert with malformed/missing Mosaic OIDs with 401', async () => {
const malformedOidCert = await makeSelfSignedCert();
const request = makeFederationRequest(malformedOidCert);
const { context, sent } = makeGuardContext(request);
await expect(guard.canActivate(context)).resolves.toBe(false);
expect(sent.statusCode).toBe(401);
expect(sent.payload).toMatchObject({
error: {
code: 'unauthorized',
message: expect.stringContaining('missing required OID'),
},
});
expect(request.federationContext).toBeUndefined();
});
it('#6 — rejects a valid client cert when its grant is revoked with 403', async () => {
expect(ids).toBeDefined();
const revokedCert = await makeMosaicIssuedCert({
grantId: ids!.revokedGrantId,
subjectUserId: ids!.subjectUserId,
});
const request = makeFederationRequest(revokedCert);
const { context, sent } = makeGuardContext(request);
await expect(guard.canActivate(context)).resolves.toBe(false);
expect(sent.statusCode).toBe(403);
expect(sent.payload).toMatchObject({
error: {
code: 'forbidden',
message: 'Federation access denied',
},
});
expect(request.federationContext).toBeUndefined();
});
it('#7 — enforces max_rows_per_query on POST /api/federation/v1/list/:resource', async () => {
expect(ids).toBeDefined();
const activeCert = await makeMosaicIssuedCert({
grantId: ids!.activeGrantId,
subjectUserId: ids!.subjectUserId,
});
const request = makeFederationRequest(activeCert);
const { context } = makeGuardContext(request);
await expect(guard.canActivate(context)).resolves.toBe(true);
const response = await listController.list('tasks', request, { limit: 100 });
const returnedIds = response.items.map((item) => item['id']);
expect(response.items).toHaveLength(2);
expect(response._truncated).toBe(true);
expect(response.nextCursor).toEqual(expect.any(String));
expect(returnedIds).toEqual([ids!.taskIds[0], ids!.taskIds[1]]);
expect(returnedIds).not.toContain(ids!.taskIds[2]);
for (const excludedId of ids!.excludedTaskIds) {
expect(returnedIds).not.toContain(excludedId);
}
expect(response.items.every((item) => item._source === 'local')).toBe(true);
});
it('excludes another user mission task notes on the same authorized mission', async () => {
expect(ids).toBeDefined();
const activeCert = await makeMosaicIssuedCert({
grantId: ids!.activeGrantId,
subjectUserId: ids!.subjectUserId,
});
const request = makeFederationRequest(activeCert);
const { context } = makeGuardContext(request);
await expect(guard.canActivate(context)).resolves.toBe(true);
const response = await listController.list('notes', request, { limit: 10 });
const returnedIds = response.items.map((item) => item['id']);
expect(returnedIds).toEqual([ids!.subjectNoteId]);
expect(returnedIds).not.toContain(ids!.otherUserNoteId);
expect(response.items.every((item) => item._source === 'local')).toBe(true);
});
it('fails closed for unsupported list resources', async () => {
expect(ids).toBeDefined();
const activeCert = await makeMosaicIssuedCert({
grantId: ids!.activeGrantId,
subjectUserId: ids!.subjectUserId,
});
const request = makeFederationRequest(activeCert);
const { context } = makeGuardContext(request);
await expect(guard.canActivate(context)).resolves.toBe(true);
await expect(listController.list('widgets', request, {})).rejects.toMatchObject({
response: {
error: {
code: 'scope_violation',
message: 'Requested federation resource is not supported',
},
},
status: 403,
});
});
});
@@ -1,11 +1,9 @@
import { Controller, Get, Inject, Optional, UseGuards } from '@nestjs/common';
import { Controller, Get, Inject, UseGuards } from '@nestjs/common';
import { sql, type Db } from '@mosaicstack/db';
import { createQueue } from '@mosaicstack/queue';
import type { MosaicConfig } from '@mosaicstack/config';
import { DB } from '../database/database.module.js';
import { AgentService } from '../agent/agent.service.js';
import { ProviderService } from '../agent/provider.service.js';
import { MOSAIC_CONFIG } from '../config/config.module.js';
import { AdminGuard } from './admin.guard.js';
import type { HealthStatusDto, ServiceStatusDto } from './admin.dto.js';
@@ -16,9 +14,6 @@ export class AdminHealthController {
@Inject(DB) private readonly db: Db,
@Inject(AgentService) private readonly agentService: AgentService,
@Inject(ProviderService) private readonly providerService: ProviderService,
@Optional()
@Inject(MOSAIC_CONFIG)
private readonly mosaicConfig: MosaicConfig | null,
) {}
@Get()
@@ -60,14 +55,6 @@ export class AdminHealthController {
}
private async checkCache(): Promise<ServiceStatusDto> {
// On Local tier there is no Redis. The cache is intentionally absent, which
// is a healthy state for this tier — report 'ok' rather than opening a new
// ioredis connection on every admin health check (which would spam
// ECONNREFUSED and create/destroy a connection per request). latencyMs 0
// signals "no cache backend to measure" for this tier.
if (this.mosaicConfig?.queue?.type === 'local') {
return { status: 'ok', latencyMs: 0 };
}
const start = Date.now();
const handle = createQueue();
try {
-624
View File
@@ -1,624 +0,0 @@
import 'reflect-metadata';
import { mkdtemp, mkdir, readFile, rm, writeFile } from 'node:fs/promises';
import * as nodeOs from 'node:os';
import { dirname, isAbsolute, join, relative, resolve } from 'node:path';
import * as nodeUrl from 'node:url';
import { MODULE_METADATA } from '@nestjs/common/constants.js';
import { describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest';
import type { MosaicConfig } from '@mosaicstack/config';
interface ComposedModuleGraph {
imports: readonly unknown[];
federationModule: unknown;
bootLogLines: readonly string[];
mosaicConfig: MosaicConfig;
resolvedConfigPath: string;
}
type StorageTier = 'local' | 'standalone' | 'federated';
interface ModuleGraphFixture {
tempRoot: string;
anchor: string;
homePath: string;
cwdPath: string;
monorepoRootEnvPath: string;
gatewayLocalEnvPath: string;
daemonEnvPath: string;
monorepoRootConfigPath: string;
gatewayLocalConfigPath: string;
}
interface ModuleGraphFixtureOptions {
rootEnvMode?: 'present' | 'absent';
rootTier?: StorageTier;
rootEnvContents?: string;
redactionMarker?: string;
gatewayLocalTier?: StorageTier;
gatewayLocalEnvContents?: string;
daemonEnvContents?: string;
inheritedTier?: StorageTier;
expectedProcessTier?: string;
setup?: (fixture: ModuleGraphFixture) => Promise<void>;
}
// Each case uses vi.resetModules() and re-imports the full gateway graph for distinct ambient FS/env; CI needs headroom, while this still guards genuine hangs.
const MODULE_IMPORT_TIMEOUT_MS = 120_000;
const MONOREPO_ROOT_DOTENV_LABEL = 'monorepo-root .env';
const DAEMON_DOTENV_LABEL = 'daemon .env';
function configJson(tier: StorageTier): string {
if (tier === 'local') {
return JSON.stringify({
tier,
storage: { type: 'pglite', dataDir: '.mosaic/storage-pglite' },
queue: { type: 'local', dataDir: '.mosaic/queue' },
memory: { type: 'keyword' },
});
}
return JSON.stringify({
tier,
storage: { type: 'postgres', url: 'postgresql://fixture.invalid/mosaic' },
queue: { type: 'bullmq' },
memory: { type: tier === 'federated' ? 'pgvector' : 'keyword' },
});
}
function snapshotProcessEnv(): Record<string, string | undefined> {
return { ...process.env };
}
function restoreProcessEnv(snapshot: Record<string, string | undefined>): void {
for (const key of Object.keys(process.env)) {
if (!(key in snapshot)) {
delete process.env[key];
}
}
for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(snapshot)) {
if (value === undefined) {
delete process.env[key];
continue;
}
process.env[key] = value;
}
}
function expectPathUnderTempRoot(path: string, tempRoot: string): void {
const relativePath = relative(tempRoot, path);
expect(relativePath === '' || (!relativePath.startsWith('..') && !isAbsolute(relativePath))).toBe(
true,
);
}
async function writeFixture(path: string, contents: string, tempRoot: string): Promise<void> {
expectPathUnderTempRoot(path, tempRoot);
await mkdir(dirname(path), { recursive: true });
await writeFile(path, contents, 'utf8');
}
interface ConfigModuleProvider {
provide: string;
useFactory: () => MosaicConfig;
}
function isConfigModuleProvider(value: unknown): value is ConfigModuleProvider {
if (typeof value !== 'object' || value === null) {
return false;
}
if (!('provide' in value) || typeof value.provide !== 'string') {
return false;
}
return 'useFactory' in value && typeof value.useFactory === 'function';
}
function singleBootLogLine(bootLogLines: readonly string[]): string {
expect(bootLogLines).toHaveLength(1);
const [bootLogLine] = bootLogLines;
if (bootLogLine === undefined) {
throw new Error('Expected a single boot log line');
}
return bootLogLine;
}
function expectBootLogLine(
bootLogLines: readonly string[],
tier: StorageTier,
source: string,
): void {
const bootLogLine = singleBootLogLine(bootLogLines);
expect(bootLogLine).toContain(`storage tier=${tier}`);
expect(bootLogLine).toContain(`source=${source}`);
}
async function loadModuleGraphFromDotenv(
options: ModuleGraphFixtureOptions,
): Promise<ComposedModuleGraph> {
const originalEnv = snapshotProcessEnv();
const tempRoot = await mkdtemp(join(nodeOs.tmpdir(), 'mosaic-gateway-module-'));
let consoleInfoSpy: ReturnType<typeof vi.spyOn> | undefined;
let cwdSpy: ReturnType<typeof vi.spyOn> | undefined;
try {
const anchor = join(tempRoot, 'anchored', 'apps', 'gateway', 'src');
const homePath = join(tempRoot, 'home');
const cwdPath = join(tempRoot, 'ambient', 'parent', 'cwd');
const fixture: ModuleGraphFixture = {
tempRoot,
anchor,
homePath,
cwdPath,
monorepoRootEnvPath: resolve(anchor, '../../..', '.env'),
gatewayLocalEnvPath: resolve(anchor, '..', '.env'),
daemonEnvPath: join(homePath, '.config', 'mosaic', 'gateway', '.env'),
monorepoRootConfigPath: resolve(anchor, '../../..', 'mosaic.config.json'),
gatewayLocalConfigPath: resolve(anchor, '..', 'mosaic.config.json'),
};
consoleInfoSpy = vi.spyOn(console, 'info').mockImplementation((): void => undefined);
for (const path of Object.values(fixture)) {
expectPathUnderTempRoot(path, tempRoot);
}
await mkdir(anchor, { recursive: true });
await mkdir(cwdPath, { recursive: true });
if ((options.rootEnvMode ?? 'present') === 'absent') {
if (
options.rootEnvContents !== undefined ||
options.rootTier !== undefined ||
options.redactionMarker !== undefined
) {
throw new Error('Expected no root env fixture values when rootEnvMode is absent');
}
} else {
if (options.rootEnvContents === undefined && options.rootTier === undefined) {
throw new Error('Expected rootTier or rootEnvContents');
}
const rootFixture = options.rootEnvContents ?? `MOSAIC_STORAGE_TIER=${options.rootTier}\n`;
const rootFixtureWithMarker = options.redactionMarker
? `${rootFixture}BETTER_AUTH_SECRET=${options.redactionMarker}\n`
: rootFixture;
await writeFixture(fixture.monorepoRootEnvPath, rootFixtureWithMarker, tempRoot);
}
if (options.daemonEnvContents !== undefined) {
await writeFixture(fixture.daemonEnvPath, options.daemonEnvContents, tempRoot);
}
if (options.gatewayLocalEnvContents !== undefined) {
await writeFixture(fixture.gatewayLocalEnvPath, options.gatewayLocalEnvContents, tempRoot);
} else if (options.gatewayLocalTier !== undefined) {
await writeFixture(
fixture.gatewayLocalEnvPath,
`MOSAIC_STORAGE_TIER=${options.gatewayLocalTier}\n`,
tempRoot,
);
}
process.env['HOME'] = homePath;
delete process.env['MOSAIC_STORAGE_TIER'];
delete process.env['DATABASE_URL'];
delete process.env['VALKEY_URL'];
delete process.env['MOSAIC_GATEWAY_HOME'];
await options.setup?.(fixture);
if (options.inheritedTier !== undefined) {
process.env['MOSAIC_STORAGE_TIER'] = options.inheritedTier;
}
vi.resetModules();
vi.doMock('node:os', () => ({ ...nodeOs, homedir: (): string => homePath }));
vi.doMock('node:url', () => ({
...nodeUrl,
fileURLToPath: (url: string | URL): string => {
const actualPath = nodeUrl.fileURLToPath(url);
if (
actualPath.endsWith('/apps/gateway/src/env.ts') ||
actualPath.endsWith('/apps/gateway/src/env.js')
) {
return join(anchor, 'env.ts');
}
return actualPath;
},
}));
cwdSpy = vi.spyOn(process, 'cwd').mockReturnValue(cwdPath);
if (options.inheritedTier === undefined) {
expect(process.env['MOSAIC_STORAGE_TIER']).toBeUndefined();
} else {
expect(process.env['MOSAIC_STORAGE_TIER']).toBe(options.inheritedTier);
}
const envModule = await import('./env.js');
expect(process.env['MOSAIC_STORAGE_TIER']).toBe(
options.expectedProcessTier ?? options.rootTier,
);
const { AppModule } = await import('./app.module.js');
const { FederationModule } = await import('./federation/federation.module.js');
const imports: unknown = Reflect.getMetadata(MODULE_METADATA.IMPORTS, AppModule);
if (!Array.isArray(imports)) {
throw new Error('AppModule imports metadata is not an array');
}
const { ConfigModule, MOSAIC_CONFIG } = await import('./config/config.module.js');
const providers: unknown = Reflect.getMetadata(MODULE_METADATA.PROVIDERS, ConfigModule);
if (!Array.isArray(providers)) {
throw new Error('ConfigModule providers metadata is not an array');
}
const configProvider = providers
.filter(isConfigModuleProvider)
.find((provider: ConfigModuleProvider): boolean => provider.provide === MOSAIC_CONFIG);
if (!configProvider) {
throw new Error('MOSAIC_CONFIG provider factory not found');
}
return {
imports,
federationModule: FederationModule,
bootLogLines: consoleInfoSpy.mock.calls.map((args: readonly unknown[]): string =>
args.map((value: unknown): string => String(value)).join(' '),
),
mosaicConfig: configProvider.useFactory(),
resolvedConfigPath: envModule.resolveGatewayConfigPath(),
};
} finally {
cwdSpy?.mockRestore();
vi.doUnmock('node:url');
vi.doUnmock('node:os');
vi.resetModules();
consoleInfoSpy?.mockRestore();
restoreProcessEnv(originalEnv);
await rm(tempRoot, { recursive: true, force: true });
}
}
describe('AppModule federation gating', (): void => {
it('loads dotenv before tracing and AppModule evaluation', async (): Promise<void> => {
const mainSource = await readFile(new URL('./main.ts', import.meta.url), 'utf8');
const envImportIndex = mainSource.indexOf("import './env.js';");
const tracingImportIndex = mainSource.indexOf("import './tracing.js';");
const appModuleImportIndex = mainSource.indexOf("import { AppModule } from './app.module.js';");
expect(envImportIndex).toBeGreaterThan(-1);
expect(envImportIndex).toBeLessThan(tracingImportIndex);
expect(envImportIndex).toBeLessThan(appModuleImportIndex);
});
it(
'ignores ambient cwd/.env and cwd/../.env files',
async (): Promise<void> => {
const graph = await loadModuleGraphFromDotenv({
rootTier: 'local',
setup: async (fixture: ModuleGraphFixture): Promise<void> => {
await writeFixture(
join(fixture.cwdPath, '.env'),
'MOSAIC_STORAGE_TIER=federated\n',
fixture.tempRoot,
);
await writeFixture(
resolve(fixture.cwdPath, '..', '.env'),
'MOSAIC_STORAGE_TIER=federated\n',
fixture.tempRoot,
);
},
});
expect(graph.imports).not.toContain(graph.federationModule);
expectBootLogLine(graph.bootLogLines, 'local', MONOREPO_ROOT_DOTENV_LABEL);
},
MODULE_IMPORT_TIMEOUT_MS,
);
it(
'ignores an ambient cwd/mosaic.config.json federated config',
async (): Promise<void> => {
const graph = await loadModuleGraphFromDotenv({
rootTier: 'local',
setup: async (fixture: ModuleGraphFixture): Promise<void> => {
await writeFixture(
join(fixture.cwdPath, 'mosaic.config.json'),
configJson('federated'),
fixture.tempRoot,
);
},
});
expect(graph.imports).not.toContain(graph.federationModule);
expectBootLogLine(graph.bootLogLines, 'local', MONOREPO_ROOT_DOTENV_LABEL);
},
MODULE_IMPORT_TIMEOUT_MS,
);
it(
'ignores an ambient cwd/../../mosaic.config.json federated config',
async (): Promise<void> => {
const graph = await loadModuleGraphFromDotenv({
rootTier: 'local',
setup: async (fixture: ModuleGraphFixture): Promise<void> => {
await writeFixture(
resolve(fixture.cwdPath, '../..', 'mosaic.config.json'),
configJson('federated'),
fixture.tempRoot,
);
},
});
expect(graph.imports).not.toContain(graph.federationModule);
expectBootLogLine(graph.bootLogLines, 'local', MONOREPO_ROOT_DOTENV_LABEL);
},
MODULE_IMPORT_TIMEOUT_MS,
);
it(
'anchored gateway-local config wins monorepo-root config and registers FederationModule',
async (): Promise<void> => {
let gatewayLocalConfigPath = '';
const graph = await loadModuleGraphFromDotenv({
rootTier: 'local',
setup: async (fixture: ModuleGraphFixture): Promise<void> => {
gatewayLocalConfigPath = fixture.gatewayLocalConfigPath;
await writeFixture(
fixture.gatewayLocalConfigPath,
configJson('federated'),
fixture.tempRoot,
);
await writeFixture(fixture.monorepoRootConfigPath, configJson('local'), fixture.tempRoot);
},
});
expect(graph.resolvedConfigPath).toBe(gatewayLocalConfigPath);
expect(graph.mosaicConfig.tier).toBe('federated');
expect(graph.imports).toContain(graph.federationModule);
expectBootLogLine(graph.bootLogLines, 'federated', 'mosaic.config.json');
},
MODULE_IMPORT_TIMEOUT_MS,
);
it(
'resolves the daemon-installed GATEWAY_HOME/mosaic.config.json ahead of gateway-local and monorepo-root configs',
async (): Promise<void> => {
let daemonConfigPath = '';
const graph = await loadModuleGraphFromDotenv({
rootEnvMode: 'absent',
setup: async (fixture: ModuleGraphFixture): Promise<void> => {
const externalGatewayHome = join(fixture.tempRoot, 'external-gateway-home');
daemonConfigPath = join(externalGatewayHome, 'mosaic.config.json');
await writeFixture(daemonConfigPath, configJson('federated'), fixture.tempRoot);
await writeFixture(
fixture.gatewayLocalConfigPath,
configJson('standalone'),
fixture.tempRoot,
);
await writeFixture(fixture.monorepoRootConfigPath, configJson('local'), fixture.tempRoot);
process.env['MOSAIC_GATEWAY_HOME'] = externalGatewayHome;
process.env['DATABASE_URL'] = 'postgresql://fixture.invalid/mosaic';
},
});
expect(graph.resolvedConfigPath).toBe(daemonConfigPath);
expect(graph.mosaicConfig.tier).toBe('federated');
expect(graph.imports).toContain(graph.federationModule);
expectBootLogLine(graph.bootLogLines, 'federated', 'mosaic.config.json');
},
MODULE_IMPORT_TIMEOUT_MS,
);
it(
'logs mosaic.config.json when anchored config and env tiers are both federated',
async (): Promise<void> => {
const graph = await loadModuleGraphFromDotenv({
rootTier: 'federated',
setup: async (fixture: ModuleGraphFixture): Promise<void> => {
await writeFixture(
fixture.monorepoRootConfigPath,
configJson('federated'),
fixture.tempRoot,
);
},
});
expect(graph.imports).toContain(graph.federationModule);
expectBootLogLine(graph.bootLogLines, 'federated', 'mosaic.config.json');
},
MODULE_IMPORT_TIMEOUT_MS,
);
it(
'logs standalone from a monorepo-root .env DATABASE_URL fallback',
async (): Promise<void> => {
const graph = await loadModuleGraphFromDotenv({
rootEnvContents: 'DATABASE_URL=fixture-database-url\n',
});
expect(graph.imports).not.toContain(graph.federationModule);
expectBootLogLine(graph.bootLogLines, 'standalone', MONOREPO_ROOT_DOTENV_LABEL);
},
MODULE_IMPORT_TIMEOUT_MS,
);
it(
'attributes an invalid monorepo-root dotenv tier to the default',
async (): Promise<void> => {
const graph = await loadModuleGraphFromDotenv({
rootEnvContents: 'MOSAIC_STORAGE_TIER=invalid\n',
expectedProcessTier: 'invalid',
});
expect(graph.imports).not.toContain(graph.federationModule);
expectBootLogLine(graph.bootLogLines, 'local', 'default');
},
MODULE_IMPORT_TIMEOUT_MS,
);
it(
'attributes DATABASE_URL fallback to daemon .env ahead of inherited local tier',
async (): Promise<void> => {
const graph = await loadModuleGraphFromDotenv({
rootEnvMode: 'absent',
daemonEnvContents: 'DATABASE_URL=fixture-database-url\n',
inheritedTier: 'local',
expectedProcessTier: 'local',
});
expect(graph.imports).not.toContain(graph.federationModule);
expectBootLogLine(graph.bootLogLines, 'standalone', DAEMON_DOTENV_LABEL);
},
MODULE_IMPORT_TIMEOUT_MS,
);
it(
'daemon .env wins over monorepo-root and gateway-local tier values',
async (): Promise<void> => {
const graph = await loadModuleGraphFromDotenv({
rootTier: 'local',
gatewayLocalTier: 'federated',
daemonEnvContents: 'MOSAIC_STORAGE_TIER=standalone\n',
expectedProcessTier: 'standalone',
});
expect(graph.imports).not.toContain(graph.federationModule);
expectBootLogLine(graph.bootLogLines, 'standalone', DAEMON_DOTENV_LABEL);
},
MODULE_IMPORT_TIMEOUT_MS,
);
it(
'inherits process.env.MOSAIC_STORAGE_TIER over daemon, monorepo-root, and gateway-local dotenv values',
async (): Promise<void> => {
const graph = await loadModuleGraphFromDotenv({
rootTier: 'local',
gatewayLocalTier: 'federated',
daemonEnvContents: 'MOSAIC_STORAGE_TIER=federated\n',
inheritedTier: 'standalone',
expectedProcessTier: 'standalone',
});
expect(graph.imports).not.toContain(graph.federationModule);
expectBootLogLine(graph.bootLogLines, 'standalone', 'process environment');
},
MODULE_IMPORT_TIMEOUT_MS,
);
it(
'gateway-local .env configures the tier and source when the monorepo-root .env is absent',
async (): Promise<void> => {
const graph = await loadModuleGraphFromDotenv({
rootEnvMode: 'absent',
gatewayLocalTier: 'federated',
expectedProcessTier: 'federated',
});
expect(graph.imports).toContain(graph.federationModule);
expectBootLogLine(graph.bootLogLines, 'federated', 'gateway-local .env');
},
MODULE_IMPORT_TIMEOUT_MS,
);
it(
'monorepo-root .env wins over gateway-local tier values',
async (): Promise<void> => {
const graph = await loadModuleGraphFromDotenv({
rootTier: 'standalone',
gatewayLocalTier: 'federated',
});
expect(graph.imports).not.toContain(graph.federationModule);
expectBootLogLine(graph.bootLogLines, 'standalone', MONOREPO_ROOT_DOTENV_LABEL);
},
MODULE_IMPORT_TIMEOUT_MS,
);
it.each(['local', 'standalone'] as const)(
'does not register FederationModule for the %s tier',
async (tier): Promise<void> => {
const graph = await loadModuleGraphFromDotenv({ rootTier: tier });
expect(graph.imports).not.toContain(graph.federationModule);
expectBootLogLine(graph.bootLogLines, tier, MONOREPO_ROOT_DOTENV_LABEL);
},
MODULE_IMPORT_TIMEOUT_MS,
);
it(
'registers FederationModule when federated tier is supplied by the anchored monorepo root .env',
async (): Promise<void> => {
const redactionMarker = 'redaction-fixture-marker';
const graph = await loadModuleGraphFromDotenv({
rootTier: 'federated',
redactionMarker,
});
expect(graph.imports).toContain(graph.federationModule);
expectBootLogLine(graph.bootLogLines, 'federated', MONOREPO_ROOT_DOTENV_LABEL);
expect(singleBootLogLine(graph.bootLogLines)).not.toContain(redactionMarker);
},
MODULE_IMPORT_TIMEOUT_MS,
);
it(
'MOSAIC_CONFIG provider ignores an ambient cwd/mosaic.config.json config',
async (): Promise<void> => {
const graph = await loadModuleGraphFromDotenv({
rootTier: 'local',
setup: async (fixture: ModuleGraphFixture): Promise<void> => {
await writeFixture(
join(fixture.cwdPath, 'mosaic.config.json'),
JSON.stringify({
tier: 'federated',
storage: {
type: 'postgres',
url: 'postgresql://ambient-attacker.invalid/mosaic',
enableVector: true,
},
queue: { type: 'bullmq' },
memory: { type: 'pgvector' },
}),
fixture.tempRoot,
);
},
});
expect(graph.mosaicConfig.tier).toBe('local');
expect(graph.mosaicConfig.storage).not.toEqual(
expect.objectContaining({ url: 'postgresql://ambient-attacker.invalid/mosaic' }),
);
},
MODULE_IMPORT_TIMEOUT_MS,
);
it(
'MOSAIC_CONFIG provider resolves from the anchored monorepo-root mosaic.config.json',
async (): Promise<void> => {
const graph = await loadModuleGraphFromDotenv({
rootTier: 'local',
setup: async (fixture: ModuleGraphFixture): Promise<void> => {
await writeFixture(
fixture.monorepoRootConfigPath,
configJson('federated'),
fixture.tempRoot,
);
},
});
expect(graph.mosaicConfig.tier).toBe('federated');
expect(graph.mosaicConfig.storage).toEqual(
expect.objectContaining({ url: 'postgresql://fixture.invalid/mosaic' }),
);
},
MODULE_IMPORT_TIMEOUT_MS,
);
});
+1 -11
View File
@@ -26,16 +26,6 @@ import { WorkspaceModule } from './workspace/workspace.module.js';
import { QueueModule } from './queue/queue.module.js';
import { FederationModule } from './federation/federation.module.js';
import { ThrottlerGuard, ThrottlerModule } from '@nestjs/throttler';
import { loadConfig } from '@mosaicstack/config';
import { resolveGatewayConfigPath } from './env.js';
// Federation (step-ca client, enrollment, federation verbs) is only wired for
// tier 'federated' — CaService hard-requires STEP_CA_* at construction, which
// must not gate standalone/local boots (docker-compose.federated.yml: the
// federation profile "must not start in non-federated dev"). The gateway
// entrypoint loads env.ts before evaluating this module so dotenv-backed tier
// configuration is visible here.
const federationEnabled = loadConfig(resolveGatewayConfigPath()).tier === 'federated';
@Module({
imports: [
@@ -63,7 +53,7 @@ const federationEnabled = loadConfig(resolveGatewayConfigPath()).tier === 'feder
QueueModule,
ReloadModule,
WorkspaceModule,
...(federationEnabled ? [FederationModule] : []),
FederationModule,
],
controllers: [HealthController],
providers: [
@@ -72,13 +72,13 @@ const mockChatGateway = {
broadcastSessionInfo: vi.fn(),
};
function buildService(redis: typeof mockRedis | null = mockRedis): CommandExecutorService {
function buildService(): CommandExecutorService {
return new CommandExecutorService(
mockRegistry as never,
mockAgentService as never,
mockSystemOverride as never,
mockSessionGC as never,
redis as never,
mockRedis as never,
mockBrain as never,
null,
mockChatGateway as never,
@@ -131,22 +131,6 @@ describe('CommandExecutorService — P8-012 commands', () => {
expect(ttl).toBe(300);
});
it('/provider login remains available without Redis on the local tier', async () => {
const localService = buildService(null);
const payload: SlashCommandPayload = {
command: 'provider',
args: 'login anthropic',
conversationId,
};
const result = await localService.execute(payload, userScope);
expect(result.success).toBe(true);
expect(result.message).not.toContain('token=');
expect(result.data).toEqual({ provider: 'anthropic' });
expect(mockRedis.set).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
// /provider with no args — returns usage
it('/provider with no args returns usage message', async () => {
const payload: SlashCommandPayload = { command: 'provider', conversationId };
@@ -23,10 +23,7 @@ export class CommandExecutorService {
@Inject(AgentService) private readonly agentService: AgentService,
@Inject(SystemOverrideService) private readonly systemOverride: SystemOverrideService,
@Inject(SessionGCService) private readonly sessionGC: SessionGCService,
// On Local tier COMMANDS_REDIS is null — provider login caching is skipped.
@Optional()
@Inject(COMMANDS_REDIS)
private readonly redis: QueueHandle['redis'] | null,
@Inject(COMMANDS_REDIS) private readonly redis: QueueHandle['redis'],
@Inject(BRAIN) private readonly brain: Brain,
@Optional()
@Inject(forwardRef(() => ReloadService))
@@ -446,7 +443,6 @@ export class CommandExecutorService {
byte.toString(16).padStart(2, '0'),
).join('');
const key = `mosaic:auth:poll:${tokenHash}`;
if (this.redis) {
// Persist only a short-lived token digest. The raw token is delivered only by
// the authenticated dashboard flow, never in chat output or command metadata.
await this.redis.set(
@@ -455,7 +451,6 @@ export class CommandExecutorService {
'EX',
300,
);
}
return {
command: 'provider',
success: true,
+5 -15
View File
@@ -1,7 +1,5 @@
import { forwardRef, Inject, Module, Optional, type OnApplicationShutdown } from '@nestjs/common';
import { forwardRef, Inject, Module, type OnApplicationShutdown } from '@nestjs/common';
import { createQueue, type QueueHandle } from '@mosaicstack/queue';
import type { MosaicConfig } from '@mosaicstack/config';
import { MOSAIC_CONFIG } from '../config/config.module.js';
import { ChatModule } from '../chat/chat.module.js';
import { GCModule } from '../gc/gc.module.js';
import { ReloadModule } from '../reload/reload.module.js';
@@ -18,17 +16,13 @@ const COMMANDS_QUEUE_HANDLE = 'COMMANDS_QUEUE_HANDLE';
providers: [
{
provide: COMMANDS_QUEUE_HANDLE,
useFactory: (config: MosaicConfig | null): QueueHandle | null => {
// On Local tier there is no Redis — skip the ioredis connection.
// CommandExecutorService falls back to no-cache for /provider login on local.
if (config?.queue?.type === 'local') return null;
useFactory: (): QueueHandle => {
return createQueue();
},
inject: [MOSAIC_CONFIG],
},
{
provide: COMMANDS_REDIS,
useFactory: (handle: QueueHandle | null) => handle?.redis ?? null,
useFactory: (handle: QueueHandle) => handle.redis,
inject: [COMMANDS_QUEUE_HANDLE],
},
CommandRegistryService,
@@ -44,13 +38,9 @@ const COMMANDS_QUEUE_HANDLE = 'COMMANDS_QUEUE_HANDLE';
],
})
export class CommandsModule implements OnApplicationShutdown {
constructor(
@Optional()
@Inject(COMMANDS_QUEUE_HANDLE)
private readonly handle: QueueHandle | null,
) {}
constructor(@Inject(COMMANDS_QUEUE_HANDLE) private readonly handle: QueueHandle) {}
async onApplicationShutdown(): Promise<void> {
await this.handle?.close().catch(() => {});
await this.handle.close().catch(() => {});
}
}
+1 -2
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,5 @@
import { Global, Module } from '@nestjs/common';
import { loadConfig, type MosaicConfig } from '@mosaicstack/config';
import { resolveGatewayConfigPath } from '../env.js';
export const MOSAIC_CONFIG = 'MOSAIC_CONFIG';
@@ -9,7 +8,7 @@ export const MOSAIC_CONFIG = 'MOSAIC_CONFIG';
providers: [
{
provide: MOSAIC_CONFIG,
useFactory: (): MosaicConfig => loadConfig(resolveGatewayConfigPath()),
useFactory: (): MosaicConfig => loadConfig(),
},
],
exports: [MOSAIC_CONFIG],
-133
View File
@@ -1,133 +0,0 @@
import { config } from 'dotenv';
import { existsSync } from 'node:fs';
import { homedir } from 'node:os';
import { dirname, join, resolve } from 'node:path';
import { fileURLToPath } from 'node:url';
import { detectFromEnv, loadConfig } from '@mosaicstack/config';
type TierSource =
| 'process environment'
| 'daemon .env'
| 'monorepo-root .env'
| 'gateway-local .env'
| 'default';
type BootSource = TierSource | 'mosaic.config.json';
export interface GatewayDotenvPaths {
daemonEnv: string;
monorepoRootEnv: string;
gatewayLocalEnv: string;
}
const here = dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url));
export function resolveGatewayDotenvPaths(
anchor: string = here,
homeBase: string = homedir(),
): GatewayDotenvPaths {
return {
daemonEnv: join(homeBase, '.config', 'mosaic', 'gateway', '.env'),
monorepoRootEnv: resolve(anchor, '../../..', '.env'),
gatewayLocalEnv: resolve(anchor, '..', '.env'),
};
}
export function resolveGatewayConfigPath(anchor: string = here): string {
// GATEWAY_HOME is daemon-created 0700; its env override adds no authority because env can set MOSAIC_STORAGE_TIER.
const gatewayHome = resolve(
process.env['MOSAIC_GATEWAY_HOME'] ?? join(homedir(), '.config', 'mosaic', 'gateway'),
);
const daemonConfig = join(gatewayHome, 'mosaic.config.json');
const gatewayLocalConfig = resolve(anchor, '..', 'mosaic.config.json');
const monorepoRootConfig = resolve(anchor, '../../..', 'mosaic.config.json');
if (existsSync(daemonConfig)) {
return daemonConfig;
}
if (existsSync(gatewayLocalConfig)) {
return gatewayLocalConfig;
}
if (existsSync(monorepoRootConfig)) {
return monorepoRootConfig;
}
return monorepoRootConfig;
}
export function loadGatewayEnv(anchor: string = here, homeBase: string = homedir()): void {
const { daemonEnv, monorepoRootEnv, gatewayLocalEnv } = resolveGatewayDotenvPaths(
anchor,
homeBase,
);
const inheritedTier = process.env['MOSAIC_STORAGE_TIER'];
let tierSource: TierSource = inheritedTier === undefined ? 'default' : 'process environment';
const inheritedDatabaseUrl = process.env['DATABASE_URL'];
let databaseUrlSource: TierSource =
inheritedDatabaseUrl === undefined ? 'default' : 'process environment';
function loadAnchoredDotenv(
path: string,
sourceLabel: Exclude<TierSource, 'process environment' | 'default'>,
): void {
if (!existsSync(path)) {
return;
}
const beforeTier = process.env['MOSAIC_STORAGE_TIER'];
const beforeDatabaseUrl = process.env['DATABASE_URL'];
config({ path, quiet: true });
if (
beforeTier === undefined &&
process.env['MOSAIC_STORAGE_TIER'] !== undefined &&
tierSource === 'default'
) {
tierSource = sourceLabel;
}
if (
beforeDatabaseUrl === undefined &&
process.env['DATABASE_URL'] !== undefined &&
databaseUrlSource === 'default'
) {
databaseUrlSource = sourceLabel;
}
}
// Load .env from daemon config dir (global install / daemon mode) first.
// It takes precedence over file-based local-dev configuration.
loadAnchoredDotenv(daemonEnv, 'daemon .env');
// Load .env from the anchored monorepo root, then fill any remaining values
// from apps/gateway/.env when present.
loadAnchoredDotenv(monorepoRootEnv, 'monorepo-root .env');
loadAnchoredDotenv(gatewayLocalEnv, 'gateway-local .env');
const envOnlyTier = detectFromEnv().tier;
const configPath = resolveGatewayConfigPath(anchor);
const anchoredConfigExists = existsSync(configPath);
const resolvedTier = loadConfig(configPath).tier;
const configuredTier = process.env['MOSAIC_STORAGE_TIER'];
const databaseUrlDeterminesTier = envOnlyTier === 'standalone' && configuredTier !== 'standalone';
const recognizedTierDeterminesTier =
(configuredTier === 'federated' ||
configuredTier === 'standalone' ||
configuredTier === 'local') &&
configuredTier === envOnlyTier;
let source: BootSource;
if (anchoredConfigExists) {
source = 'mosaic.config.json';
} else if (databaseUrlDeterminesTier && databaseUrlSource !== 'default') {
source = databaseUrlSource;
} else if (recognizedTierDeterminesTier && tierSource !== 'default') {
source = tierSource;
} else {
source = 'default';
}
console.info(`[gateway env] storage tier=${resolvedTier} source=${source}`);
}
loadGatewayEnv();
@@ -245,9 +245,21 @@ describe('EnrollmentService.createToken', () => {
const after = Date.now();
const expiresMs = new Date(result.expiresAt).getTime();
// Should be at most 900s from now
expect(expiresMs - before).toBeLessThanOrEqual(900_000 + 100);
// The property under test is CLAMPING: a 9999s request must come back as 900s.
// The gap between clamped and unclamped is 9_099_000 ms, so the tolerance below
// only has to exceed CI scheduling jitter — it does not need to be tight to keep
// the assertion discriminating. A 5s allowance consumes 0.05% of that margin and
// an unclamped result still misses by three orders of magnitude.
//
// It was 100ms and failed on a loaded agent at 900_106 — 6ms over (#1090). A
// wall-clock budget sized to a fast machine is a flake, not a tighter test.
const CI_JITTER_MS = 5_000;
expect(expiresMs - before).toBeLessThanOrEqual(900_000 + CI_JITTER_MS);
expect(expiresMs - after).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(0);
// Explicitly pin the clamp itself, independent of any timing allowance:
// unclamped (9999s) would exceed this by ~9_099_000 ms.
expect(expiresMs - before).toBeLessThan(1_000_000);
});
});
@@ -5,8 +5,6 @@ import { EnrollmentController } from './enrollment.controller.js';
import { EnrollmentService } from './enrollment.service.js';
import { FederationController } from './federation.controller.js';
import { CapabilitiesController } from './server/verbs/capabilities.controller.js';
import { GetController } from './server/verbs/get.controller.js';
import { FederationGetQueryService } from './server/verbs/get-query.service.js';
import { GrantsService } from './grants.service.js';
import { FederationClientService, QuerySourceService } from './client/index.js';
import { FederationAuthGuard, FederationScopeService } from './server/index.js';
@@ -14,13 +12,7 @@ import { ListController } from './server/verbs/list.controller.js';
import { FederationListQueryService } from './server/verbs/list-query.service.js';
@Module({
controllers: [
EnrollmentController,
FederationController,
CapabilitiesController,
ListController,
GetController,
],
controllers: [EnrollmentController, FederationController, CapabilitiesController, ListController],
providers: [
AdminGuard,
CaService,
@@ -31,7 +23,6 @@ import { FederationListQueryService } from './server/verbs/list-query.service.js
FederationAuthGuard,
FederationScopeService,
FederationListQueryService,
FederationGetQueryService,
],
exports: [
CaService,
@@ -42,7 +33,6 @@ import { FederationListQueryService } from './server/verbs/list-query.service.js
FederationAuthGuard,
FederationScopeService,
FederationListQueryService,
FederationGetQueryService,
],
})
export class FederationModule {}
@@ -1,348 +0,0 @@
import { afterAll, beforeAll, describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest';
import {
createPgliteDb,
missionTasks,
missions,
projects,
runPgliteMigrations,
teams,
users,
type Db,
type DbHandle,
} from '@mosaicstack/db';
import type { FederationScopeQueryFilter } from '../../scope.service.js';
import { FederationGetQueryService } from '../get-query.service.js';
const CREDENTIAL_FILTER: FederationScopeQueryFilter = {
resource: 'credentials',
subjectUserId: 'user-1',
includePersonal: true,
teamIds: [],
limit: 1,
maxRowsPerQuery: 25,
};
const SUBJECT_USER_ID = 'fed-m3-06-subject';
const OTHER_USER_ID = 'fed-m3-06-other';
const TEAM_ID = '06000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000001';
const UNAUTHORIZED_TEAM_ID = '06000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000002';
const PERSONAL_PROJECT_ID = '06000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000101';
const TEAM_PROJECT_ID = '06000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000102';
const UNAUTHORIZED_PROJECT_ID = '06000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000103';
const PERSONAL_MISSION_ID = '06000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000201';
const TEAM_MISSION_ID = '06000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000202';
const UNAUTHORIZED_MISSION_ID = '06000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000203';
const SUBJECT_TEAM_NOTE_ID = '06000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000301';
const OTHER_TEAM_NOTE_ID = '06000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000302';
const SUBJECT_PERSONAL_NOTE_ID = '06000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000303';
const SUBJECT_UNAUTHORIZED_NOTE_ID = '06000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000304';
let dbHandle: DbHandle | undefined;
function makeService() {
return new FederationGetQueryService({} as Db);
}
function makeDbService() {
if (!dbHandle) {
throw new Error('test DB not initialized');
}
return new FederationGetQueryService(dbHandle.db);
}
async function seedNotesFixture() {
if (!dbHandle) {
throw new Error('test DB not initialized');
}
await dbHandle.db.insert(users).values([
{
id: SUBJECT_USER_ID,
name: 'Federation Subject',
email: `${SUBJECT_USER_ID}@example.test`,
emailVerified: false,
},
{
id: OTHER_USER_ID,
name: 'Federation Other',
email: `${OTHER_USER_ID}@example.test`,
emailVerified: false,
},
]);
await dbHandle.db.insert(teams).values([
{
id: TEAM_ID,
name: 'FED-M3-06 Team',
slug: 'fed-m3-06-team',
ownerId: SUBJECT_USER_ID,
managerId: SUBJECT_USER_ID,
},
{
id: UNAUTHORIZED_TEAM_ID,
name: 'FED-M3-06 Unauthorized Team',
slug: 'fed-m3-06-unauthorized-team',
ownerId: OTHER_USER_ID,
managerId: OTHER_USER_ID,
},
]);
await dbHandle.db.insert(projects).values([
{
id: PERSONAL_PROJECT_ID,
name: 'FED-M3-06 Personal Project',
ownerId: SUBJECT_USER_ID,
ownerType: 'user',
},
{
id: TEAM_PROJECT_ID,
name: 'FED-M3-06 Team Project',
teamId: TEAM_ID,
ownerType: 'team',
},
{
id: UNAUTHORIZED_PROJECT_ID,
name: 'FED-M3-06 Unauthorized Project',
teamId: UNAUTHORIZED_TEAM_ID,
ownerType: 'team',
},
]);
await dbHandle.db.insert(missions).values([
{
id: PERSONAL_MISSION_ID,
name: 'FED-M3-06 Personal Mission',
projectId: PERSONAL_PROJECT_ID,
userId: SUBJECT_USER_ID,
},
{
id: TEAM_MISSION_ID,
name: 'FED-M3-06 Team Mission',
projectId: TEAM_PROJECT_ID,
userId: SUBJECT_USER_ID,
},
{
id: UNAUTHORIZED_MISSION_ID,
name: 'FED-M3-06 Unauthorized Mission',
projectId: UNAUTHORIZED_PROJECT_ID,
userId: SUBJECT_USER_ID,
},
]);
await dbHandle.db.insert(missionTasks).values([
{
id: SUBJECT_TEAM_NOTE_ID,
missionId: TEAM_MISSION_ID,
userId: SUBJECT_USER_ID,
notes: 'subject note on team mission',
createdAt: new Date('2026-06-24T03:00:00.000Z'),
updatedAt: new Date('2026-06-24T03:00:00.000Z'),
},
{
id: OTHER_TEAM_NOTE_ID,
missionId: TEAM_MISSION_ID,
userId: OTHER_USER_ID,
notes: 'other user note on team mission',
createdAt: new Date('2026-06-24T02:00:00.000Z'),
updatedAt: new Date('2026-06-24T02:00:00.000Z'),
},
{
id: SUBJECT_PERSONAL_NOTE_ID,
missionId: PERSONAL_MISSION_ID,
userId: SUBJECT_USER_ID,
notes: 'subject note on personal mission',
createdAt: new Date('2026-06-24T01:00:00.000Z'),
updatedAt: new Date('2026-06-24T01:00:00.000Z'),
},
{
id: SUBJECT_UNAUTHORIZED_NOTE_ID,
missionId: UNAUTHORIZED_MISSION_ID,
userId: SUBJECT_USER_ID,
notes: 'subject note outside grant-visible missions',
createdAt: new Date('2026-06-24T04:00:00.000Z'),
updatedAt: new Date('2026-06-24T04:00:00.000Z'),
},
]);
}
describe('FederationGetQueryService', () => {
beforeAll(async () => {
dbHandle = createPgliteDb(`memory://fed-m3-06-get-${Date.now()}`);
await runPgliteMigrations(dbHandle);
await seedNotesFixture();
});
afterAll(async () => {
await dbHandle?.close();
dbHandle = undefined;
});
it('denies sensitive resources in native RBAC for M3 get reads', async () => {
const service = makeService();
await expect(
service.evaluateReadAccess({
grantId: 'grant-1',
peerId: 'peer-1',
subjectUserId: 'user-1',
resource: 'credentials',
}),
).resolves.toMatchObject({
allowed: false,
reason: 'credentials federation get access is not implemented in M3',
});
});
it('allows personal memory reads without requiring team lookup', async () => {
const service = makeService();
await expect(
service.evaluateReadAccess({
grantId: 'grant-1',
peerId: 'peer-1',
subjectUserId: 'user-1',
resource: 'memory',
}),
).resolves.toEqual({
allowed: true,
access: { includePersonal: true, teamIds: [] },
});
});
it('uses subject team membership as the native RBAC upper bound for task and note reads', async () => {
const service = makeService();
const listSubjectTeamIds = vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(['team-1', 'team-2']);
(
service as unknown as {
listSubjectTeamIds: (subjectUserId: string) => Promise<string[]>;
}
).listSubjectTeamIds = listSubjectTeamIds;
await expect(
service.evaluateReadAccess({
grantId: 'grant-1',
peerId: 'peer-1',
subjectUserId: 'user-1',
resource: 'tasks',
}),
).resolves.toEqual({
allowed: true,
access: { includePersonal: true, teamIds: ['team-1', 'team-2'] },
});
expect(listSubjectTeamIds).toHaveBeenCalledWith('user-1');
});
it('does not query storage for sensitive get resources even if scope allowed them', async () => {
const service = makeService();
await expect(service.get({ filter: CREDENTIAL_FILTER, id: 'cred-1' })).resolves.toEqual({
status: 'denied',
reason: 'credentials federation get is not implemented',
});
});
it('fails closed for unsupported resources instead of returning undefined', async () => {
const service = makeService();
await expect(
service.get({
filter: {
...CREDENTIAL_FILTER,
resource: 'unknown-resource' as FederationScopeQueryFilter['resource'],
},
id: 'row-1',
}),
).resolves.toEqual({
status: 'denied',
reason: 'Unsupported federation get resource: unknown-resource',
});
});
it('does not leak another user mission task note through team-scoped get reads', async () => {
const service = makeDbService();
await expect(
service.get({
filter: {
resource: 'notes',
subjectUserId: SUBJECT_USER_ID,
includePersonal: false,
teamIds: [TEAM_ID],
limit: 1,
maxRowsPerQuery: 10,
},
id: OTHER_TEAM_NOTE_ID,
}),
).resolves.toEqual({
status: 'denied',
reason: 'Note is outside the federated scope',
});
});
it('does not return subject notes from missions outside the grant-visible project set', async () => {
const service = makeDbService();
await expect(
service.get({
filter: {
resource: 'notes',
subjectUserId: SUBJECT_USER_ID,
includePersonal: true,
teamIds: [TEAM_ID],
limit: 1,
maxRowsPerQuery: 10,
},
id: SUBJECT_UNAUTHORIZED_NOTE_ID,
}),
).resolves.toEqual({
status: 'denied',
reason: 'Note is outside the federated scope',
});
});
it('returns a subject note only when subject ownership and authorized mission intersect', async () => {
const service = makeDbService();
await expect(
service.get({
filter: {
resource: 'notes',
subjectUserId: SUBJECT_USER_ID,
includePersonal: false,
teamIds: [TEAM_ID],
limit: 1,
maxRowsPerQuery: 10,
},
id: SUBJECT_TEAM_NOTE_ID,
}),
).resolves.toMatchObject({
status: 'found',
item: {
id: SUBJECT_TEAM_NOTE_ID,
missionId: TEAM_MISSION_ID,
content: 'subject note on team mission',
},
});
});
it('does not return subject personal notes when includePersonal is false', async () => {
const service = makeDbService();
await expect(
service.get({
filter: {
resource: 'notes',
subjectUserId: SUBJECT_USER_ID,
includePersonal: false,
teamIds: [TEAM_ID],
limit: 1,
maxRowsPerQuery: 10,
},
id: SUBJECT_PERSONAL_NOTE_ID,
}),
).resolves.toEqual({
status: 'denied',
reason: 'Note is outside the federated scope',
});
});
});
@@ -1,207 +0,0 @@
import 'reflect-metadata';
import { RequestMethod } from '@nestjs/common';
import type { FastifyRequest } from 'fastify';
import { beforeEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest';
import { FederationAuthGuard } from '../../federation-auth.guard.js';
import type {
FederationScopeEvaluationResult,
FederationScopeQueryFilter,
} from '../../scope.service.js';
import { GetController } from '../get.controller.js';
import type { FederationGetQueryResult } from '../get-query.service.js';
const FEDERATION_CONTEXT = {
grantId: 'grant-1',
peerId: 'peer-1',
subjectUserId: 'user-1',
scope: { resources: ['tasks'], max_rows_per_query: 25 },
};
const TASK_FILTER: FederationScopeQueryFilter = {
resource: 'tasks',
subjectUserId: 'user-1',
includePersonal: true,
teamIds: ['team-1'],
limit: 1,
maxRowsPerQuery: 25,
};
function makeRequest(): FastifyRequest {
return { federationContext: FEDERATION_CONTEXT } as unknown as FastifyRequest;
}
function allowedScope(
filter: FederationScopeQueryFilter = TASK_FILTER,
): FederationScopeEvaluationResult {
return { allowed: true, filter };
}
function makeController(opts?: {
scopeResult?: FederationScopeEvaluationResult;
queryResult?: FederationGetQueryResult;
}) {
const scope = {
evaluateAccess: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(opts?.scopeResult ?? allowedScope()),
};
const query = {
evaluateReadAccess: vi.fn(),
get: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(
opts?.queryResult ?? {
status: 'found',
item: {
id: 'task-1',
title: 'Federated task',
createdAt: new Date('2026-06-24T00:00:00.000Z'),
},
},
),
};
return {
controller: new GetController(scope as never, query as never),
scope,
query,
};
}
describe('GetController', () => {
beforeEach(() => {
vi.clearAllMocks();
});
it('declares POST /api/federation/v1/get/:resource/:id protected only by FederationAuthGuard', () => {
expect(Reflect.getMetadata('path', GetController)).toBe('api/federation/v1/get');
expect(Reflect.getMetadata('path', GetController.prototype.get)).toBe(':resource/:id');
expect(Reflect.getMetadata('method', GetController.prototype.get)).toBe(RequestMethod.POST);
expect(Reflect.getMetadata('__guards__', GetController)).toEqual([FederationAuthGuard]);
});
it('runs AuthGuard context through ScopeService and returns one local-source tagged row', async () => {
const { controller, scope, query } = makeController();
const response = await controller.get('tasks', 'task-1', makeRequest());
expect(scope.evaluateAccess).toHaveBeenCalledWith({
context: FEDERATION_CONTEXT,
resource: 'tasks',
requestedLimit: 1,
nativeRbac: query,
});
expect(query.get).toHaveBeenCalledWith({ filter: TASK_FILTER, id: 'task-1' });
expect(response).toEqual({
item: {
id: 'task-1',
title: 'Federated task',
createdAt: new Date('2026-06-24T00:00:00.000Z'),
_source: 'local',
},
});
});
it('returns a federation error envelope when auth guard context is missing', async () => {
const { controller, scope, query } = makeController();
await expect(
controller.get('tasks', 'task-1', {} as unknown as FastifyRequest),
).rejects.toMatchObject({
response: {
error: {
code: 'unauthorized',
message: 'Federation context missing',
},
},
status: 401,
});
expect(scope.evaluateAccess).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
expect(query.get).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it('returns a federation error envelope when scope evaluation denies access', async () => {
const { controller, query } = makeController({
scopeResult: {
allowed: false,
deny: {
code: 'resource_excluded',
stage: 'resource_exclusion',
statusCode: 403,
message: 'Requested federation resource is explicitly excluded by grant scope',
grantId: 'grant-1',
peerId: 'peer-1',
subjectUserId: 'user-1',
resource: 'credentials',
},
},
});
await expect(controller.get('credentials', 'cred-1', makeRequest())).rejects.toMatchObject({
response: {
error: {
code: 'scope_violation',
message: 'Requested federation resource is explicitly excluded by grant scope',
},
},
status: 403,
});
expect(query.get).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it('returns 404 when the scoped query layer cannot find the resource id', async () => {
const { controller } = makeController({ queryResult: { status: 'not_found' } });
await expect(controller.get('tasks', 'missing-task', makeRequest())).rejects.toMatchObject({
response: { error: { code: 'not_found' } },
status: 404,
});
});
it('returns 403 when the resource exists outside the RBAC/scope intersection', async () => {
const { controller } = makeController({
queryResult: { status: 'denied', reason: 'Task is outside the federated scope' },
});
await expect(controller.get('tasks', 'task-2', makeRequest())).rejects.toMatchObject({
response: {
error: {
code: 'scope_violation',
message: 'Task is outside the federated scope',
},
},
status: 403,
});
});
it('fails closed when the query layer denies an unsupported resource', async () => {
const unsupportedFilter: FederationScopeQueryFilter = {
...TASK_FILTER,
resource: 'unknown-resource' as FederationScopeQueryFilter['resource'],
};
const { controller } = makeController({
scopeResult: allowedScope(unsupportedFilter),
queryResult: {
status: 'denied',
reason: 'Unsupported federation get resource: unknown-resource',
},
});
await expect(controller.get('unknown-resource', 'row-1', makeRequest())).rejects.toMatchObject({
response: {
error: {
code: 'scope_violation',
message: 'Unsupported federation get resource: unknown-resource',
},
},
status: 403,
});
});
it('rejects empty ids before evaluating scope', async () => {
const { controller, scope, query } = makeController();
await expect(controller.get('tasks', ' ', makeRequest())).rejects.toMatchObject({
response: { error: { code: 'invalid_request' } },
status: 400,
});
expect(scope.evaluateAccess).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
expect(query.get).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
});
@@ -1,311 +0,0 @@
/**
* Federation get query layer (FED-M3-06).
*
* Read-only DB adapter used by GetController after FederationAuthGuard and
* FederationScopeService have established the subject user, allowed resource,
* native-RBAC intersection, and row cap. Audit writes are intentionally
* deferred to M4.
*/
import { Inject, Injectable } from '@nestjs/common';
import {
and,
eq,
inArray,
insights,
or,
missionTasks,
missions,
preferences,
projects,
tasks,
teamMembers,
type Db,
} from '@mosaicstack/db';
import { DB } from '../../../database/database.module.js';
import type {
FederationNativeRbacEvaluator,
FederationNativeRbacRequest,
FederationNativeRbacResult,
FederationScopeQueryFilter,
} from '../scope.service.js';
export interface FederationGetQueryRequest {
readonly filter: FederationScopeQueryFilter;
readonly id: string;
}
export interface FederationGetQueryFoundResult<T extends object = Record<string, unknown>> {
readonly status: 'found';
readonly item: T;
}
export interface FederationGetQueryNotFoundResult {
readonly status: 'not_found';
}
export interface FederationGetQueryDeniedResult {
readonly status: 'denied';
readonly reason: string;
}
export type FederationGetQueryResult<T extends object = Record<string, unknown>> =
| FederationGetQueryFoundResult<T>
| FederationGetQueryNotFoundResult
| FederationGetQueryDeniedResult;
type RowObject = Record<string, unknown>;
function firstRow<T>(rows: T[]): T | undefined {
return rows[0];
}
function rowBelongsToAccessibleProjectOrMission(
row: { projectId?: string | null; missionId?: string | null },
projectIds: readonly string[],
missionIds: readonly string[],
): boolean {
return (
(typeof row.projectId === 'string' && projectIds.includes(row.projectId)) ||
(typeof row.missionId === 'string' && missionIds.includes(row.missionId))
);
}
@Injectable()
export class FederationGetQueryService implements FederationNativeRbacEvaluator {
constructor(@Inject(DB) private readonly db: Db) {}
async evaluateReadAccess(
request: FederationNativeRbacRequest,
): Promise<FederationNativeRbacResult> {
if (request.resource === 'credentials' || request.resource === 'api_keys') {
return {
allowed: false,
reason: `${request.resource} federation get access is not implemented in M3`,
details: { resource: request.resource },
};
}
if (request.resource === 'memory') {
return { allowed: true, access: { includePersonal: true, teamIds: [] } };
}
const teamIds = await this.listSubjectTeamIds(request.subjectUserId);
return { allowed: true, access: { includePersonal: true, teamIds } };
}
async get<T extends RowObject = RowObject>(
request: FederationGetQueryRequest,
): Promise<FederationGetQueryResult<T>> {
return this.getByResource(request.filter, request.id) as Promise<FederationGetQueryResult<T>>;
}
private async getByResource(
filter: FederationScopeQueryFilter,
id: string,
): Promise<FederationGetQueryResult> {
switch (filter.resource) {
case 'tasks':
return this.getTask(filter, id);
case 'notes':
return this.getNote(filter, id);
case 'memory':
return this.getMemory(filter, id);
case 'credentials':
case 'api_keys':
return { status: 'denied', reason: `${filter.resource} federation get is not implemented` };
default:
return {
status: 'denied',
reason: `Unsupported federation get resource: ${String(filter.resource)}`,
};
}
}
private async listSubjectTeamIds(subjectUserId: string): Promise<string[]> {
const rows = await this.db
.select({ teamId: teamMembers.teamId })
.from(teamMembers)
.where(eq(teamMembers.userId, subjectUserId));
return rows.map((row) => row.teamId);
}
private async listAccessibleProjectIds(filter: FederationScopeQueryFilter): Promise<string[]> {
const clauses = [];
if (filter.includePersonal) {
clauses.push(and(eq(projects.ownerType, 'user'), eq(projects.ownerId, filter.subjectUserId)));
}
if (filter.teamIds.length > 0) {
// Project team ownership follows TeamsService.canAccessProject: team-owned
// rows are authorized through projects.teamId, while ownerId remains the
// user who created/bootstrapped the project.
clauses.push(
and(eq(projects.ownerType, 'team'), inArray(projects.teamId, [...filter.teamIds])),
);
}
if (clauses.length === 0) {
return [];
}
const rows = await this.db
.select({ id: projects.id })
.from(projects)
.where(clauses.length === 1 ? clauses[0] : or(...clauses));
return rows.map((row) => row.id);
}
private async listMissionIds(projectIds: readonly string[]): Promise<string[]> {
if (projectIds.length === 0) {
return [];
}
const rows = await this.db
.select({ id: missions.id })
.from(missions)
.where(inArray(missions.projectId, [...projectIds]));
return rows.map((row) => row.id);
}
private async getTask(
filter: FederationScopeQueryFilter,
id: string,
): Promise<FederationGetQueryResult> {
const row = firstRow(
await this.db
.select({
id: tasks.id,
title: tasks.title,
description: tasks.description,
status: tasks.status,
priority: tasks.priority,
projectId: tasks.projectId,
missionId: tasks.missionId,
assignee: tasks.assignee,
tags: tasks.tags,
dueDate: tasks.dueDate,
metadata: tasks.metadata,
createdAt: tasks.createdAt,
updatedAt: tasks.updatedAt,
})
.from(tasks)
.where(eq(tasks.id, id))
.limit(1),
);
if (!row) {
return { status: 'not_found' };
}
const projectIds = await this.listAccessibleProjectIds(filter);
const missionIds = await this.listMissionIds(projectIds);
if (!rowBelongsToAccessibleProjectOrMission(row, projectIds, missionIds)) {
return { status: 'denied', reason: 'Task is outside the federated scope' };
}
return { status: 'found', item: row as RowObject };
}
private async getNote(
filter: FederationScopeQueryFilter,
id: string,
): Promise<FederationGetQueryResult> {
const row = firstRow(
await this.db
.select({
id: missionTasks.id,
missionId: missionTasks.missionId,
taskId: missionTasks.taskId,
userId: missionTasks.userId,
status: missionTasks.status,
content: missionTasks.notes,
createdAt: missionTasks.createdAt,
updatedAt: missionTasks.updatedAt,
})
.from(missionTasks)
.where(eq(missionTasks.id, id))
.limit(1),
);
if (!row || row.content === null || row.content === '') {
return { status: 'not_found' };
}
const projectIds = await this.listAccessibleProjectIds(filter);
const missionIds = await this.listMissionIds(projectIds);
// mission_tasks rows are user-scoped even when the mission belongs to a team.
// Scope-visible missions must intersect with subject ownership; team scope
// narrows mission IDs but never widens note reads to another user's rows.
if (row.userId !== filter.subjectUserId || !missionIds.includes(row.missionId)) {
return { status: 'denied', reason: 'Note is outside the federated scope' };
}
const item = { ...row } as RowObject;
delete item['userId'];
return { status: 'found', item };
}
private async getMemory(
filter: FederationScopeQueryFilter,
id: string,
): Promise<FederationGetQueryResult> {
const [insightRow, preferenceRow] = await Promise.all([
this.db
.select({
id: insights.id,
userId: insights.userId,
kind: insights.source,
content: insights.content,
category: insights.category,
relevanceScore: insights.relevanceScore,
metadata: insights.metadata,
createdAt: insights.createdAt,
updatedAt: insights.updatedAt,
})
.from(insights)
.where(eq(insights.id, id))
.limit(1)
.then(firstRow),
this.db
.select({
id: preferences.id,
userId: preferences.userId,
kind: preferences.category,
key: preferences.key,
value: preferences.value,
source: preferences.source,
mutable: preferences.mutable,
createdAt: preferences.createdAt,
updatedAt: preferences.updatedAt,
})
.from(preferences)
.where(eq(preferences.id, id))
.limit(1)
.then(firstRow),
]);
const candidates = [insightRow, preferenceRow].filter(
(row): row is NonNullable<typeof row> => row !== undefined,
);
if (candidates.length === 0) {
return { status: 'not_found' };
}
if (!filter.includePersonal) {
return { status: 'denied', reason: 'Memory personal rows are outside the federated scope' };
}
const accessible = candidates.find((row) => row.userId === filter.subjectUserId);
if (!accessible) {
return { status: 'denied', reason: 'Memory row belongs to another subject user' };
}
const item = { ...accessible } as RowObject;
delete item['userId'];
return { status: 'found', item };
}
}
@@ -1,100 +0,0 @@
/**
* Federation get verb (FED-M3-06).
*
* POST /api/federation/v1/get/:resource/:id
*
* Pipeline: FederationAuthGuard attaches the active grant context, then
* FederationScopeService enforces grant scope + native RBAC intersection, then
* the read-only query layer fetches one local row and tags it with `_source`.
* Read audit-log writes are deferred to M4; this controller does not persist
* request or response bodies.
*/
import { Controller, HttpException, Inject, Param, Post, Req, UseGuards } from '@nestjs/common';
import type { FastifyRequest } from 'fastify';
import {
FederationInvalidRequestError,
FederationNotFoundError,
FederationScopeViolationError,
FederationUnauthorizedError,
SOURCE_LOCAL,
type FederationGetResponse,
type SourceTag,
} from '@mosaicstack/types';
import { FederationAuthGuard } from '../federation-auth.guard.js';
import '../federation-context.js';
import { FederationScopeService } from '../scope.service.js';
import { FederationGetQueryService } from './get-query.service.js';
type FederatedRow = Record<string, unknown> & SourceTag;
function scopeDenyToHttpException(deny: {
readonly statusCode: 400 | 403;
readonly message: string;
}): HttpException {
const ErrorClass =
deny.statusCode === 400 ? FederationInvalidRequestError : FederationScopeViolationError;
return new HttpException(new ErrorClass(deny.message, deny).toEnvelope(), deny.statusCode);
}
@Controller('api/federation/v1/get')
@UseGuards(FederationAuthGuard)
export class GetController {
constructor(
@Inject(FederationScopeService) private readonly scope: FederationScopeService,
@Inject(FederationGetQueryService) private readonly query: FederationGetQueryService,
) {}
@Post(':resource/:id')
async get(
@Param('resource') resource: string,
@Param('id') id: string,
@Req() request: FastifyRequest,
): Promise<FederationGetResponse<FederatedRow>> {
if (!request.federationContext) {
throw new HttpException(
new FederationUnauthorizedError('Federation context missing').toEnvelope(),
401,
);
}
if (id.trim().length === 0) {
throw new HttpException(
new FederationInvalidRequestError('Federation get id must not be empty').toEnvelope(),
400,
);
}
const scopeResult = await this.scope.evaluateAccess({
context: request.federationContext,
resource,
requestedLimit: 1,
nativeRbac: this.query,
});
if (!scopeResult.allowed) {
throw scopeDenyToHttpException(scopeResult.deny);
}
const result = await this.query.get({ filter: scopeResult.filter, id });
if (result.status === 'not_found') {
throw new HttpException(
new FederationNotFoundError('Requested federation resource was not found').toEnvelope(),
404,
);
}
if (result.status === 'denied') {
throw new HttpException(
new FederationScopeViolationError(result.reason, {
resource,
id,
grantId: request.federationContext.grantId,
peerId: request.federationContext.peerId,
subjectUserId: request.federationContext.subjectUserId,
}).toEnvelope(),
403,
);
}
return { item: { ...result.item, _source: SOURCE_LOCAL } };
}
}
+5 -15
View File
@@ -1,7 +1,5 @@
import { Module, type OnApplicationShutdown, Inject, Optional } from '@nestjs/common';
import { Module, type OnApplicationShutdown, Inject } from '@nestjs/common';
import { createQueue, type QueueHandle } from '@mosaicstack/queue';
import type { MosaicConfig } from '@mosaicstack/config';
import { MOSAIC_CONFIG } from '../config/config.module.js';
import { SessionGCService } from './session-gc.service.js';
import { REDIS } from './gc.tokens.js';
@@ -11,17 +9,13 @@ const GC_QUEUE_HANDLE = 'GC_QUEUE_HANDLE';
providers: [
{
provide: GC_QUEUE_HANDLE,
useFactory: (config: MosaicConfig | null): QueueHandle | null => {
// On Local tier there is no Redis — skip the ioredis connection entirely.
// The Valkey GC sweep is a no-op on Local (no session keys stored there).
if (config?.queue?.type === 'local') return null;
useFactory: (): QueueHandle => {
return createQueue();
},
inject: [MOSAIC_CONFIG],
},
{
provide: REDIS,
useFactory: (handle: QueueHandle | null) => handle?.redis ?? null,
useFactory: (handle: QueueHandle) => handle.redis,
inject: [GC_QUEUE_HANDLE],
},
SessionGCService,
@@ -29,13 +23,9 @@ const GC_QUEUE_HANDLE = 'GC_QUEUE_HANDLE';
exports: [SessionGCService],
})
export class GCModule implements OnApplicationShutdown {
constructor(
@Optional()
@Inject(GC_QUEUE_HANDLE)
private readonly handle: QueueHandle | null,
) {}
constructor(@Inject(GC_QUEUE_HANDLE) private readonly handle: QueueHandle) {}
async onApplicationShutdown(): Promise<void> {
await this.handle?.close().catch(() => {});
await this.handle.close().catch(() => {});
}
}
@@ -119,19 +119,6 @@ describe('SessionGCService', () => {
).resolves.toEqual({ allowed: true });
});
it('collect() skips Valkey but still demotes only the requested session on local tier', async () => {
const localService = new SessionGCService(null, mockLogService as unknown as LogService);
const result = await localService.collect('local-session');
expect(result.sessionId).toBe('local-session');
expect(result.cleaned.valkeyKeys).toBeUndefined();
expect(mockLogService.logs.promoteSessionToWarm).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
'local-session',
expect.any(Date),
);
});
it('collect() returns sessionId in result', async () => {
const result = await service.collect('test-session-id');
expect(result.sessionId).toBe('test-session-id');
+3 -10
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
import { Inject, Injectable, Optional } from '@nestjs/common';
import { Inject, Injectable } from '@nestjs/common';
import type { QueueHandle } from '@mosaicstack/queue';
import type { LogService } from '@mosaicstack/log';
import { LOG_SERVICE } from '../log/log.tokens.js';
@@ -21,10 +21,7 @@ function escapeRedisGlobLiteral(value: string): string {
@Injectable()
export class SessionGCService {
constructor(
// Local tier has no Redis; lifecycle cleanup still demotes this session's logs.
@Optional()
@Inject(REDIS)
private readonly redis: QueueHandle['redis'] | null,
@Inject(REDIS) private readonly redis: QueueHandle['redis'],
@Inject(LOG_SERVICE) private readonly logService: LogService,
) {}
@@ -32,10 +29,8 @@ export class SessionGCService {
* Scan Valkey for all keys matching a pattern using SCAN (non-blocking).
* KEYS is avoided because it blocks the Valkey event loop for the full scan
* duration, which can cause latency spikes under production key volumes.
* Returns an empty population on the Local tier where Redis is disabled.
*/
private async scanKeys(pattern: string): Promise<string[]> {
if (!this.redis) return [];
const collected: string[] = [];
let cursor = '0';
do {
@@ -52,15 +47,13 @@ export class SessionGCService {
async collect(sessionId: string): Promise<GCResult> {
const result: GCResult = { sessionId, cleaned: {} };
// 1. Valkey: delete all session-scoped keys (skipped on Local tier).
if (this.redis) {
// 1. Valkey: delete all session-scoped keys
const pattern = `mosaic:session:${escapeRedisGlobLiteral(sessionId)}:*`;
const valkeyKeys = await this.scanKeys(pattern);
if (valkeyKeys.length > 0) {
await this.redis.del(...valkeyKeys);
result.cleaned.valkeyKeys = valkeyKeys.length;
}
}
// 2. PG: demote hot-tier agent logs for this session only.
const cutoff = new Date();
+3 -9
View File
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ import type { MosaicJobData } from '../queue/queue.service.js';
@Injectable()
export class CronService implements OnModuleInit, OnModuleDestroy {
private readonly logger = new Logger(CronService.name);
private readonly registeredWorkers: Array<Worker<MosaicJobData>> = [];
private readonly registeredWorkers: Worker<MosaicJobData>[] = [];
constructor(
@Inject(SummarizationService) private readonly summarization: SummarizationService,
@@ -26,12 +26,6 @@ export class CronService implements OnModuleInit, OnModuleDestroy {
) {}
async onModuleInit(): Promise<void> {
// Local tier deliberately has no BullMQ consumers or repeatable jobs.
if (!this.queueService.isEnabled()) {
this.logger.log('CronService: BullMQ disabled on local tier — no jobs will be scheduled');
return;
}
const summarizationSchedule = process.env['SUMMARIZATION_CRON'] ?? '0 */6 * * *'; // every 6 hours
const tierManagementSchedule = process.env['TIER_MANAGEMENT_CRON'] ?? '0 3 * * *'; // daily at 3am
@@ -45,7 +39,7 @@ export class CronService implements OnModuleInit, OnModuleDestroy {
const summarizationWorker = this.queueService.registerWorker(QUEUE_SUMMARIZATION, async () => {
await this.summarization.runSummarization();
});
if (summarizationWorker) this.registeredWorkers.push(summarizationWorker);
this.registeredWorkers.push(summarizationWorker);
// M6-005: Tier management repeatable job
await this.queueService.addRepeatableJob(
@@ -57,7 +51,7 @@ export class CronService implements OnModuleInit, OnModuleDestroy {
const tierWorker = this.queueService.registerWorker(QUEUE_TIER_MANAGEMENT, async () => {
await this.summarization.runTierManagement();
});
if (tierWorker) this.registeredWorkers.push(tierWorker);
this.registeredWorkers.push(tierWorker);
// Retire any repeatable global GC schedule created by older deployments.
// Session cleanup is now triggered only by an authorized session lifecycle operation.
-164
View File
@@ -1,164 +0,0 @@
import 'reflect-metadata';
import { mkdir, mkdtemp, rm, writeFile } from 'node:fs/promises';
import * as nodeOs from 'node:os';
import { dirname, isAbsolute, join, relative, resolve } from 'node:path';
import * as nodeUrl from 'node:url';
import type { MosaicConfig } from '@mosaicstack/config';
import type * as MosaicStorage from '@mosaicstack/storage';
import { describe, expect, it, vi, type MockInstance } from 'vitest';
// Each case uses vi.resetModules() and re-imports the full gateway graph for distinct ambient FS/env; CI needs headroom, while this still guards genuine hangs.
const MODULE_IMPORT_TIMEOUT_MS = 120_000;
function snapshotProcessEnv(): Record<string, string | undefined> {
return { ...process.env };
}
function restoreProcessEnv(snapshot: Record<string, string | undefined>): void {
for (const key of Object.keys(process.env)) {
if (!(key in snapshot)) {
delete process.env[key];
}
}
for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(snapshot)) {
if (value === undefined) {
delete process.env[key];
continue;
}
process.env[key] = value;
}
}
function expectPathUnderTempRoot(path: string, tempRoot: string): void {
const relativePath = relative(tempRoot, path);
expect(relativePath === '' || (!relativePath.startsWith('..') && !isAbsolute(relativePath))).toBe(
true,
);
}
async function writeFixture(path: string, contents: string, tempRoot: string): Promise<void> {
expectPathUnderTempRoot(path, tempRoot);
await mkdir(dirname(path), { recursive: true });
await writeFile(path, contents, 'utf8');
}
interface BootstrapPreflightResult {
capturedConfig: MosaicConfig | undefined;
}
async function runBootstrapPreflight(
anchoredConfigContents: string,
ambientConfigContents: string,
): Promise<BootstrapPreflightResult> {
const originalEnv = snapshotProcessEnv();
const tempRoot = await mkdtemp(join(nodeOs.tmpdir(), 'mosaic-gateway-main-preflight-'));
let cwdSpy: ReturnType<typeof vi.spyOn> | undefined;
let exitSpy: MockInstance<typeof process.exit> | undefined;
let consoleInfoSpy: ReturnType<typeof vi.spyOn> | undefined;
let capturedConfig: MosaicConfig | undefined;
try {
const anchor = join(tempRoot, 'anchored', 'apps', 'gateway', 'src');
const homePath = join(tempRoot, 'home');
const cwdPath = join(tempRoot, 'ambient', 'cwd');
const monorepoRootConfigPath = resolve(anchor, '../../..', 'mosaic.config.json');
await mkdir(anchor, { recursive: true });
await mkdir(cwdPath, { recursive: true });
await writeFixture(monorepoRootConfigPath, anchoredConfigContents, tempRoot);
await writeFixture(join(cwdPath, 'mosaic.config.json'), ambientConfigContents, tempRoot);
process.env['HOME'] = homePath;
process.env['BETTER_AUTH_SECRET'] = 'fixture-secret';
delete process.env['MOSAIC_STORAGE_TIER'];
delete process.env['DATABASE_URL'];
delete process.env['VALKEY_URL'];
consoleInfoSpy = vi.spyOn(console, 'info').mockImplementation((): void => undefined);
const exitMock = vi.fn<typeof process.exit>();
exitSpy = vi.spyOn(process, 'exit').mockImplementation(exitMock);
vi.resetModules();
vi.doMock('node:os', () => ({ ...nodeOs, homedir: (): string => homePath }));
vi.doMock('node:url', () => ({
...nodeUrl,
fileURLToPath: (url: string | URL): string => {
const actualPath = nodeUrl.fileURLToPath(url);
if (
actualPath.endsWith('/apps/gateway/src/env.ts') ||
actualPath.endsWith('/apps/gateway/src/env.js')
) {
return join(anchor, 'env.ts');
}
return actualPath;
},
}));
cwdSpy = vi.spyOn(process, 'cwd').mockReturnValue(cwdPath);
vi.doMock('./tracing.js', () => ({}));
const preflightSentinel = new Error('preflight-capture-sentinel');
vi.doMock('@mosaicstack/storage', async () => {
const actual = await vi.importActual<typeof MosaicStorage>('@mosaicstack/storage');
return {
...actual,
detectAndAssertTier: vi.fn((config: MosaicConfig): Promise<void> => {
capturedConfig = config;
throw preflightSentinel;
}),
};
});
await import('./main.js');
await vi.waitFor((): void => {
expect(exitSpy).toHaveBeenCalled();
});
return { capturedConfig };
} finally {
cwdSpy?.mockRestore();
exitSpy?.mockRestore();
consoleInfoSpy?.mockRestore();
vi.doUnmock('@mosaicstack/storage');
vi.doUnmock('./tracing.js');
vi.doUnmock('node:url');
vi.doUnmock('node:os');
vi.resetModules();
restoreProcessEnv(originalEnv);
await rm(tempRoot, { recursive: true, force: true });
}
}
describe('main bootstrap preflight config anchoring', (): void => {
it(
'passes the anchored monorepo-root config to detectAndAssertTier, not an ambient cwd config',
async (): Promise<void> => {
const anchoredConfig = JSON.stringify({
tier: 'local',
storage: { type: 'pglite', dataDir: '.mosaic/storage-pglite' },
queue: { type: 'local', dataDir: '.mosaic/queue' },
memory: { type: 'keyword' },
});
const ambientConfig = JSON.stringify({
tier: 'federated',
storage: {
type: 'postgres',
url: 'postgresql://ambient-attacker.invalid/mosaic',
enableVector: true,
},
queue: { type: 'bullmq' },
memory: { type: 'pgvector' },
});
const { capturedConfig } = await runBootstrapPreflight(anchoredConfig, ambientConfig);
expect(capturedConfig?.tier).toBe('local');
expect(capturedConfig?.storage).not.toEqual(
expect.objectContaining({ url: 'postgresql://ambient-attacker.invalid/mosaic' }),
);
},
MODULE_IMPORT_TIMEOUT_MS,
);
});
+15 -3
View File
@@ -1,5 +1,18 @@
#!/usr/bin/env node
import './env.js';
import { config } from 'dotenv';
import { existsSync } from 'node:fs';
import { resolve, join } from 'node:path';
import { homedir } from 'node:os';
// Load .env from daemon config dir (global install / daemon mode).
// Loaded first so monorepo .env can override for local dev.
const daemonEnv = join(homedir(), '.config', 'mosaic', 'gateway', '.env');
if (existsSync(daemonEnv)) config({ path: daemonEnv });
// Load .env from monorepo root (cwd is apps/gateway when run via pnpm filter)
config({ path: resolve(process.cwd(), '../../.env') });
config(); // Also load apps/gateway/.env if present (overrides)
import './tracing.js';
import 'reflect-metadata';
import { NestFactory } from '@nestjs/core';
@@ -13,7 +26,6 @@ import { mountAuthHandler } from './auth/auth.controller.js';
import { mountMcpHandler } from './mcp/mcp.controller.js';
import { McpService } from './mcp/mcp.service.js';
import { detectAndAssertTier, TierDetectionError } from '@mosaicstack/storage';
import { resolveGatewayConfigPath } from './env.js';
async function bootstrap(): Promise<void> {
const logger = new Logger('Bootstrap');
@@ -25,7 +37,7 @@ async function bootstrap(): Promise<void> {
// Pre-flight: assert all external services required by the configured tier
// are reachable. Runs before NestFactory.create() so failures are visible
// immediately with actionable remediation hints.
const mosaicConfig = loadConfig(resolveGatewayConfigPath());
const mosaicConfig = loadConfig();
try {
await detectAndAssertTier(mosaicConfig);
} catch (err) {
@@ -1,23 +0,0 @@
import { describe, expect, it } from 'vitest';
import type { MosaicConfig } from '@mosaicstack/config';
import { SystemOverrideService } from './system-override.service.js';
const localConfig = { queue: { type: 'local' } } as MosaicConfig;
describe('SystemOverrideService local tier', () => {
it('keeps ephemeral overrides isolated by tenant and user scope', async () => {
const service = new SystemOverrideService(localConfig);
const firstScope = { tenantId: 'tenant-a', userId: 'user-a' };
const secondScope = { tenantId: 'tenant-b', userId: 'user-b' };
await service.set('shared-session', 'first override', firstScope);
await service.set('shared-session', 'second override', secondScope);
await expect(service.get('shared-session', firstScope)).resolves.toBe('first override');
await expect(service.get('shared-session', secondScope)).resolves.toBe('second override');
await service.clear('shared-session', firstScope);
await expect(service.get('shared-session', firstScope)).resolves.toBeNull();
await expect(service.get('shared-session', secondScope)).resolves.toBe('second override');
});
});
@@ -1,8 +1,6 @@
import { Inject, Injectable, Logger, Optional, type OnApplicationShutdown } from '@nestjs/common';
import { Injectable, Logger } from '@nestjs/common';
import { createQueue, type QueueHandle } from '@mosaicstack/queue';
import type { MosaicConfig } from '@mosaicstack/config';
import type { ActorTenantScope } from '../auth/session-scope.js';
import { MOSAIC_CONFIG } from '../config/config.module.js';
const scopedSessionId = (sessionId: string, scope: ActorTenantScope) =>
`${scope.tenantId}:${scope.userId}:${sessionId}`;
@@ -17,45 +15,16 @@ interface OverrideFragment {
addedAt: number;
}
interface LocalOverrideEntry {
condensed: string;
fragments: OverrideFragment[];
}
@Injectable()
export class SystemOverrideService implements OnApplicationShutdown {
export class SystemOverrideService {
private readonly logger = new Logger(SystemOverrideService.name);
private readonly handle: QueueHandle | null;
/** Local-tier fallback, keyed by the same tenant/user/session scope as Redis. */
private readonly localStore = new Map<string, LocalOverrideEntry>();
private readonly handle: QueueHandle;
constructor(
@Optional()
@Inject(MOSAIC_CONFIG)
private readonly mosaicConfig: MosaicConfig | null,
) {
this.handle = this.mosaicConfig?.queue?.type === 'local' ? null : createQueue();
}
async onApplicationShutdown(): Promise<void> {
await this.handle?.close().catch(() => {});
constructor() {
this.handle = createQueue();
}
async set(sessionId: string, override: string, scope: ActorTenantScope): Promise<void> {
if (!this.handle) {
const key = scopedSessionId(sessionId, scope);
const entry = this.localStore.get(key) ?? { condensed: '', fragments: [] };
entry.fragments.push({ text: override, addedAt: Date.now() });
entry.condensed = await this.condenseOverrides(
entry.fragments.map((fragment) => fragment.text),
);
this.localStore.set(key, entry);
this.logger.debug(
`Set system override for session ${sessionId} (local, ${entry.fragments.length} fragment(s))`,
);
return;
}
// Load existing fragments
const existing = await this.handle.redis.get(SESSION_SYSTEM_FRAGMENTS_KEY(sessionId, scope));
const fragments: OverrideFragment[] = existing
@@ -85,14 +54,10 @@ export class SystemOverrideService implements OnApplicationShutdown {
}
async get(sessionId: string, scope: ActorTenantScope): Promise<string | null> {
if (!this.handle) {
return this.localStore.get(scopedSessionId(sessionId, scope))?.condensed ?? null;
}
return this.handle.redis.get(SESSION_SYSTEM_KEY(sessionId, scope));
}
async renew(sessionId: string, scope: ActorTenantScope): Promise<void> {
if (!this.handle) return;
const pipeline = this.handle.redis.pipeline();
pipeline.expire(SESSION_SYSTEM_KEY(sessionId, scope), SYSTEM_OVERRIDE_TTL_SECONDS);
pipeline.expire(SESSION_SYSTEM_FRAGMENTS_KEY(sessionId, scope), SYSTEM_OVERRIDE_TTL_SECONDS);
@@ -100,11 +65,6 @@ export class SystemOverrideService implements OnApplicationShutdown {
}
async clear(sessionId: string, scope: ActorTenantScope): Promise<void> {
if (!this.handle) {
this.localStore.delete(scopedSessionId(sessionId, scope));
this.logger.debug(`Cleared system override for session ${sessionId} (local)`);
return;
}
await this.handle.redis.del(
SESSION_SYSTEM_KEY(sessionId, scope),
SESSION_SYSTEM_FRAGMENTS_KEY(sessionId, scope),
@@ -1,36 +0,0 @@
import { describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest';
import type { MosaicConfig } from '@mosaicstack/config';
import { QueueService } from './queue.service.js';
const localConfig = {
queue: { type: 'local' },
} as MosaicConfig;
describe('QueueService local tier', () => {
it('disables BullMQ and treats queue operations as local no-ops', async () => {
const service = new QueueService(null, localConfig);
expect(service.isEnabled()).toBe(false);
expect(service.getQueue('mosaic-test')).toBeNull();
expect(service.registerWorker('mosaic-test', vi.fn())).toBeNull();
await expect(
service.addRepeatableJob('mosaic-test', 'local-noop', {}, '* * * * *'),
).resolves.toBeUndefined();
await expect(service.removeRepeatableJobs('mosaic-test', 'local-noop')).resolves.toBe(0);
await expect(service.getHealthStatus()).resolves.toEqual({ queues: {}, healthy: true });
await expect(service.listJobs()).resolves.toEqual([]);
await expect(service.retryJob('mosaic-test__1')).resolves.toEqual({
ok: false,
message: 'BullMQ is disabled on local tier.',
});
await expect(service.pauseQueue('mosaic-test')).resolves.toEqual({
ok: false,
message: 'BullMQ is disabled on local tier.',
});
await expect(service.resumeQueue('mosaic-test')).resolves.toEqual({
ok: false,
message: 'BullMQ is disabled on local tier.',
});
});
});
+4 -63
View File
@@ -8,9 +8,7 @@ import {
} from '@nestjs/common';
import { Queue, Worker, type Job, type ConnectionOptions } from 'bullmq';
import type { LogService } from '@mosaicstack/log';
import type { MosaicConfig } from '@mosaicstack/config';
import { LOG_SERVICE } from '../log/log.tokens.js';
import { MOSAIC_CONFIG } from '../config/config.module.js';
import type { JobDto, JobStatus } from './queue-admin.dto.js';
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -110,43 +108,22 @@ export class QueueService implements OnModuleInit, OnModuleDestroy {
private readonly connection: ConnectionOptions;
private readonly queues = new Map<string, Queue<MosaicJobData>>();
private readonly workers = new Map<string, Worker<MosaicJobData>>();
/** False on Local tier — BullMQ/Redis operations become no-ops. */
private readonly enabled: boolean;
constructor(
@Optional()
@Inject(LOG_SERVICE)
private readonly logService: LogService | null,
@Optional()
@Inject(MOSAIC_CONFIG)
private readonly mosaicConfig: MosaicConfig | null,
) {
this.enabled = this.mosaicConfig?.queue?.type !== 'local';
this.connection = this.enabled
? getConnection()
: ({ host: '127.0.0.1', port: 6380 } as ConnectionOptions);
}
/** Returns true when BullMQ/Redis is active (Standalone and Federated tiers). */
isEnabled(): boolean {
return this.enabled;
this.connection = getConnection();
}
onModuleInit(): void {
if (this.enabled) {
this.logger.log('QueueService initialised (BullMQ)');
} else {
this.logger.log(
'QueueService: BullMQ disabled for local tier — no Redis connections will be opened',
);
}
}
async onModuleDestroy(): Promise<void> {
if (this.enabled) {
await this.closeAll();
}
}
// -------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Queue helpers
@@ -154,10 +131,8 @@ export class QueueService implements OnModuleInit, OnModuleDestroy {
/**
* Get or create a BullMQ Queue for the given queue name.
* Returns null on Local tier where BullMQ is disabled.
*/
getQueue<T extends MosaicJobData = MosaicJobData>(name: string): Queue<T> | null {
if (!this.enabled) return null;
getQueue<T extends MosaicJobData = MosaicJobData>(name: string): Queue<T> {
let queue = this.queues.get(name) as Queue<T> | undefined;
if (!queue) {
queue = new Queue<T>(name, { connection: this.connection });
@@ -169,7 +144,6 @@ export class QueueService implements OnModuleInit, OnModuleDestroy {
/**
* Add a BullMQ repeatable job (cron-style).
* Uses `jobId` as a deterministic key so duplicate registrations are idempotent.
* No-op on Local tier.
*/
async addRepeatableJob<T extends MosaicJobData>(
queueName: string,
@@ -177,13 +151,7 @@ export class QueueService implements OnModuleInit, OnModuleDestroy {
data: T,
cronExpression: string,
): Promise<void> {
if (!this.enabled) {
this.logger.debug(
`Skipping repeatable job "${jobName}" on "${queueName}" (local tier — BullMQ disabled)`,
);
return;
}
const queue = this.getQueue<T>(queueName)!;
const queue = this.getQueue<T>(queueName);
// eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-explicit-any
await (queue as Queue<any>).add(jobName, data, {
repeat: { pattern: cronExpression },
@@ -199,14 +167,7 @@ export class QueueService implements OnModuleInit, OnModuleDestroy {
* safe retirement of previously registered system-wide jobs.
*/
async removeRepeatableJobs(queueName: string, jobName: string): Promise<number> {
if (!this.enabled) {
this.logger.debug(
`Skipping repeatable-job removal for "${jobName}" on "${queueName}" (local tier — BullMQ disabled)`,
);
return 0;
}
const queue = this.getQueue(queueName);
if (!queue) return 0;
const jobs = await queue.getRepeatableJobs();
const matchingJobs = jobs.filter((job) => job.name === jobName);
await Promise.all(matchingJobs.map((job) => queue.removeRepeatableByKey(job.key)));
@@ -221,18 +182,8 @@ export class QueueService implements OnModuleInit, OnModuleDestroy {
/**
* Register a Worker for the given queue name with error handling and
* exponential backoff.
* Returns null on Local tier where BullMQ is disabled.
*/
registerWorker<T extends MosaicJobData>(
queueName: string,
handler: JobHandler<T>,
): Worker<T> | null {
if (!this.enabled) {
this.logger.debug(
`Skipping worker registration for "${queueName}" (local tier — BullMQ disabled)`,
);
return null;
}
registerWorker<T extends MosaicJobData>(queueName: string, handler: JobHandler<T>): Worker<T> {
const worker = new Worker<T>(
queueName,
async (job) => {
@@ -289,12 +240,8 @@ export class QueueService implements OnModuleInit, OnModuleDestroy {
/**
* Return queue health statistics for all managed queues.
* Returns an empty healthy result on Local tier.
*/
async getHealthStatus(): Promise<QueueHealthStatus> {
if (!this.enabled) {
return { queues: {}, healthy: true };
}
const queues: QueueHealthStatus['queues'] = {};
let healthy = true;
@@ -325,10 +272,8 @@ export class QueueService implements OnModuleInit, OnModuleDestroy {
/**
* List jobs across all managed queues, optionally filtered by status.
* BullMQ jobs are fetched by state type from each queue.
* Returns empty array on Local tier.
*/
async listJobs(status?: JobStatus): Promise<JobDto[]> {
if (!this.enabled) return [];
const jobs: JobDto[] = [];
const states: JobStatus[] = status
? [status]
@@ -355,10 +300,8 @@ export class QueueService implements OnModuleInit, OnModuleDestroy {
* Retry a specific failed job by its BullMQ job ID (format: "queueName:id").
* The caller passes "<queueName>__<jobId>" as the composite ID because BullMQ
* job IDs are not globally unique — they are scoped to their queue.
* Returns an error on Local tier.
*/
async retryJob(compositeId: string): Promise<{ ok: boolean; message: string }> {
if (!this.enabled) return { ok: false, message: 'BullMQ is disabled on local tier.' };
const sep = compositeId.lastIndexOf('__');
if (sep === -1) {
return { ok: false, message: 'Invalid job id format. Expected "<queue>__<jobId>".' };
@@ -390,7 +333,6 @@ export class QueueService implements OnModuleInit, OnModuleDestroy {
* Pause a queue by name.
*/
async pauseQueue(name: string): Promise<{ ok: boolean; message: string }> {
if (!this.enabled) return { ok: false, message: 'BullMQ is disabled on local tier.' };
const queue = this.queues.get(name);
if (!queue) return { ok: false, message: `Queue "${name}" not found.` };
await queue.pause();
@@ -402,7 +344,6 @@ export class QueueService implements OnModuleInit, OnModuleDestroy {
* Resume a paused queue by name.
*/
async resumeQueue(name: string): Promise<{ ok: boolean; message: string }> {
if (!this.enabled) return { ok: false, message: 'BullMQ is disabled on local tier.' };
const queue = this.queues.get(name);
if (!queue) return { ok: false, message: `Queue "${name}" not found.` };
await queue.resume();
@@ -1,104 +0,0 @@
import 'reflect-metadata';
import {
type CanActivate,
type ExecutionContext,
type INestApplication,
ValidationPipe,
} from '@nestjs/common';
import { FastifyAdapter, type NestFastifyApplication } from '@nestjs/platform-fastify';
import { Test } from '@nestjs/testing';
import request from 'supertest';
import { afterAll, beforeAll, beforeEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest';
import { AuthGuard } from '../auth/auth.guard.js';
import { ProjectBootstrapService } from './project-bootstrap.service.js';
import { WorkspaceController } from './workspace.controller.js';
const bootstrapMock = vi.fn(() =>
Promise.resolve({
projectId: 'project-1',
workspacePath: '/opt/mosaic/.workspaces/users/user-1/project-1',
}),
);
const authGuard: CanActivate = {
canActivate(context: ExecutionContext): boolean {
const requestContext = context.switchToHttp().getRequest<{ user?: { id: string } }>();
requestContext.user = { id: 'user-1' };
return true;
},
};
describe('POST /api/workspaces repoUrl validation', () => {
let app: INestApplication;
beforeAll(async () => {
const moduleRef = await Test.createTestingModule({
controllers: [WorkspaceController],
providers: [
{
provide: ProjectBootstrapService,
useValue: { bootstrap: bootstrapMock },
},
],
})
.overrideGuard(AuthGuard)
.useValue(authGuard)
.compile();
app = moduleRef.createNestApplication<NestFastifyApplication>(new FastifyAdapter());
app.useGlobalPipes(
new ValidationPipe({
whitelist: true,
forbidNonWhitelisted: true,
transform: true,
}),
);
await app.init();
await app.getHttpAdapter().getInstance().ready();
});
beforeEach(() => {
bootstrapMock.mockClear();
});
afterAll(async () => {
await app.close();
});
it.each([
['a leading-dash value', '--upload-pack=sh -c id'],
['an ext remote helper', 'ext::sh -c id'],
['a file URL', 'file:///tmp/repository'],
['an unparseable value', 'not a url'],
['an SSH shorthand', '[email protected]:acme/repository.git'],
['a scheme without //', 'https:example.com/acme/repository.git'],
['a hostless git URL', 'git:///tmp/repository'],
])('returns 400 for %s', async (_description, repoUrl) => {
const response = await request(app.getHttpServer())
.post('/api/workspaces')
.send({ name: 'Example', repoUrl })
.set('Content-Type', 'application/json');
expect(response.status).toBe(400);
expect(bootstrapMock).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it.each([
['a plain HTTPS repository URL', 'https://example.com/acme/repository.git'],
['a git protocol repository URL', 'git://example.com/acme/repository.git'],
])('accepts %s', async (_description, repoUrl) => {
const response = await request(app.getHttpServer())
.post('/api/workspaces')
.send({ name: 'Example', repoUrl })
.set('Content-Type', 'application/json');
expect(response.status).toBe(201);
expect(bootstrapMock).toHaveBeenCalledWith({
name: 'Example',
description: undefined,
userId: 'user-1',
teamId: undefined,
repoUrl,
});
});
});
@@ -1,11 +1,7 @@
import { Body, Controller, Post, UseGuards } from '@nestjs/common';
import { AuthGuard } from '../auth/auth.guard.js';
import { CurrentUser } from '../auth/current-user.decorator.js';
import {
ProjectBootstrapService,
type BootstrapProjectResult,
} from './project-bootstrap.service.js';
import { CreateWorkspaceDto } from './workspace.dto.js';
import { ProjectBootstrapService } from './project-bootstrap.service.js';
@Controller('api/workspaces')
@UseGuards(AuthGuard)
@@ -15,14 +11,20 @@ export class WorkspaceController {
@Post()
async create(
@CurrentUser() user: { id: string },
@Body() dto: CreateWorkspaceDto,
): Promise<BootstrapProjectResult> {
@Body()
body: {
name: string;
description?: string;
teamId?: string;
repoUrl?: string;
},
) {
return this.bootstrap.bootstrap({
name: dto.name,
description: dto.description,
name: body.name,
description: body.description,
userId: user.id,
teamId: dto.teamId,
repoUrl: dto.repoUrl,
teamId: body.teamId,
repoUrl: body.repoUrl,
});
}
}
@@ -1,33 +0,0 @@
import { IsOptional, IsString, IsUrl, Matches, MaxLength } from 'class-validator';
export class CreateWorkspaceDto {
@IsString()
@MaxLength(255)
name!: string;
@IsOptional()
@IsString()
@MaxLength(10_000)
description?: string;
@IsOptional()
@IsString()
teamId?: string;
@IsOptional()
@IsString()
@Matches(/^(?:https|git):\/\//i, {
message: 'repoUrl must be a valid https:// or git:// URL',
})
@IsUrl(
{
protocols: ['https', 'git'],
require_host: true,
require_protocol: true,
require_tld: false,
require_valid_protocol: true,
},
{ message: 'repoUrl must be a valid https:// or git:// URL' },
)
repoUrl?: string;
}
@@ -1,33 +1,11 @@
import { BadRequestException } from '@nestjs/common';
import fs from 'node:fs/promises';
import os from 'node:os';
import path from 'node:path';
import { afterEach, beforeEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest';
import { describe, it, expect, beforeEach } from 'vitest';
import { WorkspaceService } from './workspace.service.js';
type ExecFileMock = (
command: string,
args: readonly string[],
options: { cwd: string },
callback: (error: Error | null, stdout: string, stderr: string) => void,
) => void;
const { execFileMock } = vi.hoisted(() => ({
execFileMock: vi.fn<ExecFileMock>(),
}));
vi.mock('node:child_process', () => ({
execFile: execFileMock,
}));
import path from 'node:path';
describe('WorkspaceService', () => {
let service: WorkspaceService;
beforeEach(() => {
execFileMock.mockReset();
execFileMock.mockImplementation((_command, _args, _options, callback) => {
callback(null, '', '');
});
service = new WorkspaceService();
});
@@ -98,69 +76,4 @@ describe('WorkspaceService', () => {
}
});
});
describe('create', () => {
const project = {
id: 'project-1',
ownerType: 'user',
userId: 'user-1',
teamId: null,
} as const;
let originalRoot: string | undefined;
let temporaryRoot: string;
beforeEach(async () => {
originalRoot = process.env['MOSAIC_ROOT'];
temporaryRoot = await fs.mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'mosaic-workspace-'));
process.env['MOSAIC_ROOT'] = temporaryRoot;
service = new WorkspaceService();
});
afterEach(async () => {
if (originalRoot === undefined) {
delete process.env['MOSAIC_ROOT'];
} else {
process.env['MOSAIC_ROOT'] = originalRoot;
}
await fs.rm(temporaryRoot, { recursive: true, force: true });
});
it.each([
['a leading-dash URL', '--upload-pack=sh -c id'],
['an ext remote helper', 'ext::sh -c id'],
['a file URL', 'file:///tmp/repository'],
['an unparseable value', 'not a url'],
['an SSH shorthand', '[email protected]:acme/repository.git'],
['a scheme without //', 'https:example.com/acme/repository.git'],
['a hostless git URL', 'git:///tmp/repository'],
])('rejects %s before invoking git', async (_description, repoUrl) => {
await expect(service.create(project, repoUrl)).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(BadRequestException);
expect(execFileMock).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it.each([
['an HTTPS URL', 'https://example.com/acme/repository.git'],
['a git protocol URL', 'git://example.com/acme/repository.git'],
])('accepts %s and invokes hardened git clone arguments', async (_description, repoUrl) => {
const workspacePath = await service.create(project, repoUrl);
expect(execFileMock).toHaveBeenCalledOnce();
expect(execFileMock).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
'git',
[
'-c',
'protocol.ext.allow=never',
'-c',
'protocol.file.allow=never',
'clone',
'--',
repoUrl,
'.',
],
{ cwd: workspacePath },
expect.any(Function),
);
});
});
});
@@ -1,30 +1,10 @@
import { BadRequestException, Injectable, Logger } from '@nestjs/common';
import { Injectable, Logger } from '@nestjs/common';
import fs from 'node:fs/promises';
import path from 'node:path';
import { execFile } from 'node:child_process';
import { promisify } from 'node:util';
const execFileAsync = promisify(execFile);
const allowedRepositoryProtocols = new Set(['https:', 'git:']);
const repositoryUrlPrefixPattern = /^(?:https|git):\/\//i;
const repositoryUrlError = 'repoUrl must be a valid https:// or git:// URL';
function assertAllowedRepositoryUrl(repoUrl: string): void {
if (repoUrl.startsWith('-') || !repositoryUrlPrefixPattern.test(repoUrl)) {
throw new BadRequestException(repositoryUrlError);
}
let parsedUrl: URL;
try {
parsedUrl = new URL(repoUrl);
} catch {
throw new BadRequestException(repositoryUrlError);
}
if (!allowedRepositoryProtocols.has(parsedUrl.protocol) || parsedUrl.hostname.length === 0) {
throw new BadRequestException(repositoryUrlError);
}
}
export interface WorkspaceProject {
id: string;
@@ -59,32 +39,14 @@ export class WorkspaceService {
* If repoUrl is provided, clone instead of init.
*/
async create(project: WorkspaceProject, repoUrl?: string): Promise<string> {
if (repoUrl !== undefined) {
assertAllowedRepositoryUrl(repoUrl);
}
const workspacePath = this.resolvePath(project);
// Create directory
await fs.mkdir(workspacePath, { recursive: true });
if (repoUrl !== undefined) {
// Clone existing repo. Defense in depth keeps dangerous local helpers
// disabled and terminates option parsing before positional arguments.
await execFileAsync(
'git',
[
'-c',
'protocol.ext.allow=never',
'-c',
'protocol.file.allow=never',
'clone',
'--',
repoUrl,
'.',
],
{ cwd: workspacePath },
);
if (repoUrl) {
// Clone existing repo
await execFileAsync('git', ['clone', repoUrl, '.'], { cwd: workspacePath });
this.logger.log(`Cloned ${repoUrl} into workspace ${workspacePath}`);
} else {
// Init new git repo
-30
View File
@@ -1,30 +0,0 @@
<!doctype html>
<html lang="en">
<head>
<meta charset="UTF-8" />
<meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1.0" />
<title>Mosaic</title>
<meta name="description" content="Mosaic Stack Dashboard" />
<link rel="preconnect" href="https://fonts.googleapis.com" />
<link rel="preconnect" href="https://fonts.gstatic.com" crossorigin />
<link
rel="stylesheet"
href="https://fonts.googleapis.com/css2?family=Outfit:wght@300;400;500;600;700&family=Fira+Code:wght@400;500&display=swap"
/>
<script>
// set data-theme before first paint so the stored theme never flashes
(function () {
try {
var theme = window.localStorage.getItem('mosaic-theme') || 'dark';
document.documentElement.setAttribute('data-theme', theme === 'light' ? 'light' : 'dark');
} catch (error) {
document.documentElement.setAttribute('data-theme', 'dark');
}
})();
</script>
</head>
<body>
<div id="root"></div>
<script type="module" src="/src/main.tsx"></script>
</body>
</html>
+1 -6
View File
@@ -4,9 +4,7 @@
"private": true,
"scripts": {
"build": "node ../../scripts/build-web.mjs",
"build:vite": "vite build",
"dev": "next dev",
"dev:vite": "vite",
"lint": "eslint src",
"typecheck": "tsc --noEmit",
"test": "vitest run --passWithNoTests",
@@ -21,7 +19,6 @@
"react": "^19.0.0",
"react-dom": "^19.0.0",
"react-markdown": "^10.1.0",
"react-router-dom": "^7.18.2",
"socket.io-client": "^4.8.0",
"tailwind-merge": "^3.5.0"
},
@@ -31,11 +28,9 @@
"@types/node": "^22.0.0",
"@types/react": "^19.0.0",
"@types/react-dom": "^19.0.0",
"@vitejs/plugin-react": "^6.0.5",
"jsdom": "^29.0.0",
"tailwindcss": "^4.0.0",
"typescript": "^5.8.0",
"vite": "^8.2.1",
"vitest": "^3.2.7"
"vitest": "^2.0.0"
}
}
@@ -3,56 +3,41 @@
import Link from 'next/link';
import { useEffect, useState } from 'react';
import { useParams, useSearchParams } from 'next/navigation';
import { api } from '@/lib/api';
import { resolveAuthCallbackURL } from '@/lib/auth-redirect';
import { signIn } from '@/lib/auth-client';
import type { SsoProviderDiscovery } from '@/lib/sso';
import { getSsoProvider } from '@/lib/sso-providers';
export default function AuthProviderRedirectPage(): React.ReactElement {
const params = useParams<{ provider: string }>();
const searchParams = useSearchParams();
const providerId = typeof params.provider === 'string' ? params.provider : '';
const requestedCallbackURL = searchParams.get('callbackURL');
const [providerName, setProviderName] = useState<string | null>(null);
const provider = getSsoProvider(providerId);
const callbackURL = searchParams.get('callbackURL') ?? '/chat';
const [error, setError] = useState<string | null>(null);
useEffect(() => {
let cancelled = false;
const currentProvider = provider;
async function redirectToProvider(): Promise<void> {
try {
const callbackURL = resolveAuthCallbackURL(requestedCallbackURL, window.location.origin);
const providers = await api<SsoProviderDiscovery[]>('/api/sso/providers');
if (cancelled) return;
const provider = providers.find((candidate) => candidate.id === providerId);
if (!provider) {
if (!currentProvider) {
setError('Unknown SSO provider.');
return;
}
setProviderName(provider.name);
if (!provider.configured) {
setError(`${provider.name} is not enabled in this deployment.`);
return;
}
if (provider.loginMode !== 'oidc') {
setError(`${provider.name} is not available for OIDC sign in.`);
if (!currentProvider.enabled) {
setError(`${currentProvider.buttonLabel} is not enabled in this deployment.`);
return;
}
const activeProvider = currentProvider;
let cancelled = false;
async function redirectToProvider(): Promise<void> {
const result = await signIn.oauth2({
providerId: provider.id,
providerId: activeProvider.id,
callbackURL,
});
if (!cancelled && result?.error) {
setError(result.error.message ?? `${provider.name} sign in failed.`);
}
} catch (caught: unknown) {
if (!cancelled) {
setError(caught instanceof Error ? caught.message : 'Unable to start single sign-on.');
}
setError(result.error.message ?? `${activeProvider.buttonLabel} sign in failed.`);
}
}
@@ -61,22 +46,19 @@ export default function AuthProviderRedirectPage(): React.ReactElement {
return () => {
cancelled = true;
};
}, [providerId, requestedCallbackURL]);
}, [callbackURL, provider]);
return (
<div className="mx-auto flex min-h-[50vh] max-w-md flex-col justify-center">
<h1 className="text-2xl font-semibold text-text-primary">Single sign-on</h1>
<p className="mt-2 text-sm text-text-secondary">
{providerName
? `Redirecting you to ${providerName}...`
{provider
? `Redirecting you to ${provider.buttonLabel.replace('Continue with ', '')}...`
: 'Preparing your sign-in request...'}
</p>
{error ? (
<div
role="alert"
className="mt-6 rounded-lg border border-error/30 bg-error/10 px-4 py-3 text-sm text-error"
>
<div className="mt-6 rounded-lg border border-error/30 bg-error/10 px-4 py-3 text-sm text-error">
<p>{error}</p>
<Link
href="/login"
-57
View File
@@ -1,57 +0,0 @@
import { afterEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest';
import { api } from './api';
describe('api', () => {
afterEach(() => {
vi.unstubAllGlobals();
});
it('fetches the supplied relative path with credentials and a JSON body', async () => {
const fetchMock = vi.fn<typeof fetch>();
fetchMock.mockResolvedValue(
new Response(JSON.stringify({ ok: true }), {
status: 200,
headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
}),
);
vi.stubGlobal('fetch', fetchMock);
await expect(
api<{ ok: boolean }>('/api/projects', {
method: 'POST',
body: { name: 'Mosaic' },
}),
).resolves.toEqual({ ok: true });
expect(fetchMock).toHaveBeenCalledOnce();
expect(fetchMock).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
'/api/projects',
expect.objectContaining({
method: 'POST',
credentials: 'include',
body: JSON.stringify({ name: 'Mosaic' }),
headers: expect.objectContaining({
Accept: 'application/json',
'Content-Type': 'application/json',
}),
}),
);
});
it('throws the gateway JSON error with its statusCode', async () => {
const fetchMock = vi.fn<typeof fetch>();
fetchMock.mockResolvedValue(
new Response(JSON.stringify({ statusCode: 403, message: 'Forbidden' }), {
status: 403,
headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
}),
);
vi.stubGlobal('fetch', fetchMock);
await expect(api('/api/admin/users')).rejects.toMatchObject({
name: 'Error',
message: 'Forbidden',
statusCode: 403,
});
});
});
+3 -1
View File
@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@
const GATEWAY_URL = process.env['NEXT_PUBLIC_GATEWAY_URL'] ?? 'http://localhost:14242';
export interface ApiRequestInit extends Omit<RequestInit, 'body'> {
body?: unknown;
}
@@ -23,7 +25,7 @@ export async function api<T>(path: string, init?: ApiRequestInit): Promise<T> {
headers['Content-Type'] = 'application/json';
}
const res = await fetch(path, {
const res = await fetch(`${GATEWAY_URL}${path}`, {
credentials: 'include',
...rest,
headers,
-29
View File
@@ -1,29 +0,0 @@
import { afterEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest';
describe('auth client origin contract', () => {
afterEach(() => {
vi.unstubAllGlobals();
vi.resetModules();
});
it('uses the same-origin BetterAuth mount at /api/auth', async () => {
const fetchMock = vi.fn<typeof fetch>();
fetchMock.mockResolvedValue(
new Response(JSON.stringify({ session: null, user: null }), {
status: 200,
headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
}),
);
vi.stubGlobal('fetch', fetchMock);
const { authClient } = await import('./auth-client');
await authClient.getSession();
expect(fetchMock).toHaveBeenCalledOnce();
const firstCall = fetchMock.mock.calls.at(0);
expect(firstCall).toBeDefined();
const requestURL = new URL(String(firstCall?.[0]), window.location.origin);
expect(requestURL.origin).toBe(window.location.origin);
expect(requestURL.pathname).toBe('/api/auth/get-session');
});
});
+1 -2
View File
@@ -1,9 +1,8 @@
import { createAuthClient } from 'better-auth/react';
import { adminClient, genericOAuthClient } from 'better-auth/client/plugins';
// The gateway and BetterAuth client both use /api/auth. Omitting baseURL keeps
// every browser request on the current origin in development and production.
export const authClient = createAuthClient({
baseURL: process.env['NEXT_PUBLIC_GATEWAY_URL'] ?? 'http://localhost:14242',
plugins: [adminClient(), genericOAuthClient()],
});
-30
View File
@@ -1,30 +0,0 @@
import { describe, expect, it } from 'vitest';
import { resolveAuthCallbackURL } from './auth-redirect';
const CURRENT_ORIGIN = 'https://mosaic.example';
describe('resolveAuthCallbackURL', () => {
it('preserves a canonical same-origin path with search and hash', () => {
expect(resolveAuthCallbackURL('/projects?view=active#current', CURRENT_ORIGIN)).toBe(
'/projects?view=active#current',
);
});
it.each([
null,
'chat',
'//evil.example',
'/..//evil.com',
'/..//evil.com/x',
'/./..//evil.com',
'/../..//evil.com',
'/foo/..//evil.com',
'/\\evil.example',
'/\n//evil.example',
'/\r//evil.example',
'/\t//evil.example',
'https://evil.example/phish',
])('falls back to chat for an unsafe callback target %#', (candidate) => {
expect(resolveAuthCallbackURL(candidate, CURRENT_ORIGIN)).toBe('/chat');
});
});
-23
View File
@@ -1,23 +0,0 @@
const DEFAULT_AUTH_CALLBACK_URL = '/chat';
/**
* Return a canonical same-origin path for post-auth navigation.
*
* Parsing before comparing origins rejects protocol-relative URLs, backslash
* variants, and control characters that the WHATWG parser normalizes away.
*/
export function resolveAuthCallbackURL(candidate: string | null, currentOrigin: string): string {
if (!candidate?.startsWith('/')) return DEFAULT_AUTH_CALLBACK_URL;
try {
const expectedOrigin = new URL(currentOrigin).origin;
const resolved = new URL(candidate, expectedOrigin);
if (resolved.origin !== expectedOrigin || resolved.pathname.startsWith('//')) {
return DEFAULT_AUTH_CALLBACK_URL;
}
return `${resolved.pathname}${resolved.search}${resolved.hash}`;
} catch {
return DEFAULT_AUTH_CALLBACK_URL;
}
}
-52
View File
@@ -1,52 +0,0 @@
import { afterEach, beforeEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest';
const { ioMock } = vi.hoisted(() => ({
ioMock: vi.fn(),
}));
vi.mock('socket.io-client', () => ({
io: ioMock,
}));
import { destroySocket, getSocket } from './socket';
describe('chat socket', () => {
let disconnectHandler: (() => void) | undefined;
beforeEach(() => {
disconnectHandler = undefined;
ioMock.mockReset();
const mockSocket = {
on: vi.fn((event: string, handler: () => void) => {
if (event === 'disconnect') disconnectHandler = handler;
return mockSocket;
}),
offAny: vi.fn(() => mockSocket),
disconnect: vi.fn(() => mockSocket),
};
ioMock.mockReturnValue(mockSocket);
});
afterEach(() => {
destroySocket();
});
it('creates one same-origin /chat namespace socket until it disconnects', () => {
const first = getSocket();
const second = getSocket();
expect(first).toBe(second);
expect(ioMock).toHaveBeenCalledOnce();
expect(ioMock).toHaveBeenCalledWith('/chat', {
withCredentials: true,
autoConnect: false,
transports: ['websocket', 'polling'],
});
disconnectHandler?.();
getSocket();
expect(ioMock).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(2);
});
});
+3 -1
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@@ -1,10 +1,12 @@
import { io, type Socket } from 'socket.io-client';
const GATEWAY_URL = process.env['NEXT_PUBLIC_GATEWAY_URL'] ?? 'http://localhost:14242';
let socket: Socket | null = null;
export function getSocket(): Socket {
if (!socket) {
socket = io('/chat', {
socket = io(`${GATEWAY_URL}/chat`, {
withCredentials: true,
autoConnect: false,
transports: ['websocket', 'polling'],
+48
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@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
import { afterEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest';
import { getEnabledSsoProviders, getSsoProvider } from './sso-providers';
describe('sso-providers', () => {
afterEach(() => {
vi.unstubAllEnvs();
});
it('returns the enabled providers in login button order', () => {
vi.stubEnv('NEXT_PUBLIC_WORKOS_ENABLED', 'true');
vi.stubEnv('NEXT_PUBLIC_KEYCLOAK_ENABLED', 'true');
expect(getEnabledSsoProviders()).toEqual([
{
id: 'workos',
buttonLabel: 'Continue with WorkOS',
description: 'Enterprise SSO via WorkOS',
enabled: true,
href: '/auth/provider/workos',
},
{
id: 'keycloak',
buttonLabel: 'Continue with Keycloak',
description: 'Enterprise SSO via Keycloak',
enabled: true,
href: '/auth/provider/keycloak',
},
]);
});
it('marks disabled providers without exposing them in the enabled list', () => {
vi.stubEnv('NEXT_PUBLIC_WORKOS_ENABLED', 'true');
vi.stubEnv('NEXT_PUBLIC_KEYCLOAK_ENABLED', 'false');
expect(getEnabledSsoProviders().map((provider) => provider.id)).toEqual(['workos']);
expect(getSsoProvider('keycloak')).toEqual({
id: 'keycloak',
buttonLabel: 'Continue with Keycloak',
description: 'Enterprise SSO via Keycloak',
enabled: false,
href: '/auth/provider/keycloak',
});
});
it('returns null for unknown providers', () => {
expect(getSsoProvider('authentik')).toBeNull();
});
});
+53
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@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
export type SsoProviderId = 'workos' | 'keycloak';
export interface SsoProvider {
id: SsoProviderId;
buttonLabel: string;
description: string;
enabled: boolean;
href: string;
}
const PROVIDER_METADATA: Record<SsoProviderId, Omit<SsoProvider, 'enabled' | 'href'>> = {
workos: {
id: 'workos',
buttonLabel: 'Continue with WorkOS',
description: 'Enterprise SSO via WorkOS',
},
keycloak: {
id: 'keycloak',
buttonLabel: 'Continue with Keycloak',
description: 'Enterprise SSO via Keycloak',
},
};
export function getEnabledSsoProviders(): SsoProvider[] {
return (Object.keys(PROVIDER_METADATA) as SsoProviderId[])
.map((providerId) => getSsoProvider(providerId))
.filter((provider): provider is SsoProvider => provider?.enabled === true);
}
export function getSsoProvider(providerId: string): SsoProvider | null {
if (!isSsoProviderId(providerId)) {
return null;
}
return {
...PROVIDER_METADATA[providerId],
enabled: isSsoProviderEnabled(providerId),
href: `/auth/provider/${providerId}`,
};
}
function isSsoProviderId(value: string): value is SsoProviderId {
return value === 'workos' || value === 'keycloak';
}
function isSsoProviderEnabled(providerId: SsoProviderId): boolean {
switch (providerId) {
case 'workos':
return process.env['NEXT_PUBLIC_WORKOS_ENABLED'] === 'true';
case 'keycloak':
return process.env['NEXT_PUBLIC_KEYCLOAK_ENABLED'] === 'true';
}
}
-19
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@@ -1,19 +0,0 @@
import { StrictMode } from 'react';
import { createRoot } from 'react-dom/client';
import { RouterProvider } from 'react-router-dom';
import { ThemeProvider } from '@/providers/theme-provider';
import { createAppRouter } from '@/routes';
import '@/app/globals.css';
const container = document.getElementById('root');
if (!container) {
throw new Error('missing #root element');
}
createRoot(container).render(
<StrictMode>
<ThemeProvider>
<RouterProvider router={createAppRouter()} />
</ThemeProvider>
</StrictMode>,
);
-49
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@@ -1,49 +0,0 @@
import type { ReactElement } from 'react';
import { createBrowserRouter, Navigate, Outlet, type RouteObject } from 'react-router-dom';
import { LoginPage } from '@/spa/pages/login';
import { RegisterPage } from '@/spa/pages/register';
import { SsoCallbackPage } from '@/spa/pages/sso-callback';
import { AuthGuard, GuestGuard } from '@/spa/guards';
import { Placeholder } from '@/spa/placeholder';
function GuestLayout(): ReactElement {
return (
<div className="flex min-h-screen items-center justify-center bg-surface-bg px-4 py-8">
<div className="w-full max-w-md rounded-xl border border-surface-border bg-surface-card p-8 shadow-lg">
<Outlet />
</div>
</div>
);
}
export const routes: RouteObject[] = [
{
element: <GuestGuard />,
children: [
{
element: <GuestLayout />,
children: [
{ path: '/login', element: <LoginPage /> },
{ path: '/register', element: <RegisterPage /> },
{ path: '/auth/provider/:provider', element: <SsoCallbackPage /> },
],
},
],
},
{
element: <AuthGuard />,
children: [
{ path: '/', element: <Navigate to="/chat" replace /> },
{ path: '/chat', element: <Placeholder title="Chat" /> },
{ path: '/projects', element: <Placeholder title="Projects" /> },
{ path: '/projects/:id', element: <Placeholder title="Project" /> },
{ path: '/tasks', element: <Placeholder title="Tasks" /> },
{ path: '/settings', element: <Placeholder title="Settings" /> },
{ path: '/admin', element: <Placeholder title="Admin" /> },
],
},
];
export function createAppRouter(): ReturnType<typeof createBrowserRouter> {
return createBrowserRouter(routes);
}
-135
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@@ -1,135 +0,0 @@
import { act } from 'react';
import { createRoot, type Root } from 'react-dom/client';
import { createMemoryRouter, RouterProvider, type RouteObject } from 'react-router-dom';
import { afterAll, afterEach, beforeAll, describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest';
const { useSessionMock } = vi.hoisted(() => ({
useSessionMock: vi.fn(),
}));
vi.mock('@/lib/auth-client', () => ({
useSession: useSessionMock,
}));
import { AuthGuard, GuestGuard } from './guards';
interface RenderedRouter {
container: HTMLDivElement;
router: ReturnType<typeof createMemoryRouter>;
}
const mountedRoots: Root[] = [];
beforeAll(() => {
Object.defineProperty(globalThis, 'IS_REACT_ACT_ENVIRONMENT', {
configurable: true,
value: true,
});
});
afterAll(() => {
Reflect.deleteProperty(globalThis, 'IS_REACT_ACT_ENVIRONMENT');
});
async function renderRouter(
routeObjects: RouteObject[],
initialEntry: string,
): Promise<RenderedRouter> {
const container = document.createElement('div');
document.body.append(container);
const router = createMemoryRouter(routeObjects, { initialEntries: [initialEntry] });
const root = createRoot(container);
mountedRoots.push(root);
await act(async () => {
root.render(<RouterProvider router={router} />);
});
return { container, router };
}
afterEach(async () => {
for (const root of mountedRoots.splice(0)) {
await act(async () => {
root.unmount();
});
}
document.body.replaceChildren();
useSessionMock.mockReset();
});
const guestRoutes: RouteObject[] = [
{
path: '/login',
element: <GuestGuard />,
children: [{ index: true, element: <p>Guest page</p> }],
},
{ path: '/chat', element: <p>Chat page</p> },
];
const authenticatedRoutes: RouteObject[] = [
{
path: '/chat',
element: <AuthGuard />,
children: [{ index: true, element: <p>Private page</p> }],
},
{ path: '/login', element: <p>Login page</p> },
];
describe('GuestGuard', () => {
it('renders the guest outlet while session lookup is pending', async () => {
useSessionMock.mockReturnValue({ data: null, isPending: true });
const view = await renderRouter(guestRoutes, '/login');
expect(view.container.textContent).toContain('Guest page');
expect(view.router.state.location.pathname).toBe('/login');
});
it('renders the guest outlet when no session exists', async () => {
useSessionMock.mockReturnValue({ data: null, isPending: false });
const view = await renderRouter(guestRoutes, '/login');
expect(view.container.textContent).toContain('Guest page');
expect(view.router.state.location.pathname).toBe('/login');
});
it('redirects an authenticated session to chat', async () => {
useSessionMock.mockReturnValue({ data: { user: { id: 'user-1' } }, isPending: false });
const view = await renderRouter(guestRoutes, '/login');
expect(view.container.textContent).toContain('Chat page');
expect(view.router.state.location.pathname).toBe('/chat');
});
});
describe('AuthGuard', () => {
it('renders the existing loading treatment while session lookup is pending', async () => {
useSessionMock.mockReturnValue({ data: null, isPending: true });
const view = await renderRouter(authenticatedRoutes, '/chat');
expect(view.container.textContent).toContain('Loading...');
expect(view.router.state.location.pathname).toBe('/chat');
});
it('redirects an unauthenticated visitor to login', async () => {
useSessionMock.mockReturnValue({ data: null, isPending: false });
const view = await renderRouter(authenticatedRoutes, '/chat');
expect(view.container.textContent).toContain('Login page');
expect(view.router.state.location.pathname).toBe('/login');
});
it('renders the authenticated outlet when a session exists', async () => {
useSessionMock.mockReturnValue({ data: { user: { id: 'user-1' } }, isPending: false });
const view = await renderRouter(authenticatedRoutes, '/chat');
expect(view.container.textContent).toContain('Private page');
expect(view.router.state.location.pathname).toBe('/chat');
});
});
-23
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@@ -1,23 +0,0 @@
import type { ReactElement } from 'react';
import { Navigate, Outlet } from 'react-router-dom';
import { useSession } from '@/lib/auth-client';
export function GuestGuard(): ReactElement {
const { data: session } = useSession();
return session ? <Navigate to="/chat" replace /> : <Outlet />;
}
export function AuthGuard(): ReactElement {
const { data: session, isPending } = useSession();
if (isPending) {
return (
<div className="flex min-h-screen items-center justify-center">
<div className="text-sm text-text-muted">Loading...</div>
</div>
);
}
return session ? <Outlet /> : <Navigate to="/login" replace />;
}
-152
View File
@@ -1,152 +0,0 @@
import { useEffect, useState, type FormEvent, type ReactElement } from 'react';
import { Link, useNavigate } from 'react-router-dom';
import { SsoProviderButtons } from '@/components/auth/sso-provider-buttons';
import { api } from '@/lib/api';
import { authClient, signIn } from '@/lib/auth-client';
import type { SsoProviderDiscovery } from '@/lib/sso';
export function LoginPage(): ReactElement {
const navigate = useNavigate();
const [error, setError] = useState<string | null>(null);
const [loading, setLoading] = useState(false);
const [ssoProviders, setSsoProviders] = useState<SsoProviderDiscovery[]>([]);
const [ssoLoadingProviderId, setSsoLoadingProviderId] = useState<
SsoProviderDiscovery['id'] | null
>(null);
useEffect(() => {
let active = true;
void api<SsoProviderDiscovery[]>('/api/sso/providers').then(
(providers) => {
if (active) setSsoProviders(providers.filter((provider) => provider.configured));
},
() => {
if (active) setSsoProviders([]);
},
);
return () => {
active = false;
};
}, []);
async function handleSubmit(event: FormEvent<HTMLFormElement>): Promise<void> {
event.preventDefault();
setError(null);
setLoading(true);
const form = new FormData(event.currentTarget);
const email = String(form.get('email') ?? '');
const password = String(form.get('password') ?? '');
try {
const result = await signIn.email({ email, password });
if (result.error) {
setError(result.error.message ?? 'Sign in failed');
return;
}
navigate('/chat', { replace: true });
} catch (caught: unknown) {
setError(caught instanceof Error ? caught.message : 'Sign in failed');
} finally {
setLoading(false);
}
}
async function handleSsoSignIn(providerId: SsoProviderDiscovery['id']): Promise<void> {
setError(null);
setSsoLoadingProviderId(providerId);
try {
const result = await authClient.signIn.oauth2({
providerId,
callbackURL: '/chat',
newUserCallbackURL: '/chat',
});
if (result.error) {
setError(result.error.message ?? `Sign in with ${providerId} failed`);
setSsoLoadingProviderId(null);
}
} catch (caught: unknown) {
setError(caught instanceof Error ? caught.message : `Sign in with ${providerId} failed`);
setSsoLoadingProviderId(null);
}
}
return (
<div>
<h1 className="text-2xl font-semibold">Sign in</h1>
<p className="mt-1 text-sm text-text-secondary">Sign in to your Mosaic account</p>
{error ? (
<div
role="alert"
className="mt-4 rounded-lg border border-error/30 bg-error/10 px-4 py-3 text-sm text-error"
>
{error}
</div>
) : null}
<form className="mt-6 space-y-4" onSubmit={handleSubmit}>
<div>
<label htmlFor="email" className="block text-sm font-medium text-text-secondary">
Email
</label>
<input
id="email"
name="email"
type="email"
autoComplete="email"
required
disabled={loading}
className="mt-1 block w-full rounded-lg border border-surface-border bg-surface-elevated px-3 py-2 text-sm text-text-primary placeholder:text-text-muted focus:border-blue-500 focus:outline-none focus:ring-1 focus:ring-blue-500 disabled:opacity-50"
placeholder="[email protected]"
/>
</div>
<div>
<label htmlFor="password" className="block text-sm font-medium text-text-secondary">
Password
</label>
<input
id="password"
name="password"
type="password"
autoComplete="current-password"
required
disabled={loading}
className="mt-1 block w-full rounded-lg border border-surface-border bg-surface-elevated px-3 py-2 text-sm text-text-primary placeholder:text-text-muted focus:border-blue-500 focus:outline-none focus:ring-1 focus:ring-blue-500 disabled:opacity-50"
placeholder="••••••••"
/>
</div>
<button
type="submit"
disabled={loading}
className="w-full rounded-lg bg-blue-600 px-4 py-2.5 text-sm font-medium text-white transition-colors hover:bg-blue-700 focus:outline-none focus:ring-2 focus:ring-blue-500 focus:ring-offset-2 focus:ring-offset-surface-card disabled:opacity-50"
>
{loading ? 'Signing in...' : 'Sign in'}
</button>
</form>
<SsoProviderButtons
providers={ssoProviders}
loadingProviderId={ssoLoadingProviderId}
onOidcSignIn={(providerId) => {
void handleSsoSignIn(providerId);
}}
/>
<p className="mt-4 text-center text-sm text-text-muted">
Don&apos;t have an account?{' '}
<Link to="/register" className="text-blue-400 hover:text-blue-300">
Sign up
</Link>
</p>
</div>
);
}
-116
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@@ -1,116 +0,0 @@
import { useState, type FormEvent, type ReactElement } from 'react';
import { Link, useNavigate } from 'react-router-dom';
import { signUp } from '@/lib/auth-client';
export function RegisterPage(): ReactElement {
const navigate = useNavigate();
const [error, setError] = useState<string | null>(null);
const [loading, setLoading] = useState(false);
async function handleSubmit(event: FormEvent<HTMLFormElement>): Promise<void> {
event.preventDefault();
setError(null);
setLoading(true);
const form = new FormData(event.currentTarget);
const name = String(form.get('name') ?? '');
const email = String(form.get('email') ?? '');
const password = String(form.get('password') ?? '');
try {
const result = await signUp.email({ name, email, password });
if (result.error) {
setError(result.error.message ?? 'Registration failed');
return;
}
navigate('/chat', { replace: true });
} catch (caught: unknown) {
setError(caught instanceof Error ? caught.message : 'Registration failed');
} finally {
setLoading(false);
}
}
return (
<div>
<h1 className="text-2xl font-semibold">Create account</h1>
<p className="mt-1 text-sm text-text-secondary">Get started with Mosaic</p>
{error ? (
<div
role="alert"
className="mt-4 rounded-lg border border-error/30 bg-error/10 px-4 py-3 text-sm text-error"
>
{error}
</div>
) : null}
<form className="mt-6 space-y-4" onSubmit={handleSubmit}>
<div>
<label htmlFor="name" className="block text-sm font-medium text-text-secondary">
Name
</label>
<input
id="name"
name="name"
type="text"
autoComplete="name"
required
disabled={loading}
className="mt-1 block w-full rounded-lg border border-surface-border bg-surface-elevated px-3 py-2 text-sm text-text-primary placeholder:text-text-muted focus:border-blue-500 focus:outline-none focus:ring-1 focus:ring-blue-500 disabled:opacity-50"
placeholder="Your name"
/>
</div>
<div>
<label htmlFor="email" className="block text-sm font-medium text-text-secondary">
Email
</label>
<input
id="email"
name="email"
type="email"
autoComplete="email"
required
disabled={loading}
className="mt-1 block w-full rounded-lg border border-surface-border bg-surface-elevated px-3 py-2 text-sm text-text-primary placeholder:text-text-muted focus:border-blue-500 focus:outline-none focus:ring-1 focus:ring-blue-500 disabled:opacity-50"
placeholder="[email protected]"
/>
</div>
<div>
<label htmlFor="password" className="block text-sm font-medium text-text-secondary">
Password
</label>
<input
id="password"
name="password"
type="password"
autoComplete="new-password"
required
disabled={loading}
className="mt-1 block w-full rounded-lg border border-surface-border bg-surface-elevated px-3 py-2 text-sm text-text-primary placeholder:text-text-muted focus:border-blue-500 focus:outline-none focus:ring-1 focus:ring-blue-500 disabled:opacity-50"
placeholder="••••••••"
/>
</div>
<button
type="submit"
disabled={loading}
className="w-full rounded-lg bg-blue-600 px-4 py-2.5 text-sm font-medium text-white transition-colors hover:bg-blue-700 focus:outline-none focus:ring-2 focus:ring-blue-500 focus:ring-offset-2 focus:ring-offset-surface-card disabled:opacity-50"
>
{loading ? 'Creating account...' : 'Create account'}
</button>
</form>
<p className="mt-4 text-center text-sm text-text-muted">
Already have an account?{' '}
<Link to="/login" className="text-blue-400 hover:text-blue-300">
Sign in
</Link>
</p>
</div>
);
}
@@ -1,90 +0,0 @@
import { act } from 'react';
import { createRoot, type Root } from 'react-dom/client';
import { createMemoryRouter, RouterProvider } from 'react-router-dom';
import { afterAll, afterEach, beforeAll, beforeEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest';
const { apiMock, oauth2Mock } = vi.hoisted(() => ({
apiMock: vi.fn(),
oauth2Mock: vi.fn(),
}));
vi.mock('@/lib/api', () => ({
api: apiMock,
}));
vi.mock('@/lib/auth-client', () => ({
signIn: { oauth2: oauth2Mock },
}));
import { SsoCallbackPage } from './sso-callback';
const mountedRoots: Root[] = [];
beforeAll(() => {
Object.defineProperty(globalThis, 'IS_REACT_ACT_ENVIRONMENT', {
configurable: true,
value: true,
});
});
beforeEach(() => {
apiMock.mockResolvedValue([
{
id: 'authentik',
name: 'Authentik',
protocols: ['oidc'],
configured: true,
loginMode: 'oidc',
callbackPath: '/api/auth/oauth2/callback/authentik',
teamSync: { enabled: false, claim: null },
samlFallback: { configured: false, loginUrl: null },
warnings: [],
},
]);
oauth2Mock.mockResolvedValue({ data: null, error: null });
});
afterEach(async () => {
for (const root of mountedRoots.splice(0)) {
await act(async () => {
root.unmount();
});
}
document.body.replaceChildren();
apiMock.mockReset();
oauth2Mock.mockReset();
});
afterAll(() => {
Reflect.deleteProperty(globalThis, 'IS_REACT_ACT_ENVIRONMENT');
});
describe('SsoCallbackPage', () => {
it('rejects a control-character callback that normalizes to an external origin', async () => {
const router = createMemoryRouter(
[
{
path: '/auth/provider/:provider',
element: <SsoCallbackPage />,
},
],
{
initialEntries: ['/auth/provider/authentik?callbackURL=%2F%0A%2F%2Fevil.example'],
},
);
const container = document.createElement('div');
document.body.append(container);
const root = createRoot(container);
mountedRoots.push(root);
await act(async () => {
root.render(<RouterProvider router={router} />);
await new Promise((resolve) => setTimeout(resolve, 0));
});
expect(oauth2Mock).toHaveBeenCalledWith({
providerId: 'authentik',
callbackURL: '/chat',
});
});
});
-91
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@@ -1,91 +0,0 @@
import { useEffect, useState, type ReactElement } from 'react';
import { Link, useParams, useSearchParams } from 'react-router-dom';
import { api } from '@/lib/api';
import { resolveAuthCallbackURL } from '@/lib/auth-redirect';
import { signIn } from '@/lib/auth-client';
import type { SsoProviderDiscovery } from '@/lib/sso';
export function SsoCallbackPage(): ReactElement {
const { provider: providerId = '' } = useParams<'provider'>();
const [searchParams] = useSearchParams();
const requestedCallbackURL = searchParams.get('callbackURL');
const [providerName, setProviderName] = useState<string | null>(null);
const [error, setError] = useState<string | null>(null);
useEffect(() => {
let cancelled = false;
async function redirectToProvider(): Promise<void> {
try {
const callbackURL = resolveAuthCallbackURL(requestedCallbackURL, window.location.origin);
const providers = await api<SsoProviderDiscovery[]>('/api/sso/providers');
if (cancelled) return;
const provider = providers.find((candidate) => candidate.id === providerId);
if (!provider) {
setError('Unknown SSO provider.');
return;
}
setProviderName(provider.name);
if (!provider.configured) {
setError(`${provider.name} is not enabled in this deployment.`);
return;
}
if (provider.loginMode !== 'oidc') {
setError(`${provider.name} is not available for OIDC sign in.`);
return;
}
const result = await signIn.oauth2({
providerId: provider.id,
callbackURL,
});
if (!cancelled && result?.error) {
setError(result.error.message ?? `${provider.name} sign in failed.`);
}
} catch (caught: unknown) {
if (!cancelled) {
setError(caught instanceof Error ? caught.message : 'Unable to start single sign-on.');
}
}
}
void redirectToProvider();
return () => {
cancelled = true;
};
}, [providerId, requestedCallbackURL]);
return (
<div className="mx-auto flex min-h-[50vh] max-w-md flex-col justify-center">
<h1 className="text-2xl font-semibold text-text-primary">Single sign-on</h1>
<p className="mt-2 text-sm text-text-secondary">
{providerName
? `Redirecting you to ${providerName}...`
: 'Preparing your sign-in request...'}
</p>
{error ? (
<div
role="alert"
className="mt-6 rounded-lg border border-error/30 bg-error/10 px-4 py-3 text-sm text-error"
>
<p>{error}</p>
<Link
to="/login"
className="mt-3 inline-block font-medium text-blue-400 hover:text-blue-300"
>
Return to login
</Link>
</div>
) : (
<div className="mt-6 rounded-lg border border-surface-border bg-surface-elevated px-4 py-3 text-sm text-text-secondary">
If the redirect does not start automatically, return to the login page and try again.
</div>
)}
</div>
);
}
-9
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@@ -1,9 +0,0 @@
import type { ReactElement } from 'react';
export function Placeholder({ title }: { title: string }): ReactElement {
return (
<main className="flex min-h-screen items-center justify-center">
<h1 className="text-xl font-medium">{title}</h1>
</main>
);
}
-58
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@@ -1,58 +0,0 @@
import { isValidElement } from 'react';
import { describe, expect, it } from 'vitest';
import type { RouteObject } from 'react-router-dom';
import { routes } from '@/routes';
import { Placeholder } from '@/spa/placeholder';
function collectPaths(routeObjects: RouteObject[]): string[] {
return routeObjects.flatMap((route) => [
...(route.path ? [route.path] : []),
...(route.children ? collectPaths(route.children) : []),
]);
}
function findRoute(routeObjects: RouteObject[], path: string): RouteObject | undefined {
for (const route of routeObjects) {
if (route.path === path) return route;
const nested = route.children ? findRoute(route.children, path) : undefined;
if (nested) return nested;
}
return undefined;
}
describe('SPA route table', () => {
it('covers every v1 parity route from the Phase P RFC', () => {
expect(collectPaths(routes).sort()).toEqual(
[
'/',
'/admin',
'/auth/provider/:provider',
'/chat',
'/login',
'/projects',
'/projects/:id',
'/register',
'/settings',
'/tasks',
].sort(),
);
});
it('separates guest and authenticated route groups', () => {
const guestPaths = collectPaths(routes.at(0)?.children ?? []);
const authPaths = collectPaths(routes.at(1)?.children ?? []);
expect(guestPaths).toContain('/login');
expect(guestPaths).not.toContain('/chat');
expect(authPaths).toContain('/chat');
});
it.each(['/login', '/register', '/auth/provider/:provider'])(
'renders a real guest page instead of the P1 placeholder at %s',
(path) => {
const element = findRoute(routes, path)?.element;
expect(isValidElement(element)).toBe(true);
if (!isValidElement(element)) throw new Error(`Missing route element for ${path}`);
expect(element.type).not.toBe(Placeholder);
},
);
});
-14
View File
@@ -1,14 +0,0 @@
import { describe, expect, it } from 'vitest';
describe('Vitest abort-controller realm', () => {
it('provides a global signal accepted by Node native Request', () => {
const controller = new AbortController();
const request = new Request('https://mosaic.invalid/navigation', {
signal: controller.signal,
});
expect(request.signal).toBeInstanceOf(AbortSignal);
controller.abort();
expect(request.signal.aborted).toBe(true);
});
});
-23
View File
@@ -1,23 +0,0 @@
import { transferableAbortController } from 'node:util';
// jsdom installs realm-local abort constructors while Node's undici Request
// remains native. React Router passes a global AbortSignal to Request, so both
// constructors must come from Node's native realm during tests.
const nativeController = transferableAbortController();
const nativeAbortController = nativeController.constructor;
const nativeAbortSignal = nativeController.signal.constructor;
for (const target of [globalThis, window]) {
Object.defineProperties(target, {
AbortController: {
configurable: true,
writable: true,
value: nativeAbortController,
},
AbortSignal: {
configurable: true,
writable: true,
value: nativeAbortSignal,
},
});
}
-24
View File
@@ -1,24 +0,0 @@
import { fileURLToPath } from 'node:url';
import react from '@vitejs/plugin-react';
import { defineConfig } from 'vite';
// The proxy exists only in dev; in production the SPA is same-origin with the gateway
// (served by it under Candidate A, or behind one FQDN under Candidate B) and every
// request uses a relative path, so no origin may ever be configured here or in src/.
const gatewayTarget = 'http://localhost:14242';
export default defineConfig({
plugins: [react()],
resolve: {
alias: {
'@': fileURLToPath(new URL('./src', import.meta.url)),
},
},
server: {
port: 3100,
proxy: {
'/api': gatewayTarget,
'/socket.io': { target: gatewayTarget, ws: true },
},
},
});
-12
View File
@@ -1,21 +1,9 @@
import { fileURLToPath } from 'node:url';
import { defineConfig } from 'vitest/config';
export default defineConfig({
resolve: {
alias: {
'@': fileURLToPath(new URL('./src', import.meta.url)),
},
},
// tsconfig uses "jsx": "preserve" for Next; tests need esbuild to compile it
esbuild: {
jsx: 'automatic',
},
test: {
globals: true,
environment: 'jsdom',
setupFiles: ['./src/test/setup.ts'],
isolate: true,
exclude: ['e2e/**', 'node_modules/**'],
},
});
+4 -17
View File
@@ -10,8 +10,6 @@ COPY pnpm-workspace.yaml pnpm-lock.yaml package.json ./
COPY apps/gateway/package.json ./apps/gateway/
COPY packages/ ./packages/
COPY plugins/ ./plugins/
# the root prepare script runs scripts/install-hooks.mjs on install
COPY scripts/ ./scripts/
RUN pnpm install --frozen-lockfile
COPY . .
# Build gateway and all of its workspace dependencies via turbo dependency graph
@@ -23,22 +21,11 @@ RUN pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/gateway --prod deploy --legacy /deploy
FROM base AS runner
WORKDIR /app
ENV NODE_ENV=production
# WorkspaceService shells out to git at runtime and roots workspaces at
# $MOSAIC_ROOT/.workspaces (apps/gateway/src/workspace/workspace.service.ts);
# mount a volume over /opt/mosaic to persist workspaces across container restarts.
# Intentionally unpinned: Alpine's signed repository is the trust anchor; pinning
# git was declined so routine base-image security updates remain maintainable.
RUN apk add --no-cache git \
&& mkdir -p /opt/mosaic/.workspaces \
&& chown -R node:node /opt/mosaic /app
ENV MOSAIC_ROOT=/opt/mosaic
# Use the pnpm deploy output — resolves all deps into a flat, self-contained node_modules
COPY --chown=node:node --from=builder /deploy/node_modules ./node_modules
COPY --chown=node:node --from=builder /deploy/package.json ./package.json
COPY --from=builder /deploy/node_modules ./node_modules
COPY --from=builder /deploy/package.json ./package.json
# dist is declared in package.json "files" so pnpm deploy copies it into /deploy;
# copy from builder explicitly as belt-and-suspenders
COPY --chown=node:node --from=builder /app/apps/gateway/dist ./dist
# gateway defaults to port 14242 (apps/gateway/src/main.ts)
EXPOSE 14242
USER node
COPY --from=builder /app/apps/gateway/dist ./dist
EXPOSE 4000
CMD ["node", "dist/main.js"]
+1 -3
View File
@@ -8,11 +8,9 @@ WORKDIR /app
COPY pnpm-workspace.yaml pnpm-lock.yaml package.json ./
COPY apps/web/package.json ./apps/web/
COPY packages/ ./packages/
# the root prepare script runs scripts/install-hooks.mjs on install
COPY scripts/ ./scripts/
RUN pnpm install --frozen-lockfile
COPY . .
RUN pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/web build
RUN pnpm --filter @mosaic/web build
FROM base AS runner
WORKDIR /app
+237
View File
@@ -102,6 +102,128 @@ Context compaction, session replacement, and same-PID runtime reloads can leave
---
## Pi Persistent Goal Loop (#1150)
### Problem and objective
A Pi agent can stop after a plausible-looking answer even when the operator's broader objective is
not complete, and ordinary compaction can weaken or omit the original objective. Mosaic needs an
optional, operator-controlled goal loop that keeps a Pi session oriented, checks progress at native
lifecycle boundaries, and resumes work until completion is verified or a bounded safety state is
reached.
The objective is a Mosaic-owned Pi extension deployed from the framework into
`~/.config/mosaic/runtime/pi/`. It must not install into or depend on `~/.pi/agent/extensions/`.
### Scope
#### In scope
1. `PGL-REQ-01`: The framework SHALL ship a dedicated Pi goal extension under
`packages/mosaic/framework/runtime/pi/`, seed it under `$MOSAIC_HOME/runtime/pi/`, and make
`mosaic pi` load it alongside the core Mosaic extension when present.
2. `PGL-REQ-02`: `/goal` SHALL support setting a goal plus status, pause, resume, cancel, and help
operations without silently replacing an active goal.
3. `PGL-REQ-03`: Active branch-specific goal state SHALL be persisted in Pi custom session entries,
restored on session start and tree navigation, and never rely on a compaction summary as its
source of truth.
4. `PGL-REQ-04`: A hidden goal contract SHALL be injected through Pi's `context` event before every
model request so it remains effective across tool turns, retries, and post-compaction requests.
5. `PGL-REQ-05`: The harness SHALL inspect every `turn_end` and successful `session_compact` event.
A structured terminating goal-report tool SHALL capture `continue`, evidence-bearing `achieved`,
or `blocked` status without requiring a redundant model turn.
6. `PGL-REQ-06`: An achievement claim SHALL remain provisional until a second consecutive
evidence-bearing verification report. Any continuation report or successful compaction during
verification SHALL reset the verification sequence.
7. `PGL-REQ-07`: Continuation SHALL be initiated at safe lifecycle boundaries, primarily
`agent_settled`; manual compaction and restored active sessions may schedule a deferred idle
continuation without re-entering compaction handlers.
8. `PGL-REQ-08`: The loop SHALL have operator cancellation plus bounded turn and repeated-no-progress
limits. Exhausted or blocked goals pause rather than continuing indefinitely.
9. `PGL-REQ-09`: Framework installation and update SHALL preserve normal manifest ownership: the
goal extension is framework-owned under `runtime/**`, while no goal extension or configuration
asset is created or modified under the operator's main Pi configuration. Pi remains the owner of
its native session files used by `appendEntry()`.
#### Out of scope
1. A mathematical guarantee that an arbitrary natural-language goal is semantically complete.
2. Automatically executing user-supplied shell predicates or accepting executable validation code in
`/goal` arguments.
3. Restarting Pi after process, host, or supervisor failure; the existing Mosaic fleet/runtime
supervisor owns process durability.
4. Gateway, database, web UI, Discord, or cross-harness goal orchestration in this slice.
### User and stakeholder requirements
- An operator can start a goal from Pi and see its current phase, evidence, limits, and latest report.
- The agent remains oriented after each turn and compaction until verified, paused, blocked,
exhausted, or cancelled.
- Local testing uses a file under `~/.config/mosaic/runtime/pi/`; the feature never writes an
extension asset to `~/.pi/agent/extensions/`.
- Framework updates deploy the same reviewed extension source through Mosaic's existing manifest
sync path.
### Non-functional requirements
1. **Safety:** bounded continuation, explicit cancellation, no arbitrary command execution, and no
completion without non-empty reported evidence.
2. **Reliability:** serialized continuation scheduling, branch-aware restoration, compaction-safe
context injection, and stale-timer cancellation on session shutdown.
3. **Performance:** no extra nested judge-model request on every turn; structured reporting uses the
active agent's final terminating tool call.
4. **Observability:** Pi status/notifications expose phase and bounded counters without recording
credentials or hidden model reasoning.
5. **Maintainability:** the state machine is deterministic and behavior-tested independently from Pi
provider/network access.
### Acceptance criteria
1. `AC-PGL-01`: A framework-sync fixture installs the extension at
`$MOSAIC_HOME/runtime/pi/goal-extension.ts`, and launcher tests prove both Mosaic Pi extensions are
emitted in deterministic order while absent optional files remain backward-compatible.
2. `AC-PGL-02`: Command tests prove set/status/pause/resume/cancel behavior, active-goal replacement
refusal, and bounded input handling.
3. `AC-PGL-03`: Lifecycle tests prove every turn is recorded, active context is injected on every
request, two evidence-bearing achievement reports are required, and `agent_settled` continues an
unmet goal without duplicate scheduling.
4. `AC-PGL-04`: Compaction and restoration tests prove goal state survives, verification is reset and
rechecked after compaction, manual compaction continuation is deferred until idle, and tree/session
branch state is reconstructed correctly.
5. `AC-PGL-05`: Limit tests prove max-turn and repeated-no-progress exhaustion stop autonomous
continuation, while pause/cancel/blocked states do not restart.
6. `AC-PGL-06`: Focused tests, package typecheck/lint/test, repository quality gates, a local Pi load
smoke test from `~/.config/mosaic/runtime/pi/`, independent review, and terminal-green CI pass before
issue #1150 closes.
### Constraints, risks, and assumptions
- Dependency: Pi's extension API must continue to provide `registerCommand`, `registerTool`,
`context`, `turn_end`, `agent_settled`, `session_compact`, session custom entries, and terminating
tool results.
- Risk: the working agent can overstate completion. Mitigation: structured evidence, a mandatory
second verification pass, explicit semantic limitations, and operator-visible reports.
- Risk: an impossible goal can consume unbounded resources. Mitigation: hard turn/no-progress bounds
and paused terminal states.
- Risk: automatic continuation can race compaction or session replacement. Mitigation: drive from
`agent_settled`, defer idle restarts, generation-check timers, and clear timers on shutdown.
- `ASSUMPTION:` Two consecutive evidence-bearing reports are the initial local verification policy;
rationale: it provides a real recheck without doubling every turn's model cost. Future policy may
add independent or deterministic validators.
- `ASSUMPTION:` Default limits are 40 turns and 6 repeated no-progress reports, configurable only by
bounded Mosaic environment settings; rationale: useful persistence with a finite autonomous budget.
- `ASSUMPTION:` Documentation remains canonical in-repo for this slice; no external docs publication
is requested.
### Testing and delivery intent
Use TDD for the deterministic controller and lifecycle invariants. Test with fake Pi lifecycle
objects first, then run a local load/smoke test from the deployed Mosaic path. Deliver source, tests,
launcher wiring, framework/runtime documentation, user/developer guides, and sitemap updates in one
reviewed squash PR to `main` with terminal-green CI.
---
## Fleet Declarative Configuration Management Workstream (FCM, #758)
### Problem and objective
@@ -146,6 +268,68 @@ lands. M0 consists only of these normative requirements, the complete task DAG,
documentation IA checklist, and the legacy example/profile disposition inventory. Subsequent cards
are defined in [docs/TASKS.md](./TASKS.md) and must remain one card/one PR.
### Fleet git identity launch propagation (#1043)
#### Problem and objective
A fleet seat can have a registered per-agent Git credential while its launched runtime process lacks
`MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY`. The credential resolver then cannot select the seat identity reliably, which
blocks repository operations on fail-closed estates and can fall through to an unrelated identity on
estates where that refusal is not active. The objective is to make Git identity a deterministic,
roster-derived part of the generated launch projection and prove it reaches the launched process.
#### Normative requirements
1. `FGI-REQ-01`: Every generated fleet agent projection SHALL declare
`MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY=<MOSAIC_AGENT_NAME>`; a differing or unsafe identity SHALL fail closed before
tmux launch.
2. `FGI-REQ-02`: The clean `/usr/bin/env -i` pane boundary SHALL pass every variable declared by the
generated projection, including `MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY`, to the launched runtime process.
3. `FGI-REQ-03`: A behavioral integration test SHALL set-compare the complete generated projection
against the launched process environment. Source-text/string-presence assertions are insufficient.
4. `FGI-REQ-04`: Verification SHALL include RED-first evidence and a delete-the-subject mutation that
removes Git-identity pane propagation and makes the behavioral test fail.
#### Acceptance criteria
1. `AC-FGI-01`: A launched seat process contains every key/value pair declared by its generated
environment projection, including the roster-derived Git identity.
2. `AC-FGI-02`: Missing, unsafe, or split Git identity is rejected before a tmux session is created.
3. `AC-FGI-03`: Focused launcher and generated-environment tests, repository quality gates,
independent review, and the required RED/green/R7 evidence are recorded before push.
### Framework shell assertion portability (#1098)
#### Problem and objective
The blocking framework-shell chain can report that a pane command omitted `/usr/bin/env -i` even when
`-i` matched successfully. A short-circuiting `grep -q` under `set -o pipefail` may close its pipe after
the match and cause an upstream producer to exit with SIGPIPE, turning a valid semantic result into a
nonzero aggregate pipeline. The objective is to inspect the captured NUL-delimited argv directly and
make failures carry the observed records needed for diagnosis.
#### Normative requirements
1. `FSP-REQ-01`: The pane-boundary test SHALL validate an adjacent `/usr/bin/env`, `-i` argv pair from
the authoritative NUL-delimited tmux capture without a short-circuit pipeline whose upstream status
can override a successful match.
2. `FSP-REQ-02`: Missing, reversed, or non-adjacent boundary tokens SHALL fail, while valid boundaries
SHALL remain valid regardless of trailing argv size, pipe capacity, process scheduling, or host/CI
utility implementation.
3. `FSP-REQ-03`: A failed boundary check SHALL print stable indexed, shell-escaped observed argv records
before exiting nonzero; the fixture SHALL continue to contain generated non-secret launch data only.
4. `FSP-REQ-04`: Verification SHALL include RED-first large-payload evidence, negative token-order
controls, the complete focused launcher suite, canonical Woodpecker CI, and independent review.
#### Acceptance criteria
1. `AC-FSP-01`: A large captured argv with adjacent `/usr/bin/env`, `-i` passes even when the former
`grep -q` pipeline returns nonzero from an upstream SIGPIPE.
2. `AC-FSP-02`: Missing executable, missing flag, and detached/reversed flag fixtures return nonzero and
emit the indexed observed argv.
3. `AC-FSP-03`: The focused suite passes on the development host and CI image, and the merged-main
Woodpecker pipeline is terminal green before #1098 closes.
---
## Exact Cross-Harness Fleet Communications Contract (#766)
@@ -1345,6 +1529,59 @@ All work is **alpha** (< 0.1.0) until Jason approves 0.1.0 beta release.
---
## Workspace placement guard hardening (#1174)
### Problem and objective
The Bash pre-tool guard must prevent Git checkouts and repository state from being placed under
`$HOME` without refusing ordinary Git commands merely because a source, option value, branch name,
or metadata mentions `$HOME`. A guard that over-blocks routine work is unsafe because operators
will route around it.
### Scope and requirements
1. `WPG-REQ-01`: `git clone` and `git worktree add` placement SHALL be judged from their placement
operands, not from every HOME-shaped word in the command.
2. `WPG-REQ-02`: Clone sources, references, templates, environment assignments, and non-placement
worktree metadata MAY resolve under HOME when all placement operands resolve elsewhere.
3. `WPG-REQ-03`: Both attached and separate-value `--separate-git-dir` forms SHALL remain placement
operands and SHALL be refused when they resolve under HOME.
4. `WPG-REQ-04`: Option classification SHALL account for Git's rule-generated boolean negations
without relying on an enumerable allowlist of flag spellings.
5. `WPG-REQ-05`: Quote removal, escapes, shell command boundaries, redirections, and end-of-options
handling SHALL preserve existing fail-closed checkout coverage.
6. `WPG-REQ-06`: Absolute placement aliases SHALL resolve shell-known HOME spellings, dot segments,
repeated separators, and existing symlink parents before the HOME boundary comparison.
7. Relative targets whose effective path depends on the shell cwd are out of scope and tracked by
#1197.
### Acceptance and verification
1. Git's own option parser accepts each tested flag, including generated `--no-*` forms, while the
guard allows a HOME-valued source with an explicit safe destination.
2. Equivalent clone and worktree fixtures cover rule-generated negations and remain discriminating
against the prior head where the defect existed.
3. Real HOME destinations and both `--separate-git-dir` forms remain blocked, including placements
after shell command boundaries.
4. The full hermetic guard suite, syntax/static checks, adversarial probes, independent review, and
terminal-green CI pass before merge.
5. Any option-classification residual is documented with its deliberate failure direction.
### Constraints, risks, and assumptions
- Security and usability are co-equal: neither a placement bypass nor routine over-block is an
acceptable repair.
- `ASSUMPTION:` The value-taking option surface exposed by the installed Git version is closed and
measurable through Git's own parser/help output; rationale: boolean flags are rule-generated,
while separate-value options have explicit grammar and must be classified as such.
- Risk: a future Git release may add a new value-taking placement option. Mitigation: document the
chosen residual direction and pin every currently supported placement option in behavior tests.
- Risk: a symlink can be replaced after pre-execution canonicalization. Mitigation: resolve every
existing parent physically and document the remaining inherent TOCTOU window; the worktree helper
remains the authoritative path-derivation mechanism, with atomic closure tracked by #1199.
---
## Assumptions
1. RESOLVED: **pgvector is sufficient** for semantic search at v0.1.0 scale (personal/family/team = thousands to low hundreds-of-thousands of vectors). `@mosaicstack/memory` defines a `VectorStore` interface with pgvector as the default adapter. The interface boundary makes Qdrant a drop-in migration if PG resource contention or scale demands it later. Zero additional infrastructure for v0.1.0. Rationale: Reduces ops burden; pgvector HNSW indexes are fast at this scale; interface abstraction costs almost nothing now.
+7
View File
@@ -14,6 +14,13 @@
- [Skill registration user guide](guides/user-guide.md#claude-code-skill-registration) — register, unregister, list statuses, automatic install/update reconciliation, and Claude reload behavior.
- [Skill bridge developer guide](guides/dev-guide.md#claude-code-skill-bridge) — path-validation, ownership, clobber-protection, install/update wiring, tests, and Pi/Codex scope notes.
## Pi persistent goals
- [Persistent goal user guide](guides/user-guide.md#pi-persistent-goals) — `/goal` commands, verification behavior, limits, compaction/resume semantics, and limitations.
- [Goal extension developer guide](guides/dev-guide.md#pi-persistent-goal-extension) — framework ownership, launcher ordering, lifecycle design, tests, and local Mosaic-path smoke workflow.
- [Goal loop operations](guides/admin-guide.md#pi-goal-loop-operations) — deployment ownership, bounded settings, pause/resume procedures, and supervisor boundary.
- [Pi runtime reference](../packages/mosaic/framework/runtime/pi/RUNTIME.md#extensions) — deployed paths, command summary, and bounded environment settings.
## Fleet configuration management
- [Fleet configuration entry point](fleet/README.md) — desired-versus-observed decision tree and complete operator link map.
@@ -1,63 +0,0 @@
# npm `@next` prerelease lane
Status: **IMPLEMENTED**
## Current behavior
`tools/install.sh --next` provides the prerelease integration lane for the permanent `next` branch.
The lane is fast-by-default:
1. Install framework files from the `next` source archive.
2. Resolve the Gitea npm registry `next` dist-tag for the globally installed packages:
```bash
npm view @mosaicstack/gateway@next version
npm view @mosaicstack/mosaic@next version
```
3. Require both resolved versions to share the same `next.<pipeline>` suffix, then install the exact resolved versions.
4. If either `@next` package is missing, unreachable, mismatched, or fails to install, fall back to the source-build path at `next`.
`--next` never hard-fails solely because the prerelease npm dist-tag is unavailable.
## Published packages
The `next` publish pipeline publishes non-private `@mosaicstack/*` packages to the Mosaic Gitea npm registry:
```text
https://git.mosaicstack.dev/api/packages/mosaicstack/npm/
```
Observed `next` dist-tags after enabling the pipeline:
```text
@mosaicstack/mosaic@next -> 0.0.49-next.1633
@mosaicstack/gateway@next -> 0.0.7-next.1633
```
The gateway also publishes a Docker image as `gateway:sha-<short>` on `next` merges. The installer fast path uses the npm gateway package when available; the Docker image is for deployed gateway/runtime harness flows.
## Explicit source lanes
Source builds remain available and are still the authority for explicit ref validation:
- `--dev` always builds from source.
- `--ref <ref>` / `MOSAIC_REF=<ref>` wins over `--next` and uses the source path for that exact ref.
## Pipeline shape
1. Trigger on `next` merges.
2. Compute the next prerelease version from the upcoming stable version plus the Woodpecker pipeline number (`<target-stable>-next.<CI_PIPELINE_NUMBER>`).
3. Build and publish non-private packages in CI.
4. Publish to the Mosaic Gitea npm registry with dist-tag `next`.
5. Keep `latest` untouched; only main/release promotion can update `latest`.
6. Publish gateway Docker images from `next` as `gateway:sha-<short>` only.
## Guardrails
- `@next` is mutable prerelease convenience, not a deployment pin.
- Stable installs continue to use `@latest`.
- Contributor validation remains available through `--dev --ref <branch>`.
- Pipeline output traces every prerelease package back to the source commit on `next`.
- The installer falls back to source rather than hard-failing on prerelease registry issues.
+7 -4
View File
@@ -6,8 +6,8 @@ Generated environment files are rebuildable projections, not an operator-editabl
## Launch chain
| Layer | Responsibility |
| ------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| Roster | `fleet/roster.yaml` supplies the agent name, class, supported runtime, model, reasoning, tool policy, workdir, and tmux socket. |
| ------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| Roster | `fleet/roster.yaml` supplies the agent name, class, supported runtime, model, reasoning, tool policy, workdir, and tmux socket; Git identity is derived from the exact agent name. |
| Projection writer | Renders deterministic fleet/agents/<name>.env.generated from the roster. |
| Optional local data | Reads a strict, data-only fleet/agents/<name>.env.local; it cannot shadow generated keys. |
| systemd | Starts the launcher with env -i and fixed bootstrap data. It does not preload either environment file. |
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ secret-like key names, duplicate keys, comments, quoted/export syntax, and unsaf
```dotenv
MOSAIC_AGENT_NAME=<roster name>
MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY=<roster name>
MOSAIC_AGENT_CLASS=<roster class>
MOSAIC_AGENT_RUNTIME=<roster runtime>
MOSAIC_AGENT_MODEL=<roster model hint>
@@ -33,8 +34,10 @@ MOSAIC_AGENT_WORKDIR=<absolute roster work directory>
MOSAIC_TMUX_SOCKET=<roster socket or empty>
```
The generated launch contract supports `claude`, `codex`, `opencode`, and `pi`. mosaic fleet add
rejects another runtime before it writes the roster or modifies generated, local, or quarantine state.
`MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY` is not independently configurable: it must equal `MOSAIC_AGENT_NAME`, preventing
split runtime and repository identity authority. The generated launch contract supports `claude`,
`codex`, `opencode`, and `pi`. mosaic fleet add rejects another runtime before it writes the roster or
modifies generated, local, or quarantine state.
The legacy dogfood stub remains an observability-only canary on its separate `mosaic-factory` socket;
it has no generated-launch adapter and cannot be added through this path.
@@ -3,11 +3,12 @@
The launcher consumes validated data, not shell configuration.
1. Read and validate the canonical roster.
2. Render deterministic <name>.env.generated data from that roster.
2. Render deterministic <name>.env.generated data from that roster, including `MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY` derived exactly from the roster agent name.
3. Parse optional <name>.env.local through a strict allowlist.
4. Reject generated-key shadowing, unknown or sensitive-looking keys, unsafe paths/values, duplicates, malformed lines, shell syntax, and command overrides.
5. Derive the runtime command from validated runtime/model/reasoning data.
6. Target only the exact configured tmux socket and roster session after ownership checks.
5. Reject a Git identity that is unsafe or differs from the generated agent name.
6. Derive the runtime command from validated runtime/model/reasoning data and pass every generated projection entry through the clean process environment boundary.
7. Target only the exact configured tmux socket and roster session after ownership checks.
## File precedence and ownership
@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ values, credential material, or command text.
```dotenv
MOSAIC_AGENT_NAME=<roster name>
MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY=<roster name>
MOSAIC_AGENT_CLASS=<roster class>
MOSAIC_AGENT_RUNTIME=<roster runtime>
MOSAIC_AGENT_MODEL=<roster model hint>
@@ -44,8 +45,9 @@ MOSAIC_AGENT_WORKDIR=<absolute roster work directory>
MOSAIC_TMUX_SOCKET=<roster socket or empty>
```
The generated launch contract supports only `claude`, `codex`, `opencode`, and `pi`. fleet add
uses that same runtime authority and rejects any other runtime before it writes the roster or changes
`MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY` is derived from and must equal `MOSAIC_AGENT_NAME`; it is not a separate
operator-controlled identity authority. The generated launch contract supports only `claude`, `codex`,
`opencode`, and `pi`. fleet add uses that same runtime authority and rejects any other runtime before it writes the roster or changes
projection, local, or quarantine files. The legacy dogfood stub on its separate `mosaic-factory`
socket remains an observability canary; it has no generated-launch adapter and cannot be added through
this projection path.
+38 -1
View File
@@ -7,7 +7,8 @@
3. [Provider Configuration](#provider-configuration)
4. [MCP Server Configuration](#mcp-server-configuration)
5. [Environment Variables Reference](#environment-variables-reference)
6. [Local Fleet Canary](./fleet-local-canary.md)
6. [Pi Goal Loop Operations](#pi-goal-loop-operations)
7. [Local Fleet Canary](./fleet-local-canary.md)
---
@@ -264,6 +265,16 @@ Each OIDC provider requires its client ID, client secret, and issuer URL togethe
| `AGENT_SYSTEM_PROMPT` | — | Platform-level system prompt injected into all sessions |
| `AGENT_USER_TOOLS` | all tools | Comma-separated allowlist of tools for non-admin users |
### Mosaic Pi goal loop
| Variable | Default | Description |
| ----------------------------- | ------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| `MOSAIC_GOAL_MAX_TURNS` | `40` | Per-goal autonomous turn limit; accepted range `1..500` |
| `MOSAIC_GOAL_MAX_NO_PROGRESS` | `6` | Consecutive identical progress-report limit; accepted range `1..100` |
These variables are consumed by the framework-owned Pi goal extension at goal creation. Invalid or
out-of-range values fall back to the defaults; they do not disable the bounds.
### Providers
| Variable | Default | Description |
@@ -374,3 +385,29 @@ Session cleanup is scoped to one session identifier and only removes that sessio
| Variable | Default | Description |
| ----------------------- | ----------------------------- | ------------------------------------------ |
| `MOSAIC_WORKSPACE_ROOT` | monorepo root (auto-detected) | Root path for mission workspace operations |
---
## Pi Goal Loop Operations
The reviewed runtime asset is deployed at
`~/.config/mosaic/runtime/pi/goal-extension.ts` by framework install/update. Do not install another
copy under `~/.pi/agent/extensions/`; duplicate registration can create suffixed commands and two
competing lifecycle controllers.
Operational checks:
1. Run `mosaic pi` and verify `/goal help` is available.
2. Use `/goal status` to inspect phase, turn/no-progress limits, compaction checks, and evidence.
Reports persist in Pi session data; controller-owned state redacts common credential shapes, but
Pi's model/tool-call history is separate. Operators must not place secrets or raw sensitive output
in goals, pause reasons, or evidence.
3. Use `/goal pause <reason>` before planned maintenance or manual investigation. Pause and cancel
abort the current goal-driven run when Pi is busy.
4. Use `/goal resume` only after addressing a blocker; counters restart with the configured bounds.
5. Use `/goal cancel` before replacing an unfinished goal.
A blocked or exhausted goal remains stopped and visible; Mosaic does not automatically raise its
limits or restart the process. Framework sync owns file deployment, while Pi's native session file
owns branch replay. Process/host restart remains the responsibility of the existing runtime or fleet
supervisor.
+82 -13
View File
@@ -9,8 +9,9 @@
5. [Adding New MCP Tools](#adding-new-mcp-tools)
6. [Database Schema and Migrations](#database-schema-and-migrations)
7. [Claude Code Skill Bridge](#claude-code-skill-bridge)
8. [API Endpoint Reference](#api-endpoint-reference)
9. [Local Fleet Canary](./fleet-local-canary.md)
8. [Pi Persistent Goal Extension](#pi-persistent-goal-extension)
9. [API Endpoint Reference](#api-endpoint-reference)
10. [Local Fleet Canary](./fleet-local-canary.md)
---
@@ -195,17 +196,6 @@ pnpm format:check && pnpm typecheck && pnpm lint
A pre-push hook enforces this mechanically.
### CI Publish Channels
Woodpecker `.woodpecker/publish.yml` keeps stable and integration-line artifacts separate:
| Source | npm packages | Gateway image |
| --------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| `main` push/manual or release tag | committed package versions published to Gitea npm without changing the dist-tag workflow | `gateway:sha-<short>` plus `gateway:latest` on `main`, and the release tag on tag events |
| `next` push/manual | CI-computed prereleases, `<target-stable>-next.<CI_PIPELINE_NUMBER>`, published with `npm publish --tag next` | `gateway:sha-<short>` only |
`next` never publishes npm `latest` or Docker `latest`. The next npm publish step verifies that `@mosaicstack/mosaic@next` resolves to the computed prerelease before the pipeline can pass.
---
## Adding New Agent Tools
@@ -396,6 +386,85 @@ M1 intentionally manages Claude Code only. Pi's Mosaic launcher can discover the
canonical root directly. Codex still relies on the existing full skill-sync
linker and needs separate parity analysis before this lifecycle API is extended.
## Pi Persistent Goal Extension
The source of the Mosaic-owned Pi goal controller is:
```text
packages/mosaic/framework/runtime/pi/goal-extension.ts
```
The framework manifest classifies `runtime/**` as framework-owned. Both the bash installer and the
TypeScript file adapter therefore deploy the same reviewed source to:
```text
$MOSAIC_HOME/runtime/pi/goal-extension.ts
# default: ~/.config/mosaic/runtime/pi/goal-extension.ts
```
Do not copy or link this extension into `~/.pi/agent/extensions/`. The launcher function
`discoverPiExtensionArgs()` emits the core `mosaic-extension.ts` first and the optional
`goal-extension.ts` second, preserving compatibility with an older installed framework that does
not have the goal file yet.
### Lifecycle design
| Pi API | Goal-controller responsibility |
| ------------------------------ | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| `registerCommand('goal')` | Set, inspect, pause, resume, or cancel one branch-specific goal |
| `registerTool(...)` | Record a terminating structured progress report with evidence |
| `context` | Inject the active goal contract before every provider request |
| `turn_end` | Record every turn, reject mixed final reports, and enforce the turn bound |
| `agent_settled` | Start one deduplicated continuation only after Pi has no retry/compact/queue work |
| `session_compact` | Record the compact check, reset provisional verification, and defer idle work |
| `session_start`/`session_tree` | Rebuild state from custom entries on the active branch |
| `session_shutdown` | Invalidate deferred callbacks and clear UI state |
State is appended as `mosaic-goal-state` custom entries, which do not enter model context. The
`context` hook creates a fresh hidden `mosaic-goal-context` message for each request instead of
trusting compaction summaries. The `mosaic_goal_report` result uses `terminate: true`; when it is the
sole final tool call, Pi avoids an unnecessary model response before the controller decides whether
to verify, continue, or stop.
Before state is appended or displayed, the controller applies bounded credential-pattern redaction
to the goal statement, report summary/evidence/next step, and stop reason. Fingerprints are computed
over redacted report content. Pi session entries are append-only, so a credential-bearing legacy
entry cannot honestly be erased by the extension: restoration fails closed, emits a warning, and
requires removal of the affected session before setting a new goal. This is defense-in-depth rather
than a secret-storage contract, and it does not rewrite Pi's separate model-message/tool-call
history. Goal prompts tell the agent not to submit credentials or raw sensitive output, and tests use
canaries to prove known forms do not reach new custom entries, status text, context, or tool details
while ordinary typed fields such as `token: string` remain intact.
Completion remains evidence-gated but semantic: two consecutive `achieved` reports are required,
and the second run is explicitly a verification pass. This avoids an extra judge-model request after
every turn. Deterministic validator commands are intentionally not accepted as `/goal` input in this
slice, so never describe this mechanism as proof of arbitrary natural-language completion.
### Tests and local smoke workflow
```bash
pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/mosaic exec vitest run \
src/runtime/pi-goal-extension.spec.ts \
src/commands/launch.spec.ts \
src/config/file-adapter.test.ts
bash packages/mosaic/framework/tools/quality/scripts/test-install-migration.sh
```
For an additive local smoke test without reseeding unrelated live framework files:
```bash
install -D -m 0644 \
packages/mosaic/framework/runtime/pi/goal-extension.ts \
~/.config/mosaic/runtime/pi/goal-extension.ts
pi --extension ~/.config/mosaic/runtime/pi/goal-extension.ts
```
Use `/goal help`, `/goal set ...`, and `/goal status` in that test session. A released framework
sync installs the file, and a released Mosaic CLI loads it automatically through `mosaic pi`.
## API Endpoint Reference
All endpoints are served by the gateway at `http://localhost:14242` by default.
+57 -15
View File
@@ -8,9 +8,10 @@
4. [Tasks](#tasks)
5. [Settings](#settings)
6. [CLI Usage](#cli-usage)
7. [Sub-package Commands](#sub-package-commands)
8. [Telemetry](#telemetry)
9. [Local Fleet Canary](./fleet-local-canary.md)
7. [Pi Persistent Goals](#pi-persistent-goals)
8. [Sub-package Commands](#sub-package-commands)
9. [Telemetry](#telemetry)
10. [Local Fleet Canary](./fleet-local-canary.md)
---
@@ -175,18 +176,8 @@ Or use the direct URL:
bash <(curl -fsSL https://git.mosaicstack.dev/mosaicstack/stack/raw/branch/main/tools/install.sh)
```
The installer places the `mosaic` binary at `~/.npm-global/bin/mosaic`.
Install lanes:
| Lane | Command | Source |
| ------------------------ | ------------------------------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| Stable | `bash tools/install.sh` | npm `@mosaicstack/mosaic@latest` + `main` |
| Prerelease integration | `bash tools/install.sh --next` | Fast npm `@mosaicstack/mosaic@next` + `@mosaicstack/gateway@next`; source fallback at `next` |
| Contributor/source build | `bash tools/install.sh --dev --ref X` | Build-from-source at the requested ref |
`--next` is fast-by-default from the Gitea npm `next` dist-tag and falls back to a source build at the permanent `next` branch if the dist-tag is missing or unreachable. Explicit `--ref` or `MOSAIC_REF` still wins and uses the source path.
Flags for non-interactive use:
The installer places the `mosaic` binary at `~/.npm-global/bin/mosaic`. Flags for
non-interactive use:
```bash
--yes # Accept all defaults
@@ -317,6 +308,57 @@ mosaic prdy
mosaic quality-rails
```
## Pi Persistent Goals
`mosaic pi` loads a Mosaic-owned goal extension from
`~/.config/mosaic/runtime/pi/goal-extension.ts`. It is deliberately not installed in
`~/.pi/agent/extensions/`; framework installation and updates manage it with the rest of the Mosaic
runtime assets.
Start Pi, then set a goal:
```text
/goal set Deliver the feature, tests, documentation, and verification evidence
# Shorthand:
/goal Deliver the feature, tests, documentation, and verification evidence
```
Control and inspect the loop with:
| Command | Behavior |
| ---------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------ |
| `/goal status` | Show phase, limits, compaction checks, latest report, and evidence |
| `/goal pause [reason]` | Stop autonomous continuation while preserving the goal |
| `/goal resume` | Resume with fresh turn and no-progress counters |
| `/goal cancel` | Cancel the goal and remove its active status |
| `/goal help` | Show command help |
While a goal is active, Mosaic injects its contract before every Pi model request and checks every
completed model/tool turn. The agent ends each work cycle with the structured
`mosaic_goal_report` tool. `achieved` is provisional until a second consecutive report rechecks the
whole goal with evidence. A continuation report or a successful compaction resets provisional
verification.
Goal statements and reports are stored in Pi session data. Mosaic redacts common credential shapes
before appending its goal-state entries and before goal tool output or `/goal status`, but
pattern-based redaction is not a secret store. Pi's own model-message and tool-call records are
outside that redactor. Never put tokens, passwords, private keys, connection strings, or raw
sensitive output in a goal or report; cite the command, artifact, and pass/fail result instead.
The loop stops instead of running forever when it is paused, blocked, cancelled, verified, reaches
its turn limit, or repeats the same no-progress report too many times. Defaults are 40 turns and 6
repeated no-progress reports. Operators may lower or raise them within enforced bounds before
launching Pi:
```bash
MOSAIC_GOAL_MAX_TURNS=60 MOSAIC_GOAL_MAX_NO_PROGRESS=8 mosaic pi
```
Goal state is branch-specific Pi session data. It survives compaction and session resume, but Pi's
process still must be relaunched or supervised after a process/host failure. This initial verifier
checks structured evidence twice; it cannot mathematically prove every arbitrary natural-language
goal. Use explicit acceptance criteria and inspect `/goal status` for consequential work.
---
### Claude Code Skill Registration
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
@@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
# #1099 pipefail + early-exit sweep
Baseline: `df4c591ab42aa1ae62c12935fdc0e772684864a0`
This is a site inventory, not a risk count. `FIXED` means the early-exiting consumer no longer has a piped upstream process whose SIGPIPE can become the result under `pipefail`. `NOT-LOAD-BEARING` means the pipeline status is explicitly discarded. `UNREACHABLE-AND-WHY` describes designed input, not a payload-size safety claim.
## Tranche 1 — runtime and general scripts
| Baseline site | Verdict | Construction / reason |
| --- | --- | --- |
| `tools/matrix-presence-harness/run.sh:38` | FIXED | nullglob array selects the first path; no pipeline |
| `tools/e2e-install-test.sh:139` | FIXED | capture help completely, then grep via redirection |
| `tools/install.sh:312` | FIXED | NUL `mapfile` reads all roots; count != 1 reaches the named malformed-archive diagnostic |
| `scripts/analysis/reflect-board-history.sh:76` | FIXED | capture Git history completely, then grep via redirection |
| `scripts/analysis/reflect-git-history.sh:67` | FIXED | grep reads from a here-string |
| `scripts/analysis/reflect-git-history.sh:69` | FIXED | grep reads from a here-string |
| `packages/mosaic/framework/tools/authentik/user-create.sh:72` | FIXED | jq `first(...)` reads the response directly |
| `packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/mutate-push-guard.sh:87` | FIXED | grep `-m1` reads the file directly; downstream `cut` consumes its complete scalar output |
| `packages/mosaic/framework/tools/orchestrator/session-resume.sh:94` | FIXED | `mapfile` plus bounded indexed loop replaces `head` pipeline |
| `packages/mosaic/framework/tools/prdy/prdy-status.sh:69` | FIXED | grep reads from a here-string |
| `packages/mosaic/framework/tools/qa/reflect-stop-hook.sh:172` | FIXED | grep reads from a here-string |
| `packages/mosaic/framework/tools/qa/reflect-stop-hook.sh:173` | FIXED | grep reads from a here-string |
| `packages/mosaic/framework/tools/qa/reflect-stop-hook.sh:174` | FIXED | grep reads from a here-string |
| `packages/mosaic/framework/tools/qa/reflect-stop-hook.sh:175` | FIXED | grep reads from a here-string |
| `packages/mosaic/framework/tools/qa/reflect-stop-hook.sh:176` | FIXED | grep reads from a here-string |
| `packages/mosaic/framework/tools/qa/reflect-stop-hook.sh:177` | FIXED | grep reads from a here-string |
| `packages/mosaic/framework/tools/qa/reflect-stop-hook.sh:178` | FIXED | grep reads from a here-string |
| `packages/mosaic/framework/tools/qa/typecheck-hook.sh:16` | FIXED | Bash regex extracts the first field without a pipeline |
| `packages/mosaic/framework/tools/qa/typecheck-hook.sh:56` | FIXED | grep and bounded sed each read from a here-string |
| `packages/mosaic/framework/tools/tmux/send-message.sh:113` | FIXED | grep reads from a here-string |
| `packages/mosaic/framework/tools/tmux/send-message.sh:124` | FIXED | grep reads from a here-string |
| `packages/mosaic/framework/tools/wake/detector.sh:126` | FIXED | one awk reads the manifest directly and exits after the first exact key |
| `packages/mosaic/framework/tools/wake/detector.sh:270` | FIXED | grep reads from a here-string |
| `packages/mosaic/framework/tools/wake/detector.sh:278` | FIXED | grep reads from a here-string |
| `packages/mosaic/framework/tools/wake/digest.sh:647` | FIXED | capture complete locator output, then select first line by parameter expansion |
| `packages/mosaic/framework/tools/wake/reconcile.sh:149` | FIXED | one awk reads the manifest directly and exits after the first exact key |
## Explicit withdrawn / non-load-bearing sites
| Baseline site | Verdict | Reason |
| --- | --- | --- |
| `tools/install.sh:182` | NOT-LOAD-BEARING | `|| true` explicitly discards lookup status |
| `tools/install.sh:356` | UNREACHABLE-AND-WHY | `pnpm pack` writes one matching CLI tarball into a fresh directory immediately before lookup; citation withdrawn in #1099 |
| `tools/install.sh:357` | UNREACHABLE-AND-WHY | same fresh-directory invariant for gateway tarball; citation withdrawn in #1099 |
| `tools/install.sh:627` | NOT-LOAD-BEARING | `|| true` explicitly discards lookup status |
| `scripts/agent/session-start.sh:70` | NOT-LOAD-BEARING | optional scratchpad lookup has `|| true` |
| `packages/mosaic/framework/templates/repo/scripts/agent/session-start.sh:58` | NOT-LOAD-BEARING | optional scratchpad lookup has `|| true` |
| `packages/mosaic/framework/tools/qa/qa-hook-stdin.sh:25` | UNREACHABLE-AND-WHY | withdrawn in #1099 after designed-input reachability measurement; preserved without re-litigation |
| `packages/mosaic/framework/tools/qa/qa-hook-stdin.sh:27` | UNREACHABLE-AND-WHY | same withdrawn designed-input finding |
| `packages/mosaic/framework/tools/qa/qa-hook-stdin.sh:30` | UNREACHABLE-AND-WHY | same withdrawn designed-input finding |
| `packages/mosaic/framework/tools/qa/qa-hook-stdin.sh:32` | UNREACHABLE-AND-WHY | same withdrawn designed-input finding |
| `packages/mosaic/framework/tools/qa/qa-hook-stdin.sh:34` | UNREACHABLE-AND-WHY | same withdrawn designed-input finding |
## Tranche 2 — non-wake test harnesses
All 22 baseline sites below are `FIXED`; the checked-in tranche fixture is passed through the same scanner and asserts all 22 occurrences and 21 normalized identities (the same response-split line occurs twice).
| Baseline site(s) | Verdict | Construction |
| --- | --- | --- |
| `systemd/user/test-fleet-units.sh:148` | FIXED | capture tmux output, then grep via redirection |
| `git/test-issue-comment-readback.sh:283,302` | FIXED | parameter expansion splits status/body without `head` |
| `git/test-pr-review-gitea-comment.sh:228` | FIXED | parameter expansion splits status/body |
| `git/test-lane-brief-pr-linkage.sh:72` | FIXED | grep reads from a here-string |
| `git/test-pr-review-repo-host-override.sh:225-226` | FIXED | grep reads from a here-string |
| `orchestrator/smoke-test.sh:67,72` | FIXED | parameter expansion selects first line |
| `orchestrator/test-board-roll.sh:99-100` | FIXED | grep reads from a here-string |
| `quality/scripts/test-upgrade-durable-snapshot.sh:180` | FIXED | complete sorted output is read with `mapfile`, then indexed |
| `quality/scripts/test-upgrade-rollback.sh:339,356` | FIXED | direct `grep -m1` file reads; cleanup captures before testing |
| `tmux/test-send-message-socket.sh:37,38,44-46,68,72` | FIXED | capture commands complete before redirected grep assertions |
| `tmux/test-send-message-verdict.sh:34` | FIXED | grep reads from a here-string |
## Tranche 3 — wake validation harnesses
All 26 baseline occurrences (25 normalized identities; one preimage selector occurs twice) are `FIXED` and mechanically bound through the wake fixture and shared scanner.
| Baseline site(s) | Verdict | Construction |
| --- | --- | --- |
| `wake/test-wake-digest-quarantine.sh:567` | FIXED | complete match populations are captured, then first line selected by parameter expansion |
| `wake/test-wake-preimage.sh:182-183,346-347` | FIXED | jq `first(...)` reads each JSONL file directly |
| `wake/validate-973/microtest-wake-assert.sh:153,170-171,176,204-209,233-234,251-252,286-287` | FIXED | scalar assertions use here-strings; diagnostics use non-early sed ranges; source line captured before matching |
| `wake/validate-973/validate-973.sh:110,119,180,182,187` | FIXED | scalar assertions use here-strings; diagnostic truncation uses consuming sed ranges |
The scoped inventory is complete: 26 runtime/general + 22 non-wake tests + 26 wake tests fixed; 11 explicitly withdrawn or non-load-bearing sites retain their documented verdicts.
@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
# #1019 — Zero-timeout queue-guard harness race
- **Issue:** #1019 (parent status remains `believed-fixed, pending jarvis validation`; do not close)
- **Branch:** `fix/1019-ci-queue-timeout-harness`
- **Owner:** `be-coder-08`
- **Base:** `origin/main` at `5916aeefd6ed12bcac086c6834c7f6c4ae38e1bc`
- **Charter:** `/home/hermes/agent-work/tl-mosaic/CHARTER-1019-HARNESS-FIX.md`
## Objective
Make `test-ci-queue-wait-tristate.sh` deterministic without changing any asserted outcome. Remove the indiscriminate zero-timeout race, require every status-classification case to prove the provider was observed, and prove the harness-controlled virtual clock is active.
## Scope
- In scope: `packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/test-ci-queue-wait-tristate.sh` only, plus this evidence scratchpad.
- Out of scope: guard parsers, D2/D3 behavior, installer/reseed staleness, PR #1060, and issue closure.
## Acceptance criteria
1. RED deterministically reproduces deadline pre-emption before the provider call.
2. Every case that intends status classification positively proves provider observation.
3. Pending observes `pending` before deterministic virtual-time expiration.
4. The virtual clock has a positive interception control; a broken-clock mutant makes the suite red.
5. The exact CI-base image passes the final harness repeatedly with zero failures.
6. Baseline gates, independent code/security review, exact-head CI, and coordinator-authorized squash merge pass.
## Plan
1. Add deterministic RED instrumentation for the known merge/provider-unreachable pre-emption.
2. Replace global `-t 0` with a nonzero timeout interpreted under an event-driven virtual clock; stub sleep without wall waiting.
3. Add provider-observation and virtual-clock positive controls without changing outcome assertions.
4. Run focused shell checks, repeat in exact CI-base image, baseline gates, and independent reviews.
5. Commit with both identity layers, queue-guard plus direct Woodpecker terminal-state verification, push, self-post PR, verify poster/head/CI, obtain coordinator merge authorization, then squash merge without closing #1019.
## Budget
- No explicit token cap supplied. Keep scope to one harness file and one scratchpad; stop/report at the charter's 60% context gate.
## Evidence
- RED, deterministic pre-provider expiry: `evidence/1019-harness-fix/red-pre-provider-expiry.log` — rc 1; merge/provider-unreachable got rc 124 instead of 75, omitted CANNOT_ASSERT, did not observe the status provider, and wrote no additional audit record (four named failures).
- GREEN host focused harness: `evidence/1019-harness-fix/green-host.log` — rc 0, all outcome classes passed.
- Load-bearing clock negative control: a temporary same-directory mutant replaced the virtual `date` body with `/bin/date`; `evidence/1019-harness-fix/red-clock-not-intercepted.log` — rc 1 with named `virtual clock interception did not run` failures. The mutant file was removed after the run.
- Exact CI-base repeat: `git.mosaicstack.dev/mosaicstack/stack/ci-base:latest`, repository mounted read-only, harness work under container `/tmp`; `evidence/1019-harness-fix/ci-image-repeat/summary.log`**100 pass / 0 fail / 100 total**.
- Synchronization design: provider-status observation creates the event marker; virtual time is 1000 before the event and 1002 afterward. Pending alone reaches the stubbed no-op sleep and a post-observation deadline check. `-t 1` is uniquely load-bearing because removing it restores the 900-second default deadline at virtual time 1900, which 1002 does not cross. The numeric timeout is subject semantics under virtual time, not a wall-clock synchronization duration.
## Review remediation — semantic timeout vs. liveness bound
Security review found that virtual time remained at 1000 forever before provider observation and stubbed sleep never waited. A regression looping before the status endpoint—or blocking in the first provider call—therefore could prevent `run_guard` from returning, so the post-return provider assertion could never fire.
**General rule:** A timeout usually serves two purposes: semantics and liveness. Removing wall time from semantic synchronization can silently remove the only independent hang bound. Preserve deterministic virtual time for subject semantics, but provide a separately implemented real-clock liveness watchdog and prove that watchdog fires.
Remediation:
- Every guard subject invocation is launched by absolute `/usr/bin/python3` in a new session. Python's internal monotonic `wait(timeout=...)` provides real-clock liveness independently of PATH; expiry kills the entire isolated process group, so neither PATH-front shims nor a blocked provider descendant can retain the capture pipe.
- Watchdog expiry returns distinct harness rc 90 plus `FAIL HANG watchdog`, separate from subject timeout rc 124.
- A first attempt using absolute `/usr/bin/timeout -s KILL` passed on GNU coreutils but failed in the exact Alpine CI-base image: BusyBox killed the immediate wrapper while the guard/provider descendants survived and retained the command-substitution pipe. The process-group kill is therefore required behavior, not portability polish.
- A committed positive control hangs the branch-provider stub before the status endpoint. It must terminate through the watchdog, emit the hang-specific diagnostic, return rc 90, and prove the status provider was never reached.
- RED before remediation: a temporary ordinary-success mutant hung before provider observation; only an external control could kill the suite (rc 137), and there was no internal hang-specific diagnostic (`red-watchdog-absent.log`).
- The watchdog mutant/control is load-bearing: removing the internal watchdog leaves the control unable to produce its required rc 90 and diagnostic.
Post-review evidence:
- Host focused harness with process-group watchdog: rc 0 (`green-watchdog-process-group-host.log`).
- Exact Alpine CI-base focused harness with process-group watchdog: rc 0 (`green-watchdog-ci-image.log`).
- Hanging ordinary-success mutant: suite rc 1; success returned rc 90, emitted `FAIL HANG watchdog`, and loudly reported that provider/clock observation did not occur (`red-watchdog-fires.log`).
- Removed-`-t 1` mutant: suite rc 1; pending was terminated by the watchdog instead of producing `ASSERTED_NOT_READY`, proving the explicit timeout is load-bearing (`red-timeout-argument-removed.log`).
## 60% context hold
Stopped before baseline/review/commit as required by the charter. Remaining: inspect final diff, shell/static/baseline gates, independent code/security review, remediation if any, identity-bound commit/trailer verification, mandatory queue guard plus direct terminal Woodpecker `mosaic` enumeration, push, self-posted PR/provider poster read-back, exact-head terminal-green CI, coordinator merge authorization, squash merge, main CI verification, and leave #1019 unclosed as `believed-fixed, pending jarvis validation`.
+229
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@@ -0,0 +1,229 @@
# #1043 — Fleet pane git-identity propagation
## Objective
Ensure a fleet seat's launched runtime process receives its roster-derived `MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY`, and lock the complete generated-environment propagation boundary with an enumerated set comparison.
## Tracking
- External issue: `mosaicstack/stack#1043`
- Branch: `fix/1043-pane-git-identity`
- Coordinator: `tl-mosaic`
- `docs/TASKS.md`: read-only by project worker contract; not modified.
## Constraints
- RED-first bug reproducer is mandatory.
- R7 delete-the-subject mutation must turn the behavioral test red.
- Assert launched-process environment, not source text.
- One push only; do not poll CI after push.
- Run the CI queue guard immediately before push and report its `state=` line as state, not evidence.
- Do not modify a live host launcher or obtain/copy another credential.
- Self-post the PR, verify provider attribution, then stop.
- Final status wording: `believed-fixed, pending jarvis validation`.
## Scope inventory
Re-derived against `origin/main` at `85d2108e`:
- Launch consumer: `packages/mosaic/framework/tools/fleet/start-agent-session.sh`
- Behavioral launch test: `packages/mosaic/framework/tools/fleet/test-start-agent-session.sh`
- Generated-environment contract/parser: `packages/mosaic/src/fleet/generated-env-boundary.ts`
- Roster projection producers:
- `packages/mosaic/src/commands/fleet.ts`
- `packages/mosaic/src/fleet/fleet-reconciler.ts`
- `packages/mosaic/src/fleet/fleet-agent-crud.ts`
- `packages/mosaic/src/fleet/v1-v2-migration.ts`
- Contract and producer tests discovered by repository search.
- Generated-environment operator/developer docs and their executable documentation contract test.
Discrepancy sent to `tl-mosaic`: current main no longer contains the charter's `PANE_SHELL_SNIPPET`; #772 replaced it with an `/usr/bin/env -i` argv launch boundary, and current generated projections do not declare git identity. Code-read inventory is **NOT MEASURED** behavior.
## Plan
1. Add the process-environment set-comparison regression first and record RED.
2. Add roster-derived `MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY=<agent name>` to the complete generated projection contract.
3. Validate identity syntax and equality with `MOSAIC_AGENT_NAME`; pass it through the clean pane environment.
4. Update affected projection tests and generated-environment docs.
5. Run focused and baseline gates.
6. Perform R7 by deleting the pane propagation entry, prove RED, restore, and prove GREEN.
7. Run independent review, remediate, commit, queue guard, one push, self-post PR, verify provider attribution, and stop without CI polling.
## Budget
No explicit token cap was provided. Working cap: one narrow logical unit, no dependency installation unless existing tooling requires it, no unrelated refactor.
## Evidence log
### TDD and mutation evidence
- RED-first, repository launcher: `bash packages/mosaic/framework/tools/fleet/test-start-agent-session.sh` exited 64 on pre-fix source with `code=unknown-key key=MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY`. The generated seat could not launch with the required declared identity.
- GREEN: the same repository launcher test emitted `ok - start-agent-session generated environment boundary`.
- R7 delete-the-subject: removed only `"MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY=$MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY"` from the repository launch array; the same test exited 1 with `FAIL: runtime pane omitted or changed generated environment keys: MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY`.
- R7 restoration: restored that launch entry; the same test returned green.
- Launcher under test is explicitly `packages/mosaic/framework/tools/fleet/start-agent-session.sh` through the test's `$START`, **not** the stale installed host copy.
### Situational and focused tests
- Repository launcher boundary: green, including set comparison of all nine generated projection entries and fail-before-tmux cases for missing, unsafe, mismatched, and local-shadow Git identity.
- Fleet systemd launcher integration: `bash packages/mosaic/framework/systemd/user/test-fleet-units.sh` — green.
- Focused Mosaic Vitest set: 6 files, 311 tests — green.
- `bash -n` on changed shell files — green.
- `git diff --check` — green.
### Baseline gates
- `pnpm typecheck` — 45/45 tasks green.
- `pnpm lint` — 25/25 tasks green.
- `pnpm format:check` — green.
- `pnpm test:checkout` — green.
- Repository-wide Vitest under a hermetic current-version npm prefix: Mosaic 81/81 files and 1510/1510 tests green; other workspace test tasks shown green before the framework-shell phase.
- Canonical `pnpm test` is not fully green on this host for unrelated environment-sensitive gates:
1. the first two runs exposed the globally installed Mosaic 0.0.48 update banner in three CLI smoke tests expecting empty stderr;
2. after isolating that global-version input, the framework wake assertion aborted at the known `#973` Bash `BASH_LINENO` convention check (exit 97; observed `[3 5]`, expected `[3 4]`).
No tests were weakened or bypassed; focused changed-surface tests are green. CI remains the canonical clean-environment result and is intentionally not polled after push per charter.
### Independent review
- Codex code review first pass: request changes for missing shell rejection-path coverage.
- Remediation: added table-driven missing/unsafe/mismatch/local-shadow launcher cases, each asserting no tmux call.
- Codex code re-review: **approve**, no findings, confidence 0.88.
- Codex security review: risk `none`, no findings, confidence 0.97.
### Acceptance criteria mapping
| Acceptance criterion | Evidence |
| --- | --- |
| AC-FGI-01: launched process receives every generated key/value | Repository launcher process-environment `comm -23` set comparison; GREEN and R7 RED evidence above |
| AC-FGI-02: missing, unsafe, or split identity fails before tmux | Table-driven shell cases plus TypeScript generated-boundary tests |
| AC-FGI-03: focused/baseline/review evidence recorded | Commands and review outcomes above; host-sensitive full-suite limitations stated explicitly |
### Documentation checklist
- PRD updated with #1043 requirements and acceptance criteria.
- Fleet launch runbook, generated-env concept, and generated-env reference updated.
- No API/OpenAPI, sitemap, user publishing target, deployment, or external docs publication change applies.
- `docs/TASKS.md` remains unmodified per its single-writer project contract.
## Round 2 — PR #1073 review 97 remediation
### Review blocker
The launched-process suite was signed-excluded from CI enumeration. Manual GREEN/R7 evidence therefore did not prove a PR workflow could detect regression.
### RED-first and canonical wiring
1. Removed the suite's signed exclusion before adding a CI execution path.
2. `check-test-enumeration.sh` went RED with exact `UNENUMERATED` output for `test-start-agent-session.sh`: population 49, enumerated 30, excluded 18.
3. Added both `framework/tools/fleet/test-start-agent-session.sh` and `framework/systemd/user/test-fleet-units.sh` to `@mosaicstack/mosaic`'s canonical `test:framework-shell` chain.
4. The guard returned GREEN: population 49, enumerated 32, excluded 18, surfaces 45. The systemd suite is outside the guard's tools-only population but now has the same explicit canonical execution disposition.
### Workflow-level R7
- Deleted only the pane launch entry `"MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY=$MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY"`.
- Ran the exact `.woodpecker/ci.yml` test-step command, `pnpm test`, with only a temporary PATH-scoped npm shim reporting the checkout's current 0.0.49 version so the unrelated global 0.0.48 banner could not preempt the shell chain.
- Result: exit 1 at `@mosaicstack/mosaic#test`, with the enumeration guard GREEN followed by `FAIL: runtime pane omitted or changed generated environment keys: MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY`.
- Restored the launch entry. The canonical `test:framework-shell` chain then reached both newly wired suites and printed both GREEN markers before the known unrelated #973 host-only `BASH_LINENO` abort.
- An actual provider PR workflow on the intentionally broken mutant is **NOT MEASURED**: the one-push constraint forbids pushing a red mutant and then a repaired head. Local execution proves the exact PR workflow command and dependency chain go RED on the subject deletion; CI on the repaired pushed head remains canonical.
### Workflow population
- **DEFINED:** 3 workflows (`ci.yml`, `ci-image.yml`, `publish.yml`).
- **ELIGIBLE for `pull_request`:** 1/3 (`ci.yml`), based on top-level `when:` clauses.
- **REPORTED:** Round-1 exact-head provider read reported 1/1 eligible context (`ci/woodpecker/pr/ci`). Post-remediation-head reported count is **NOT MEASURED** by this seat because CI polling is prohibited; workflow definitions and eligibility did not change.
### Independent remediation review
- First Round-2 review identified a CI-image blocker: the newly wired launcher suite used Perl, which the Alpine CI base does not install.
- Replaced the suite's three Perl-only fixture mutations with POSIX/BusyBox-compatible `sed -i` substitutions; production behavior and assertions are unchanged.
- Codex re-review: **APPROVE**, confidence 0.93, no findings.
### Vitest denominator reconciliation
The PR's `311/311` is correct for its explicitly named six-file command at both the original and remediation worktrees:
- generated environment boundary: 24
- fleet documentation: 23
- Tess service profile: 6
- fleet regen command: 27
- fleet agent CRUD command: 22
- fleet command: 209
- total: **311**
Review 97 reported 312/312 without naming its six files. That is a different or miscounted population and cannot replace the command-scoped 311 denominator; the PR follow-up will name the exact files and arithmetic.
## Round 3 — Alpine stale-marker portability
### Objective and plan
- Replace the GNU-only relative-date fixture with a deterministic POSIX/BusyBox timestamp while preserving the required stale-marker assertion.
- Re-run the launcher suite in the canonical `ci-base:latest` Alpine image, then run applicable repository gates and independent review.
- Update the PR body to name the repeated GNU-host/Alpine-CI portability pattern, run the mandatory queue guard, push once, verify provider attribution, and stop without CI polling.
- Working budget: 8K tokens; scope is one fixture line plus delivery evidence. No production behavior changes.
### RED-first evidence
Before the fix, the canonical CI image command
`docker run --rm -v "$PWD:/work" -w /work git.mosaicstack.dev/mosaicstack/stack/ci-base:latest bash packages/mosaic/framework/tools/fleet/test-start-agent-session.sh`
exited 1 at the stale-marker setup with exact BusyBox output
`touch: invalid date '10 seconds ago'`. The prior fresh-marker assertions had already executed, matching pipeline 2233's failure location.
### Root cause and fix
The test used GNU `touch -d` relative-date parsing although the PR workflow runs on Alpine/BusyBox. The fixture now uses POSIX `touch -t 200001010000.00`, a fixed timestamp that is unconditionally stale; the stale assertion remains mandatory and was not made tolerant of missing timestamp metadata.
### Structural pattern
This is the third GNU-host/Alpine-CI portability defect in the lane: GNU `grep` multi-match counting, Perl-only fixture mutation, and GNU `touch -d` date parsing. The repeated cause is shell suites authored on a GNU host but executed in an Alpine CI image; durable prevention belongs in CI-image execution or portability lint, not assertion weakening.
### GREEN and quality evidence
- Focused launcher suite in `ci-base:latest`: exit 0, `ok - start-agent-session generated environment boundary`.
- Canonical test step in `ci-base:latest` with the pipeline's `pgvector/pgvector:pg17` service, readiness check, migration, and `pnpm test`: exit 0; 46/46 Turbo tasks; Mosaic 81/81 files and 1510/1510 tests; Gateway 57 passed/5 skipped files and 629 passed/11 skipped tests; enumeration 49 population / 32 enumerated / 18 signed exclusions / 45 named surfaces.
- The first image-only `pnpm test` attempt lacked the pipeline PostgreSQL service and failed only on connection refusal after the launcher suite was GREEN. The rerun supplied the canonical service precondition and passed.
- Canonical-image baseline: typecheck 45/45 tasks, lint 25/25 tasks, format check GREEN; `git diff --check` GREEN.
- Independent Codex code review: APPROVE, confidence 0.96, 2/2 Round-3 files, no findings.
- Independent Codex security review: risk none, confidence 0.99, 2/2 Round-3 files, no findings.
### Re-derived inventory and denominators
- Round-3 git delta: **2/2 files** — launcher suite and task scratchpad; 25 insertions / 1 deletion before evidence finalization.
- Full PR path inventory against `origin/main` at `85d2108e`: **19/19 changed paths**; Round 3 adds no new PR path.
- Workflow definition population: **1/3 pull-request-eligible** (`ci.yml` of `ci.yml`, `ci-image.yml`, `publish.yml`).
- Do not re-litigate the settled 311/312 populations; both are valid for their separately named Tess6 and CRUD-core7 sets.
## Round 4 — bound stale-marker observation
### Objective and plan
- Make the heartbeat assertion discriminate an initially stale native marker from a fresh marker without changing the production staleness threshold or shortening the polling window.
- Freeze only the sidecar's numeric observation clock during the stale-fixture arm so elapsed assertion time cannot turn a fresh mutant stale.
- Prove two independent mutants RED: disable production stale-marker detection while retaining the stale fixture; replace the stale fixture with a fresh marker. Restore the tree and prove GREEN in the canonical Alpine image.
- Re-derive the changed-path inventory, run applicable quality and independent review gates, commit with environment-only author/committer identity, queue-guard, push once, verify provider attribution using curl stdin config, and stop without CI polling.
- Working budget: 8K tokens. Scope is the launcher test and its scratchpad evidence; production launcher behavior remains unchanged.
### Root cause and bounded observation
The 30 × 0.1-second assertion window overlaps the production `now - marker > interval * 2 + 1` threshold at interval 1. Depending on second boundaries and load, a fresh marker can age past the threshold before the assertion ends. A focused pre-fix fresh-mutant attempt returned RED while Review 101's full-suite run returned GREEN; the differing result is itself timing dependence, not a discriminating assertion.
The test now supplies a fixed numeric epoch only to the stale-fixture sidecar. Its real marker mtime is still read from the filesystem, but assertion runtime cannot advance `now`. Date formatting still delegates to the image's real `/bin/date`. Neither the production threshold nor the 30 × 0.1-second polling window changed.
### Two-mutant RED / restored GREEN
All three runs used `git.mosaicstack.dev/mosaicstack/stack/ci-base:latest`:
1. **Stale-detection mutant RED:** replaced only the production stale-age predicate with `false` while retaining the fixed stale marker; suite exit 1 with `FAIL: heartbeat sidecar did not resume after native marker became stale or absent`.
2. **Fresh-marker mutant RED:** replaced only `touch -t 200001010000.00` with fresh `touch`; suite exit 1 with the same failed stale-resumption assertion. The fixed observation epoch kept the mutant fresh throughout all 30 polls.
3. **Restored tree GREEN:** suite exit 0 with `ok - start-agent-session generated environment boundary`.
### Re-derived inventory
- Round-4 delta: **2/2 files** — launcher test plus task scratchpad; production launcher delta is empty.
- Full PR inventory against `origin/main`: **19/19 paths**; Round 4 adds no path.
- Production stale threshold remains `now - marker > iv * 2 + 1`; assertion polling remains 30 × 0.1 seconds.
- Review 101's confirmed enumeration/workflow/CI and attribution evidence is accepted without re-polling or re-derivation.
## Residual risk
- Landing on `main` does not update the currently installed host launcher. Host framework installation/reseed and Jarvis live-seat validation are separate downstream events.
- Canonical CI result is pending and will not be polled by this seat.
@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
# #1098 — Framework shell portability / red main
## Objective
Restore terminal-green `main` by making the `test-start-agent-session.sh` clean-environment assertion semantic and portable without removing either newly enumerated framework-shell suite.
## Scope
- Tracking issue: `mosaicstack/stack#1098`
- Branch: `fix/framework-shell-portability`
- Base: `origin/main` at `4fa2768962702d53e16e8b67ee6ad52ebcb0910e`
- Primary file: `packages/mosaic/framework/tools/fleet/test-start-agent-session.sh`
- Requirements source: `docs/PRD.md` § Framework shell assertion portability (#1098)
- Out of scope: deployed files under `~/.config/mosaic`, pnpm-store cleanup, checkout deletion, and changes to the launchers `/usr/bin/env -i` behavior.
## Acceptance criteria
1. The test inspects the captured NUL-delimited tmux argv semantically and accepts an adjacent `/usr/bin/env`, `-i` pair regardless of trailing payload size or pipe scheduling.
2. Missing `/usr/bin/env`, missing `-i`, and non-adjacent `-i` remain failures.
3. Failure output includes the observed argv records with stable indexes and shell escaping; it exposes no credentials because this fixture supplies only generated non-secret launch data.
4. The focused suite passes on the dev host and in the repository CI image; the blocking PR/main pipeline returns terminal green.
5. Independent review passes; PR is squash-merged and #1098 is closed only after merged-main CI is terminal green.
## Budget
- ASSUMPTION: 30K-token working budget; rationale: one shell-test defect plus full PR/CI lifecycle.
- Auto-reduction: focused shell and package gates first; rely on canonical Woodpecker for the full monorepo suite rather than duplicating a dependency install under constrained `/home`.
- Disk baseline before clone/build: `/home` 7.1G free (99% used), `/tmp` 2.4G free (92% used).
## Investigation
### First-hand CI evidence
- Public log: `GET https://ci.mosaicstack.dev/api/repos/47/logs/2269/53041`
- Decoded 1,436 entries (11 null `data` entries treated as empty log rows), 190,756 bytes.
- Failure: `FAIL: pane command did not clear its environment` immediately after the expected pane-PID warning.
- BusyBox primitives, complete assertion pipeline, real CI image, stale/current image digests, Turbo cache masking, gateway failure, and heartbeat-sidecar concurrent writing were independently excluded.
### Root cause
The assertion ends in:
```bash
printf '%s\n' "$pane_args" | tail -n +"$after_pane_env" | grep -qxF -- '-i'
```
The script has `set -o pipefail`. `grep -q` exits as soon as it finds the valid `-i` record. Upstream `tail`/`printf` can then receive SIGPIPE, making the aggregate pipeline nonzero even though grep returned 0 and the semantic property is true. This depends on payload size, pipe capacity, and scheduling, explaining a local/image pass with a CI failure.
Discriminating stress control with `/usr/bin/env` followed immediately by `-i`:
- 8,192-byte trailing payload: `printf=0 tail=0 grep=0`, aggregate 0.
- 16,384-byte trailing payload: `printf=0 tail=141 grep=0`, aggregate 141.
- 32,768+ bytes: `printf=141 tail=141 grep=0`, aggregate 141.
- A full-reading `grep -xF` control remained 0 for every payload.
This is a third branch omitted by the earlier present-vs-corrupted split: the pair can be present and intact while `pipefail` reports an upstream SIGPIPE.
## TDD plan
1. RED: preserve the one-off stress reproducer above and add an automated large-argv semantic regression that fails under the current pipeline implementation.
2. GREEN: parse the authoritative NUL-delimited capture into a Bash array and search for an adjacent `/usr/bin/env`, `-i` pair without a short-circuit pipeline.
3. Add negative controls for missing, detached, and reversed tokens.
4. On failure, print indexed `%q` argv records before returning nonzero.
5. Run focused suite, mutation controls, shell syntax/format checks, then repository baseline gates feasible without dependency installation.
6. Independent review, queue guard, push, PR, CI, coordinator merge authorization, squash merge, merged-main CI, issue close.
## Progress
- [x] Checkout created and based on `origin/main` `4fa27689`.
- [x] CI log decoded directly.
- [x] Root-cause stress control reproduced semantic match + aggregate pipeline failure.
- [x] RED evidence: intact `/usr/bin/env`, `-i` fixture produced component statuses `0/141/0` and aggregate 141 under the former `grep -q` pipeline; full-reading semantic control stayed 0.
- [x] GREEN implementation: direct NUL-argv adjacency parser, indexed diagnostics, and full-reading scalar predicates replace all load-bearing early-exit pipelines in this test.
- [x] Baseline/situational tests:
- focused launcher suite: PASS on GNU host and cached Alpine CI image;
- paired `test-fleet-units.sh`: PASS;
- enumeration guard: PASS (`population=53`, `enumerated=36`, `excluded=18`), 14/14 mutation needles;
- `bash -n`, ShellCheck, `git diff --check`: PASS;
- static denominator after change: zero load-bearing `grep -q`/`head`/`-m1` pipeline candidates in `test-start-agent-session.sh`;
- delete-the-subject mutation removing production `-i`: RED with 78 indexed argv records, byte count, and explicit boundary failure.
- [x] Independent review:
- first Codex review: request changes — negative fixtures did not each assert diagnostics;
- remediation: centralized predicate + diagnostic wrapper and exercised all four negative fixtures;
- second Codex review: APPROVE, 0 blockers/should-fix/suggestions;
- Codex security review: risk none, 0 findings.
- [ ] PR CI, formal fleet review, merge, merged-main CI, issue closure.
## Documentation disposition
- Updated canonical `docs/PRD.md` with FSP requirements and acceptance criteria.
- This is an internal test/reliability change with no API, user workflow, deployment, navigation, or publishing-surface change; no user/admin/API/sitemap update is required.
- `docs/TASKS.md` remains unchanged because the project contract makes it orchestrator-only.
## Risks
- The CI failure did not print its captured argv, so the exact CI payload is unavailable. The stress control proves the assertion is non-portable and can emit the exact false verdict; branch CI is the canonical confirmation that replacing it resolves pipeline 2269s failure class.
- Printing fixture argv is safe only while this tests projection remains non-secret. The diagnostic must stay scoped to the test capture and shell-escaped.
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# #1099 — pipefail + early-exit sweep
## Scope and decisions
- Baseline `df4c591ab42aa1ae62c12935fdc0e772684864a0`, after #1100 removed its 35 sites.
- Split into review-sized non-closing tranches: runtime/general; tmux/git/quality tests; wake validation/tests.
- Do not equate class membership with demonstrated risk. Do not use payload size or pipeline stage count as a safety proxy.
- Preserve the issue's withdrawn findings for `qa-hook-stdin.sh` and the two fresh-directory `pnpm pack` lookups. Fix `install.sh:312` because malformed multi-root input must reach its named handler.
## Tranche 1 TDD
RED-first control: `node --test scripts/pipefail-early-exit.test.mjs` reported exactly 26 non-accepted runtime/general sites, including `install.sh:312`, and exited 1. A checked-in fixture generated from immutable baseline `df4c591a` records all 26 normalized sites; the control passes every fixture entry through the same scanner, asserts exact identity/count/uniqueness, and separately requires zero findings in the current tree. It also inventories accepted sites rather than silently excluding whole files.
Construction choices:
- here-string/file redirection for scalar grep assertions;
- full capture then parameter expansion for first-line selection;
- arrays/`mapfile` for complete populations;
- direct jq/awk/grep selection where one tool can express the property;
- no `|| true` added to a load-bearing assertion.
Site-by-site verdicts: `docs/reports/quality/1099-pipefail-sweep.md`.
## Tranche 2 TDD
Expanded the unconditional scanner over 11 non-wake test harnesses. RED named exactly 22 source lines; a second immutable-baseline fixture now asserts those 22 entries through the same scanner. Rewrites preserve command status by capturing producers before redirected assertions, use parameter expansion for line selection, and use complete `mapfile` populations where ordering matters. Current-tree finding count is zero for tranches 1 and 2.
## Tranche 3 TDD
Expanded the shared scanner over four wake validation harnesses. RED named 26 occurrences. The wake fixture asserts 26 occurrences / 25 normalized identities through the same scanner; all scalar assertions now use redirection, direct jq selection, complete capture, or consuming diagnostic ranges. Current-tree finding count is zero across the full scoped population.
## Verification so far
- `bash -n` on every changed shell script: pass.
- structural Node control: pass.
- `test-mutate-push-guard.sh`: 8/8 pass.
- `test-send-message-verdict.sh`: 3/3 pass.
- `test-send-message-socket.sh`: pass.
- Independent review 143 found two semantic regressions: a help-probe `|| true` changed the failure truth table, and an unguarded Git capture changed non-Git data-dir behavior from rc 0 + JSON to silent rc 128. Both received RED-first regressions before correction; help status is now separate and required, and Git status remains condition-guarded.
- Wake static inventory remains aligned at 261/261 after line-neutral rewrites; no static-set mismatch. Wake detector/reconcile/digest/preimage suites terminate at their existing fail-closed #973 `BASH_LINENO` environment probe (exit 97, observed `[3 5]`, expected `[3 4]`) before subject tests. No bypass or skip was used; canonical CI remains required.
- ShellCheck reports only pre-existing source-following, unused-variable, and untouched `ls | head` findings; no new diagnostic was introduced.
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# #1150 — Pi persistent goal extension
- **Task ID:** ISSUE-1150 (no `docs/TASKS.md` row; that file is orchestrator-only)
- **Issue:** #1150`pi: add persistent /goal controller extension to Mosaic framework`
- **Branch:** `feat/1150-pi-goal-extension`
- **Mode:** Delivery
- **Status:** in progress
## Objective
Build and locally validate a Mosaic-owned Pi `/goal` extension. Source must ship from
`packages/mosaic/framework/runtime/pi/`, framework sync must deploy it under
`~/.config/mosaic/runtime/pi/`, and no extension/configuration asset may be written into `~/.pi`.
Pi's native session manager remains the owner of session entries.
## Scope and acceptance source
- Canonical requirements: `docs/PRD.md`, section **Pi Persistent Goal Loop (#1150)**.
- User intent: continuous goal orientation and status checking after each Pi turn and compaction,
tested locally before framework delivery.
- Documentation target: canonical in-repo user/developer/runtime docs; no external publication.
## Assumptions
- `ASSUMPTION:` Initial semantic verification uses two consecutive structured, evidence-bearing
reports from the working agent rather than a second model request after every turn. This keeps the
loop testable and avoids doubling model cost while making the limitation explicit.
- `ASSUMPTION:` Default autonomous bounds are 40 turns and 6 repeated no-progress reports, with only
bounded numeric environment overrides.
- `ASSUMPTION:` A local smoke copy to `~/.config/mosaic/runtime/pi/goal-extension.ts` is authorized by
the user's explicit request. Full framework reseed into the live home is not required for the smoke
test and would touch unrelated framework-owned files.
## Budget
- Working estimate: 30K implementation/review tokens.
- Hard user cap: none stated.
- Cost control: deterministic fake-Pi tests; no nested evaluator calls; only bounded arithmetic/load
smoke workflows against the installed runtime.
## Plan
1. Update PRD and create tracking/scratchpad artifacts.
2. Read launcher, installer ownership, Pi extension, and documentation surfaces.
3. TDD: add fake-Pi behavior tests for commands, state restoration, turn checks, compaction, limits,
verification, and continuation deduplication.
4. Implement `runtime/pi/goal-extension.ts` and deterministic launcher discovery.
5. Add framework-sync/deployment acceptance coverage.
6. Update user, developer, runtime, framework README, and sitemap documentation.
7. Run focused tests, local Mosaic-path smoke test, then baseline repository gates.
8. Run independent review, remediate, commit, push/PR/CI/merge/issue closure per delivery gates.
## TDD decision
Applied. The continuation state machine and lifecycle scheduling are control-path logic where a race
or false terminal state can cause unbounded work or premature completion.
## Progress checkpoints
- [x] Issue #1150 created through Mosaic wrapper.
- [x] Isolated worktree created from `origin/main`.
- [x] PRD requirements and acceptance criteria added.
- [x] Task scratchpad created.
- [x] RED controller and security-regression tests written and observed failing before implementation.
- [x] Goal controller, launcher discovery, framework deployment coverage, and bounded state machine
implemented.
- [x] User, admin, developer, runtime, adapter, README, and sitemap documentation updated.
- [x] Final source copied additively to `~/.config/mosaic/runtime/pi/goal-extension.ts`; source and
deployed SHA-256 are identical.
- [x] Live Pi RPC smoke from the exact Mosaic path reached `achieved` with two verification passes and
no extension errors.
- [x] Baseline and situational checks completed, except the explicitly documented unavailable
PostgreSQL-only root integration case.
- [x] Independent code and OWASP/security reviews completed; all findings remediated and re-reviewed.
- [ ] Commit, push, PR, terminal-green CI, squash merge, and issue closure complete.
## Tests and evidence
### Situational
- `pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/mosaic exec vitest run src/runtime/pi-goal-extension.spec.ts`
- final: 25 passed.
- Covers commands, per-turn checks, context injection, two-pass verification, mixed-report
rejection, bounded limits, compaction, branch restore, stale timers, credential redaction,
typed-field false-positive protection, and append-only legacy-state fail-closed behavior.
- Final focused launcher/controller/file-adapter run: 3 files / 67 tests passed.
- Final V8 coverage for `framework/runtime/pi/goal-extension.ts`:
- 99.17% statements/lines, 93.78% branches, 100% functions.
- Installer migration fixture: 24 passed and byte-compared the deployed framework asset.
- Standalone extension TypeScript check against installed Pi 0.84.1 types passed:
`pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/mosaic exec tsc --noEmit --pretty false --module NodeNext
--moduleResolution NodeNext --target ES2022 --skipLibCheck framework/runtime/pi/goal-extension.ts`.
- Live deployment/load evidence:
- source/deployed SHA-256:
`1f0a3806e0948ad5f49684273a7e535e9880c148f7fd16d13ee487fcd601f637`.
- `get_commands` identified `/goal` as an extension command sourced from
`~/.config/mosaic/runtime/pi/goal-extension.ts`; `/goal help` succeeded; zero extension errors.
- live arithmetic goal ended `achieved`, verification `2/2`, with 3 goal reports / 3 agent starts
and zero extension errors.
- no goal extension exists under `~/.pi` extension paths.
### Baseline
- `pnpm build`: passed before the final framework-only redaction remediation; the extension is not a
package build input and its final source passed the standalone Pi type check.
- `pnpm typecheck`: 45/45 tasks passed.
- `pnpm lint`: 25/25 tasks passed.
- `pnpm format:check`: passed.
- Final Mosaic package components:
- Vitest: 82 files / 1,539 tests passed.
- full `test:framework-shell` harness passed.
- the discovered pre-existing tmux loader-marker race was reproduced with constructor PID
evidence, fixed with a pane readiness/FIFO barrier, passed 3 consecutive focused runs, and passed
in the full shell harness.
- one combined rerun encountered the separate existing real-lease probe TOCTOU in
`install-ordering-guard.spec.ts`; an earlier final Vitest run was fully green and the changed
focused suites remained green.
- Gateway safe baseline excluding the prohibited PostgreSQL-only fixture: 55 files / 600 tests passed
(6 files / 12 tests skipped by their existing environment gates).
- Root `pnpm test` reached 43 successful workspace tasks and all changed-package Vitest tests, but
the unchanged `apps/gateway/src/__tests__/cross-user-isolation.test.ts` afterAll hook retried a
PostgreSQL connection and failed authentication (`28P01`). This checkout explicitly forbids local
PostgreSQL startup/access; the failure is unrelated to #1150 and cannot be remediated by starting
the database. The gateway suite excluding that PostgreSQL-only file and required CI are used as
the safe verification paths.
### Independent review
- Codex code review: approved, 0 findings across 15 files.
- Initial Codex security review: one medium CWE-532/A09 finding for raw report persistence.
- Remediation added central credential-pattern redaction, prompt/docs guidance, canary tests, typed
field false-positive guards, and sticky fail-closed restore for credential-bearing append-only
history.
- Codex security re-review: risk `none`, 0 findings, confidence 0.87.
- Focused remediation review findings were fixed; final focused re-review verdict: `APPROVE`.
- Focused independent review of the tmux readiness barrier: `APPROVE`, no actionable findings.
## Risks and blockers
- Live `~/.config/mosaic` is shared by active Pi/fleet processes. Local deployment remained a single
additive framework file and did not reload or restart unrelated sessions.
- Completion verification is semantic, not mathematical: the active agent supplies structured
evidence twice. Operators must still inspect consequential outcomes.
- Credential redaction is pattern-based defense-in-depth, not a secret store. It covers
controller-owned state/status/tool details, not Pi's separate model-message/tool-call history.
Goals and reports must never contain real secrets or raw sensitive output. Because Pi session
entries are append-only, a detected credential-bearing legacy branch fails closed and the affected
session must be removed.
- Current installed Pi is newer than the repository's historical gateway Pi dependency. The
extension was checked and smoke-tested against installed Pi 0.84.1 using stable documented APIs.
- Local root testing cannot safely execute the unchanged PostgreSQL-only integration fixture under
the checkout's explicit database safety constraints. Terminal-green PR CI remains mandatory before
merge.
- The unchanged real-lease default-probe test can observe different broker availability across its two
sequential probes; one combined package rerun hit that existing TOCTOU. The same final Vitest suite
passed in a separate run, and CI remains the merge authority.
@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
# #1174 — Wrapper guard rounds 1011
## Objective
Make checkout enforcement judge Git placement operands rather than every HOME-shaped word in the command, without reopening `--separate-git-dir` placement under HOME.
## Plan
1. Reproduce the four over-blocks and the placement-option control at head `20d86e39`.
2. Add RED fixtures before production changes.
3. Extract clone/worktree placement operands from the existing shell-aware normalized stream.
4. Run the full guard corpus, historical-head discrimination, syntax/static checks, probes, review, and CI.
## Progress and evidence
- Reproduced: `NOTE=$HOME`, `--reference=$HOME`, `GIT_DIR=$HOME/x`, and `--template=$HOME/t` all blocked despite explicit `/src/wt` destinations.
- RED at `20d86e39`: expanded suite had 8 failures, all HOME-valued non-placement cases.
- GREEN: expanded suite passes 242/242.
- Round-10 probes: 7/7 placement expectations and 4/4 placement-option controls pass.
- Earlier path probes remain green: 60/60, 24/24, and 17/17.
- Historical discrimination with the 242-fixture suite:
- `3d0a882a`: 216 pass / 26 fail.
- `4b8eba95`: 222 pass / 20 fail.
- `20d86e39`: 234 pass / 8 fail.
- `bash -n`, ShellCheck warning-or-higher, and `git diff --check`: pass.
## Residual / risk
- Relative destinations whose effective path depends on cwd are tracked separately by #1197 and remain out of scope.
- Unknown future Git options with a separate following value fail closed when that value is HOME-shaped. This may require classification when Git adds an unrelated path-taking option, but prevents a new placement option from silently bypassing the guard.
## Round 11 objective and intake
- **Issue / PR:** #1174.
- **Objective:** Remove the finite boolean-flag allowlists that turn accepted clone/worktree flags into fake placement operands, while preserving all real HOME placement blocks.
- **Scope:** `wrapper-guard.sh`, its hermetic fixtures, and task documentation. Relative cwd-dependent destinations remain in #1197.
- **Surfaces:** security-sensitive Bash hook behavior and shell/Git option grammar; no API, DB, UI, auth, deploy, or dependency changes.
- **Budget assumption:** 25K working tokens; reduce exploratory matrices before reducing acceptance coverage.
### Round 11 plan
1. Use Git itself to classify accepted/rejected clone and worktree options, and Bash itself to resolve path-word expectations.
2. Add RED fixtures for all six reported clone flags, generated negations, and equivalent worktree grammar.
3. Replace the open-ended unknown-option fail-closed fallback with a parser based on the closed value-taking option surface; keep explicit placement options special.
4. Run the full corpus, historical discrimination, shell/static checks, targeted probes, independent code/security review, one push, and exact-head CI.
### Root-cause evidence
- Git 2.39.5 accepts all six reported clone flags and the broader generated family measured in the brief: `--bare`, `--mirror`, `--ipv4`, `--ipv6`, `-4`, `-6`, `--no-local`, `--no-reject-shallow`, `--no-bare`, `--no-sparse`, `--no-dissociate`, `--no-shallow-submodules`, `--no-quiet`, `--no-progress`, and `--no-recurse-submodules`; it rejects `--relative-paths` as unknown.
- Git 2.39.5 accepts worktree negations including `--no-force`, `--no-detach`, `--no-lock`, `--no-guess-remote`, and `--no-track`; the current finite worktree flag list does not describe that generated family.
- `bash -c "printf '%s' <word>"` resolves `$HOME/source`, `${HOME}/source`, and `"$HOME"/source` under HOME while `/src/wt` remains outside it.
- **Hypothesis:** only separate-value options need positive classification. Treat every other option token as a no-value flag unless it is the explicit placement option; this matches Git's non-enumerable boolean family and confines the residual to genuinely new future value-taking options.
### TDD and verification checkpoints
- RED against the unmodified `91cc37bc` guard: 253 pass / 22 fail in the initial expanded 275-fixture suite. Failures include all 15 accepted clone flags, accepted long abbreviations, short value-taking bundles, abbreviated placement, worktree metadata abbreviation, and both directions of bundled worktree branch parsing.
- An exploratory fail-closed residual test drove emission of every worktree positional. Re-review correctly showed that this over-blocked HOME-shaped commit-ish metadata; a new commit-ish fixture failed RED against that intermediate implementation (278 pass / 2 fail, including one transient message assertion) and the parser was restored to emit only the actual path.
- GREEN after remediation: 280/280.
- Ultron's 13-shape option probe: 13/13 correct, including the six reported over-blocks, HOME destinations, end-of-options, worktree controls, and a later-command placement.
- Round-10 probes remain green: 7/7 subject-placement expectations and 4/4 `--separate-git-dir` controls.
- Earlier shell/path probes remain green: 60/60, 24/24, and 17/17.
- `bash -n`, ShellCheck warning-or-higher, and `git diff --check`: pass.
### Deliberate residual
A future Git release could add a new separate-value option absent from the closed value grammar. It defaults to no-value flag parsing, which leaves the following word positional. For clone, this can fail open if that future option itself creates repository state at its value. For worktree, it can shift which word is read as the path. This hypothetical future ambiguity is accepted deliberately because failing closed on every unclassified option is proven to over-block Git's open-ended present-day boolean/`--no-*` family. Every value-taking and placement option Git currently supports is classified, including accepted abbreviations of `--separate-git-dir`. Relative cwd-dependent targets remain in #1197.
### Independent review checkpoint
- Initial Codex code/security review raised `--orphan` as value-taking. Upstream Git `master` contradicts that premise: the synopsis is `[--orphan] [(-b | -B) <new-branch>] <path> [<commit-ish>]`, and the prose derives the branch from the path when `-b`/`-B` is absent. `--orphan` is therefore correctly handled as a boolean flag.
- The security review separately identified the generic future worktree shift residual. An attempted fail-closed remediation emitted every positional, but code re-review correctly rejected it because valid grammar has only one placement positional and an optional commit-ish. Final behavior checks only the path and documents the hypothetical future option shift deliberately; paired actual-grammar `--orphan` fixtures cover safe/HOME paths and `-b` metadata.
- Security re-review initially had no findings. Code re-review's commit-ish blocker was remediated with a RED fixture and path-only restoration; final code re-review approved with no findings.
- Final security review then found non-canonical absolute and symlink aliases. Eight lexical fixtures failed RED against the prior implementation, followed by three symlink fixtures failing RED. Remediation expands only shell-visible HOME tokens, resolves the longest existing directory prefix physically, and lexically normalizes the nonexistent suffix. The suite is now 292/292.
- Inherent residual: a symlink can be replaced between pre-tool inspection and Git execution. Existing aliases are resolved; eliminating the race requires enforcement inside the filesystem mutation path rather than a text pre-hook. Security review classified this medium, and architectural closure is tracked in #1199.
- Final independent code review: APPROVE, 0 findings. Final security review: no critical/high findings; the single medium TOCTOU residual is explicitly tracked in #1199.
### Final local evidence
- Final hermetic suite: 292/292; the same suite against `91cc37bc` discriminates at 256 pass / 36 fail.
- Ultron option probe: 13/13; round-10 probes: 7/7 plus 4/4 controls; earlier shell/path probes: 60/60, 24/24, and 17/17.
- `bash -n`, ShellCheck warning-or-higher, `git diff --check`, sanitization gate, and test-enumeration gate (population 55; 38 enumerated; 18 signed exclusions): pass.
- Independent code review: APPROVE, 0 findings. Security review's remaining medium TOCTOU architecture residual is tracked in #1199; no critical/high findings remain.
- Repository-wide TypeScript gates require dependencies absent from this worktree; the canonical Woodpecker pipeline will run them against the pushed exact head.
### Documentation checklist
- `docs/PRD.md` updated with WPG requirements, acceptance, canonicalization, and residual risk.
- Task scratchpad updated in the same logical change set; `docs/TASKS.md` remains orchestrator-only.
- No API, auth, UI, navigation, deployment, user-guide, or admin-guide surface changed; OpenAPI, endpoint index, sitemap, and publishing are not applicable.
@@ -1,38 +0,0 @@
# Scratchpad — FED-M3-06 get verb
## Objective
Implement `POST /api/federation/v1/get/:resource/:id` for M3 inbound federation reads.
## Scope
- `apps/gateway/src/federation/server/verbs/get.controller.ts`
- `apps/gateway/src/federation/server/verbs/get-query.service.ts`
- Unit coverage for controller pipeline + query service RBAC guardrails
- Register controller/service in `FederationModule`
## Plan
1. Mirror the list verb pipeline: `FederationAuthGuard``FederationScopeService` → read-only query service.
2. Return one `_source: "local"` tagged item on success.
3. Return federation error envelopes:
- `404 not_found` when the resource id does not exist.
- `403 scope_violation` when the row exists but falls outside native RBAC/scope intersection.
- `400 invalid_request` for malformed ids/scope requests.
4. Keep read audit persistence deferred to M4; no body or response persistence in M3.
## Verification Evidence
- Rebased onto `origin/main` at `86e106fcc9a1dfa3a18f7846bb477be128794aad` after M3-05 merged; resolved `FederationModule` by registering both list and get verb controllers/services.
- Review-change coverage added for comment 15971:
- get note access now requires subject ownership AND authorized mission intersection.
- missing federation context returns structured `401 unauthorized` envelope.
- unsupported get resources fail closed with structured denial.
- PGlite regressions cover cross-user note exclusion and subject-note unauthorized-mission exclusion.
- `pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/gateway test -- src/federation/server/verbs/__tests__/get.controller.spec.ts src/federation/server/verbs/__tests__/get-query.service.spec.ts` — pass (2 files / 17 tests; re-run after review changes).
- `pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/gateway build` — pass (re-run after review changes).
- `pnpm build` — pass (23 successful tasks before review changes).
- `pnpm typecheck` — pass (41 successful tasks; re-run after review changes).
- `pnpm lint` — pass (23 successful tasks; re-run after review changes).
- `pnpm format:check` — pass (re-run after review changes).
- `~/.config/mosaic/tools/codex/codex-code-review.sh --uncommitted` — approve, 0 findings after review changes.
@@ -1,82 +0,0 @@
# B1 / @next Durable Publish Pipeline — Design
## Objective
Make `next` a durable integration line that publishes the artifacts required by downstream federation boot tests without manual builds.
Every merge to `next` publishes:
1. **npm prerelease packages** to the Gitea npm registry with dist-tag `next`.
2. **Gateway container image** tagged only as `gateway:sha-<short>`.
The existing stable release behavior remains isolated to `main` / tags.
## Registry verification
Target registry: `https://git.mosaicstack.dev/api/packages/mosaicstack/npm/`.
Pre-implementation checks:
- `npm view @mosaicstack/mosaic dist-tags --registry https://git.mosaicstack.dev/api/packages/mosaicstack/npm/ --json` returned a dist-tags object (`latest: 0.0.48`).
- `npm view @mosaicstack/mosaic@latest version --registry https://git.mosaicstack.dev/api/packages/mosaicstack/npm/` resolved `0.0.48`.
- `@next` currently returns 404 because no `next` dist-tag exists yet; this is expected before the first next prerelease publish.
Pipeline design includes a post-publish verification that `npm view @mosaicstack/mosaic@next version` resolves to the exact CI-computed prerelease version. If Gitea fails to honor the `next` dist-tag, the pipeline fails closed.
## Version scheme
The prerelease version is computed at publish time only; no `package.json` version changes are committed.
For each non-private `@mosaicstack/*` package:
```text
<target-stable>-next.<CI_PIPELINE_NUMBER>
```
Where:
- `CI_PIPELINE_NUMBER` is Woodpecker's monotonic pipeline number.
- `target-stable` is the package's current committed stable version with the patch component incremented.
- Example: `@mosaicstack/mosaic` `0.0.48` publishes as `0.0.49-next.1626`.
- Example: `@mosaicstack/gateway` `0.0.6` publishes as `0.0.7-next.1626`.
Rationale:
- npm semver sorts `0.0.49-next.1627` above `0.0.49-next.1626`.
- The prerelease does not overtake the future stable `0.0.49`.
- The monotonic pipeline number avoids conflicts across repeated `next` merges.
## Branch and tag guardrails
| Pipeline path | Branch/event | Publishes | Forbidden |
| --------------------- | ------------------------------ | ------------------------------------------------------- | ---------------------- |
| stable npm publish | `main` push/manual or tag | package versions already committed in package manifests | `@next` dist-tag |
| next npm publish | `next` push/manual only | CI-computed prereleases with `--tag next` | `latest` dist-tag |
| gateway image | `main` push/manual or tag | `sha-<short>` + `latest` on main + tag on tag events | next prerelease npm |
| gateway image | `next` push/manual only | `sha-<short>` only | `latest` |
| appservice/web images | `main` push/manual or tag only | existing stable image behavior | next image publication |
The pipeline has explicit branch checks inside the publish commands as a second fail-closed layer beyond Woodpecker `when` clauses.
## Implementation plan
1. Widen `.woodpecker/publish.yml` top-level `when` to include `next` so the publish pipeline runs on next merges.
2. Keep existing `publish-npm` on `main` / tags only.
3. Add `publish-next-npm` for `next` push/manual only:
- configure Gitea npm auth from existing `gitea_token` secret as `NPM_TOKEN`;
- preflight registry dist-tag metadata;
- compute prerelease versions in CI by temporarily editing package manifests in the workspace;
- run `pnpm publish ... --tag next` against non-private `@mosaicstack/*` packages;
- verify `@mosaicstack/mosaic@next` resolves to the computed version.
4. Split image `when` anchors:
- `image_build_when` includes `next` and is used by `build-gateway`;
- `main_image_build_when` keeps appservice/web on main/tags only.
5. Keep gateway next image destinations to `sha-<short>` only; no `latest` on next.
## Risk controls
- Auth/registry failures are fatal.
- No manual image build/push path is introduced.
- No production `latest` tags are touched from `next`.
- No `@latest` npm dist-tags are touched from `next`.
- All changes live in CI config and docs; no runtime source behavior changes.
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@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
# B2 — Fresh-install skills sync path
## Problem
Greenfield wizard on `next` reported:
```text
Skills sync script not found at ~/.config/mosaic/bin/mosaic-sync-skills
Skills: install failed
```
## Diagnosis
The framework install migration removed the legacy `~/.config/mosaic/bin/` directory and now installs framework helper scripts under:
```text
~/.config/mosaic/tools/_scripts/
```
`packages/mosaic/src/stages/finalize.ts` still resolved wizard helper scripts from `mosaicHome/bin`, so wizard-selected skills failed even though `mosaic-sync-skills` was present in the current framework layout.
## Fix
- Resolve framework helper scripts through `tools/_scripts/<name>` first.
- Keep a legacy `bin/<name>` fallback for pre-migration installs.
- Point missing-script warnings at the current `tools/_scripts` layout.
- Update the finalize skills test fixture to model the fresh framework layout.
- Update framework README examples from legacy `bin/` helper paths to `tools/_scripts/`.
## Verification
- Unit: `pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/mosaic test -- finalize-skills`
- Gates: `pnpm typecheck`, `pnpm lint`, `pnpm format:check`, `pnpm build`
- Fresh path: ran `packages/mosaic/framework/install.sh` with a temp `MOSAIC_HOME` and `MOSAIC_SYNC_ONLY=1`; verified `tools/_scripts/mosaic-sync-skills` exists, legacy `bin/mosaic-sync-skills` does not, and the script installs a selected fake `lint` skill into Mosaic + Pi runtime skill directories.
@@ -1,36 +0,0 @@
# B3 — Wizard completion ordering
## Problem
The wizard printed the success summary / `Mosaic is ready.` during `finalizeStage`, before the gateway configuration stage had completed its daemon health check. If the gateway health gate later failed, the user could see a success claim followed by a gateway failure.
## Diagnosis
`finalizeStage` handled both mutation work and terminal success messaging. Wizard paths then ran `gatewayConfigStage` and `gatewayBootstrapStage` afterward:
1. finalize writes config, links runtime assets, syncs skills, runs doctor;
2. finalize prints `Installation Summary` + `Mosaic is ready.`;
3. gateway config starts/waits for daemon health;
4. gateway bootstrap runs.
The summary needed to be deferred until after the gateway readiness gates.
## Fix
- `finalizeStage` now returns a `showSummary()` callback and supports `deferSummary`.
- Wizard/quick-start paths call finalize with `deferSummary: true`.
- `showSummary()` is called only after gateway config reports ready and bootstrap completes, or immediately when the caller explicitly skips gateway setup.
- If gateway health/config reports not ready, the wizard returns/aborts without printing the success summary.
- Folded in adjacent runtime install hint fix for Pi: `curl -fsSL https://pi.dev/install.sh | sh`.
## Verification
- Added unified-wizard coverage for summary-after-health and no-summary-on-health-failure.
- Targeted: `pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/mosaic test -- unified-wizard finalize-skills`
- `pnpm format:check`
- `pnpm typecheck`
- `pnpm lint`
- `pnpm build`
- `pnpm test`
- Codex code review: approve.
- Codex security review: one low finding on the requested Pi `curl | sh` install hint; no security finding in the wizard completion-ordering change.
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@@ -1,36 +0,0 @@
# B4 — Wizard step deduplication
## Problem
Greenfield wizard testing showed completed wizard steps could be executed again after the menu marked them `[done]`. In practice this made the Providers/API-key flow and Skills flow appear twice in one wizard run.
There was a second related API-key duplication path: when the Providers step was completed with no key, `gatewayConfigStage` still prompted for `ANTHROPIC_API_KEY` during Finish because it only skipped the gateway API-key prompt when `providerKey` was non-empty.
## Diagnosis
- `runMenuLoop` labeled completed sections with `[done]`, but still dispatched the selected step again if the user selected that row.
- Quick Start ran Providers and Skills but did not mark those sections complete in `completedSections`.
- `runFinishPath`/`quickStartPath` defaulted `providerType` to `none` for gateway config, which made it impossible for `gatewayConfigStage` to distinguish:
- provider step completed and user intentionally skipped the key, vs.
- provider step was never run.
## Fix
- Added a shared menu section key helper and a completed-step guard in `runMenuLoop`.
- Completed menu steps now log a skip message instead of re-running their stage.
- Quick Start marks Providers and Skills complete after running them.
- Finish/Quick Start now pass `state.providerType` as-is to gateway config instead of defaulting to `none`.
- `gatewayConfigStage` treats `providerType: 'none'` as an explicit completed provider setup with no key and skips the second gateway API-key prompt.
## Verification
- Added unified wizard regression coverage asserting repeated Providers/Skills menu selections only execute each stage once.
- Added gateway config coverage asserting `providerType: 'none'` does not prompt for a gateway API key and writes no API key env var.
- Targeted: `pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/mosaic test -- unified-wizard gateway-config`
- `pnpm format:check`
- `pnpm typecheck`
- `pnpm lint`
- `pnpm build`
- `pnpm test`
- Codex code review: approve.
- Codex security review: no findings.
@@ -1,60 +0,0 @@
# FED-M3-10 — Federation M3 Integration Tests
## Objective
Add single-gateway gateway integration tests for M3 acceptance #6 and #7.
## Branch / base
- Branch: `feat/federation-m3-integration`
- Base: `origin/next` (`838701bd` after M3-06/#683 merge)
- PR base when unblocked: `next`
## Scope
- Real PostgreSQL via `@mosaicstack/db`.
- Mocked TLS context / Fastify request shim for `FederationAuthGuard`.
- Direct controller calls using the real M3 route contract: `POST /api/federation/v1/list/:resource` with body `{ limit?, cursor? }`.
- Gated by `FEDERATED_INTEGRATION=1`.
- No federation harness dependency.
## Fixture notes
Aligned with the B2 seed design vocabulary:
- `tasks` visibility uses personal `projects` + `missions` chain.
- `notes` are `mission_tasks.notes`; the integration suite asserts subject-only note visibility on an authorized mission.
- Seed includes a second user and unauthorized team/project tasks to prove exclusion from the max-row-cap list result.
- Grants/peers are direct DB fixtures; cert auth still runs through `FederationAuthGuard` using real X.509 certs generated by existing test helpers.
## Current implementation
Added `apps/gateway/src/__tests__/integration/federation-m3-list.integration.test.ts` covering:
1. M3 #6 — cert missing Mosaic OIDs returns 401 federation `unauthorized` envelope.
2. M3 #6 — valid cert whose grant row is `revoked` returns 403 federation `forbidden` envelope.
3. M3 #7 — active grant with `max_rows_per_query: 2` caps `list tasks`, returns `_truncated` + `nextCursor`, source-tags rows, and excludes other-user / unauthorized-team tasks.
4. Cross-user notes invariant — subject can list their own `mission_tasks.notes` row while another user's note on the same authorized mission is excluded.
5. Unsupported-resource invariant — `list widgets` fails closed with a federation `scope_violation` envelope.
## Verification
- `pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/types build` — PASS.
- `pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/db build` — PASS.
- `pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/storage build` — PASS.
- `pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/brain build` — PASS.
- `pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/queue build` — PASS.
- `pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/config build` — PASS.
- `pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/auth build` — PASS.
- `pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/gateway test -- src/__tests__/integration/federation-m3-list.integration.test.ts` — PASS skipped when `FEDERATED_INTEGRATION` unset (5 skipped).
- `FEDERATED_INTEGRATION=1 pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/gateway test -- src/__tests__/integration/federation-m3-list.integration.test.ts` — PASS (5 tests) after local `docker compose up -d postgres` + `pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/db db:push`.
- `pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/gateway typecheck` — PASS.
- `pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/gateway lint` — PASS.
- `pnpm format:check` — PASS.
- `~/.config/mosaic/tools/codex/codex-code-review.sh --uncommitted` — PASS; approve, no findings.
- `~/.config/mosaic/tools/codex/codex-security-review.sh --uncommitted` — PASS; risk level none, no findings.
## Push / PR
- #683 landed in `next`; branch rebased onto `origin/next` before push.
- CI is serialized; run queue guard before push.
@@ -1,40 +0,0 @@
# Installer `--next` fast npm lane — 2026-06-25
## Scope
Flip `tools/install.sh --next` from source-build-first to fast npm `@next` first, with source fallback.
## Registry reality check
Gitea npm registry: `https://git.mosaicstack.dev/api/packages/mosaicstack/npm/`
Verified before implementation:
- `@mosaicstack/mosaic@next` resolves to `0.0.49-next.1633`.
- `@mosaicstack/gateway@next` resolves to `0.0.7-next.1633`.
- `@mosaicstack/gateway` dist-tags include `latest: 0.0.6` and `next: 0.0.7-next.1633`.
- `apps/gateway/package.json` is non-private and has Gitea npm `publishConfig`.
Conclusion: the installer can fast-install both CLI and gateway npm packages for `--next`. The gateway Docker `gateway:sha-<short>` remains the deployment/harness artifact; the npm gateway package is valid for the installer global package path.
## Behavior
- `--next` with no explicit ref:
1. framework archive from `next`;
2. resolve `@mosaicstack/gateway@next` and `@mosaicstack/mosaic@next`;
3. require both resolved versions to share the same `next.<pipeline>` suffix;
4. install the exact resolved package versions;
5. set `MOSAIC_GATEWAY_SKIP_NPM_INSTALL=1` so wizard does not overwrite the prerelease gateway;
6. if either package is missing/unreachable/mismatched/fails, fall back to existing source build at `next`.
- `--dev` remains pure source build.
- explicit `--ref` / `MOSAIC_REF` still wins over `--next` and uses the source path for that exact ref.
## Install detail
The installer writes the scoped npmrc mapping (`@mosaicstack:registry=...`) and then runs npm install without overriding npm's default registry. Passing `--registry=<gitea>` to `npm install` forces public transitive dependencies (for example `@anthropic-ai/sdk`) to resolve from Gitea and breaks the fast path; the scoped npmrc mapping is the correct split-registry behavior.
## Verification notes
- Added `tools/install-next-lane.test.sh` with a fake npm/source harness for exact-version fast install, registry failure source fallback, explicit-ref precedence, and mismatched suffix warning.
- Wired the installer harness into `pnpm test` via `pnpm run test:installer`.
- Real temp-prefix fast install succeeded with `@mosaicstack/[email protected]` and `@mosaicstack/[email protected]`.
@@ -1,35 +0,0 @@
# Scratchpad — installer `--next` lane
## Objective
Add a prerelease installer lane for the permanent `next` integration branch.
## Scope
- `tools/install.sh`
- README/install documentation
- Follow-up design note for future npm `@next` prerelease publishing
## Plan
1. Add `--next` and `MOSAIC_NEXT=1` as source-build shorthand for `next`.
2. Preserve explicit ref precedence: `MOSAIC_REF` and `--ref` win over `--next`.
3. Update installer source display/help text.
4. Document three lanes:
- stable npm `@latest`
- prerelease `--next`
- contributor `--dev --ref X`
5. Run shell and repo gates locally, then hold before push/PR until runner serialization greenlight.
## Verification
- `bash -n tools/install.sh` — pass.
- `docker run --rm -v "$PWD:/mnt" -w /mnt koalaman/shellcheck:stable tools/install.sh` — pass.
- `bash tools/install.sh --check --framework --next` — source display shows `ref: next, --next prerelease lane`.
- `bash tools/install.sh --check --cli --next --ref feature-x` — source display shows explicit ref wins.
- `MOSAIC_NEXT=1 MOSAIC_REF=feature-env bash tools/install.sh --check --cli` — source display shows explicit env ref wins.
- `pnpm install --frozen-lockfile --prefer-offline --store-dir /home/jarvis/.local/share/pnpm/store` — pass (local override for repo `.npmrc` CI store path).
- `pnpm typecheck` — pass (41 successful tasks).
- `pnpm lint` — pass (23 successful tasks).
- `pnpm format:check` — pass.
- `bash tools/e2e-install-test.sh` — attempted; current baseline fails during gateway health after stable registry install because Valkey is unavailable in the clean container. The `tools/install.sh --yes --no-auto-launch` stage itself completed before the downstream gateway verification failure.
@@ -0,0 +1,99 @@
# PR merge squash message field
- **Charter:** `/home/hermes/agent-work/CHARTER-PRMERGE-MESSAGE-FIELD.md`
- **Owner:** `be-coder-08`
- **Branch:** `fix/pr-merge-message-field`
- **Base:** remote `main` / local `origin/main` at `85d2108e4ed15c744ad3b87a5b629e7b2d39405a`
- **Estate:** HOMELAB tooling shared by HOMELAB and USC
## Objective
Add an optional, identity-checked Gitea squash message to `pr-merge.sh` so genuine multi-author PRs retain non-poster branch authors without weakening hardcoded squash behavior.
## Binding requirements
1. `Do` remains hardcoded to `squash`; no provider/repository default may select merge style.
2. A verified trailer uses a PR commit's linked `author.login` and that same commit's author email. No `/users/{login}` primary-email lookup occurs. Recorded rationale: this asks only what the provider can answer.
3. A commit with `author.login` null blocks before merge, prints both the null provider fact and commit email fact, and names the escalation principal.
4. The BLOCK arm must be observed firing; a normal canonical single-author API payload remains explicit squash plus its reviewed `head_commit_id`.
5. Every provider mutation is read back from the provider; no real PR is merged during tests.
## Derived interface decisions
- Add `--co-author-trailers` rather than accepting arbitrary message text. The wrapper enumerates PR commits and constructs trailers, making an unchecked `Co-authored-by` line unexpressible.
- Require `--escalate-to PRINCIPAL` with `--co-author-trailers`, so the BLOCK diagnostic always names a principal rather than a generic role.
- Do not expose `MergeTitleField` separately. When trailers exist, set it from the provider PR title and set `MergeMessageField` only to construction-generated trailers. This preserves one provider source for the title and avoids an unrelated caller-controlled degree of freedom.
- Preserve first-commit order and emit one trailer per distinct non-poster `author.login`, using that first linked commit's own email.
## Canonical delivery plan
1. Port the capability into the installed source of truth, `packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/pr-merge.sh`; do not retain `infra/fleet/tools/git` as a second copy.
2. Preserve canonical `--expect-head`, exact head branch/repository/SHA queue inspection, Gitea atomic head pinning, GitHub `--match-head-commit`, and delete-after-merge semantics.
3. Do not port the deployed-only `--skip-queue-guard` bypass. Add the focused harness to the canonical framework-shell suite and re-establish RED/GREEN on the packaged baseline.
4. Deliver through a reviewed package release followed by `mosaic update` with its default framework reseed. The installer snapshots, manifest-syncs framework-owned `tools/**`, and rolls back on failure.
5. Before either estate relies on the change, require installed/package hash equality, `MergeMessageField` presence, and a green focused harness. Release/reseed ownership is currently unassigned and blocks activation after source merge.
## Evidence
- RED against the byte-identical deployed baseline (`sha256 08a65e8584c5…`): rc 1 with eight named failures. The wrapper rejected `--co-author-trailers`; the null-login path emitted none of the required BLOCK facts/principal; and both verified/ordinary API paths failed the stdin-config credential assertion (ordinary path exposed the fixture token through curl argv). Log: `/home/hermes/agent-work/be-coder-08/evidence/prmerge-message-field-red.log`.
- GREEN on the deployed-baseline candidate: verified linked multi-author payload, null-login BLOCK, required named principal, explicit squash, stdin-config token transport, and absence of `/users` lookup all passed. Log: `/home/hermes/agent-work/be-coder-08/evidence/prmerge-message-field-green.log`.
- RED against canonical packaged baseline `c581ef48…`: rc 1 with 32 assertions. It rejects the new option, and the first harness version did not satisfy canonical head branch/repository/SHA metadata. Log: `/home/hermes/agent-work/be-coder-08/evidence/prmerge-packaged-baseline-red.log`. The port adapts the fixture rather than weakening canonical head controls.
- Provider capability probe against `git.mosaicstack.dev`: authenticated `be-coder-08` POST to deliberately nonexistent PR `2147483647` with both message fields returned JSON HTTP 404; the unauthenticated same request returned JSON HTTP 401 (not the charter's predicted 403). The authenticated-vs-unauthenticated differential proves write authorization resolved while no mergeable subject existed. `tl-mosaic` ruled the literal non-load-bearing: preserve the observed 404/401 pair and do not manufacture a 403 case. No cause was inferred and no real PR was targeted.
- Provider-generated trailer behavior is not treated as exclusive or absent. The wrapper's VERIFIED/BLOCK decision binds each requested non-poster trailer to commit `author.login` plus that commit's email; it does not assume `MergeMessageField` is the squash's only trailer source. The poster is omitted from the constructed list because the resulting squash author already records the poster; any additional provider-generated trailer is outside this change's unmeasured mechanism.
- An early candidate SHA-256 `5de32876990e4f26920448cb3220cc7f1146d558b4dd2bc1ee1a2abee2f2cbe6` passed the initial harness, then author-side review found credential-fallback and argv-exposure defects. The live deployed wrapper was atomically restored to baseline SHA-256 `08a65e8584c52c6d41ea1c686f8b95585c21e4b37320a2447eba09359a0e02c1`; the remediated candidate remains only in the worktree.
## Remediation and current review state
1. Token and Basic Auth now use stdin curl configuration, not argv. PR title, contributor email, and the JSON payload also remain out of child argv.
2. Each credential attempt binds commit inspection and merge. A token failure during either inspection or mutation causes Basic fallback to repeat inspection before mutation; the payload pins the inspected `head_commit_id`.
3. Focused tests cover token-resolution fail-closed behavior, both HTTP-401 fallback seams, metadata/credential argv absence, null-login BLOCK, explicit squash, canonical reviewed-head binding, unchanged ordinary payload, and retained log-safe provider diagnostics. Token-resolution RED: `/home/hermes/agent-work/be-coder-08/evidence/prmerge-token-resolution-red.log`.
4. Codex review rounds 35 requested retained provider error text, log-safe provider diagnostics, fail-closed credential fallback, stable value-option parsing, and PR-title trailer-injection prevention. These are remediated with regression assertions. A post-remediation independent review is still required.
5. **Accepted linkage limitation:** `author.login` resolution proves that the commit address maps to a registered provider account. It does not prove that the named principal authored the commit because Git author metadata is self-asserted. This gate checks attribution linkage, not authorship; commit signing is out of scope and currently unadopted. Coordinators explicitly ruled that this does not add a third state.
6. Codex's sandbox could not execute the harness because its checkout was read-only; that environmental limitation is recorded separately from host-side test results.
## Disposable provider fixture acceptance
- Use a retained scratch repository only, with two branch authors and `author != committer` on at least one commit.
- Arm A supplies a message-field trailer for one non-poster; record whether that value lands without forcing the partial-pair result into under-specified `APPENDS`/`REPLACES` labels. Demonstrate an absence control.
- Arm B includes a registered trailer for a different non-poster on a branch commit; record whether it survives or drops. Verify identity through an existing commit whose `author.login` resolves and demonstrate an absence control.
- Parse landed trailers key-agnostically with `^[A-Za-z-]+-[Bb]y:` and record generated poster pair presence/absence plus resulting poster attribution.
- Record `/users/<login>` status and raw email only as non-gating estate telemetry. Never read `active`, `visibility`, or any profile field as an identity gate.
- Use distinct principals: poster `be-coder-08`, merger `Mos`, Arm A `be-coder-07`, and Arm B `be-coder-06`. Capture every trailer-shaped line verbatim and in order. Zero trailer lines means the generator did not fire and the run is `VOID`, not evidence that either arm dropped.
- Report the same read-back evidence to `mos-claude` on socket `default` and `tl-mosaic` on socket `mosaic-fleet`. Report values rather than mechanism inferences and stop on any poster-attribution regression.
## Fixture preflight
- Retained public repository: `mosaicstack/prmerge-trailer-fixture`; PR `#1`, posted by `be-coder-08` and reserved for merge by `Mos`.
- Existing `mosaicstack/stack` commits resolve `be-coder-07` and `be-coder-06` through `author.login`; exact addresses are `[email protected]` and `[email protected]`.
- Non-gating HOMELAB telemetry for authenticated reader `be-coder-08`: `/api/v1/users/be-coder-06` returned HTTP 200 with raw `email` value `[email protected]`.
- Provider preflight showed PR commit enumeration is newest-first. A new RED test proved that deriving `head_commit_id` from the final array element selected the wrong commit. The candidate now reads `.head.sha` from the authenticated PR endpoint before enumeration, verifies it appears in the commit set, and atomically pins that SHA in the explicit squash payload. RED: `/home/hermes/agent-work/be-coder-08/evidence/prmerge-head-order-red.log`.
- Fixture PR head `f6ba6e5105031fa21f5ff7bd8e4379d99c16e1de` has `author.login=be-coder-07`, `committer.login=be-coder-08`, and branch-message trailer `Co-authored-by: be-coder-06 <[email protected]>`.
## Fixture result
- `Mos` merged retained fixture PR `#1` through staged candidate SHA-256 `60e779a85fd13b729d859ea7c986d1e9b1641b97991611329226c1b3113ffb6e`; resulting squash commit: `3f550715d9bc716426fd355a65fe997b3a90fa7d` with one parent.
- Provider read-back: poster/commit author `be-coder-08`, committer/merger `Mos`. The run is non-void.
- Trailer-shaped lines, verbatim and in order:
1. `Co-authored-by: be-coder-07 <[email protected]>`
2. `Co-authored-by: be-coder-08 <[email protected]>`
- Arm A supplied field value (`be-coder-07`) landed. Arm B branch trailer (`be-coder-06`) dropped. Both fabricated absence controls remained absent. No `Co-committed-by:` line landed.
- The candidate payload construction explicitly excludes the poster and supplied only the Arm A `be-coder-07` line. Therefore the landed poster line was provider-generated, not candidate-composed. The raw result supports `FIELD LANDS`, `BRANCH DROPS`, and `POSTER GENERATED`; it does not support a claim that candidate code supplied the poster. Evidence: `/home/hermes/agent-work/be-coder-08/evidence/prmerge-fixture-readback.log` and the retained provider object.
- Retained fixture PR `#2` measured the N=2 shape needed by `#1030`: supplied `be-coder-07` then `be-coder-06`; both landed in that order, followed by the provider-generated poster line. No truncation or dedup occurred at N=2. Resulting squash: `39db9d13aed0…`.
## Current hold point
PR `mosaicstack/stack#1066` is open. Its first frozen head `f4b162fa…` was terminal-green in Woodpecker `mosaic` pipeline `#2225`, but that evidence becomes stale when the canonical port moves the head. The deployed wrapper remains baseline `08a65e85…`; no manual copy will occur. Canonical port tests, commit amendment, rebase, one guarded force-with-lease, exact-head CI, and new independent review remain. Even after source merge, activation remains blocked on an assigned package-release/reseed owner and installed-byte read-back.
## Security review 96 remediation
Exact reviewed predecessor head: `1ceb11058f64dd7f4a817ceb2124f980a1c4dd23`.
RED-first focused harness produced 10 named failures: all curl calls lacked size/time/connect bounds; raw ESC email reached mutation; oversized and stalled curl failures were discarded and reached mutation; nonempty Basic output with resolver rc 91 authorized mutation.
Security remediation:
- Removed the cross-principal HTTP-401 Basic fallback. Both inspection-401 and merge-401 paths now refuse without Basic resolution or mutation; `get_gitea_basic_auth` references in the merge subject are 0.
- Applied `--max-filesize`, `--max-time`, and `--connect-timeout` to all 3/3 provider curl sites and fail closed on curl transport rc at all 3/3 sites.
- Required linked email bytes to be ASCII and printable before constructing `MergeMessageField`; guarded construction sites 1/1.
GREEN: message-field, exact-head, empty-UID/API, queue branch/repository/SHA, bash syntax, ShellCheck, and diff check pass. R7 total-removal mutants went RED: email guard 3 rows; bound switches 1 row; transport-rc guards 4 rows; HTTP-401 refusal 3 rows. R7 bound: mutants prove total removal only; explicit denominators above prove site coverage.
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# WebUI Fleet Bridge Planning Scratchpad
**Mode:** Task 0 docs-only decision PR authorized; Task 1 and all executable/runtime work remain blocked.
**Owner:** Velma
**Opened:** 2026-08-09
**Scope:** One enrolled Agent Host launching one native `mosaic claude` OAuth session and streaming it into `apps/web` through `apps/gateway`.
## Objective
Turn the approved direction in `jarvis-brain/docs/scratchpads/MOSAIC-WEBUI-FLEET-BRIDGE.md` into a test-first implementation plan while preserving Fred's harness-home/launcher contract and Scooby's greenfield safety findings.
## Source reconciliation
- Current `origin/main`: `b0f7d26dd9c14d91eaaefc35d6c9fd6618a0bd92`.
- Current `origin/next`: `4df478cdd150fdf8d52ea109f02ade5d85017acd`.
- Branches currently diverge (`main` has 11 unique commits; `next` has 13). `next` contains local-tier Redis fix #689; `main` contains later fleet/shell fixes.
- Fred's three-root harness-home design and promotion stack are not yet fully present on either baseline.
- Therefore neither current SHA is an acceptable implementation pin. Code may begin only from a Fred-certified reconciled SHA containing the required launcher/home contract and safe Gateway startup prerequisites.
- The deployed `mosaic.woltje.com` v0.0.20 UI remains reference-only.
## Verified seams
- Current browser chat uses an in-process Pi SDK session.
- `AgentRuntimeProvider` supports list/tree/stream/send/attach/detach/terminate, but not create/start.
- `InteractionController` enrolls an already-existing runtime session; it cannot launch one.
- Hermes is the only runtime provider registered in Gateway.
- Tmux streaming is explicitly unsupported and remains out of scope.
- `mosaic claude` is the authoritative launcher and accepts Claude's machine-facing stream-json flags.
- Installed discovery version: Claude Code 2.1.226. Target Distrobox version must be independently pinned and certified.
## Non-negotiable dependencies
1. Fred approves the machine-facing launcher/seat-home contract before code.
2. No WebUI/Gateway direct read of lease broker state, daemon socket, or state files (F-V3).
3. No provider OAuth token leaves the Agent Host.
4. No local Gateway/Web startup around the KBN/database hold.
5. Greenfield work runs in a Debian Distrobox with an isolated home.
6. The initial plan PR targets `next`; Fred binds D1D15 on its exact head before issue/PRD/tracker completion or implementation work.
## Reproducible evidence
Run from a clean Stack clone:
```bash
git fetch origin main next
git rev-parse origin/main origin/next
git rev-list --left-right --count origin/main...origin/next
rg -n "interface AgentRuntimeProvider|createSession|streamEvents|terminate" \
packages/types/src/agent packages/agent/src apps/gateway/src/agent
rg -n "AgentService\.prompt|interaction_sessions|createRuntimeTerminationApproval" \
apps/gateway/src packages/db/src/schema.ts
```
Primary inspected source seams:
- `packages/types/src/agent/agent-runtime-provider.ts`
- `packages/agent/src/{runtime-provider-registry,hermes-runtime-provider,matrix-native-runtime-provider,tmux-fleet-runtime-provider}.ts`
- `apps/gateway/src/agent/{runtime-provider-registry.service,interaction.controller,durable-session.repository,durable-session.service}.ts`
- `apps/gateway/src/chat/chat.gateway.ts`
- `packages/mosaic/src/commands/{launch,interaction}.ts`
- `packages/mosaic/src/fleet/generated-env-boundary.ts`
- `packages/db/src/schema.ts`
- `apps/web/src/app/(dashboard)/chat/page.tsx`
Planning-only investigation transcripts are local and intentionally uncommitted:
- `/tmp/velma-plan-stack-surface.txt`
- `/tmp/velma-plan-structure.txt`
- `/tmp/velma-plan-scooby.txt`
- `/tmp/velma-plan-runtime-contract.txt`
## Source findings that constrain the design
- `interaction_sessions.id` is the stable primary key; there are no create/policy/enrollment/state columns.
- `interaction_outbox` has a unique `(session_id, idempotency_key)` index and only `pending | processing | delivered`.
- Baseline `DurableSessionRepository.create()` can replace provider/runtime identity for the same owner; M1 must remove that implicit mutation.
- Baseline termination approval is Redis-backed and currently consumes separately from PostgreSQL; M1 therefore needs durable authorization acceptance before destructive token deletion/dispatch.
- Existing interaction HTTP base is `/api/interaction/:agentName`; the plan extends it rather than inventing a second route family.
- Baseline `launch.ts`/lease launcher still use ambient lookup/literal interpreters. Section 4.1 is non-binding consumer input to Fred's W-F design; W-F's final resolved-launch contract must exist in the certified base before Velma can certify it.
- Root `pnpm test` is not KBN-safe: it includes PGlite migration and framework-shell/lease-broker suites.
## Independent draft review
Seven adversarial review rounds found and drove explicit fixes for:
- a candidate resolved-seat consumer descriptor and threat model, now explicitly non-binding input to Fred's W-F-owned launcher design;
- one active launch per stable conversation, exact pending/failed encodings, durable pre-dispatch reservation, CAS activation, and crash lookup without a migration;
- generation-bound enrollment, command/event revalidation, `SIGHUP` config epochs, and stale-epoch rejection;
- Redis/PostgreSQL exact-stop crash safety via non-destructive verify, durable authorization acceptance, atomic claim/`GETDEL`, and same-operation status reconciliation;
- sequence gaps/reorder limits, deterministic UUIDv5 completion, and Gateway restart fail-closed behavior;
- shared streaming redaction before host ring/transport and again before Gateway persistence/browser;
- D2/D12-selected path-free provenance and a separate safe browser DTO—never raw or hashed path strings;
- exact F-V3 boundary: bridge has no broker API, while Fred's sealed launcher may enforce broker policy internally;
- migration-free focused tests in Tasks 18, with live OAuth, repository transaction, Gateway/Web, and Playwright restricted to the Fred/Scooby-certified Task 9 path;
- candidate private/public commitment and artifact-binding mechanisms that W-F may accept, simplify, replace, or defer;
- JCS event-digest recomputation and equal/different duplicate handling in both accepted and future-buffer states;
- a safe browser presentation DTO for host/workspace/seat/persona labels, readiness, and connection state;
- explicit `OnApplicationBootstrap` create/stop recovery enumeration with no auto-launch;
- all POSIX/Windows/UNC/file/tilde path classes in the streaming redactor and definitive failed-stop response semantics;
- the full 14-column canonical task schema, fake-only Task 5 repository tests, migration-free certified Task 9 DB test, server-owned operation correlations/routes, and exact merged-SHA smoke;
- per-commit independent review, queue guards, exact-head PR review, squash merge, exact merged-next SHA/CI wait, worktree-bound smoke, issue-state readback, and reviewed tracker-closure PR with its own merged-next CI;
- a private DB URL loader captured/exported per session without recording or echoing the credential;
- an attached Task 9 implementation branch, provider-filtered exact issue-state readback, and machine-verified smoke JSON binding source/worktree/deployed SHA;
- a capped, duplicate-key-rejecting, exact-key/type smoke schema so report extensions or JSON boolean/float coercion cannot smuggle data or fake child-count evidence.
The plan remains deliberately **decision-PR-ready, not implementation-ready**. Fred authorized only Task 0's initial two-document PR on `next`. He must still return every Section 2 value, replace all `[FRED-GATE]` entries, certify storage/startup, and provide the W-F-dependent `IMPLEMENTATION_BASE_SHA` before Task 0 closes or Task 1 starts.
## Current status
- Gitea principal verified as `velma`; helper and API wrapper resolution are fail-closed and correct.
- Fred authorized the initial Task 0 docs-only PR in `comms/20260809T094952Z__from-fred__ec0e85.md` and confirmed its `next` lane/W-F descriptor corrections in `comms/20260809T095437Z__from-fred__4ee79d.md`.
- Provisional decisions: D1/D8/D9/D10/D13/D14 approved; D4 tool labels exactly `{Read, Grep, Glob}`; D5/D12 provisional; D11 remains a single-operator seam; D2/D3/D6/D7 and `IMPLEMENTATION_BASE_SHA` are `BLOCKED-ON-W-F`.
- Awaiting exact plan-PR-head review and Fred's complete D1D15 binding contract.
- No source code, database, deployment, or live runtime changes made.
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# WebUI Phase P — P2 Data + Auth Scratchpad
**Task ID:** WEBUI-P2
**Tracking ref:** stacked on PR #1143 (`feat/webui-p1-vite-skeleton`); no separate issue specified in the author brief
**Branch:** `feat/webui-p2-data-auth`
**Started:** 2026-08-09
**Role:** P2 author worker (must not modify `docs/TASKS.md`)
## Original tasking
> Read `/home/jwoltje/briefs/P2-brief.md` and execute it fully in `/home/jwoltje/src/stack-p1` on branch `feat/webui-p2-data-auth`. Run every listed verification gate, commit locally only, and do not push.
Container path mapping:
- Brief: `/home/jwoltje/distrobox-homes/mosaic-dev/briefs/P2-brief.md`
- Repo: `/home/jwoltje/distrobox-homes/mosaic-dev/src/stack-p1`
## Objective
Make the P1 Vite SPA authenticate against the Mosaic Gateway by same-origin relative paths, replace guest-route placeholders with real login/register/SSO callback pages, and enforce guest/authenticated route guards without modifying the parallel Next app tree except for unavoidable shared-library import fixes.
## Scope and invariants
- All SPA HTTP and Socket.IO access remains origin-relative (`/api/...`, `/api/auth/...`, `/chat`).
- No `NEXT_PUBLIC_*`, `VITE_*` origin setting, or hard-coded `http://localhost:14242` under `apps/web/src/`.
- Verify the Gateway BetterAuth mount path from source before choosing auth-client configuration.
- Delete the legacy static SSO-provider discovery module and test; runtime `/api/sso/providers` is canonical.
- Preserve the Next build while adding React Router guest pages and session guards.
- Never push; stage named files only; do not touch the modified `.mosaic/orchestrator/session.lock`.
## Plan
1. Inspect P1 SPA structure, shared libraries, legacy Next auth pages/components, Gateway auth mount, and current test setup.
2. Add/adjust tests first for relative API behavior, auth-client origin configuration, relative Socket.IO singleton behavior, and all guard session states; run focused tests and capture expected RED failures.
3. Implement shared-library relative networking and remove the legacy SSO-provider module/imports.
4. Port login, register, and provider callback pages to React Router and wire routes.
5. Implement session-aware guest/auth guards and satisfy focused tests.
6. Run focused tests, all brief verification gates, invariant searches, and an independent code/security review; remediate and re-run affected gates.
7. Update this scratchpad with evidence, stage named files only, and commit locally.
## Testing strategy
- TDD is required because this increment changes authentication/session behavior.
- Primary situational evidence: jsdom router guard state tests plus guest-page/auth-flow contract tests already present or added as needed.
- Baseline gates: web tests, Vite build, Next build, typecheck, lint, and root format check exactly as listed in the brief.
- Browser automation is not required by the brief for P2; if used, it will be headless only.
## Budget
No explicit user token cap was provided. Working soft cap: **30K tokens**, derived from a multi-file auth/frontend increment with tests, dual builds, review, and remediation. Keep implementation within the brief; no unrelated refactors or dependencies.
## Progress / evidence
- [x] Loaded mission protocol, active MVP manifest/scratchpad, top-level tasks, PRD, relevant frontend/auth/testing/type/review guides, and matching skills.
- [x] Resolved host paths to the Distrobox-mapped repo and brief.
- [x] Confirmed branch `feat/webui-p2-data-auth`, stacked at P1 commit `068d0f9b`.
- [x] Source and Gateway mount inspection complete.
- [x] RED tests observed.
- [x] Implementation complete.
- [x] Independent review complete and findings remediated.
- [x] Verification gates complete.
- [x] Local implementation commit created: `46d68e1f`.
### Source decisions
- Gateway source mounts BetterAuth at `/api/auth/` in `apps/gateway/src/auth/auth.controller.ts`; `packages/auth/src/auth.ts` configures `basePath: '/api/auth'`.
- BetterAuth 1.5.5 defaults its browser client to `/api/auth` when `baseURL` is omitted. `src/lib/auth-client.ts` therefore omits `baseURL`, preserving same-origin behavior without encoding any gateway origin.
- The only `src/app/` edit is the transitional Next provider redirect page. Deleting `src/lib/sso-providers.ts` required that mechanical consumer migration; it now uses the same runtime `/api/sso/providers` discovery and callback sanitizer as the SPA.
- GuestGuard pending behavior intentionally follows the approved brief: if no session object exists (including pending), render `<Outlet />`; only a present session redirects to `/chat`. AuthGuard alone renders the specified pending treatment.
### TDD evidence
- Initial focused run: 9 expected failures, proving absolute API/auth/socket origins, P1 guest placeholders, and missing guard redirects/loading behavior.
- After implementation: focused contract suite 15/15 passed.
- Security remediation RED: `%2F%0A%2F%2Fevil.example` reached `signIn.oauth2` as an external-normalizing callback target before the fix.
- Security remediation GREEN: shared `resolveAuthCallbackURL` unit suite 9/9 plus SPA callback regression 1/1 passed; both SPA and Next consumers use the shared helper.
### Independent review
- Primary Codex wrappers could not run because `jq` is absent; direct Codex fallback then failed authentication with HTTP 401. No review result was claimed from those attempts.
- Independent Claude Sonnet code review found no implementation-scope blocker, one pending-state UX suggestion, and one pre-existing `api.ts` type-assertion suggestion. The pending-state suggestion was rejected because it contradicts the brief's explicit GuestGuard contract; the API cleanup is outside P2's preserve-contract scope.
- Independent Claude Sonnet security review found a high-severity control-character open redirect in the callback prefix check shared by the newly ported SPA logic and transitional Next consumer.
- Remediation centralized WHATWG URL parsing plus exact current-origin comparison in `src/lib/auth-redirect.ts`, returns only path/search/hash, and added the RED-first regression above.
- Fresh code re-review: `approve`, 0 blockers, 0 should-fix findings.
- Fresh security re-review: `low`, 0 critical/high/medium/low findings.
### Documentation checklist disposition
- `docs/PRD.md` exists and P2 aligns to FR-8 / AC-7 authentication requirements.
- No Gateway endpoint, DTO, permission, or API schema changed; existing `/api/auth/*` and `/api/sso/providers` contracts are consumed unchanged, so OpenAPI/API-index updates are not applicable.
- Route paths were already present in the P1 route table; P2 replaces placeholders without changing site-map navigation, so `docs/SITEMAP.md` is unchanged.
- User/admin auth behavior is parity with the still-live Next implementation, not a new workflow. Implementation decisions, failure behavior, testing, and migration compatibility are documented here; no publishing action is in scope.
- Documentation remains in-repo; no generated publishing output was created.
### Final verification evidence
Run fresh after remediation from the locations required by the brief:
- `apps/web: pnpm test` — PASS: `Test Files 9 passed (9)`; `Tests 27 passed (27)`.
- `apps/web: pnpm build:vite` — PASS: `✓ 113 modules transformed`; `✓ built in 565ms`.
- `apps/web: pnpm build` — PASS: `✓ Compiled successfully in 4.6s`; 10/10 static pages generated; dynamic provider/project routes retained.
- `apps/web: pnpm typecheck` — PASS: `tsc --noEmit` exited 0.
- `apps/web: pnpm lint` — PASS: `eslint src` exited 0.
- Root `pnpm format:check` — PASS: `All matched files use Prettier code style!`.
- Invariant scan — PASS: no `NEXT_PUBLIC_*`, `VITE_*`, `GATEWAY_URL`, `http://localhost:14242`, or `sso-providers` references under `apps/web/src`.
- `git diff --check` — PASS.
- All six required gates above were repeated successfully after implementation commit `46d68e1f`, proving the exact committed source tree.
## Risks / blockers
- `.mosaic/orchestrator/session.lock` is modified by the active harness and must remain unstaged.
- P2 changes shared `src/lib/` modules consumed by both Vite and Next, so the Next build is a required compatibility gate.
## Remediation 1 — independent Node 26 verification failure
**Correction received:** 2026-08-09
The orchestrator rejected the P2 verification claim after an independent run under Node 26.4.0 produced 2 failed redirect tests and 2 unhandled errors. React Router passed jsdom's realm-local `AbortSignal` to Node 26's native undici `Request`, which rejects non-native signals. Production guard behavior is correct and must not change.
### Remediation constraints
- Preserve both redirect assertions and all `guards.tsx` behavior; no skips, weakening, or test deletion.
- Add the smallest Vitest environment repair so global `AbortController` / `AbortSignal` are constructors accepted by native undici `Request`.
- Run all six required gates, commit named files locally without pushing, leave `.mosaic/orchestrator/session.lock` untouched, then run `apps/web: pnpm test` as the final worktree action.
- Completion requires zero failed tests, zero test errors, and zero unhandled rejections.
### Remediation plan
1. Reproduce under Node 26.4.0 if an ephemeral matching runtime is available.
2. Add a Vitest `setupFiles` module deriving Node-native abort constructors from `node:util` and register it in `apps/web/vitest.config.ts`.
3. Add a direct regression assertion that a global controller's signal is accepted by native `Request`, while retaining the existing redirect behavior tests unchanged.
4. Run focused Node 22 and Node 26 tests, independent review, all required gates, and local commit(s).
5. After every edit/commit/status check is complete, run `pnpm test` from `apps/web` as the last command.
### Remediation implementation and evidence
- Reproduced under ephemeral Node `v26.4.0`: `Test Files 1 failed (1)`, `Tests 2 failed | 4 passed (6)`, `Errors 2 errors`, with the exact undici `AbortSignal` realm rejection from the remediation brief.
- Added `apps/web/src/test/setup.ts`, registered through `vitest.config.ts#setupFiles`. It derives Node-native abort constructors from the built-in `node:util.transferableAbortController()` and aligns both `globalThis` and jsdom `window`; it does not replace `Request`, `Response`, or `fetch`.
- Explicitly pinned Vitest `isolate: true` so the test-only global constructors cannot leak between test-file environments.
- Added `src/test/setup.spec.ts`, which proves a global controller signal is accepted by Node's native `Request` and that abort propagation remains functional.
- Existing `guards.spec.tsx` and production `guards.tsx` remain unchanged.
- Focused Node 26.4.0 remediation run: `Test Files 2 passed (2)` and `Tests 7 passed (7)`, with zero errors/unhandled rejections.
- Preliminary full Node 26.4.0 run: `Test Files 9 passed (9)` and `Tests 27 passed (27)`, with zero errors/unhandled rejections before the direct setup regression was added.
- No dependency was added; `node:util` is a Node built-in.
### Remediation independent review
- First code review: approve, 0 blockers, 0 should-fix; suggested a direct Request regression and version-neutral comment.
- First security/integrity review: low risk; suggested pinning test isolation explicitly.
- All suggestions were applied.
- Fresh code re-review: approve, 0 blockers, 0 should-fix, no findings.
- Fresh security/integrity re-review: low risk, 0 findings.
### Remediation pre-commit gate evidence
- Node 26.4.0 `pnpm test`: `Test Files 10 passed (10)`; `Tests 28 passed (28)`; zero errors and zero unhandled rejections.
- `pnpm typecheck`: `tsc --noEmit` exited 0.
- `pnpm build:vite`: `✓ 113 modules transformed`; `✓ built in 960ms`.
- `pnpm build` (Next): `✓ Compiled successfully in 4.8s`; static pages generated 10/10.
- `pnpm lint`: `eslint src` exited 0.
- Root `pnpm format:check`: `All matched files use Prettier code style!`.
- Final post-commit non-test gates and final-action Node 26 `pnpm test` remain required before reporting completion.
### Remediation committed verification
- Implementation commit: `e16c08aa` (`test(web): align jsdom abort signals with Node`).
- Post-commit `pnpm typecheck`: `tsc --noEmit` exited 0.
- Post-commit `pnpm build:vite`: `✓ 113 modules transformed`; `✓ built in 323ms`.
- Post-commit `pnpm build` (Next): `✓ Compiled successfully in 4.6s`; static pages generated 10/10.
- Post-commit `pnpm lint`: `eslint src` exited 0.
- Post-commit root `pnpm format:check`: `All matched files use Prettier code style!`.
- Final Node 26 `pnpm test` will be the last worktree action and its verbatim output will be reported to the orchestrator.
-115
View File
@@ -1,115 +0,0 @@
# WebUI Phase P — File / Folder Structure & Migration Map
> **Status:** living document — first pass. Structure and increment status are verified against
> `next` as of merge `8c27024d`. Details (per-surface component inventories, exact route tables,
> test matrices) are still being fleshed out; extend the stub sections below rather than rewriting
> the verified structure.
## 1. What Phase P is
Phase P migrates the Mosaic **web UI** (`apps/web`) from the legacy **Next.js App Router** app to a
**Vite + React Router single-page app (SPA)** that the **Gateway serves same-origin** on
`:14242`. The RFC splits the work into **six increments (P1P6)**; the P1 PR title records this as
"increment 1/6".
The migration is deliberately **incremental and non-destructive**: the new SPA is built up
_beside_ the existing Next app, sharing one `apps/web/src/lib` networking/auth layer, until the
final cutover (P5) removes the Next tree. At every point in between, **both app trees exist in the
same package** — this is intentional, not drift.
## 2. Current tree on `next` (dual-app, transitional)
```
apps/web/
├── next.config.ts # legacy Next.js config (removed at P5)
├── vite.config.ts # SPA build + DEV proxy config (canonical from P5)
├── package.json # dev/build default to NEXT today; :vite variants opt in
└── src/
├── main.tsx # ── SPA entry (Vite)
├── routes.tsx # ── SPA React Router route table
├── spa/ # ── NEW SPA surfaces
│ ├── guards.tsx # guest / authenticated route guards
│ ├── pages/ # login, register, sso-callback (P2); chat + error boundary (P3)
│ └── chat/ # P3 typed chat: use-chat-connection, commands-panel,
│ # session-panel, message-transcript, tool-call-list, composer
├── lib/ # ── SHARED by BOTH trees (origin-relative networking + auth)
│ ├── api.ts # fetch wrapper — relative /api/...
│ ├── socket.ts # Socket.IO singleton — relative /chat
│ ├── auth-client.ts # BetterAuth client — relative /api/auth/...
│ ├── auth-redirect.ts # post-auth redirect resolution (protocol-relative rejected)
│ ├── chat-contract.ts # P3 typed chat wire contract (runtime-guarded)
│ ├── sso.ts · types.ts · cn.ts
├── app/ # ══ LEGACY Next.js App Router (removed at P5)
│ ├── (auth)/{login,register}/
│ ├── (dashboard)/{admin,chat,projects,projects/[id],settings,tasks}/
│ ├── auth/provider/[provider]/
│ └── layout.tsx · page.tsx · globals.css
├── components/ # ══ LEGACY Next component library (auth, chat, layout,
│ # projects, settings, tasks, ui) — ported into spa/ across P3/P4
└── providers/ # ══ theme-provider (legacy; SPA equivalent under providers)
```
Legend: `──` new SPA (keep), `══` legacy Next (removed at P5), shared `lib/` in the middle.
## 3. Networking / serving model (why it's same-origin)
- The SPA speaks **origin-relative paths only**: `/api/...`, `/api/auth/...`, `/chat`. No
`NEXT_PUBLIC_*` / `VITE_*` origin var, no hard-coded `http://localhost:14242` under
`apps/web/src`.
- **Dev:** `vite.config.ts` runs a dev-only proxy that forwards those paths to the Gateway (so the
SPA on its dev port and the Gateway on `:14242` behave as one origin).
- **Prod (target):** the SPA is **same-origin with the Gateway** — the Gateway serves the built
static bundle and the API/WS on `:14242`, so no proxy and no CORS. _(The Gateway does not serve
the web `dist` yet — adding that is the core of P5; see §5.)_
## 4. Build scripts (`apps/web/package.json`)
| Script | Today | Notes |
| ----------------------------- | -------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------ |
| `dev` | `next dev` | legacy dev server |
| `dev:vite` | `vite` | SPA dev server (+ dev proxy) |
| `build` | `node ../../scripts/build-web.mjs` | currently a **Next** build |
| `build:vite` | `vite build` | SPA production build → `dist/` |
| `lint` / `typecheck` / `test` | `eslint src` / `tsc --noEmit` / `vitest run` | tree-agnostic |
At **P5** the `:vite` variants become the defaults (`dev`→vite, `build`→vite build) and the Next
build path is retired.
## 5. Increment map (P1P6)
| # | Increment | Branch | Status |
| ------ | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ----------------------------- | ------------------------- |
| **P1** | Vite + React Router skeleton beside Next (entry, router, guards, vitest) | `feat/webui-p1-vite-skeleton` | ✅ merged — PR **#1143** |
| **P2** | SPA data layer + same-origin auth (login/register/SSO pages, guards, relative api/socket/auth-client) | `feat/webui-p2-data-auth` | ✅ merged — PR **#1144** |
| **P3** | Typed SPA **chat** (`spa/chat/*`, `chat-contract.ts`, chat page + error boundary) | `feat/webui-p3-chat` | 🚧 in progress (unmerged) |
| **P4** | Port **projects / tasks / settings / admin** dashboard surfaces into the SPA | _tbd_ | ⏳ not started |
| **P5** | **Cutover**: Gateway serves the Vite `dist` on `:14242`; flip `dev`/`build` to vite; **remove** the legacy Next `app/` tree + `next.config.ts` | _tbd_ | ⏳ not started |
| **P6** | CI / images (trails): build the SPA in CI, ship images | _tbd_ | ⏳ trails |
Each increment follows the same delivery pipeline: brief traceable to the RFC → author →
**independent** integrator verification (build+test+typecheck+lint) → **independent** code + security
review (author ≠ reviewer) → author remediates → branch + PR to `next`**independent** merge-gate
merges. Author self-reports are not trusted; every gate is re-derived independently.
## 6. Known dependency / blocker
- **Issue #1145 — Gateway `dist` boot is broken** (DI failure on a defaulted constructor param);
the Gateway currently runs **dev-mode only**. This is a **hard precondition for P5**: the Gateway
cannot serve the SPA `dist` on `:14242` until `dist` boot works. P3/P4 remain on the dev-proxy
topology meanwhile.
## 7. Not part of Phase P (disambiguation)
`docs/plans/2026-08-09-webui-fleet-claude-bridge.md` and
`docs/scratchpads/webui-fleet-bridge-plan.md` describe a **separate** WebUI ↔ fleet/Claude bridge
effort. They are **not** the Phase P SPA migration and should not be conflated with the increments
above.
## 8. Where the detail lives (extend these)
- Per-increment working notes: `docs/scratchpads/webui-p*-*.md` (e.g. `webui-p2-data-auth.md`).
- _Stub — to flesh out:_ per-surface component inventory (which `components/*` port to which
`spa/*`), the full SPA route table, the P5 cutover checklist, and the P6 CI/image plan.
+1 -2
View File
@@ -10,8 +10,7 @@
"clean:generated": "node scripts/clean-generated.mjs",
"typecheck": "pnpm preflight && turbo run typecheck",
"test:checkout": "node --test scripts/*.test.mjs",
"test": "pnpm test:checkout && turbo run test && pnpm run test:installer",
"test:installer": "bash tools/install-next-lane.test.sh",
"test": "pnpm test:checkout && turbo run test",
"format": "prettier --write \"**/*.{ts,tsx,js,jsx,json,md}\"",
"format:check": "prettier --check \"**/*.{ts,tsx,js,jsx,json,md}\"",
"prepare": "node scripts/install-hooks.mjs"
@@ -11,37 +11,9 @@ import { join } from 'node:path';
import { tmpdir } from 'node:os';
import { HeadlessPrompter } from '../../src/prompter/headless-prompter.js';
import { createConfigService } from '../../src/config/config-service.js';
import type { SelectOption } from '../../src/prompter/interface.js';
import type { MenuSection, WizardState } from '../../src/types.js';
const gatewayConfigMock = vi.fn();
const gatewayBootstrapMock = vi.fn();
const providerSetupMock = vi.fn();
const skillsSelectMock = vi.fn();
class SequencedMenuPrompter extends HeadlessPrompter {
constructor(
answers: Record<string, string | boolean | string[]>,
private readonly menuChoices: string[],
) {
super(answers);
}
override async select<T>(opts: {
message: string;
options: SelectOption<T>[];
initialValue?: T;
}): Promise<T> {
if (opts.message === 'What would you like to configure?') {
const next = this.menuChoices.shift();
if (!next) throw new Error('No queued menu choice left');
const match = opts.options.find((o) => String(o.value) === next);
if (!match) throw new Error(`Queued menu choice not available: ${next}`);
return match.value;
}
return super.select(opts);
}
}
vi.mock('../../src/stages/gateway-config.js', () => ({
gatewayConfigStage: (...args: unknown[]) => gatewayConfigMock(...args),
@@ -51,14 +23,6 @@ vi.mock('../../src/stages/gateway-bootstrap.js', () => ({
gatewayBootstrapStage: (...args: unknown[]) => gatewayBootstrapMock(...args),
}));
vi.mock('../../src/stages/provider-setup.js', () => ({
providerSetupStage: (...args: unknown[]) => providerSetupMock(...args),
}));
vi.mock('../../src/stages/skills-select.js', () => ({
skillsSelectStage: (...args: unknown[]) => skillsSelectMock(...args),
}));
// Import AFTER the mocks so runWizard picks up the mocked stage modules.
import { runWizard } from '../../src/wizard.js';
@@ -80,16 +44,6 @@ describe('Unified wizard (runWizard with default skipGateway)', () => {
}
gatewayConfigMock.mockReset();
gatewayBootstrapMock.mockReset();
providerSetupMock.mockReset();
skillsSelectMock.mockReset();
providerSetupMock.mockImplementation(async (_p: HeadlessPrompter, state: WizardState) => {
state.providerType = 'none';
state.completedSections?.add('providers' satisfies MenuSection);
});
skillsSelectMock.mockImplementation(async (_p: HeadlessPrompter, state: WizardState) => {
state.selectedSkills = [];
state.completedSections?.add('skills' satisfies MenuSection);
});
// Pretend we're on an interactive TTY so the wizard's headless-abort
// branch does not call `process.exit(1)` during these tests.
Object.defineProperty(process.stdin, 'isTTY', { value: true, configurable: true });
@@ -144,12 +98,8 @@ describe('Unified wizard (runWizard with default skipGateway)', () => {
expect(bootstrapCall[2]).toMatchObject({ host: 'localhost', port: 14242 });
});
it('prints the success summary only after gateway health succeeds', async () => {
gatewayConfigMock.mockImplementation(async (p: HeadlessPrompter) => {
p.log('Gateway is healthy.');
return { ready: true, host: 'localhost', port: 14242 };
});
gatewayBootstrapMock.mockResolvedValue({ completed: true });
it('does not invoke bootstrap when config stage reports not ready', async () => {
gatewayConfigMock.mockResolvedValue({ ready: false });
const prompter = new HeadlessPrompter({
'Installation mode': 'quick',
@@ -168,43 +118,6 @@ describe('Unified wizard (runWizard with default skipGateway)', () => {
skipGatewayNpmInstall: true,
});
const logs = prompter.getLogs();
const healthIndex = logs.findIndex((line) => line.includes('Gateway is healthy.'));
const summaryIndex = logs.findIndex((line) => line.includes('Installation Summary'));
const readyIndex = logs.findIndex((line) => line.includes('Mosaic is ready.'));
expect(healthIndex).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(0);
expect(summaryIndex).toBeGreaterThan(healthIndex);
expect(readyIndex).toBeGreaterThan(summaryIndex);
});
it('does not claim success when gateway health reports not ready', async () => {
gatewayConfigMock.mockImplementation(async (p: HeadlessPrompter) => {
p.warn('Gateway did not become healthy within 30 seconds.');
return { ready: false };
});
const prompter = new HeadlessPrompter({
'Installation mode': 'quick',
'What name should agents use?': 'TestBot',
'Communication style': 'direct',
'Your name': 'Tester',
'Your pronouns': 'They/Them',
'Your timezone': 'UTC',
});
await runWizard({
mosaicHome: tmpDir,
sourceDir: tmpDir,
prompter,
configService: createConfigService(tmpDir, tmpDir),
skipGatewayNpmInstall: true,
});
const logs = prompter.getLogs();
expect(logs.some((line) => line.includes('Gateway did not become healthy'))).toBe(true);
expect(logs.some((line) => line.includes('Installation Summary'))).toBe(false);
expect(logs.some((line) => line.includes('Mosaic is ready.'))).toBe(false);
expect(gatewayConfigMock).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
expect(gatewayBootstrapMock).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
@@ -230,34 +143,4 @@ describe('Unified wizard (runWizard with default skipGateway)', () => {
expect(gatewayConfigMock).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
expect(gatewayBootstrapMock).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it('does not re-run completed provider or skills menu steps', async () => {
const prompter = new SequencedMenuPrompter(
{
'What name should agents use?': 'TestBot',
'Communication style': 'direct',
'Your name': 'Tester',
'Your pronouns': 'They/Them',
'Your timezone': 'UTC',
},
['providers', 'providers', 'skills', 'skills', 'finish'],
);
await runWizard({
mosaicHome: tmpDir,
sourceDir: tmpDir,
prompter,
configService: createConfigService(tmpDir, tmpDir),
skipGateway: true,
});
expect(providerSetupMock).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
expect(skillsSelectMock).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
expect(prompter.getLogs()).toEqual(
expect.arrayContaining([
expect.stringContaining('Providers [done] is already complete; skipping.'),
expect.stringContaining('Skills [done] is already complete; skipping.'),
]),
);
});
});
+3 -1
View File
@@ -13,7 +13,8 @@ Pi is the native Mosaic agent runtime. The `mosaic pi` launcher:
1. Injects the full runtime contract via `--append-system-prompt`
2. Loads Mosaic skills via `--skill` flags
3. Loads the Mosaic extension via `--extension` for lifecycle hooks
3. Loads framework-owned `mosaic-extension.ts` and `goal-extension.ts` from
`~/.config/mosaic/runtime/pi/` via ordered `--extension` flags
4. Detects active missions and injects initial prompts
## Capabilities vs Other Runtimes
@@ -22,6 +23,7 @@ Pi is the native Mosaic agent runtime. The `mosaic pi` launcher:
- Native thinking levels replace sequential-thinking MCP
- Native skill discovery compatible with Mosaic SKILL.md format
- Native extension system for lifecycle hooks (TypeScript, not bash shims)
- Bounded persistent `/goal` loop with per-turn, post-compaction, and two-pass evidence checks
- Native session persistence and resume
- Model-agnostic (Anthropic, OpenAI, Google, Ollama, custom providers)
+15 -21
View File
@@ -43,16 +43,6 @@ The installer:
- Runs a health audit
- Detects existing installs and preserves local files (SOUL.md, USER.md, etc.)
### Install lanes
| Lane | Command | Use when | Source |
| ------------------------ | ------------------------------------- | ---------------------------------------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| Stable | `bash tools/install.sh` | You want the released framework and CLI | npm `@mosaicstack/mosaic@latest` + `main` |
| Prerelease integration | `bash tools/install.sh --next` | You want the permanent `next` integration lane | Fast npm `@mosaicstack/mosaic@next` + `@mosaicstack/gateway@next`; source fallback at `next` |
| Contributor/source build | `bash tools/install.sh --dev --ref X` | You are validating a branch before release | Build-from-source at the requested git ref |
`--next` is fast-by-default from the Gitea npm `next` dist-tag and falls back to a source build at the permanent `next` branch if the dist-tag is missing or unreachable. Explicit `--ref` or `MOSAIC_REF` wins and uses the source path.
## First Run
After install, open a new terminal (or `source ~/.bashrc`) and run:
@@ -104,7 +94,14 @@ The launcher:
1. Verifies `~/.config/mosaic` exists
2. Verifies `SOUL.md` exists (auto-runs `mosaic init` if missing)
3. Injects `AGENTS.md` into the runtime
4. Forwards all arguments to the runtime CLI
4. For Pi, loads the framework-owned core and persistent-goal extensions from
`~/.config/mosaic/runtime/pi/`
5. Forwards all arguments to the runtime CLI
Inside `mosaic pi`, `/goal set <statement>` starts a bounded persistent goal loop. Use `/goal status`,
`/goal pause`, `/goal resume`, or `/goal cancel` to control it. The extension remains part of Mosaic
under `~/.config/mosaic/runtime/pi/goal-extension.ts`; it is not installed in Pi's main extension
directory.
You can still launch runtimes directly (`claude`, `codex`, etc.) — thin runtime adapters will tell the agent to read `~/.config/mosaic/AGENTS.md`.
@@ -118,13 +115,13 @@ You can still launch runtimes directly (`claude`, `codex`, etc.) — thin runtim
├── TOOLS.md ← Machine-level tool reference (generated by mosaic init)
├── STANDARDS.md ← Machine-wide standards
├── guides/ ← Operational guides (E2E delivery, PRD, docs, etc.)
├── bin/ ← CLI tools (mosaic launcher, mosaic-init, mosaic-doctor, etc.)
├── tools/ ← Tool suites: git, orchestrator, prdy, quality, etc.
│ └── _scripts/ ← Framework helper scripts (sync skills, doctor, runtime links)
├── runtime/ ← Runtime adapters + runtime-specific references
│ ├── claude/ ← CLAUDE.md, RUNTIME.md, settings.json, hooks
│ ├── codex/ ← instructions.md, RUNTIME.md
│ ├── opencode/ ← AGENTS.md, RUNTIME.md
│ ├── pi/ ← RUNTIME.md, mosaic-extension.ts
│ ├── pi/ ← RUNTIME.md, mosaic-extension.ts, goal-extension.ts
│ └── mcp/ ← MCP server configs
├── skills/ ← Universal skills (synced from mosaic/agent-skills)
├── skills-local/ ← Local cross-runtime skills
@@ -136,7 +133,7 @@ You can still launch runtimes directly (`claude`, `codex`, etc.) — thin runtim
| Launch method | Injection mechanism |
| ------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| `mosaic pi` | `--append-system-prompt` with composed runtime contract + skills + extension |
| `mosaic pi` | `--append-system-prompt` with composed runtime contract + skills + Mosaic extensions |
| `mosaic claude` | `--append-system-prompt` with composed runtime contract (`AGENTS.md` + runtime reference) |
| `mosaic codex` | Writes composed runtime contract to `~/.codex/instructions.md` before launch |
| `mosaic opencode` | Writes composed runtime contract to `~/.config/opencode/AGENTS.md` before launch |
@@ -184,9 +181,7 @@ The installer preserves local `SOUL.md`, `USER.md`, `TOOLS.md`, and `memory/` by
bash tools/install.sh --check # Version check only
bash tools/install.sh --framework # Framework only (skip npm CLI)
bash tools/install.sh --cli # npm CLI only (skip framework)
bash tools/install.sh --next # Prerelease lane: npm @next, source fallback
bash tools/install.sh --dev # Contributor lane: source build at --ref/main
bash tools/install.sh --ref v1.0 # Install from a specific git ref (--ref wins over --next)
bash tools/install.sh --ref v1.0 # Install from a specific git ref
```
The installer rejects unrecognized flags or positional arguments before making changes and prints the supported-option usage.
@@ -197,7 +192,6 @@ The installer syncs skills from `mosaic/agent-skills` into `~/.config/mosaic/ski
```bash
mosaic sync # Full canonical catalog sync
~/.config/mosaic/tools/_scripts/mosaic-sync-skills --link-only # Re-link only
mosaic skill list # Show registered, missing, dangling, and foreign entries
mosaic skill register <name> # Register or repair one canonical Claude link
mosaic skill unregister <name> # Remove one Mosaic-owned Claude link
@@ -211,7 +205,7 @@ M1 lifecycle management targets Claude Code. Pi can discover the canonical Mosai
```bash
mosaic doctor # Standard audit
~/.config/mosaic/tools/_scripts/mosaic-doctor --fail-on-warn # Strict mode
~/.config/mosaic/bin/mosaic-doctor --fail-on-warn # Strict mode
```
## MCP Registration
@@ -222,8 +216,8 @@ sequential-thinking MCP is required for Mosaic Stack. The installer registers it
To verify or re-register manually:
```bash
~/.config/mosaic/tools/_scripts/mosaic-ensure-sequential-thinking
~/.config/mosaic/tools/_scripts/mosaic-ensure-sequential-thinking --check
~/.config/mosaic/bin/mosaic-ensure-sequential-thinking
~/.config/mosaic/bin/mosaic-ensure-sequential-thinking --check
```
### Claude Code MCP Registration
@@ -52,6 +52,52 @@ If a repo does not expose these scripts, run equivalent local workflow commands
- Do not auto-resolve data conflicts in shared state files.
- Keep commits scoped to a single logical change set.
## Model Tiering
Model choice is a standard, not a preference. Delegating a mechanical grep to a
frontier reasoning model wastes budget; sending a security review to a cheap tier
produces a review that passes and proves nothing. Both are defects.
Tiers are named by **capability class**, so the standard survives a model
generation. An operator binds each class to a concrete model id.
| Class | Use for |
| ------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| `search` | grep/glob, file location, status and health checks, one-line mechanical edits |
| `build` | feature implementation, test writing, bugfixes, routine refactors |
| `judge` | code review, planning, API/compat-sensitive changes |
| `adversarial` | security review, ambiguous architecture, anything where a wrong "looks fine" is expensive |
Rules:
1. **Start at the cheapest class that can do the task; escalate on evidence, not
on nerves.** Omitting a tier is not neutral — it inherits the caller's model,
which is usually the most expensive one.
2. **Compat-sensitive work escalates one class.** A change that must interoperate
with an existing contract is judged, not just built.
3. **A tier assignment is benchmarked, not asserted.** Move a task class to a
cheaper tier only against a blind A/B on real work from this codebase, ranked
by someone other than the author. "It seemed fine" is not evidence.
4. **Reviewer independence beats reviewer size.** An `adversarial` verdict from
the model that wrote the code is not a second opinion (see Constitution gate 16).
### Where the binding lives
The class→model map is operator configuration, never framework source: model
availability, cost, and quotas differ per operator and per host.
Resolution order, first hit wins:
1. the config service (DB-backed, surfaced and editable in the Mosaic webUI)
2. a local operator file (`STANDARDS.local.md`, or `policy/` where the runtime
injects it)
3. the framework default — the class names above, with no binding
Only layer 1 is auditable across a fleet, so it is the target end state; layers 2
and 3 exist so a host with no config service still runs. A local override that
silently disagrees with the config service is drift — the same failure class the
tool-index gate exists to catch, and it belongs in `mosaic doctor`.
## Prompting Contract
All runtime adapters should inject:
@@ -11,22 +11,105 @@ All tool suites are located at `~/.config/mosaic/tools/`.
Mosaic wrappers at `~/.config/mosaic/tools/git/*.sh` handle platform detection and edge cases. Always use these before raw CLI commands.
This index is complete and is kept complete mechanically: `tools/quality/scripts/check-tools-index.sh`
fails CI when a wrapper ships without an entry here, or when an entry here names a wrapper that no
longer exists. A wrapper missing from this list is, from inside an agent session, indistinguishable
from a wrapper that was never written — which is how the APPROVE/APPROVED incident below happened.
Every command takes `--help`. All of them accept `--login <account>` to pin the acting identity;
supply it explicitly on any host where the provider CLI's default account is an admin.
| Issues | |
| ------------------ | --------------------------------- |
| `issue-create.sh` | Create an issue (Gitea or GitHub) |
| `issue-view.sh` | Show one issue |
| `issue-list.sh` | List issues |
| `issue-edit.sh` | Edit title/body/labels/milestone |
| `issue-comment.sh` | Add a comment |
| `issue-assign.sh` | Assign or unassign |
| `issue-close.sh` | Close an issue |
| `issue-reopen.sh` | Reopen a closed issue |
| Pull requests | |
| ---------------- | --------------------------------------------------------- |
| `pr-create.sh` | Open a pull request |
| `pr-view.sh` | Show one PR |
| `pr-list.sh` | List PRs |
| `pr-diff.sh` | Fetch a PR's diff |
| `pr-metadata.sh` | PR metadata as JSON (head SHA, base, state, mergeability) |
| `pr-review.sh` | **Place a review verdict — see the dialect note below** |
| `pr-ci-wait.sh` | Block until the PR's CI reaches a terminal state |
| `pr-merge.sh` | Merge a PR |
| `pr-close.sh` | Close a PR without merging |
| Milestones | |
| --------------------- | ------------------ |
| `milestone-create.sh` | Create a milestone |
| `milestone-list.sh` | List milestones |
| `milestone-close.sh` | Close a milestone |
| Gates and guards | |
| ----------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| `ci-queue-wait.sh` | CI queue guard — required before push/merge (see below) |
| `push-guard.sh` | Refuse verifications that pass for the wrong reason (e.g. green against an unpushed tree) |
| `mutate-push-guard.sh` | Regenerate the guard's mutation-coverage table from measurement, so the table cannot drift from the guard |
| `verify-clean-clone.sh` | Prove the **committed** artifact runs, from a clean clone — not the working tree |
| Context | |
| -------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| `detect-platform.sh` | Resolve the provider (Gitea vs GitHub) for the current repo; every other wrapper uses it |
| `lane-brief.sh` | Live dispatch brief for a repo "lane" (milestone/label) straight from the provider |
| Workspace | |
| -------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
| `mosaic-worktree.sh` | Create/list/remove git worktrees — **the only supported way**; see below |
| `wrapper-guard.sh` | PreToolUse hook that enforces the two rules above; not called by hand |
**Workspace placement is derived, not chosen.** `mosaic-worktree.sh new <branch>` takes a branch
name and nothing else. Every path comes out of `git worktree list --porcelain` — main worktree,
repo name, parent dir, then `<parent>/<repo>-worktrees/<branch-slug>`. There is no placement flag
because a decision an agent has to make is a decision that drifts: the rule "big work goes on a work
filesystem" already existed in prose and 255 GB accumulated in `$HOME` across 842 directories
anyway, under five simultaneous conventions on a single host.
```bash
# Issues
~/.config/mosaic/tools/git/issue-create.sh
~/.config/mosaic/tools/git/issue-close.sh
~/.config/mosaic/tools/git/mosaic-worktree.sh new <branch> [--from <base>]
~/.config/mosaic/tools/git/mosaic-worktree.sh path <branch> # derived path, no side effect
~/.config/mosaic/tools/git/mosaic-worktree.sh list # this repo's worktrees + state
~/.config/mosaic/tools/git/mosaic-worktree.sh rm <branch> # removal is part of the task
~/.config/mosaic/tools/git/mosaic-worktree.sh gc [--apply] # reclaim clean + fully-pushed ones
```
# PRs
~/.config/mosaic/tools/git/pr-create.sh
~/.config/mosaic/tools/git/pr-merge.sh
Worktrees rather than clones, because `git worktree list` makes every checkout enumerable — a bare
clone dropped somewhere on disk can never be safely reclaimed, so it is never reclaimed. `rm` and
`gc` decide by **evidence, never by size or age**: a worktree is reclaimable only when
`git status --porcelain` is empty _and_ `git rev-list --count HEAD --not --remotes` is 0. Anything
else is preserved and reported. `--force` exists and is yours to type deliberately.
# Milestones
~/.config/mosaic/tools/git/milestone-create.sh
`wrapper-guard.sh` is registered as a Claude Code `PreToolUse` hook on `Bash` (see
`runtime/claude/settings.json`). It blocks exactly three things and lets everything else through:
a `git clone`/`git worktree add` targeting `$HOME`; a raw provider-API **write** to an endpoint that
already has a wrapper above (reads are untouched — they are how you gather evidence); and the
literal `"event": "APPROVE"`. For a genuine gap no wrapper can express, prefix
`MOSAIC_WRAPPER_OVERRIDE=1`. Reaching for the override twice for the same call means the wrapper has
a missing flag — extend the wrapper.
```bash
~/.config/mosaic/tools/git/issue-create.sh --help
~/.config/mosaic/tools/git/pr-review.sh --pr 42 --event APPROVED --body "..."
# CI queue guard (required before push/merge; defaults to the checked-out branch)
~/.config/mosaic/tools/git/ci-queue-wait.sh --purpose push|merge
```
**Review dialect — the reason `pr-review.sh` is not optional.** Gitea's approve event is
`APPROVED`; GitHub's is `APPROVE`. Send GitHub's spelling to a Gitea host and it answers **HTTP
200**, files the review as PENDING, and then rejects the submit with `422 review stay pending` — the
verdict looks placed and is not. (`REQUEST_CHANGES` is spelled identically on both, so only the
approve path carries the trap.) `pr-review.sh` sends the correct token for the detected provider.
Whatever you use, re-read `GET /pulls/{n}/reviews` and assert the state before reporting a verdict
placed.
The guard exits nonzero for any provider-asserted non-green, missing, or malformed CI state. If credentials or the provider are unavailable, it emits `CANNOT_ASSERT` and writes a JSONL audit record. Push degrades to exit 0 so recovery work is not bricked; merge holds with retryable exit 75 until the provider recovers, then self-clears without manual reset. Neither outcome is evidence that CI was clear. `pr-merge.sh` automatically inspects the exact PR head repository and full commit SHA rather than its `main` base; this also handles fork PRs without branch-name ambiguity. Pass `--expect-head <approved-full-sha>` to bind a commit-specific review or merge-gate verdict; Gitea uses atomic `head_commit_id` and GitHub uses `--match-head-commit`.
### Code Review (Codex)
@@ -52,6 +52,16 @@
"timeout": 10
}
]
},
{
"matcher": "Bash",
"hooks": [
{
"type": "command",
"command": "~/.config/mosaic/tools/git/wrapper-guard.sh",
"timeout": 10
}
]
}
],
"PostToolUse": [
@@ -51,12 +51,26 @@ Skills are discovered from:
### Extensions
The Mosaic Pi extension (`~/.config/mosaic/runtime/pi/mosaic-extension.ts`) handles:
`mosaic pi` loads framework-owned extensions directly from `~/.config/mosaic/runtime/pi/` in this
order:
- Session start/end lifecycle hooks
- Active mission detection and context injection
- Memory routing to `~/.config/mosaic/memory/`
- MACP queue status reporting
1. `mosaic-extension.ts` — session lifecycle, mission context, memory routing, lease/mutator gates,
and fleet heartbeat reporting.
2. `goal-extension.ts` — optional persistent `/goal` controller with per-turn and post-compaction
checks.
The goal extension is deployed by Mosaic and MUST NOT be copied into `~/.pi/agent/extensions/`.
Use `/goal set <statement>` (or `/goal <statement>`) to start, then `/goal status`, `/goal pause`,
`/goal resume`, or `/goal cancel` to control it. An active goal is injected before every model
request, restored from branch-specific session entries, and considered achieved only after two
consecutive evidence-bearing reports. Common credential shapes are redacted before controller-owned
goal-state entries are persisted or
displayed; Pi's own model/tool-call history is separate. Goals and reports must contain references
and pass/fail summaries rather than secrets or raw sensitive output.
- `MOSAIC_GOAL_MAX_TURNS` — autonomous turn limit, default `40`, accepted range `1..500`.
- `MOSAIC_GOAL_MAX_NO_PROGRESS` — identical no-progress report limit, default `6`, accepted range
`1..100`.
### Sessions
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