fix(fleet): export MOSAIC_AGENT_CLASS into the agent pane so personas inject

A3a/A3b ship a per-agent persona contract that the launcher composes from
process.env.MOSAIC_AGENT_CLASS (compose-contract -> readPersonaContractBlock,
launch.js). generateAgentEnv already writes MOSAIC_AGENT_CLASS to
agents/<name>.env, but start-agent-session.sh only re-exported
MOSAIC_AGENT_NAME into the pane snippet — never the class.

The pane inherits the tmux SERVER environment, not this script's env nor the
systemd unit's EnvironmentFile, so the class set in the .env was invisible
in-pane. The launcher then saw an undefined class and silently injected NO
persona contract: every fleet agent came up class-less while `fleet ps`
reported healthy. The comms block kept working only because it keys on
MOSAIC_AGENT_NAME (which IS re-exported).

Fix: re-export MOSAIC_AGENT_CLASS into PANE_SHELL_SNIPPET exactly as
MOSAIC_AGENT_NAME, %q-quoted (empty/unset class -> '' is a harmless no-op,
matching readPersonaContractBlock's empty-class contract). Verified live: a
relaunched agent now carries MOSAIC_AGENT_CLASS in its pane env and the
matching `# Persona Contract (<class>)` block in its composed prompt.

Adds a regression guard to test-start-agent-session.sh asserting the pane
snippet exports both MOSAIC_AGENT_NAME and the per-agent MOSAIC_AGENT_CLASS.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

.prettierignore

@@ -5,5 +5,3 @@ pnpm-lock.yaml
 **/drizzle
 **/.next
 .claude/
-docs/tess/TASKS.md
-docs/scratchpads/

.woodpecker/ci.yml

@@ -7,14 +7,7 @@ variables:
   - &enable_pnpm 'corepack enable'
 
 when:
-  # PR + manual CI run on any branch — the pull_request pipeline is the merge gate.
-  # push CI is restricted to protected branches (main) so a feature-branch push no
-  # longer fires a redundant SECOND pipeline alongside its PR pipeline. This ~halves
-  # CI load on the storage-constrained runner with zero loss of gating (branch
-  # protection requires no push/ci status context; main still gets full push CI).
-  - event: [pull_request, manual]
-  - event: push
-    branch: main
+  - event: [push, pull_request, manual]
 
 # Turbo remote cache (turbo.mosaicstack.dev) is configured via Woodpecker
 # repository-level environment variables (TURBO_API, TURBO_TEAM, TURBO_TOKEN).

apps/gateway/src/admin/admin-health.controller.ts

@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ export class AdminHealthController {
   async check(): Promise<HealthStatusDto> {
     const [database, cache] = await Promise.all([this.checkDatabase(), this.checkCache()]);
 
-    const sessions = this.agentService.listAllSessionsForSystem();
+    const sessions = this.agentService.listSessions();
     const providers = this.providerService.listProviders();
 
     const allOk = database.status === 'ok' && cache.status === 'ok';

apps/gateway/src/agent/__tests__/agent-service-ownership.test.ts

@@ -1,142 +0,0 @@
-import { ForbiddenException } from '@nestjs/common';
-import { describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest';
-import { AgentService, type AgentSession } from '../agent.service.js';
-import type { ActorTenantScope } from '../../auth/session-scope.js';
-
-const CONVERSATION_ID = '22222222-2222-4222-8222-222222222222';
-const OWNER_SCOPE: ActorTenantScope = { userId: 'owner-user', tenantId: 'owner-tenant' };
-const FOREIGN_SCOPE: ActorTenantScope = { userId: 'foreign-user', tenantId: 'foreign-tenant' };
-
-type AgentServiceInternals = {
-  sessions: Map<string, AgentSession>;
-  creating: Map<string, Promise<AgentSession>>;
-};
-
-function makeService(): AgentService {
-  return new AgentService(
-    {} as never,
-    {} as never,
-    {} as never,
-    { available: false } as never,
-    {} as never,
-    {} as never,
-    {} as never,
-    null,
-    null,
-    { collect: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined) } as never,
-  );
-}
-
-function internals(service: AgentService): AgentServiceInternals {
-  return service as unknown as AgentServiceInternals;
-}
-
-function makeSession(scope: ActorTenantScope = OWNER_SCOPE): AgentSession {
-  return {
-    id: CONVERSATION_ID,
-    provider: 'test-provider',
-    modelId: 'test-model',
-    piSession: {
-      thinkingLevel: 'off',
-      getAvailableThinkingLevels: vi.fn().mockReturnValue(['off', 'low', 'high']),
-      setThinkingLevel: vi.fn(),
-      abort: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined),
-      prompt: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined),
-      dispose: vi.fn(),
-      getSessionStats: vi.fn(),
-      getContextUsage: vi.fn(),
-    } as unknown as AgentSession['piSession'],
-    listeners: new Set(),
-    unsubscribe: vi.fn(),
-    createdAt: Date.now(),
-    promptCount: 0,
-    channels: new Set(),
-    skillPromptAdditions: [],
-    sandboxDir: '/tmp/tess-session-ownership-test',
-    allowedTools: null,
-    userId: scope.userId,
-    tenantId: scope.tenantId,
-    metrics: {
-      tokens: { input: 0, output: 0, cacheRead: 0, cacheWrite: 0, total: 0 },
-      modelSwitches: 0,
-      messageCount: 0,
-      lastActivityAt: new Date('2026-07-12T00:00:00Z').toISOString(),
-    },
-  };
-}
-
-describe('AgentService owner/tenant scope enforcement', () => {
-  it('allows owner-scoped operations and rejects foreign scopes for seeded sessions', async () => {
-    const service = makeService();
-    const session = makeSession();
-    internals(service).sessions.set(CONVERSATION_ID, session);
-
-    expect(service.getSession(CONVERSATION_ID, OWNER_SCOPE)).toBe(session);
-    expect(service.getSession(CONVERSATION_ID, FOREIGN_SCOPE)).toBeUndefined();
-    expect(service.getSessionInfo(CONVERSATION_ID, FOREIGN_SCOPE)).toBeUndefined();
-    expect(service.listSessions(OWNER_SCOPE)).toHaveLength(1);
-    expect(service.listSessions(FOREIGN_SCOPE)).toEqual([]);
-
-    service.addChannel(CONVERSATION_ID, 'websocket:owner', OWNER_SCOPE);
-    expect(session.channels.has('websocket:owner')).toBe(true);
-    expect(() => service.addChannel(CONVERSATION_ID, 'websocket:foreign', FOREIGN_SCOPE)).toThrow(
-      ForbiddenException,
-    );
-    expect(() => service.removeChannel(CONVERSATION_ID, 'websocket:owner', FOREIGN_SCOPE)).toThrow(
-      ForbiddenException,
-    );
-
-    expect(() =>
-      service.updateSessionModel(CONVERSATION_ID, 'foreign-model', FOREIGN_SCOPE),
-    ).toThrow(ForbiddenException);
-    service.updateSessionModel(CONVERSATION_ID, 'owner-model', OWNER_SCOPE);
-    expect(session.modelId).toBe('owner-model');
-
-    expect(() =>
-      service.applyAgentConfig(CONVERSATION_ID, 'agent-foreign', 'Foreign Agent', FOREIGN_SCOPE),
-    ).toThrow(ForbiddenException);
-    service.applyAgentConfig(CONVERSATION_ID, 'agent-owner', 'Owner Agent', OWNER_SCOPE);
-    expect(session.agentConfigId).toBe('agent-owner');
-
-    expect(() => service.onEvent(CONVERSATION_ID, vi.fn(), FOREIGN_SCOPE)).toThrow(
-      ForbiddenException,
-    );
-    const cleanup = service.onEvent(CONVERSATION_ID, vi.fn(), OWNER_SCOPE);
-    cleanup();
-
-    await expect(
-      service.prompt(CONVERSATION_ID, 'foreign prompt', FOREIGN_SCOPE),
-    ).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(ForbiddenException);
-    await service.prompt(CONVERSATION_ID, 'owner prompt', OWNER_SCOPE);
-    expect(session.piSession.prompt).toHaveBeenCalledWith('owner prompt');
-
-    await expect(service.destroySession(CONVERSATION_ID, FOREIGN_SCOPE)).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(
-      ForbiddenException,
-    );
-    expect(internals(service).sessions.has(CONVERSATION_ID)).toBe(true);
-
-    await service.destroySession(CONVERSATION_ID, OWNER_SCOPE);
-    expect(session.piSession.dispose).toHaveBeenCalled();
-    expect(internals(service).sessions.has(CONVERSATION_ID)).toBe(false);
-  });
-
-  it('checks owner/tenant scope before returning an in-flight session creation', async () => {
-    const service = makeService();
-    const session = makeSession();
-    internals(service).creating.set(CONVERSATION_ID, Promise.resolve(session));
-
-    await expect(
-      service.createSession(CONVERSATION_ID, {
-        userId: FOREIGN_SCOPE.userId,
-        tenantId: FOREIGN_SCOPE.tenantId,
-      }),
-    ).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(ForbiddenException);
-
-    await expect(
-      service.createSession(CONVERSATION_ID, {
-        userId: OWNER_SCOPE.userId,
-        tenantId: OWNER_SCOPE.tenantId,
-      }),
-    ).resolves.toBe(session);
-  });
-});

apps/gateway/src/agent/__tests__/session-ownership.test.ts

@@ -1,262 +0,0 @@
-import { readFileSync } from 'node:fs';
-import { resolve } from 'node:path';
-import { ForbiddenException, NotFoundException } from '@nestjs/common';
-import { describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest';
-
-vi.mock('../agent.service.js', () => ({ AgentService: class AgentService {} }));
-vi.mock('../../commands/command-executor.service.js', () => ({
-  CommandExecutorService: class CommandExecutorService {},
-}));
-vi.mock('../routing/routing-engine.service.js', () => ({
-  RoutingEngineService: class RoutingEngineService {},
-}));
-
-import { SessionsController } from '../sessions.controller.js';
-import { ChatController } from '../../chat/chat.controller.js';
-import { ChatGateway } from '../../chat/chat.gateway.js';
-import type { AgentSession } from '../agent.service.js';
-import type { SessionInfoDto } from '../session.dto.js';
-
-const USER_A = { id: 'user-a', tenantId: 'tenant-a' };
-const USER_B = { id: 'user-b', tenantId: 'tenant-b' };
-const CONVERSATION_ID = '11111111-1111-4111-8111-111111111111';
-
-function makeSessionInfo(overrides?: Partial<SessionInfoDto>): SessionInfoDto {
-  return {
-    id: CONVERSATION_ID,
-    provider: 'test-provider',
-    modelId: 'test-model',
-    createdAt: new Date('2026-07-12T00:00:00Z').toISOString(),
-    promptCount: 0,
-    channels: [],
-    durationMs: 0,
-    metrics: {
-      tokens: { input: 0, output: 0, cacheRead: 0, cacheWrite: 0, total: 0 },
-      modelSwitches: 0,
-      messageCount: 0,
-      lastActivityAt: new Date('2026-07-12T00:00:00Z').toISOString(),
-    },
-    ...overrides,
-  };
-}
-
-function makeAgentSession(owner = USER_A): AgentSession {
-  return {
-    id: CONVERSATION_ID,
-    provider: 'test-provider',
-    modelId: 'test-model',
-    piSession: {
-      thinkingLevel: 'off',
-      getAvailableThinkingLevels: vi.fn().mockReturnValue(['off', 'low', 'high']),
-      setThinkingLevel: vi.fn(),
-      abort: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined),
-      prompt: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined),
-      dispose: vi.fn(),
-      getSessionStats: vi.fn(),
-      getContextUsage: vi.fn(),
-    } as unknown as AgentSession['piSession'],
-    listeners: new Set(),
-    unsubscribe: vi.fn(),
-    createdAt: Date.now(),
-    promptCount: 0,
-    channels: new Set(),
-    skillPromptAdditions: [],
-    sandboxDir: '/tmp',
-    allowedTools: null,
-    userId: owner.id,
-    tenantId: owner.tenantId,
-    metrics: {
-      tokens: { input: 0, output: 0, cacheRead: 0, cacheWrite: 0, total: 0 },
-      modelSwitches: 0,
-      messageCount: 0,
-      lastActivityAt: new Date('2026-07-12T00:00:00Z').toISOString(),
-    },
-  };
-}
-
-function makeScopedAgentService() {
-  const foreign = makeAgentSession(USER_A);
-  return {
-    listSessions: vi.fn((scope?: { userId: string; tenantId?: string }) =>
-      scope?.userId === USER_B.id ? [] : [makeSessionInfo({ id: foreign.id })],
-    ),
-    getSessionInfo: vi.fn((_id: string, scope?: { userId: string; tenantId?: string }) =>
-      scope?.userId === USER_B.id ? undefined : makeSessionInfo({ id: foreign.id }),
-    ),
-    destroySession: vi.fn(),
-    getSession: vi.fn((_id: string, scope?: { userId: string; tenantId?: string }) =>
-      scope?.userId === USER_B.id ? undefined : foreign,
-    ),
-    createSession: vi.fn().mockRejectedValue(new ForbiddenException('Session scope mismatch')),
-    onEvent: vi.fn(() => vi.fn()),
-    addChannel: vi.fn(),
-    removeChannel: vi.fn(),
-    recordMessage: vi.fn(),
-    prompt: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined),
-  };
-}
-
-describe('TESS-M1-SEC-002 AgentService ownership boundary', () => {
-  it('requires explicit owner+tenant scope on protected session operations', () => {
-    const source = readFileSync(resolve('src/agent/agent.service.ts'), 'utf8');
-
-    expect(source).toContain('getSession(sessionId: string, scope: ActorTenantScope)');
-    expect(source).toContain('listSessions(scope: ActorTenantScope)');
-    expect(source).toContain('getSessionInfo(sessionId: string, scope: ActorTenantScope)');
-    expect(source).toContain(
-      'addChannel(sessionId: string, channel: string, scope: ActorTenantScope)',
-    );
-    expect(source).toContain(
-      'removeChannel(sessionId: string, channel: string, scope: ActorTenantScope)',
-    );
-    expect(source).toContain(
-      'async prompt(sessionId: string, message: string, scope: ActorTenantScope)',
-    );
-    expect(source).toContain('scope: ActorTenantScope,');
-    expect(source).toContain('async destroySession(sessionId: string, scope: ActorTenantScope)');
-    expect(source).not.toContain('scope?: ActorTenantScope');
-  });
-});
-
-describe('TESS-M1-SEC-002 REST session ownership and tenant binding', () => {
-  it('lists only sessions owned by the authenticated owner+tenant scope', () => {
-    const agentService = makeScopedAgentService();
-    const controller = new SessionsController(agentService as never);
-
-    expect(controller.list(USER_B)).toEqual({ sessions: [], total: 0 });
-    expect(agentService.listSessions).toHaveBeenCalledWith({
-      userId: USER_B.id,
-      tenantId: USER_B.tenantId,
-    });
-  });
-
-  it('does not reveal another owner/tenant session by guessed id', () => {
-    const agentService = makeScopedAgentService();
-    const controller = new SessionsController(agentService as never);
-
-    expect(() => controller.findOne(CONVERSATION_ID, USER_B)).toThrow(NotFoundException);
-    expect(agentService.getSessionInfo).toHaveBeenCalledWith(CONVERSATION_ID, {
-      userId: USER_B.id,
-      tenantId: USER_B.tenantId,
-    });
-  });
-
-  it('does not terminate another owner/tenant session by guessed id', async () => {
-    const agentService = makeScopedAgentService();
-    const controller = new SessionsController(agentService as never);
-
-    await expect(controller.destroy(CONVERSATION_ID, USER_B)).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(
-      NotFoundException,
-    );
-    expect(agentService.destroySession).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
-  });
-});
-
-describe('TESS-M1-SEC-002 REST chat send ownership and tenant binding', () => {
-  it('does not send a prompt into another owner/tenant session by guessed conversationId', async () => {
-    const agentService = makeScopedAgentService();
-    const controller = new ChatController(agentService as never);
-
-    await expect(
-      controller.chat({ conversationId: CONVERSATION_ID, content: 'take over' }, USER_B),
-    ).rejects.toMatchObject({ status: 404 });
-
-    expect(agentService.getSession).toHaveBeenCalledWith(CONVERSATION_ID, {
-      userId: USER_B.id,
-      tenantId: USER_B.tenantId,
-    });
-    expect(agentService.prompt).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
-  });
-});
-
-describe('TESS-M1-SEC-002 WebSocket session ownership and tenant binding', () => {
-  function makeGateway(agentService = makeScopedAgentService()) {
-    const brain = {
-      conversations: {
-        findById: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined),
-        create: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined),
-        update: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined),
-        findMessages: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue([]),
-        addMessage: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined),
-      },
-    };
-    const commandRegistry = { getManifest: vi.fn().mockReturnValue([]) };
-    const commandExecutor = { execute: vi.fn() };
-    const routingEngine = {
-      resolve: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue({ provider: 'test', model: 'test-model' }),
-    };
-    const gateway = new ChatGateway(
-      agentService as never,
-      {} as never,
-      brain as never,
-      commandRegistry as never,
-      commandExecutor as never,
-      routingEngine as never,
-    );
-    return { gateway, agentService };
-  }
-
-  function makeSocket() {
-    return {
-      id: 'socket-b',
-      connected: true,
-      data: { user: USER_B, session: { id: 'auth-session-b', userId: USER_B.id } },
-      emit: vi.fn(),
-      disconnect: vi.fn(),
-    };
-  }
-
-  it('does not attach or send to another owner/tenant session by guessed conversationId', async () => {
-    const { gateway, agentService } = makeGateway();
-    const socket = makeSocket();
-
-    await gateway.handleMessage(socket as never, {
-      conversationId: CONVERSATION_ID,
-      content: 'attach to foreign session',
-    });
-
-    expect(agentService.getSession).toHaveBeenCalledWith(CONVERSATION_ID, {
-      userId: USER_B.id,
-      tenantId: USER_B.tenantId,
-    });
-    expect(agentService.onEvent).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
-    expect(agentService.addChannel).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
-    expect(agentService.prompt).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
-    expect(socket.emit).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
-      'error',
-      expect.objectContaining({ conversationId: CONVERSATION_ID }),
-    );
-  });
-
-  it('does not mutate thinking level on another owner/tenant session', () => {
-    const { gateway, agentService } = makeGateway();
-    const socket = makeSocket();
-
-    gateway.handleSetThinking(socket as never, { conversationId: CONVERSATION_ID, level: 'high' });
-
-    expect(agentService.getSession).toHaveBeenCalledWith(CONVERSATION_ID, {
-      userId: USER_B.id,
-      tenantId: USER_B.tenantId,
-    });
-    expect(socket.emit).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
-      'error',
-      expect.objectContaining({ conversationId: CONVERSATION_ID }),
-    );
-  });
-
-  it('does not terminate another owner/tenant session over WebSocket abort', async () => {
-    const { gateway, agentService } = makeGateway();
-    const socket = makeSocket();
-
-    await gateway.handleAbort(socket as never, { conversationId: CONVERSATION_ID });
-
-    expect(agentService.getSession).toHaveBeenCalledWith(CONVERSATION_ID, {
-      userId: USER_B.id,
-      tenantId: USER_B.tenantId,
-    });
-    expect(socket.emit).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
-      'error',
-      expect.objectContaining({ conversationId: CONVERSATION_ID }),
-    );
-  });
-});

apps/gateway/src/agent/agent.service.ts

@@ -1,11 +1,4 @@
-import {
-  ForbiddenException,
-  Inject,
-  Injectable,
-  Logger,
-  Optional,
-  type OnModuleDestroy,
-} from '@nestjs/common';
+import { Inject, Injectable, Logger, Optional, type OnModuleDestroy } from '@nestjs/common';
 import {
   createAgentSession,
   DefaultResourceLoader,
@@ -35,7 +28,6 @@ import type { SessionInfoDto, SessionMetrics } from './session.dto.js';
 import { SystemOverrideService } from '../preferences/system-override.service.js';
 import { PreferencesService } from '../preferences/preferences.service.js';
 import { SessionGCService } from '../gc/session-gc.service.js';
-import type { ActorTenantScope } from '../auth/session-scope.js';
 
 /** A single message from DB conversation history, used for context injection. */
 export interface ConversationHistoryMessage {
@@ -76,8 +68,6 @@ export interface AgentSessionOptions {
   agentConfigId?: string;
   /** ID of the user who owns this session. Used for preferences and system override lookups. */
   userId?: string;
-  /** Server-derived tenant scope that owns this session. Falls back to userId for solo users. */
-  tenantId?: string;
   /**
    * Prior conversation messages to inject as context when resuming a session.
    * These messages are formatted and prepended to the system prompt so the
@@ -104,8 +94,6 @@ export interface AgentSession {
   allowedTools: string[] | null;
   /** User ID that owns this session, used for preference lookups. */
   userId?: string;
-  /** Server-derived tenant scope that owns this session. Falls back to userId for solo users. */
-  tenantId?: string;
   /** Agent config ID applied to this session, if any (M5-001). */
   agentConfigId?: string;
   /** Human-readable agent name applied to this session, if any (M5-001). */
@@ -186,20 +174,12 @@ export class AgentService implements OnModuleDestroy {
       .filter((t) => t.length > 0);
   }
 
-  async createSession(sessionId: string, options: AgentSessionOptions): Promise<AgentSession> {
-    const scope = this.scopeFromOptions(options);
+  async createSession(sessionId: string, options?: AgentSessionOptions): Promise<AgentSession> {
     const existing = this.sessions.get(sessionId);
-    if (existing) {
-      this.assertSessionScope(existing, scope);
-      return existing;
-    }
+    if (existing) return existing;
 
     const inflight = this.creating.get(sessionId);
-    if (inflight) {
-      const session = await inflight;
-      this.assertSessionScope(session, scope);
-      return session;
-    }
+    if (inflight) return inflight;
 
     const promise = this.doCreateSession(sessionId, options).finally(() => {
       this.creating.delete(sessionId);
@@ -362,7 +342,6 @@ export class AgentService implements OnModuleDestroy {
       sandboxDir,
       allowedTools,
       userId: mergedOptions?.userId,
-      tenantId: this.tenantIdFor(mergedOptions?.userId, mergedOptions?.tenantId),
       agentConfigId: mergedOptions?.agentConfigId,
       agentName: resolvedAgentName,
       metrics: {
@@ -494,70 +473,38 @@ export class AgentService implements OnModuleDestroy {
     return this.providerService.getDefaultModel() ?? null;
   }
 
-  getSession(sessionId: string, scope: ActorTenantScope): AgentSession | undefined {
-    const session = this.sessions.get(sessionId);
-    if (!session || !this.sessionMatchesScope(session, scope)) return undefined;
-    return session;
+  getSession(sessionId: string): AgentSession | undefined {
+    return this.sessions.get(sessionId);
   }
 
-  listSessions(scope: ActorTenantScope): SessionInfoDto[] {
+  listSessions(): SessionInfoDto[] {
     const now = Date.now();
-    return Array.from(this.sessions.values())
-      .filter((s) => this.sessionMatchesScope(s, scope))
-      .map((s) => this.toSessionInfo(s, now));
+    return Array.from(this.sessions.values()).map((s) => ({
+      id: s.id,
+      provider: s.provider,
+      modelId: s.modelId,
+      ...(s.agentName ? { agentName: s.agentName } : {}),
+      createdAt: new Date(s.createdAt).toISOString(),
+      promptCount: s.promptCount,
+      channels: Array.from(s.channels),
+      durationMs: now - s.createdAt,
+      metrics: { ...s.metrics },
+    }));
   }
 
-  listAllSessionsForSystem(): SessionInfoDto[] {
-    const now = Date.now();
-    return Array.from(this.sessions.values()).map((s) => this.toSessionInfo(s, now));
-  }
-
-  getSessionInfo(sessionId: string, scope: ActorTenantScope): SessionInfoDto | undefined {
+  getSessionInfo(sessionId: string): SessionInfoDto | undefined {
     const s = this.sessions.get(sessionId);
-    if (!s || !this.sessionMatchesScope(s, scope)) return undefined;
-    return this.toSessionInfo(s);
-  }
-
-  private scopeFromOptions(options: AgentSessionOptions): ActorTenantScope {
-    if (!options.userId) {
-      throw new ForbiddenException('Session owner scope is required');
-    }
+    if (!s) return undefined;
     return {
-      userId: options.userId,
-      tenantId: this.tenantIdFor(options.userId, options.tenantId) ?? options.userId,
-    };
-  }
-
-  private tenantIdFor(
-    userId: string | undefined,
-    tenantId: string | undefined,
-  ): string | undefined {
-    return tenantId ?? userId;
-  }
-
-  private sessionMatchesScope(session: AgentSession, scope: ActorTenantScope): boolean {
-    return (
-      session.userId === scope.userId && (session.tenantId ?? session.userId) === scope.tenantId
-    );
-  }
-
-  private assertSessionScope(session: AgentSession, scope: ActorTenantScope): void {
-    if (!this.sessionMatchesScope(session, scope)) {
-      throw new ForbiddenException('Session does not belong to the current owner/tenant scope');
-    }
-  }
-
-  private toSessionInfo(session: AgentSession, now = Date.now()): SessionInfoDto {
-    return {
-      id: session.id,
-      provider: session.provider,
-      modelId: session.modelId,
-      ...(session.agentName ? { agentName: session.agentName } : {}),
-      createdAt: new Date(session.createdAt).toISOString(),
-      promptCount: session.promptCount,
-      channels: Array.from(session.channels),
-      durationMs: now - session.createdAt,
-      metrics: { ...session.metrics },
+      id: s.id,
+      provider: s.provider,
+      modelId: s.modelId,
+      ...(s.agentName ? { agentName: s.agentName } : {}),
+      createdAt: new Date(s.createdAt).toISOString(),
+      promptCount: s.promptCount,
+      channels: Array.from(s.channels),
+      durationMs: Date.now() - s.createdAt,
+      metrics: { ...s.metrics },
     };
   }
 
@@ -606,10 +553,9 @@ export class AgentService implements OnModuleDestroy {
    * not reconstructed — the model is used on the next createSession call for
    * the same conversationId when the session is torn down or a new one is created.
    */
-  updateSessionModel(sessionId: string, modelId: string, scope: ActorTenantScope): void {
+  updateSessionModel(sessionId: string, modelId: string): void {
     const session = this.sessions.get(sessionId);
     if (!session) return;
-    this.assertSessionScope(session, scope);
     const prev = session.modelId;
     session.modelId = modelId;
     this.recordModelSwitch(sessionId);
@@ -626,51 +572,48 @@ export class AgentService implements OnModuleDestroy {
     sessionId: string,
     agentConfigId: string,
     agentName: string,
-    scope: ActorTenantScope,
     modelId?: string,
   ): void {
     const session = this.sessions.get(sessionId);
     if (!session) return;
-    this.assertSessionScope(session, scope);
     session.agentConfigId = agentConfigId;
     session.agentName = agentName;
     if (modelId) {
-      this.updateSessionModel(sessionId, modelId, scope);
+      this.updateSessionModel(sessionId, modelId);
     }
     this.logger.log(
       `Session ${sessionId}: agent switched to "${agentName}" (${agentConfigId}) (M5-003)`,
     );
   }
 
-  addChannel(sessionId: string, channel: string, scope: ActorTenantScope): void {
+  addChannel(sessionId: string, channel: string): void {
     const session = this.sessions.get(sessionId);
-    if (!session) return;
-    this.assertSessionScope(session, scope);
-    session.channels.add(channel);
+    if (session) {
+      session.channels.add(channel);
+    }
   }
 
-  removeChannel(sessionId: string, channel: string, scope: ActorTenantScope): void {
+  removeChannel(sessionId: string, channel: string): void {
     const session = this.sessions.get(sessionId);
-    if (!session) return;
-    this.assertSessionScope(session, scope);
-    session.channels.delete(channel);
+    if (session) {
+      session.channels.delete(channel);
+    }
   }
 
-  async prompt(sessionId: string, message: string, scope: ActorTenantScope): Promise<void> {
+  async prompt(sessionId: string, message: string): Promise<void> {
     const session = this.sessions.get(sessionId);
     if (!session) {
       throw new Error(`No agent session found: ${sessionId}`);
     }
-    this.assertSessionScope(session, scope);
     session.promptCount += 1;
 
     // Prepend session-scoped system override if present (renew TTL on each turn)
     let effectiveMessage = message;
     if (this.systemOverride) {
-      const override = await this.systemOverride.get(sessionId, scope);
+      const override = await this.systemOverride.get(sessionId);
       if (override) {
         effectiveMessage = `[System Override]\n${override}\n\n${message}`;
-        await this.systemOverride.renew(sessionId, scope);
+        await this.systemOverride.renew(sessionId);
         this.logger.debug(`Applied system override for session ${sessionId}`);
       }
     }
@@ -686,28 +629,16 @@ export class AgentService implements OnModuleDestroy {
     }
   }
 
-  onEvent(
-    sessionId: string,
-    listener: (event: AgentSessionEvent) => void,
-    scope: ActorTenantScope,
-  ): () => void {
+  onEvent(sessionId: string, listener: (event: AgentSessionEvent) => void): () => void {
     const session = this.sessions.get(sessionId);
     if (!session) {
       throw new Error(`No agent session found: ${sessionId}`);
     }
-    this.assertSessionScope(session, scope);
     session.listeners.add(listener);
     return () => session.listeners.delete(listener);
   }
 
-  async destroySession(sessionId: string, scope: ActorTenantScope): Promise<void> {
-    const session = this.sessions.get(sessionId);
-    if (!session) return;
-    this.assertSessionScope(session, scope);
-    await this.destroySessionForSystem(sessionId);
-  }
-
-  private async destroySessionForSystem(sessionId: string): Promise<void> {
+  async destroySession(sessionId: string): Promise<void> {
     const session = this.sessions.get(sessionId);
     if (!session) return;
     this.logger.log(`Destroying agent session ${sessionId}`);
@@ -736,7 +667,7 @@ export class AgentService implements OnModuleDestroy {
 
   async onModuleDestroy(): Promise<void> {
     this.logger.log('Shutting down all agent sessions');
-    const stops = Array.from(this.sessions.keys()).map((id) => this.destroySessionForSystem(id));
+    const stops = Array.from(this.sessions.keys()).map((id) => this.destroySession(id));
     const results = await Promise.allSettled(stops);
     for (const result of results) {
       if (result.status === 'rejected') {

apps/gateway/src/agent/sessions.controller.ts

@@ -10,8 +10,6 @@ import {
   UseGuards,
 } from '@nestjs/common';
 import { AuthGuard } from '../auth/auth.guard.js';
-import { CurrentUser } from '../auth/current-user.decorator.js';
-import { scopeFromUser, type AuthenticatedUserLike } from '../auth/session-scope.js';
 import { AgentService } from './agent.service.js';
 
 @Controller('api/sessions')
@@ -20,24 +18,23 @@ export class SessionsController {
   constructor(@Inject(AgentService) private readonly agentService: AgentService) {}
 
   @Get()
-  list(@CurrentUser() user: AuthenticatedUserLike) {
-    const sessions = this.agentService.listSessions(scopeFromUser(user));
+  list() {
+    const sessions = this.agentService.listSessions();
     return { sessions, total: sessions.length };
   }
 
   @Get(':id')
-  findOne(@Param('id') id: string, @CurrentUser() user: AuthenticatedUserLike) {
-    const info = this.agentService.getSessionInfo(id, scopeFromUser(user));
+  findOne(@Param('id') id: string) {
+    const info = this.agentService.getSessionInfo(id);
     if (!info) throw new NotFoundException('Session not found');
     return info;
   }
 
   @Delete(':id')
   @HttpCode(HttpStatus.NO_CONTENT)
-  async destroy(@Param('id') id: string, @CurrentUser() user: AuthenticatedUserLike) {
-    const scope = scopeFromUser(user);
-    const info = this.agentService.getSessionInfo(id, scope);
+  async destroy(@Param('id') id: string) {
+    const info = this.agentService.getSessionInfo(id);
     if (!info) throw new NotFoundException('Session not found');
-    await this.agentService.destroySession(id, scope);
+    await this.agentService.destroySession(id);
   }
 }

apps/gateway/src/auth/session-scope.ts

@@ -1,24 +0,0 @@
-export interface AuthenticatedUserLike {
-  id: string;
-  tenantId?: string | null;
-  teamId?: string | null;
-  organizationId?: string | null;
-  orgId?: string | null;
-}
-
-export interface ActorTenantScope {
-  userId: string;
-  tenantId: string;
-}
-
-/**
- * Build the immutable server-derived scope used for Tess session operations.
- * Current Mosaic auth is user-scoped; future org/team claims can populate one
- * of the tenant fields without allowing clients to choose another tenant.
- */
-export function scopeFromUser(user: AuthenticatedUserLike): ActorTenantScope {
-  return {
-    userId: user.id,
-    tenantId: user.tenantId ?? user.teamId ?? user.organizationId ?? user.orgId ?? user.id,
-  };
-}

apps/gateway/src/chat/__tests__/chat-security.test.ts

@@ -12,8 +12,7 @@ describe('Chat controller source hardening', () => {
     const source = readFileSync(resolve('src/chat/chat.controller.ts'), 'utf8');
 
     expect(source).toContain('@UseGuards(AuthGuard)');
-    expect(source).toContain('@CurrentUser() user: AuthenticatedUserLike');
-    expect(source).toContain('const scope = scopeFromUser(user);');
+    expect(source).toContain('@CurrentUser() user: { id: string }');
   });
 });
 

apps/gateway/src/chat/chat.controller.ts

@@ -3,10 +3,8 @@ import {
   Post,
   Body,
   Logger,
-  ForbiddenException,
   HttpException,
   HttpStatus,
-  NotFoundException,
   Inject,
   UseGuards,
 } from '@nestjs/common';
@@ -15,7 +13,6 @@ import { Throttle } from '@nestjs/throttler';
 import { AgentService } from '../agent/agent.service.js';
 import { AuthGuard } from '../auth/auth.guard.js';
 import { CurrentUser } from '../auth/current-user.decorator.js';
-import { scopeFromUser, type AuthenticatedUserLike } from '../auth/session-scope.js';
 import { v4 as uuid } from 'uuid';
 import { ChatRequestDto } from './chat.dto.js';
 
@@ -35,23 +32,16 @@ export class ChatController {
   @Throttle({ default: { limit: 10, ttl: 60_000 } })
   async chat(
     @Body() body: ChatRequestDto,
-    @CurrentUser() user: AuthenticatedUserLike,
+    @CurrentUser() user: { id: string },
   ): Promise<ChatResponse> {
     const conversationId = body.conversationId ?? uuid();
-    const scope = scopeFromUser(user);
 
     try {
-      let agentSession = this.agentService.getSession(conversationId, scope);
+      let agentSession = this.agentService.getSession(conversationId);
       if (!agentSession) {
-        agentSession = await this.agentService.createSession(conversationId, {
-          userId: scope.userId,
-          tenantId: scope.tenantId,
-        });
+        agentSession = await this.agentService.createSession(conversationId);
       }
     } catch (err) {
-      if (err instanceof ForbiddenException) {
-        throw new NotFoundException('Session not found');
-      }
       this.logger.error(
         `Session creation failed for conversation=${conversationId}`,
         err instanceof Error ? err.stack : String(err),
@@ -70,27 +60,20 @@ export class ChatController {
         reject(new Error('Agent response timed out'));
       }, 120_000);
 
-      const cleanup = this.agentService.onEvent(
-        conversationId,
-        (event: AgentSessionEvent) => {
-          if (
-            event.type === 'message_update' &&
-            event.assistantMessageEvent.type === 'text_delta'
-          ) {
-            responseText += event.assistantMessageEvent.delta;
-          }
-          if (event.type === 'agent_end') {
-            clearTimeout(timer);
-            cleanup();
-            resolve();
-          }
-        },
-        scope,
-      );
+      const cleanup = this.agentService.onEvent(conversationId, (event: AgentSessionEvent) => {
+        if (event.type === 'message_update' && event.assistantMessageEvent.type === 'text_delta') {
+          responseText += event.assistantMessageEvent.delta;
+        }
+        if (event.type === 'agent_end') {
+          clearTimeout(timer);
+          cleanup();
+          resolve();
+        }
+      });
     });
 
     try {
-      await this.agentService.prompt(conversationId, body.content, scope);
+      await this.agentService.prompt(conversationId, body.content);
       await done;
     } catch (err) {
       if (err instanceof HttpException) throw err;

apps/gateway/src/chat/chat.gateway-command-approval.spec.ts

@@ -1,74 +0,0 @@
-import { describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest';
-import type { SlashCommandPayload } from '@mosaicstack/types';
-import { ChatGateway } from './chat.gateway.js';
-
-const payload: SlashCommandPayload = {
-  command: 'gc',
-  conversationId: 'conversation-1',
-  approvalId: 'approval-1',
-};
-
-function buildGateway(commandExecutor: {
-  execute: ReturnType<typeof vi.fn>;
-  createApproval: ReturnType<typeof vi.fn>;
-}): ChatGateway {
-  return new ChatGateway(
-    {} as never,
-    {} as never,
-    {} as never,
-    {} as never,
-    commandExecutor as never,
-    {} as never,
-  );
-}
-
-describe('ChatGateway command approval ingress', () => {
-  it('passes the client approval ID through to command execution while deriving the actor server-side', async (): Promise<void> => {
-    const commandExecutor = {
-      execute: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue({ ...payload, success: true }),
-      createApproval: vi.fn(),
-    };
-    const gateway = buildGateway(commandExecutor);
-    const client = { data: { user: { id: 'admin-1' } }, emit: vi.fn() };
-
-    await gateway.handleCommandExecute(client as never, payload);
-
-    expect(commandExecutor.execute).toHaveBeenCalledWith(payload, {
-      userId: 'admin-1',
-      tenantId: 'admin-1',
-    });
-    expect(client.emit).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
-      'command:result',
-      expect.objectContaining({ success: true }),
-    );
-  });
-
-  it('issues a durable approval only for the authenticated actor', async (): Promise<void> => {
-    const commandExecutor = {
-      execute: vi.fn(),
-      createApproval: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue({
-        approvalId: 'approval-1',
-        expiresAt: '2026-07-12T00:05:00.000Z',
-      }),
-    };
-    const gateway = buildGateway(commandExecutor);
-    const client = { data: { user: { id: 'admin-1' } }, emit: vi.fn() };
-
-    await gateway.handleCommandApproval(client as never, {
-      command: 'gc',
-      conversationId: 'conversation-1',
-    });
-
-    expect(commandExecutor.createApproval).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
-      { command: 'gc', conversationId: 'conversation-1' },
-      { userId: 'admin-1', tenantId: 'admin-1' },
-    );
-    expect(client.emit).toHaveBeenCalledWith('command:approval', {
-      command: 'gc',
-      conversationId: 'conversation-1',
-      success: true,
-      approvalId: 'approval-1',
-      expiresAt: '2026-07-12T00:05:00.000Z',
-    });
-  });
-});

apps/gateway/src/chat/chat.gateway.ts

@@ -15,7 +15,6 @@ import type { Auth } from '@mosaicstack/auth';
 import type { Brain } from '@mosaicstack/brain';
 import type {
   SetThinkingPayload,
-  SlashCommandApprovalResultPayload,
   SlashCommandPayload,
   SystemReloadPayload,
   RoutingDecisionInfo,
@@ -23,11 +22,6 @@ import type {
 } from '@mosaicstack/types';
 import { AgentService, type ConversationHistoryMessage } from '../agent/agent.service.js';
 import { AUTH } from '../auth/auth.tokens.js';
-import {
-  scopeFromUser,
-  type ActorTenantScope,
-  type AuthenticatedUserLike,
-} from '../auth/session-scope.js';
 import { BRAIN } from '../brain/brain.tokens.js';
 import { CommandRegistryService } from '../commands/command-registry.service.js';
 import { CommandExecutorService } from '../commands/command-executor.service.js';
@@ -46,8 +40,6 @@ interface ClientSession {
   toolCalls: Array<{ toolCallId: string; toolName: string; args: unknown; isError: boolean }>;
   /** Tool calls in-flight (started but not ended yet). */
   pendingToolCalls: Map<string, { toolName: string; args: unknown }>;
-  /** Server-derived owner/tenant scope for this socket's conversation attachment. */
-  scope: ActorTenantScope;
   /** Last routing decision made for this session (M4-008) */
   lastRoutingDecision?: RoutingDecisionInfo;
 }
@@ -105,48 +97,25 @@ export class ChatGateway implements OnGatewayInit, OnGatewayConnection, OnGatewa
     const session = this.clientSessions.get(client.id);
     if (session) {
       session.cleanup();
-      this.agentService.removeChannel(
-        session.conversationId,
-        `websocket:${client.id}`,
-        session.scope,
-      );
+      this.agentService.removeChannel(session.conversationId, `websocket:${client.id}`);
       this.clientSessions.delete(client.id);
     }
   }
 
-  private getClientScope(client: Socket): ActorTenantScope | null {
-    const user = client.data.user as AuthenticatedUserLike | undefined;
-    if (!user?.id) return null;
-    return scopeFromUser(user);
-  }
-
-  private modelOverrideKey(conversationId: string, scope: ActorTenantScope): string {
-    return `${scope.tenantId}:${scope.userId}:${conversationId}`;
-  }
-
-  private scopesEqual(a: ActorTenantScope, b: ActorTenantScope): boolean {
-    return a.userId === b.userId && a.tenantId === b.tenantId;
-  }
-
   @SubscribeMessage('message')
   async handleMessage(
     @ConnectedSocket() client: Socket,
     @MessageBody() data: ChatSocketMessageDto,
   ): Promise<void> {
     const conversationId = data.conversationId ?? uuid();
-    const scope = this.getClientScope(client);
-    if (!scope) {
-      client.emit('error', { conversationId, error: 'Authenticated user scope is required.' });
-      return;
-    }
-    const userId = scope.userId;
+    const userId = (client.data.user as { id: string } | undefined)?.id;
 
     this.logger.log(`Message from ${client.id} in conversation ${conversationId}`);
 
     // Ensure agent session exists for this conversation
     let sessionRoutingDecision: RoutingDecisionInfo | undefined;
     try {
-      let agentSession = this.agentService.getSession(conversationId, scope);
+      let agentSession = this.agentService.getSession(conversationId);
       if (!agentSession) {
         // When resuming an existing conversation, load prior messages to inject as context (M1-004)
         const conversationHistory = await this.loadConversationHistory(conversationId, userId);
@@ -166,7 +135,7 @@ export class ChatGateway implements OnGatewayInit, OnGatewayConnection, OnGatewa
         let resolvedProvider = data.provider;
         let resolvedModelId = data.modelId;
 
-        const modelOverride = modelOverrides.get(this.modelOverrideKey(conversationId, scope));
+        const modelOverride = modelOverrides.get(conversationId);
         if (modelOverride) {
           // /model override bypasses routing engine (M4-007)
           resolvedModelId = modelOverride;
@@ -203,7 +172,6 @@ export class ChatGateway implements OnGatewayInit, OnGatewayConnection, OnGatewa
           modelId: resolvedModelId,
           agentConfigId: data.agentId,
           userId,
-          tenantId: scope.tenantId,
           conversationHistory: conversationHistory.length > 0 ? conversationHistory : undefined,
         });
 
@@ -264,13 +232,9 @@ export class ChatGateway implements OnGatewayInit, OnGatewayConnection, OnGatewa
     }
 
     // Subscribe to agent events and relay to client
-    const cleanup = this.agentService.onEvent(
-      conversationId,
-      (event: AgentSessionEvent) => {
-        this.relayEvent(client, conversationId, event);
-      },
-      scope,
-    );
+    const cleanup = this.agentService.onEvent(conversationId, (event: AgentSessionEvent) => {
+      this.relayEvent(client, conversationId, event);
+    });
 
     // Preserve routing decision from the existing client session if we didn't get a new one
     const prevClientSession = this.clientSessions.get(client.id);
@@ -282,17 +246,16 @@ export class ChatGateway implements OnGatewayInit, OnGatewayConnection, OnGatewa
       assistantText: '',
       toolCalls: [],
       pendingToolCalls: new Map(),
-      scope,
       lastRoutingDecision: routingDecisionToStore,
     });
 
     // Track channel connection
-    this.agentService.addChannel(conversationId, `websocket:${client.id}`, scope);
+    this.agentService.addChannel(conversationId, `websocket:${client.id}`);
 
     // Send session info so the client knows the model/provider (M4-008: include routing decision)
     // Include agentName when a named agent config is active (M5-001)
     {
-      const agentSession = this.agentService.getSession(conversationId, scope);
+      const agentSession = this.agentService.getSession(conversationId);
       if (agentSession) {
         const piSession = agentSession.piSession;
         client.emit('session:info', {
@@ -312,7 +275,7 @@ export class ChatGateway implements OnGatewayInit, OnGatewayConnection, OnGatewa
 
     // Dispatch to agent
     try {
-      await this.agentService.prompt(conversationId, data.content, scope);
+      await this.agentService.prompt(conversationId, data.content);
     } catch (err) {
       this.logger.error(
         `Agent prompt failed for client=${client.id}, conversation=${conversationId}`,
@@ -330,16 +293,7 @@ export class ChatGateway implements OnGatewayInit, OnGatewayConnection, OnGatewa
     @ConnectedSocket() client: Socket,
     @MessageBody() data: SetThinkingPayload,
   ): void {
-    const scope = this.getClientScope(client);
-    if (!scope) {
-      client.emit('error', {
-        conversationId: data.conversationId,
-        error: 'Authenticated user scope is required.',
-      });
-      return;
-    }
-
-    const session = this.agentService.getSession(data.conversationId, scope);
+    const session = this.agentService.getSession(data.conversationId);
     if (!session) {
       client.emit('error', {
         conversationId: data.conversationId,
@@ -380,13 +334,7 @@ export class ChatGateway implements OnGatewayInit, OnGatewayConnection, OnGatewa
     const conversationId = data.conversationId;
     this.logger.log(`Abort requested by ${client.id} for conversation ${conversationId}`);
 
-    const scope = this.getClientScope(client);
-    if (!scope) {
-      client.emit('error', { conversationId, error: 'Authenticated user scope is required.' });
-      return;
-    }
-
-    const session = this.agentService.getSession(conversationId, scope);
+    const session = this.agentService.getSession(conversationId);
     if (!session) {
       client.emit('error', {
         conversationId,
@@ -415,45 +363,11 @@ export class ChatGateway implements OnGatewayInit, OnGatewayConnection, OnGatewa
     @ConnectedSocket() client: Socket,
     @MessageBody() payload: SlashCommandPayload,
   ): Promise<void> {
-    const scope = this.getClientScope(client);
-    if (!scope) {
-      client.emit('command:result', {
-        command: payload.command,
-        conversationId: payload.conversationId,
-        success: false,
-        message: 'Authenticated user scope is required.',
-      });
-      return;
-    }
-
-    const result = await this.commandExecutor.execute(payload, scope);
+    const userId = (client.data.user as { id: string } | undefined)?.id ?? 'unknown';
+    const result = await this.commandExecutor.execute(payload, userId);
     client.emit('command:result', result);
   }
 
-  @SubscribeMessage('command:approve')
-  async handleCommandApproval(
-    @ConnectedSocket() client: Socket,
-    @MessageBody() payload: SlashCommandPayload,
-  ): Promise<void> {
-    const scope = this.getClientScope(client);
-    const approval = scope ? await this.commandExecutor.createApproval(payload, scope) : null;
-    const result: SlashCommandApprovalResultPayload = approval
-      ? {
-          command: payload.command,
-          conversationId: payload.conversationId,
-          success: true,
-          approvalId: approval.approvalId,
-          expiresAt: approval.expiresAt,
-        }
-      : {
-          command: payload.command,
-          conversationId: payload.conversationId,
-          success: false,
-          message: 'Not authorized to approve this command.',
-        };
-    client.emit('command:approval', result);
-  }
-
   broadcastReload(payload: SystemReloadPayload): void {
     this.server.emit('system:reload', payload);
     this.logger.log('Broadcasted system:reload to all connected clients');
@@ -466,23 +380,18 @@ export class ChatGateway implements OnGatewayInit, OnGatewayConnection, OnGatewa
    * M5-005: Emits session:info to clients subscribed to this conversation when a model is set.
    * M5-007: Records a model switch in session metrics.
    */
-  setModelOverride(
-    conversationId: string,
-    modelName: string | null,
-    scope: ActorTenantScope,
-  ): void {
-    const key = this.modelOverrideKey(conversationId, scope);
+  setModelOverride(conversationId: string, modelName: string | null): void {
     if (modelName) {
-      modelOverrides.set(key, modelName);
+      modelOverrides.set(conversationId, modelName);
       this.logger.log(`Model override set: conversation=${conversationId} model="${modelName}"`);
 
       // M5-002: Update the live session's modelId so session:info reflects the new model immediately
-      this.agentService.updateSessionModel(conversationId, modelName, scope);
+      this.agentService.updateSessionModel(conversationId, modelName);
 
       // M5-005: Broadcast session:info to all clients subscribed to this conversation
-      this.broadcastSessionInfo(conversationId, scope);
+      this.broadcastSessionInfo(conversationId);
     } else {
-      modelOverrides.delete(key);
+      modelOverrides.delete(conversationId);
       this.logger.log(`Model override cleared: conversation=${conversationId}`);
     }
   }
@@ -490,8 +399,8 @@ export class ChatGateway implements OnGatewayInit, OnGatewayConnection, OnGatewa
   /**
    * Return the active model override for a conversation, or undefined if none.
    */
-  getModelOverride(conversationId: string, scope: ActorTenantScope): string | undefined {
-    return modelOverrides.get(this.modelOverrideKey(conversationId, scope));
+  getModelOverride(conversationId: string): string | undefined {
+    return modelOverrides.get(conversationId);
   }
 
   /**
@@ -500,10 +409,9 @@ export class ChatGateway implements OnGatewayInit, OnGatewayConnection, OnGatewa
    */
   broadcastSessionInfo(
     conversationId: string,
-    scope: ActorTenantScope,
     extra?: { agentName?: string; routingDecision?: RoutingDecisionInfo },
   ): void {
-    const agentSession = this.agentService.getSession(conversationId, scope);
+    const agentSession = this.agentService.getSession(conversationId);
     if (!agentSession) return;
 
     const piSession = agentSession.piSession;
@@ -520,7 +428,7 @@ export class ChatGateway implements OnGatewayInit, OnGatewayConnection, OnGatewa
 
     // Emit to all clients currently subscribed to this conversation
     for (const [clientId, session] of this.clientSessions) {
-      if (session.conversationId === conversationId && this.scopesEqual(session.scope, scope)) {
+      if (session.conversationId === conversationId) {
         const socket = this.server.sockets.sockets.get(clientId);
         if (socket?.connected) {
           socket.emit('session:info', payload);
@@ -642,10 +550,7 @@ export class ChatGateway implements OnGatewayInit, OnGatewayConnection, OnGatewa
 
       case 'agent_end': {
         // Gather usage stats from the Pi session
-        const activeClientSession = this.clientSessions.get(client.id);
-        const agentSession = activeClientSession
-          ? this.agentService.getSession(conversationId, activeClientSession.scope)
-          : undefined;
+        const agentSession = this.agentService.getSession(conversationId);
         const piSession = agentSession?.piSession;
         const stats = piSession?.getSessionStats();
         const contextUsage = piSession?.getContextUsage();

apps/gateway/src/commands/command-authorization.service.spec.ts

@@ -1,61 +0,0 @@
-import { describe, expect, it } from 'vitest';
-import type { CommandDef, SlashCommandPayload } from '@mosaicstack/types';
-import { CommandAuthorizationService } from './command-authorization.service.js';
-
-const adminCommand: CommandDef = {
-  name: 'gc',
-  description: 'GC',
-  aliases: [],
-  scope: 'admin',
-  execution: 'socket',
-  available: true,
-};
-const payload: SlashCommandPayload = { command: 'gc', conversationId: 'conversation-1' };
-
-function createService(role: string): CommandAuthorizationService {
-  const entries = new Map<string, string>();
-  const db = {
-    select: () => ({ from: () => ({ where: () => ({ limit: async () => [{ role }] }) }) }),
-  };
-  const redis = {
-    get: async (key: string) => entries.get(key) ?? null,
-    set: async (key: string, value: string) => {
-      entries.set(key, value);
-    },
-    del: async (key: string) => Number(entries.delete(key)),
-  };
-  return new CommandAuthorizationService(db as never, redis);
-}
-
-describe('CommandAuthorizationService', () => {
-  it('consumes one exact actor-bound approval once', async (): Promise<void> => {
-    const service = createService('admin');
-    const approval = await service.createApproval(adminCommand, payload, 'admin-1');
-    expect(approval).not.toBeNull();
-    expect(
-      (await service.authorize(adminCommand, payload, 'admin-1', approval!.approvalId)).allowed,
-    ).toBe(true);
-    expect(
-      (await service.authorize(adminCommand, payload, 'admin-1', approval!.approvalId)).allowed,
-    ).toBe(false);
-  });
-
-  it('rejects an approval when the structured action is mutated', async (): Promise<void> => {
-    const service = createService('admin');
-    const approval = await service.createApproval(adminCommand, payload, 'admin-1');
-    const mutated = { ...payload, conversationId: 'other-conversation' };
-    expect(approval).not.toBeNull();
-    expect(
-      (await service.authorize(adminCommand, mutated, 'admin-1', approval!.approvalId)).allowed,
-    ).toBe(false);
-  });
-
-  it('denies an admin command to a member before approval is considered', async (): Promise<void> => {
-    const service = createService('member');
-    const approval = await service.createApproval(adminCommand, payload, 'member-1');
-    expect(approval).toBeNull();
-    expect(
-      (await service.authorize(adminCommand, payload, 'member-1', 'forged-approval-id')).allowed,
-    ).toBe(false);
-  });
-});

apps/gateway/src/commands/command-authorization.service.ts

@@ -1,138 +0,0 @@
-import { createHash, randomUUID } from 'node:crypto';
-import { Inject, Injectable } from '@nestjs/common';
-import { eq, users as usersTable, type Db } from '@mosaicstack/db';
-import type { CommandDef, SlashCommandPayload } from '@mosaicstack/types';
-import { DB } from '../database/database.module.js';
-import { COMMANDS_REDIS } from './commands.tokens.js';
-
-export type CommandRole = 'admin' | 'member' | 'viewer';
-
-export interface CommandApproval {
-  approvalId: string;
-  actionDigest: string;
-  actorId: string;
-  command: string;
-  expiresAt: string;
-}
-
-export interface CommandAuthorizationResult {
-  allowed: boolean;
-  reason?: string;
-}
-
-@Injectable()
-export class CommandAuthorizationService {
-  constructor(
-    @Inject(DB) private readonly db: Db,
-    @Inject(COMMANDS_REDIS)
-    private readonly redis: {
-      get(key: string): Promise<string | null>;
-      set(key: string, value: string, ...args: string[]): Promise<unknown>;
-      del(key: string): Promise<number>;
-    },
-  ) {}
-
-  async authorize(
-    command: CommandDef,
-    payload: SlashCommandPayload,
-    actorId: string,
-    approvalId?: string,
-  ): Promise<CommandAuthorizationResult> {
-    const role = await this.resolveRole(actorId);
-    if (!role || !this.hasScope(role, command.scope)) {
-      return { allowed: false, reason: 'not authorized for this command scope' };
-    }
-    if (command.scope !== 'admin') return { allowed: true };
-    if (!approvalId) return { allowed: false, reason: 'durable approval is required' };
-    const actionDigest = this.actionDigest(command.name, payload);
-    const approved = await this.consumeApproval(approvalId, actorId, actionDigest);
-    return approved
-      ? { allowed: true }
-      : {
-          allowed: false,
-          reason: 'approval is invalid, expired, replayed, or does not match this action',
-        };
-  }
-
-  async createApproval(
-    command: CommandDef,
-    payload: SlashCommandPayload,
-    actorId: string,
-  ): Promise<CommandApproval | null> {
-    const role = await this.resolveRole(actorId);
-    if (!role || command.scope !== 'admin' || !this.hasScope(role, command.scope)) return null;
-
-    const approvalId = randomUUID();
-    const expiresAt = new Date(Date.now() + 5 * 60_000).toISOString();
-    const approval: CommandApproval = {
-      approvalId,
-      actionDigest: this.actionDigest(command.name, payload),
-      actorId,
-      command: command.name,
-      expiresAt,
-    };
-    await this.redis.set(this.key(approvalId), JSON.stringify(approval), 'EX', '300');
-    return approval;
-  }
-
-  private async resolveRole(actorId: string): Promise<CommandRole | null> {
-    const [user] = await this.db
-      .select({ role: usersTable.role })
-      .from(usersTable)
-      .where(eq(usersTable.id, actorId))
-      .limit(1);
-    const role = user?.role;
-    return role === 'admin' || role === 'member' || role === 'viewer' ? role : null;
-  }
-
-  private hasScope(role: CommandRole, scope: CommandDef['scope']): boolean {
-    if (role === 'admin') return true;
-    return role === 'member' && (scope === 'core' || scope === 'agent');
-  }
-
-  private async consumeApproval(
-    approvalId: string,
-    actorId: string,
-    actionDigest: string,
-  ): Promise<boolean> {
-    const key = this.key(approvalId);
-    const encoded = await this.redis.get(key);
-    if (!encoded) return false;
-    const parsed: unknown = JSON.parse(encoded);
-    if (
-      !this.isApproval(parsed) ||
-      parsed.actorId !== actorId ||
-      parsed.actionDigest !== actionDigest ||
-      Date.parse(parsed.expiresAt) <= Date.now()
-    )
-      return false;
-    return (await this.redis.del(key)) === 1;
-  }
-
-  private actionDigest(command: string, payload: SlashCommandPayload): string {
-    return createHash('sha256')
-      .update(
-        JSON.stringify({
-          command,
-          args: payload.args?.trim() ?? '',
-          conversationId: payload.conversationId,
-        }),
-      )
-      .digest('hex');
-  }
-
-  private isApproval(value: unknown): value is CommandApproval {
-    return (
-      typeof value === 'object' &&
-      value !== null &&
-      'approvalId' in value &&
-      'actionDigest' in value &&
-      'actorId' in value &&
-      'expiresAt' in value
-    );
-  }
-
-  private key(approvalId: string): string {
-    return `tess:command-approval:${approvalId}`;
-  }
-}

apps/gateway/src/commands/command-executor-p8012.spec.ts

@@ -89,7 +89,6 @@ function buildService(): CommandExecutorService {
 describe('CommandExecutorService — P8-012 commands', () => {
   let service: CommandExecutorService;
   const userId = 'user-123';
-  const userScope = { userId, tenantId: userId };
   const conversationId = 'conv-456';
 
   beforeEach(() => {
@@ -100,7 +99,7 @@ describe('CommandExecutorService — P8-012 commands', () => {
   // /provider login — missing provider name
   it('/provider login with no provider name returns usage error', async () => {
     const payload: SlashCommandPayload = { command: 'provider', args: 'login', conversationId };
-    const result = await service.execute(payload, userScope);
+    const result = await service.execute(payload, userId);
     expect(result.success).toBe(false);
     expect(result.message).toContain('Usage: /provider login');
     expect(result.command).toBe('provider');
@@ -113,7 +112,7 @@ describe('CommandExecutorService — P8-012 commands', () => {
       args: 'login anthropic',
       conversationId,
     };
-    const result = await service.execute(payload, userScope);
+    const result = await service.execute(payload, userId);
     expect(result.success).toBe(true);
     expect(result.command).toBe('provider');
     expect(result.message).toContain('anthropic');
@@ -139,7 +138,7 @@ describe('CommandExecutorService — P8-012 commands', () => {
   // /provider with no args — returns usage
   it('/provider with no args returns usage message', async () => {
     const payload: SlashCommandPayload = { command: 'provider', conversationId };
-    const result = await service.execute(payload, userScope);
+    const result = await service.execute(payload, userId);
     expect(result.success).toBe(true);
     expect(result.message).toContain('Usage: /provider');
   });
@@ -147,7 +146,7 @@ describe('CommandExecutorService — P8-012 commands', () => {
   // /provider list
   it('/provider list returns success', async () => {
     const payload: SlashCommandPayload = { command: 'provider', args: 'list', conversationId };
-    const result = await service.execute(payload, userScope);
+    const result = await service.execute(payload, userId);
     expect(result.success).toBe(true);
     expect(result.command).toBe('provider');
   });
@@ -155,7 +154,7 @@ describe('CommandExecutorService — P8-012 commands', () => {
   // /provider logout with no name — usage error
   it('/provider logout with no name returns error', async () => {
     const payload: SlashCommandPayload = { command: 'provider', args: 'logout', conversationId };
-    const result = await service.execute(payload, userScope);
+    const result = await service.execute(payload, userId);
     expect(result.success).toBe(false);
     expect(result.message).toContain('Usage: /provider logout');
   });
@@ -167,7 +166,7 @@ describe('CommandExecutorService — P8-012 commands', () => {
       args: 'unknown',
       conversationId,
     };
-    const result = await service.execute(payload, userScope);
+    const result = await service.execute(payload, userId);
     expect(result.success).toBe(false);
     expect(result.message).toContain('Unknown subcommand');
   });
@@ -175,7 +174,7 @@ describe('CommandExecutorService — P8-012 commands', () => {
   // /mission status
   it('/mission status returns stub message', async () => {
     const payload: SlashCommandPayload = { command: 'mission', args: 'status', conversationId };
-    const result = await service.execute(payload, userScope);
+    const result = await service.execute(payload, userId);
     expect(result.success).toBe(true);
     expect(result.command).toBe('mission');
     expect(result.message).toContain('Mission status');
@@ -184,7 +183,7 @@ describe('CommandExecutorService — P8-012 commands', () => {
   // /mission with no args
   it('/mission with no args returns status stub', async () => {
     const payload: SlashCommandPayload = { command: 'mission', conversationId };
-    const result = await service.execute(payload, userScope);
+    const result = await service.execute(payload, userId);
     expect(result.success).toBe(true);
     expect(result.message).toContain('Mission status');
   });
@@ -196,7 +195,7 @@ describe('CommandExecutorService — P8-012 commands', () => {
       args: 'set my-mission-123',
       conversationId,
     };
-    const result = await service.execute(payload, userScope);
+    const result = await service.execute(payload, userId);
     expect(result.success).toBe(true);
     expect(result.message).toContain('my-mission-123');
   });
@@ -204,7 +203,7 @@ describe('CommandExecutorService — P8-012 commands', () => {
   // /agent list
   it('/agent list returns stub message', async () => {
     const payload: SlashCommandPayload = { command: 'agent', args: 'list', conversationId };
-    const result = await service.execute(payload, userScope);
+    const result = await service.execute(payload, userId);
     expect(result.success).toBe(true);
     expect(result.command).toBe('agent');
     expect(result.message).toContain('agent');
@@ -213,7 +212,7 @@ describe('CommandExecutorService — P8-012 commands', () => {
   // /agent with no args
   it('/agent with no args returns usage', async () => {
     const payload: SlashCommandPayload = { command: 'agent', conversationId };
-    const result = await service.execute(payload, userScope);
+    const result = await service.execute(payload, userId);
     expect(result.success).toBe(true);
     expect(result.message).toContain('Usage: /agent');
   });
@@ -225,7 +224,7 @@ describe('CommandExecutorService — P8-012 commands', () => {
       args: 'my-agent-id',
       conversationId,
     };
-    const result = await service.execute(payload, userScope);
+    const result = await service.execute(payload, userId);
     expect(result.success).toBe(true);
     expect(result.message).toContain('my-agent-id');
   });
@@ -233,7 +232,7 @@ describe('CommandExecutorService — P8-012 commands', () => {
   // /prdy
   it('/prdy returns PRD wizard message', async () => {
     const payload: SlashCommandPayload = { command: 'prdy', conversationId };
-    const result = await service.execute(payload, userScope);
+    const result = await service.execute(payload, userId);
     expect(result.success).toBe(true);
     expect(result.command).toBe('prdy');
     expect(result.message).toContain('mosaic prdy');
@@ -242,7 +241,7 @@ describe('CommandExecutorService — P8-012 commands', () => {
   // /tools
   it('/tools returns tools stub message', async () => {
     const payload: SlashCommandPayload = { command: 'tools', conversationId };
-    const result = await service.execute(payload, userScope);
+    const result = await service.execute(payload, userId);
     expect(result.success).toBe(true);
     expect(result.command).toBe('tools');
     expect(result.message).toContain('tools');

apps/gateway/src/commands/command-executor-tess-security.spec.ts

@@ -1,109 +0,0 @@
-import { beforeEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest';
-import type { SlashCommandPayload } from '@mosaicstack/types';
-import { CommandAuthorizationService } from './command-authorization.service.js';
-import { CommandExecutorService } from './command-executor.service.js';
-
-const registry = {
-  getManifest: vi.fn(() => ({
-    version: 1,
-    commands: [
-      {
-        name: 'gc',
-        description: 'System-wide garbage collection',
-        aliases: [],
-        scope: 'admin' as const,
-        execution: 'socket' as const,
-        available: true,
-      },
-    ],
-    skills: [],
-  })),
-};
-
-const sessionGc = {
-  sweepOrphans: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue({ orphanedSessions: 1, totalCleaned: [], duration: 1 }),
-};
-
-const scope = (userId: string) => ({ userId, tenantId: 'tenant-1' });
-
-const authorization = {
-  authorize: vi.fn((_command: unknown, _payload: unknown, actorId: string) =>
-    Promise.resolve(
-      actorId === 'member-1'
-        ? { allowed: false, reason: 'durable approval is required' }
-        : { allowed: false, reason: 'not authorized for this command scope' },
-    ),
-  ),
-};
-
-function buildExecutor(authorizationService: unknown = authorization): CommandExecutorService {
-  return new CommandExecutorService(
-    registry as never,
-    { getSession: vi.fn() } as never,
-    { clear: vi.fn(), set: vi.fn() } as never,
-    sessionGc as never,
-    { set: vi.fn() } as never,
-    { agents: {} } as never,
-    null,
-    null,
-    null,
-    authorizationService as never,
-  );
-}
-
-function createDurableAuthorization(): CommandAuthorizationService {
-  const entries = new Map<string, string>();
-  const db = {
-    select: () => ({ from: () => ({ where: () => ({ limit: async () => [{ role: 'admin' }] }) }) }),
-  };
-  const redis = {
-    get: async (key: string) => entries.get(key) ?? null,
-    set: async (key: string, value: string) => {
-      entries.set(key, value);
-    },
-    del: async (key: string) => Number(entries.delete(key)),
-  };
-  return new CommandAuthorizationService(db as never, redis);
-}
-
-describe('TESS-M1-SEC-001 command authorization abuse cases', () => {
-  const payload: SlashCommandPayload = { command: 'gc', conversationId: 'conversation-1' };
-
-  beforeEach((): void => {
-    vi.clearAllMocks();
-  });
-
-  it('denies a forged admin identity and does not execute a system-wide command', async (): Promise<void> => {
-    const result = await buildExecutor().execute(payload, scope('admin-forged-by-client'));
-
-    expect(result.success).toBe(false);
-    expect(result.message).toContain('not authorized');
-    expect(sessionGc.sweepOrphans).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
-  });
-
-  it('denies a privileged command without a server-bound durable approval', async (): Promise<void> => {
-    const result = await buildExecutor().execute(payload, scope('member-1'));
-
-    expect(result.success).toBe(false);
-    expect(result.message).toContain('approval');
-    expect(sessionGc.sweepOrphans).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
-  });
-
-  it('executes an admin command only after a valid durable approval is issued and supplied', async (): Promise<void> => {
-    const executor = buildExecutor(createDurableAuthorization());
-
-    const adminScope = scope('admin-1');
-    const denied = await executor.execute(payload, adminScope);
-    const approval = await executor.createApproval(payload, adminScope);
-    const approved = await executor.execute(
-      { ...payload, approvalId: approval?.approvalId },
-      adminScope,
-    );
-
-    expect(denied.success).toBe(false);
-    expect(denied.message).toContain('approval');
-    expect(approval).not.toBeNull();
-    expect(approved.success).toBe(true);
-    expect(sessionGc.sweepOrphans).toHaveBeenCalledOnce();
-  });
-});

apps/gateway/src/commands/command-executor.service.ts

@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ import type { QueueHandle } from '@mosaicstack/queue';
 import type { Brain } from '@mosaicstack/brain';
 import type { SlashCommandPayload, SlashCommandResultPayload } from '@mosaicstack/types';
 import { AgentService } from '../agent/agent.service.js';
-import type { ActorTenantScope } from '../auth/session-scope.js';
 import { ChatGateway } from '../chat/chat.gateway.js';
 import { SessionGCService } from '../gc/session-gc.service.js';
 import { SystemOverrideService } from '../preferences/system-override.service.js';
@@ -11,7 +10,6 @@ import { ReloadService } from '../reload/reload.service.js';
 import { McpClientService } from '../mcp-client/mcp-client.service.js';
 import { BRAIN } from '../brain/brain.tokens.js';
 import { COMMANDS_REDIS } from './commands.tokens.js';
-import { CommandAuthorizationService } from './command-authorization.service.js';
 import { CommandRegistryService } from './command-registry.service.js';
 
 @Injectable()
@@ -34,17 +32,10 @@ export class CommandExecutorService {
     @Optional()
     @Inject(McpClientService)
     private readonly mcpClient: McpClientService | null,
-    @Optional()
-    @Inject(CommandAuthorizationService)
-    private readonly authorization: CommandAuthorizationService | null = null,
   ) {}
 
-  async execute(
-    payload: SlashCommandPayload,
-    scope: ActorTenantScope,
-  ): Promise<SlashCommandResultPayload> {
+  async execute(payload: SlashCommandPayload, userId: string): Promise<SlashCommandResultPayload> {
     const { command, args, conversationId } = payload;
-    const userId = scope.userId;
 
     const def = this.registry.getManifest().commands.find((c) => c.name === command);
     if (!def) {
@@ -56,24 +47,14 @@ export class CommandExecutorService {
       };
     }
 
-    const authorization = await this.authorization?.authorize(
-      def,
-      payload,
-      userId,
-      payload.approvalId,
-    );
-    if (authorization && !authorization.allowed) {
-      return { command, conversationId, success: false, message: authorization.reason };
-    }
-
     try {
       switch (command) {
         case 'model':
-          return await this.handleModel(args ?? null, conversationId, scope);
+          return await this.handleModel(args ?? null, conversationId);
         case 'thinking':
           return await this.handleThinking(args ?? null, conversationId);
         case 'system':
-          return await this.handleSystem(args ?? null, conversationId, scope);
+          return await this.handleSystem(args ?? null, conversationId);
         case 'new':
           return {
             command,
@@ -113,7 +94,7 @@ export class CommandExecutorService {
           };
         }
         case 'agent':
-          return await this.handleAgent(args ?? null, conversationId, scope);
+          return await this.handleAgent(args ?? null, conversationId, userId);
         case 'provider':
           return await this.handleProvider(args ?? null, userId, conversationId);
         case 'mission':
@@ -162,22 +143,13 @@ export class CommandExecutorService {
     }
   }
 
-  async createApproval(payload: SlashCommandPayload, scope: ActorTenantScope) {
-    const def = this.registry
-      .getManifest()
-      .commands.find((command) => command.name === payload.command);
-    if (!def || !this.authorization) return null;
-    return this.authorization.createApproval(def, payload, scope.userId);
-  }
-
   private async handleModel(
     args: string | null,
     conversationId: string,
-    scope: ActorTenantScope,
   ): Promise<SlashCommandResultPayload> {
     if (!args || args.trim().length === 0) {
       // Show current override or usage hint
-      const currentOverride = this.chatGateway?.getModelOverride(conversationId, scope);
+      const currentOverride = this.chatGateway?.getModelOverride(conversationId);
       if (currentOverride) {
         return {
           command: 'model',
@@ -199,7 +171,7 @@ export class CommandExecutorService {
 
     // /model clear removes the override and re-enables automatic routing
     if (modelName === 'clear') {
-      this.chatGateway?.setModelOverride(conversationId, null, scope);
+      this.chatGateway?.setModelOverride(conversationId, null);
       return {
         command: 'model',
         conversationId,
@@ -209,9 +181,9 @@ export class CommandExecutorService {
     }
 
     // Set the sticky per-session override (M4-007)
-    this.chatGateway?.setModelOverride(conversationId, modelName, scope);
+    this.chatGateway?.setModelOverride(conversationId, modelName);
 
-    const session = this.agentService.getSession(conversationId, scope);
+    const session = this.agentService.getSession(conversationId);
     if (!session) {
       return {
         command: 'model',
@@ -252,11 +224,10 @@ export class CommandExecutorService {
   private async handleSystem(
     args: string | null,
     conversationId: string,
-    scope: ActorTenantScope,
   ): Promise<SlashCommandResultPayload> {
     if (!args || args.trim().length === 0) {
       // Clear the override when called with no args
-      await this.systemOverride.clear(conversationId, scope);
+      await this.systemOverride.clear(conversationId);
       return {
         command: 'system',
         conversationId,
@@ -265,7 +236,7 @@ export class CommandExecutorService {
       };
     }
 
-    await this.systemOverride.set(conversationId, args.trim(), scope);
+    await this.systemOverride.set(conversationId, args.trim());
     return {
       command: 'system',
       conversationId,
@@ -277,9 +248,8 @@ export class CommandExecutorService {
   private async handleAgent(
     args: string | null,
     conversationId: string,
-    scope: ActorTenantScope,
+    userId: string,
   ): Promise<SlashCommandResultPayload> {
-    const userId = scope.userId;
     if (!args) {
       return {
         command: 'agent',
@@ -368,14 +338,11 @@ export class CommandExecutorService {
         conversationId,
         agentConfig.id,
         agentConfig.name,
-        scope,
         agentConfig.model ?? undefined,
       );
 
       // Broadcast updated session:info so TUI TopBar reflects new agent/model
-      this.chatGateway?.broadcastSessionInfo(conversationId, scope, {
-        agentName: agentConfig.name,
-      });
+      this.chatGateway?.broadcastSessionInfo(conversationId, { agentName: agentConfig.name });
 
       this.logger.log(
         `Agent switched to "${agentConfig.name}" (${agentConfig.id}) for conversation ${conversationId} (M5-003)`,

apps/gateway/src/commands/commands.integration.spec.ts

@@ -159,7 +159,6 @@ describe('CommandExecutorService — integration', () => {
   let registry: CommandRegistryService;
   let executor: CommandExecutorService;
   const userId = 'user-integ-001';
-  const userScope = { userId, tenantId: userId };
   const conversationId = 'conv-integ-001';
 
   beforeEach(() => {
@@ -171,7 +170,7 @@ describe('CommandExecutorService — integration', () => {
   // Unknown command returns error
   it('unknown command returns success:false with descriptive message', async () => {
     const payload: SlashCommandPayload = { command: 'nonexistent', conversationId };
-    const result = await executor.execute(payload, userScope);
+    const result = await executor.execute(payload, userId);
     expect(result.success).toBe(false);
     expect(result.message).toContain('nonexistent');
     expect(result.command).toBe('nonexistent');
@@ -180,7 +179,7 @@ describe('CommandExecutorService — integration', () => {
   // /gc handler calls SessionGCService.sweepOrphans (admin-only, no userId arg)
   it('/gc calls SessionGCService.sweepOrphans without arguments', async () => {
     const payload: SlashCommandPayload = { command: 'gc', conversationId };
-    const result = await executor.execute(payload, userScope);
+    const result = await executor.execute(payload, userId);
     expect(mockSessionGC.sweepOrphans).toHaveBeenCalledWith();
     expect(result.success).toBe(true);
     expect(result.message).toContain('GC sweep complete');
@@ -191,8 +190,8 @@ describe('CommandExecutorService — integration', () => {
   it('/system with text calls SystemOverrideService.set', async () => {
     const override = 'You are a helpful assistant.';
     const payload: SlashCommandPayload = { command: 'system', args: override, conversationId };
-    const result = await executor.execute(payload, userScope);
-    expect(mockSystemOverride.set).toHaveBeenCalledWith(conversationId, override, userScope);
+    const result = await executor.execute(payload, userId);
+    expect(mockSystemOverride.set).toHaveBeenCalledWith(conversationId, override);
     expect(result.success).toBe(true);
     expect(result.message).toContain('override set');
   });
@@ -200,8 +199,8 @@ describe('CommandExecutorService — integration', () => {
   // /system with no args clears the override
   it('/system with no args calls SystemOverrideService.clear', async () => {
     const payload: SlashCommandPayload = { command: 'system', conversationId };
-    const result = await executor.execute(payload, userScope);
-    expect(mockSystemOverride.clear).toHaveBeenCalledWith(conversationId, userScope);
+    const result = await executor.execute(payload, userId);
+    expect(mockSystemOverride.clear).toHaveBeenCalledWith(conversationId);
     expect(result.success).toBe(true);
     expect(result.message).toContain('cleared');
   });
@@ -213,7 +212,7 @@ describe('CommandExecutorService — integration', () => {
       args: 'claude-3-opus',
       conversationId,
     };
-    const result = await executor.execute(payload, userScope);
+    const result = await executor.execute(payload, userId);
     expect(result.success).toBe(true);
     expect(result.command).toBe('model');
     expect(result.message).toContain('claude-3-opus');
@@ -222,7 +221,7 @@ describe('CommandExecutorService — integration', () => {
   // /thinking with valid level returns success
   it('/thinking with valid level returns success', async () => {
     const payload: SlashCommandPayload = { command: 'thinking', args: 'high', conversationId };
-    const result = await executor.execute(payload, userScope);
+    const result = await executor.execute(payload, userId);
     expect(result.success).toBe(true);
     expect(result.message).toContain('high');
   });
@@ -230,7 +229,7 @@ describe('CommandExecutorService — integration', () => {
   // /thinking with invalid level returns usage message
   it('/thinking with invalid level returns usage message', async () => {
     const payload: SlashCommandPayload = { command: 'thinking', args: 'invalid', conversationId };
-    const result = await executor.execute(payload, userScope);
+    const result = await executor.execute(payload, userId);
     expect(result.success).toBe(true);
     expect(result.message).toContain('Usage:');
   });
@@ -238,7 +237,7 @@ describe('CommandExecutorService — integration', () => {
   // /new command returns success
   it('/new returns success', async () => {
     const payload: SlashCommandPayload = { command: 'new', conversationId };
-    const result = await executor.execute(payload, userScope);
+    const result = await executor.execute(payload, userId);
     expect(result.success).toBe(true);
     expect(result.command).toBe('new');
   });
@@ -246,7 +245,7 @@ describe('CommandExecutorService — integration', () => {
   // /reload without reloadService returns failure
   it('/reload without ReloadService returns failure', async () => {
     const payload: SlashCommandPayload = { command: 'reload', conversationId };
-    const result = await executor.execute(payload, userScope);
+    const result = await executor.execute(payload, userId);
     expect(result.success).toBe(false);
     expect(result.message).toContain('ReloadService');
   });
@@ -256,7 +255,7 @@ describe('CommandExecutorService — integration', () => {
   for (const cmd of stubCommands) {
     it(`/${cmd} returns success (stub)`, async () => {
       const payload: SlashCommandPayload = { command: cmd, conversationId };
-      const result = await executor.execute(payload, userScope);
+      const result = await executor.execute(payload, userId);
       expect(result.success).toBe(true);
       expect(result.command).toBe(cmd);
     });

apps/gateway/src/commands/commands.module.ts

@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ import { createQueue, type QueueHandle } from '@mosaicstack/queue';
 import { ChatModule } from '../chat/chat.module.js';
 import { GCModule } from '../gc/gc.module.js';
 import { ReloadModule } from '../reload/reload.module.js';
-import { CommandAuthorizationService } from './command-authorization.service.js';
 import { CommandExecutorService } from './command-executor.service.js';
 import { CommandRegistryService } from './command-registry.service.js';
 import { COMMANDS_REDIS } from './commands.tokens.js';
@@ -25,7 +24,6 @@ const COMMANDS_QUEUE_HANDLE = 'COMMANDS_QUEUE_HANDLE';
       inject: [COMMANDS_QUEUE_HANDLE],
     },
     CommandRegistryService,
-    CommandAuthorizationService,
     CommandExecutorService,
   ],
   exports: [CommandRegistryService, CommandExecutorService],

apps/gateway/src/federation/client/__tests__/query-source.service.spec.ts

@@ -1,255 +0,0 @@
-import 'reflect-metadata';
-import { describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest';
-import type { Db } from '@mosaicstack/db';
-import type { FederationListResponse } from '@mosaicstack/types';
-import {
-  FederationClientError,
-  type FederationClientService,
-} from '../federation-client.service.js';
-import { type QuerySourceError, QuerySourceService } from '../query-source.service.js';
-
-interface TestRow {
-  id: string;
-  title: string;
-}
-
-interface PeerRow {
-  id: string;
-  commonName: string;
-  endpointUrl: string | null;
-  clientKeyPem: string | null;
-  state: 'active' | 'pending' | 'suspended' | 'revoked';
-}
-
-const LOCAL_ROWS: TestRow[] = [
-  { id: 'local-1', title: 'Local One' },
-  { id: 'local-2', title: 'Local Two' },
-];
-
-const PEER_A: PeerRow = {
-  id: 'aaaaaaaa-aaaa-aaaa-aaaa-aaaaaaaaaaaa',
-  commonName: 'peer-a',
-  endpointUrl: 'https://peer-a.example.com',
-  clientKeyPem: 'sealed-key-a',
-  state: 'active',
-};
-
-const PEER_B: PeerRow = {
-  id: 'bbbbbbbb-bbbb-bbbb-bbbb-bbbbbbbbbbbb',
-  commonName: 'peer-b',
-  endpointUrl: 'https://peer-b.example.com',
-  clientKeyPem: 'sealed-key-b',
-  state: 'active',
-};
-
-const PEER_LOCALHOST: PeerRow = {
-  id: 'cccccccc-cccc-cccc-cccc-cccccccccccc',
-  commonName: 'peer-localhost',
-  endpointUrl: 'https://localhost:3001',
-  clientKeyPem: 'sealed-key-c',
-  state: 'active',
-};
-
-function makeDb(activePeers: PeerRow[]): Db {
-  const orderBy = vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(activePeers);
-  const where = vi.fn().mockReturnValue({ orderBy });
-  const from = vi.fn().mockReturnValue({ where });
-  const select = vi.fn().mockReturnValue({ from });
-
-  return {
-    select,
-    insert: vi.fn(),
-    update: vi.fn(),
-    delete: vi.fn(),
-    transaction: vi.fn(),
-  } as unknown as Db;
-}
-
-function makeFederationClient(
-  list: (
-    peerId: string,
-    resource: string,
-    request: Record<string, unknown>,
-  ) => Promise<FederationListResponse<TestRow>>,
-): FederationClientService {
-  return {
-    list: list as unknown as FederationClientService['list'],
-  } as FederationClientService;
-}
-
-function makeLocalResponse(rows: TestRow[] = LOCAL_ROWS): Promise<FederationListResponse<TestRow>> {
-  return Promise.resolve({ items: rows });
-}
-
-describe('QuerySourceService', () => {
-  it('routes source="local" to the local executor and tags rows as local', async () => {
-    const list = vi.fn(async (): Promise<FederationListResponse<TestRow>> => ({ items: [] }));
-    const service = new QuerySourceService(makeDb([PEER_A]), makeFederationClient(list));
-
-    const result = await service.list<TestRow>({
-      source: 'local',
-      resource: 'tasks',
-      request: { cursor: 'ignored-for-local-test' },
-      local: () => makeLocalResponse(),
-    });
-
-    expect(result).toEqual({
-      items: [
-        { id: 'local-1', title: 'Local One', _source: 'local' },
-        { id: 'local-2', title: 'Local Two', _source: 'local' },
-      ],
-    });
-    expect(list).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
-  });
-
-  it('routes source="federated:<host>" to the matching active peer and tags rows with peer commonName', async () => {
-    const list = vi.fn(
-      async (): Promise<FederationListResponse<TestRow>> => ({
-        items: [{ id: 'remote-1', title: 'Remote One' }],
-      }),
-    );
-    const service = new QuerySourceService(makeDb([PEER_A, PEER_B]), makeFederationClient(list));
-
-    const result = await service.list<TestRow>({
-      source: 'federated:peer-b.example.com',
-      resource: 'tasks',
-      request: { status: 'open' },
-      local: () => makeLocalResponse(),
-    });
-
-    expect(result).toEqual({
-      items: [{ id: 'remote-1', title: 'Remote One', _source: 'peer-b' }],
-    });
-    expect(list).toHaveBeenCalledWith(PEER_B.id, 'tasks', { status: 'open' });
-  });
-
-  it('matches federated hosts by endpoint host including non-default port', async () => {
-    const list = vi.fn(
-      async (): Promise<FederationListResponse<TestRow>> => ({
-        items: [{ id: 'remote-port', title: 'Remote Port' }],
-      }),
-    );
-    const service = new QuerySourceService(makeDb([PEER_LOCALHOST]), makeFederationClient(list));
-
-    const result = await service.list<TestRow>({
-      source: 'federated:localhost:3001',
-      resource: 'tasks',
-      request: {},
-      local: () => makeLocalResponse(),
-    });
-
-    expect(result).toEqual({
-      items: [{ id: 'remote-port', title: 'Remote Port', _source: 'peer-localhost' }],
-    });
-    expect(list).toHaveBeenCalledWith(PEER_LOCALHOST.id, 'tasks', {});
-  });
-
-  it('fans out source="all" to local plus every active outbound peer in parallel and merges tagged rows', async () => {
-    const callOrder: string[] = [];
-    const list = vi.fn(async (peerId: string): Promise<FederationListResponse<TestRow>> => {
-      callOrder.push(`remote-start:${peerId}`);
-      await Promise.resolve();
-      return {
-        items: [{ id: `remote-${peerId.slice(0, 1)}`, title: `Remote ${peerId.slice(0, 1)}` }],
-      };
-    });
-    const service = new QuerySourceService(makeDb([PEER_A, PEER_B]), makeFederationClient(list));
-
-    const result = await service.list<TestRow>({
-      source: 'all',
-      resource: 'tasks',
-      request: { limit: 25 },
-      local: async () => {
-        callOrder.push('local-start');
-        await Promise.resolve();
-        return { items: [{ id: 'local-1', title: 'Local One' }] };
-      },
-    });
-
-    expect(result).toEqual({
-      items: [
-        { id: 'local-1', title: 'Local One', _source: 'local' },
-        { id: 'remote-a', title: 'Remote a', _source: 'peer-a' },
-        { id: 'remote-b', title: 'Remote b', _source: 'peer-b' },
-      ],
-    });
-    expect(list).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(2);
-    expect(callOrder).toEqual([
-      'local-start',
-      `remote-start:${PEER_A.id}`,
-      `remote-start:${PEER_B.id}`,
-    ]);
-  });
-
-  it('marks source="all" as partial and truncated when any subquery returns a cursor', async () => {
-    const list = vi.fn(
-      async (): Promise<FederationListResponse<TestRow>> => ({
-        items: [{ id: 'remote-a', title: 'Remote A' }],
-        nextCursor: 'remote-next',
-      }),
-    );
-    const service = new QuerySourceService(makeDb([PEER_A]), makeFederationClient(list));
-
-    const result = await service.list<TestRow>({
-      source: 'all',
-      resource: 'tasks',
-      request: {},
-      local: () => makeLocalResponse([{ id: 'local-1', title: 'Local One' }]),
-    });
-
-    expect(result).toEqual({
-      items: [
-        { id: 'local-1', title: 'Local One', _source: 'local' },
-        { id: 'remote-a', title: 'Remote A', _source: 'peer-a' },
-      ],
-      _partial: true,
-      _truncated: true,
-    });
-  });
-
-  it('returns _partial=true for source="all" when one peer fails without dropping successful sources', async () => {
-    const list = vi.fn(async (peerId: string): Promise<FederationListResponse<TestRow>> => {
-      if (peerId === PEER_B.id) {
-        throw new FederationClientError({
-          code: 'NETWORK',
-          message: 'peer unavailable',
-          peerId,
-        });
-      }
-      return { items: [{ id: 'remote-a', title: 'Remote A' }] };
-    });
-    const service = new QuerySourceService(makeDb([PEER_A, PEER_B]), makeFederationClient(list));
-
-    const result = await service.list<TestRow>({
-      source: 'all',
-      resource: 'tasks',
-      request: {},
-      local: () => makeLocalResponse([{ id: 'local-1', title: 'Local One' }]),
-    });
-
-    expect(result).toEqual({
-      items: [
-        { id: 'local-1', title: 'Local One', _source: 'local' },
-        { id: 'remote-a', title: 'Remote A', _source: 'peer-a' },
-      ],
-      _partial: true,
-    });
-  });
-
-  it('throws QuerySourceError when a federated host does not match an active outbound peer', async () => {
-    const list = vi.fn(async (): Promise<FederationListResponse<TestRow>> => ({ items: [] }));
-    const service = new QuerySourceService(makeDb([PEER_A]), makeFederationClient(list));
-
-    await expect(
-      service.list<TestRow>({
-        source: 'federated:missing.example.com',
-        resource: 'tasks',
-        request: {},
-        local: () => makeLocalResponse(),
-      }),
-    ).rejects.toMatchObject({
-      name: 'QuerySourceError',
-      code: 'PEER_NOT_FOUND',
-    } satisfies Partial<QuerySourceError>);
-  });
-});

apps/gateway/src/federation/client/index.ts

@@ -11,13 +11,3 @@ export {
   type FederationClientErrorCode,
   type FederationClientErrorOptions,
 } from './federation-client.service.js';
-export {
-  QuerySourceService,
-  QuerySourceError,
-  type QuerySource,
-  type QuerySourceErrorCode,
-  type QuerySourceErrorOptions,
-  type QuerySourceListOptions,
-  type QuerySourceListResponse,
-  type LocalListExecutor,
-} from './query-source.service.js';

apps/gateway/src/federation/client/query-source.service.ts

@@ -1,261 +0,0 @@
-/**
- * QuerySourceService — gateway query source router (FED-M3-09).
- *
- * Accepts the federation query-layer `source` selector and routes list-style
- * reads to local storage, one federated peer, or all active outbound peers.
- *
- * `source: "all"` is intentionally tolerant of per-peer failures: local data
- * and successful peer responses are returned, and the envelope is marked
- * `_partial: true`.  Local failures still reject because there is no safe local
- * fallback and the gateway's own storage is expected to be authoritative.
- */
-
-import { Inject, Injectable, Logger } from '@nestjs/common';
-import { and, eq, federationPeers, isNotNull, type Db } from '@mosaicstack/db';
-import {
-  SOURCE_LOCAL,
-  tagWithSource,
-  type FederationListResponse,
-  type SourceTag,
-} from '@mosaicstack/types';
-import { DB } from '../../database/database.module.js';
-import { FederationClientService } from './federation-client.service.js';
-
-export type QuerySource = 'local' | 'all' | `federated:${string}`;
-
-export type QuerySourceErrorCode = 'INVALID_SOURCE' | 'PEER_NOT_FOUND';
-
-export interface QuerySourceErrorOptions {
-  code: QuerySourceErrorCode;
-  message: string;
-  source: string;
-}
-
-export class QuerySourceError extends Error {
-  readonly code: QuerySourceErrorCode;
-  readonly source: string;
-
-  constructor(opts: QuerySourceErrorOptions) {
-    super(opts.message);
-    this.name = 'QuerySourceError';
-    this.code = opts.code;
-    this.source = opts.source;
-  }
-}
-
-export type LocalListExecutor<T extends object> = () => Promise<FederationListResponse<T> | T[]>;
-
-export interface QuerySourceListOptions<T extends object> {
-  source: QuerySource;
-  resource: string;
-  request?: Record<string, unknown>;
-  local: LocalListExecutor<T>;
-}
-
-export type QuerySourceListResponse<T extends object> = FederationListResponse<T & SourceTag>;
-
-interface OutboundPeer {
-  id: string;
-  commonName: string;
-  endpointUrl: string;
-}
-
-interface TaggedList<T extends object> {
-  items: Array<T & SourceTag>;
-  partial: boolean;
-  truncated: boolean;
-  nextCursor?: string;
-}
-
-@Injectable()
-export class QuerySourceService {
-  private readonly logger = new Logger(QuerySourceService.name);
-
-  constructor(
-    @Inject(DB) private readonly db: Db,
-    @Inject(FederationClientService) private readonly federationClient: FederationClientService,
-  ) {}
-
-  async list<T extends object>(
-    options: QuerySourceListOptions<T>,
-  ): Promise<QuerySourceListResponse<T>> {
-    const request = options.request ?? {};
-
-    if (options.source === 'local') {
-      const local = await this.runLocal(options.local);
-      return this.toResponse(this.tagList(local, SOURCE_LOCAL));
-    }
-
-    if (options.source === 'all') {
-      return this.listAll(options.resource, request, options.local);
-    }
-
-    if (options.source.startsWith('federated:')) {
-      const host = options.source.slice('federated:'.length).trim();
-      if (!host) {
-        throw new QuerySourceError({
-          code: 'INVALID_SOURCE',
-          message: 'Federated source must include a host after federated:',
-          source: options.source,
-        });
-      }
-
-      const peer = await this.findPeerByHost(host, options.source);
-      const remote = await this.federationClient.list<T>(peer.id, options.resource, request);
-      return this.toResponse(this.tagList(remote, peer.commonName));
-    }
-
-    throw new QuerySourceError({
-      code: 'INVALID_SOURCE',
-      message: `Unsupported query source: ${options.source}`,
-      source: options.source,
-    });
-  }
-
-  private async listAll<T extends object>(
-    resource: string,
-    request: Record<string, unknown>,
-    local: LocalListExecutor<T>,
-  ): Promise<QuerySourceListResponse<T>> {
-    const peers = await this.listActiveOutboundPeers();
-
-    const localPromise = this.runLocal(local).then((response) =>
-      this.tagList(response, SOURCE_LOCAL),
-    );
-    const remotePromises = peers.map(async (peer: OutboundPeer): Promise<TaggedList<T> | null> => {
-      try {
-        const response = await this.federationClient.list<T>(peer.id, resource, request);
-        return this.tagList(response, peer.commonName);
-      } catch (error: unknown) {
-        this.logger.warn(
-          `Federated query to peer ${peer.commonName} (${peer.id}) failed; returning partial all-source response: ${
-            error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error)
-          }`,
-        );
-        return null;
-      }
-    });
-
-    const [localResult, ...remoteResults] = await Promise.all([localPromise, ...remotePromises]);
-    const successfulRemoteResults = remoteResults.filter(
-      (result: TaggedList<T> | null): result is TaggedList<T> => result !== null,
-    );
-    const allResults = [localResult, ...successfulRemoteResults];
-    const peerFailure = successfulRemoteResults.length !== peers.length;
-
-    return this.mergeTaggedLists(allResults, peerFailure);
-  }
-
-  private async runLocal<T extends object>(
-    local: LocalListExecutor<T>,
-  ): Promise<FederationListResponse<T>> {
-    const response = await local();
-    if (Array.isArray(response)) {
-      return { items: response };
-    }
-    return response;
-  }
-
-  private tagList<T extends object>(
-    response: FederationListResponse<T>,
-    source: string,
-  ): TaggedList<T> {
-    return {
-      items: tagWithSource(response.items, source),
-      partial: response._partial === true,
-      truncated: response._truncated === true || response.nextCursor !== undefined,
-      nextCursor: response.nextCursor,
-    };
-  }
-
-  private mergeTaggedLists<T extends object>(
-    lists: Array<TaggedList<T>>,
-    peerFailure: boolean,
-  ): QuerySourceListResponse<T> {
-    const items = lists.flatMap((list: TaggedList<T>) => list.items);
-    const partial =
-      peerFailure ||
-      lists.some((list: TaggedList<T>) => list.partial || list.nextCursor !== undefined);
-    const truncated = lists.some((list: TaggedList<T>) => list.truncated);
-
-    const response: QuerySourceListResponse<T> = { items };
-    if (partial) {
-      response._partial = true;
-    }
-    if (truncated) {
-      response._truncated = true;
-    }
-    return response;
-  }
-
-  private toResponse<T extends object>(tagged: TaggedList<T>): QuerySourceListResponse<T> {
-    const response: QuerySourceListResponse<T> = {
-      items: tagged.items,
-    };
-    if (tagged.nextCursor !== undefined) {
-      response.nextCursor = tagged.nextCursor;
-    }
-    if (tagged.partial) {
-      response._partial = true;
-    }
-    if (tagged.truncated) {
-      response._truncated = true;
-    }
-    return response;
-  }
-
-  private async findPeerByHost(sourceHost: string, source: string): Promise<OutboundPeer> {
-    const host = normalizeHost(sourceHost);
-    const peers = await this.listActiveOutboundPeers();
-    const peer = peers.find((candidate: OutboundPeer) => {
-      const commonName = normalizeHost(candidate.commonName);
-      const endpointHosts = endpointHostKeys(candidate.endpointUrl).map((endpointHost: string) =>
-        normalizeHost(endpointHost),
-      );
-      return commonName === host || endpointHosts.includes(host);
-    });
-
-    if (!peer) {
-      throw new QuerySourceError({
-        code: 'PEER_NOT_FOUND',
-        message: `No active outbound federation peer matches source ${source}`,
-        source,
-      });
-    }
-
-    return peer;
-  }
-
-  private async listActiveOutboundPeers(): Promise<OutboundPeer[]> {
-    const rows = await this.db
-      .select({
-        id: federationPeers.id,
-        commonName: federationPeers.commonName,
-        endpointUrl: federationPeers.endpointUrl,
-      })
-      .from(federationPeers)
-      .where(
-        and(
-          eq(federationPeers.state, 'active'),
-          isNotNull(federationPeers.endpointUrl),
-          isNotNull(federationPeers.clientKeyPem),
-        ),
-      )
-      .orderBy(federationPeers.commonName);
-
-    return rows.filter((row): row is OutboundPeer => typeof row.endpointUrl === 'string');
-  }
-}
-
-function normalizeHost(host: string): string {
-  return host.trim().toLowerCase();
-}
-
-function endpointHostKeys(endpointUrl: string): string[] {
-  try {
-    const url = new URL(endpointUrl);
-    return Array.from(new Set([url.host, url.hostname].filter((host: string) => host.length > 0)));
-  } catch {
-    return [];
-  }
-}

apps/gateway/src/federation/federation.module.ts

@@ -4,35 +4,26 @@ import { CaService } from './ca.service.js';
 import { EnrollmentController } from './enrollment.controller.js';
 import { EnrollmentService } from './enrollment.service.js';
 import { FederationController } from './federation.controller.js';
-import { CapabilitiesController } from './server/verbs/capabilities.controller.js';
 import { GrantsService } from './grants.service.js';
-import { FederationClientService, QuerySourceService } from './client/index.js';
-import { FederationAuthGuard, FederationScopeService } from './server/index.js';
-import { ListController } from './server/verbs/list.controller.js';
-import { FederationListQueryService } from './server/verbs/list-query.service.js';
+import { FederationClientService } from './client/index.js';
+import { FederationAuthGuard } from './server/index.js';
 
 @Module({
-  controllers: [EnrollmentController, FederationController, CapabilitiesController, ListController],
+  controllers: [EnrollmentController, FederationController],
   providers: [
     AdminGuard,
     CaService,
     EnrollmentService,
     GrantsService,
     FederationClientService,
-    QuerySourceService,
     FederationAuthGuard,
-    FederationScopeService,
-    FederationListQueryService,
   ],
   exports: [
     CaService,
     EnrollmentService,
     GrantsService,
     FederationClientService,
-    QuerySourceService,
     FederationAuthGuard,
-    FederationScopeService,
-    FederationListQueryService,
   ],
 })
 export class FederationModule {}

apps/gateway/src/federation/server/__tests__/scope.service.spec.ts

@@ -1,324 +0,0 @@
-/**
- * Unit tests for FederationScopeService (FED-M3-04).
- *
- * Coverage:
- *  - resource allowlist deny
- *  - excluded resource deny
- *  - invalid scope deny
- *  - invalid requested limit deny
- *  - native RBAC deny as subjectUserId
- *  - scope/native filter intersection for personal and team rows
- *  - native RBAC personal deny wins over scope include_personal allow/default
- *  - max_rows_per_query cap
- */
-
-import { beforeEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest';
-import { FederationScopeService, type FederationNativeRbacEvaluator } from '../scope.service.js';
-import type { FederationContext } from '../federation-context.js';
-
-const GRANT_ID = 'grant-1';
-const PEER_ID = 'peer-1';
-const SUBJECT_USER_ID = 'user-1';
-
-function makeContext(scope: Record<string, unknown>): FederationContext {
-  return {
-    grantId: GRANT_ID,
-    peerId: PEER_ID,
-    subjectUserId: SUBJECT_USER_ID,
-    scope,
-  };
-}
-
-function makeNativeRbac(
-  result: Awaited<ReturnType<FederationNativeRbacEvaluator['evaluateReadAccess']>>,
-): FederationNativeRbacEvaluator {
-  return {
-    evaluateReadAccess: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(result),
-  };
-}
-
-describe('FederationScopeService', () => {
-  let service: FederationScopeService;
-
-  beforeEach(() => {
-    service = new FederationScopeService();
-  });
-
-  it('allows a granted resource and returns a capped query filter', async () => {
-    const nativeRbac = makeNativeRbac({
-      allowed: true,
-      access: { includePersonal: true, teamIds: ['team-1', 'team-2'] },
-    });
-
-    const result = await service.evaluateAccess({
-      context: makeContext({
-        resources: ['tasks'],
-        filters: { tasks: { include_teams: ['team-1', 'team-3'], include_personal: true } },
-        max_rows_per_query: 50,
-      }),
-      resource: 'tasks',
-      requestedLimit: 500,
-      nativeRbac,
-    });
-
-    expect(result).toEqual({
-      allowed: true,
-      filter: {
-        resource: 'tasks',
-        subjectUserId: SUBJECT_USER_ID,
-        includePersonal: true,
-        teamIds: ['team-1'],
-        limit: 50,
-        maxRowsPerQuery: 50,
-      },
-    });
-    expect(nativeRbac.evaluateReadAccess).toHaveBeenCalledWith({
-      grantId: GRANT_ID,
-      peerId: PEER_ID,
-      subjectUserId: SUBJECT_USER_ID,
-      resource: 'tasks',
-    });
-  });
-
-  it('defaults absent resource filters to native RBAC personal and team visibility', async () => {
-    const result = await service.evaluateAccess({
-      context: makeContext({ resources: ['notes'], max_rows_per_query: 100 }),
-      resource: 'notes',
-      nativeRbac: makeNativeRbac({
-        allowed: true,
-        access: { includePersonal: true, teamIds: ['team-1', 'team-2'] },
-      }),
-    });
-
-    expect(result).toMatchObject({
-      allowed: true,
-      filter: {
-        includePersonal: true,
-        teamIds: ['team-1', 'team-2'],
-        limit: 100,
-      },
-    });
-  });
-
-  it('honors include_personal false even when native RBAC allows personal rows', async () => {
-    const result = await service.evaluateAccess({
-      context: makeContext({
-        resources: ['memory'],
-        filters: { memory: { include_personal: false } },
-        max_rows_per_query: 25,
-      }),
-      resource: 'memory',
-      nativeRbac: makeNativeRbac({
-        allowed: true,
-        access: { includePersonal: true, teamIds: [] },
-      }),
-    });
-
-    expect(result).toMatchObject({
-      allowed: true,
-      filter: {
-        includePersonal: false,
-        teamIds: [],
-      },
-    });
-  });
-
-  it('does not leak personal rows when scope allows personal but native RBAC denies personal', async () => {
-    const result = await service.evaluateAccess({
-      context: makeContext({
-        resources: ['tasks'],
-        filters: { tasks: { include_personal: true } },
-        max_rows_per_query: 25,
-      }),
-      resource: 'tasks',
-      nativeRbac: makeNativeRbac({
-        allowed: true,
-        access: { includePersonal: false, teamIds: ['team-1'] },
-      }),
-    });
-
-    expect(result).toMatchObject({
-      allowed: true,
-      filter: {
-        includePersonal: false,
-        teamIds: ['team-1'],
-      },
-    });
-  });
-
-  it('does not widen native RBAC when scope includes teams the user cannot access', async () => {
-    const result = await service.evaluateAccess({
-      context: makeContext({
-        resources: ['tasks'],
-        filters: { tasks: { include_teams: ['team-2'], include_personal: false } },
-        max_rows_per_query: 25,
-      }),
-      resource: 'tasks',
-      nativeRbac: makeNativeRbac({
-        allowed: true,
-        access: { includePersonal: true, teamIds: ['team-1'] },
-      }),
-    });
-
-    expect(result).toMatchObject({
-      allowed: true,
-      filter: {
-        includePersonal: false,
-        teamIds: [],
-      },
-    });
-  });
-
-  it('denies invalid grant scope before RBAC evaluation', async () => {
-    const nativeRbac = makeNativeRbac({
-      allowed: true,
-      access: { includePersonal: true, teamIds: [] },
-    });
-
-    const result = await service.evaluateAccess({
-      context: makeContext({ resources: [], max_rows_per_query: 100 }),
-      resource: 'tasks',
-      nativeRbac,
-    });
-
-    expect(result).toMatchObject({
-      allowed: false,
-      deny: {
-        code: 'invalid_scope',
-        stage: 'scope_parse',
-        statusCode: 400,
-        grantId: GRANT_ID,
-        subjectUserId: SUBJECT_USER_ID,
-        resource: 'tasks',
-      },
-    });
-    expect(nativeRbac.evaluateReadAccess).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
-  });
-
-  it('denies unsupported resource names before RBAC evaluation', async () => {
-    const nativeRbac = makeNativeRbac({
-      allowed: true,
-      access: { includePersonal: true, teamIds: [] },
-    });
-
-    const result = await service.evaluateAccess({
-      context: makeContext({ resources: ['tasks'], max_rows_per_query: 100 }),
-      resource: 'unknown_resource',
-      nativeRbac,
-    });
-
-    expect(result).toMatchObject({
-      allowed: false,
-      deny: {
-        code: 'invalid_resource',
-        stage: 'resource_allowlist',
-        statusCode: 403,
-      },
-    });
-    expect(nativeRbac.evaluateReadAccess).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
-  });
-
-  it('denies resources explicitly present in excluded_resources before allowlist miss', async () => {
-    const nativeRbac = makeNativeRbac({
-      allowed: true,
-      access: { includePersonal: true, teamIds: [] },
-    });
-
-    const result = await service.evaluateAccess({
-      context: makeContext({
-        resources: ['tasks'],
-        excluded_resources: ['credentials'],
-        max_rows_per_query: 100,
-      }),
-      resource: 'credentials',
-      nativeRbac,
-    });
-
-    expect(result).toMatchObject({
-      allowed: false,
-      deny: {
-        code: 'resource_excluded',
-        stage: 'resource_exclusion',
-        statusCode: 403,
-        resource: 'credentials',
-      },
-    });
-    expect(nativeRbac.evaluateReadAccess).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
-  });
-
-  it('denies supported resources that are not granted by scope', async () => {
-    const nativeRbac = makeNativeRbac({
-      allowed: true,
-      access: { includePersonal: true, teamIds: [] },
-    });
-
-    const result = await service.evaluateAccess({
-      context: makeContext({ resources: ['tasks'], max_rows_per_query: 100 }),
-      resource: 'notes',
-      nativeRbac,
-    });
-
-    expect(result).toMatchObject({
-      allowed: false,
-      deny: {
-        code: 'resource_not_granted',
-        stage: 'resource_allowlist',
-        statusCode: 403,
-        resource: 'notes',
-      },
-    });
-    expect(nativeRbac.evaluateReadAccess).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
-  });
-
-  it('denies invalid requested row limits before RBAC evaluation', async () => {
-    const nativeRbac = makeNativeRbac({
-      allowed: true,
-      access: { includePersonal: true, teamIds: [] },
-    });
-
-    const result = await service.evaluateAccess({
-      context: makeContext({ resources: ['tasks'], max_rows_per_query: 100 }),
-      resource: 'tasks',
-      requestedLimit: 0,
-      nativeRbac,
-    });
-
-    expect(result).toMatchObject({
-      allowed: false,
-      deny: {
-        code: 'invalid_limit',
-        stage: 'row_cap',
-        statusCode: 400,
-        details: { requestedLimit: 0 },
-      },
-    });
-    expect(nativeRbac.evaluateReadAccess).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
-  });
-
-  it('denies when native RBAC rejects subjectUserId access to the resource', async () => {
-    const result = await service.evaluateAccess({
-      context: makeContext({ resources: ['tasks'], max_rows_per_query: 100 }),
-      resource: 'tasks',
-      nativeRbac: makeNativeRbac({
-        allowed: false,
-        reason: 'read:tasks denied',
-        details: { permission: 'tasks:read' },
-      }),
-    });
-
-    expect(result).toEqual({
-      allowed: false,
-      deny: {
-        code: 'native_rbac_denied',
-        stage: 'native_rbac',
-        statusCode: 403,
-        message: 'read:tasks denied',
-        grantId: GRANT_ID,
-        peerId: PEER_ID,
-        subjectUserId: SUBJECT_USER_ID,
-        resource: 'tasks',
-        details: { permission: 'tasks:read' },
-      },
-    });
-  });
-});

apps/gateway/src/federation/server/index.ts

@@ -10,22 +10,4 @@
  */
 
 export { FederationAuthGuard } from './federation-auth.guard.js';
-export { FederationScopeService } from './scope.service.js';
 export type { FederationContext } from './federation-context.js';
-export type {
-  FederationNativeRbacAccess,
-  FederationNativeRbacAllowedResult,
-  FederationNativeRbacDeniedResult,
-  FederationNativeRbacEvaluator,
-  FederationNativeRbacRequest,
-  FederationNativeRbacResult,
-  FederationScopeAllowedResult,
-  FederationScopeDeniedResult,
-  FederationScopeDenyCode,
-  FederationScopeDenyDetails,
-  FederationScopeDenyReason,
-  FederationScopeDenyStage,
-  FederationScopeEvaluationInput,
-  FederationScopeEvaluationResult,
-  FederationScopeQueryFilter,
-} from './scope.service.js';

apps/gateway/src/federation/server/scope.service.ts

@@ -1,272 +0,0 @@
-/**
- * FederationScopeService — M3 server-side scope enforcement pipeline.
- *
- * Pure trust-boundary service: it validates the grant scope, asks an injected
- * native RBAC evaluator what the subject user can read locally, intersects that
- * answer with the federation scope filters, and returns a query filter for the
- * verb controllers. The service performs no DB calls directly.
- */
-
-import { Injectable } from '@nestjs/common';
-import {
-  FEDERATION_RESOURCE_VALUES,
-  type FederationResource,
-  FederationScopeError,
-  parseFederationScope,
-} from '../scope-schema.js';
-import type { FederationContext } from './federation-context.js';
-
-const federationResourceSet: ReadonlySet<string> = new Set<string>(FEDERATION_RESOURCE_VALUES);
-
-export type FederationScopeDenyStage =
-  | 'scope_parse'
-  | 'resource_allowlist'
-  | 'resource_exclusion'
-  | 'native_rbac'
-  | 'row_cap';
-
-export type FederationScopeDenyCode =
-  | 'invalid_scope'
-  | 'invalid_resource'
-  | 'resource_not_granted'
-  | 'resource_excluded'
-  | 'native_rbac_denied'
-  | 'invalid_limit';
-
-export type FederationScopeDenyStatus = 400 | 403;
-
-export interface FederationScopeDenyDetails {
-  readonly [key: string]: string | number | boolean | readonly string[];
-}
-
-export interface FederationScopeDenyReason {
-  readonly code: FederationScopeDenyCode;
-  readonly stage: FederationScopeDenyStage;
-  readonly statusCode: FederationScopeDenyStatus;
-  readonly message: string;
-  readonly grantId: string;
-  readonly peerId: string;
-  readonly subjectUserId: string;
-  readonly resource: string;
-  readonly details?: FederationScopeDenyDetails;
-}
-
-export interface FederationNativeRbacRequest {
-  readonly grantId: string;
-  readonly peerId: string;
-  readonly subjectUserId: string;
-  readonly resource: FederationResource;
-}
-
-export interface FederationNativeRbacAccess {
-  /** Whether this user may read personal rows for this resource. */
-  readonly includePersonal: boolean;
-
-  /** Team IDs this user may read for this resource under native RBAC. */
-  readonly teamIds: readonly string[];
-}
-
-export interface FederationNativeRbacAllowedResult {
-  readonly allowed: true;
-  readonly access: FederationNativeRbacAccess;
-}
-
-export interface FederationNativeRbacDeniedResult {
-  readonly allowed: false;
-  readonly reason?: string;
-  readonly details?: FederationScopeDenyDetails;
-}
-
-export type FederationNativeRbacResult =
-  | FederationNativeRbacAllowedResult
-  | FederationNativeRbacDeniedResult;
-
-export interface FederationNativeRbacEvaluator {
-  evaluateReadAccess(request: FederationNativeRbacRequest): Promise<FederationNativeRbacResult>;
-}
-
-export interface FederationScopeEvaluationInput {
-  readonly context: FederationContext;
-  readonly resource: string;
-  readonly requestedLimit?: number;
-  readonly nativeRbac: FederationNativeRbacEvaluator;
-}
-
-export interface FederationScopeQueryFilter {
-  readonly resource: FederationResource;
-  readonly subjectUserId: string;
-  readonly includePersonal: boolean;
-  readonly teamIds: readonly string[];
-  readonly limit: number;
-  readonly maxRowsPerQuery: number;
-}
-
-export interface FederationScopeAllowedResult {
-  readonly allowed: true;
-  readonly filter: FederationScopeQueryFilter;
-}
-
-export interface FederationScopeDeniedResult {
-  readonly allowed: false;
-  readonly deny: FederationScopeDenyReason;
-}
-
-export type FederationScopeEvaluationResult =
-  | FederationScopeAllowedResult
-  | FederationScopeDeniedResult;
-
-function isFederationResource(resource: string): resource is FederationResource {
-  return federationResourceSet.has(resource);
-}
-
-function uniqueStrings(values: readonly string[]): readonly string[] {
-  return Array.from(new Set<string>(values));
-}
-
-function intersectTeamIds(
-  nativeTeamIds: readonly string[],
-  scopedTeamIds: readonly string[] | undefined,
-): readonly string[] {
-  const uniqueNativeTeamIds = uniqueStrings(nativeTeamIds);
-
-  if (scopedTeamIds === undefined) {
-    return uniqueNativeTeamIds;
-  }
-
-  const nativeSet = new Set<string>(uniqueNativeTeamIds);
-  return uniqueStrings(scopedTeamIds).filter((teamId: string): boolean => nativeSet.has(teamId));
-}
-
-function makeDenyReason(params: {
-  readonly code: FederationScopeDenyCode;
-  readonly stage: FederationScopeDenyStage;
-  readonly statusCode?: FederationScopeDenyStatus;
-  readonly message: string;
-  readonly context: FederationContext;
-  readonly resource: string;
-  readonly details?: FederationScopeDenyDetails;
-}): FederationScopeDeniedResult {
-  return {
-    allowed: false,
-    deny: {
-      code: params.code,
-      stage: params.stage,
-      statusCode: params.statusCode ?? 403,
-      message: params.message,
-      grantId: params.context.grantId,
-      peerId: params.context.peerId,
-      subjectUserId: params.context.subjectUserId,
-      resource: params.resource,
-      ...(params.details !== undefined ? { details: params.details } : {}),
-    },
-  };
-}
-
-@Injectable()
-export class FederationScopeService {
-  async evaluateAccess(
-    input: FederationScopeEvaluationInput,
-  ): Promise<FederationScopeEvaluationResult> {
-    const { context, resource, requestedLimit, nativeRbac } = input;
-
-    let scope: ReturnType<typeof parseFederationScope>;
-    try {
-      scope = parseFederationScope(context.scope);
-    } catch (error: unknown) {
-      const message =
-        error instanceof FederationScopeError
-          ? 'Federation grant scope is invalid'
-          : 'Federation grant scope could not be parsed';
-      const details = error instanceof Error ? { reason: error.message } : undefined;
-      return makeDenyReason({
-        code: 'invalid_scope',
-        stage: 'scope_parse',
-        statusCode: 400,
-        message,
-        context,
-        resource,
-        ...(details !== undefined ? { details } : {}),
-      });
-    }
-
-    if (!isFederationResource(resource)) {
-      return makeDenyReason({
-        code: 'invalid_resource',
-        stage: 'resource_allowlist',
-        message: 'Requested federation resource is not supported',
-        context,
-        resource,
-        details: { supportedResources: FEDERATION_RESOURCE_VALUES },
-      });
-    }
-
-    if (scope.excluded_resources.includes(resource)) {
-      return makeDenyReason({
-        code: 'resource_excluded',
-        stage: 'resource_exclusion',
-        message: 'Requested federation resource is explicitly excluded by grant scope',
-        context,
-        resource,
-      });
-    }
-
-    if (!scope.resources.includes(resource)) {
-      return makeDenyReason({
-        code: 'resource_not_granted',
-        stage: 'resource_allowlist',
-        message: 'Requested federation resource is not granted by scope',
-        context,
-        resource,
-        details: { grantedResources: scope.resources },
-      });
-    }
-
-    if (requestedLimit !== undefined && (!Number.isInteger(requestedLimit) || requestedLimit < 1)) {
-      return makeDenyReason({
-        code: 'invalid_limit',
-        stage: 'row_cap',
-        statusCode: 400,
-        message: 'Requested row limit must be a positive integer',
-        context,
-        resource,
-        details: { requestedLimit },
-      });
-    }
-
-    const nativeResult = await nativeRbac.evaluateReadAccess({
-      grantId: context.grantId,
-      peerId: context.peerId,
-      subjectUserId: context.subjectUserId,
-      resource,
-    });
-
-    if (!nativeResult.allowed) {
-      return makeDenyReason({
-        code: 'native_rbac_denied',
-        stage: 'native_rbac',
-        message: nativeResult.reason ?? 'Subject user is not allowed to read this resource',
-        context,
-        resource,
-        ...(nativeResult.details !== undefined ? { details: nativeResult.details } : {}),
-      });
-    }
-
-    const scopeFilter = scope.filters?.[resource];
-    const includePersonal =
-      Boolean(scopeFilter?.include_personal ?? true) && nativeResult.access.includePersonal;
-    const teamIds = intersectTeamIds(nativeResult.access.teamIds, scopeFilter?.include_teams);
-    const limit = Math.min(requestedLimit ?? scope.max_rows_per_query, scope.max_rows_per_query);
-
-    return {
-      allowed: true,
-      filter: {
-        resource,
-        subjectUserId: context.subjectUserId,
-        includePersonal,
-        teamIds,
-        limit,
-        maxRowsPerQuery: scope.max_rows_per_query,
-      },
-    };
-  }
-}

apps/gateway/src/federation/server/verbs/__tests__/capabilities.controller.spec.ts

@@ -1,88 +0,0 @@
-import 'reflect-metadata';
-import { RequestMethod } from '@nestjs/common';
-import { describe, expect, it } from 'vitest';
-import type { FastifyRequest } from 'fastify';
-import { FederationCapabilitiesResponseSchema, FEDERATION_VERBS } from '@mosaicstack/types';
-import { FederationScopeError } from '../../../scope-schema.js';
-import { FederationAuthGuard } from '../../federation-auth.guard.js';
-import { CapabilitiesController } from '../capabilities.controller.js';
-
-const VALID_SCOPE = {
-  resources: ['tasks', 'notes'],
-  excluded_resources: ['credentials'],
-  max_rows_per_query: 250,
-} as const;
-
-const DEFAULTED_SCOPE = {
-  resources: ['memory'],
-  max_rows_per_query: 10,
-} as const;
-
-function makeRequest(scope: Record<string, unknown>): FastifyRequest {
-  return {
-    federationContext: {
-      grantId: 'grant-1',
-      peerId: 'peer-1',
-      subjectUserId: 'user-1',
-      scope,
-    },
-  } as FastifyRequest;
-}
-
-describe('CapabilitiesController', () => {
-  it('declares GET /api/federation/v1/capabilities', () => {
-    expect(Reflect.getMetadata('path', CapabilitiesController)).toBe(
-      'api/federation/v1/capabilities',
-    );
-    expect(Reflect.getMetadata('path', CapabilitiesController.prototype.getCapabilities)).toBe('/');
-    expect(Reflect.getMetadata('method', CapabilitiesController.prototype.getCapabilities)).toBe(
-      RequestMethod.GET,
-    );
-  });
-
-  it('is protected only by FederationAuthGuard', () => {
-    const guards = Reflect.getMetadata('__guards__', CapabilitiesController) as unknown[];
-
-    expect(guards).toEqual([FederationAuthGuard]);
-  });
-
-  it('returns resources, excluded resources, max rows, and M3 supported verbs from the active grant scope', () => {
-    const controller = new CapabilitiesController();
-
-    const response = controller.getCapabilities(makeRequest(VALID_SCOPE));
-
-    expect(response).toEqual({
-      resources: ['tasks', 'notes'],
-      excluded_resources: ['credentials'],
-      max_rows_per_query: 250,
-      supported_verbs: [...FEDERATION_VERBS],
-    });
-    expect(FederationCapabilitiesResponseSchema.safeParse(response).success).toBe(true);
-  });
-
-  it('applies scope defaults without RBAC or resource filtering', () => {
-    const controller = new CapabilitiesController();
-
-    const response = controller.getCapabilities(makeRequest(DEFAULTED_SCOPE));
-
-    expect(response).toEqual({
-      resources: ['memory'],
-      excluded_resources: [],
-      max_rows_per_query: 10,
-      supported_verbs: ['list', 'get', 'capabilities'],
-    });
-  });
-
-  it('rejects invalid scope state instead of returning an invalid capabilities contract', () => {
-    const controller = new CapabilitiesController();
-
-    expect(() =>
-      controller.getCapabilities(
-        makeRequest({
-          resources: [],
-          max_rows_per_query: 0,
-        }),
-      ),
-    ).toThrow(FederationScopeError);
-  });
-});

apps/gateway/src/federation/server/verbs/__tests__/list-query.service.spec.ts

@@ -1,428 +0,0 @@
-import { afterAll, beforeAll, describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest';
-import {
-  createPgliteDb,
-  insights,
-  missionTasks,
-  missions,
-  preferences,
-  projects,
-  runPgliteMigrations,
-  teams,
-  users,
-  type Db,
-  type DbHandle,
-} from '@mosaicstack/db';
-import type { FederationScopeQueryFilter } from '../../scope.service.js';
-import { FederationListQueryService } from '../list-query.service.js';
-
-const TASK_FILTER: FederationScopeQueryFilter = {
-  resource: 'tasks',
-  subjectUserId: 'user-1',
-  includePersonal: true,
-  teamIds: [],
-  limit: 2,
-  maxRowsPerQuery: 2,
-};
-
-const SUBJECT_USER_ID = 'fed-m3-05-subject';
-const OTHER_USER_ID = 'fed-m3-05-other';
-const TEAM_ID = '05000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000001';
-const UNAUTHORIZED_TEAM_ID = '05000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000002';
-const PERSONAL_PROJECT_ID = '05000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000101';
-const TEAM_PROJECT_ID = '05000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000102';
-const UNAUTHORIZED_PROJECT_ID = '05000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000103';
-const PERSONAL_MISSION_ID = '05000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000201';
-const TEAM_MISSION_ID = '05000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000202';
-const UNAUTHORIZED_MISSION_ID = '05000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000203';
-const SUBJECT_TEAM_NOTE_ID = '05000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000301';
-const OTHER_TEAM_NOTE_ID = '05000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000302';
-const SUBJECT_PERSONAL_NOTE_ID = '05000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000303';
-const SUBJECT_UNAUTHORIZED_NOTE_ID = '05000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000304';
-const INSIGHT_ONE_ID = '05000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000401';
-const INSIGHT_TWO_ID = '05000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000402';
-const PREFERENCE_ONE_ID = '05000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000501';
-const PREFERENCE_TWO_ID = '05000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000502';
-
-let dbHandle: DbHandle | undefined;
-
-function makeService() {
-  return new FederationListQueryService({} as Db);
-}
-
-function makeDbService() {
-  if (!dbHandle) {
-    throw new Error('test DB not initialized');
-  }
-  return new FederationListQueryService(dbHandle.db);
-}
-
-async function seedNotesFixture() {
-  if (!dbHandle) {
-    throw new Error('test DB not initialized');
-  }
-
-  await dbHandle.db.insert(users).values([
-    {
-      id: SUBJECT_USER_ID,
-      name: 'Federation Subject',
-      email: `${SUBJECT_USER_ID}@example.test`,
-      emailVerified: false,
-    },
-    {
-      id: OTHER_USER_ID,
-      name: 'Federation Other',
-      email: `${OTHER_USER_ID}@example.test`,
-      emailVerified: false,
-    },
-  ]);
-
-  await dbHandle.db.insert(teams).values([
-    {
-      id: TEAM_ID,
-      name: 'FED-M3-05 Team',
-      slug: 'fed-m3-05-team',
-      ownerId: SUBJECT_USER_ID,
-      managerId: SUBJECT_USER_ID,
-    },
-    {
-      id: UNAUTHORIZED_TEAM_ID,
-      name: 'FED-M3-05 Unauthorized Team',
-      slug: 'fed-m3-05-unauthorized-team',
-      ownerId: OTHER_USER_ID,
-      managerId: OTHER_USER_ID,
-    },
-  ]);
-
-  await dbHandle.db.insert(projects).values([
-    {
-      id: PERSONAL_PROJECT_ID,
-      name: 'FED-M3-05 Personal Project',
-      ownerId: SUBJECT_USER_ID,
-      ownerType: 'user',
-    },
-    {
-      id: TEAM_PROJECT_ID,
-      name: 'FED-M3-05 Team Project',
-      teamId: TEAM_ID,
-      ownerType: 'team',
-    },
-    {
-      id: UNAUTHORIZED_PROJECT_ID,
-      name: 'FED-M3-05 Unauthorized Project',
-      teamId: UNAUTHORIZED_TEAM_ID,
-      ownerType: 'team',
-    },
-  ]);
-
-  await dbHandle.db.insert(missions).values([
-    {
-      id: PERSONAL_MISSION_ID,
-      name: 'FED-M3-05 Personal Mission',
-      projectId: PERSONAL_PROJECT_ID,
-      userId: SUBJECT_USER_ID,
-    },
-    {
-      id: TEAM_MISSION_ID,
-      name: 'FED-M3-05 Team Mission',
-      projectId: TEAM_PROJECT_ID,
-      userId: SUBJECT_USER_ID,
-    },
-    {
-      id: UNAUTHORIZED_MISSION_ID,
-      name: 'FED-M3-05 Unauthorized Mission',
-      projectId: UNAUTHORIZED_PROJECT_ID,
-      userId: SUBJECT_USER_ID,
-    },
-  ]);
-
-  await dbHandle.db.insert(missionTasks).values([
-    {
-      id: SUBJECT_TEAM_NOTE_ID,
-      missionId: TEAM_MISSION_ID,
-      userId: SUBJECT_USER_ID,
-      notes: 'subject note on team mission',
-      createdAt: new Date('2026-06-24T03:00:00.000Z'),
-      updatedAt: new Date('2026-06-24T03:00:00.000Z'),
-    },
-    {
-      id: OTHER_TEAM_NOTE_ID,
-      missionId: TEAM_MISSION_ID,
-      userId: OTHER_USER_ID,
-      notes: 'other user note on team mission',
-      createdAt: new Date('2026-06-24T02:00:00.000Z'),
-      updatedAt: new Date('2026-06-24T02:00:00.000Z'),
-    },
-    {
-      id: SUBJECT_PERSONAL_NOTE_ID,
-      missionId: PERSONAL_MISSION_ID,
-      userId: SUBJECT_USER_ID,
-      notes: 'subject note on personal mission',
-      createdAt: new Date('2026-06-24T01:00:00.000Z'),
-      updatedAt: new Date('2026-06-24T01:00:00.000Z'),
-    },
-    {
-      id: SUBJECT_UNAUTHORIZED_NOTE_ID,
-      missionId: UNAUTHORIZED_MISSION_ID,
-      userId: SUBJECT_USER_ID,
-      notes: 'subject note outside grant-visible missions',
-      createdAt: new Date('2026-06-24T04:00:00.000Z'),
-      updatedAt: new Date('2026-06-24T04:00:00.000Z'),
-    },
-  ]);
-
-  const memoryCreatedAt = new Date('2026-06-24T05:00:00.000Z');
-  await dbHandle.db.insert(insights).values([
-    {
-      id: INSIGHT_ONE_ID,
-      userId: SUBJECT_USER_ID,
-      content: 'first insight',
-      source: 'agent',
-      createdAt: memoryCreatedAt,
-      updatedAt: memoryCreatedAt,
-    },
-    {
-      id: INSIGHT_TWO_ID,
-      userId: SUBJECT_USER_ID,
-      content: 'second insight',
-      source: 'agent',
-      createdAt: memoryCreatedAt,
-      updatedAt: memoryCreatedAt,
-    },
-  ]);
-
-  await dbHandle.db.insert(preferences).values([
-    {
-      id: PREFERENCE_ONE_ID,
-      userId: SUBJECT_USER_ID,
-      key: 'fed-m3-05-pref-1',
-      value: { enabled: true },
-      createdAt: memoryCreatedAt,
-      updatedAt: memoryCreatedAt,
-    },
-    {
-      id: PREFERENCE_TWO_ID,
-      userId: SUBJECT_USER_ID,
-      key: 'fed-m3-05-pref-2',
-      value: { enabled: false },
-      createdAt: memoryCreatedAt,
-      updatedAt: memoryCreatedAt,
-    },
-  ]);
-}
-
-function stubRows(
-  service: FederationListQueryService,
-  ...pages: Array<Array<Record<string, unknown>>>
-) {
-  const mock = vi.fn();
-  for (const page of pages) {
-    mock.mockResolvedValueOnce(page);
-  }
-  (
-    service as unknown as {
-      listAllRows: (
-        _filter: FederationScopeQueryFilter,
-        _rowLimit: number,
-        _cursor: unknown,
-      ) => Promise<Array<Record<string, unknown>>>;
-    }
-  ).listAllRows = mock;
-  return mock;
-}
-
-describe('FederationListQueryService', () => {
-  beforeAll(async () => {
-    dbHandle = createPgliteDb(`memory://fed-m3-05-list-${Date.now()}`);
-    await runPgliteMigrations(dbHandle);
-    await seedNotesFixture();
-  });
-
-  afterAll(async () => {
-    await dbHandle?.close();
-    dbHandle = undefined;
-  });
-
-  it('denies sensitive resources in native RBAC for M3 list reads', async () => {
-    const service = makeService();
-
-    await expect(
-      service.evaluateReadAccess({
-        grantId: 'grant-1',
-        peerId: 'peer-1',
-        subjectUserId: 'user-1',
-        resource: 'credentials',
-      }),
-    ).resolves.toMatchObject({
-      allowed: false,
-      reason: 'credentials federation list access is not implemented in M3',
-    });
-  });
-
-  it('allows personal memory reads without requiring team lookup', async () => {
-    const service = makeService();
-
-    await expect(
-      service.evaluateReadAccess({
-        grantId: 'grant-1',
-        peerId: 'peer-1',
-        subjectUserId: 'user-1',
-        resource: 'memory',
-      }),
-    ).resolves.toEqual({
-      allowed: true,
-      access: { includePersonal: true, teamIds: [] },
-    });
-  });
-
-  it('applies the scope row cap and returns an opaque next cursor when truncated', async () => {
-    const service = makeService();
-    const listAllRows = stubRows(
-      service,
-      [
-        { id: '3', createdAt: new Date('2026-06-24T03:00:00.000Z') },
-        { id: '2', createdAt: new Date('2026-06-24T02:00:00.000Z') },
-        { id: '1', createdAt: new Date('2026-06-24T01:00:00.000Z') },
-      ],
-      [{ id: '1', createdAt: new Date('2026-06-24T01:00:00.000Z') }],
-    );
-
-    const firstPage = await service.list({ filter: TASK_FILTER });
-
-    expect(firstPage).toEqual({
-      items: [
-        { id: '3', createdAt: new Date('2026-06-24T03:00:00.000Z') },
-        { id: '2', createdAt: new Date('2026-06-24T02:00:00.000Z') },
-      ],
-      truncated: true,
-      nextCursor: expect.any(String),
-    });
-
-    expect(listAllRows).toHaveBeenNthCalledWith(1, TASK_FILTER, 3, undefined);
-
-    const secondPage = await service.list({ filter: TASK_FILTER, cursor: firstPage.nextCursor });
-    expect(secondPage).toEqual({
-      items: [{ id: '1', createdAt: new Date('2026-06-24T01:00:00.000Z') }],
-      truncated: false,
-    });
-    expect(listAllRows).toHaveBeenNthCalledWith(
-      2,
-      TASK_FILTER,
-      3,
-      expect.objectContaining({ id: '2' }),
-    );
-  });
-
-  it('rejects invalid cursors instead of falling back to the first page', async () => {
-    const service = makeService();
-    stubRows(service, [{ id: '1' }]);
-
-    await expect(service.list({ filter: TASK_FILTER, cursor: 'not-base64-json' })).rejects.toThrow(
-      'Invalid federation list cursor',
-    );
-  });
-
-  it('throws when a truncated page cannot encode a resumable cursor', async () => {
-    const service = makeService();
-    stubRows(service, [
-      { id: '2', createdAt: 'not-a-date' },
-      { id: '1', createdAt: 'not-a-date' },
-    ]);
-
-    await expect(service.list({ filter: { ...TASK_FILTER, limit: 1 } })).rejects.toThrow(
-      'Federation list cursor cannot be encoded',
-    );
-  });
-
-  it('throws on unsupported resources instead of crashing pagination', async () => {
-    const service = makeService();
-
-    await expect(
-      service.list({
-        filter: {
-          ...TASK_FILTER,
-          resource: 'unknown-resource' as FederationScopeQueryFilter['resource'],
-        },
-      }),
-    ).rejects.toThrow('Unsupported federation list resource');
-  });
-
-  it('does not leak another user mission task notes through team-scoped note reads', async () => {
-    const service = makeDbService();
-
-    const result = await service.list({
-      filter: {
-        resource: 'notes',
-        subjectUserId: SUBJECT_USER_ID,
-        includePersonal: false,
-        teamIds: [TEAM_ID],
-        limit: 10,
-        maxRowsPerQuery: 10,
-      },
-    });
-
-    const ids = result.items.map((item) => item['id']);
-    expect(ids).toEqual([SUBJECT_TEAM_NOTE_ID]);
-    expect(ids).not.toContain(OTHER_TEAM_NOTE_ID);
-  });
-
-  it('does not return subject personal mission task notes when includePersonal is false', async () => {
-    const service = makeDbService();
-
-    const result = await service.list({
-      filter: {
-        resource: 'notes',
-        subjectUserId: SUBJECT_USER_ID,
-        includePersonal: false,
-        teamIds: [TEAM_ID],
-        limit: 10,
-        maxRowsPerQuery: 10,
-      },
-    });
-
-    expect(result.items.map((item) => item['id'])).not.toContain(SUBJECT_PERSONAL_NOTE_ID);
-  });
-
-  it('does not return subject notes from missions outside the grant-visible project set', async () => {
-    const service = makeDbService();
-
-    const result = await service.list({
-      filter: {
-        resource: 'notes',
-        subjectUserId: SUBJECT_USER_ID,
-        includePersonal: true,
-        teamIds: [TEAM_ID],
-        limit: 10,
-        maxRowsPerQuery: 10,
-      },
-    });
-
-    const ids = result.items.map((item) => item['id']);
-    expect(ids).toContain(SUBJECT_PERSONAL_NOTE_ID);
-    expect(ids).toContain(SUBJECT_TEAM_NOTE_ID);
-    expect(ids).not.toContain(SUBJECT_UNAUTHORIZED_NOTE_ID);
-    expect(ids).not.toContain(OTHER_TEAM_NOTE_ID);
-  });
-
-  it('paginates memory deterministically across insights and preferences', async () => {
-    const service = makeDbService();
-    const filter: FederationScopeQueryFilter = {
-      resource: 'memory',
-      subjectUserId: SUBJECT_USER_ID,
-      includePersonal: true,
-      teamIds: [],
-      limit: 2,
-      maxRowsPerQuery: 2,
-    };
-
-    const firstPage = await service.list({ filter });
-    const secondPage = await service.list({ filter, cursor: firstPage.nextCursor });
-    const firstPageIds = firstPage.items.map((item) => item['id']);
-    const secondPageIds = secondPage.items.map((item) => item['id']);
-    const allIds = [...firstPageIds, ...secondPageIds];
-
-    expect(firstPage).toMatchObject({ truncated: true, nextCursor: expect.any(String) });
-    expect(firstPageIds).toEqual([INSIGHT_TWO_ID, INSIGHT_ONE_ID]);
-    expect(secondPageIds).toEqual([PREFERENCE_TWO_ID, PREFERENCE_ONE_ID]);
-    expect(new Set(allIds).size).toBe(allIds.length);
-  });
-});

apps/gateway/src/federation/server/verbs/__tests__/list.controller.spec.ts

@@ -1,188 +0,0 @@
-import 'reflect-metadata';
-import { RequestMethod } from '@nestjs/common';
-import type { FastifyRequest } from 'fastify';
-import { beforeEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest';
-import { FederationAuthGuard } from '../../federation-auth.guard.js';
-import type {
-  FederationScopeEvaluationResult,
-  FederationScopeQueryFilter,
-} from '../../scope.service.js';
-import { ListController } from '../list.controller.js';
-import type { FederationListQueryResult } from '../list-query.service.js';
-
-const FEDERATION_CONTEXT = {
-  grantId: 'grant-1',
-  peerId: 'peer-1',
-  subjectUserId: 'user-1',
-  scope: { resources: ['tasks'], max_rows_per_query: 25 },
-};
-
-const TASK_FILTER: FederationScopeQueryFilter = {
-  resource: 'tasks',
-  subjectUserId: 'user-1',
-  includePersonal: true,
-  teamIds: ['team-1'],
-  limit: 10,
-  maxRowsPerQuery: 25,
-};
-
-function makeRequest(): FastifyRequest {
-  return { federationContext: FEDERATION_CONTEXT } as unknown as FastifyRequest;
-}
-
-function allowedScope(
-  filter: FederationScopeQueryFilter = TASK_FILTER,
-): FederationScopeEvaluationResult {
-  return { allowed: true, filter };
-}
-
-function makeController(opts?: {
-  scopeResult?: FederationScopeEvaluationResult;
-  queryResult?: FederationListQueryResult;
-}) {
-  const scope = {
-    evaluateAccess: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(opts?.scopeResult ?? allowedScope()),
-  };
-  const query = {
-    evaluateReadAccess: vi.fn(),
-    list: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(
-      opts?.queryResult ?? {
-        items: [
-          {
-            id: 'task-1',
-            title: 'Federated task',
-            createdAt: new Date('2026-06-24T00:00:00.000Z'),
-          },
-        ],
-        truncated: false,
-      },
-    ),
-  };
-
-  return {
-    controller: new ListController(scope as never, query as never),
-    scope,
-    query,
-  };
-}
-
-describe('ListController', () => {
-  beforeEach(() => {
-    vi.clearAllMocks();
-  });
-
-  it('declares POST /api/federation/v1/list/:resource protected only by FederationAuthGuard', () => {
-    expect(Reflect.getMetadata('path', ListController)).toBe('api/federation/v1/list');
-    expect(Reflect.getMetadata('path', ListController.prototype.list)).toBe(':resource');
-    expect(Reflect.getMetadata('method', ListController.prototype.list)).toBe(RequestMethod.POST);
-    expect(Reflect.getMetadata('__guards__', ListController)).toEqual([FederationAuthGuard]);
-  });
-
-  it('runs AuthGuard context through ScopeService and returns local-source tagged rows', async () => {
-    const { controller, scope, query } = makeController();
-
-    const response = await controller.list('tasks', makeRequest(), { limit: 10 });
-
-    expect(scope.evaluateAccess).toHaveBeenCalledWith({
-      context: FEDERATION_CONTEXT,
-      resource: 'tasks',
-      requestedLimit: 10,
-      nativeRbac: query,
-    });
-    expect(query.list).toHaveBeenCalledWith({ filter: TASK_FILTER, cursor: undefined });
-    expect(response).toEqual({
-      items: [
-        {
-          id: 'task-1',
-          title: 'Federated task',
-          createdAt: new Date('2026-06-24T00:00:00.000Z'),
-          _source: 'local',
-        },
-      ],
-    });
-  });
-
-  it('preserves pagination metadata when row cap truncates the query layer result', async () => {
-    const { controller } = makeController({
-      queryResult: {
-        items: [{ id: 'task-1' }],
-        nextCursor: 'cursor-2',
-        truncated: true,
-      },
-    });
-
-    const response = await controller.list('tasks', makeRequest(), { cursor: 'cursor-1' });
-
-    expect(response).toEqual({
-      items: [{ id: 'task-1', _source: 'local' }],
-      nextCursor: 'cursor-2',
-      _truncated: true,
-    });
-  });
-
-  it('returns a federation error envelope when auth guard context is missing', async () => {
-    const { controller, scope, query } = makeController();
-
-    await expect(
-      controller.list('tasks', {} as unknown as FastifyRequest, {}),
-    ).rejects.toMatchObject({
-      response: {
-        error: {
-          code: 'unauthorized',
-          message: 'Federation context missing',
-        },
-      },
-      status: 401,
-    });
-    expect(scope.evaluateAccess).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
-    expect(query.list).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
-  });
-
-  it('returns a federation error envelope when scope evaluation denies access', async () => {
-    const { controller, query } = makeController({
-      scopeResult: {
-        allowed: false,
-        deny: {
-          code: 'resource_excluded',
-          stage: 'resource_exclusion',
-          statusCode: 403,
-          message: 'Requested federation resource is explicitly excluded by grant scope',
-          grantId: 'grant-1',
-          peerId: 'peer-1',
-          subjectUserId: 'user-1',
-          resource: 'credentials',
-        },
-      },
-    });
-
-    await expect(controller.list('credentials', makeRequest(), {})).rejects.toMatchObject({
-      response: {
-        error: {
-          code: 'scope_violation',
-          message: 'Requested federation resource is explicitly excluded by grant scope',
-        },
-      },
-      status: 403,
-    });
-    expect(query.list).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
-  });
-
-  it('rejects malformed request body fields before querying storage', async () => {
-    const { controller, scope, query } = makeController();
-
-    await expect(controller.list('tasks', makeRequest(), { cursor: 123 })).rejects.toMatchObject({
-      response: { error: { code: 'invalid_request' } },
-      status: 400,
-    });
-    await expect(controller.list('tasks', makeRequest(), { limit: false })).rejects.toMatchObject({
-      response: { error: { code: 'invalid_request' } },
-      status: 400,
-    });
-    await expect(controller.list('tasks', makeRequest(), { limit: 'abc' })).rejects.toMatchObject({
-      response: { error: { code: 'invalid_request' } },
-      status: 400,
-    });
-    expect(scope.evaluateAccess).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
-    expect(query.list).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
-  });
-});

apps/gateway/src/federation/server/verbs/capabilities.controller.ts

@@ -1,38 +0,0 @@
-/**
- * Federation capabilities verb (FED-M3-07).
- *
- * Returns the read-only capability envelope for the active grant attached by
- * FederationAuthGuard. This endpoint intentionally does not invoke native RBAC
- * or ScopeService: an active grant is enough to ask what the grant allows.
- */
-
-import { Controller, Get, Req, UseGuards } from '@nestjs/common';
-import type { FastifyRequest } from 'fastify';
-import {
-  FEDERATION_VERBS,
-  type FederationCapabilitiesResponse,
-  type FederationVerb,
-} from '@mosaicstack/types';
-import { parseFederationScope } from '../../scope-schema.js';
-import { FederationAuthGuard } from '../federation-auth.guard.js';
-import '../federation-context.js';
-
-@Controller('api/federation/v1/capabilities')
-@UseGuards(FederationAuthGuard)
-export class CapabilitiesController {
-  @Get()
-  getCapabilities(@Req() request: FastifyRequest): FederationCapabilitiesResponse {
-    if (!request.federationContext) {
-      throw new Error('Federation context missing after auth guard');
-    }
-
-    const scope = parseFederationScope(request.federationContext.scope);
-
-    return {
-      resources: [...scope.resources],
-      excluded_resources: [...scope.excluded_resources],
-      max_rows_per_query: scope.max_rows_per_query,
-      supported_verbs: [...FEDERATION_VERBS] satisfies FederationVerb[],
-    };
-  }
-}

apps/gateway/src/federation/server/verbs/list-query.service.ts

@@ -1,408 +0,0 @@
-/**
- * Federation list query layer (FED-M3-05).
- *
- * Read-only DB adapter used by ListController after FederationAuthGuard and
- * FederationScopeService have established the subject user, allowed resource,
- * native-RBAC intersection, and row cap. Audit writes are intentionally
- * deferred to M4.
- */
-
-import { Inject, Injectable } from '@nestjs/common';
-import {
-  and,
-  desc,
-  eq,
-  inArray,
-  insights,
-  isNotNull,
-  lt,
-  missionTasks,
-  missions,
-  or,
-  preferences,
-  projects,
-  tasks,
-  teamMembers,
-  type Db,
-} from '@mosaicstack/db';
-import type {
-  FederationNativeRbacEvaluator,
-  FederationNativeRbacRequest,
-  FederationNativeRbacResult,
-  FederationScopeQueryFilter,
-} from '../scope.service.js';
-import { DB } from '../../../database/database.module.js';
-
-export interface FederationListQueryRequest {
-  readonly filter: FederationScopeQueryFilter;
-  readonly cursor?: string;
-}
-
-export interface FederationListQueryResult<T extends object = Record<string, unknown>> {
-  readonly items: T[];
-  readonly nextCursor?: string;
-  readonly truncated: boolean;
-}
-
-type CursorSource = 'insights' | 'preferences';
-const CURSOR_SOURCE = Symbol('federationCursorSource');
-
-type RowObject = Record<string, unknown> & { readonly [CURSOR_SOURCE]?: CursorSource };
-
-interface KeysetCursor {
-  readonly createdAt: Date;
-  readonly id: string;
-  readonly source?: CursorSource;
-}
-
-function encodeCursor(row: RowObject): string {
-  const createdAt = row['createdAt'];
-  const id = row['id'];
-  if (!(createdAt instanceof Date) || typeof id !== 'string') {
-    throw new Error('Federation list cursor cannot be encoded');
-  }
-
-  const source = row[CURSOR_SOURCE];
-  return Buffer.from(
-    JSON.stringify({ createdAt: createdAt.toISOString(), id, ...(source ? { source } : {}) }),
-    'utf8',
-  ).toString('base64url');
-}
-
-function decodeCursor(cursor: string | undefined): KeysetCursor | undefined {
-  if (cursor === undefined) {
-    return undefined;
-  }
-
-  try {
-    const parsed = JSON.parse(Buffer.from(cursor, 'base64url').toString('utf8')) as unknown;
-    if (typeof parsed !== 'object' || parsed === null) {
-      throw new Error('cursor must be an object');
-    }
-
-    const { createdAt, id, source } = parsed as {
-      createdAt?: unknown;
-      id?: unknown;
-      source?: unknown;
-    };
-    if (typeof createdAt !== 'string' || typeof id !== 'string' || id.length === 0) {
-      throw new Error('cursor is missing createdAt or id');
-    }
-    if (source !== undefined && source !== 'insights' && source !== 'preferences') {
-      throw new Error('cursor source is invalid');
-    }
-
-    const date = new Date(createdAt);
-    if (Number.isNaN(date.getTime())) {
-      throw new Error('cursor createdAt is invalid');
-    }
-
-    return { createdAt: date, id, ...(source ? { source } : {}) };
-  } catch {
-    throw new Error('Invalid federation list cursor');
-  }
-}
-
-function paginate<T extends RowObject>(rows: T[], limit: number): FederationListQueryResult<T> {
-  const page = rows.slice(0, limit);
-  const hasMore = rows.length > limit;
-  const nextCursor = hasMore ? encodeCursor(page[page.length - 1] ?? {}) : undefined;
-
-  return {
-    items: page,
-    truncated: hasMore,
-    ...(nextCursor !== undefined ? { nextCursor } : {}),
-  };
-}
-
-function markCursorSource<T extends RowObject>(row: T, source: CursorSource): T {
-  Object.defineProperty(row, CURSOR_SOURCE, {
-    value: source,
-    enumerable: false,
-    configurable: false,
-  });
-  return row;
-}
-
-function sortRows(rows: RowObject[]): RowObject[] {
-  return [...rows].sort((a, b) => {
-    const aTime = a['createdAt'] instanceof Date ? a['createdAt'].getTime() : 0;
-    const bTime = b['createdAt'] instanceof Date ? b['createdAt'].getTime() : 0;
-    if (aTime !== bTime) {
-      return bTime - aTime;
-    }
-    return String(b['id'] ?? '').localeCompare(String(a['id'] ?? ''));
-  });
-}
-
-@Injectable()
-export class FederationListQueryService implements FederationNativeRbacEvaluator {
-  constructor(@Inject(DB) private readonly db: Db) {}
-
-  async evaluateReadAccess(
-    request: FederationNativeRbacRequest,
-  ): Promise<FederationNativeRbacResult> {
-    if (request.resource === 'credentials' || request.resource === 'api_keys') {
-      return {
-        allowed: false,
-        reason: `${request.resource} federation list access is not implemented in M3`,
-        details: { resource: request.resource },
-      };
-    }
-
-    if (request.resource === 'memory') {
-      return { allowed: true, access: { includePersonal: true, teamIds: [] } };
-    }
-
-    const teamIds = await this.listSubjectTeamIds(request.subjectUserId);
-    return { allowed: true, access: { includePersonal: true, teamIds } };
-  }
-
-  async list<T extends RowObject = RowObject>(
-    request: FederationListQueryRequest,
-  ): Promise<FederationListQueryResult<T>> {
-    const cursor = decodeCursor(request.cursor);
-    const rows = await this.listAllRows(request.filter, request.filter.limit + 1, cursor);
-    return paginate(rows as T[], request.filter.limit);
-  }
-
-  private async listAllRows(
-    filter: FederationScopeQueryFilter,
-    rowLimit: number,
-    cursor: KeysetCursor | undefined,
-  ): Promise<RowObject[]> {
-    switch (filter.resource) {
-      case 'tasks':
-        return this.listTasks(filter, rowLimit, cursor);
-      case 'notes':
-        return this.listNotes(filter, rowLimit, cursor);
-      case 'memory':
-        return this.listMemory(filter, rowLimit, cursor);
-      case 'credentials':
-      case 'api_keys':
-        return [];
-      default:
-        throw new Error(`Unsupported federation list resource: ${String(filter.resource)}`);
-    }
-  }
-
-  private async listSubjectTeamIds(subjectUserId: string): Promise<string[]> {
-    const rows = await this.db
-      .select({ teamId: teamMembers.teamId })
-      .from(teamMembers)
-      .where(eq(teamMembers.userId, subjectUserId));
-
-    return rows.map((row) => row.teamId);
-  }
-
-  private async listAccessibleProjectIds(filter: FederationScopeQueryFilter): Promise<string[]> {
-    const clauses = [];
-    if (filter.includePersonal) {
-      clauses.push(and(eq(projects.ownerType, 'user'), eq(projects.ownerId, filter.subjectUserId)));
-    }
-    if (filter.teamIds.length > 0) {
-      clauses.push(
-        and(eq(projects.ownerType, 'team'), inArray(projects.teamId, [...filter.teamIds])),
-      );
-    }
-
-    if (clauses.length === 0) {
-      return [];
-    }
-
-    const rows = await this.db
-      .select({ id: projects.id })
-      .from(projects)
-      .where(clauses.length === 1 ? clauses[0] : or(...clauses));
-
-    return rows.map((row) => row.id);
-  }
-
-  private async listMissionIds(projectIds: readonly string[]): Promise<string[]> {
-    if (projectIds.length === 0) {
-      return [];
-    }
-
-    const rows = await this.db
-      .select({ id: missions.id })
-      .from(missions)
-      .where(inArray(missions.projectId, [...projectIds]));
-
-    return rows.map((row) => row.id);
-  }
-
-  private async listTasks(
-    filter: FederationScopeQueryFilter,
-    rowLimit: number,
-    cursor: KeysetCursor | undefined,
-  ): Promise<RowObject[]> {
-    const projectIds = await this.listAccessibleProjectIds(filter);
-    const missionIds = await this.listMissionIds(projectIds);
-    const clauses = [];
-
-    if (projectIds.length > 0) {
-      clauses.push(inArray(tasks.projectId, projectIds));
-    }
-    if (missionIds.length > 0) {
-      clauses.push(inArray(tasks.missionId, missionIds));
-    }
-
-    if (clauses.length === 0) {
-      return [];
-    }
-
-    const scopeClause = clauses.length === 1 ? clauses[0] : or(...clauses);
-    const cursorClause = cursor
-      ? or(
-          lt(tasks.createdAt, cursor.createdAt),
-          and(eq(tasks.createdAt, cursor.createdAt), lt(tasks.id, cursor.id)),
-        )
-      : undefined;
-
-    const rows = await this.db
-      .select({
-        id: tasks.id,
-        title: tasks.title,
-        description: tasks.description,
-        status: tasks.status,
-        priority: tasks.priority,
-        projectId: tasks.projectId,
-        missionId: tasks.missionId,
-        assignee: tasks.assignee,
-        tags: tasks.tags,
-        dueDate: tasks.dueDate,
-        metadata: tasks.metadata,
-        createdAt: tasks.createdAt,
-        updatedAt: tasks.updatedAt,
-      })
-      .from(tasks)
-      .where(and(scopeClause, cursorClause))
-      .orderBy(desc(tasks.createdAt), desc(tasks.id))
-      .limit(rowLimit);
-
-    return sortRows(rows as RowObject[]);
-  }
-
-  private async listNotes(
-    filter: FederationScopeQueryFilter,
-    rowLimit: number,
-    cursor: KeysetCursor | undefined,
-  ): Promise<RowObject[]> {
-    const projectIds = await this.listAccessibleProjectIds(filter);
-    const missionIds = await this.listMissionIds(projectIds);
-
-    if (missionIds.length === 0) {
-      return [];
-    }
-
-    // mission_tasks rows are user-scoped even when the mission belongs to a team.
-    // Team visibility can narrow the mission set, but it must never widen the
-    // query to other users' mission task notes.
-    const scopeClause = and(
-      eq(missionTasks.userId, filter.subjectUserId),
-      inArray(missionTasks.missionId, missionIds),
-    );
-    const cursorClause = cursor
-      ? or(
-          lt(missionTasks.createdAt, cursor.createdAt),
-          and(eq(missionTasks.createdAt, cursor.createdAt), lt(missionTasks.id, cursor.id)),
-        )
-      : undefined;
-
-    const rows = await this.db
-      .select({
-        id: missionTasks.id,
-        missionId: missionTasks.missionId,
-        taskId: missionTasks.taskId,
-        status: missionTasks.status,
-        content: missionTasks.notes,
-        createdAt: missionTasks.createdAt,
-        updatedAt: missionTasks.updatedAt,
-      })
-      .from(missionTasks)
-      .where(and(scopeClause, cursorClause, isNotNull(missionTasks.notes)))
-      .orderBy(desc(missionTasks.createdAt), desc(missionTasks.id))
-      .limit(rowLimit);
-
-    return sortRows(rows.filter((row) => row.content !== '') as RowObject[]);
-  }
-
-  private async listMemory(
-    filter: FederationScopeQueryFilter,
-    rowLimit: number,
-    cursor: KeysetCursor | undefined,
-  ): Promise<RowObject[]> {
-    if (!filter.includePersonal) {
-      return [];
-    }
-    if (cursor && cursor.source === undefined) {
-      throw new Error('Invalid federation list cursor');
-    }
-
-    const rows: RowObject[] = [];
-
-    // Memory spans two physical tables. To keep pagination deterministic and
-    // resumable without a SQL UNION, M3 emits a fixed block order: all insights
-    // first, then preferences. The opaque cursor records which table produced
-    // the boundary row, so the next page never re-applies one table's keyset to
-    // the other table (which could duplicate/skip rows at equal timestamps).
-    if (cursor?.source !== 'preferences') {
-      const insightCursorClause = cursor
-        ? or(
-            lt(insights.createdAt, cursor.createdAt),
-            and(eq(insights.createdAt, cursor.createdAt), lt(insights.id, cursor.id)),
-          )
-        : undefined;
-      const insightRows = await this.db
-        .select({
-          id: insights.id,
-          kind: insights.source,
-          content: insights.content,
-          category: insights.category,
-          relevanceScore: insights.relevanceScore,
-          metadata: insights.metadata,
-          createdAt: insights.createdAt,
-          updatedAt: insights.updatedAt,
-        })
-        .from(insights)
-        .where(and(eq(insights.userId, filter.subjectUserId), insightCursorClause))
-        .orderBy(desc(insights.createdAt), desc(insights.id))
-        .limit(rowLimit);
-
-      rows.push(...(insightRows as RowObject[]).map((row) => markCursorSource(row, 'insights')));
-    }
-
-    const remaining = rowLimit - rows.length;
-    if (remaining <= 0) {
-      return rows;
-    }
-
-    const preferenceCursorClause =
-      cursor?.source === 'preferences'
-        ? or(
-            lt(preferences.createdAt, cursor.createdAt),
-            and(eq(preferences.createdAt, cursor.createdAt), lt(preferences.id, cursor.id)),
-          )
-        : undefined;
-    const preferenceRows = await this.db
-      .select({
-        id: preferences.id,
-        kind: preferences.category,
-        key: preferences.key,
-        value: preferences.value,
-        source: preferences.source,
-        mutable: preferences.mutable,
-        createdAt: preferences.createdAt,
-        updatedAt: preferences.updatedAt,
-      })
-      .from(preferences)
-      .where(and(eq(preferences.userId, filter.subjectUserId), preferenceCursorClause))
-      .orderBy(desc(preferences.createdAt), desc(preferences.id))
-      .limit(remaining);
-
-    rows.push(
-      ...(preferenceRows as RowObject[]).map((row) => markCursorSource(row, 'preferences')),
-    );
-    return rows;
-  }
-}

apps/gateway/src/federation/server/verbs/list.controller.ts

@@ -1,147 +0,0 @@
-/**
- * Federation list verb (FED-M3-05).
- *
- * POST /api/federation/v1/list/:resource
- *
- * Pipeline: FederationAuthGuard attaches the active grant context, then
- * FederationScopeService enforces grant scope + native RBAC intersection, then
- * the read-only query layer returns capped rows tagged with `_source`. Read
- * audit-log writes are deferred to M4; this controller does not persist request
- * or response bodies.
- */
-
-import {
-  Body,
-  Controller,
-  HttpException,
-  Inject,
-  Param,
-  Post,
-  Req,
-  UseGuards,
-} from '@nestjs/common';
-import type { FastifyRequest } from 'fastify';
-import {
-  FederationInvalidRequestError,
-  FederationScopeViolationError,
-  FederationUnauthorizedError,
-  SOURCE_LOCAL,
-  tagWithSource,
-  type FederationListResponse,
-  type SourceTag,
-} from '@mosaicstack/types';
-import { FederationAuthGuard } from '../federation-auth.guard.js';
-import '../federation-context.js';
-import { FederationScopeService } from '../scope.service.js';
-import { FederationListQueryService } from './list-query.service.js';
-
-interface FederationListRequestBody {
-  readonly limit?: unknown;
-  readonly cursor?: unknown;
-}
-
-type FederatedRow = Record<string, unknown> & SourceTag;
-
-function parseLimit(body: FederationListRequestBody | undefined): number | undefined {
-  if (body?.limit === undefined) {
-    return undefined;
-  }
-
-  const parsed =
-    typeof body.limit === 'number'
-      ? body.limit
-      : typeof body.limit === 'string' && body.limit.trim().length > 0
-        ? Number(body.limit)
-        : Number.NaN;
-
-  if (!Number.isSafeInteger(parsed) || parsed < 1) {
-    throw new HttpException(
-      new FederationInvalidRequestError(
-        'Federation list limit must be a positive integer',
-      ).toEnvelope(),
-      400,
-    );
-  }
-
-  return parsed;
-}
-
-function parseCursor(body: FederationListRequestBody | undefined): string | undefined {
-  if (body?.cursor === undefined) {
-    return undefined;
-  }
-  if (typeof body.cursor === 'string') {
-    return body.cursor;
-  }
-  throw new HttpException(
-    new FederationInvalidRequestError('Federation list cursor must be a string').toEnvelope(),
-    400,
-  );
-}
-
-@Controller('api/federation/v1/list')
-@UseGuards(FederationAuthGuard)
-export class ListController {
-  constructor(
-    @Inject(FederationScopeService) private readonly scope: FederationScopeService,
-    @Inject(FederationListQueryService) private readonly query: FederationListQueryService,
-  ) {}
-
-  @Post(':resource')
-  async list(
-    @Param('resource') resource: string,
-    @Req() request: FastifyRequest,
-    @Body() body?: FederationListRequestBody,
-  ): Promise<FederationListResponse<FederatedRow>> {
-    if (!request.federationContext) {
-      throw new HttpException(
-        new FederationUnauthorizedError('Federation context missing').toEnvelope(),
-        401,
-      );
-    }
-
-    const requestedLimit = parseLimit(body);
-    const cursor = parseCursor(body);
-    const scopeResult = await this.scope.evaluateAccess({
-      context: request.federationContext,
-      resource,
-      requestedLimit,
-      nativeRbac: this.query,
-    });
-
-    if (!scopeResult.allowed) {
-      const ErrorClass =
-        scopeResult.deny.statusCode === 400
-          ? FederationInvalidRequestError
-          : FederationScopeViolationError;
-      throw new HttpException(
-        new ErrorClass(scopeResult.deny.message, scopeResult.deny).toEnvelope(),
-        scopeResult.deny.statusCode,
-      );
-    }
-
-    let result: Awaited<ReturnType<FederationListQueryService['list']>>;
-    try {
-      result = await this.query.list({ filter: scopeResult.filter, cursor });
-    } catch (error: unknown) {
-      if (error instanceof Error && error.message === 'Invalid federation list cursor') {
-        throw new HttpException(
-          new FederationInvalidRequestError('Federation list cursor is invalid').toEnvelope(),
-          400,
-        );
-      }
-      throw error;
-    }
-
-    const response: FederationListResponse<FederatedRow> = {
-      items: tagWithSource(result.items, SOURCE_LOCAL),
-    };
-    if (result.nextCursor !== undefined) {
-      response.nextCursor = result.nextCursor;
-    }
-    if (result.truncated) {
-      response._truncated = true;
-    }
-    return response;
-  }
-}

apps/gateway/src/mcp/mcp.controller.ts

@@ -3,11 +3,7 @@ import { Logger } from '@nestjs/common';
 import { fromNodeHeaders } from 'better-auth/node';
 import type { Auth } from '@mosaicstack/auth';
 import type { NestFastifyApplication } from '@nestjs/platform-fastify';
-import {
-  createMcpActorContext,
-  deriveMcpToolScopesForUser,
-  type McpService,
-} from './mcp.service.js';
+import type { McpService } from './mcp.service.js';
 import { AUTH } from '../auth/auth.tokens.js';
 
 /**
@@ -71,25 +67,14 @@ async function handleMcpRequest(
     return;
   }
 
-  const authUser = result.user as {
-    id: string;
-    role?: string | null;
-    tenantId?: string | null;
-    organizationId?: string | null;
-  };
-  const actor = createMcpActorContext({
-    userId: authUser.id,
-    role: authUser.role,
-    tenantId: authUser.tenantId ?? authUser.organizationId ?? undefined,
-    scopes: deriveMcpToolScopesForUser({ role: authUser.role }),
-  });
+  const userId = result.user.id;
 
   // ─── Session routing ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────
   const sessionId = req.raw.headers['mcp-session-id'];
 
   if (typeof sessionId === 'string' && sessionId.length > 0) {
     // Existing session request
-    const transport = mcpService.getSession(sessionId, actor);
+    const transport = mcpService.getSession(sessionId);
     if (!transport) {
       logger.warn(`MCP session not found: ${sessionId}`);
       reply.raw.writeHead(404, { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' });
@@ -127,10 +112,8 @@ async function handleMcpRequest(
   }
 
   // Create new session and handle this initializing request
-  const { transport } = mcpService.createSession(actor);
-  logger.log(
-    `New MCP session created for actor=${actor.userId} tenant=${actor.tenantId} correlation=${actor.correlationId}`,
-  );
+  const { transport } = mcpService.createSession(userId);
+  logger.log(`New MCP session created for user ${userId}`);
 
   await transport.handleRequest(req.raw, reply.raw, body);
 }

apps/gateway/src/mcp/mcp.service.spec.ts

@@ -1,461 +0,0 @@
-import { describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest';
-import type { z } from 'zod';
-import type { McpServer } from '@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/server/mcp.js';
-import type { Brain } from '@mosaicstack/brain';
-import type { Memory } from '@mosaicstack/memory';
-import type { EmbeddingService } from '../memory/embedding.service.js';
-import type { CoordService } from '../coord/coord.service.js';
-import {
-  assertMcpToolAuthorized,
-  createMcpActorContext,
-  deriveMcpToolScopesForUser,
-  MCP_TOOL_SCOPES,
-  McpService,
-  type McpToolName,
-} from './mcp.service.js';
-
-type ToolResult = { content: Array<{ type: 'text'; text: string }> };
-type ToolHandler = (params: Record<string, unknown>) => Promise<ToolResult>;
-
-interface CapturedTool {
-  inputSchema: z.ZodType;
-  handler: ToolHandler;
-}
-
-function makeCapturingServer(): { server: McpServer; tools: Map<string, CapturedTool> } {
-  const tools = new Map<string, CapturedTool>();
-  const server = {
-    registerTool(name: string, config: { inputSchema: z.ZodType }, handler: ToolHandler): void {
-      tools.set(name, { inputSchema: config.inputSchema, handler });
-    },
-  };
-  return { server: server as unknown as McpServer, tools };
-}
-
-function makeService(opts?: {
-  projects?: Array<Record<string, unknown> & { id: string; ownerId?: string | null }>;
-  missions?: Array<
-    Record<string, unknown> & { id: string; projectId?: string | null; userId?: string | null }
-  >;
-  tasks?: Array<
-    Record<string, unknown> & {
-      id: string;
-      projectId?: string | null;
-      missionId?: string | null;
-      status?: string;
-    }
-  >;
-}) {
-  const projects = opts?.projects ?? [];
-  const missions = opts?.missions ?? [];
-  const tasks = opts?.tasks ?? [];
-  const brain = {
-    projects: {
-      findAll: vi.fn(async () => projects),
-      findById: vi.fn(async (id: string) => projects.find((project) => project.id === id) ?? null),
-    },
-    tasks: {
-      findAll: vi.fn(async () => tasks),
-      findById: vi.fn(async (id: string) => tasks.find((task) => task.id === id) ?? null),
-      findByProject: vi.fn(async (projectId: string) =>
-        tasks.filter((task) => task.projectId === projectId),
-      ),
-      findByMission: vi.fn(async (missionId: string) =>
-        tasks.filter((task) => task.missionId === missionId),
-      ),
-      findByStatus: vi.fn(async (status: string) => tasks.filter((task) => task.status === status)),
-      create: vi.fn(async (task: Record<string, unknown>) => ({ id: 'task-1', ...task })),
-      update: vi.fn(async (id: string, updates: Record<string, unknown>) => ({ id, ...updates })),
-    },
-    missions: {
-      findAll: vi.fn(async () => missions),
-      findById: vi.fn(async (id: string) => missions.find((mission) => mission.id === id) ?? null),
-      findByProject: vi.fn(async (projectId: string) =>
-        missions.filter((mission) => mission.projectId === projectId),
-      ),
-    },
-    conversations: {
-      findAll: vi.fn(async (userId: string) => [{ id: 'conversation-1', userId }]),
-    },
-  } as unknown as Brain;
-
-  const memory = {
-    insights: {
-      searchByEmbedding: vi.fn(async (userId: string) => [{ id: 'insight-1', userId }]),
-      create: vi.fn(async (insight: Record<string, unknown>) => ({ id: 'insight-2', ...insight })),
-    },
-    preferences: {
-      findByUser: vi.fn(async (userId: string) => [{ key: 'theme', userId }]),
-      findByUserAndCategory: vi.fn(async (userId: string, category: string) => [
-        { key: 'theme', userId, category },
-      ]),
-      upsert: vi.fn(async (preference: Record<string, unknown>) => ({
-        id: 'pref-1',
-        ...preference,
-      })),
-    },
-  } as unknown as Memory;
-
-  const embeddings = {
-    available: true,
-    embed: vi.fn(async () => [0.1, 0.2, 0.3]),
-  } as unknown as EmbeddingService;
-
-  const coord = {
-    getMissionStatus: vi.fn(async () => null),
-    listTasks: vi.fn(async () => []),
-    getTaskStatus: vi.fn(async () => null),
-  } as unknown as CoordService;
-
-  return {
-    service: new McpService(brain, memory, embeddings, coord),
-    brain: brain as unknown as {
-      conversations: { findAll: ReturnType<typeof vi.fn> };
-      tasks: {
-        create: ReturnType<typeof vi.fn>;
-        update: ReturnType<typeof vi.fn>;
-      };
-    },
-    memory: memory as unknown as {
-      insights: { searchByEmbedding: ReturnType<typeof vi.fn> };
-    },
-    coord: coord as unknown as {
-      listTasks: ReturnType<typeof vi.fn>;
-    },
-  };
-}
-
-function getTool(tools: Map<string, CapturedTool>, name: McpToolName): CapturedTool {
-  const tool = tools.get(name);
-  if (!tool) throw new Error(`Missing captured tool ${name}`);
-  return tool;
-}
-
-function makeMemberActor(userId = 'authenticated-user') {
-  return createMcpActorContext({
-    userId,
-    role: 'member',
-    scopes: deriveMcpToolScopesForUser({ role: 'member' }),
-  });
-}
-
-function makeAdminActor(userId = 'admin-user', tenantId?: string) {
-  return createMcpActorContext({
-    userId,
-    tenantId,
-    role: 'admin',
-    scopes: deriveMcpToolScopesForUser({ role: 'admin' }),
-  });
-}
-
-function makePlatformAdminActor(userId = 'platform-admin-user') {
-  return createMcpActorContext({
-    userId,
-    role: 'platform-admin',
-    scopes: deriveMcpToolScopesForUser({ role: 'platform-admin' }),
-  });
-}
-
-describe('MCP actor identity and tool scope enforcement', () => {
-  it('derives immutable actor, tenant, channel, correlation, and explicit tool scopes server-side', () => {
-    const actor = createMcpActorContext({
-      userId: ' user-authenticated ',
-      role: 'member',
-      scopes: deriveMcpToolScopesForUser({ role: 'member' }),
-    });
-
-    expect(actor.userId).toBe('user-authenticated');
-    expect(actor.tenantId).toBe('user:user-authenticated');
-    expect(actor.role).toBe('member');
-    expect(actor.channel).toBe('mcp');
-    expect(actor.correlationId).toMatch(/[0-9a-f-]{36}/i);
-    expect(actor.scopes.has(MCP_TOOL_SCOPES.memory_search)).toBe(true);
-    expect(actor.scopes.has(MCP_TOOL_SCOPES.coord_list_tasks)).toBe(false);
-    expect(
-      deriveMcpToolScopesForUser({ role: 'admin' }).has(MCP_TOOL_SCOPES.coord_list_tasks),
-    ).toBe(false);
-    expect(
-      deriveMcpToolScopesForUser({ role: 'platform-admin' }).has(MCP_TOOL_SCOPES.coord_list_tasks),
-    ).toBe(true);
-  });
-
-  it('fails closed when scopes are not supplied by the authenticated context policy', () => {
-    const actor = createMcpActorContext({ userId: 'user-authenticated' });
-
-    expect(actor.scopes.size).toBe(0);
-    expect(() => assertMcpToolAuthorized(actor, 'memory_search', { query: 'notes' })).toThrow(
-      'MCP tool scope denied: memory:insight:read',
-    );
-  });
-
-  it('fails closed when a tool caller supplies actor or tenant identity fields', () => {
-    const actor = createMcpActorContext({ userId: 'user-authenticated' });
-
-    expect(() =>
-      assertMcpToolAuthorized(actor, 'memory_search', {
-        userId: 'victim-user',
-        query: 'private data',
-      }),
-    ).toThrow('MCP caller-controlled identity field is forbidden: userId');
-
-    expect(() =>
-      assertMcpToolAuthorized(actor, 'coord_list_tasks', {
-        tenantId: 'victim-tenant',
-        projectPath: '/tmp/project',
-      }),
-    ).toThrow('MCP caller-controlled identity field is forbidden: tenantId');
-
-    expect(() =>
-      assertMcpToolAuthorized(actor, 'brain_create_task', {
-        title: 'forged org',
-        organizationId: 'victim-org',
-      }),
-    ).toThrow('MCP caller-controlled identity field is forbidden: organizationId');
-
-    expect(() =>
-      assertMcpToolAuthorized(actor, 'brain_update_task', {
-        title: 'forged team',
-        teamId: 'victim-team',
-      }),
-    ).toThrow('MCP caller-controlled identity field is forbidden: teamId');
-  });
-
-  it('fails closed when the server-derived actor lacks the required per-tool scope', () => {
-    const actor = createMcpActorContext({ userId: 'user-authenticated', scopes: [] });
-
-    expect(() => assertMcpToolAuthorized(actor, 'memory_search', { query: 'notes' })).toThrow(
-      'MCP tool scope denied: memory:insight:read',
-    );
-  });
-
-  it('removes caller-controlled userId from memory schemas and never queries victim memory', async () => {
-    const { service, memory } = makeService();
-    const { server, tools } = makeCapturingServer();
-    const actor = makeMemberActor('authenticated-user');
-
-    service.registerTools(server, actor);
-    const tool = getTool(tools, 'memory_search');
-
-    expect(tool.inputSchema.safeParse({ userId: 'victim-user', query: 'anything' }).success).toBe(
-      false,
-    );
-    await expect(tool.handler({ userId: 'victim-user', query: 'anything' })).rejects.toThrow(
-      'MCP caller-controlled identity field is forbidden: userId',
-    );
-    expect(memory.insights.searchByEmbedding).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
-
-    await tool.handler({ query: 'only my notes' });
-    expect(memory.insights.searchByEmbedding).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
-      'authenticated-user',
-      [0.1, 0.2, 0.3],
-      5,
-    );
-  });
-
-  it('binds conversation listing to the authenticated actor instead of a caller-supplied userId', async () => {
-    const { service, brain } = makeService();
-    const { server, tools } = makeCapturingServer();
-    const actor = makeMemberActor('authenticated-user');
-
-    service.registerTools(server, actor);
-    const tool = getTool(tools, 'brain_list_conversations');
-
-    expect(tool.inputSchema.safeParse({ userId: 'victim-user' }).success).toBe(false);
-    await expect(tool.handler({ userId: 'victim-user' })).rejects.toThrow(
-      'MCP caller-controlled identity field is forbidden: userId',
-    );
-    expect(brain.conversations.findAll).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
-
-    await tool.handler({});
-    expect(brain.conversations.findAll).toHaveBeenCalledWith('authenticated-user');
-  });
-
-  it('scopes brain project, mission, and task reads to the authenticated actor', async () => {
-    const { service } = makeService({
-      projects: [
-        { id: 'project-owned', ownerId: 'authenticated-user', name: 'owned' },
-        { id: 'project-victim', ownerId: 'victim-user', name: 'victim' },
-      ],
-      missions: [
-        { id: 'mission-owned', projectId: 'project-owned' },
-        { id: 'mission-victim', userId: 'victim-user', projectId: 'project-victim' },
-      ],
-      tasks: [
-        { id: 'task-owned-project', projectId: 'project-owned', status: 'not-started' },
-        { id: 'task-owned-mission', missionId: 'mission-owned', status: 'not-started' },
-        { id: 'task-victim-project', projectId: 'project-victim', status: 'not-started' },
-        { id: 'task-unowned', status: 'not-started' },
-      ],
-    });
-    const { server, tools } = makeCapturingServer();
-    const actor = makeMemberActor('authenticated-user');
-
-    service.registerTools(server, actor);
-
-    const projects = JSON.parse(
-      (await getTool(tools, 'brain_list_projects').handler({})).content[0]!.text,
-    );
-    expect(projects.map((project: { id: string }) => project.id)).toEqual(['project-owned']);
-
-    const missions = JSON.parse(
-      (await getTool(tools, 'brain_list_missions').handler({})).content[0]!.text,
-    );
-    expect(missions.map((mission: { id: string }) => mission.id)).toEqual(['mission-owned']);
-
-    const tasks = JSON.parse(
-      (await getTool(tools, 'brain_list_tasks').handler({})).content[0]!.text,
-    );
-    expect(tasks.map((task: { id: string }) => task.id)).toEqual([
-      'task-owned-project',
-      'task-owned-mission',
-    ]);
-  });
-
-  it('enforces tenant boundaries for tenant-admin brain project, mission, and task reads', async () => {
-    const { service } = makeService({
-      projects: [
-        {
-          id: 'project-tenant-a',
-          ownerId: 'other-user-a',
-          teamId: 'tenant-a',
-          name: 'same tenant',
-        },
-        {
-          id: 'project-tenant-b',
-          ownerId: 'other-user-b',
-          teamId: 'tenant-b',
-          name: 'other tenant',
-        },
-      ],
-      missions: [
-        { id: 'mission-tenant-a', tenantId: 'tenant-a', projectId: 'project-tenant-a' },
-        { id: 'mission-tenant-b', tenantId: 'tenant-b', projectId: 'project-tenant-b' },
-      ],
-      tasks: [
-        { id: 'task-tenant-a', projectId: 'project-tenant-a', status: 'not-started' },
-        { id: 'task-tenant-b', projectId: 'project-tenant-b', status: 'not-started' },
-      ],
-    });
-    const { server, tools } = makeCapturingServer();
-    const actor = makeAdminActor('tenant-admin-user', 'tenant-a');
-
-    service.registerTools(server, actor);
-
-    const projects = JSON.parse(
-      (await getTool(tools, 'brain_list_projects').handler({})).content[0]!.text,
-    );
-    expect(projects.map((project: { id: string }) => project.id)).toEqual(['project-tenant-a']);
-
-    const missions = JSON.parse(
-      (await getTool(tools, 'brain_list_missions').handler({})).content[0]!.text,
-    );
-    expect(missions.map((mission: { id: string }) => mission.id)).toEqual(['mission-tenant-a']);
-
-    const tasks = JSON.parse(
-      (await getTool(tools, 'brain_list_tasks').handler({})).content[0]!.text,
-    );
-    expect(tasks.map((task: { id: string }) => task.id)).toEqual(['task-tenant-a']);
-  });
-
-  it('denies tenant-admin task writes outside the authenticated tenant', async () => {
-    const { service, brain } = makeService({
-      projects: [
-        { id: 'project-tenant-a', ownerId: 'other-user-a', teamId: 'tenant-a' },
-        { id: 'project-tenant-b', ownerId: 'other-user-b', teamId: 'tenant-b' },
-      ],
-      missions: [
-        { id: 'mission-tenant-a', tenantId: 'tenant-a', projectId: 'project-tenant-a' },
-        { id: 'mission-tenant-b', tenantId: 'tenant-b', projectId: 'project-tenant-b' },
-      ],
-      tasks: [
-        { id: 'task-tenant-a', projectId: 'project-tenant-a', status: 'not-started' },
-        { id: 'task-tenant-b', projectId: 'project-tenant-b', status: 'not-started' },
-      ],
-    });
-    const { server, tools } = makeCapturingServer();
-    const actor = makeAdminActor('tenant-admin-user', 'tenant-a');
-
-    service.registerTools(server, actor);
-
-    await expect(
-      getTool(tools, 'brain_create_task').handler({
-        title: 'unscoped tenant write',
-      }),
-    ).rejects.toThrow('MCP task scope denied');
-    expect(brain.tasks.create).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
-
-    await expect(
-      getTool(tools, 'brain_create_task').handler({
-        title: 'cross-tenant write',
-        projectId: 'project-tenant-b',
-      }),
-    ).rejects.toThrow('MCP task project scope denied');
-    expect(brain.tasks.create).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
-
-    await expect(
-      getTool(tools, 'brain_update_task').handler({
-        id: 'task-tenant-a',
-        projectId: 'project-tenant-b',
-      }),
-    ).rejects.toThrow('MCP task project scope denied');
-    expect(brain.tasks.update).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
-
-    const updateResult = await getTool(tools, 'brain_update_task').handler({
-      id: 'task-tenant-b',
-      title: 'cross-tenant update',
-    });
-    expect(updateResult.content[0]!.text).toBe('Task not found: task-tenant-b');
-    expect(brain.tasks.update).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
-
-    await getTool(tools, 'brain_create_task').handler({
-      title: 'same-tenant write',
-      projectId: 'project-tenant-a',
-    });
-    expect(brain.tasks.create).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
-      expect.objectContaining({ projectId: 'project-tenant-a', title: 'same-tenant write' }),
-    );
-  });
-
-  it('keeps admin-only coordination tools on server-derived paths', async () => {
-    const { service, coord } = makeService();
-    const { server, tools } = makeCapturingServer();
-    const member = makeMemberActor('authenticated-user');
-    const tenantAdmin = makeAdminActor('admin-user');
-    const platformAdmin = makePlatformAdminActor('platform-admin-user');
-
-    service.registerTools(server, member);
-    const memberTool = getTool(tools, 'coord_list_tasks');
-    expect(memberTool.inputSchema.safeParse({ projectPath: '/tmp/victim' }).success).toBe(false);
-    await expect(memberTool.handler({})).rejects.toThrow('MCP tool scope denied: coord:read');
-
-    tools.clear();
-    service.registerTools(server, tenantAdmin);
-    const tenantAdminTool = getTool(tools, 'coord_list_tasks');
-    await expect(tenantAdminTool.handler({})).rejects.toThrow('MCP tool scope denied: coord:read');
-
-    tools.clear();
-    service.registerTools(server, platformAdmin);
-    const platformAdminTool = getTool(tools, 'coord_list_tasks');
-    await platformAdminTool.handler({ projectPath: '/tmp/victim' });
-    expect(coord.listTasks).toHaveBeenCalledWith(process.cwd());
-  });
-
-  it('does not attach a guessed or stale-scope MCP session to another authenticated context', async () => {
-    const { service } = makeService();
-    const owner = makeMemberActor('owner-user');
-    const attacker = makeMemberActor('attacker-user');
-    const admin = makeAdminActor('admin-user');
-    const downgradedAdmin = makeMemberActor('admin-user');
-
-    const { sessionId, transport } = service.createSession(owner);
-    const staleSession = service.createSession(admin);
-
-    expect(service.getSession(sessionId, owner)).toBe(transport);
-    expect(service.getSession(sessionId, attacker)).toBeNull();
-    expect(service.getSession(sessionId, owner)).toBe(transport);
-    expect(service.getSession(staleSession.sessionId, downgradedAdmin)).toBeNull();
-    expect(service.getSession(staleSession.sessionId, admin)).toBe(staleSession.transport);
-
-    await service.onModuleDestroy();
-  });
-});

apps/gateway/src/mcp/mcp.service.ts

@@ -10,216 +10,11 @@ import { MEMORY } from '../memory/memory.tokens.js';
 import { EmbeddingService } from '../memory/embedding.service.js';
 import { CoordService } from '../coord/coord.service.js';
 
-export const MCP_CALLER_IDENTITY_FIELDS = [
-  'actorId',
-  'actor',
-  'authenticatedUserId',
-  'channel',
-  'organizationId',
-  'ownerId',
-  'sessionUserId',
-  'teamId',
-  'tenant',
-  'tenantId',
-  'user',
-  'userId',
-] as const;
-
-type McpCallerIdentityField = (typeof MCP_CALLER_IDENTITY_FIELDS)[number];
-
-export const MCP_TOOL_SCOPES = {
-  brain_list_projects: 'brain:project:read',
-  brain_get_project: 'brain:project:read',
-  brain_list_tasks: 'brain:task:read',
-  brain_create_task: 'brain:task:write',
-  brain_update_task: 'brain:task:write',
-  brain_list_missions: 'brain:mission:read',
-  brain_list_conversations: 'brain:conversation:read',
-  memory_search: 'memory:insight:read',
-  memory_get_preferences: 'memory:preference:read',
-  memory_save_preference: 'memory:preference:write',
-  memory_save_insight: 'memory:insight:write',
-  coord_mission_status: 'coord:read',
-  coord_list_tasks: 'coord:read',
-  coord_task_detail: 'coord:read',
-} as const;
-
-export type McpToolName = keyof typeof MCP_TOOL_SCOPES;
-export type McpToolScope = (typeof MCP_TOOL_SCOPES)[McpToolName];
-
-export interface McpActorContext {
-  userId: string;
-  tenantId: string;
-  role: string;
-  channel: 'mcp';
-  correlationId: string;
-  scopes: ReadonlySet<McpToolScope>;
-}
-
 interface SessionEntry {
   server: McpServer;
   transport: StreamableHTTPServerTransport;
   createdAt: Date;
-  actor: McpActorContext;
-}
-
-const GLOBAL_ADMIN_MCP_SCOPES = new Set<McpToolScope>(Object.values(MCP_TOOL_SCOPES));
-const TENANT_ADMIN_MCP_SCOPES = new Set<McpToolScope>([
-  MCP_TOOL_SCOPES.brain_list_projects,
-  MCP_TOOL_SCOPES.brain_get_project,
-  MCP_TOOL_SCOPES.brain_list_tasks,
-  MCP_TOOL_SCOPES.brain_create_task,
-  MCP_TOOL_SCOPES.brain_update_task,
-  MCP_TOOL_SCOPES.brain_list_missions,
-  MCP_TOOL_SCOPES.brain_list_conversations,
-  MCP_TOOL_SCOPES.memory_search,
-  MCP_TOOL_SCOPES.memory_get_preferences,
-  MCP_TOOL_SCOPES.memory_save_preference,
-  MCP_TOOL_SCOPES.memory_save_insight,
-]);
-const MEMBER_MCP_SCOPES = new Set<McpToolScope>([
-  MCP_TOOL_SCOPES.brain_list_projects,
-  MCP_TOOL_SCOPES.brain_get_project,
-  MCP_TOOL_SCOPES.brain_list_tasks,
-  MCP_TOOL_SCOPES.brain_list_missions,
-  MCP_TOOL_SCOPES.brain_list_conversations,
-  MCP_TOOL_SCOPES.memory_search,
-  MCP_TOOL_SCOPES.memory_get_preferences,
-  MCP_TOOL_SCOPES.memory_save_preference,
-  MCP_TOOL_SCOPES.memory_save_insight,
-]);
-
-export function deriveMcpToolScopesForUser(input: {
-  role?: string | null;
-}): ReadonlySet<McpToolScope> {
-  if (input.role === 'platform-admin' || input.role === 'super-admin') {
-    return new Set(GLOBAL_ADMIN_MCP_SCOPES);
-  }
-  if (input.role === 'admin') {
-    return new Set(TENANT_ADMIN_MCP_SCOPES);
-  }
-  return new Set(MEMBER_MCP_SCOPES);
-}
-
-export function createMcpActorContext(input: {
   userId: string;
-  tenantId?: string;
-  role?: string | null;
-  scopes?: Iterable<McpToolScope>;
-  correlationId?: string;
-}): McpActorContext {
-  const userId = input.userId.trim();
-  if (userId.length === 0) {
-    throw new Error('MCP authenticated user is required');
-  }
-
-  return {
-    userId,
-    tenantId: input.tenantId?.trim() || `user:${userId}`,
-    role: input.role ?? 'member',
-    channel: 'mcp',
-    correlationId: input.correlationId ?? randomUUID(),
-    scopes: new Set(input.scopes ?? []),
-  };
-}
-
-export function assertNoCallerControlledIdentity(params: unknown): void {
-  if (params === null || typeof params !== 'object') return;
-
-  const keys = new Set(Object.keys(params));
-  const forbidden = MCP_CALLER_IDENTITY_FIELDS.find((field: McpCallerIdentityField) =>
-    keys.has(field),
-  );
-  if (forbidden) {
-    throw new Error(`MCP caller-controlled identity field is forbidden: ${forbidden}`);
-  }
-}
-
-export function assertMcpToolAuthorized(
-  actor: McpActorContext,
-  toolName: McpToolName,
-  params: unknown,
-): void {
-  assertNoCallerControlledIdentity(params);
-  const requiredScope = MCP_TOOL_SCOPES[toolName];
-  if (!actor.scopes.has(requiredScope)) {
-    throw new Error(`MCP tool scope denied: ${requiredScope}`);
-  }
-}
-
-function strictObject<T extends z.ZodRawShape>(shape: T): z.ZodObject<T> {
-  return z.object(shape).strict();
-}
-
-type TenantScopedLike = {
-  tenantId?: string | null;
-  organizationId?: string | null;
-  teamId?: string | null;
-};
-type ProjectLike = TenantScopedLike & { id: string; ownerId?: string | null };
-type MissionLike = TenantScopedLike & {
-  id: string;
-  projectId?: string | null;
-  userId?: string | null;
-};
-type TaskLike = TenantScopedLike & {
-  projectId?: string | null;
-  missionId?: string | null;
-  userId?: string | null;
-};
-
-function isGlobalAdminActor(actor: McpActorContext): boolean {
-  return actor.role === 'platform-admin' || actor.role === 'super-admin';
-}
-
-function isTenantAdminActor(actor: McpActorContext): boolean {
-  return actor.role === 'admin';
-}
-
-function matchesTenant(actor: McpActorContext, record: TenantScopedLike): boolean {
-  return (
-    record.tenantId === actor.tenantId ||
-    record.organizationId === actor.tenantId ||
-    record.teamId === actor.tenantId
-  );
-}
-
-function filterProjectsForActor<T extends ProjectLike>(actor: McpActorContext, projects: T[]): T[] {
-  if (isGlobalAdminActor(actor)) return projects;
-  return projects.filter(
-    (project) =>
-      project.ownerId === actor.userId ||
-      (isTenantAdminActor(actor) && matchesTenant(actor, project)),
-  );
-}
-
-function filterMissionsByDirectActorScope<T extends MissionLike>(
-  actor: McpActorContext,
-  missions: T[],
-): T[] {
-  if (isGlobalAdminActor(actor)) return missions;
-  return missions.filter(
-    (mission) =>
-      mission.userId === actor.userId ||
-      (isTenantAdminActor(actor) && matchesTenant(actor, mission)),
-  );
-}
-
-function scopesEqual(left: ReadonlySet<McpToolScope>, right: ReadonlySet<McpToolScope>): boolean {
-  if (left.size !== right.size) return false;
-  for (const scope of left) {
-    if (!right.has(scope)) return false;
-  }
-  return true;
-}
-
-function sameActorAuthorization(stored: McpActorContext, current: McpActorContext): boolean {
-  return (
-    stored.userId === current.userId &&
-    stored.tenantId === current.tenantId &&
-    stored.role === current.role &&
-    scopesEqual(stored.scopes, current.scopes)
-  );
 }
 
 @Injectable()
@@ -238,18 +33,13 @@ export class McpService implements OnModuleDestroy {
    * Creates a new MCP session with its own server + transport pair.
    * Returns the transport for use by the controller.
    */
-  createSession(actor: McpActorContext): {
-    sessionId: string;
-    transport: StreamableHTTPServerTransport;
-  } {
+  createSession(userId: string): { sessionId: string; transport: StreamableHTTPServerTransport } {
     const sessionId = randomUUID();
 
     const transport = new StreamableHTTPServerTransport({
       sessionIdGenerator: () => sessionId,
       onsessioninitialized: (id) => {
-        this.logger.log(
-          `MCP session initialized: ${id} for actor=${actor.userId} tenant=${actor.tenantId} correlation=${actor.correlationId}`,
-        );
+        this.logger.log(`MCP session initialized: ${id} for user ${userId}`);
       },
     });
 
@@ -258,7 +48,7 @@ export class McpService implements OnModuleDestroy {
       { capabilities: { tools: {} } },
     );
 
-    this.registerTools(server, actor);
+    this.registerTools(server, userId);
 
     transport.onclose = () => {
       this.logger.log(`MCP session closed: ${sessionId}`);
@@ -271,126 +61,31 @@ export class McpService implements OnModuleDestroy {
       );
     });
 
-    this.sessions.set(sessionId, { server, transport, createdAt: new Date(), actor });
+    this.sessions.set(sessionId, { server, transport, createdAt: new Date(), userId });
     return { sessionId, transport };
   }
 
   /**
-   * Returns the transport for an existing session only when it belongs to the
-   * currently authenticated MCP actor. Guessed or cross-tenant session IDs grant
-   * no authority.
+   * Returns the transport for an existing session, or null if not found.
    */
-  getSession(sessionId: string, actor: McpActorContext): StreamableHTTPServerTransport | null {
-    const entry = this.sessions.get(sessionId);
-    if (!entry) return null;
-    if (!sameActorAuthorization(entry.actor, actor)) {
-      this.logger.warn(
-        `MCP session actor or scope mismatch: session=${sessionId} actor=${actor.userId} tenant=${actor.tenantId} role=${actor.role}`,
-      );
-      return null;
-    }
-    return entry.transport;
-  }
-
-  private async isProjectAuthorized(actor: McpActorContext, projectId: string): Promise<boolean> {
-    if (isGlobalAdminActor(actor)) return true;
-    const project = (await this.brain.projects.findById(projectId)) as ProjectLike | undefined;
-    return project ? filterProjectsForActor(actor, [project]).length === 1 : false;
-  }
-
-  private async filterMissionsForActor<T extends MissionLike>(
-    actor: McpActorContext,
-    missions: T[],
-  ): Promise<T[]> {
-    if (isGlobalAdminActor(actor)) return missions;
-
-    const projects = (await this.brain.projects.findAll()) as ProjectLike[];
-    const projectIds = new Set(
-      filterProjectsForActor(actor, projects).map((project) => project.id),
-    );
-
-    return missions.filter(
-      (mission) =>
-        filterMissionsByDirectActorScope(actor, [mission]).length === 1 ||
-        (typeof mission.projectId === 'string' && projectIds.has(mission.projectId)),
-    );
-  }
-
-  private async isMissionAuthorized(actor: McpActorContext, missionId: string): Promise<boolean> {
-    if (isGlobalAdminActor(actor)) return true;
-    const mission = (await this.brain.missions.findById(missionId)) as MissionLike | undefined;
-    if (!mission) return false;
-    return (await this.filterMissionsForActor(actor, [mission])).length === 1;
-  }
-
-  private async assertTaskReferencesAuthorized(
-    actor: McpActorContext,
-    refs: { projectId?: string | null; missionId?: string | null },
-  ): Promise<void> {
-    if (refs.projectId && !(await this.isProjectAuthorized(actor, refs.projectId))) {
-      throw new Error('MCP task project scope denied');
-    }
-    if (refs.missionId && !(await this.isMissionAuthorized(actor, refs.missionId))) {
-      throw new Error('MCP task mission scope denied');
-    }
-  }
-
-  private async assertTaskCreateScopeAuthorized(
-    actor: McpActorContext,
-    refs: { projectId?: string | null; missionId?: string | null },
-  ): Promise<void> {
-    if (!isGlobalAdminActor(actor) && !refs.projectId && !refs.missionId) {
-      throw new Error('MCP task scope denied');
-    }
-    await this.assertTaskReferencesAuthorized(actor, refs);
-  }
-
-  private async filterTasksForActor<T extends TaskLike>(
-    actor: McpActorContext,
-    tasks: T[],
-  ): Promise<T[]> {
-    if (isGlobalAdminActor(actor)) return tasks;
-
-    const [projects, missions] = await Promise.all([
-      this.brain.projects.findAll(),
-      this.brain.missions.findAll(),
-    ]);
-    const projectIds = new Set(
-      filterProjectsForActor(actor, projects as ProjectLike[]).map((project) => project.id),
-    );
-    const missionIds = new Set(
-      (await this.filterMissionsForActor(actor, missions as MissionLike[])).map(
-        (mission) => mission.id,
-      ),
-    );
-
-    return tasks.filter(
-      (task) =>
-        task.userId === actor.userId ||
-        (isTenantAdminActor(actor) && matchesTenant(actor, task)) ||
-        (typeof task.projectId === 'string' && projectIds.has(task.projectId)) ||
-        (typeof task.missionId === 'string' && missionIds.has(task.missionId)),
-    );
+  getSession(sessionId: string): StreamableHTTPServerTransport | null {
+    return this.sessions.get(sessionId)?.transport ?? null;
   }
 
   /**
    * Registers all platform tools on the given McpServer instance.
    */
-  registerTools(server: McpServer, actor: McpActorContext): void {
+  private registerTools(server: McpServer, _userId: string): void {
     // ─── Brain: Project tools ────────────────────────────────────────────
 
     server.registerTool(
       'brain_list_projects',
       {
         description: 'List all projects in the brain.',
-        inputSchema: strictObject({}),
+        inputSchema: z.object({}),
       },
-      async (params) => {
-        assertMcpToolAuthorized(actor, 'brain_list_projects', params);
-        const projects = filterProjectsForActor(
-          actor,
-          (await this.brain.projects.findAll()) as ProjectLike[],
-        );
+      async () => {
+        const projects = await this.brain.projects.findAll();
         return {
           content: [{ type: 'text' as const, text: JSON.stringify(projects, null, 2) }],
         };
@@ -401,21 +96,17 @@ export class McpService implements OnModuleDestroy {
       'brain_get_project',
       {
         description: 'Get a project by ID.',
-        inputSchema: strictObject({
+        inputSchema: z.object({
           id: z.string().describe('Project ID (UUID)'),
         }),
       },
-      async ({ id, ...params }) => {
-        assertMcpToolAuthorized(actor, 'brain_get_project', params);
-        const project = (await this.brain.projects.findById(id)) as ProjectLike | undefined;
-        const authorizedProject = project ? filterProjectsForActor(actor, [project])[0] : undefined;
+      async ({ id }) => {
+        const project = await this.brain.projects.findById(id);
         return {
           content: [
             {
               type: 'text' as const,
-              text: authorizedProject
-                ? JSON.stringify(authorizedProject, null, 2)
-                : `Project not found: ${id}`,
+              text: project ? JSON.stringify(project, null, 2) : `Project not found: ${id}`,
             },
           ],
         };
@@ -428,23 +119,20 @@ export class McpService implements OnModuleDestroy {
       'brain_list_tasks',
       {
         description: 'List tasks, optionally filtered by project, mission, or status.',
-        inputSchema: strictObject({
+        inputSchema: z.object({
           projectId: z.string().optional().describe('Filter by project ID'),
           missionId: z.string().optional().describe('Filter by mission ID'),
           status: z.string().optional().describe('Filter by status'),
         }),
       },
-      async (params) => {
-        assertMcpToolAuthorized(actor, 'brain_list_tasks', params);
-        const { projectId, missionId, status } = params;
+      async ({ projectId, missionId, status }) => {
         type TaskStatus = 'not-started' | 'in-progress' | 'blocked' | 'done' | 'cancelled';
         let tasks;
         if (projectId) tasks = await this.brain.tasks.findByProject(projectId);
         else if (missionId) tasks = await this.brain.tasks.findByMission(missionId);
         else if (status) tasks = await this.brain.tasks.findByStatus(status as TaskStatus);
         else tasks = await this.brain.tasks.findAll();
-        const scopedTasks = await this.filterTasksForActor(actor, tasks as TaskLike[]);
-        return { content: [{ type: 'text' as const, text: JSON.stringify(scopedTasks, null, 2) }] };
+        return { content: [{ type: 'text' as const, text: JSON.stringify(tasks, null, 2) }] };
       },
     );
 
@@ -452,7 +140,7 @@ export class McpService implements OnModuleDestroy {
       'brain_create_task',
       {
         description: 'Create a new task in the brain.',
-        inputSchema: strictObject({
+        inputSchema: z.object({
           title: z.string().describe('Task title'),
           description: z.string().optional().describe('Task description'),
           projectId: z.string().optional().describe('Project ID'),
@@ -461,8 +149,6 @@ export class McpService implements OnModuleDestroy {
         }),
       },
       async (params) => {
-        assertMcpToolAuthorized(actor, 'brain_create_task', params);
-        await this.assertTaskCreateScopeAuthorized(actor, params);
         type Priority = 'low' | 'medium' | 'high' | 'critical';
         const task = await this.brain.tasks.create({
           ...params,
@@ -476,7 +162,7 @@ export class McpService implements OnModuleDestroy {
       'brain_update_task',
       {
         description: 'Update an existing task.',
-        inputSchema: strictObject({
+        inputSchema: z.object({
           id: z.string().describe('Task ID'),
           title: z.string().optional(),
           description: z.string().optional(),
@@ -485,17 +171,9 @@ export class McpService implements OnModuleDestroy {
             .optional()
             .describe('not-started, in-progress, blocked, done, cancelled'),
           priority: z.string().optional(),
-          projectId: z.string().optional().describe('Project ID'),
-          missionId: z.string().optional().describe('Mission ID'),
         }),
       },
       async ({ id, ...updates }) => {
-        assertMcpToolAuthorized(actor, 'brain_update_task', updates);
-        const existing = (await this.brain.tasks.findById(id)) as TaskLike | undefined;
-        if (!existing || (await this.filterTasksForActor(actor, [existing])).length === 0) {
-          return { content: [{ type: 'text' as const, text: `Task not found: ${id}` }] };
-        }
-        await this.assertTaskReferencesAuthorized(actor, updates);
         type TaskStatus = 'not-started' | 'in-progress' | 'blocked' | 'done' | 'cancelled';
         type Priority = 'low' | 'medium' | 'high' | 'critical';
         const task = await this.brain.tasks.update(id, {
@@ -520,19 +198,14 @@ export class McpService implements OnModuleDestroy {
       'brain_list_missions',
       {
         description: 'List all missions, optionally filtered by project.',
-        inputSchema: strictObject({
+        inputSchema: z.object({
           projectId: z.string().optional().describe('Filter by project ID'),
         }),
       },
-      async (params) => {
-        assertMcpToolAuthorized(actor, 'brain_list_missions', params);
-        const { projectId } = params;
-        const missions = await this.filterMissionsForActor(
-          actor,
-          (projectId
-            ? await this.brain.missions.findByProject(projectId)
-            : await this.brain.missions.findAll()) as MissionLike[],
-        );
+      async ({ projectId }) => {
+        const missions = projectId
+          ? await this.brain.missions.findByProject(projectId)
+          : await this.brain.missions.findAll();
         return { content: [{ type: 'text' as const, text: JSON.stringify(missions, null, 2) }] };
       },
     );
@@ -540,12 +213,13 @@ export class McpService implements OnModuleDestroy {
     server.registerTool(
       'brain_list_conversations',
       {
-        description: 'List conversations for the authenticated MCP actor.',
-        inputSchema: strictObject({}),
+        description: 'List conversations for a user.',
+        inputSchema: z.object({
+          userId: z.string().describe('User ID'),
+        }),
       },
-      async (params) => {
-        assertMcpToolAuthorized(actor, 'brain_list_conversations', params);
-        const conversations = await this.brain.conversations.findAll(actor.userId);
+      async ({ userId }) => {
+        const conversations = await this.brain.conversations.findAll(userId);
         return {
           content: [{ type: 'text' as const, text: JSON.stringify(conversations, null, 2) }],
         };
@@ -558,15 +232,14 @@ export class McpService implements OnModuleDestroy {
       'memory_search',
       {
         description:
-          'Search stored insights and knowledge for the authenticated MCP actor using natural language.',
-        inputSchema: strictObject({
+          'Search across stored insights and knowledge using natural language. Returns semantically similar results.',
+        inputSchema: z.object({
+          userId: z.string().describe('User ID to search memory for'),
           query: z.string().describe('Natural language search query'),
           limit: z.number().optional().describe('Max results (default 5)'),
         }),
       },
-      async (params) => {
-        assertMcpToolAuthorized(actor, 'memory_search', params);
-        const { query, limit } = params;
+      async ({ userId, query, limit }) => {
         if (!this.embeddings.available) {
           return {
             content: [
@@ -578,11 +251,7 @@ export class McpService implements OnModuleDestroy {
           };
         }
         const embedding = await this.embeddings.embed(query);
-        const results = await this.memory.insights.searchByEmbedding(
-          actor.userId,
-          embedding,
-          limit ?? 5,
-        );
+        const results = await this.memory.insights.searchByEmbedding(userId, embedding, limit ?? 5);
         return { content: [{ type: 'text' as const, text: JSON.stringify(results, null, 2) }] };
       },
     );
@@ -590,21 +259,20 @@ export class McpService implements OnModuleDestroy {
     server.registerTool(
       'memory_get_preferences',
       {
-        description: 'Retrieve stored preferences for the authenticated MCP actor.',
-        inputSchema: strictObject({
+        description: 'Retrieve stored preferences for a user.',
+        inputSchema: z.object({
+          userId: z.string().describe('User ID'),
           category: z
             .string()
             .optional()
             .describe('Filter by category: communication, coding, workflow, appearance, general'),
         }),
       },
-      async (params) => {
-        assertMcpToolAuthorized(actor, 'memory_get_preferences', params);
-        const { category } = params;
+      async ({ userId, category }) => {
         type Cat = 'communication' | 'coding' | 'workflow' | 'appearance' | 'general';
         const prefs = category
-          ? await this.memory.preferences.findByUserAndCategory(actor.userId, category as Cat)
-          : await this.memory.preferences.findByUser(actor.userId);
+          ? await this.memory.preferences.findByUserAndCategory(userId, category as Cat)
+          : await this.memory.preferences.findByUser(userId);
         return { content: [{ type: 'text' as const, text: JSON.stringify(prefs, null, 2) }] };
       },
     );
@@ -613,8 +281,9 @@ export class McpService implements OnModuleDestroy {
       'memory_save_preference',
       {
         description:
-          'Store a learned preference for the authenticated MCP actor (e.g., "prefers tables over paragraphs").',
-        inputSchema: strictObject({
+          'Store a learned user preference (e.g., "prefers tables over paragraphs", "timezone: America/Chicago").',
+        inputSchema: z.object({
+          userId: z.string().describe('User ID'),
           key: z.string().describe('Preference key'),
           value: z.string().describe('Preference value (JSON string)'),
           category: z
@@ -623,9 +292,7 @@ export class McpService implements OnModuleDestroy {
             .describe('Category: communication, coding, workflow, appearance, general'),
         }),
       },
-      async (params) => {
-        assertMcpToolAuthorized(actor, 'memory_save_preference', params);
-        const { key, value, category } = params;
+      async ({ userId, key, value, category }) => {
         type Cat = 'communication' | 'coding' | 'workflow' | 'appearance' | 'general';
         let parsedValue: unknown;
         try {
@@ -634,7 +301,7 @@ export class McpService implements OnModuleDestroy {
           parsedValue = value;
         }
         const pref = await this.memory.preferences.upsert({
-          userId: actor.userId,
+          userId,
           key,
           value: parsedValue,
           category: (category as Cat) ?? 'general',
@@ -648,8 +315,9 @@ export class McpService implements OnModuleDestroy {
       'memory_save_insight',
       {
         description:
-          'Store a learned insight, decision, or knowledge for the authenticated MCP actor.',
-        inputSchema: strictObject({
+          'Store a learned insight, decision, or knowledge extracted from the current interaction.',
+        inputSchema: z.object({
+          userId: z.string().describe('User ID'),
           content: z.string().describe('The insight or knowledge to store'),
           category: z
             .string()
@@ -657,13 +325,11 @@ export class McpService implements OnModuleDestroy {
             .describe('Category: decision, learning, preference, fact, pattern, general'),
         }),
       },
-      async (params) => {
-        assertMcpToolAuthorized(actor, 'memory_save_insight', params);
-        const { content, category } = params;
+      async ({ userId, content, category }) => {
         type Cat = 'decision' | 'learning' | 'preference' | 'fact' | 'pattern' | 'general';
         const embedding = this.embeddings.available ? await this.embeddings.embed(content) : null;
         const insight = await this.memory.insights.create({
-          userId: actor.userId,
+          userId,
           content,
           embedding,
           source: 'agent',
@@ -680,11 +346,16 @@ export class McpService implements OnModuleDestroy {
       {
         description:
           'Get the current orchestration mission status including milestones, tasks, and active session.',
-        inputSchema: strictObject({}),
+        inputSchema: z.object({
+          projectPath: z
+            .string()
+            .optional()
+            .describe('Project path. Defaults to gateway working directory.'),
+        }),
       },
-      async (params) => {
-        assertMcpToolAuthorized(actor, 'coord_mission_status', params);
-        const status = await this.coordService.getMissionStatus(process.cwd());
+      async ({ projectPath }) => {
+        const resolvedPath = projectPath ?? process.cwd();
+        const status = await this.coordService.getMissionStatus(resolvedPath);
         return {
           content: [
             {
@@ -700,11 +371,16 @@ export class McpService implements OnModuleDestroy {
       'coord_list_tasks',
       {
         description: 'List all tasks from the orchestration TASKS.md file.',
-        inputSchema: strictObject({}),
+        inputSchema: z.object({
+          projectPath: z
+            .string()
+            .optional()
+            .describe('Project path. Defaults to gateway working directory.'),
+        }),
       },
-      async (params) => {
-        assertMcpToolAuthorized(actor, 'coord_list_tasks', params);
-        const tasks = await this.coordService.listTasks(process.cwd());
+      async ({ projectPath }) => {
+        const resolvedPath = projectPath ?? process.cwd();
+        const tasks = await this.coordService.listTasks(resolvedPath);
         return { content: [{ type: 'text' as const, text: JSON.stringify(tasks, null, 2) }] };
       },
     );
@@ -713,14 +389,17 @@ export class McpService implements OnModuleDestroy {
       'coord_task_detail',
       {
         description: 'Get detailed status for a specific orchestration task.',
-        inputSchema: strictObject({
+        inputSchema: z.object({
           taskId: z.string().describe('Task ID (e.g. P2-005)'),
+          projectPath: z
+            .string()
+            .optional()
+            .describe('Project path. Defaults to gateway working directory.'),
         }),
       },
-      async (params) => {
-        assertMcpToolAuthorized(actor, 'coord_task_detail', params);
-        const { taskId } = params;
-        const detail = await this.coordService.getTaskStatus(process.cwd(), taskId);
+      async ({ taskId, projectPath }) => {
+        const resolvedPath = projectPath ?? process.cwd();
+        const detail = await this.coordService.getTaskStatus(resolvedPath, taskId);
         return {
           content: [
             {

apps/gateway/src/preferences/system-override.service.ts

@@ -1,13 +1,9 @@
 import { Injectable, Logger } from '@nestjs/common';
 import { createQueue, type QueueHandle } from '@mosaicstack/queue';
-import type { ActorTenantScope } from '../auth/session-scope.js';
 
-const scopedSessionId = (sessionId: string, scope: ActorTenantScope) =>
-  `${scope.tenantId}:${scope.userId}:${sessionId}`;
-const SESSION_SYSTEM_KEY = (sessionId: string, scope: ActorTenantScope) =>
-  `mosaic:session:${scopedSessionId(sessionId, scope)}:system`;
-const SESSION_SYSTEM_FRAGMENTS_KEY = (sessionId: string, scope: ActorTenantScope) =>
-  `mosaic:session:${scopedSessionId(sessionId, scope)}:system:fragments`;
+const SESSION_SYSTEM_KEY = (sessionId: string) => `mosaic:session:${sessionId}:system`;
+const SESSION_SYSTEM_FRAGMENTS_KEY = (sessionId: string) =>
+  `mosaic:session:${sessionId}:system:fragments`;
 const SYSTEM_OVERRIDE_TTL_SECONDS = 604800; // 7 days
 
 interface OverrideFragment {
@@ -24,9 +20,9 @@ export class SystemOverrideService {
     this.handle = createQueue();
   }
 
-  async set(sessionId: string, override: string, scope: ActorTenantScope): Promise<void> {
+  async set(sessionId: string, override: string): Promise<void> {
     // Load existing fragments
-    const existing = await this.handle.redis.get(SESSION_SYSTEM_FRAGMENTS_KEY(sessionId, scope));
+    const existing = await this.handle.redis.get(SESSION_SYSTEM_FRAGMENTS_KEY(sessionId));
     const fragments: OverrideFragment[] = existing
       ? (JSON.parse(existing) as OverrideFragment[])
       : [];
@@ -41,11 +37,11 @@ export class SystemOverrideService {
     // Store both: fragments array and condensed result
     const pipeline = this.handle.redis.pipeline();
     pipeline.setex(
-      SESSION_SYSTEM_FRAGMENTS_KEY(sessionId, scope),
+      SESSION_SYSTEM_FRAGMENTS_KEY(sessionId),
       SYSTEM_OVERRIDE_TTL_SECONDS,
       JSON.stringify(fragments),
     );
-    pipeline.setex(SESSION_SYSTEM_KEY(sessionId, scope), SYSTEM_OVERRIDE_TTL_SECONDS, condensed);
+    pipeline.setex(SESSION_SYSTEM_KEY(sessionId), SYSTEM_OVERRIDE_TTL_SECONDS, condensed);
     await pipeline.exec();
 
     this.logger.debug(
@@ -53,21 +49,21 @@ export class SystemOverrideService {
     );
   }
 
-  async get(sessionId: string, scope: ActorTenantScope): Promise<string | null> {
-    return this.handle.redis.get(SESSION_SYSTEM_KEY(sessionId, scope));
+  async get(sessionId: string): Promise<string | null> {
+    return this.handle.redis.get(SESSION_SYSTEM_KEY(sessionId));
   }
 
-  async renew(sessionId: string, scope: ActorTenantScope): Promise<void> {
+  async renew(sessionId: string): Promise<void> {
     const pipeline = this.handle.redis.pipeline();
-    pipeline.expire(SESSION_SYSTEM_KEY(sessionId, scope), SYSTEM_OVERRIDE_TTL_SECONDS);
-    pipeline.expire(SESSION_SYSTEM_FRAGMENTS_KEY(sessionId, scope), SYSTEM_OVERRIDE_TTL_SECONDS);
+    pipeline.expire(SESSION_SYSTEM_KEY(sessionId), SYSTEM_OVERRIDE_TTL_SECONDS);
+    pipeline.expire(SESSION_SYSTEM_FRAGMENTS_KEY(sessionId), SYSTEM_OVERRIDE_TTL_SECONDS);
     await pipeline.exec();
   }
 
-  async clear(sessionId: string, scope: ActorTenantScope): Promise<void> {
+  async clear(sessionId: string): Promise<void> {
     await this.handle.redis.del(
-      SESSION_SYSTEM_KEY(sessionId, scope),
-      SESSION_SYSTEM_FRAGMENTS_KEY(sessionId, scope),
+      SESSION_SYSTEM_KEY(sessionId),
+      SESSION_SYSTEM_FRAGMENTS_KEY(sessionId),
     );
     this.logger.debug(`Cleared system override for session ${sessionId}`);
   }

docs/MISSION-MANIFEST.md

@@ -67,11 +67,10 @@ The MVP is complete when ALL declared workstreams are complete AND every cross-c
 
 ## Workstreams
 
-| #   | ID   | Name                                        | Status            | Manifest                                                                | Notes                                               |
-| --- | ---- | ------------------------------------------- | ----------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------- | --------------------------------------------------- |
-| W1  | FED  | Federation v1                               | planning-complete | [docs/federation/MISSION-MANIFEST.md](./federation/MISSION-MANIFEST.md) | 7 milestones, ~175K tokens, issues #460–#466 filed  |
-| W2  | TESS | Tess interaction agent                      | planning-complete | [docs/tess/MISSION-MANIFEST.md](./tess/MISSION-MANIFEST.md)             | 5 milestones; issue #706; M1 issue #707 ready       |
-| W3+ | TBD  | (additional workstreams declared as scoped) | —                 | —                                                                       | Scope creep is expected and explicitly accommodated |
+| #   | ID  | Name                                        | Status            | Manifest                                                                | Notes                                               |
+| --- | --- | ------------------------------------------- | ----------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------- | --------------------------------------------------- |
+| W1  | FED | Federation v1                               | planning-complete | [docs/federation/MISSION-MANIFEST.md](./federation/MISSION-MANIFEST.md) | 7 milestones, ~175K tokens, issues #460–#466 filed  |
+| W2+ | TBD | (additional workstreams declared as scoped) | —                 | —                                                                       | Scope creep is expected and explicitly accommodated |
 
 ### Likely Additional Workstreams (Not Yet Declared)
 

docs/PRD.md

@@ -79,102 +79,6 @@ Jarvis (v0.2.0) is a self-hosted AI assistant with a Python FastAPI backend and
 
 ---
 
-## Tess Interaction Agent Workstream (TESS)
-
-### Problem and Objective
-
-Jason needs one durable, operator-facing Mosaic agent outside Hermes that is reachable through a dedicated Discord channel and CLI, can attach to and operate the Mosaic fleet and transitional Hermes agents, and preserves context across restarts and compaction. Mos remains the coding/general fleet orchestrator; Tess is the complementary human interaction, visibility, control, and migration agent.
-
-The objective is to ship **Tess** (from _tessera_, a piece of a mosaic) as a Pi-native, GPT-5.6 Sol agent with high reasoning. Tess must use Mosaic-owned contracts and plugins so Hermes can be replaced incrementally rather than becoming a permanent architectural dependency.
-
-### Scope
-
-#### In Scope
-
-1. `TESS-ARP-001`: A runtime-neutral `AgentRuntimeProvider` contract supporting `listSessions`, `streamSession`, `sendMessage`, `terminate`, `getSessionTree`, `attach`, health, capability discovery, and normalized events/errors.
-2. `TESS-PI-001`: A long-running Pi-native Tess agent profile/service pinned to GPT-5.6 Sol with high reasoning, explicit tool policy, lifecycle hooks, durable checkpoints, and restart recovery.
-3. `TESS-DSC-001`: Dedicated Discord channel binding to Tess through the Mosaic gateway, with allowlists/RBAC, thread/reply policy, streaming, attachments, approvals, and correlation IDs.
-4. `TESS-CLI-001`: `mosaic tess` CLI commands for chat, status, session listing, attach/detach, send/steer/stop, provider health, and recovery.
-5. `TESS-FLT-001`: Fleet plugin capabilities for roster/status/heartbeat inspection, message delivery, session hierarchy, safe attach, and controlled restart/recovery.
-6. `TESS-MOS-001`: Explicit Mos coordination boundary and tools: hand off orchestration requests, observe mission/task state, receive results, and never silently compete for orchestration authority.
-7. `TESS-HRM-001`: Transitional Hermes adapter for profiles/agents, sessions, streaming/messages, Kanban, skills, memory, tools, cron, and health, using capability negotiation and fail-closed unsupported operations.
-8. `TESS-MEM-001`: Unified memory/retrieval plugin with scoped search/recent/capture/stats, startup context injection, provenance, redaction, namespace isolation, and flat-file/project truth precedence.
-9. `TESS-STA-001`: Durable agent state, inbox, handoff, compaction-recovery, and resume reconstruction.
-10. `TESS-PLG-001`: Plugin/tool catalog covering runtime bootstrap, repository/PR workflow, fleet diagnostics, incident-safe read operations, Discord interaction, and extensible MCP/skill discovery.
-11. `TESS-TRN-001`: Replaceable transport providers: tmux/fleet now, Matrix/native Mosaic transport later, with no Discord/CLI business logic coupled to transport details.
-12. `TESS-SEC-001`: RBAC, per-operation authorization, explicit approval for destructive/privileged/customer-visible actions, audit events, secret/PII redaction, tenant isolation, and bounded command execution.
-13. `TESS-SEC-002`: Command execution SHALL enforce declared scope/role server-side; admin/system and destructive operations SHALL require policy-bound durable approval.
-14. `TESS-SEC-003`: Every session list/read/attach/send/terminate operation SHALL enforce server-derived owner and tenant scope; guessed or client-supplied IDs SHALL grant no authority.
-15. `TESS-SEC-004`: MCP tools SHALL derive actor/tenant from authenticated context and SHALL NOT accept caller-controlled identity fields.
-16. `TESS-SEC-005`: Discord plugin ingress SHALL authenticate service identity, enforce guild/channel/user allowlists, propagate correlation/message IDs, and reject replay.
-17. `TESS-SEC-006`: Secret/PII classification and redaction SHALL occur before persistence and before channel egress, including tool metadata and authentication flows.
-18. `TESS-SEC-007`: Approvals SHALL be one-time, expiring, actor/tenant-bound, and cryptographically bound to the exact structured action digest.
-19. `TESS-SEC-008`: Ingress, provider sends, tool side effects, and responses SHALL use durable inbox/outbox/checkpoints and idempotency records for restart-safe replay.
-20. `TESS-SEC-009`: Garbage collection and retention SHALL be session/tenant scoped unless executed as a separately authorized and audited system-wide job.
-21. `TESS-OBS-001`: Structured logs, traces, health/readiness, provider latency/errors, session lifecycle, tool audit, and actionable recovery diagnostics.
-22. `TESS-MIG-001`: Capability inventory and staged Hermes-to-Mosaic migration matrix with coexistence, cutover, rollback, and deprecation gates.
-
-#### Out of Scope
-
-1. Replacing Mos as coding/general fleet orchestrator.
-2. Making Hermes the Mosaic core or coupling Mosaic domain logic to Hermes schemas.
-3. Migrating every historical chat verbatim; only policy-compliant indexed summaries and user-selected sessions are migrated.
-4. Unrestricted shell execution from Discord.
-5. Full web UI parity in the first Tess operational milestone; gateway contracts must remain web-consumable.
-6. Replacing tmux before Matrix/native transport reaches operational parity.
-
-### Stakeholder and User Requirements
-
-- Jason must be able to converse with the same Tess session from Discord and CLI.
-- Jason must be able to see what is running, stale, blocked, or unhealthy without attaching manually to every session.
-- Jason must be able to attach to Tess and authorized fleet sessions through supported CLI controls.
-- Tess must collaborate with Mos and the fleet while preserving a single clear orchestration authority.
-- The system must migrate useful Hermes/OpenClaw capabilities intentionally, with evidence, instead of copying implementations wholesale.
-
-### Non-Functional Requirements
-
-1. **Security:** default-deny provider/tool capabilities, least privilege, no secrets in logs/prompts/commits, Discord user/channel authorization, and auditable approvals.
-2. **Reliability:** durable inbox/checkpoints; idempotent message handling; reconnect with bounded backoff; no message loss or duplicate execution across gateway restart.
-3. **Performance:** first acknowledgement within 2 seconds when connected; streamed agent output begins within 5 seconds excluding model/provider delay; status reads return within 2 seconds under nominal local conditions.
-4. **Observability:** every ingress message and resulting provider/tool operation carries a correlation ID across Discord, gateway, Tess, provider, and audit events.
-5. **Maintainability:** channel, runtime, transport, memory, and external-agent integrations remain adapter-based with contract tests.
-6. **Privacy:** only scoped context enters external runtimes; persisted messages/memories follow retention and redaction policy.
-7. **Portability:** Tess runs through Pi/Mosaic contracts and does not require Hermes to start or serve native Mosaic operations.
-
-### Acceptance Criteria
-
-1. `AC-TESS-01`: A dedicated Discord channel and `mosaic tess chat` connect to one durable Tess session and stream responses bidirectionally.
-2. `AC-TESS-02`: `mosaic tess status|sessions|tree|attach|send|stop` operate against authorized provider capabilities with stable typed outputs and actionable errors.
-3. `AC-TESS-03`: Tess runs GPT-5.6 Sol at high reasoning and its effective runtime/model/tool policy is visible through status without exposing credentials.
-4. `AC-TESS-04`: Tess can inspect and message the Mosaic fleet, hand orchestration work to Mos, and demonstrate that Tess does not independently claim Mos-owned orchestration work.
-5. `AC-TESS-05`: Hermes adapter demonstrates session listing, streaming/message delivery, hierarchy mapping, and at least one approved capability in each of Kanban, skills, memory, tools, and cron—or reports unsupported capabilities fail-closed.
-6. `AC-TESS-06`: Restart/compaction test preserves session identity, pending inbox, last durable checkpoint, and a resumable handoff without duplicate side effects.
-7. `AC-TESS-07`: Unauthorized Discord users/channels, cross-tenant access, unsafe tool calls, forged approvals, and sensitive-output cases are denied and audited.
-8. `AC-TESS-08`: tmux/fleet and Matrix/native transport implementations pass the same provider contract suite; Matrix may remain non-default until readiness gates pass.
-9. `AC-TESS-09`: Baseline quality gates, unit/integration/contract tests, Discord+CLI E2E, restart/recovery tests, independent code review, and security review are green.
-10. `AC-TESS-10`: Migration matrix documents every audited Hermes/OpenClaw capability as native, adapted, deferred, or rejected, with cutover and rollback evidence.
-11. `AC-TESS-11`: User, admin, developer, API/OpenAPI, operations/recovery, and plugin-authoring documentation is current and linked from the sitemap.
-
-### Constraints, Dependencies, Risks, and Assumptions
-
-- Dependency: Mosaic gateway remains the single API surface; Pi is the native runtime; Valkey/PostgreSQL provide canonical durable state where required.
-- Dependency: Discord bot credentials and dedicated channel ID are deployment secrets provisioned outside source control.
-- Risk: Tess could drift into a second orchestrator. Mitigation: explicit role policy, Mos handoff contract, authority checks, and E2E boundary tests.
-- Risk: broad Hermes compatibility can freeze legacy semantics into Mosaic. Mitigation: Mosaic-owned normalized contracts and capability negotiation.
-- Risk: Discord creates a privileged remote-control surface. Mitigation: pairing/allowlists, RBAC, approvals, rate limits, audit, and safe tool classes.
-- Risk: transcript ingestion can violate privacy or overload memory. Mitigation: scoped opt-in import, redacted summaries, provenance, retention, and deduplication.
-- Risk: current root filesystem has limited headroom. Mitigation: isolated worktrees, no duplicated dependency installation unless required, and cleanup only after active-lane verification.
-- `ASSUMPTION:` The public name is **Tess**, because the user requested a name and the tessera/Mosaic relationship is distinctive; config must permit later display-name changes without renaming APIs or storage keys.
-- `ASSUMPTION:` The dedicated Discord channel ID and final guild policy will be supplied/provisioned during deployment, so implementation uses explicit configuration and fail-fast startup validation.
-- `ASSUMPTION:` tmux/fleet is the production transport for the first operational milestone; Matrix/native transport is implemented behind the same contract and promoted only after parity/reliability verification.
-- `ASSUMPTION:` Project/task truth remains in canonical Mosaic/project stores; semantic memory systems are retrieval/mirror layers, not hidden authorities.
-
-### Testing and Delivery Intent
-
-Delivery uses five gated milestones: runtime contracts/security; Pi service/state; Discord/CLI; fleet/Hermes/plugin suite; migration/Matrix/recovery/qualification. Every source-code task requires tests, independent review, a PR to `main`, terminal-green CI, and issue/task closure. Production activation additionally requires a clean-host Pi launch, dedicated Discord channel smoke test, CLI attach test, restart/recovery drill, and rollback procedure.
-
----
-
 ## Architecture
 
 ### High-Level System Diagram

docs/TASKS.md

@@ -14,10 +14,9 @@
 
 ## Workstream Rollup
 
-| id  | status            | workstream             | progress         | tasks file                                        | notes                                                           |
-| --- | ----------------- | ---------------------- | ---------------- | ------------------------------------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------- |
-| W1  | planning-complete | Federation v1 (FED)    | 0 / 7 milestones | [docs/federation/TASKS.md](./federation/TASKS.md) | M1 task breakdown populated; M2–M7 deferred to mission planning |
-| W2  | planning-complete | Tess interaction agent | 0 / 5 milestones | [docs/tess/TASKS.md](./tess/TASKS.md)             | Issue #706; independent planning gate PASS; M1 issue #707 ready |
+| id  | status            | workstream          | progress         | tasks file                                        | notes                                                           |
+| --- | ----------------- | ------------------- | ---------------- | ------------------------------------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| W1  | planning-complete | Federation v1 (FED) | 0 / 7 milestones | [docs/federation/TASKS.md](./federation/TASKS.md) | M1 task breakdown populated; M2–M7 deferred to mission planning |
 
 ## Cross-Cutting Tracking
 

docs/federation/TASKS.md

@@ -91,22 +91,22 @@ Goal: Two federated gateways exchange real data over mTLS. Inbound requests pass
 >
 > **Tracking issue:** #462.
 
-| id        | status      | description                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            | issue | agent  | branch                               | depends_on                        | estimate | notes                                                                                                                                                    |
-| --------- | ----------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | ----- | ------ | ------------------------------------ | --------------------------------- | -------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
-| FED-M3-01 | done        | `packages/types/src/federation/` — request/response DTOs for `list`, `get`, `capabilities` verbs. Wire-format zod schemas + inferred TS types. Includes `FederationRequest`, `FederationListResponse<T>`, `FederationGetResponse<T>`, `FederationCapabilitiesResponse`, error envelope, `_source` tag. | #462  | sonnet | feat/federation-m3-types             | —                                 | 4K       | Reusable from gateway server + client + harness. Pure types — no I/O, no NestJS.                                                                         |
-| FED-M3-02 | done        | `tools/federation-harness/` scaffold: `docker-compose.two-gateways.yml` (Server A + Server B + step-CA), `seed.ts` (provisions grants, peers, sample tasks/notes/credentials per scope variant), `harness.ts` helper (boots stack, returns typed clients). README documents harness use.               | #462  | sonnet | feat/federation-m3-harness           | DEPLOY-04 (soft)                  | 8K       | Falls back to local docker-compose if `mos-test-1/-2` not yet redeployed (DEPLOY chain blocked on IMG-FIX). Permanent test infra used by M3+.            |
-| FED-M3-03 | done        | `apps/gateway/src/federation/server/federation-auth.guard.ts` (NestJS guard). Validates inbound client cert from Fastify TLS context, extracts `grantId` + `subjectUserId` from custom OIDs, loads grant from DB, asserts `status='active'`, attaches `FederationContext` to request.                  | #462  | sonnet | feat/federation-m3-auth-guard        | M3-01                             | 8K       | Reuses OID parsing logic mirrored from `ca.service.ts` post-issuance verification. 401 on malformed/missing OIDs; 403 on revoked/expired/missing grant.  |
-| FED-M3-04 | in-progress | `apps/gateway/src/federation/server/scope.service.ts`. Pipeline: (1) resource allowlist + excluded check, (2) native RBAC eval as `subjectUserId`, (3) scope filter intersection (`include_teams`, `include_personal`), (4) `max_rows_per_query` cap. Pure service — DB calls injected.                | #462  | sonnet | feat/federation-m3-scope-service     | M3-01                             | 10K      | Hardest correctness target in M3. Reuses `parseFederationScope` (M2-03). Returns either `{ allowed: true, filter }` or structured deny reason for audit. |
-| FED-M3-05 | in-progress | `apps/gateway/src/federation/server/verbs/list.controller.ts`. Wires AuthGuard → ScopeService → tasks/notes/memory query layer; applies row cap; tags rows with `_source`. Resource selector via path param.                                                                                           | #462  | sonnet | feat/federation-m3-verb-list         | M3-03, M3-04                      | 6K       | Routes: `POST /api/federation/v1/list/:resource`. No body persistence. Audit write deferred to M4.                                                       |
-| FED-M3-06 | not-started | `apps/gateway/src/federation/server/verbs/get.controller.ts`. Single-resource fetch by id; same pipeline as list. 404 on not-found, 403 on RBAC/scope deny — both audited the same way.                                                                                                                | #462  | sonnet | feat/federation-m3-verb-get          | M3-03, M3-04                      | 6K       | `POST /api/federation/v1/get/:resource/:id`. Mirrors list controller patterns.                                                                           |
-| FED-M3-07 | done        | `apps/gateway/src/federation/server/verbs/capabilities.controller.ts`. Read-only enumeration: returns `{ resources, excluded_resources, max_rows_per_query, supported_verbs }` derived from grant scope. Always allowed for an active grant — no RBAC eval.                                            | #462  | sonnet | feat/federation-m3-verb-capabilities | M3-03                             | 4K       | `GET /api/federation/v1/capabilities`. Smallest verb; useful sanity check that mTLS + auth guard work end-to-end.                                        |
-| FED-M3-08 | done        | `apps/gateway/src/federation/client/federation-client.service.ts`. Outbound mTLS dialer: picks `(certPem, sealed clientKey)` from `federation_peers`, unwraps key, builds undici Agent with mTLS, calls peer verb, parses typed response, wraps non-2xx into `FederationClientError`.                  | #462  | sonnet | feat/federation-m3-client            | M3-01                             | 8K       | Independent of server stream — can land in parallel with M3-03/04. Cert/key cached per-peer; flushed by future M5/M6 logic.                              |
-| FED-M3-09 | done        | `apps/gateway/src/federation/client/query-source.service.ts`. Accepts `source: "local" \| "federated:<host>" \| "all"` from gateway query layer; for `"all"` fans out to local + each peer in parallel; merges results; tags every row with `_source`.                                                 | #462  | sonnet | feat/federation-m3-query-source      | M3-08                             | 8K       | Per-peer failure surfaces as `_partial: true` in response, not hard failure (sets up M5 offline UX). M5 adds caching + circuit breaker on top.           |
-| FED-M3-10 | not-started | Integration tests for MILESTONES.md M3 acceptance #6 (malformed OIDs → 401; valid cert + revoked grant → 403) and #7 (`max_rows_per_query` cap). Real PG, mocked TLS context (Fastify req shim).                                                                                                       | #462  | sonnet | feat/federation-m3-integration       | M3-05, M3-06                      | 8K       | Vitest profile gated by `FEDERATED_INTEGRATION=1`. Single-gateway suite; no harness required.                                                            |
-| FED-M3-11 | not-started | E2E tests for MILESTONES.md M3 acceptance #1, #2, #3, #4, #5, #8, #9, #10 (8 cases). Uses harness from M3-02; two real gateways, real Step-CA, real mTLS. Each test asserts both happy-path response and audit/no-persist invariants.                                                                  | #462  | sonnet | feat/federation-m3-e2e               | M3-02, M3-04, M3-05, M3-06, M3-09 | 12K      | Largest single task. Each acceptance gets its own `it(...)` for clear failure attribution.                                                               |
-| FED-M3-12 | not-started | Independent security review (sonnet, not author of M3-03/04/05/06/07/08/09): focus on cert-SAN spoofing, OID extraction edge cases, scope-bypass via filter manipulation, RBAC-bypass via subjectUser swap, response leakage when scope deny.                                                          | #462  | sonnet | feat/federation-m3-security-review   | M3-11                             | 10K      | Two review rounds budgeted. PRD requires explicit test for every 401/403 path — review verifies coverage.                                                |
-| FED-M3-13 | not-started | Docs update: `docs/federation/SETUP.md` mTLS handshake section, new `docs/federation/HARNESS.md` for federation-harness usage, OID reference table in SETUP.md, scope enforcement pipeline diagram. Runbook still M7-deferred.                                                                         | #462  | haiku  | feat/federation-m3-docs              | M3-12                             | 5K       | One ASCII diagram for the auth-guard → scope → RBAC pipeline; helps future reviewers reason about denial paths.                                          |
-| FED-M3-14 | not-started | PR aggregate close, CI green, merge to main, close #462. Release tag `fed-v0.3.0-m3`. Update mission manifest M3 row → done; M4 row → in-progress when work begins.                                                                                                                                    | #462  | sonnet | chore/federation-m3-close            | M3-13                             | 3K       | Same close pattern as M1-12 / M2-13.                                                                                                                     |
+| id        | status      | description                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            | issue | agent  | branch                               | depends_on       | estimate | notes                                                                                                                                                    |
+| --------- | ----------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | ----- | ------ | ------------------------------------ | ---------------- | -------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| FED-M3-01 | not-started | `packages/types/src/federation/` — request/response DTOs for `list`, `get`, `capabilities` verbs. Wire-format zod schemas + inferred TS types. Includes `FederationRequest`, `FederationListResponse<T>`, `FederationGetResponse<T>`, `FederationCapabilitiesResponse`, error envelope, `_source` tag. | #462  | sonnet | feat/federation-m3-types             | —                | 4K       | Reusable from gateway server + client + harness. Pure types — no I/O, no NestJS.                                                                         |
+| FED-M3-02 | not-started | `tools/federation-harness/` scaffold: `docker-compose.two-gateways.yml` (Server A + Server B + step-CA), `seed.ts` (provisions grants, peers, sample tasks/notes/credentials per scope variant), `harness.ts` helper (boots stack, returns typed clients). README documents harness use.               | #462  | sonnet | feat/federation-m3-harness           | DEPLOY-04 (soft) | 8K       | Falls back to local docker-compose if `mos-test-1/-2` not yet redeployed (DEPLOY chain blocked on IMG-FIX). Permanent test infra used by M3+.            |
+| FED-M3-03 | not-started | `apps/gateway/src/federation/server/federation-auth.guard.ts` (NestJS guard). Validates inbound client cert from Fastify TLS context, extracts `grantId` + `subjectUserId` from custom OIDs, loads grant from DB, asserts `status='active'`, attaches `FederationContext` to request.                  | #462  | sonnet | feat/federation-m3-auth-guard        | M3-01            | 8K       | Reuses OID parsing logic mirrored from `ca.service.ts` post-issuance verification. 401 on malformed/missing OIDs; 403 on revoked/expired/missing grant.  |
+| FED-M3-04 | not-started | `apps/gateway/src/federation/server/scope.service.ts`. Pipeline: (1) resource allowlist + excluded check, (2) native RBAC eval as `subjectUserId`, (3) scope filter intersection (`include_teams`, `include_personal`), (4) `max_rows_per_query` cap. Pure service — DB calls injected.                | #462  | sonnet | feat/federation-m3-scope-service     | M3-01            | 10K      | Hardest correctness target in M3. Reuses `parseFederationScope` (M2-03). Returns either `{ allowed: true, filter }` or structured deny reason for audit. |
+| FED-M3-05 | not-started | `apps/gateway/src/federation/server/verbs/list.controller.ts`. Wires AuthGuard → ScopeService → tasks/notes/memory query layer; applies row cap; tags rows with `_source`. Resource selector via path param.                                                                                           | #462  | sonnet | feat/federation-m3-verb-list         | M3-03, M3-04     | 6K       | Routes: `POST /api/federation/v1/list/:resource`. No body persistence. Audit write deferred to M4.                                                       |
+| FED-M3-06 | not-started | `apps/gateway/src/federation/server/verbs/get.controller.ts`. Single-resource fetch by id; same pipeline as list. 404 on not-found, 403 on RBAC/scope deny — both audited the same way.                                                                                                                | #462  | sonnet | feat/federation-m3-verb-get          | M3-03, M3-04     | 6K       | `POST /api/federation/v1/get/:resource/:id`. Mirrors list controller patterns.                                                                           |
+| FED-M3-07 | not-started | `apps/gateway/src/federation/server/verbs/capabilities.controller.ts`. Read-only enumeration: returns `{ resources, excluded_resources, max_rows_per_query, supported_verbs }` derived from grant scope. Always allowed for an active grant — no RBAC eval.                                            | #462  | sonnet | feat/federation-m3-verb-capabilities | M3-03            | 4K       | `GET /api/federation/v1/capabilities`. Smallest verb; useful sanity check that mTLS + auth guard work end-to-end.                                        |
+| FED-M3-08 | not-started | `apps/gateway/src/federation/client/federation-client.service.ts`. Outbound mTLS dialer: picks `(certPem, sealed clientKey)` from `federation_peers`, unwraps key, builds undici Agent with mTLS, calls peer verb, parses typed response, wraps non-2xx into `FederationClientError`.                  | #462  | sonnet | feat/federation-m3-client            | M3-01            | 8K       | Independent of server stream — can land in parallel with M3-03/04. Cert/key cached per-peer; flushed by future M5/M6 logic.                              |
+| FED-M3-09 | not-started | `apps/gateway/src/federation/client/query-source.service.ts`. Accepts `source: "local" \| "federated:<host>" \| "all"` from gateway query layer; for `"all"` fans out to local + each peer in parallel; merges results; tags every row with `_source`.                                                 | #462  | sonnet | feat/federation-m3-query-source      | M3-08            | 8K       | Per-peer failure surfaces as `_partial: true` in response, not hard failure (sets up M5 offline UX). M5 adds caching + circuit breaker on top.           |
+| FED-M3-10 | not-started | Integration tests for MILESTONES.md M3 acceptance #6 (malformed OIDs → 401; valid cert + revoked grant → 403) and #7 (`max_rows_per_query` cap). Real PG, mocked TLS context (Fastify req shim).                                                                                                       | #462  | sonnet | feat/federation-m3-integration       | M3-05, M3-06     | 8K       | Vitest profile gated by `FEDERATED_INTEGRATION=1`. Single-gateway suite; no harness required.                                                            |
+| FED-M3-11 | not-started | E2E tests for MILESTONES.md M3 acceptance #1, #2, #3, #4, #5, #8, #9, #10 (8 cases). Uses harness from M3-02; two real gateways, real Step-CA, real mTLS. Each test asserts both happy-path response and audit/no-persist invariants.                                                                  | #462  | sonnet | feat/federation-m3-e2e               | M3-02, M3-09     | 12K      | Largest single task. Each acceptance gets its own `it(...)` for clear failure attribution.                                                               |
+| FED-M3-12 | not-started | Independent security review (sonnet, not author of M3-03/04/05/06/07/08/09): focus on cert-SAN spoofing, OID extraction edge cases, scope-bypass via filter manipulation, RBAC-bypass via subjectUser swap, response leakage when scope deny.                                                          | #462  | sonnet | feat/federation-m3-security-review   | M3-11            | 10K      | Two review rounds budgeted. PRD requires explicit test for every 401/403 path — review verifies coverage.                                                |
+| FED-M3-13 | not-started | Docs update: `docs/federation/SETUP.md` mTLS handshake section, new `docs/federation/HARNESS.md` for federation-harness usage, OID reference table in SETUP.md, scope enforcement pipeline diagram. Runbook still M7-deferred.                                                                         | #462  | haiku  | feat/federation-m3-docs              | M3-12            | 5K       | One ASCII diagram for the auth-guard → scope → RBAC pipeline; helps future reviewers reason about denial paths.                                          |
+| FED-M3-14 | not-started | PR aggregate close, CI green, merge to main, close #462. Release tag `fed-v0.3.0-m3`. Update mission manifest M3 row → done; M4 row → in-progress when work begins.                                                                                                                                    | #462  | sonnet | chore/federation-m3-close            | M3-13            | 3K       | Same close pattern as M1-12 / M2-13.                                                                                                                     |
 
 **M3 estimate:** ~100K tokens (vs MILESTONES.md 40K — same per-task breakdown pattern as M1/M2: tests, review, and docs split out from implementation cost). Largest milestone in the federation mission.
 
@@ -118,10 +118,6 @@ Goal: Two federated gateways exchange real data over mTLS. Inbound requests pass
 
 **Test bed fallback:** If `mos-test-1.woltje.com` / `mos-test-2.woltje.com` are still blocked on `FED-M2-DEPLOY-IMG-FIX` when M3-11 is ready to run, the harness's local `docker-compose.two-gateways.yml` is a sufficient stand-in. Production-host validation moves to M7 acceptance suite (PRD AC-12).
 
-**Backlog sync — 2026-06-24 (orchestrator):** Status reconciled against `origin/main` (release 0.0.48). Landed on main: **FED-M3-01** (DTOs, PR #506), **FED-M3-02** (harness scaffold, PR #505), **FED-M3-03** (mTLS auth-guard, PR #509 — CRIT-1/2 + HIGH-1..4 remediated in-PR), **FED-M3-08** (outbound mTLS client, PR #508). With M3-01/03/08 merged, three cards became dependency-clear and were dispatched to the idle coder lane: **FED-M3-04** scope.service → coder0 (`feat/federation-m3-scope-service`); **FED-M3-09** query-source + **FED-M3-07** capabilities verb → coder1 (`feat/federation-m3-query-source` first). Reviewer warmed for the M3 trust-boundary PRs. Remaining blocked-by-DAG: M3-05/06 (await M3-04), M3-10 (await M3-05/06), M3-11 (await M3-09), M3-12→14 (tail). Deploy chain (DEPLOY-IMG-FIX → 03/04) still independent of M3 code — harness local docker-compose fallback covers M3-11.
-
-**Backlog sync #2 — 2026-06-24 (orchestrator):** **FED-M3-09** (query-source) merged via PR #673 and **FED-M3-07** (capabilities) merged via PR #674 — both squash-merged on independent agent review-of-record + green CI (formal Gitea approve unavailable under the shared service account; merge is not gated by the self-approve guard). **FED-M3-05** (list verb) dispatched to coder1 (based on the M3-04 branch, rebase onto main once #672 lands). **FED-M3-04** (scope.service, PR #672) is in review-changes (one include_personal no-leak test outstanding). **DAG fix:** corrected `FED-M3-11` depends_on from `M3-02, M3-09` → `M3-02, M3-04, M3-05, M3-06, M3-09` — the E2E acceptance cases (#1–#5, #8–#10) exercise list/get over mTLS, so the server verbs + scope service are hard prerequisites; the original edge set omitted them and caused a premature M3-11 dispatch. Note: M3 read-path invariant for M3-11 is **no-persist + existing enrollment audit only** — read-verb audit-log writes are deferred to M4 (see M3-05/06 notes), so M3-11 must not assert read-audit-log entries.
-
 ## Milestone 4 — search + audit + rate limit (FED-M4)
 
 _Deferred. Issue #463._

docs/scratchpads/462-fed-m3-04-scope-service.md

@@ -1,60 +0,0 @@
-# Scratchpad — FED-M3-04 Scope Service
-
-## Objective
-
-Implement `apps/gateway/src/federation/server/scope.service.ts` for the M3 inbound federation scope-enforcement pipeline.
-
-## Scope / Constraints
-
-- Task: FED-M3-04, issue #462.
-- Branch: `feat/federation-m3-scope-service` from `origin/main` @ 0.0.48.
-- Pure service: no direct DB access; native RBAC/data access is injected per evaluation call.
-- Reuse `parseFederationScope` from M2-03.
-- Workers do not edit `docs/federation/TASKS.md` per repo AGENTS.md.
-
-## Acceptance Criteria
-
-1. Resource allowlist and `excluded_resources` enforced.
-2. Native RBAC evaluated as `subjectUserId` through an injected evaluator.
-3. Scope filter intersection supports `include_teams` and `include_personal` without widening native RBAC.
-4. `max_rows_per_query` caps requested limits.
-5. Service returns `{ allowed: true, filter }` or a structured deny reason usable by M4 audit.
-6. Unit tests cover every deny path.
-
-## Plan
-
-1. Inspect existing federation scope/schema/auth guard contracts.
-2. Add pure `FederationScopeService` plus typed result/filter/deny interfaces.
-3. Add focused unit tests for happy paths, filter intersection, row cap, and deny paths.
-4. Export/register service for future verb controllers.
-5. Run situational tests, baseline gates, code review, then PR.
-
-## Budget
-
-- Provided model tier: sonnet.
-- Estimate from task row: 10K tokens.
-- Working cap assumption: keep implementation focused to FED-M3-04 surfaces only.
-
-## Progress
-
-- Intake complete; dirty base worktree avoided by creating isolated worktree at `/home/jarvis/src/mosaic-mono-v1-fed-m3-04`.
-- Project PRD and federation task spec reviewed.
-- Added `FederationScopeService` with structured allow/deny result types and injected native RBAC evaluator contract.
-- Added unit coverage for happy path, row cap, filter intersection, and every deny path.
-- Exported/registered the service for upcoming M3 verb controllers.
-
-## Verification Evidence
-
-- `pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/gateway test -- src/federation/server/__tests__/scope.service.spec.ts` — pass (10 tests before review update; 11 tests after adding include_personal no-leak coverage).
-- `pnpm build` — pass (23 successful tasks).
-- `pnpm typecheck` — pass (41 successful tasks; re-run after review update).
-- `pnpm lint` — pass (23 successful tasks; re-run after review update).
-- `pnpm format:check` — pass (re-run after review update).
-- `pnpm test` — pass after starting local `postgres`/`valkey` and running `pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/db db:push` for the DB-backed cross-user isolation suite (41 successful tasks; gateway 477 passed / 11 skipped).
-- Code review: `~/.config/mosaic/tools/codex/codex-code-review.sh --uncommitted` — approve, 0 findings.
-- Security review: `~/.config/mosaic/tools/codex/codex-security-review.sh --uncommitted` — risk none, 0 findings.
-
-## Risks / Blockers
-
-- Issue #462 is already closed in provider output; likely milestone tracking mismatch. Will still reference #462 in PR body unless orchestrator redirects.
-- Local full-test setup required `docker compose up -d postgres valkey` + `db:push`; containers were stopped with `docker compose down` after verification.

docs/scratchpads/561-python-is-python3.md

@@ -1,33 +0,0 @@
-# Issue #561 — Bare python on agent hosts
-
-## Objective
-
-Make the durable bootstrap/provisioning guidance ensure agent hosts provide a bare `python` command that resolves to Python 3.
-
-## Scope
-
-- Add Debian/Ubuntu `python-is-python3` to agent-host prerequisites in bootstrap docs.
-- Check for actual OS package provisioning scripts and update only if an existing agent-host package install path exists.
-- Do not touch live host state.
-- Do not update `docs/TASKS.md`; repo guidance says workers read it but never modify it.
-
-## Recon
-
-- Issue #561 confirms repeated `python: command not found` failures from fleet agents that emit `python foo.py`.
-- `guides/BOOTSTRAP.md` and `packages/mosaic/framework/guides/BOOTSTRAP.md` are the source and packaged framework copies of the bootstrap guide.
-- Targeted repo sweep found no agent-host Debian package provisioning script. Existing `apt-get install` hits are CI/test helper paths or unrelated deployment docs.
-
-## Plan
-
-1. Add a host prerequisite section to both bootstrap guide copies.
-2. Include `python-is-python3` in the Debian/Ubuntu package list with an issue comment.
-3. Note the non-Debian equivalent as a `/usr/bin/python -> python3` symlink.
-4. Validate markdown/diff, run shell syntax checks where applicable, run required review, commit, queue guard, and push.
-
-## Validation Log
-
-- `rg` recon: no existing agent-host Debian package provisioning script; only CI/test helper `apt-get install` paths and unrelated deployment docs.
-- `git diff --check`: passed.
-- `bash -n packages/mosaic/framework/install.sh tools/install.sh packages/mosaic/framework/tools/bootstrap/init-project.sh packages/mosaic/framework/tools/_scripts/mosaic-bootstrap-repo`: passed. No touched shell scripts.
-- `~/.config/mosaic/tools/codex/codex-code-review.sh --uncommitted`: approved, 0 findings.
-- `pnpm format:check`: initially blocked because `node_modules` was absent and `prettier` was unavailable; `pnpm install --frozen-lockfile` initially hit an invalid `/root` pnpm store path. Reran install with `--store-dir /home/hermes/agent-work/.pnpm-store`, then `pnpm format:check` passed.

docs/scratchpads/672-fleet-personas-timeout.md

@@ -1,25 +0,0 @@
-# Scratchpad — fleet-personas spec timeout
-
-## Objective
-
-Raise the `@mosaicstack/mosaic` Vitest timeout to 30s at config level so filesystem-backed fleet drift-guard specs (`fleet-personas`, `fleet-profiles`, and siblings) stop false-reding under contended CI.
-
-## Plan
-
-1. Move timeout policy into `packages/mosaic/vitest.config.ts` with `testTimeout: 30_000`.
-2. Remove the narrower `fleet-personas.spec.ts` local override so PR #677 fixes the suite class, not one file.
-3. Run targeted fleet specs plus typecheck/lint/format gates.
-4. Commit, queue guard, push, PR update.
-
-## Evidence
-
-- `pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/mosaic test -- src/commands/fleet-personas.spec.ts` — pass (8 tests; initial narrow fix).
-- `pnpm typecheck` — pass (41 tasks; initial narrow fix).
-- `pnpm lint` — pass (23 tasks; initial narrow fix).
-- `pnpm format:check` — pass after formatting this scratchpad (initial narrow fix).
-- Package-wide timeout follow-up:
-  - `pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/mosaic test -- src/commands/fleet-personas.spec.ts src/commands/fleet-profiles.spec.ts` — pass (24 tests).
-  - `pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/mosaic test` — pass (44 files / 618 tests).
-  - `pnpm typecheck` — pass (41 tasks).
-  - `pnpm lint` — pass (23 tasks).
-  - `pnpm format:check` — pass.

docs/scratchpads/703-wrapper-interactive-auth.md

@@ -1,49 +0,0 @@
-# #703 Git Wrapper Interactive and Auth Resilience
-
-## Objective
-
-Restore the deployed Git wrapper contract: issue-create supports interactive invocation and Gitea mutation behavior tolerates a stale Tea authenticated user by validating current identity and using the existing host-scoped API fallback.
-
-## Scope
-
-- `packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/issue-create.sh`
-- `packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/detect-platform.sh`
-- Git wrapper regression harnesses
-- This scratchpad
-
-## Requirements / acceptance evidence
-
-1. `issue-create -i` and `--interactive` prompt for missing issue fields without exposing credentials.
-2. Explicit command-line fields retain precedence and do not trigger prompt input.
-3. Gitea wrapper resolves the current user dynamically from the target host and does not rely on the saved Tea user identity.
-4. A Tea `GetUserByName` failure falls back to authenticated API creation.
-5. Existing body-safety, login-resolution, issue-create, and pr-create paths remain green.
-6. Source framework is re-seeded to deployed `~/.config/mosaic`, then deployed wrappers are verified end to end.
-
-## Plan
-
-1. Add failing shell regression harness for interactive input and stale Tea user fallback.
-2. Implement minimal helper and parser changes.
-3. Run wrapper harnesses, syntax checks, and repository baseline checks.
-4. Re-seed deployed framework and run live wrapper verification.
-5. Commit, queue guard, push, open PR, and stop for independent review.
-
-## Progress
-
-- Issue #703 filed before code; issue comment records #536 root cause and stale-login trigger.
-- Deployed wrapper `issue-create.sh -i` reproduced: `Unknown option: -i` (exit 1).
-- Live Tea mutation did not reproduce `GetUserByName` on this host because the current mosaicstack Tea login is valid. The test harness models the reported stale authenticated-user condition.
-- Implemented `-i` / `--interactive` prompt collection and a dynamic Tea `/user` validation. A stale Tea identity now selects the existing host-scoped Gitea API fallback before mutation for both issue and PR creation.
-- Re-seeded the framework with `MOSAIC_INSTALL_MODE=keep MOSAIC_SYNC_ONLY=1 bash packages/mosaic/framework/install.sh`. Installed and source wrapper SHA-256 values matched.
-- Live deployed verification: interactive issue-create opened then closed #704; installed dynamic identity resolved `jason.woltje`.
-
-## Verification
-
-- PASS: `packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/test-issue-create-interactive-auth.sh`
-- PASS: `packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/test-issue-create-body-safety.sh`
-- PASS: `packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/test-gitea-login-resolution.sh`
-- PASS: `packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/test-pr-metadata-gitea.sh`
-- PASS: `packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/test-pr-merge-gitea-empty-uid.sh`
-- PASS: `bash packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/test-lane-brief-pr-linkage.sh`
-- PASS: `bash -n packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/*.sh`
-- PASS: Prettier check for this scratchpad

docs/scratchpads/FED-M3-05-list-verb.md

@@ -1,52 +0,0 @@
-# FED-M3-05 — Federation List Verb Scratchpad
-
-## Objective
-
-Implement `POST /api/federation/v1/list/:resource`.
-
-## Scope
-
-- Wire `FederationAuthGuard` → `FederationScopeService` → read-only list query layer.
-- Apply `max_rows_per_query` row cap and return pagination metadata when truncated.
-- Tag returned rows with `_source: "local"`.
-- Keep audit writes deferred to M4.
-- No request/response body persistence.
-
-## Base / branch
-
-- Branch: `feat/federation-m3-verb-list`
-- Base: `main` after M3-04 scope service merged via PR #672 (`c739256a`).
-
-## Implementation notes
-
-- Added `ListController` under `apps/gateway/src/federation/server/verbs/`.
-- Added `FederationListQueryService` as the read-only query layer and native RBAC evaluator.
-- Query resources supported in M3 list path:
-  - `tasks`: project/mission scoped tasks visible through personal/team project access.
-  - `notes`: non-empty `mission_tasks.notes` rows visible through personal/team mission access.
-  - `memory`: user-owned `insights` and `preferences` rows.
-  - `credentials` / `api_keys`: denied by native RBAC in M3 even if present in scope; sensitive-resource implementation is not part of FED-M3-05.
-- Cursor pagination uses an opaque base64url keyset cursor over `(createdAt, id)`; DB reads fetch at most `limit + 1` rows per resource query.
-- Reviewer isolation fix: `mission_tasks.notes` rows are always constrained by `missionTasks.userId = subjectUserId` and accessible mission IDs; team scope narrows missions but never widens to other users' mission task notes.
-- Follow-up review fix: memory listing now uses deterministic table-block pagination (`insights` first, then `preferences`) with cursor source metadata, so one table's cursor is never applied to the other.
-- Follow-up hardening: missing auth-guard context returns a structured federation `unauthorized` envelope; unsupported resources and non-encodable truncated cursors throw instead of silently crashing/truncating.
-
-## Tests
-
-- `pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/gateway test -- list.controller.spec.ts list-query.service.spec.ts` — PASS (16 tests, including PGlite regression coverage for team-scoped notes isolation, unauthorized mission notes exclusion, `includePersonal: false`, deterministic memory pagination, missing context envelope, unsupported resource, and cursor encode failure).
-- `pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/gateway typecheck` — PASS.
-- `pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/gateway lint` — PASS.
-- `pnpm format:check` — PASS.
-- `pnpm typecheck` — PASS (41/41 turbo tasks).
-- `pnpm lint` — PASS (23/23 turbo tasks).
-- `pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/gateway test` — FAIL in pre-existing/live-DB integration suite: `apps/gateway/src/__tests__/cross-user-isolation.test.ts` cleanup cannot connect to local PostgreSQL on `localhost:5433`. New list tests pass; failure is outside FED-M3-05.
-
-## Review evidence
-
-- `~/.config/mosaic/tools/codex/codex-code-review.sh --uncommitted` — PASS after follow-up remediation; approve, no findings.
-- `~/.config/mosaic/tools/codex/codex-security-review.sh --uncommitted` — PASS after follow-up remediation; risk level none, no findings.
-- Security-review note: read-path audit logging remains intentionally deferred to M4 per orchestrator clarification and FED-M3-05 scope.
-
-## Risks / follow-up
-
-- Read-path audit logging remains intentionally deferred to M4.

docs/scratchpads/FED-M3-07-capabilities.md

@@ -1,65 +0,0 @@
-# FED-M3-07 — Capabilities Verb Scratchpad
-
-## Objective
-
-Implement `GET /api/federation/v1/capabilities` in `apps/gateway/src/federation/server/verbs/capabilities.controller.ts`.
-
-## Scope
-
-- Add read-only capabilities controller under federation server verbs.
-- Use `FederationAuthGuard` only; active grant is sufficient and no native RBAC/scope-service eval runs.
-- Response shape: `{ resources, excluded_resources, max_rows_per_query, supported_verbs }` derived from grant scope.
-- Register controller in `FederationModule`.
-- Unit-test happy path, defaults, no-context guard seam, and invalid scope handling.
-
-## Constraints / assumptions
-
-- Issue: #462.
-- Branch: `feat/federation-m3-verb-capabilities` from `origin/main` (`3eeed04e`).
-- Depends on M3-03 auth guard; guard attaches `request.federationContext.scope` after active-grant validation.
-- ASSUMPTION: `supported_verbs` is the M3 verb set from `@mosaicstack/types` (`list`, `get`, `capabilities`).
-- ASSUMPTION: `filters`/`rate_limit` are intentionally omitted for FED-M3-07 because the card’s response shape lists only the four required fields.
-- Budget: no explicit hard cap from orchestrator; working cap ~4K-8K tokens for card implementation + tests + PR cycle.
-
-## Plan
-
-1. Write controller unit tests first.
-2. Implement controller and module registration.
-3. Run scoped tests + typecheck/lint/format.
-4. Run Codex code/security review and remediate.
-5. Commit, queue guard, push, PR via wrapper.
-
-## Progress
-
-- 2026-06-24: Intake complete; fresh worktree created from origin/main.
-- 2026-06-24: Added `CapabilitiesController`, registered it in `FederationModule`, and added 5 unit tests.
-- 2026-06-24: Code/security reviews passed with no findings.
-
-## Tests run
-
-- `pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/gateway test -- capabilities.controller.spec.ts` — PASS (5 tests).
-- `pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/gateway typecheck` — PASS.
-- `pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/gateway lint` — PASS.
-- `pnpm format:check` — PASS.
-- `pnpm typecheck` — PASS (41/41 turbo tasks).
-- `pnpm lint` — PASS (23/23 turbo tasks).
-- `pnpm test` — FAIL in pre-existing/live-DB integration suite: `apps/gateway/src/__tests__/cross-user-isolation.test.ts` cleanup hit PostgreSQL connection/schema state for the `messages` table. Changed capabilities tests passed; failure is outside FED-M3-07 surface. No `fleet-personas.spec` flake encountered.
-
-## Review evidence
-
-- `~/.config/mosaic/tools/codex/codex-code-review.sh --uncommitted` — PASS/approve, no findings.
-- `~/.config/mosaic/tools/codex/codex-security-review.sh --uncommitted` — PASS, risk level none, no findings.
-
-## Risks / blockers
-
-- Full repo `pnpm test` may hit known `fleet-personas.spec` flake per orchestrator; ignore that specific flake if encountered.
-- Previous card saw local DB schema issue in `cross-user-isolation.test.ts`; scoped capabilities tests should be authoritative for this surface.
-
-## Acceptance evidence mapping
-
-| Acceptance criterion                                                       | Evidence                                                                                                                   |
-| -------------------------------------------------------------------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
-| GET `/api/federation/v1/capabilities` exists                               | Route metadata test in `capabilities.controller.spec.ts`; scoped test PASS                                                 |
-| Uses active-grant auth guard and no RBAC eval                              | Guard metadata test confirms only `FederationAuthGuard`; controller has no service injections/RBAC calls; scoped test PASS |
-| Response enumerates resources/excluded/max rows/supported verbs from scope | Happy-path/default scope tests + response schema parse; scoped test PASS                                                   |
-| Read-only/no persistence side effects                                      | Controller only parses request `federationContext.scope` and returns a DTO; no DB/service dependency; code review PASS     |

docs/scratchpads/FED-M3-09-query-source.md

@@ -1,67 +0,0 @@
-# FED-M3-09 — Query Source Service Scratchpad
-
-## Objective
-
-Implement `apps/gateway/src/federation/client/query-source.service.ts` for `source: "local" | "federated:<host>" | "all"` routing.
-
-## Scope
-
-- Add QuerySourceService in gateway federation client layer.
-- Unit-test local-only, single federated peer, all-source fan-out/merge, and per-peer partial failures.
-- Keep `docs/federation/TASKS.md` read-only per project agent guidance.
-
-## Constraints / assumptions
-
-- Issue: #462.
-- Branch: `feat/federation-m3-query-source` from `origin/main` (`e0e7be70`).
-- ASSUMPTION: `federated:<host>` should match active outbound peers by `commonName` first and by `endpointUrl` host/hostname as compatibility fallback; source tags use `peer.commonName` per `@mosaicstack/types` source-tag docs.
-- ASSUMPTION: QuerySourceService provides list/fan-out behavior; get/source routing can be layered later because card acceptance says merge rows.
-- ASSUMPTION: `source: "all"` cannot safely return a single continuation cursor for multiple sub-sources; any subquery cursor marks the merged response `_partial: true` + `_truncated: true` while omitting `nextCursor`.
-- Budget: no explicit hard cap from orchestrator; working cap ~8K-12K tokens for card 1 implementation + tests + PR cycle.
-- OpenBrain unavailable: credential loader failed with missing `/home/jarvis/.config/mosaic/credentials.json`; not blocking code delivery.
-
-## Plan
-
-1. Review federation client/types/db patterns.
-2. Write unit tests for source behavior.
-3. Implement QuerySourceService and export/register it in FederationModule.
-4. Run scoped tests, typecheck, lint, format.
-5. Run codex uncommitted review and remediate.
-6. Commit, queue guard, push, PR via wrapper.
-
-## Progress
-
-- 2026-06-24: Intake complete; using isolated worktree to avoid dirty orchestrator files in original checkout.
-- 2026-06-24: Added QuerySourceService, module export, barrel export, and 7 unit tests.
-- 2026-06-24: First Codex review found pagination and port-host matching issues; both remediated with tests.
-
-## Tests run
-
-- `pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/gateway test -- query-source.service.spec.ts` — PASS (7 tests).
-- `pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/gateway typecheck` — PASS.
-- `pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/gateway lint` — PASS.
-- `pnpm format:check` — PASS.
-- `pnpm typecheck` — PASS (41/41 turbo tasks).
-- `pnpm lint` — PASS (23/23 turbo tasks).
-- `pnpm test` — FAIL in pre-existing/live-DB integration suite: `apps/gateway/src/__tests__/cross-user-isolation.test.ts` cleanup hit `relation "messages" does not exist` against local PostgreSQL. Changed QuerySource unit tests passed; failure is outside FED-M3-09 surface and appears tied to local DB schema state.
-
-## Review evidence
-
-- `~/.config/mosaic/tools/codex/codex-code-review.sh --uncommitted` — first pass request-changes, 2 should-fix findings (all-source cursor handling; endpoint port host matching).
-- Remediation: `_partial` + `_truncated` when any all-source subquery has `nextCursor`; endpoint match accepts URL `host` and `hostname`; added tests for both.
-- `~/.config/mosaic/tools/codex/codex-code-review.sh --uncommitted` — PASS/approve, no findings.
-- `~/.config/mosaic/tools/codex/codex-security-review.sh --uncommitted` — PASS, risk level none, no findings.
-
-## Risks / blockers
-
-- Federation query layer is not yet wired; service API needs to be stable and easy to compose.
-- Must avoid hard-failing `source: all` on remote peer failures.
-
-## Acceptance evidence mapping
-
-| Acceptance criterion                                                            | Evidence                                                                          |
-| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
-| local source returns local rows tagged `_source: local`                         | `query-source.service.spec.ts` local test; scoped test PASS                       |
-| `federated:<host>` queries selected peer and tags rows with peer source         | `query-source.service.spec.ts` commonName/endpoint-host tests; scoped test PASS   |
-| `all` fans out local + active outbound peers in parallel and merges tagged rows | `query-source.service.spec.ts` all-source call-order/merge test; scoped test PASS |
-| per-peer failure on `all` returns `_partial: true`, not throw                   | `query-source.service.spec.ts` peer failure test; scoped test PASS                |

docs/scratchpads/tess-20260712.md

@@ -1,58 +0,0 @@
-# Scratchpad — Tess Interaction Agent
-
-## 2026-07-12 — Mission intake
-
-**Objective:** Build a Pi-native GPT-5.6 Sol high-reasoning Mosaic interaction agent, named Tess, as Jason's primary Discord/CLI access point for Mosaic fleet and transitional Hermes capabilities. Tess complements Mos and must not become a competing orchestrator.
-
-**Issue:** #706
-
-**Budget:** No explicit cap provided. Original working estimate was 290K implementation/review tokens. That estimate is superseded after six security prerequisite tasks were added; revised arithmetic total is pending because the calculation tool was blocked by runtime consent. Run at most two workers; prefer one implementation lane plus one independent review/discovery lane. Re-estimate after planning approval and each milestone.
-
-**Evidence gathered:**
-- Mosaic already provides Pi lifecycle hooks, fleet/tmux sessions, Matrix connector/controller pieces, typed chat events, Discord/Telegram channel plugins, and command/plugin registries.
-- Current `IProviderAdapter` is an LLM model/completion abstraction, not an external agent/session provider.
-- Required new seam is `AgentRuntimeProvider`: sessions, stream, message, terminate, hierarchy, attach, health, capabilities.
-- Recurring cross-runtime needs: unified memory/retrieval, Discord routing/approvals, agent state/inbox/compaction recovery, runtime bootstrap, fleet/incident controls, and GitOps workflow.
-- Project truth must remain in canonical project/Mosaic stores; semantic memory is retrieval/mirror.
-
-**Decisions:**
-1. Name: Tess (tessera). Stable machine key `tess`; display name configurable.
-2. Mos owns orchestration; Tess delegates Mos-owned work through an explicit coordination contract.
-3. Gateway owns ingress/auth/routing; Discord and CLI remain thin clients.
-4. tmux/fleet ships first behind an adapter; Matrix/native Mosaic is the forward transport.
-5. Hermes integration is transitional and capability-negotiated; unsupported operations fail closed.
-6. No unrestricted Discord shell. Privileged/destructive/customer-visible actions require authorization and approval.
-
-**Plan:**
-1. Land requirements/architecture/task graph.
-2. Deliver runtime contracts and security model.
-3. Deliver durable Pi service/state.
-4. Deliver Discord and CLI.
-5. Deliver fleet/Mos/Hermes/memory/tool plugins.
-6. Deliver Matrix/native transport, migration matrix, recovery, docs, and qualification.
-
-**Progress:** Issue #706 created. PRD/manifest/tasks initialized on clean branch `feat/tess-interaction-agent` from `origin/main`.
-
-**Risks:** 14 GB root filesystem headroom; active fleet lanes; broad migration scope; Discord privilege boundary; possible duplicate orchestration authority.
-
-## 2026-07-12 — Independent planning and threat review
-
-**Verdict received:** BLOCK TESS-PLAN-001. Coding remains stopped.
-
-**Blocking findings:** formal threat model absent; verification matrix absent; migration inventory implied but absent; non-existent task paths; AC-TESS-03 lacked a crisp test. Security review also identified command scope bypass, cross-tenant session attachment, MCP actor impersonation, unsafe Discord service ingress, pre-persistence/egress secret leakage, non-durable replay, and globally scoped GC.
-
-**Remediation applied:**
-- Added `docs/tess/ARCHITECTURE.md`.
-- Added `docs/tess/THREAT-MODEL.md` with TM-01..12.
-- Added `docs/tess/VERIFICATION-MATRIX.md` mapping AC-TESS-01..11.
-- Added `docs/tess/MIGRATION-INVENTORY.md`.
-- Added hard requirements TESS-SEC-002..009.
-- Added six prerequisite security tasks before provider/ingress implementation.
-- Corrected task paths to existing package surfaces.
-- Added explicit GPT-5.6 Sol/high/tool-policy status verification for AC-TESS-03.
-
-**Re-review 1:** BLOCK only on composite `repo` values that looked like nonexistent paths. Remediated by declaring comma-separated roots and validating every root.
-
-**Final focused review:** PASS. Deterministic audit validated all task repository roots with zero missing paths; no planning placeholders remained; security prerequisites still gate Tess exposure; observability traceability is explicit.
-
-**Current gate:** planning PR must merge to `main` with terminal-green CI before any source-code worker starts.

docs/scratchpads/tess-m1-sec-001.md

@@ -1,27 +0,0 @@
-# TESS-M1-SEC-001 — Command authorization and exact-action approval
-
-- Issue/milestone: #707 / M1
-- Branch: `fix/tess-command-authz`
-- Requirement: `TESS-SEC-002`, with approval binding controls from `TESS-SEC-007`
-- Scope: `apps/gateway` only, plus required in-repo security/developer documentation.
-
-## Plan
-
-1. Locate the gateway command executor, command metadata, authorization context, and existing test conventions.
-2. Write abuse/authz tests before production changes. Expected red cases: non-admin blocked from admin/system command; forged caller scope cannot authorize; privileged/destructive action requires durable exact-action approval; expired/replayed/mutated approvals deny.
-3. Implement server-derived role/scope enforcement and durable approval validation/consumption with audit results.
-4. Run focused security tests, then repository baseline gates: typecheck, lint, format-check, test.
-5. Run independent security/code review, commit, queue-guard, push, and open the PR to `main` through the stated Gitea API fallback. Stop after PR creation.
-
-## Assumptions
-
-- The existing gateway persistence interface is the available durable approval boundary. If no persistence abstraction exists, a minimal injectable repository interface will be introduced rather than an in-memory approval implementation, because TESS-SEC-002/007 require durable enforcement.
-- “Exact action” is a canonical digest over structured command identity and normalized arguments; role/scope checks always use authenticated server context, not client-declared claims.
-
-## TDD evidence
-
-- Pending: abuse/authz test written and observed red before implementation.
-
-## Verification evidence
-
-- Pending.

docs/tess/ARCHITECTURE.md

@@ -1,71 +0,0 @@
-# Tess Architecture
-
-## Purpose
-
-Tess is the Mosaic operator interaction plane. Mos remains the coding/general fleet orchestration authority. Tess receives authorized operator intent, presents fleet/session state, delegates Mos-owned work to Mos, and exposes native Mosaic plus transitional external-agent capabilities through normalized providers.
-
-## Component Boundaries
-
-```text
-Discord plugin ─┐
-                ├─ authenticated ingress envelope ─> Mosaic Gateway
-mosaic tess CLI ┘                                  │
-                                                   ├─ policy/approval/audit
-                                                   ├─ Tess durable session service (Pi GPT-5.6 Sol high)
-                                                   ├─ AgentRuntimeProvider registry
-                                                   │   ├─ native Pi provider
-                                                   │   ├─ fleet/tmux provider
-                                                   │   ├─ Hermes adapter
-                                                   │   └─ Matrix/native transport provider
-                                                   ├─ memory/state/inbox plugins
-                                                   └─ Mos coordination adapter ─> Mos / fleet queue
-```
-
-## Core Contract
-
-`AgentRuntimeProvider` is separate from the existing model-completion `IProviderAdapter`. It normalizes external and native agent runtimes without leaking provider-specific schemas.
-
-Required operations:
-
-- `capabilities()` and `health()`
-- `listSessions(scope)`
-- `getSessionTree(scope)`
-- `streamSession(sessionRef, cursor, scope)`
-- `sendMessage(sessionRef, message, idempotencyKey, scope)`
-- `attach(sessionRef, mode, scope)` / `detach()`
-- `terminate(sessionRef, approvalRef, scope)`
-
-Every call receives an immutable, server-derived actor/tenant/channel scope and correlation ID. Caller-supplied actor IDs are forbidden. Unsupported capabilities fail closed with typed errors.
-
-## Authority Model
-
-| Intent                                                                      | Owner                   | Tess behavior                                                          |
-| --------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ----------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------- |
-| Conversation, status, retrieval, safe diagnostics                           | Tess                    | Execute within policy                                                  |
-| Code/project decomposition, worker assignment, reviews, merge orchestration | Mos                     | Create a correlated handoff and observe result                         |
-| Destructive, privileged, external/customer-visible action                   | Human approval + policy | Propose, wait for durable one-time approval, then execute idempotently |
-| Provider-specific unsupported action                                        | None                    | Fail closed; never emulate silently                                    |
-
-## Session and State Model
-
-A Tess session has stable `sessionId`, `tenantId`, `ownerId`, provider/runtime identity, ingress bindings, cursor, checkpoint, inbox/outbox, and idempotency records. Discord and CLI bind to the same authorized session. Ownership is verified server-side on every list/read/attach/send/terminate operation.
-
-Valkey may hold ephemeral coordination state; PostgreSQL is canonical for durable session bindings, approvals, audit, checkpoints, inbox/outbox, and idempotency. Pi session files are replay sources, not cross-agent truth.
-
-## Transport Strategy
-
-- **Initial:** fleet/tmux provider, including exact target, socket, identity, heartbeat, and safe attach semantics.
-- **Forward:** Matrix/native Mosaic provider using authenticated identity, idempotent transaction IDs, replay cursors, and the same contract suite.
-- Discord/CLI never call tmux or Matrix directly.
-
-## Plugin Families
-
-1. Channel: Discord now; other channels later.
-2. Runtime: Pi, fleet/tmux, Hermes, Matrix/native.
-3. Operator tools: fleet health, Mos handoff, GitOps wrappers, incident-safe diagnostics.
-4. Memory/state: search/recent/capture, durable inbox, checkpoint, handoff, compaction recovery.
-5. Migration: capability inventory, adapters, cutover, rollback, telemetry.
-
-## Deployment
-
-Tess runs as a rostered, systemd-supervised Pi agent using GPT-5.6 Sol and high reasoning. Secrets are supplied through approved runtime secret mechanisms. Startup fails when required model, gateway identity, Discord binding, or durable-state dependencies are missing. Health reports effective model/reasoning/tool policy without credential material.

docs/tess/MIGRATION-INVENTORY.md

@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
-# Tess Capability Migration Inventory
-
-Status values: `native` · `adapt` · `defer` · `reject`. This is the initial inventory; M5 requires implementation and evidence fields to be completed before cutover.
-
-| Capability                               | Current source                           | Target                                     | Initial status | Cutover/rollback intent                                                 |
-| ---------------------------------------- | ---------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------ | -------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------- |
-| Interactive agent chat/session streaming | Hermes/Pi/OpenClaw                       | Mosaic Tess session service                | native         | Dual-run per channel; revert binding to legacy gateway                  |
-| Discord dedicated-channel routing        | Hermes/Claude/OpenClaw plugins           | Mosaic Discord plugin + gateway            | native         | Per-channel binding switch; legacy bot disabled only after soak         |
-| CLI/TUI session interaction and attach   | Hermes/Pi/tmux                           | `mosaic tess` + AgentRuntimeProvider       | native         | Keep direct tmux attach as break-glass rollback                         |
-| Session list/tree/send/terminate         | Hermes/fleet                             | AgentRuntimeProvider                       | native         | Capability-negotiated adapter remains during migration                  |
-| Mos/fleet orchestration handoff          | tmux messaging/Mosaic fleet              | Mosaic coord/fleet provider                | native         | tmux handoff remains initial transport                                  |
-| Kanban/projects/tasks                    | Hermes Kanban                            | Mosaic queue/coord/project providers       | adapt          | Read projection first; mutating cutover after parity/audit              |
-| Skills catalog/load/manage               | Hermes skills/Pi skills                  | Mosaic skill registry/provider             | adapt          | Import metadata/provenance; preserve source skill until validated       |
-| Tools and MCP                            | Hermes/OpenClaw/MCP                      | Mosaic tool registry/MCP                   | adapt          | Default deny; migrate allowlisted tools one capability at a time        |
-| Cron/scheduled work                      | Hermes cron                              | Mosaic scheduler/queue                     | adapt          | Shadow schedules; prevent duplicate execution; rollback owner field     |
-| Memory search/recent/capture             | jarvis-brain/OpenViking/OpenBrain/Hermes | Mosaic memory provider                     | adapt          | Flat/project stores remain truth; semantic systems are mirrors          |
-| User/profile preferences                 | Hermes memory/user profile               | Mosaic user/memory domain                  | adapt          | Provenance + explicit conflict rules; exportable rollback snapshot      |
-| Agent state/inbox/handoff                | OpenClaw extensions/session files        | Mosaic durable state service               | native         | Read legacy handoff during coexistence; write Mosaic only after cutover |
-| Runtime contract/bootstrap               | Mosaic framework/Hermes/OpenClaw         | Mosaic compose/runtime provider            | native         | Legacy launchers remain until clean-host parity passes                  |
-| Repository/PR workflow                   | Mosaic wrappers/Hermes tools             | Mosaic operator plugin                     | native         | Wrapper-only; no raw-provider fallback                                  |
-| Incident-safe diagnostics                | Hermes skills/tools                      | Mosaic scoped operator plugin              | adapt          | Read-only first; privileged recovery requires approval                  |
-| Broad unrestricted shell from Discord    | Hermes/OpenClaw configurations           | None                                       | reject         | No cutover; replace with allowlisted typed operations                   |
-| Raw full transcript bulk migration       | Hermes/Claude/OpenClaw histories         | Indexed summaries/selective import         | reject         | Keep source archives subject to retention; no automatic copy            |
-| Voice/video interaction                  | Hermes optional tools                    | Future Mosaic channel plugins              | defer          | Not required for Tess operational release                               |
-| Matrix transport                         | Mosaic connector                         | AgentRuntimeProvider Matrix implementation | native         | Non-default until contract/reliability parity; tmux rollback            |
-
-## Cutover Gates
-
-1. Capability contract and security tests pass.
-2. Data mapping/provenance and retention are documented.
-3. Shadow or dual-run shows no unauthorized access, loss, or duplicate effects.
-4. Operator runbook and rollback are exercised.
-5. Channel/provider binding changes are reversible without schema rollback.
-6. Legacy capability is disabled only after a defined soak period and evidence review.

docs/tess/MISSION-MANIFEST.md

@@ -1,46 +0,0 @@
-# Mission Manifest — Tess Interaction Agent
-
-## Mission
-
-- **ID:** tess-20260712
-- **Issue:** #706
-- **Branch:** `feat/tess-interaction-agent`
-- **Phase:** Execution
-- **Current Milestone:** TESS-M1 — Runtime contracts and security foundation
-- **Progress:** 0 / 5 delivery milestones complete
-- **Status:** active
-- **Owner:** Mosaic orchestrator; Mos is coordinating fleet authority
-- **Source PRD:** `docs/PRD.md` — `TESS-*` requirements
-- **Scratchpad:** `docs/scratchpads/tess-20260712.md`
-
-## Mission Statement
-
-Ship Tess as Jason's durable Pi-native GPT-5.6 Sol high-reasoning interaction agent for Discord and CLI, with safe visibility/control of Mosaic fleet and transitional Hermes capabilities, while Mos remains the coding/general orchestration authority.
-
-## Invariants
-
-1. Mosaic is the enterprise AI hub; Hermes is a reference migration adapter.
-2. Gateway is the single API surface.
-3. Mos owns coding/general fleet orchestration; Tess owns human interaction, visibility, mediation, and migration access.
-4. Runtime, transport, channel, memory, and external-agent integrations are replaceable adapters.
-5. No source task completes before merged PR, terminal-green CI, independent review, and linked task/issue closure.
-
-## Milestones
-
-| ID      | Issue | Name                                                                | Status      | Exit gate                                                                                                         |
-| ------- | ----- | ------------------------------------------------------------------- | ----------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
-| TESS-M1 | #707  | Runtime contracts and security foundation                           | ready       | AgentRuntimeProvider, normalized events/capabilities/errors, RBAC/audit contracts and contract tests merged       |
-| TESS-M2 | #708  | Durable Pi Tess service and state                                   | not-started | GPT-5.6 Sol high service starts, resumes, checkpoints, and passes restart/compaction tests                        |
-| TESS-M3 | #709  | Discord and CLI interaction surfaces                                | not-started | One durable session works through dedicated Discord binding and `mosaic tess`, including attach and approvals     |
-| TESS-M4 | #710  | Fleet, Mos, Hermes, memory, state, and tool plugins                 | not-started | Fleet/Mos boundary and transitional capability matrix demonstrated end-to-end                                     |
-| TESS-M5 | #711  | Matrix/native migration, recovery, documentation, and qualification | not-started | Transport parity, migration/rollback matrix, security review, docs, greenfield and deployment validation complete |
-
-## Success Criteria
-
-All `AC-TESS-*` criteria in `docs/PRD.md` are mapped to reproducible evidence. The final operational test must prove Discord + CLI session continuity, fleet/Mos coordination, authorized Hermes transition capabilities, denial/audit paths, restart recovery, and rollback.
-
-## Session History
-
-| Session | Date       | Runtime              | Outcome                                                                                                                                     |
-| ------- | ---------- | -------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
-| S1      | 2026-07-12 | Hermes / GPT-5.6 Sol | User commission captured; Mosaic/OpenViking/session/code archaeology completed; issue #706 created; PRD and task control plane initialized. |

docs/tess/TASKS.md

@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
-# Tasks — Tess Interaction Agent
-
-> Mission: `tess-20260712` · Issue: #706 · PRD requirements: `TESS-*`
-> Orchestrator is sole writer. Workers must not modify this file.
-> `repo` contains one or more comma-separated repository-relative roots; every listed root must exist before dispatch.
-
-| id | status | description | issue | agent | repo | branch | depends_on | estimate | notes |
-| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
-| TESS-PLAN-001 | done | Finalize PRD, architecture, authority boundary, threat model, migration inventory, and verification matrix | #706 | sonnet | docs, packages/types, apps/gateway | feat/tess-interaction-agent | — | 22K | Independent gate PASS after two remediation rounds; completion effective when planning PR merges |
-| TESS-M1-SEC-001 | not-started | Enforce command scopes/roles and durable exact-action approval for privileged/destructive commands | #707 | codex | apps/gateway | fix/tess-command-authz | TESS-PLAN-001 | 25K | TESS-SEC-002; security TDD |
-| TESS-M1-SEC-002 | not-started | Enforce owner/tenant binding on session list/read/attach/send/terminate across REST and WS | #707 | codex | apps/gateway | fix/tess-session-ownership | TESS-PLAN-001 | 30K | TESS-SEC-003; security TDD |
-| TESS-M1-SEC-003 | not-started | Bind MCP actor/tenant to authenticated context and add per-tool scopes | #707 | codex | apps/gateway | fix/tess-mcp-identity | TESS-PLAN-001 | 22K | TESS-SEC-004; security TDD |
-| TESS-M1-SEC-004 | not-started | Add authenticated Discord service ingress, allowlists, correlation and replay protection | #707 | codex | plugins/discord, apps/gateway | fix/tess-discord-ingress | TESS-PLAN-001 | 28K | TESS-SEC-005; security TDD |
-| TESS-M1-SEC-005 | not-started | Redact/classify secret and PII before persistence/egress; harden provider login flow | #707 | codex | apps/gateway, packages/log | fix/tess-redaction | TESS-PLAN-001 | 28K | TESS-SEC-006; seeded canary tests |
-| TESS-M1-SEC-006 | not-started | Scope session GC/retention or separate authorized global retention job | #707 | codex | apps/gateway, packages/log | fix/tess-session-gc-scope | TESS-PLAN-001 | 18K | TESS-SEC-009; isolation TDD |
-| TESS-M1-001 | not-started | Define AgentRuntimeProvider, capabilities, session tree, normalized stream events/errors, attach semantics | #707 | codex | packages/types, packages/agent | feat/tess-runtime-contract | TESS-PLAN-001 | 25K | TESS-ARP-001, TESS-TRN-001; contract TDD |
-| TESS-M1-002 | not-started | Implement provider registry/service with immutable actor scope, approval, audit and correlation boundaries | #707 | codex | apps/gateway, packages/agent | feat/tess-provider-registry | TESS-M1-001,TESS-M1-SEC-001,TESS-M1-SEC-002,TESS-M1-SEC-003 | 30K | TESS-SEC-001..004,007; security TDD |
-| TESS-M1-003 | not-started | Implement tmux/fleet runtime provider and safe attach/message/terminate capability policy | #707 | codex | packages/mosaic, packages/agent | feat/tess-fleet-provider | TESS-M1-002 | 30K | TESS-FLT-001; exact target/identity tests |
-| TESS-M1-OBS-001 | not-started | Implement correlation propagation, structured runtime/provider/tool audit, health/readiness and safe effective-policy status | #707 | codex | apps/gateway, packages/agent, packages/log | feat/tess-observability | TESS-M1-002 | 24K | TESS-OBS-001; no credential material |
-| TESS-M1-V | not-started | Independent architecture/security review and complete contract/abuse-suite verification | #707 | sonnet | apps/gateway, packages/agent, packages/log, plugins/discord | review/tess-m1 | TESS-M1-SEC-001,TESS-M1-SEC-002,TESS-M1-SEC-003,TESS-M1-SEC-004,TESS-M1-SEC-005,TESS-M1-SEC-006,TESS-M1-003,TESS-M1-OBS-001 | 20K | Gate M2 |
-| TESS-M2-001 | not-started | Add Tess roster/profile/service pinned to GPT-5.6 Sol high with fail-fast config and observable effective policy | #708 | codex | packages/mosaic/framework | feat/tess-pi-service | TESS-M1-V | 22K | TESS-PI-001; explicit AC-TESS-03 test |
-| TESS-M2-002 | not-started | Implement durable session identity, inbox/outbox, approval, checkpoint, handoff, compaction and restart recovery | #708 | codex | apps/gateway, packages/agent, packages/db | feat/tess-durable-state | TESS-M2-001 | 38K | TESS-STA-001, TESS-SEC-007..008; recovery TDD |
-| TESS-M2-V | not-started | Clean-host Pi launch plus model/policy status and restart/compaction/duplicate-side-effect verification | #708 | sonnet | apps/gateway/src/__tests__/integration, packages/mosaic/src | review/tess-m2 | TESS-M2-002 | 18K | Gate M3; AC-TESS-03/06 |
-| TESS-M3-001 | not-started | Bind dedicated Tess Discord channel with streaming, threads, attachments, pairing/RBAC and approvals | #709 | codex | plugins/discord, apps/gateway | feat/tess-discord | TESS-M2-V,TESS-M1-SEC-004 | 35K | TESS-DSC-001 |
-| TESS-M3-002 | not-started | Implement `mosaic tess` chat/status/sessions/tree/attach/send/stop/health/recover CLI | #709 | codex | packages/mosaic | feat/tess-cli | TESS-M2-V | 30K | TESS-CLI-001 |
-| TESS-M3-V | not-started | Discord+CLI same-session E2E, denial/approval tests, and operator-flow review | #709 | sonnet | apps/gateway/src/__tests__/integration, plugins/discord, packages/mosaic/src | review/tess-m3 | TESS-M3-001,TESS-M3-002 | 20K | Gate M4 |
-| TESS-M4-001 | not-started | Implement Mos coordination handoff/observe/result contract with authority-boundary tests | #710 | codex | packages/coord, apps/gateway | feat/tess-mos-coordination | TESS-M3-V | 25K | TESS-MOS-001 |
-| TESS-M4-002 | not-started | Implement transitional Hermes runtime/capability adapter | #710 | codex | packages/agent, apps/gateway | feat/tess-hermes-adapter | TESS-M3-V | 40K | TESS-HRM-001; no legacy schema in core contracts |
-| TESS-M4-003 | not-started | Implement memory/retrieval, state/inbox, runtime bootstrap, fleet diagnostics and GitOps plugin foundations | #710 | codex | packages/memory, packages/agent, packages/mosaic | feat/tess-operator-plugins | TESS-M3-V | 40K | TESS-MEM-001, TESS-PLG-001 |
-| TESS-M4-V | not-started | Cross-provider capability, privacy, authority and failure-path qualification | #710 | sonnet | apps/gateway/src/__tests__/integration, packages/agent | review/tess-m4 | TESS-M4-001,TESS-M4-002,TESS-M4-003 | 22K | Gate M5 |
-| TESS-M5-001 | not-started | Implement Matrix/native runtime provider behind common contracts and parity suite | #711 | codex | packages/mosaic, packages/agent | feat/tess-matrix-provider | TESS-M4-V | 30K | TESS-TRN-001 |
-| TESS-M5-002 | not-started | Complete migration inventory, cutover, rollback, retention and deprecation evidence | #711 | sonnet | docs/tess | feat/tess-migration-docs | TESS-M4-V | 18K | TESS-MIG-001 |
-| TESS-M5-003 | not-started | Complete OpenAPI, user/admin/developer/plugin/operations docs and checklist | #711 | codex | docs | feat/tess-docs | TESS-M5-001,TESS-M5-002 | 22K | Documentation hard gate |
-| TESS-M5-V | not-started | Full baseline, contract, integration, Discord/CLI E2E, security review, recovery drill and rollback qualification | #711 | sonnet | apps/gateway, packages/agent, plugins/discord, packages/mosaic | review/tess-final | TESS-M5-003 | 35K | Maps AC-TESS-01..11 to evidence |

docs/tess/THREAT-MODEL.md

@@ -1,46 +0,0 @@
-# Tess Threat Model
-
-## Assets and Trust Boundaries
-
-Assets: operator identity, tenant/project data, agent sessions, fleet control, approvals, credentials, memories, tool outputs, audit evidence, and provider transports.
-
-Trust boundaries: Discord→plugin, CLI→gateway, plugin→gateway service identity, gateway→Pi/provider, Tess→Mos/fleet, Tess→Hermes, MCP→gateway, persistence, and tmux/Matrix transports.
-
-## Threat Matrix
-
-| ID    | Severity | Threat                                                                   | Required control                                                                                                                     | Required verification                                                     |
-| ----- | -------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------ | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | ------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
-| TM-01 | critical | Client invokes admin/system command without role                         | Server-side scope/role enforcement in executor; durable approval for privileged/destructive commands                                 | Authenticated non-admin and forged-scope tests deny and audit             |
-| TM-02 | critical | Cross-user/tenant list, attach, send, or terminate by guessed session ID | Owner/tenant binding on every session operation; admin override is explicit and audited                                              | Cross-tenant matrix for REST, WS, CLI, Discord and provider methods       |
-| TM-03 | high     | MCP caller supplies another `userId`                                     | Remove actor IDs from schemas; derive actor/tenant from authenticated context; per-tool scopes                                       | Forged actor/tool calls deny; no victim data returned                     |
-| TM-04 | high     | Discord ingress impersonates user/channel or bypasses gateway auth       | Service-to-service identity, guild/channel/user allowlists, signed/correlated envelope, replay protection                            | Invalid service identity, unlisted IDs, replayed message IDs all deny     |
-| TM-05 | high     | Secrets/PII leak in chat, auth links, tool args, logs, memory, or DB     | Redact before persistence/egress; DM/out-of-band auth flow; short-lived hashed token state; output classification                    | Seeded secret/PII canary absent from durable stores/logs/public channel   |
-| TM-06 | high     | Prompt/tool injection escalates from content to privileged action        | Treat messages/files/tool output as untrusted data; structured proposals only; allowlisted tools; approval binds exact action digest | Injection corpus cannot invoke unapproved tools or alter authority        |
-| TM-07 | high     | Approval forged, replayed, or applied to modified action                 | One-time approval with actor, tenant, action digest, expiry, correlation and consumption record                                      | Forged/replayed/expired/mutated approvals deny and audit                  |
-| TM-08 | medium   | Restart causes message loss or duplicate side effects                    | Durable inbox/outbox/checkpoint; idempotency keys; transactional state transitions; bounded replay                                   | Kill/restart at each state transition; exactly-once effect or safe dedupe |
-| TM-09 | medium   | Session GC/retention crosses tenant/session scope                        | Session/user-scoped GC or separately authorized global retention job                                                                 | GC one session; unrelated logs/memory remain unchanged                    |
-| TM-10 | high     | tmux/Matrix transport target or identity spoofing                        | Exact target/socket binding, peer identity verification, Matrix whoami, authenticated transport metadata                             | Wrong socket/peer/room/identity refuses delivery/attach                   |
-| TM-11 | medium   | Hermes adapter exposes unsupported or broader legacy powers              | Capability negotiation, default deny, normalized scopes, adapter sandbox/timeouts                                                    | Unsupported and over-scoped operations fail closed                        |
-| TM-12 | medium   | Tess competes with Mos or bypasses orchestration gates                   | Authority policy and correlated Mos handoff; no Tess worker-claim capability by default                                              | Coding/decomposition intent produces handoff, not direct claim            |
-
-## Security Invariants
-
-1. Authentication is not authorization; every command/tool/provider operation is authorized server-side.
-2. Actor, tenant, roles, and channel bindings come only from authenticated gateway context.
-3. No client-provided session ID grants ownership or attachment.
-4. No privileged action executes without a matching, unexpired, one-time approval when policy requires it.
-5. Redaction occurs before persistence and before channel egress.
-6. Every externally caused operation is replay-safe and correlated.
-7. Provider capability absence is a denial, not an invitation to shell around it.
-
-## Existing Findings That Block Tess
-
-- Command executor lacks server-side enforcement for declared scopes.
-- Session list/reuse/destroy surfaces are not owner-filtered consistently.
-- MCP schemas accept caller-supplied user identity.
-- Discord plugin lacks a complete authenticated service ingress and user/channel allowlists.
-- Chat/tool persistence lacks mandatory redaction.
-- Sessions/pending Discord output are in-memory and not restart-safe.
-- Session GC currently performs globally scoped promotion.
-
-These are tracked as M1 security prerequisites and must pass independent security review before Tess ingress is enabled.

docs/tess/VERIFICATION-MATRIX.md

@@ -1,30 +0,0 @@
-# Tess Verification Matrix
-
-| Acceptance criterion | Requirements                             | Planned evidence                                                                                                                | Gate             |
-| -------------------- | ---------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ---------------- |
-| AC-TESS-01           | TESS-PI-001, TESS-DSC-001, TESS-CLI-001  | Discord/CLI same-session integration and streaming E2E                                                                          | M3-V             |
-| AC-TESS-02           | TESS-ARP-001, TESS-CLI-001, TESS-FLT-001 | CLI contract tests for status/sessions/tree/attach/send/stop, typed denial/error snapshots                                      | M3-V             |
-| AC-TESS-03           | TESS-PI-001, TESS-OBS-001                | Clean service launch; status asserts GPT-5.6 Sol, high reasoning and effective tool policy with secret canaries absent          | M2-V, M3-V       |
-| AC-TESS-04           | TESS-MOS-001, TESS-FLT-001               | Authority E2E: coding request creates Mos handoff; safe status runs in Tess; no competing worker claim                          | M4-V             |
-| AC-TESS-05           | TESS-HRM-001                             | Hermes capability contract suite: sessions/stream/send/tree plus Kanban/skills/memory/tools/cron supported-or-denied matrix     | M4-V             |
-| AC-TESS-06           | TESS-STA-001, TESS-SEC-008               | Kill/restart/compaction fault injection across inbox/outbox/checkpoint transitions; duplicate side-effect detector              | M2-V, M5-V       |
-| AC-TESS-07           | TESS-SEC-001..009                        | Threat-model abuse suite: authz, tenant isolation, forged identity/approval, injection, redaction, transport identity, GC scope | M1-V, M3-V, M5-V |
-| AC-TESS-08           | TESS-TRN-001                             | Common provider contract suite against tmux/fleet and Matrix/native; identity and replay tests                                  | M5-V             |
-| AC-TESS-09           | all                                      | `pnpm typecheck`, lint, format, unit/integration/contract/E2E; independent code and security reviews; CI URLs                   | Every milestone  |
-| AC-TESS-10           | TESS-MIG-001                             | Completed capability inventory with native/adapted/deferred/rejected state, owner, cutover/rollback evidence                    | M5-V             |
-| AC-TESS-11           | TESS-PLG-001, TESS-OBS-001               | OpenAPI and user/admin/developer/plugin/ops docs, sitemap links, documentation checklist                                        | M5-V             |
-
-## Security Abuse Suite Minimum
-
-- Role/scope matrix for every command and provider capability.
-- Cross-tenant and cross-user session ID matrix across REST, WS, Discord, CLI, MCP, and providers.
-- Discord service identity, guild/channel/user allowlist, replay, attachment, and mention/DM policy cases.
-- Prompt/tool injection corpus and structured-proposal enforcement.
-- Approval action-digest mutation, replay, expiry, tenant, and actor mismatch cases.
-- Secret/PII canaries through message, attachment, tool args/output, logs, memory, audit, and error paths.
-- Restart fault injection before/after enqueue, provider send, side effect, response persistence, and acknowledgement.
-- Wrong tmux socket/target and Matrix identity/room/replay cases.
-
-## Evidence Rules
-
-Evidence must include command/test name, terminal result, CI run URL, PR/merge reference, environment, and artifact/log location. A worker self-report is not evidence until independently verified.

eslint.config.mjs

@@ -30,7 +30,6 @@ export default tseslint.config(
             'apps/gateway/vitest.config.ts',
             'packages/db/vitest.config.ts',
             'packages/storage/vitest.config.ts',
-            'packages/mosaic/vitest.config.ts',
             'packages/mosaic/__tests__/*.ts',
             'tools/federation-harness/*.ts',
           ],

guides/BOOTSTRAP.md

@@ -15,22 +15,6 @@ This guide covers how to bootstrap a project so AI agents (Claude, Codex, etc.)
 7. Branching/merging is consistent: `branch -> main` via PR with squash-only merges
 8. Steered-autonomy execution is enabled so agents can run end-to-end with escalation-only human intervention
 
-## Agent Host Prerequisites
-
-Agent hosts must provide the Python runtime shape that runtime agents and
-Mosaic automation assume is present.
-
-For Debian/Ubuntu hosts:
-
-```bash
-sudo apt-get update
-# #561: bare python invocations from agents must resolve.
-sudo apt-get install -y python3 python-is-python3
-```
-
-For non-Debian hosts, install the equivalent Python 3 runtime and ensure
-`/usr/bin/python` resolves to `python3` (for example, via a managed symlink).
-
 ## Quick Start
 
 ```bash

packages/mosaic/framework/guides/BOOTSTRAP.md

@@ -15,22 +15,6 @@ This guide covers how to bootstrap a project so AI agents (Claude, Codex, etc.)
 7. Branching/merging is consistent: `branch -> main` via PR with squash-only merges
 8. Steered-autonomy execution is enabled so agents can run end-to-end with escalation-only human intervention
 
-## Agent Host Prerequisites
-
-Agent hosts must provide the Python runtime shape that runtime agents and
-Mosaic automation assume is present.
-
-For Debian/Ubuntu hosts:
-
-```bash
-sudo apt-get update
-# #561: bare python invocations from agents must resolve.
-sudo apt-get install -y python3 python-is-python3
-```
-
-For non-Debian hosts, install the equivalent Python 3 runtime and ensure
-`/usr/bin/python` resolves to `python3` (for example, via a managed symlink).
-
 ## Quick Start
 
 ```bash

packages/mosaic/framework/tools/_lib/credentials.sh

@@ -15,23 +15,13 @@
 #
 # After loading, service-specific env vars are exported.
 # Run `load_credentials --help` for details.
-#
-# Resolution order (first match wins):
-#   1. $MOSAIC_CREDENTIALS_FILE (explicit override — never second-guessed)
-#   2. $HOME/.config/mosaic/credentials.json
-#   3. /etc/mosaic/credentials.json (host-level fallback)
-# The /etc fallback exists for HOME-redirected profile environments, where
-# $HOME points at a per-profile directory that has no credentials file.
-# Operators symlink /etc/mosaic/credentials.json to the host's canonical
-# file once, instead of exporting MOSAIC_CREDENTIALS_FILE per invocation.
 
 if [[ -z "${MOSAIC_CREDENTIALS_FILE:-}" ]]; then
-  for _cand in "$HOME/.config/mosaic/credentials.json" "/etc/mosaic/credentials.json"; do
+  for _cand in "$HOME/.config/mosaic/credentials.json"; do
     if [[ -f "$_cand" ]]; then MOSAIC_CREDENTIALS_FILE="$_cand"; break; fi
   done
   : "${MOSAIC_CREDENTIALS_FILE:=$HOME/.config/mosaic/credentials.json}"
 fi
-export MOSAIC_CREDENTIALS_FILE
 
 _mosaic_require_jq() {
   if ! command -v jq &>/dev/null; then

packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/detect-platform.sh

@@ -86,16 +86,7 @@ gitea_url_matches_host() {
 
 get_gitea_service_for_host() {
     local host="$1"
-    local cred_file="${MOSAIC_CREDENTIALS_FILE:-}"
-    if [[ -z "$cred_file" ]]; then
-        # Same resolution chain as _lib/credentials.sh: profile HOME, then
-        # host-level /etc only if it exists; neither existing keeps the
-        # $HOME default (matches the lib's final := fallback).
-        cred_file="$HOME/.config/mosaic/credentials.json"
-        if [[ ! -f "$cred_file" && -f /etc/mosaic/credentials.json ]]; then
-            cred_file="/etc/mosaic/credentials.json"
-        fi
-    fi
+    local cred_file="${MOSAIC_CREDENTIALS_FILE:-$HOME/.config/mosaic/credentials.json}"
 
     case "$host" in
         git.mosaicstack.dev)
@@ -240,33 +231,6 @@ get_gitea_login_for_host() {
     return 1
 }
 
-# Validate the current authenticated Gitea user for a resolved Tea login.
-# Tea stores a user name with each login which can become stale after user rename,
-# token rotation, or server migration. Querying /user derives the identity from the
-# active credential instead of trusting that saved name. Callers fall back to the
-# host-scoped API path when this validation fails.
-get_gitea_authenticated_user() {
-    local login_name="$1" response
-
-    command -v tea >/dev/null 2>&1 || return 1
-    response=$(tea api --login "$login_name" /user 2>/dev/null) || return 1
-    TEA_AUTHENTICATED_USER_JSON="$response" python3 - <<'PY'
-import json
-import os
-
-try:
-    user = json.loads(os.environ["TEA_AUTHENTICATED_USER_JSON"])
-except (KeyError, json.JSONDecodeError):
-    raise SystemExit(1)
-
-login = user.get("login") if isinstance(user, dict) else None
-if isinstance(login, str) and login:
-    print(login)
-    raise SystemExit(0)
-raise SystemExit(1)
-PY
-}
-
 get_default_tea_login() {
     local logins_json
 

packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/issue-assign.sh

@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ Examples:
     $(basename "$0") -i 42 -l "in-progress" -m "0.2.0"
     $(basename "$0") -i 42 -a @me
 EOF
-    exit "${1:-1}"
+    exit 1
 }
 
 # Parse arguments
@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ while [[ $# -gt 0 ]]; do
             shift
             ;;
         -h|--help)
-            usage 0
+            usage
             ;;
         *)
             echo "Unknown option: $1" >&2

packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/issue-create.sh

@@ -12,7 +12,6 @@ TITLE=""
 BODY=""
 LABELS=""
 MILESTONE=""
-INTERACTIVE=false
 
 # get_remote_host and get_gitea_token are provided by detect-platform.sh
 
@@ -67,15 +66,13 @@ Options:
     -b, --body BODY         Issue body/description
     -l, --labels LABELS     Comma-separated labels (e.g., "bug,feature")
     -m, --milestone NAME    Milestone name to assign
-    -i, --interactive       Prompt for missing issue fields
     -h, --help              Show this help message
 
 Examples:
     $(basename "$0") -t "Fix login bug" -l "bug,priority-high"
     $(basename "$0") -t "Add dark mode" -b "Implement theme switching" -m "0.2.0"
-    $(basename "$0") -i
 EOF
-    exit "${1:-1}"
+    exit 1
 }
 
 # Parse arguments
@@ -97,12 +94,8 @@ while [[ $# -gt 0 ]]; do
             MILESTONE="$2"
             shift 2
             ;;
-        -i|--interactive)
-            INTERACTIVE=true
-            shift
-            ;;
         -h|--help)
-            usage 0
+            usage
             ;;
         *)
             echo "Unknown option: $1" >&2
@@ -111,13 +104,6 @@ while [[ $# -gt 0 ]]; do
     esac
 done
 
-if [[ "$INTERACTIVE" == true ]]; then
-    [[ -n "$TITLE" ]] || read -r -p "Issue title: " TITLE
-    [[ -n "$BODY" ]] || read -r -p "Issue body (optional): " BODY || true
-    [[ -n "$LABELS" ]] || read -r -p "Labels, comma-separated (optional): " LABELS || true
-    [[ -n "$MILESTONE" ]] || read -r -p "Milestone (optional): " MILESTONE || true
-fi
-
 if [[ -z "$TITLE" ]]; then
     echo "Error: Title is required (-t)" >&2
     usage
@@ -141,11 +127,6 @@ case "$PLATFORM" in
                 gitea_issue_create_api
                 exit $?
             }
-            if ! get_gitea_authenticated_user "$GITEA_LOGIN_NAME" >/dev/null; then
-                echo "Warning: Tea authenticated-user validation failed (possible stale user/login); trying Gitea API fallback..." >&2
-                gitea_issue_create_api
-                exit $?
-            fi
             REPO_ARGS=(--repo "$REPO_SLUG" --login "$GITEA_LOGIN_NAME")
             CMD=(tea issue create "${REPO_ARGS[@]}" --title "$TITLE")
             [[ -n "$BODY" ]] && CMD+=(--description "$BODY")

packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/issue-list.sh

@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ Examples:
     $(basename "$0") -m "0.2.0"               # Issues in milestone 0.2.0
     $(basename "$0") --repo ddk/ai-bma         # List issues from anywhere
 EOF
-    exit "${1:-1}"
+    exit 1
 }
 
 # Parse arguments
@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ while [[ $# -gt 0 ]]; do
             shift 2
             ;;
         -h|--help)
-            usage 0
+            usage
             ;;
         *)
             echo "Unknown option: $1" >&2

packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/milestone-create.sh

@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ Examples:
     $(basename "$0") -t "0.0.1" -d "Pre-MVP Foundation Sprint"
     $(basename "$0") -t "0.1.0" -d "MVP Release" --due "2025-03-01"
 EOF
-    exit "${1:-1}"
+    exit 1
 }
 
 # Parse arguments
@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ while [[ $# -gt 0 ]]; do
             shift
             ;;
         -h|--help)
-            usage 0
+            usage
             ;;
         *)
             echo "Unknown option: $1" >&2

packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/pr-create.sh

@@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ Examples:
     $(basename "$0") -i 42 -b "Implements the feature described in #42"
     $(basename "$0") -t "WIP: New feature" --draft
 EOF
-    exit "${1:-1}"
+    exit 1
 }
 
 # Parse arguments
@@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ while [[ $# -gt 0 ]]; do
             shift
             ;;
         -h|--help)
-            usage 0
+            usage
             ;;
         *)
             echo "Unknown option: $1" >&2
@@ -183,11 +183,6 @@ case "$PLATFORM" in
             gitea_pr_create_api
             exit $?
         }
-        if ! get_gitea_authenticated_user "$GITEA_LOGIN_NAME" >/dev/null; then
-            echo "Warning: Tea authenticated-user validation failed (possible stale user/login); trying Gitea API fallback..." >&2
-            gitea_pr_create_api
-            exit $?
-        fi
         REPO_ARGS=(--repo "$REPO_SLUG" --login "$GITEA_LOGIN_NAME")
         CMD=(tea pr create "${REPO_ARGS[@]}" --title "$TITLE")
         [[ -n "$BODY" ]] && CMD+=(--description "$BODY")

packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/pr-list.sh

@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ Examples:
     $(basename "$0") -s merged -a username    # Merged PRs by user
     $(basename "$0") --repo ddk/ai-bma         # List PRs from anywhere
 EOF
-    exit "${1:-1}"
+    exit 1
 }
 
 # Parse arguments
@@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ while [[ $# -gt 0 ]]; do
             shift 2
             ;;
         -h|--help)
-            usage 0
+            usage
             ;;
         *)
             echo "Unknown option: $1" >&2

packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/pr-merge.sh

@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ Examples:
     $(basename "$0") -n 42 -d                 # Squash merge and delete branch
     $(basename "$0") -n 42 --skip-queue-guard # Skip queue guard wait
 EOF
-    exit "${1:-1}"
+    exit 1
 }
 
 # Parse arguments
@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ while [[ $# -gt 0 ]]; do
             shift
             ;;
         -h|--help)
-            usage 0
+            usage
             ;;
         *)
             echo "Unknown option: $1" >&2

packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/test-gitea-login-resolution.sh

@@ -45,11 +45,6 @@ JSON
     exit 0
 fi
 
-if [[ "${1:-}" == "api" ]]; then
-    printf '%s\n' '{"login":"ci-bot"}'
-    exit 0
-fi
-
 printf 'tea %s\n' "$*" >> "$MOSAIC_TEST_LOG"
 if [[ "${MOSAIC_TEA_FAIL_PR_CREATE:-}" == "1" && "$*" == pr\ create* ]]; then
     echo 'GetUserByName: simulated stale login failure' >&2

packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/test-help-exit-code.sh

@@ -1,53 +0,0 @@
-#!/usr/bin/env bash
-# Regression harness for #701: -h/--help must exit 0, bad args must still exit nonzero.
-#
-# Covers the 7 wrappers whose usage() previously hard-coded `exit 1`, so every
-# --help invocation exited nonzero and logged a phantom isError across fleet lanes.
-# Asserts, per wrapper:
-#   1. `--help` exits 0 and prints usage.
-#   2. `-h` exits 0 and prints usage.
-#   3. A genuine unknown flag still exits nonzero (usage() default path untouched).
-
-set -euo pipefail
-
-SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
-
-WRAPPERS=(
-    issue-assign.sh
-    issue-create.sh
-    issue-list.sh
-    milestone-create.sh
-    pr-create.sh
-    pr-list.sh
-    pr-merge.sh
-)
-
-fail=0
-
-for wrapper in "${WRAPPERS[@]}"; do
-    path="$SCRIPT_DIR/$wrapper"
-
-    if ! output=$(bash "$path" --help 2>&1); then
-        echo "FAIL: $wrapper --help exited nonzero" >&2
-        fail=1
-    elif [[ "$output" != Usage:* ]]; then
-        echo "FAIL: $wrapper --help did not print usage" >&2
-        fail=1
-    fi
-
-    if ! bash "$path" -h >/dev/null 2>&1; then
-        echo "FAIL: $wrapper -h exited nonzero" >&2
-        fail=1
-    fi
-
-    if bash "$path" --this-is-not-a-real-flag >/dev/null 2>&1; then
-        echo "FAIL: $wrapper accepted an unknown flag (should have exited nonzero)" >&2
-        fail=1
-    fi
-done
-
-if [[ "$fail" -eq 0 ]]; then
-    echo "help-exit-code regression passed (7/7 wrappers)"
-fi
-
-exit "$fail"

packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/test-issue-create-body-safety.sh

@@ -55,11 +55,6 @@ JSON
     exit 0
 fi
 
-if [[ "${1:-}" == "api" ]]; then
-    printf '%s\n' '{"login":"ci-bot"}'
-    exit 0
-fi
-
 if [[ "${1:-}" == "issue" && "${2:-}" == "create" ]]; then
     desc=""
     while [[ $# -gt 0 ]]; do

packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/test-issue-create-interactive-auth.sh

@@ -1,88 +0,0 @@
-#!/usr/bin/env bash
-# Regression harness for #703: interactive issue creation and stale Tea-user fallback.
-
-set -euo pipefail
-
-SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
-WORK_DIR="${MOSAIC_TEST_WORK_DIR:-$PWD/.mosaic-test-work/issue-create-interactive-auth}"
-REPO_DIR="$WORK_DIR/repo"
-BIN_DIR="$WORK_DIR/bin"
-LOG_FILE="$WORK_DIR/calls.log"
-CREDENTIALS_FILE="$WORK_DIR/credentials.json"
-
-rm -rf "$WORK_DIR"
-mkdir -p "$REPO_DIR" "$BIN_DIR"
-git -C "$REPO_DIR" init -q
-git -C "$REPO_DIR" remote add origin https://git.mosaicstack.dev/mosaicstack/stack.git
-
-cat > "$CREDENTIALS_FILE" <<'JSON'
-{"gitea":{"mosaicstack":{"url":"https://git.mosaicstack.dev","token":"test-token"}}}
-JSON
-
-cat > "$BIN_DIR/tea" <<'SH'
-#!/usr/bin/env bash
-set -euo pipefail
-if [[ "$*" == "login list --output json" ]]; then
-  printf '%s\n' '[{"name":"mosaicstack","url":"https://git.mosaicstack.dev"}]'
-  exit 0
-fi
-if [[ "${1:-}" == "api" ]]; then
-  if [[ "${MOSAIC_TEA_STALE_USER:-0}" == "1" ]]; then
-    echo 'GetUserByName: stale configured user' >&2
-    exit 1
-  fi
-  printf '%s\n' '{"login":"current-user"}'
-  exit 0
-fi
-printf 'tea %s\n' "$*" >> "$MOSAIC_TEST_LOG"
-exit 0
-SH
-
-cat > "$BIN_DIR/curl" <<'SH'
-#!/usr/bin/env bash
-set -euo pipefail
-printf 'curl %s\n' "$*" >> "$MOSAIC_TEST_LOG"
-printf '%s\n' '{"number":703}'
-SH
-chmod +x "$BIN_DIR/tea" "$BIN_DIR/curl"
-
-run_wrapper() {
-  (
-    cd "$REPO_DIR"
-    PATH="$BIN_DIR:$PATH" \
-    MOSAIC_CREDENTIALS_FILE="$CREDENTIALS_FILE" \
-    MOSAIC_TEST_LOG="$LOG_FILE" \
-    "$@"
-  )
-}
-
-: > "$LOG_FILE"
-printf 'Interactive title\nInteractive body\nlabel-a,label-b\nM1\n' | run_wrapper "$SCRIPT_DIR/issue-create.sh" -i >/dev/null
-
-grep -q -- 'tea issue create --repo mosaicstack/stack --login mosaicstack --title Interactive title --description Interactive body --labels label-a,label-b --milestone M1' "$LOG_FILE"
-
-# Explicit values take precedence in interactive mode: no title input is
-# supplied, but the wrapper still creates the issue with the explicit title.
-: > "$LOG_FILE"
-printf '\n\n\n' | run_wrapper "$SCRIPT_DIR/issue-create.sh" -i -t 'Explicit title' >/dev/null
-grep -q -- 'tea issue create --repo mosaicstack/stack --login mosaicstack --title Explicit title' "$LOG_FILE"
-
-: > "$LOG_FILE"
-run_wrapper env MOSAIC_TEA_STALE_USER=1 "$SCRIPT_DIR/issue-create.sh" -t 'Fallback title' -b 'Fallback body' >/dev/null 2>"$WORK_DIR/issue-stderr"
-grep -q -- 'curl .*https://git.mosaicstack.dev/api/v1/repos/mosaicstack/stack/issues' "$LOG_FILE"
-grep -q -- 'Tea authenticated-user validation failed' "$WORK_DIR/issue-stderr"
-if grep -q -- 'tea issue create' "$LOG_FILE"; then
-  echo 'FAIL: issue-create invoked Tea mutation after stale-user validation failed' >&2
-  exit 1
-fi
-
-: > "$LOG_FILE"
-run_wrapper env MOSAIC_TEA_STALE_USER=1 "$SCRIPT_DIR/pr-create.sh" -t 'PR fallback' -H feature/wrapfix >/dev/null 2>"$WORK_DIR/pr-stderr"
-grep -q -- 'curl .*https://git.mosaicstack.dev/api/v1/repos/mosaicstack/stack/pulls' "$LOG_FILE"
-grep -q -- 'Tea authenticated-user validation failed' "$WORK_DIR/pr-stderr"
-if grep -q -- 'tea pr create' "$LOG_FILE"; then
-  echo 'FAIL: pr-create invoked Tea mutation after stale-user validation failed' >&2
-  exit 1
-fi
-
-echo 'issue-create interactive/auth regression harness passed'

packages/mosaic/framework/tools/tmux/README.md

@@ -87,10 +87,6 @@ message crosses the wire as base64 (`-b`) to avoid all shell-quoting hazards.
 
 - `agent-send.sh` — inter-agent wrapper (preamble + local/remote dispatch).
 - `send-message.sh` — low-level reliable single-pane submitter (`-b` base64 input).
-- `auto-submit-drafts.sh` — watchdog that flushes stable unsubmitted prompt
-  drafts on a coordinator pane (default target `mos-claude`); run it as a
-  long-lived process alongside the coordinator session.
-- `agent-send.test.sh` — regression + grammar lock for `agent-send.sh`.
 - `test-send-message-socket.sh` — smoke test for named-socket isolation.
 
 ## Distribution

packages/mosaic/framework/tools/tmux/auto-submit-drafts.sh

@@ -1,80 +0,0 @@
-#!/usr/bin/env bash
-# auto-submit-drafts.sh — watchdog for Claude Code panes that receive channel
-# messages but leave them as unsubmitted prompt drafts. Intended for Mos only.
-set -uo pipefail
-
-TARGET="${1:-mos-claude}"
-INTERVAL="${INTERVAL:-2}"
-STABLE_SECONDS="${STABLE_SECONDS:-4}"
-LOG_PREFIX="[auto-submit-drafts:$TARGET]"
-
-last_prompt=""
-first_seen=0
-
-prompt_text() {
-  tmux capture-pane -t "$TARGET" -p 2>/dev/null | python3 -c '
-import sys, re
-lines = sys.stdin.read().splitlines()
-idx = None
-for i in range(len(lines)-1, -1, -1):
-    if "❯" in lines[i]:
-        idx = i
-        break
-if idx is None:
-    raise SystemExit
-parts = []
-after = lines[idx].split("❯", 1)[1]
-parts.append(after)
-for line in lines[idx+1:]:
-    # Stop at Claude Code separator/border lines.
-    if "─" in line or "╰" in line or "╭" in line:
-        break
-    s = line.replace("\u00a0", " ")
-    s = re.sub(r"[\x00-\x1f\x7f]", "", s).strip()
-    if s:
-        parts.append(s)
-text = " ".join(parts).replace("\u00a0", " ")
-text = re.sub(r"[\x00-\x1f\x7f]", "", text).strip()
-print(text)
-'
-}
-
-while true; do
-  if ! tmux has-session -t "$TARGET" 2>/dev/null; then
-    echo "$LOG_PREFIX target missing; waiting" >&2
-    sleep "$INTERVAL"
-    last_prompt=""
-    first_seen=0
-    continue
-  fi
-
-  current="$(prompt_text || true)"
-  now="$(date +%s)"
-
-  if [[ -z "$current" ]]; then
-    last_prompt=""
-    first_seen=0
-    sleep "$INTERVAL"
-    continue
-  fi
-
-  if [[ "$current" != "$last_prompt" ]]; then
-    last_prompt="$current"
-    first_seen="$now"
-    sleep "$INTERVAL"
-    continue
-  fi
-
-  age=$(( now - first_seen ))
-  if (( age >= STABLE_SECONDS )); then
-    echo "$LOG_PREFIX submitting stable draft after ${age}s: ${current:0:120}" >&2
-    tmux send-keys -t "$TARGET" C-j
-    sleep 0.8
-    tmux send-keys -t "$TARGET" C-m
-    sleep 2
-    last_prompt=""
-    first_seen=0
-  else
-    sleep "$INTERVAL"
-  fi
-done

packages/mosaic/framework/tools/tmux/send-message.sh

@@ -77,20 +77,10 @@ snippet=$(printf '%s' "$MSG" | tr '\n' ' ' | tr -s ' ' | sed 's/[^[:print:]]//g'
 
 # 1) Paste the body as a bracketed paste so multi-line content does not submit
 #    line-by-line. load-buffer/paste-buffer is far safer than `send-keys -l`.
-# Buffer name MUST be unique per invocation: concurrent senders on the shared
-# tmux server race a fixed name (load overwrites load, -d deletes underneath),
-# cross-delivering or dropping messages — bit the fleet on the 2026-07-09
-# simultaneous restart (briefs swapped between sessions).
-BUF="__mosaic_send_$$_$(date +%s%N)"
-printf '%s' "$MSG" | "${tmux_cmd[@]}" load-buffer -b "$BUF" -
+printf '%s' "$MSG" | "${tmux_cmd[@]}" load-buffer -b __mosaic_send -
 # -p = bracketed paste when the client supports it; fall back if not.
-"${tmux_cmd[@]}" paste-buffer -d -p -b "$BUF" -t "$EFFECTIVE_TARGET" 2>/dev/null \
-  || "${tmux_cmd[@]}" paste-buffer -d -b "$BUF" -t "$EFFECTIVE_TARGET" \
-  || "${tmux_cmd[@]}" delete-buffer -b "$BUF" 2>/dev/null
-# ^ -d deletes the buffer only on a SUCCESSFUL paste; if both attempts fail
-#   (e.g. the target vanished since the liveness check), delete explicitly —
-#   named buffers are exempt from tmux's buffer-limit eviction, so orphans
-#   would otherwise accumulate forever.
+"${tmux_cmd[@]}" paste-buffer -d -p -b __mosaic_send -t "$EFFECTIVE_TARGET" 2>/dev/null \
+  || "${tmux_cmd[@]}" paste-buffer -d -b __mosaic_send -t "$EFFECTIVE_TARGET"
 sleep 0.5
 
 # 2) Submit, then verify; flush with another Enter if it is still a draft.

packages/mosaic/framework/tools/tmux/test-send-message-socket.sh

@@ -47,32 +47,4 @@ if capture_default | grep -qF "agent socket hello"; then
   fail "agent-send.sh leaked named-socket message to default tmux server"
 fi
 
-# Concurrency: parallel senders on one server must not cross-deliver or drop.
-# Locks the unique-per-invocation paste buffer (a fixed buffer name raced:
-# load overwrote load, -d deleted underneath — messages swapped between panes).
-CONC_N=5
-for i in $(seq 1 "$CONC_N"); do
-  tmux -L "$SOCKET" new-session -d -s "conc-$i" -c "$TMPDIR" 'bash --noprofile --norc -i'
-done
-pids=()
-for i in $(seq 1 "$CONC_N"); do
-  "$SEND_MESSAGE" -L "$SOCKET" -t "=conc-$i" -m "CONCPAYLOAD-${i}-END" >/dev/null &
-  pids+=($!)
-done
-for pid in "${pids[@]}"; do
-  wait "$pid" || fail "concurrent send-message.sh invocation exited non-zero"
-done
-sleep 0.2
-for i in $(seq 1 "$CONC_N"); do
-  pane=$(tmux -L "$SOCKET" capture-pane -t "=conc-$i:0.0" -p)
-  printf '%s' "$pane" | grep -qF "CONCPAYLOAD-${i}-END" \
-    || fail "concurrent send dropped payload for pane conc-$i"
-  for j in $(seq 1 "$CONC_N"); do
-    [ "$j" = "$i" ] && continue
-    if printf '%s' "$pane" | grep -qF "CONCPAYLOAD-${j}-END"; then
-      fail "concurrent send cross-delivered payload $j to pane conc-$i"
-    fi
-  done
-done
-
 echo "ok - named tmux socket send tools"

packages/mosaic/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@mosaicstack/mosaic",
-  "version": "0.0.48",
+  "version": "0.0.47",
   "repository": {
     "type": "git",
     "url": "https://git.mosaicstack.dev/mosaicstack/stack.git",

packages/mosaic/src/commands/fleet-personas.ts

@@ -234,21 +234,6 @@ export async function resolvePersona(
     extractClassesFromDir(rolesDir),
     extractClassesFromDir(overrideDir),
   ]);
-  return resolvePersonaFrom(klass, { rolesDir, overrideDir, base, over });
-}
-
-/**
- * Resolve a single class against ALREADY-EXTRACTED layer maps. Callers that
- * resolve many classes against the same two directories (e.g. provisioning a
- * full roster) should {@link extractClassesFromDir} each dir ONCE and reuse the
- * result here, rather than paying a full directory re-scan per class. Precedence
- * is identical to {@link resolvePersona}: override layer wins, then baseline.
- */
-export async function resolvePersonaFrom(
-  klass: string,
-  layers: { rolesDir: string; overrideDir: string; base: DirClasses; over: DirClasses },
-): Promise<PersonaResolution | null> {
-  const { rolesDir, overrideDir, base, over } = layers;
 
   const fromLayer = async (
     dir: string,

packages/mosaic/src/commands/fleet-provision.spec.ts

@@ -1,270 +0,0 @@
-import { access, mkdir, mkdtemp, rm, writeFile } from 'node:fs/promises';
-import { constants } from 'node:fs';
-import { tmpdir } from 'node:os';
-import { dirname, join, resolve } from 'node:path';
-import { fileURLToPath } from 'node:url';
-import { afterEach, beforeEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest';
-import { loadFleetRoster } from './fleet.js';
-import { generateRoster, runProvision } from './fleet-provision.js';
-import { loadProfile } from './fleet-profiles.js';
-
-// These are INTEGRATION tests: each exercises real filesystem I/O — scanning the
-// committed framework/fleet persona library, rendering YAML, writing to a temp
-// mosaicHome, and round-tripping through the real roster parser. On a heavily
-// contended CI runner (the whole monorepo's suites run in parallel) that genuine
-// I/O can exceed vitest's 5s default even though it completes in ~400ms locally.
-// Give the legitimately I/O-bound work generous headroom so CI is deterministic.
-vi.setConfig({ testTimeout: 30_000 });
-
-// The real, committed library: packages/mosaic/src/commands -> framework/fleet.
-const frameworkFleet = resolve(
-  dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url)),
-  '..',
-  '..',
-  'framework',
-  'fleet',
-);
-const rolesDir = join(frameworkFleet, 'roles');
-const profilesDir = join(frameworkFleet, 'profiles');
-
-/** A fresh temp mosaicHome whose fleet/ dir is empty (for write-path tests). */
-async function freshMosaicHome(): Promise<string> {
-  const home = await mkdtemp(join(tmpdir(), 'mosaic-provision-'));
-  await mkdir(join(home, 'fleet'), { recursive: true });
-  return home;
-}
-
-async function fileExists(path: string): Promise<boolean> {
-  try {
-    await access(path, constants.F_OK);
-    return true;
-  } catch {
-    return false;
-  }
-}
-
-describe('provision software-delivery (floor, default)', () => {
-  it('materializes only the floor seats with correct flags + valid scaffold', async () => {
-    const profile = await loadProfile('software-delivery', { profilesDir, rolesDir });
-    const { seats, yaml } = await generateRoster(profile, { profilesDir, rolesDir });
-
-    // Floor is orchestrator + enhancer.
-    expect(seats.map((s) => s.name).sort()).toEqual(['enhancer', 'orchestrator']);
-    const orch = seats.find((s) => s.name === 'orchestrator');
-    const enh = seats.find((s) => s.name === 'enhancer');
-    // RULE 2: floor + lead get persistent_persona.
-    expect(orch?.persistentPersona).toBe(true);
-    expect(enh?.persistentPersona).toBe(true);
-    // RULE 3: floor/lead do NOT reset between tasks.
-    expect(orch?.resetBetweenTasks).toBeUndefined();
-    expect(enh?.resetBetweenTasks).toBeUndefined();
-    // RULE 4: default runtime claude.
-    expect(orch?.runtime).toBe('claude');
-
-    // Scaffold round-trips through the real parser.
-    expect(yaml).toContain('version: 1');
-    expect(yaml).toContain('transport: tmux');
-    expect(yaml).toContain('socket_name: mosaic-fleet');
-  });
-});
-
-describe('provision --full', () => {
-  it('expands the entire roster, including multiplicity, deterministically', async () => {
-    const profile = await loadProfile('software-delivery', { profilesDir, rolesDir });
-    const { seats } = await generateRoster(profile, { full: true, profilesDir, rolesDir });
-
-    const names = seats.map((s) => s.name);
-    // code multiplicity 2 -> code0/code1 (RULE 1).
-    expect(names).toContain('code0');
-    expect(names).toContain('code1');
-    expect(names).not.toContain('code');
-    // Singleton seats keep the bare class name.
-    expect(names).toContain('planner');
-    expect(names).toContain('merge-gate');
-
-    // Deterministic ordering: profile roster order, multiplicity expanded inline.
-    const codeIdx0 = names.indexOf('code0');
-    expect(names[codeIdx0 + 1]).toBe('code1');
-
-    // RULE 3: a non-floor, non-lead execution seat resets between tasks.
-    const code0 = seats.find((s) => s.name === 'code0');
-    expect(code0?.resetBetweenTasks).toBe(true);
-    expect(code0?.persistentPersona).toBeUndefined();
-
-    // Seat count == sum of multiplicities.
-    const expected = profile.roster.reduce((n, e) => n + e.multiplicity, 0);
-    expect(seats.length).toBe(expected);
-  });
-});
-
-describe('generated roster round-trips through the real parser', () => {
-  it('feeds generated YAML back through loadFleetRoster (key correctness proof)', async () => {
-    const home = await freshMosaicHome();
-    try {
-      const result = await runProvision('software-delivery', {
-        mosaicHome: home,
-        profilesDir,
-        rolesDir,
-        full: true,
-        write: true,
-      });
-      expect(result.wrote).toBe(join(home, 'fleet', 'roster.yaml'));
-
-      const parsed = await loadFleetRoster(result.wrote!);
-      // It parses with no error and carries every seat.
-      const profile = await loadProfile('software-delivery', { profilesDir, rolesDir });
-      const expected = profile.roster.reduce((n, e) => n + e.multiplicity, 0);
-      expect(parsed.agents.length).toBe(expected);
-      // Classes survive the round-trip.
-      expect(parsed.agents.some((a) => a.className === 'orchestrator')).toBe(true);
-      expect(parsed.agents.filter((a) => a.className === 'code').length).toBe(2);
-      // reports_to must NOT have been emitted (parser rejects unknown keys).
-      expect(result.yaml).not.toContain('reports_to');
-    } finally {
-      await rm(home, { recursive: true, force: true });
-    }
-  });
-});
-
-describe('override-aware persona validation', () => {
-  let dir: string;
-  beforeEach(async () => {
-    dir = await mkdtemp(join(tmpdir(), 'mosaic-provision-ov-'));
-  });
-  afterEach(async () => {
-    await rm(dir, { recursive: true, force: true });
-  });
-
-  it('resolves a user-added (roles.local-only) persona without a false unresolved error', async () => {
-    const overrideDir = join(dir, 'roles.local');
-    const customProfilesDir = join(dir, 'profiles');
-    await mkdir(overrideDir, { recursive: true });
-    await mkdir(customProfilesDir, { recursive: true });
-    // A brand-new class that exists ONLY in roles.local.
-    await writeFile(
-      join(overrideDir, 'widget-maker.md'),
-      '# widget-maker\n\nThe widget-maker persona (`class: widget-maker`).\n',
-    );
-    await writeFile(
-      join(customProfilesDir, 'custom.yaml'),
-      [
-        'id: custom',
-        'title: Custom',
-        'description: a custom system',
-        'lead: widget-maker',
-        'floor: [widget-maker]',
-        'roster:',
-        '  - class: widget-maker',
-        '',
-      ].join('\n'),
-    );
-
-    const result = await runProvision('custom', {
-      mosaicHome: dir,
-      profilesDir: customProfilesDir,
-      // Point baseline rolesDir at a missing dir so resolution depends on override.
-      rolesDir: join(dir, 'no-baseline'),
-      overrideDir,
-    });
-    expect(result.yaml).toContain('class: widget-maker');
-    // It resolved from the override layer.
-    // (generateRoster records personaLayer; the seat is present.)
-    expect(result.summary).toContain('persona=override');
-  });
-
-  it('FAILS with a clear message when a profile references a bogus class', async () => {
-    const customProfilesDir = join(dir, 'profiles');
-    await mkdir(customProfilesDir, { recursive: true });
-    await writeFile(
-      join(customProfilesDir, 'bogus.yaml'),
-      [
-        'id: bogus',
-        'title: Bogus',
-        'description: bad system',
-        'lead: orchestrator',
-        'floor: [orchestrator]',
-        'roster:',
-        '  - class: orchestrator',
-        '  - class: not-a-real-persona-xyz',
-        '    reports_to: orchestrator',
-        '',
-      ].join('\n'),
-    );
-    await expect(
-      runProvision('bogus', {
-        mosaicHome: dir,
-        profilesDir: customProfilesDir,
-        rolesDir,
-        overrideDir: join(dir, 'roles.local'),
-      }),
-    ).rejects.toThrow(/not-a-real-persona-xyz|not a known persona class/);
-  });
-});
-
-describe('--write protection', () => {
-  it('refuses to clobber an existing roster.yaml without --force', async () => {
-    const home = await freshMosaicHome();
-    try {
-      const rosterPath = join(home, 'fleet', 'roster.yaml');
-      await writeFile(rosterPath, 'version: 1\n# operator customizations\n');
-      await expect(
-        runProvision('software-delivery', { mosaicHome: home, profilesDir, rolesDir, write: true }),
-      ).rejects.toThrow(/Refusing to overwrite/);
-      // The original file is untouched.
-      const { readFile } = await import('node:fs/promises');
-      expect(await readFile(rosterPath, 'utf8')).toContain('operator customizations');
-    } finally {
-      await rm(home, { recursive: true, force: true });
-    }
-  });
-
-  it('--write --force overwrites an existing roster', async () => {
-    const home = await freshMosaicHome();
-    try {
-      const rosterPath = join(home, 'fleet', 'roster.yaml');
-      await writeFile(rosterPath, 'version: 1\n# old\n');
-      const result = await runProvision('software-delivery', {
-        mosaicHome: home,
-        profilesDir,
-        rolesDir,
-        write: true,
-        force: true,
-      });
-      expect(result.wrote).toBe(rosterPath);
-      const parsed = await loadFleetRoster(rosterPath);
-      expect(parsed.agents.length).toBeGreaterThan(0);
-    } finally {
-      await rm(home, { recursive: true, force: true });
-    }
-  });
-
-  it('--write to a fresh mosaicHome creates the roster file', async () => {
-    const home = await freshMosaicHome();
-    try {
-      const result = await runProvision('software-delivery', {
-        mosaicHome: home,
-        profilesDir,
-        rolesDir,
-        write: true,
-      });
-      expect(await fileExists(result.wrote!)).toBe(true);
-    } finally {
-      await rm(home, { recursive: true, force: true });
-    }
-  });
-
-  it('dry run (no --write) writes nothing', async () => {
-    const home = await freshMosaicHome();
-    try {
-      const result = await runProvision('software-delivery', {
-        mosaicHome: home,
-        profilesDir,
-        rolesDir,
-      });
-      expect(result.wrote).toBeUndefined();
-      expect(await fileExists(join(home, 'fleet', 'roster.yaml'))).toBe(false);
-    } finally {
-      await rm(home, { recursive: true, force: true });
-    }
-  });
-});

packages/mosaic/src/commands/fleet-provision.ts

@@ -1,406 +0,0 @@
-/**
- * `mosaic fleet provision --profile <id>` — turn a declared SYSTEM TYPE (a
- * profile) into a concrete fleet roster (North Star H3).
- *
- * A profile (fleet/profiles/<id>.yaml) is a DECLARATIVE mapping from a system
- * type to a persona roster + org topology (H2). This command MATERIALIZES that
- * declaration into the concrete `roster.yaml` shape the live fleet consumes — the
- * same shape `fleet.ts` parses (version/transport/tmux/defaults/runtimes/agents).
- *
- * DRY-RUN-FIRST + REVIEWABLE: with no --write it prints the roster it WOULD
- * generate plus a topology summary and writes nothing. --write persists it, and
- * REFUSES to clobber an existing roster.yaml without --force (protects operator
- * customizations).
- *
- * DRY: profile parsing/validation is reused wholesale from fleet-profiles.ts
- * (loadProfile/validateProfile) and persona resolution from fleet-personas.ts
- * (resolvePersona, override-aware). This module owns ONLY the profile→roster
- * generation policy, documented inline below so each default is reviewable.
- */
-
-import { access, mkdir, writeFile } from 'node:fs/promises';
-import { constants } from 'node:fs';
-import { homedir } from 'node:os';
-import { dirname, join } from 'node:path';
-import type { Command } from 'commander';
-import YAML from 'yaml';
-import {
-  loadProfile,
-  validateProfile,
-  type FleetProfile,
-  type ProfileRosterEntry,
-  defaultProfilesDir,
-  defaultRolesDir,
-  listPersonaClassesWithOverrides,
-} from './fleet-profiles.js';
-import {
-  defaultOverrideDir,
-  extractClassesFromDir,
-  resolvePersonaFrom,
-  type PersonaLayer,
-} from './fleet-personas.js';
-
-function defaultMosaicHome(): string {
-  return process.env['MOSAIC_HOME'] ?? join(homedir(), '.config', 'mosaic');
-}
-
-// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-// GENERATION RULES — each default below is intentionally simple and documented
-// so a reviewer can ratify or override the policy. See the PR body for the open
-// runtime-per-class question (RULE 4).
-// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
-/**
- * RULE 4 — Runtime assignment policy (THE one open design question).
- *
- * Default: EVERY seat → `runtime: claude`. Claude runs every persona, so it is
- * the safe universal default and guarantees a structurally-valid, launchable
- * roster regardless of how the policy ultimately lands. We deliberately do NOT
- * hardcode pi / gpt-5.5 per class here. The live roster today runs coders on
- * pi + openai-codex/gpt-5.5:high — whether provisioning should encode a
- * class→runtime/model map (and WHERE: the profile schema vs a separate
- * runtime-policy file) is flagged in the PR body for ratification.
- *
- * Centralized so changing the policy is a ONE-edit change. If a future profile
- * entry (or persona) declares a runtime/model preference, honor it here; until
- * then everything defaults to claude.
- */
-export const DEFAULT_RUNTIME = 'claude';
-
-/** Result of applying the runtime policy to one seat. */
-interface RuntimeChoice {
-  runtime: string;
-  modelHint?: string;
-}
-
-/**
- * The single centralized runtime-policy function. Today it returns the universal
- * `claude` default for every seat. To encode a class→runtime/model map later,
- * edit ONLY this function (and/or extend the profile schema and read it here).
- */
-export function resolveSeatRuntime(
-  _klass: string,
-  _isFloor: boolean,
-  _isLead: boolean,
-): RuntimeChoice {
-  return { runtime: DEFAULT_RUNTIME };
-}
-
-/** One generated seat, fully resolved for emission + topology display. */
-export interface GeneratedSeat {
-  name: string;
-  className: string;
-  runtime: string;
-  modelHint?: string;
-  persistentPersona?: boolean;
-  resetBetweenTasks?: boolean;
-  /** Topology edge from the profile (NOT emitted to roster.yaml — see RULE 6). */
-  reportsTo?: string;
-  /** Which persona layer the class resolved from (baseline/override). */
-  personaLayer: PersonaLayer;
-}
-
-export interface GenerateRosterResult {
-  seats: GeneratedSeat[];
-  /** The roster.yaml text (parser-valid, drop-in). */
-  yaml: string;
-}
-
-export interface ProvisionOptions {
-  /** Materialize the entire profile roster (multiplicity expanded). */
-  full?: boolean;
-  mosaicHome?: string;
-  /** Test overrides — mirror fleet-profiles LoadProfilesOptions. */
-  profilesDir?: string;
-  rolesDir?: string;
-  overrideDir?: string;
-}
-
-function resolveDirs(opts: ProvisionOptions): {
-  mosaicHome: string;
-  profilesDir: string;
-  rolesDir: string;
-  overrideDir: string;
-} {
-  const mosaicHome = opts.mosaicHome ?? defaultMosaicHome();
-  return {
-    mosaicHome,
-    profilesDir: opts.profilesDir ?? defaultProfilesDir(mosaicHome),
-    rolesDir: opts.rolesDir ?? defaultRolesDir(mosaicHome),
-    overrideDir: opts.overrideDir ?? defaultOverrideDir(mosaicHome),
-  };
-}
-
-/**
- * RULE 1 — Seat naming. multiplicity 1 → name = class (e.g. `planner`).
- * multiplicity N>1 → `<class>0`,`<class>1`,… (e.g. `code` ×2 → code0/code1).
- * Names are deterministic, following profile roster order.
- */
-function seatNames(entry: ProfileRosterEntry): string[] {
-  if (entry.multiplicity <= 1) return [entry.class];
-  return Array.from({ length: entry.multiplicity }, (_, i) => `${entry.class}${i}`);
-}
-
-/**
- * Generate the concrete seats + roster.yaml for a validated profile.
- *
- * Seat selection:
- *   --full  → the ENTIRE profile roster, multiplicity expanded.
- *   default → ONLY the `floor` classes (the always-staffed minimum), matching
- *             the profile note "two-agent floor always staffed; every other seat
- *             added on demand."
- *
- * Per-seat flags:
- *   RULE 2 persistent_persona: true for floor classes AND the lead; else omitted.
- *   RULE 3 reset_between_tasks: true for non-floor, non-lead execution seats;
- *           floor/lead omit it (mirrors today's coders resetting while the
- *           orchestrator/enhancer do not).
- *   RULE 4 runtime: via resolveSeatRuntime (defaults claude).
- *   RULE 6 reports_to: tracked on the seat for the topology summary but NOT
- *           emitted to roster.yaml — the fleet.ts parser rejects unknown agent
- *           keys, so writing reports_to would break round-trip. Confirmed against
- *           normalizeAgent's allow-list in fleet.ts.
- *
- * Persona resolution: every emitted class is resolved override-aware via
- * resolvePersona so we can (a) record the layer for the summary and (b) refuse
- * to emit a roster that references a nonexistent persona.
- */
-export async function generateRoster(
-  profile: FleetProfile,
-  opts: ProvisionOptions,
-): Promise<GenerateRosterResult> {
-  const { rolesDir, overrideDir } = resolveDirs(opts);
-  const floor = new Set(profile.floor);
-  const lead = profile.lead;
-
-  const selected: ProfileRosterEntry[] = opts.full
-    ? profile.roster
-    : profile.roster.filter((e) => floor.has(e.class));
-
-  // Scan the persona directories ONCE, then resolve every roster entry against
-  // the in-memory maps. resolvePersona() would otherwise re-scan both dirs per
-  // entry — O(entries × files) redundant reads that push --full provisioning
-  // past the test timeout on slow/contended filesystems.
-  const [base, over] = await Promise.all([
-    extractClassesFromDir(rolesDir),
-    extractClassesFromDir(overrideDir),
-  ]);
-
-  const seats: GeneratedSeat[] = [];
-  for (const entry of selected) {
-    const isFloor = floor.has(entry.class);
-    const isLead = entry.class === lead;
-
-    const resolved = await resolvePersonaFrom(entry.class, { rolesDir, overrideDir, base, over });
-    if (!resolved) {
-      // Defensive: validateProfile already guards this, but a class can resolve
-      // for membership yet have no readable file. Fail loudly rather than emit a
-      // roster pointing at a persona we cannot load.
-      throw new Error(
-        `Cannot provision: roster class "${entry.class}" does not resolve to a readable persona.`,
-      );
-    }
-
-    const runtimeChoice = resolveSeatRuntime(entry.class, isFloor, isLead);
-    for (const name of seatNames(entry)) {
-      const seat: GeneratedSeat = {
-        name,
-        className: entry.class,
-        runtime: runtimeChoice.runtime,
-        personaLayer: resolved.layer,
-      };
-      if (runtimeChoice.modelHint) seat.modelHint = runtimeChoice.modelHint;
-      if (isFloor || isLead) seat.persistentPersona = true;
-      if (!isFloor && !isLead) seat.resetBetweenTasks = true;
-      if (entry.reportsTo) seat.reportsTo = entry.reportsTo;
-      seats.push(seat);
-    }
-  }
-
-  if (seats.length === 0) {
-    throw new Error(
-      `Profile "${profile.id}" produced no seats. ` +
-        (opts.full ? 'Its roster is empty.' : 'No floor seats are defined — try --full.'),
-    );
-  }
-
-  return { seats, yaml: renderRosterYaml(seats) };
-}
-
-/**
- * RULE 5 — Standard roster scaffolding. We emit the same generic, non-personal
- * scaffold the committed example presets use (socket_name: mosaic-fleet,
- * holder_session: _holder, working_directory: ~, claude + pi runtimes) so the
- * output is a drop-in valid roster. No operator-personal data is copied.
- *
- * Built via the `yaml` lib (same serializer the parser uses) so the result
- * round-trips. reports_to is intentionally NOT included on agents (RULE 6).
- */
-function renderRosterYaml(seats: GeneratedSeat[]): string {
-  const agents = seats.map((s) => {
-    const a: Record<string, unknown> = {
-      name: s.name,
-      runtime: s.runtime,
-      class: s.className,
-    };
-    if (s.persistentPersona) a['persistent_persona'] = true;
-    if (s.modelHint) a['model_hint'] = s.modelHint;
-    if (s.resetBetweenTasks) a['reset_between_tasks'] = true;
-    return a;
-  });
-
-  const doc = {
-    version: 1,
-    transport: 'tmux',
-    tmux: { socket_name: 'mosaic-fleet', holder_session: '_holder' },
-    defaults: { working_directory: '~' },
-    runtimes: {
-      claude: { reset_command: '/clear' },
-      pi: { reset_command: '/new' },
-    },
-    agents,
-  };
-
-  return YAML.stringify(doc);
-}
-
-// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-// Validation — reuse fleet-profiles.validateProfile (override-aware classes) and
-// name any unresolved class clearly. Never generate a roster referencing a
-// nonexistent persona.
-// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
-/**
- * Validate the profile against the override-aware persona library. Throws with a
- * clear, class-naming message if any referenced class is unresolved.
- */
-export async function validateProfileForProvision(
-  profile: FleetProfile,
-  opts: ProvisionOptions,
-): Promise<void> {
-  const { rolesDir, overrideDir } = resolveDirs(opts);
-  const validClasses = await listPersonaClassesWithOverrides(rolesDir, overrideDir);
-  const problems = validateProfile(profile, validClasses);
-  if (problems.length > 0) {
-    throw new Error(
-      `Profile "${profile.id}" is invalid; cannot provision:\n  - ${problems.join('\n  - ')}`,
-    );
-  }
-}
-
-// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-// Topology summary (printed in dry-run and after write).
-// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
-function formatTopologySummary(seats: GeneratedSeat[]): string {
-  const lines: string[] = [];
-  lines.push(`Topology (${seats.length} seat(s)):`);
-  for (const s of seats) {
-    const reports = s.reportsTo ? `reports_to=${s.reportsTo}` : 'reports_to=- (lead)';
-    lines.push(
-      `  - ${s.name}\tclass=${s.className}\truntime=${s.runtime}\t${reports}\tpersona=${s.personaLayer}`,
-    );
-  }
-  return lines.join('\n');
-}
-
-// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-// CLI wiring — mirror registerFleetProfileCommand / registerFleetPersonaCommand.
-// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
-export interface ProvisionRunResult {
-  yaml: string;
-  summary: string;
-  wrote?: string;
-}
-
-/**
- * Core provision flow shared by the CLI: load + validate the profile, generate
- * the roster, optionally write it. Returns the artifacts for printing/testing.
- */
-export async function runProvision(
-  profileId: string,
-  opts: ProvisionOptions & { write?: boolean; force?: boolean },
-): Promise<ProvisionRunResult> {
-  const dirs = resolveDirs(opts);
-  const profile = await loadProfile(profileId, {
-    mosaicHome: dirs.mosaicHome,
-    profilesDir: dirs.profilesDir,
-    rolesDir: dirs.rolesDir,
-    overrideDir: dirs.overrideDir,
-  });
-  // loadProfile already validates, but re-run with our explicit error wording so
-  // an unresolved class is named clearly even if invoked directly.
-  await validateProfileForProvision(profile, opts);
-
-  const { seats, yaml } = await generateRoster(profile, opts);
-  const summary = formatTopologySummary(seats);
-
-  if (!opts.write) {
-    return { yaml, summary };
-  }
-
-  const rosterPath = join(dirs.mosaicHome, 'fleet', 'roster.yaml');
-  if (!opts.force) {
-    let exists = false;
-    try {
-      await access(rosterPath, constants.F_OK);
-      exists = true;
-    } catch {
-      exists = false;
-    }
-    if (exists) {
-      throw new Error(
-        `Refusing to overwrite existing roster: ${rosterPath}. ` +
-          `Pass --force to overwrite, or edit it by hand.`,
-      );
-    }
-  }
-  await mkdir(dirname(rosterPath), { recursive: true });
-  await writeFile(rosterPath, yaml, 'utf8');
-  return { yaml, summary, wrote: rosterPath };
-}
-
-/**
- * Register `provision` under an existing `fleet` command. `mosaicHomeFor`
- * resolves the active --mosaic-home (parent flag) at call time, exactly like the
- * profile/persona/backlog subcommands.
- */
-export function registerFleetProvisionCommand(
-  fleetCmd: Command,
-  mosaicHomeFor: () => string,
-): Command {
-  const provisionCmd = fleetCmd
-    .command('provision')
-    .description('Materialize a roster.yaml from a system-type profile (H3). DRY-RUN by default.')
-    .requiredOption('--profile <id>', 'System-type profile id to provision')
-    .option('--full', 'Materialize the entire profile roster (default: floor seats only)')
-    .option('--write', 'Write the generated roster to <mosaicHome>/fleet/roster.yaml')
-    .option('--force', 'Overwrite an existing roster.yaml (requires --write)')
-    .action(async (opts: { profile: string; full?: boolean; write?: boolean; force?: boolean }) => {
-      try {
-        const result = await runProvision(opts.profile, {
-          mosaicHome: mosaicHomeFor(),
-          full: opts.full,
-          write: opts.write,
-          force: opts.force,
-        });
-        if (result.wrote) {
-          console.log(`Wrote roster: ${result.wrote}`);
-          console.log('');
-          console.log(result.summary);
-        } else {
-          // DRY RUN: print the roster it WOULD generate + topology, write nothing.
-          console.log('# DRY RUN — no files written. Re-run with --write to persist.');
-          console.log(result.yaml.trimEnd());
-          console.log('');
-          console.log(result.summary);
-        }
-      } catch (err) {
-        process.stderr.write(`${err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err)}\n`);
-        process.exitCode = 1;
-      }
-    });
-
-  return provisionCmd;
-}

packages/mosaic/src/commands/fleet.spec.ts

@@ -4,7 +4,6 @@ import { dirname, join, resolve } from 'node:path';
 import { Command } from 'commander';
 import { afterEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest';
 import {
-  acquireRestartLock,
   addAgentToRoster,
   buildAgentSendCommand,
   buildAgentWatchAttachCommand,
@@ -46,8 +45,6 @@ import {
   removeAgentFromRoster,
   resolveFleetPaths,
   resolvePresetFilename,
-  restartLockPath,
-  RESTART_LOCK_STALE_MS,
   RUNTIME_ACCEPTABLE_COMMANDS,
   serializeRosterToYaml,
   VERIFY_DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_MS,
@@ -87,7 +84,6 @@ describe('registerFleetCommand', () => {
       'install-systemd',
       'persona',
       'profile',
-      'provision',
       'ps',
       'remove',
       'restart',
@@ -681,364 +677,6 @@ describe('fleet command construction', () => {
     }
   });
 
-  it('waits for an in-flight restart to clear before relaunching (re-entry guard)', async () => {
-    const home = await tempDir();
-    const rosterPath = join(home, 'fleet', 'roster.yaml');
-    await mkdir(join(home, 'fleet'), { recursive: true });
-    await writeFile(
-      rosterPath,
-      ['version: 1', 'transport: tmux', 'agents:', '  - name: coder0', '    runtime: codex'].join(
-        '\n',
-      ),
-    );
-
-    // Simulate another `mosaic fleet restart` process mid-teardown: a fresh lock
-    // (recent timestamp, so it is NOT treated as stale) already held.
-    const lockPath = restartLockPath(home);
-    await mkdir(dirname(lockPath), { recursive: true });
-    await writeFile(lockPath, `4242\n${Date.now()}\n`);
-
-    const events: string[] = [];
-    const runner: CommandRunner = async (command, args) => {
-      events.push(`run:${args[args.length - 1]}`);
-      return { stdout: '', stderr: '', exitCode: 0 };
-    };
-    // The injected sleep stands in for time passing while we wait; the in-flight
-    // restart "finishes" (releases its lock) after the first poll.
-    let sleeps = 0;
-    const sleepFn: SleepFn = async () => {
-      sleeps += 1;
-      events.push(`sleep:${sleeps}`);
-      await rm(lockPath, { force: true });
-    };
-
-    const program = new Command();
-    program.exitOverride();
-    registerFleetCommand(program, { runner, sleepFn, mosaicHome: home });
-
-    try {
-      await program.parseAsync(['node', 'mosaic', 'fleet', 'restart']);
-
-      // It must have waited at least once before issuing any systemctl restart.
-      expect(sleeps).toBeGreaterThan(0);
-      const firstSleep = events.findIndex((e) => e.startsWith('sleep:'));
-      const firstRun = events.findIndex((e) => e.startsWith('run:'));
-      expect(firstSleep).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(0);
-      expect(firstRun).toBeGreaterThan(firstSleep);
-
-      // And it still performs the full restart once the lock clears.
-      expect(events).toContain('run:mosaic-tmux-holder.service');
-      expect(events).toContain('run:mosaic-agent@coder0.service');
-
-      // The lock is released after the restart completes.
-      await expect(readFile(lockPath, 'utf8')).rejects.toMatchObject({ code: 'ENOENT' });
-    } finally {
-      await rm(home, { recursive: true, force: true });
-    }
-  });
-
-  it('breaks a stale restart lock and proceeds without waiting', async () => {
-    const home = await tempDir();
-    const rosterPath = join(home, 'fleet', 'roster.yaml');
-    await mkdir(join(home, 'fleet'), { recursive: true });
-    await writeFile(
-      rosterPath,
-      ['version: 1', 'transport: tmux', 'agents:', '  - name: coder0', '    runtime: codex'].join(
-        '\n',
-      ),
-    );
-
-    // A lock left behind by a crashed owner: timestamp older than the stale window.
-    const lockPath = restartLockPath(home);
-    await mkdir(dirname(lockPath), { recursive: true });
-    await writeFile(lockPath, `4242\n${Date.now() - RESTART_LOCK_STALE_MS - 1_000}\n`);
-
-    const calls: string[][] = [];
-    const runner: CommandRunner = async (command, args) => {
-      calls.push([command, ...args]);
-      return { stdout: '', stderr: '', exitCode: 0 };
-    };
-    const sleepFn = vi.fn<SleepFn>(async () => {});
-
-    const program = new Command();
-    program.exitOverride();
-    registerFleetCommand(program, { runner, sleepFn, mosaicHome: home });
-
-    try {
-      await program.parseAsync(['node', 'mosaic', 'fleet', 'restart']);
-
-      // Stale lock is broken immediately — no waiting.
-      expect(sleepFn).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
-      expect(calls).toEqual([
-        ['systemctl', '--user', 'restart', 'mosaic-tmux-holder.service'],
-        ['systemctl', '--user', 'restart', 'mosaic-agent@coder0.service'],
-      ]);
-      // The stale lock is gone once the restart completes.
-      await expect(readFile(lockPath, 'utf8')).rejects.toMatchObject({ code: 'ENOENT' });
-    } finally {
-      await rm(home, { recursive: true, force: true });
-    }
-  });
-
-  it('releases the restart lock so a subsequent restart is not blocked', async () => {
-    const home = await tempDir();
-    const rosterPath = join(home, 'fleet', 'roster.yaml');
-    await mkdir(join(home, 'fleet'), { recursive: true });
-    await writeFile(
-      rosterPath,
-      ['version: 1', 'transport: tmux', 'agents:', '  - name: coder0', '    runtime: codex'].join(
-        '\n',
-      ),
-    );
-
-    const calls: string[][] = [];
-    const runner: CommandRunner = async (command, args) => {
-      calls.push([command, ...args]);
-      return { stdout: '', stderr: '', exitCode: 0 };
-    };
-    const sleepFn = vi.fn<SleepFn>(async () => {});
-
-    const program = new Command();
-    program.exitOverride();
-    registerFleetCommand(program, { runner, sleepFn, mosaicHome: home });
-
-    try {
-      await program.parseAsync(['node', 'mosaic', 'fleet', 'restart']);
-      await program.parseAsync(['node', 'mosaic', 'fleet', 'restart']);
-
-      // Two sequential restarts both run fully and neither has to wait.
-      expect(sleepFn).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
-      expect(calls).toEqual([
-        ['systemctl', '--user', 'restart', 'mosaic-tmux-holder.service'],
-        ['systemctl', '--user', 'restart', 'mosaic-agent@coder0.service'],
-        ['systemctl', '--user', 'restart', 'mosaic-tmux-holder.service'],
-        ['systemctl', '--user', 'restart', 'mosaic-agent@coder0.service'],
-      ]);
-    } finally {
-      await rm(home, { recursive: true, force: true });
-    }
-  });
-
-  it('guards the single-agent restart path behind the in-flight restart lock', async () => {
-    const home = await tempDir();
-    const rosterPath = join(home, 'fleet', 'roster.yaml');
-    await mkdir(join(home, 'fleet'), { recursive: true });
-    await writeFile(
-      rosterPath,
-      ['version: 1', 'transport: tmux', 'agents:', '  - name: coder0', '    runtime: codex'].join(
-        '\n',
-      ),
-    );
-
-    // A full restart is mid-flight (lock held); a single-agent restart re-enters.
-    const lockPath = restartLockPath(home);
-    await mkdir(dirname(lockPath), { recursive: true });
-    await writeFile(lockPath, `4242\n${Date.now()}\n`);
-
-    const events: string[] = [];
-    const runner: CommandRunner = async (command, args) => {
-      events.push(`run:${args[args.length - 1]}`);
-      return { stdout: '', stderr: '', exitCode: 0 };
-    };
-    let sleeps = 0;
-    const sleepFn: SleepFn = async () => {
-      sleeps += 1;
-      events.push(`sleep:${sleeps}`);
-      await rm(lockPath, { force: true });
-    };
-
-    const program = new Command();
-    program.exitOverride();
-    registerFleetCommand(program, { runner, sleepFn, mosaicHome: home });
-
-    try {
-      await program.parseAsync(['node', 'mosaic', 'fleet', 'restart', 'coder0']);
-
-      // The single-agent restart waits for the in-flight restart before acting.
-      expect(sleeps).toBeGreaterThan(0);
-      const firstSleep = events.findIndex((e) => e.startsWith('sleep:'));
-      const firstRun = events.findIndex((e) => e.startsWith('run:'));
-      expect(firstSleep).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(0);
-      expect(firstRun).toBeGreaterThan(firstSleep);
-      // Only the named agent is restarted; the holder is untouched.
-      expect(events).toContain('run:mosaic-agent@coder0.service');
-      expect(events).not.toContain('run:mosaic-tmux-holder.service');
-    } finally {
-      await rm(home, { recursive: true, force: true });
-    }
-  });
-
-  it('does not let a timed-out owner drop a lock another restart broke and re-owned', async () => {
-    const home = await tempDir();
-    const runDir = join(home, 'fleet', 'run');
-    await mkdir(runDir, { recursive: true });
-    const lockPath = restartLockPath(home);
-    const tokenOf = async (): Promise<string> => {
-      const raw = await readFile(lockPath, 'utf8');
-      return raw.split('\n')[2]?.trim() ?? '';
-    };
-    const sleepFn = vi.fn<SleepFn>(async () => {});
-
-    // R1 acquires the lock and begins a restart that then hangs.
-    const r1 = await acquireRestartLock(home, sleepFn);
-    const tokenR1 = await tokenOf();
-    expect(tokenR1).not.toBe('');
-
-    // The hung R1 leaves a stale lock: rewrite its timestamp into the past while
-    // preserving R1's token — exactly the on-disk state a stuck owner leaves.
-    await writeFile(lockPath, `4242\n${Date.now() - RESTART_LOCK_STALE_MS - 1_000}\n${tokenR1}\n`);
-
-    // R2 re-enters, sees the stale lock, and atomically takes ownership.
-    const r2 = await acquireRestartLock(home, sleepFn);
-    const tokenR2 = await tokenOf();
-    expect(tokenR2).not.toBe(tokenR1);
-    expect(sleepFn).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
-
-    // R1 finally finishes and releases. It must NOT delete R2's lock — otherwise
-    // a third restart (R3) could acquire and interleave with R2 still running.
-    await r1.release();
-    expect(await tokenOf()).toBe(tokenR2);
-
-    // R2 releases cleanly and the lock is gone.
-    await r2.release();
-    await expect(readFile(lockPath, 'utf8')).rejects.toMatchObject({ code: 'ENOENT' });
-
-    await rm(home, { recursive: true, force: true });
-  });
-
-  it('lets only one of several concurrent breakers proceed past a stale lock', async () => {
-    const home = await tempDir();
-    const lockPath = restartLockPath(home);
-    await mkdir(dirname(lockPath), { recursive: true });
-
-    // A stale lock left by a crashed owner: every concurrent re-entrant restart
-    // will judge it stale and try to break it at the same instant. Breaking must
-    // NOT grant ownership — only the atomic re-create may — so exactly one
-    // contender can ever hold the lock at a time. (The v2 fix wrote our own token
-    // during the break and read it back, so two breakers each saw their own token
-    // and BOTH proceeded; this guards that regression.)
-    await writeFile(
-      lockPath,
-      `4242\n${Date.now() - RESTART_LOCK_STALE_MS - 1_000}\nstale-owner-token\n`,
-    );
-
-    // Yielding sleep so a waiting contender lets the current owner finish and
-    // release before it re-contends, instead of spinning the microtask queue.
-    const sleepFn: SleepFn = async () => {
-      await new Promise((res) => setTimeout(res, 0));
-    };
-
-    let active = 0;
-    let maxActive = 0;
-    const tokens: string[] = [];
-    const tokenOf = async (): Promise<string> => {
-      const raw = await readFile(lockPath, 'utf8');
-      return raw.split('\n')[2]?.trim() ?? '';
-    };
-
-    // One "restart" = acquire the lock, do work in the critical section, release.
-    const restartOnce = async (): Promise<void> => {
-      const guard = await acquireRestartLock(home, sleepFn);
-      active += 1;
-      maxActive = Math.max(maxActive, active);
-      // Record the token we own while we hold it, then yield to interleave with
-      // any other contender that might (wrongly) believe it owns the lock too.
-      tokens.push(await tokenOf());
-      await new Promise((res) => setTimeout(res, 0));
-      active -= 1;
-      await guard.release();
-    };
-
-    try {
-      // Three breakers race the single stale lock simultaneously.
-      await Promise.all([restartOnce(), restartOnce(), restartOnce()]);
-
-      // Mutual exclusion held: never two owners at once despite concurrent breaks.
-      expect(maxActive).toBe(1);
-      // Each acquire owned with its own distinct token — no two ever shared it.
-      expect(new Set(tokens).size).toBe(3);
-      // The lock is fully released at the end.
-      await expect(readFile(lockPath, 'utf8')).rejects.toMatchObject({ code: 'ENOENT' });
-    } finally {
-      await rm(home, { recursive: true, force: true });
-    }
-  });
-
-  it('lets exactly one of two breakers take over a stale lock while the other waits', async () => {
-    const home = await tempDir();
-    const lockPath = restartLockPath(home);
-    await mkdir(dirname(lockPath), { recursive: true });
-
-    // A single stale lock both contenders will judge stale at the same instant.
-    // Every transition runs under the registry mutex, so only one may take the
-    // lock over; the other must observe a now-fresh owner and WAIT/re-evaluate
-    // rather than also taking over. (A content-blind clobber let both believe
-    // they owned it — this asserts the mutex-gated CAS takeover instead.)
-    await writeFile(
-      lockPath,
-      `4242\n${Date.now() - RESTART_LOCK_STALE_MS - 1_000}\nstale-owner-token\n`,
-    );
-
-    // Barrier the winner holds against until the loser has observed the lock
-    // fresh and waited at least once — forcing the exact interleaving where one
-    // proceeds while the other waits, deterministically rather than by timing.
-    let resolveLoserWaited: () => void = () => {};
-    const loserWaited = new Promise<void>((res) => {
-      resolveLoserWaited = res;
-    });
-    let sleeps = 0;
-    const sleepFn: SleepFn = async () => {
-      sleeps += 1;
-      resolveLoserWaited();
-      await new Promise((res) => setTimeout(res, 0));
-    };
-
-    let active = 0;
-    let maxActive = 0;
-    const tokens: string[] = [];
-    const tokenOf = async (): Promise<string> => {
-      const raw = await readFile(lockPath, 'utf8');
-      return raw.split('\n')[2]?.trim() ?? '';
-    };
-
-    let firstOwner = true;
-    const restartOnce = async (): Promise<void> => {
-      const guard = await acquireRestartLock(home, sleepFn);
-      active += 1;
-      maxActive = Math.max(maxActive, active);
-      tokens.push(await tokenOf());
-      if (firstOwner) {
-        // Winner: keep holding the lock until the loser has waited once, so the
-        // loser is guaranteed to see a FRESH owner (not the stale one) and back
-        // off — proving it could not also take over.
-        firstOwner = false;
-        await loserWaited;
-      } else {
-        await new Promise((res) => setTimeout(res, 0));
-      }
-      active -= 1;
-      await guard.release();
-    };
-
-    try {
-      // Exactly two breakers race the single stale lock.
-      await Promise.all([restartOnce(), restartOnce()]);
-
-      // Mutual exclusion: never two owners at once (if both took over the stale
-      // lock, this would be 2).
-      expect(maxActive).toBe(1);
-      // Both eventually owned, each with its own distinct token.
-      expect(new Set(tokens).size).toBe(2);
-      // The loser observed the winner's fresh lock and waited — it did NOT also
-      // take over the stale lock.
-      expect(sleeps).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(1);
-      // The lock is fully released at the end.
-      await expect(readFile(lockPath, 'utf8')).rejects.toMatchObject({ code: 'ENOENT' });
-    } finally {
-      await rm(home, { recursive: true, force: true });
-    }
-  });
-
   it('attempts every agent and the holder during fleet stop even when an agent stop fails', async () => {
     const home = await tempDir();
     const rosterPath = join(home, 'fleet', 'roster.yaml');

packages/mosaic/src/commands/fleet.ts

@@ -1,16 +1,5 @@
 import { constants } from 'node:fs';
-import {
-  access,
-  chmod,
-  copyFile,
-  mkdir,
-  open,
-  readFile,
-  stat,
-  unlink,
-  writeFile,
-} from 'node:fs/promises';
-import { randomUUID } from 'node:crypto';
+import { access, chmod, copyFile, mkdir, readFile, unlink, writeFile } from 'node:fs/promises';
 import { homedir, hostname, userInfo } from 'node:os';
 import { dirname, join, resolve } from 'node:path';
 import { fileURLToPath } from 'node:url';
@@ -22,7 +11,6 @@ import { resolveCommsBlock } from '../fleet/comms-onboarding.js';
 import { registerFleetBacklogCommand } from './fleet-backlog.js';
 import { registerFleetPersonaCommand } from './fleet-personas.js';
 import { registerFleetProfileCommand } from './fleet-profiles.js';
-import { registerFleetProvisionCommand } from './fleet-provision.js';
 
 /**
  * A function that spawns a command with inherited stdio (TTY passthrough).
@@ -544,295 +532,6 @@ export function buildFleetServiceCommand(action: FleetServiceAction, agentName?:
   return ['systemctl', '--user', action, service];
 }
 
-/** Poll interval (ms) while waiting for an in-flight restart's lock to clear. */
-export const RESTART_LOCK_POLL_INTERVAL_MS = 250;
-/**
- * Maximum time (ms) a re-entrant restart waits for the in-flight restart to
- * finish before it breaks the lock and proceeds anyway. A bound is required so
- * a crashed holder of the lock can never deadlock the fleet permanently.
- */
-export const RESTART_LOCK_MAX_WAIT_MS = 30_000;
-/**
- * Age (ms) past which a restart lock is treated as stale (its owner died
- * without releasing it) and is broken immediately rather than waited on.
- */
-export const RESTART_LOCK_STALE_MS = 60_000;
-
-/**
- * Resolves the path of the cross-process restart lock for a given Mosaic home.
- * Kept strictly under `<mosaicHome>/fleet/run` (not the heartbeat env override)
- * so the lock is scoped to the same fleet the restart acts on.
- */
-export function restartLockPath(mosaicHome: string): string {
-  return join(mosaicHome, 'fleet', 'run', 'restart.lock');
-}
-
-/** A held restart lock; `release()` removes the lock file iff we still own it. */
-interface RestartGuard {
-  release(): Promise<void>;
-}
-
-/** Lock-file contents: pid (informational), timestamp, and a unique owner token. */
-function formatRestartLockContent(token: string): string {
-  return `${process.pid}\n${Date.now()}\n${token}\n`;
-}
-
-/**
- * Reads the owner token (line 3) from a lock file, or null if the file is
- * missing/unreadable/tokenless. The token is what makes release and break
- * ownership-safe: a process only ever acts on a lock whose token matches its own.
- */
-async function readRestartLockToken(lockPath: string): Promise<string | null> {
-  let raw: string;
-  try {
-    raw = await readFile(lockPath, 'utf8');
-  } catch {
-    return null;
-  }
-  const token = raw.split('\n')[2]?.trim();
-  return token ? token : null;
-}
-
-/**
- * Returns true when a lock's contents are stale: older than RESTART_LOCK_STALE_MS,
- * or unparseable (a corrupt or partially written lock left by a crashed owner).
- */
-function isRestartLockContentStale(raw: string, now: number): boolean {
-  const stampLine = raw.split('\n')[1] ?? '';
-  const stamp = Number.parseInt(stampLine.trim(), 10);
-  if (!Number.isFinite(stamp)) {
-    return true;
-  }
-  return now - stamp >= RESTART_LOCK_STALE_MS;
-}
-
-/**
- * Path of the short-lived registry mutex that guards EVERY transition of the
- * restart lock (acquire, release, takeover). Held only across a few filesystem
- * ops — never across the restart itself — so contention clears in microseconds.
- */
-function restartMutexPath(lockPath: string): string {
-  return `${lockPath}.mutex`;
-}
-
-/** Brief back-off between registry-mutex acquisition attempts (held microseconds). */
-const RESTART_MUTEX_RETRY_MS = 20;
-
-/**
- * Staleness for the internal mutex / reclaim locks, judged by the file's mtime
- * rather than its CONTENT. `open(path, 'wx')` creates the inode (with a fresh
- * mtime) before any token/timestamp is written into it, so a content-based check
- * would momentarily see that empty file as corrupt-and-stale and could reap a
- * lock another contender is still acquiring. mtime is set atomically at creation,
- * so a just-created lock always reads as live; only a lock whose holder died and
- * stopped touching it ages past the threshold. These locks are never held across
- * the restart itself (only a couple of filesystem ops), so any mtime this old can
- * belong only to a dead holder.
- */
-async function isRestartLockPathStale(path: string, now: number): Promise<boolean> {
-  try {
-    const info = await stat(path);
-    return now - info.mtimeMs >= RESTART_LOCK_STALE_MS;
-  } catch (err) {
-    if ((err as NodeJS.ErrnoException).code === 'ENOENT') {
-      return false; // Gone, not stale — the caller will re-contend.
-    }
-    return false; // Can't stat — treat as live and back off rather than reap.
-  }
-}
-
-/** Path of the reclaim lock that serializes reaping of a crashed-holder mutex. */
-function restartReclaimPath(mutexPath: string): string {
-  return `${mutexPath}.reclaim`;
-}
-
-/**
- * Reap a registry mutex left behind by a process that CRASHED mid-transition —
- * one whose file has aged past RESTART_LOCK_STALE_MS. Because the mutex is held
- * only for a couple of filesystem ops (no sleeps, never across the restart), a
- * mutex this old can only belong to a dead holder.
- *
- * The reap removes the dead mutex but never CREATES/holds it — acquisition stays
- * the single `open('wx')` create in {@link acquireRestartMutex}, so exactly one
- * contender wins ownership no matter how the reap and acquires interleave. The
- * removal is made conditional by a dedicated reclaim lock: while it is held the
- * dead mutex is stable (its dead holder will never touch it, and no other
- * reclaimer can race), so re-reading it and removing it only if it is STILL stale
- * is a true compare — a live holder's fresh mutex is never removed. This closes
- * the reclaim race a content-blind rename-and-restore left open (a third
- * contender slipping into the gap while a fresh mutex was moved aside).
- */
-async function reclaimStaleRestartMutex(mutexPath: string): Promise<void> {
-  const reclaimPath = restartReclaimPath(mutexPath);
-  let handle: Awaited<ReturnType<typeof open>>;
-  try {
-    handle = await open(reclaimPath, 'wx');
-  } catch (err) {
-    if ((err as NodeJS.ErrnoException).code !== 'EEXIST') {
-      throw err;
-    }
-    // Someone is already reclaiming. If their reclaim lock is itself stale by
-    // mtime, its holder crashed mid-reap (the lock spans only a stat + unlink,
-    // microseconds) — clear it so a later pass can retry. Otherwise a live
-    // reclaimer has it; back off. Either way we do not reap the mutex this pass.
-    if (await isRestartLockPathStale(reclaimPath, Date.now())) {
-      await unlink(reclaimPath).catch(() => {});
-    }
-    return;
-  }
-  try {
-    // Re-check the mutex UNDER the reclaim lock and remove it only if it is STILL
-    // stale by mtime. A live holder's mutex is fresh and is left untouched; a dead
-    // holder's mutex is stable here (its holder is gone and no other reclaimer can
-    // race us), so this re-check is authoritative.
-    if (await isRestartLockPathStale(mutexPath, Date.now())) {
-      await unlink(mutexPath).catch(() => {});
-    }
-  } finally {
-    await handle.close();
-    await unlink(reclaimPath).catch(() => {});
-  }
-}
-
-/**
- * Acquire the registry mutex, BLOCKING (with brief back-offs) until held, and
- * return a token-gated release. This is the single point of mutual exclusion for
- * the restart lock: acquire, release, and stale/timeout takeover all run under it,
- * so "read the lock, then mutate it" is atomic — no acquirer, releaser, or breaker
- * can ever interleave with another. A mutex left by a crashed holder is reclaimed
- * once it ages past the stale threshold.
- */
-async function acquireRestartMutex(
-  mutexPath: string,
-  token: string,
-): Promise<RestartGuard['release']> {
-  for (;;) {
-    let handle: Awaited<ReturnType<typeof open>>;
-    try {
-      handle = await open(mutexPath, 'wx');
-    } catch (err) {
-      if ((err as NodeJS.ErrnoException).code !== 'EEXIST') {
-        throw err;
-      }
-      // Staleness is judged by mtime, not content, so a mutex that exists but has
-      // not yet had its token written (the open-before-write window) reads as live
-      // and is never wrongly reaped.
-      if (!(await isRestartLockPathStale(mutexPath, Date.now()))) {
-        // A live holder has it — it will be gone in microseconds. Back off briefly.
-        await new Promise((resolve) => setTimeout(resolve, RESTART_MUTEX_RETRY_MS));
-        continue;
-      }
-      await reclaimStaleRestartMutex(mutexPath);
-      continue;
-    }
-    // We created the mutex. Populate it with our token; if writing fails, clean up
-    // our own file so we never leak an empty mutex that a peer would have to reap.
-    try {
-      await handle.writeFile(formatRestartLockContent(token));
-      await handle.close();
-    } catch (err) {
-      await handle.close().catch(() => {});
-      await unlink(mutexPath).catch(() => {});
-      throw err;
-    }
-    return async (): Promise<void> => {
-      if ((await readRestartLockToken(mutexPath)) !== token) return;
-      await unlink(mutexPath).catch(() => {});
-    };
-  }
-}
-
-/**
- * Acquire the fleet restart lock, serializing concurrent `mosaic fleet restart`
- * invocations across processes. Each restart tears the tmux holder (and the
- * agent sessions inside it) down and back up; without this guard a re-entrant
- * restart relaunches agents against a half-torn-down holder, which fails and
- * tight-loops. A re-entrant caller waits for the in-flight restart to release
- * the lock (clean shutdown settled) before proceeding, breaks a stale lock left
- * by a crashed owner, and after RESTART_LOCK_MAX_WAIT_MS breaks the lock to
- * avoid a permanent deadlock.
- *
- * Correctness rests on a single invariant: EVERY transition of the lock — taking
- * a free lock, taking over a stale/timed-out one, and releasing — happens under
- * the registry mutex. Because the check ("is the lock free / stale / fresh?") and
- * the mutation that follows it both run while the mutex is held, they are atomic:
- * no other acquirer, releaser, or breaker can slip in between. That is what makes
- * takeover a true compare-and-swap rather than a content-blind clobber — a normal
- * `open('wx')` acquirer cannot create a fresh lock in a gap, and the original
- * owner's `release()` (also mutex-gated and token-checked) cannot drop a lock a
- * breaker already took over. So no interleaving lets two restarts both own the
- * lock and run concurrently.
- */
-export async function acquireRestartLock(
-  mosaicHome: string,
-  sleepFn: SleepFn,
-): Promise<RestartGuard> {
-  const token = randomUUID();
-  const lockPath = restartLockPath(mosaicHome);
-  const mutexPath = restartMutexPath(lockPath);
-  await mkdir(dirname(lockPath), { recursive: true });
-  const release = async (): Promise<void> => {
-    // Mutex-gated and token-gated: only remove the lock if it is still ours. If
-    // another caller took it over (after a stale/timeout break) the token no
-    // longer matches and we leave their lock intact.
-    const releaseMutex = await acquireRestartMutex(mutexPath, token);
-    try {
-      if ((await readRestartLockToken(lockPath)) === token) {
-        await unlink(lockPath).catch(() => {});
-      }
-    } finally {
-      await releaseMutex();
-    }
-  };
-  const deadline = Date.now() + RESTART_LOCK_MAX_WAIT_MS;
-  for (;;) {
-    let owned = false;
-    const releaseMutex = await acquireRestartMutex(mutexPath, token);
-    try {
-      // Read and (if appropriate) mutate the lock atomically under the mutex.
-      let current: string | null = null;
-      let absent = false;
-      try {
-        current = await readFile(lockPath, 'utf8');
-      } catch (readErr) {
-        if ((readErr as NodeJS.ErrnoException).code === 'ENOENT') {
-          absent = true;
-        } else {
-          current = null; // Unreadable/corrupt: treat as stale.
-        }
-      }
-      const now = Date.now();
-      if (absent) {
-        // Lock is free — take it.
-        await writeFile(lockPath, formatRestartLockContent(token));
-        owned = true;
-      } else {
-        const stale = current === null || isRestartLockContentStale(current, now);
-        const timedOut = now >= deadline;
-        if (stale || timedOut) {
-          process.stderr.write(
-            stale
-              ? 'Breaking stale fleet restart lock.\n'
-              : `Timed out after ${RESTART_LOCK_MAX_WAIT_MS}ms waiting for the in-flight fleet ` +
-                  'restart; breaking the lock.\n',
-          );
-          // Takeover is just an overwrite — safe because we hold the mutex, so no
-          // acquirer or releaser can touch the lock between our read and this write.
-          await writeFile(lockPath, formatRestartLockContent(token));
-          owned = true;
-        }
-        // else: a fresh restart owns it — wait below and re-evaluate.
-      }
-    } finally {
-      await releaseMutex();
-    }
-    if (owned) {
-      return { release };
-    }
-    await sleepFn(RESTART_LOCK_POLL_INTERVAL_MS);
-  }
-}
-
 /**
  * Returns the systemctl --user enable command for a given unit.
  * Used by the install auto-enable step to persist units across reboots.
@@ -1472,7 +1171,6 @@ export function isSendAccepted(capturedOutput: string): SendVerifyResult {
 
 export function registerFleetCommand(program: Command, deps: FleetCommandDeps = {}): Command {
   const runner = deps.runner ?? runCommand;
-  const sleepFn = deps.sleepFn ?? defaultSleep;
   const paths = resolveFleetPaths(deps.mosaicHome);
   const frameworkRoot = deps.frameworkRoot ?? resolveFrameworkRoot();
 
@@ -1586,22 +1284,9 @@ export function registerFleetCommand(program: Command, deps: FleetCommandDeps =
       .command(`${action} [agent]`)
       .description(`${action} the fleet holder or one agent`)
       .action(async (agent?: string) => {
-        const commandOpts = cmd.opts<{ mosaicHome: string; roster?: string }>();
-        const activePaths = resolveFleetPaths(commandOpts.mosaicHome);
         const roster = await loadRosterForCommand(cmd);
         if (agent) {
           getRosterAgent(roster, agent);
-          // Single-agent restart is guarded too: it can race a full restart that
-          // is tearing the shared holder down.
-          if (action === 'restart') {
-            const guard = await acquireRestartLock(activePaths.mosaicHome, sleepFn);
-            try {
-              await runChecked(runner, buildFleetServiceCommand(action, agent));
-            } finally {
-              await guard.release();
-            }
-            return;
-          }
           await runChecked(runner, buildFleetServiceCommand(action, agent));
           return;
         }
@@ -1612,21 +1297,6 @@ export function registerFleetCommand(program: Command, deps: FleetCommandDeps =
           );
           return;
         }
-        if (action === 'restart') {
-          // Serialize the holder+agents teardown/relaunch behind the restart lock
-          // so a re-entrant restart waits for clean shutdown before relaunching,
-          // instead of racing a half-torn-down holder into a tight loop.
-          const guard = await acquireRestartLock(activePaths.mosaicHome, sleepFn);
-          try {
-            await runChecked(runner, buildFleetServiceCommand(action));
-            for (const rosterAgent of roster.agents) {
-              await runChecked(runner, buildFleetServiceCommand(action, rosterAgent.name));
-            }
-          } finally {
-            await guard.release();
-          }
-          return;
-        }
         await runChecked(runner, buildFleetServiceCommand(action));
         for (const rosterAgent of roster.agents) {
           await runChecked(runner, buildFleetServiceCommand(action, rosterAgent.name));
@@ -2050,10 +1720,6 @@ export function registerFleetCommand(program: Command, deps: FleetCommandDeps =
   // --mosaic-home flag.
   registerFleetPersonaCommand(cmd, () => cmd.opts<{ mosaicHome: string }>().mosaicHome);
 
-  // Provisioning (H3): materialize a concrete roster.yaml from a system-type
-  // profile. DRY-RUN by default; --write persists under the same --mosaic-home.
-  registerFleetProvisionCommand(cmd, () => cmd.opts<{ mosaicHome: string }>().mosaicHome);
-
   return cmd;
 }
 

packages/mosaic/vitest.config.ts

@@ -4,6 +4,5 @@ export default defineConfig({
   test: {
     globals: true,
     environment: 'node',
-    testTimeout: 30_000,
   },
 });

packages/types/src/agent/agent-runtime-provider.spec.ts

@@ -1,44 +0,0 @@
-import { describe, expect, it } from 'vitest';
-import type {
-  AgentRuntimeProvider,
-  RuntimeAttachHandle,
-  RuntimeCapability,
-  RuntimeError,
-  RuntimeSession,
-  RuntimeStreamEvent,
-} from './agent-runtime-provider.js';
-
-describe('AgentRuntimeProvider contract', (): void => {
-  it('exposes stable, normalized runtime-only contracts', (): void => {
-    const capability: RuntimeCapability = 'session.attach';
-    const session: RuntimeSession = {
-      id: 'session-1',
-      providerId: 'fleet',
-      runtimeId: 'tmux',
-      state: 'active',
-      createdAt: '2026-07-12T00:00:00.000Z',
-      updatedAt: '2026-07-12T00:00:00.000Z',
-    };
-    const event: RuntimeStreamEvent = {
-      type: 'message.delta',
-      sessionId: session.id,
-      cursor: '2',
-      occurredAt: session.updatedAt,
-      content: 'hello',
-    };
-    const error: RuntimeError = {
-      code: 'capability_unsupported',
-      message: 'Denied',
-      retryable: false,
-    };
-    const attach: RuntimeAttachHandle = {
-      attachmentId: 'attach-1',
-      sessionId: session.id,
-      mode: 'read',
-      expiresAt: session.updatedAt,
-    };
-    const provider: Pick<AgentRuntimeProvider, 'capabilities' | 'getSessionTree' | 'attach'> =
-      {} as Pick<AgentRuntimeProvider, 'capabilities' | 'getSessionTree' | 'attach'>;
-    expect([capability, session.id, event.type, error.code, attach.mode, provider]).toHaveLength(6);
-  });
-});

packages/types/src/agent/agent-runtime-provider.ts

@@ -1,110 +0,0 @@
-export type RuntimeCapability =
-  | 'session.list'
-  | 'session.tree'
-  | 'session.stream'
-  | 'session.send'
-  | 'session.attach'
-  | 'session.terminate';
-export type RuntimeSessionState = 'starting' | 'active' | 'idle' | 'stopped' | 'failed';
-export type RuntimeAttachMode = 'read' | 'control';
-
-/** Server-derived immutable authority context. Client identity fields are intentionally absent. */
-export interface RuntimeScope {
-  readonly actorId: string;
-  readonly tenantId: string;
-  readonly channelId: string;
-  readonly correlationId: string;
-}
-export interface RuntimeSession {
-  id: string;
-  providerId: string;
-  runtimeId: string;
-  parentSessionId?: string;
-  state: RuntimeSessionState;
-  createdAt: string;
-  updatedAt: string;
-}
-export interface RuntimeSessionTree {
-  session: RuntimeSession;
-  children: RuntimeSessionTree[];
-}
-export interface RuntimeCapabilitySet {
-  supported: RuntimeCapability[];
-}
-export interface RuntimeHealth {
-  status: 'healthy' | 'degraded' | 'down';
-  checkedAt: string;
-  detail?: string;
-}
-export interface RuntimeMessage {
-  content: string;
-  idempotencyKey: string;
-}
-export interface RuntimeAttachHandle {
-  attachmentId: string;
-  sessionId: string;
-  mode: RuntimeAttachMode;
-  expiresAt: string;
-}
-export interface RuntimeError {
-  code:
-    | 'capability_unsupported'
-    | 'not_found'
-    | 'forbidden'
-    | 'conflict'
-    | 'unavailable'
-    | 'invalid_request';
-  message: string;
-  retryable: boolean;
-}
-export type RuntimeStreamEvent =
-  | {
-      type: 'session.state';
-      sessionId: string;
-      cursor: string;
-      occurredAt: string;
-      state: RuntimeSessionState;
-    }
-  | {
-      type: 'message.delta';
-      sessionId: string;
-      cursor: string;
-      occurredAt: string;
-      content: string;
-    }
-  | {
-      type: 'message.complete';
-      sessionId: string;
-      cursor: string;
-      occurredAt: string;
-      messageId: string;
-    }
-  | {
-      type: 'runtime.error';
-      sessionId: string;
-      cursor: string;
-      occurredAt: string;
-      error: RuntimeError;
-    };
-
-/** Runtime-neutral boundary; implementations fail closed for unsupported operations. */
-export interface AgentRuntimeProvider {
-  readonly id: string;
-  capabilities(scope: RuntimeScope): Promise<RuntimeCapabilitySet>;
-  health(scope: RuntimeScope): Promise<RuntimeHealth>;
-  listSessions(scope: RuntimeScope): Promise<RuntimeSession[]>;
-  getSessionTree(scope: RuntimeScope): Promise<RuntimeSessionTree[]>;
-  streamSession(
-    sessionId: string,
-    cursor: string | undefined,
-    scope: RuntimeScope,
-  ): AsyncIterable<RuntimeStreamEvent>;
-  sendMessage(sessionId: string, message: RuntimeMessage, scope: RuntimeScope): Promise<void>;
-  attach(
-    sessionId: string,
-    mode: RuntimeAttachMode,
-    scope: RuntimeScope,
-  ): Promise<RuntimeAttachHandle>;
-  detach(attachmentId: string, scope: RuntimeScope): Promise<void>;
-  terminate(sessionId: string, approvalRef: string, scope: RuntimeScope): Promise<void>;
-}

packages/types/src/agent/index.ts

@@ -2,5 +2,3 @@
 export interface AgentSessionHandle {
   readonly id: string;
 }
-
-export * from './agent-runtime-provider.js';

packages/types/src/chat/events.ts

@@ -1,6 +1,5 @@
 import type {
   CommandManifestPayload,
-  SlashCommandApprovalResultPayload,
   SlashCommandPayload,
   SlashCommandResultPayload,
   SystemReloadPayload,
@@ -117,7 +116,6 @@ export interface ServerToClientEvents {
   'session:info': (payload: SessionInfoPayload) => void;
   'commands:manifest': (payload: CommandManifestPayload) => void;
   'command:result': (payload: SlashCommandResultPayload) => void;
-  'command:approval': (payload: SlashCommandApprovalResultPayload) => void;
   'system:reload': (payload: SystemReloadPayload) => void;
   error: (payload: ErrorPayload) => void;
 }
@@ -127,6 +125,5 @@ export interface ClientToServerEvents {
   message: (data: ChatMessagePayload) => void;
   'set:thinking': (data: SetThinkingPayload) => void;
   'command:execute': (data: SlashCommandPayload) => void;
-  'command:approve': (data: SlashCommandPayload) => void;
   abort: (data: AbortPayload) => void;
 }

packages/types/src/commands/index.ts

@@ -63,18 +63,6 @@ export interface SlashCommandPayload {
   conversationId: string;
   command: string;
   args?: string;
-  /** One-time server-issued approval for a privileged command execution. */
-  approvalId?: string;
-}
-
-/** Server response to a request to approve a privileged slash command. */
-export interface SlashCommandApprovalResultPayload {
-  conversationId: string;
-  command: string;
-  success: boolean;
-  approvalId?: string;
-  expiresAt?: string;
-  message?: string;
 }
 
 /** Server response to a slash command */

tools/install.sh

@@ -16,10 +16,6 @@
 #   --framework       Install/upgrade framework only (skip npm CLI)
 #   --cli             Install/upgrade npm CLI only (skip framework)
 #   --ref <branch>    Git ref for framework archive (default: main)
-#   --dev             Build CLI + gateway FROM SOURCE at --ref instead of the
-#                     registry @latest. Zero registry writes — packs local
-#                     tarballs and installs them globally. Use to test a branch
-#                     end-to-end before cutting a release.
 #   --yes             Accept all defaults; headless/non-interactive install
 #   --no-auto-launch  Skip automatic mosaic wizard + gateway install on first install
 #   --uninstall       Reverse the install: remove framework dir, CLI package, and npmrc line
@@ -31,7 +27,6 @@
 #   MOSAIC_PREFIX       — npm global prefix          (default: ~/.npm-global)
 #   MOSAIC_NO_COLOR     — disable colour             (set to 1)
 #   MOSAIC_REF          — git ref for framework      (default: main)
-#   MOSAIC_DEV          — equivalent to --dev         (set to 1)
 #   MOSAIC_ASSUME_YES   — equivalent to --yes        (set to 1)
 # ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 #
@@ -48,7 +43,6 @@ FLAG_CLI=true
 FLAG_NO_AUTO_LAUNCH=false
 FLAG_YES=false
 FLAG_UNINSTALL=false
-FLAG_DEV=false
 GIT_REF="${MOSAIC_REF:-main}"
 
 # MOSAIC_ASSUME_YES env var acts the same as --yes
@@ -56,18 +50,12 @@ if [[ "${MOSAIC_ASSUME_YES:-0}" == "1" ]]; then
   FLAG_YES=true
 fi
 
-# MOSAIC_DEV env var acts the same as --dev
-if [[ "${MOSAIC_DEV:-0}" == "1" ]]; then
-  FLAG_DEV=true
-fi
-
 while [[ $# -gt 0 ]]; do
   case "$1" in
     --check)          FLAG_CHECK=true; shift ;;
     --framework)      FLAG_CLI=false; shift ;;
     --cli)            FLAG_FRAMEWORK=false; shift ;;
     --ref)            GIT_REF="${2:-main}"; shift 2 ;;
-    --dev)            FLAG_DEV=true; shift ;;
     --yes|-y)         FLAG_YES=true; shift ;;
     --no-auto-launch) FLAG_NO_AUTO_LAUNCH=true; shift ;;
     --uninstall)      FLAG_UNINSTALL=true; shift ;;
@@ -84,17 +72,6 @@ CLI_PKG="${SCOPE}/mosaic"
 REPO_BASE="https://git.mosaicstack.dev/mosaicstack/stack"
 ARCHIVE_URL="${REPO_BASE}/archive/${GIT_REF}.tar.gz"
 
-# In dev (build-from-source) mode the gateway is installed globally from a
-# locally-built tarball. Tell the wizard / gateway-config stage NOT to overwrite
-# it with the registry @latest build (honored by gatewayConfigStage).
-if [[ "$FLAG_DEV" == "true" ]]; then
-  export MOSAIC_GATEWAY_SKIP_NPM_INSTALL=1
-fi
-
-# Shared monorepo checkout (populated on demand by ensure_monorepo).
-WORK_DIR=""
-EXTRACTED_DIR=""
-
 # ─── uninstall path ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 # Shell-level uninstall for when the CLI is broken or not available.
 # Handles: framework directory, npm CLI package, npmrc scope line.
@@ -262,99 +239,6 @@ framework_version() {
   fi
 }
 
-# Download + extract the monorepo archive at $GIT_REF exactly once per run.
-# Sets the script-level EXTRACTED_DIR to the repo root. Reused by both the
-# framework install (Part 1) and the dev build-from-source path (Part 2).
-ensure_monorepo() {
-  if [[ -n "$EXTRACTED_DIR" ]] && [[ -d "$EXTRACTED_DIR" ]]; then
-    return 0
-  fi
-
-  require_cmd tar
-
-  WORK_DIR="$(mktemp -d "${TMPDIR:-/tmp}/mosaic-install-XXXXXX")"
-  # shellcheck disable=SC2317
-  cleanup_work() { [[ -n "$WORK_DIR" ]] && rm -rf "$WORK_DIR"; }
-  trap cleanup_work EXIT
-
-  info "Downloading source from ${GIT_REF}…"
-  if command -v curl &>/dev/null; then
-    curl -fsSL "$ARCHIVE_URL" | tar xz -C "$WORK_DIR"
-  elif command -v wget &>/dev/null; then
-    wget -qO- "$ARCHIVE_URL" | tar xz -C "$WORK_DIR"
-  else
-    fail "curl or wget required to download source."
-    exit 1
-  fi
-
-  # Gitea archives extract to <repo-name>/ inside the work dir
-  EXTRACTED_DIR="$(find "$WORK_DIR" -maxdepth 1 -mindepth 1 -type d | head -1)"
-  if [[ -z "$EXTRACTED_DIR" ]] || [[ ! -d "$EXTRACTED_DIR" ]]; then
-    fail "Could not locate extracted source in archive."
-    ls -la "$WORK_DIR" >&2
-    exit 1
-  fi
-}
-
-# Build @mosaicstack/mosaic + @mosaicstack/gateway from source and install both
-# globally from locally-packed tarballs. ZERO registry writes. Workspace deps
-# (brain/config/db/…) are pulled from the registry at the versions pinned in
-# each package.json — `pnpm pack` rewrites `workspace:*` to those versions.
-install_cli_from_source() {
-  local src="$EXTRACTED_DIR"
-  local out_dir="$WORK_DIR/dist-tarballs"
-  mkdir -p "$out_dir"
-
-  # pnpm via corepack (ships with Node >= 16.9; required by Node >= 20 preflight).
-  # Pin to the repo's packageManager version so the build matches CI. Surface
-  # corepack failures so the fresh-machine case gives an actionable error
-  # instead of a bare "command not found".
-  if ! command -v pnpm &>/dev/null; then
-    info "Activating pnpm via corepack…"
-    corepack enable 2>&1 | sed 's/^/  /' || warn "corepack enable failed — pnpm may need manual install."
-    corepack prepare pnpm@10.6.2 --activate 2>&1 | sed 's/^/  /' \
-      || warn "corepack prepare failed — pnpm may need manual install."
-  fi
-  if ! command -v pnpm &>/dev/null; then
-    fail "pnpm not available after corepack activation."
-    echo "  Install pnpm manually (https://pnpm.io/installation) and re-run with --dev."
-    exit 1
-  fi
-
-  info "Installing workspace dependencies (pnpm install)…"
-  ( cd "$src" && pnpm install ) 2>&1 | sed 's/^/  /'
-
-  info "Building CLI + gateway from source…"
-  ( cd "$src" && pnpm --filter "@mosaicstack/mosaic..." --filter "@mosaicstack/gateway..." run build ) 2>&1 | sed 's/^/  /'
-
-  info "Packing local tarballs…"
-  ( cd "$src/packages/mosaic" && pnpm pack --pack-destination "$out_dir" ) 2>&1 | sed 's/^/  /'
-  ( cd "$src/apps/gateway"    && pnpm pack --pack-destination "$out_dir" ) 2>&1 | sed 's/^/  /'
-
-  local cli_tgz gw_tgz
-  cli_tgz="$(ls -1t "$out_dir"/mosaicstack-mosaic-*.tgz 2>/dev/null | head -1)"
-  gw_tgz="$(ls -1t "$out_dir"/mosaicstack-gateway-*.tgz 2>/dev/null | head -1)"
-
-  if [[ ! -f "$cli_tgz" ]]; then
-    fail "CLI tarball was not produced by pnpm pack."
-    exit 1
-  fi
-  if [[ ! -f "$gw_tgz" ]]; then
-    fail "Gateway tarball was not produced by pnpm pack."
-    exit 1
-  fi
-
-  # Gateway first so it is present globally before the CLI's wizard runs (which
-  # skips its own gateway install via MOSAIC_GATEWAY_SKIP_NPM_INSTALL=1).
-  info "Installing gateway from source tarball (global)…"
-  npm install -g "$gw_tgz" --prefix="$PREFIX" 2>&1 | sed 's/^/  /'
-
-  info "Installing CLI from source tarball (global)…"
-  npm install -g "$cli_tgz" --prefix="$PREFIX" 2>&1 | sed 's/^/  /'
-
-  ok "Installed from source: CLI $(installed_cli_version)"
-}
-
 # ─── preflight ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 
 require_cmd node
@@ -398,8 +282,25 @@ if [[ "$FLAG_FRAMEWORK" == "true" ]]; then
       warn "Framework not installed."
     fi
   else
-    # Download repo archive and extract framework (shared with the dev build)
-    ensure_monorepo
+    # Download repo archive and extract framework
+    require_cmd tar
+
+    WORK_DIR="$(mktemp -d "${TMPDIR:-/tmp}/mosaic-install-XXXXXX")"
+    cleanup_work() { rm -rf "$WORK_DIR"; }
+    trap cleanup_work EXIT
+
+    info "Downloading framework from ${GIT_REF}…"
+    if command -v curl &>/dev/null; then
+      curl -fsSL "$ARCHIVE_URL" | tar xz -C "$WORK_DIR"
+    elif command -v wget &>/dev/null; then
+      wget -qO- "$ARCHIVE_URL" | tar xz -C "$WORK_DIR"
+    else
+      fail "curl or wget required to download framework."
+      exit 1
+    fi
+
+    # Gitea archives extract to <repo-name>/ inside the work dir
+    EXTRACTED_DIR="$(find "$WORK_DIR" -maxdepth 1 -mindepth 1 -type d | head -1)"
     FRAMEWORK_SRC="$EXTRACTED_DIR/packages/mosaic/framework"
 
     if [[ ! -d "$FRAMEWORK_SRC" ]]; then
@@ -455,11 +356,7 @@ if [[ "$FLAG_CLI" == "true" ]]; then
   fi
 
   CURRENT="$(installed_cli_version)"
-  if [[ "$FLAG_DEV" == "true" ]]; then
-    LATEST=""
-  else
-    LATEST="$(latest_cli_version)"
-  fi
+  LATEST="$(latest_cli_version)"
 
   if [[ -n "$CURRENT" ]]; then
     dim "  Installed: ${CLI_PKG}@${CURRENT}"
@@ -467,9 +364,7 @@ if [[ "$FLAG_CLI" == "true" ]]; then
     dim "  Installed: (none)"
   fi
 
-  if [[ "$FLAG_DEV" == "true" ]]; then
-    dim "  Source:    ${REPO_BASE} (ref: ${GIT_REF}, build-from-source)"
-  elif [[ -n "$LATEST" ]]; then
+  if [[ -n "$LATEST" ]]; then
     dim "  Latest:    ${CLI_PKG}@${LATEST}"
   else
     dim "  Latest:    (registry unreachable)"
@@ -477,9 +372,7 @@ if [[ "$FLAG_CLI" == "true" ]]; then
   echo ""
 
   if [[ "$FLAG_CHECK" == "true" ]]; then
-    if [[ "$FLAG_DEV" == "true" ]]; then
-      info "Dev mode: installed version is ${CURRENT:-(none)} (no registry comparison)."
-    elif [[ -z "$LATEST" ]]; then
+    if [[ -z "$LATEST" ]]; then
       warn "Could not reach registry."
     elif [[ -z "$CURRENT" ]]; then
       warn "Not installed."
@@ -490,16 +383,6 @@ if [[ "$FLAG_CLI" == "true" ]]; then
     else
       ok "Up to date (or ahead of registry)."
     fi
-  elif [[ "$FLAG_DEV" == "true" ]]; then
-    info "Dev mode — building CLI + gateway from source at ref ${GIT_REF}…"
-    ensure_monorepo
-    install_cli_from_source
-
-    # PATH check for npm prefix
-    if [[ ":$PATH:" != *":$PREFIX/bin:"* ]]; then
-      warn "$PREFIX/bin is not on your PATH"
-      dim "  Add to your shell rc:  export PATH=\"$PREFIX/bin:\$PATH\""
-    fi
   else
     if [[ -z "$LATEST" ]]; then
       warn "Could not reach registry at $REGISTRY — skipping npm CLI."