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- [Logical identity and connector lease/fencing implementation](https://git.mosaicstack.dev/mosaicstack/stack/issues/755)
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- [M1 logical identity and fencing architecture](architecture/mos-runtime-portability-m1.md)
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- [M1 connector lease operations](guides/mos-connector-lease-operations.md)
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## Comms evolution — Matrix-native MACP (design, draft)
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- [RFC-001 — MACP: a Mosaic-native, Matrix-native comms layer](rfcs/RFC-001-MACP-MATRIX-NATIVE.md) — Synapse + Mosaic appservice backbone, MACP v1 protocol, presence/escalation, federation, strangler migration off the Hermes MCP bridge.
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- [RFC-002 — Install, configuration & topology for the Matrix/MACP comms system](rfcs/RFC-002-INSTALL-CONFIG-TOPOLOGY.md) — open-source install topology modes, ACME cert provisioning, pluggable secret backend, and config precedence.
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docs/rfcs/RFC-001-MACP-MATRIX-NATIVE.md
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docs/rfcs/RFC-001-MACP-MATRIX-NATIVE.md
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# RFC-001 — MACP: A Mosaic-Native, Matrix-Native Comms Layer
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- **Status:** DRAFT — for Team Lead → Orchestrator staffing
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- **Author:** MS-LEAD (reviewer identity `ms-lead-reviewer`)
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- **Sponsor / veto:** Jason (human lead)
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- **Date:** 2026-07-24
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- **Program:** Mosaic Stack comms-evolution
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- **Supersedes backbone:** the Hermes MCP chat bridge (strangler-retired, see §9)
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- **Audience:** Team Leads, the Mosaic orchestrator, infra, and any harness maintainer (Claude Code / Codex / Pi / Goose)
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> This is a **design document**. No code ships from this RFC. It exists to be decomposed into missions (P1→P5, §10) with per-phase acceptance criteria. Where a claim is uncertain or needs live validation, it is flagged **[VERIFY]**.
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---
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## 0. TL;DR
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We are building a **Mosaic-native comms layer on Matrix**. We self-host a **Synapse** homeserver and register a privileged **Mosaic Application Service** (the "appservice") that the orchestrator controls. The appservice bulk-provisions one Matrix identity per agent-spin, creates and manages rooms, posts agent introductions, and tracks presence/liveness. Agents talk to it through a thin `packages/comms` client SDK. **tmux stays the P0 same-host fast path**; Matrix is the durable, presence-aware, federated layer above it, and **MACP** (the Mosaic Agent Comms Protocol) is the standard that says which path to use when. Federation is **per-site Synapse homeservers federated over TLS we control** — a direct answer to "the homelab agent went dark and took comms with it." We adopt **Buzz's patterns** (auto-detect/enroll, signed identity, unified event log, humans-and-agents on one surface) without adopting Buzz/Nostr as transport. We migrate off Hermes by the **strangler** pattern: stand native alongside, move channels as proven, retire at parity.
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The **first standalone shippable slice is presence** (P1).
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---
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## 1. Goals / Non-Goals
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### 1.1 Goals
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- **G1 — Presence & liveness first.** A Team Lead must be able to answer "is my coordinator online, away, or dead?" in seconds, not by polling for 13 hours. Presence is the P1 slice and ships before anything else.
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- **G2 — A native backbone we own.** Replace _Hermes-as-backbone_ with a self-hosted Synapse + a Mosaic-controlled appservice. External chat bridging becomes an optional edge, not the spine.
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- **G3 — Turnkey harness enrollment.** `mosaic enroll` auto-detects the harness and self-registers the agent via the appservice on spin. No hand-rolled per-bot identity juggling.
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- **G4 — A real protocol (MACP v1).** Structured, versioned event schema over Matrix custom event types; a documented routing contract for tmux vs Matrix; a documented escalation policy.
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- **G5 — No central SPOF.** Per-site homeservers federated over TLS/DNS we already control, so one site going dark cannot take the fleet's comms with it.
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- **G6 — Gate-action integrity.** Reviews / merges / approvals carry **signed authorship** (Buzz pattern) so a gate-critical action is cryptographically attributable, retiring the fragile "distinct bot identity" juggling.
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### 1.2 Non-Goals
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- **NG1 — Do NOT rip out working comms mid-MVP.** tmux fast-path and the existing `mos-comms` git-branch channel keep working until their replacement is proven at parity. This RFC is strangler, not big-bang.
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- **NG2 — tmux is NOT being replaced.** tmux inter-agent comms remains **P0**. Matrix is _above_ it, not instead of it. MACP defines the boundary; it does not move it.
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- **NG3 — Not adopting Buzz/Nostr as transport.** We adopt Buzz's _patterns_; the wire is Matrix.
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- **NG4 — Not building a new chat client in P1–P4.** HIL uses an existing Matrix client (Element or equivalent) until/unless a custom client is justified (open question, §11).
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- **NG5 — Not federating to the public Matrix network.** Federation is Mosaic-site-to-Mosaic-site over infrastructure we control. Public `matrix.org` federation is out of scope (and should likely be firewalled off).
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- **NG6 — Not a Hermes feature-clone.** We reach _parity on the channels that matter_ (§9 checklist), not bug-for-bug Hermes compatibility.
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---
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## 2. Architecture
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### 2.1 Layer diagram
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```
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┌───────────────────────────────────────────────┐
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│ HUMAN (Jason / HIL) │
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│ Element (or custom client) — §11 │
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└───────────────────────┬───────────────────────┘
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│ (same Matrix surface as agents)
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│
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┌──────────────────────────────────────────────▼──────────────────────────────────────────────┐
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│ SYNAPSE HOMESERVER (self-hosted, ours) │
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│ - Client-Server API (agents + humans send/receive events) │
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│ - Application Service API (privileged AS hooks: transactions, user/room namespaces) │
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│ - Presence EDUs, receipts, typing │
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│ - Federation API (S2S) over TLS ── to peer site homeservers (§6, P4) │
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└───────▲───────────────────────────────────▲──────────────────────────────────────▲───────────┘
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│ AS API (hs_token / as_token) │ C-S API (per-agent access_token) │ S2S
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│ │ │
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┌───────┴───────────────────────┐ ┌────────┴─────────────────┐ ┌─────────┴──────────┐
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│ MOSAIC APPSERVICE │ │ packages/comms (SDK) │ │ PEER SITE Synapse │
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│ (apps/matrix-appservice) │ │ used by every harness │ │ (site-B, site-C…) │
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│ THE "native layer" │ │ - login/whoami │ │ own appservice │
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│ replacing Hermes-backbone │ │ - send MACP events │ │ own agents │
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│ │ │ - subscribe/sync │ └────────────────────┘
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│ - bulk-provision MXIDs │◄───┤ - presence heartbeat │
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│ (@mosaic_<agent>:site) │ │ - signed-authorship │
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│ - create/manage rooms │ │ envelope (gate acts) │
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│ - post introductions │ └────────────┬─────────────┘
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│ - track presence/liveness │ │ in-process / IPC
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│ - enforce room taxonomy │ ┌─────────▼──────────────────────────────────────────┐
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│ - escalation watchdog (§5) │ │ AGENT HARNESS │
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│ - controlled by ORCHESTRATOR │ │ Claude Code / Codex / Pi / Goose │
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└───────▲───────────────────────┘ │ `mosaic enroll` runs on spin (§4.1) │
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│ orchestrator drives AS └─────────┬───────────────────────────────────────────┘
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┌───────┴───────────────────────┐ │
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│ MOSAIC ORCHESTRATOR │ │ P0 FAST PATH (same host, low-latency)
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│ (~/.config/mosaic) │ ┌─────────▼──────────┐ tmux send-keys / pane I/O
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│ spins agents, owns rooms, │◄──────►│ tmux (P0) │◄─►│ peer agent on same host │
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│ sets escalation policy │ MACP └────────────────────┘ └─────────────────────────┘
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└───────────────────────────────┘ routing rules decide tmux vs Matrix per message (§4.6)
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```
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Key idea: **the appservice is the backbone.** It is a long-lived privileged process registered with Synapse via an appservice registration file (`hs_token`/`as_token`, namespaces). It is the thing that used to be "Hermes-as-backbone," except we own it, it is inside the orchestrator's control plane, and it speaks native Matrix.
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### 2.2 Message flow: agent spin-up → auto-enroll → room join → introduction → presence-online
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```
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Orchestrator Harness (mosaic enroll) Mosaic Appservice Synapse
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│ │ │ │
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1. spin agent ─────────────────► │ │ │
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│ │ 2. auto-detect harness │ │
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│ │ (Claude/Codex/Pi/Goose) │ │
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│ │ 3. POST /enroll {agent meta} ─► │
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│ │ │ 4. provision MXID │
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│ │ │ @mosaic_<agent>:site │
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│ │ │ via AS API register ─► (201, in namespace)
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│ │ │ 5. mint access_token │
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│ │ 6. ◄── {mxid, token, rooms}──┤ (or as_token masq) │
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│ │ │ 7. invite+join rooms ─► (mission/team/fleet)
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│ │ 8. /sync (via packages/comms)─────────────────────────► (joined state)
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│ │ │ 9. post introduction ─► m.room.message +
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│ │ │ (mosaic.introduction) custom event → rooms
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│ │ 10. set presence ONLINE ─────────────────────────────► presence EDU
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│ │ 11. start heartbeat loop │ │
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│ │ (mosaic.presence ping) │ │
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│ 12. appservice reports agent │ │ │
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│ ◄──── live in fleet room ────┤ (watchdog now tracks liveness) │
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```
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Notes on the steps that matter:
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- **Step 4/5** use the **Application Service API**: the appservice can register users inside its namespace (`@mosaic_*:site`) and act on their behalf. Two viable modes: (a) mint a real per-agent `access_token` via appservice login, or (b) have the appservice **masquerade** using `user_id` query param on C-S calls with the `as_token`. **Recommendation: mint per-agent tokens** for P2 so the agent process holds only its own credential (blast-radius containment, §8); reserve masquerade for bulk/bootstrap operations the appservice itself performs. **[VERIFY]** exact token-lifetime and refresh behavior against the running Synapse version.
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- **Step 9** — the introduction is both a human-readable `m.room.message` _and_ a structured `mosaic.introduction` custom event (so other agents can machine-parse capabilities without scraping prose).
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- **Step 10/11** — presence goes online immediately, then a **heartbeat** keeps liveness fresh. Native Matrix presence auto-decays to `unavailable`/`offline`, but we do **not** rely solely on it (Synapse presence timeouts are coarse and federation presence is lossy **[VERIFY]**); MACP adds an explicit `mosaic.presence` heartbeat event for deterministic liveness (§4.5, §5).
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---
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## 3. Repo-home decision (RESOLVED — recommendation)
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The core tension: **product monorepo** (`mosaicstack/stack`, this checkout `/src/mosaic-stack`) vs **framework** (`~/.config/mosaic`, the agent/harness runtime that every agent shares regardless of product). The boundary rule I am ratifying:
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> **Product-monorepo owns the deployed _services and libraries_. Framework owns the _agent/harness contract_ — anything an agent needs the moment it spins, before any product code is checked out.**
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Applying that rule:
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| Piece | Home | Rationale |
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| ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
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| **Synapse deployment** (compose/helm, config, TLS, `.well-known`, pipelines) | **Product monorepo** → `infra/matrix/` + CI in the monorepo's pipeline dir | It is deployed infrastructure with the same lifecycle/observability as Gateway/Web/DB. Lives beside other `infra/` and Woodpecker pipelines. |
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| **Mosaic Appservice** | **Product monorepo** → `apps/matrix-appservice` | It is a first-class deployed service (NestJS-style app, same conventions: ESM, `@Inject()`, DTOs, OTEL-before-bootstrap). It talks to Synapse, holds `hs_token`/`as_token`, and is operated like any other app. It is **controlled by** the orchestrator but **is not** the orchestrator. |
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| **Client SDK** | **Product monorepo** → `packages/comms` | A workspace library consumed by product apps _and_ by harnesses. Published/linked like `packages/queue`, `packages/db`. Versioned with the product. |
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| **MACP spec** (the standard doc + JSON schemas) | **Framework** → `~/.config/mosaic/spec/macp/` (mirrored/vendored into `packages/comms` at build) | The protocol is an agent-level contract that must exist independent of any one product checkout. Framework is the source of truth; `packages/comms` vendors a pinned copy so the SDK and spec cannot drift silently. |
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| **`mosaic enroll` harness glue** (auto-detect, spin hook) | **Framework** → `~/.config/mosaic/tools/enroll/` | Agents/harnesses are framework-level. Enrollment must run _before_ the agent has product context; it cannot depend on `/src/mosaic-stack` being present. This is exactly parallel to the existing `~/.config/mosaic/tools/*` wrappers. |
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**Boundary summary:** _the wire and the services are product; the contract and the spin-time glue are framework._ The one deliberate coupling is **MACP**: framework is authoritative, but `packages/comms` pins a vendored copy and CI fails if they diverge, so an agent enrolling via framework and a service validating via `packages/comms` agree on the schema by construction.
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**Rejected alternative:** putting the appservice in the framework. Rejected because the appservice is a stateful, deployed, secret-holding network service that needs the product's CI/observability/secret plumbing; burying it in `~/.config/mosaic` would split its operational story from every other Mosaic service.
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---
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## 4. MACP v1 — the standard
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MACP (Mosaic Agent Comms Protocol) v1 is a **profile of Matrix**: it does not invent a transport, it constrains how Mosaic agents use Matrix so that behavior is uniform across harnesses. Versioned via a `macp_version` field on every custom event; v1 is frozen at ratification (P3).
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### 4.1 Enrollment contract
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`mosaic enroll` MUST, on agent spin, in order:
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1. **Auto-detect harness.** Detection order + signal:
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- Claude Code — presence of the Claude Code runtime/env (e.g. `CLAUDE_CODE_*` env, `~/.claude`) **[VERIFY exact signal per harness]**
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- Codex — Codex runtime markers
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- Pi — Pi SDK runtime (`packages/agent` / `packages/mosaic` context)
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- Goose — Goose runtime markers
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- Fallback: explicit `--harness` flag; if undetectable, enroll as `generic` and warn.
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2. **Provision identity** — call appservice `POST /enroll` with `{agent_slug, harness, host, mission_id?, team_id?, capabilities[]}`. Appservice returns `{mxid, access_token, homeserver, rooms[]}` (§2.2 step 4–6).
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3. **Join rooms** — accept invites / join the returned room set per taxonomy (§4.6).
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4. **Introduce** — post `mosaic.introduction` (+ human-readable `m.room.message`) to each joined room.
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5. **Go present** — set Matrix presence `online` and start the `mosaic.presence` heartbeat loop.
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Enrollment is **idempotent**: re-running `mosaic enroll` for an existing agent slug rebinds to the same MXID (re-mints token if needed) rather than creating a duplicate identity. This is what retires the "distinct bot identity juggling."
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### 4.2 Structured event schema (Matrix custom event types)
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All MACP events carry a common envelope in `content`:
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```jsonc
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{
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"macp_version": "1.0",
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"macp_type": "<see below>",
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"agent": { "mxid": "@mosaic_teamlead-3:site-a", "slug": "teamlead-3", "harness": "claude-code" },
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"ts": 1753300000000,
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"mission_id": "KBN-101", // optional
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"signature": { ... } // present ONLY for gate actions, §4.4
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// ...type-specific fields...
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}
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```
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Event types (Matrix `type` shown; timeline events use `m.room.message` with a custom `msgtype` where a human-visible fallback is desirable, state events use a dotted custom `type`):
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| MACP type | Matrix carrier | Purpose | Notable fields |
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| --------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | -------------------------------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
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| **message** | `m.room.message`, `msgtype: "mosaic.message"` (+ `body` fallback) | ordinary agent/human chat | `body`, `thread?` |
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| **presence** | `m.room.message` msgtype `mosaic.presence` in fleet room **or** custom EDU-backed state | heartbeat/liveness ping | `status: online\|away\|offline`, `seq`, `interval_ms` |
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| **workflow-step** | state event `mosaic.workflow.step` (state_key = step id) | durable record of a workflow/mission step | `step`, `status: started\|blocked\|done\|failed`, `detail` |
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| **review / approval** | `m.room.message` msgtype `mosaic.review` | a review verdict or merge/approval | `subject` (PR/commit ref), `verdict: approve\|reject\|request-changes`, `signature` (REQUIRED) |
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| **escalation** | `m.room.message` msgtype `mosaic.escalation` | raise a stuck/dark condition to HIL/fallback | `reason`, `target`, `severity`, `since_ts` |
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Rationale for the carrier split: **timeline events** (`m.room.message` variants) are the durable, receipted, replayable log (this _is_ Buzz's "unified event log," §7). **State events** (`mosaic.workflow.step`, presence-as-state) give last-writer-wins current status that a newly-joined agent reads instantly from room state without replaying history.
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Every custom event is validated against a JSON Schema shipped in the MACP spec (§3). Unknown/newer `macp_version` → consumers MUST degrade gracefully (render `body`, ignore unknown fields).
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### 4.3 Agent identity model
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- **MXID:** appservice-namespaced `@mosaic_<slug>:<site-domain>`. The `mosaic_` prefix is the AS **user namespace** declared in the registration file (`namespaces.users` regex `@mosaic_.*`), so Synapse routes those users to our appservice and no human can squat the namespace.
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- **Provisioning:** exclusively via the appservice (AS API register). Never hand-created. One MXID per agent-spin; idempotent rebind on re-enroll (§4.1).
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- **Signed authorship** overlays identity for gate actions only (§4.4). MXID answers "who is this account"; signature answers "did the real key-holder authorize this gate action."
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### 4.4 Signed-authorship for gate-critical actions (Buzz pattern, scoped)
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Gate-critical = **reviews, merges, approvals** — anything that can move code to `main` or unblock a mission gate.
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- Each enrolled agent is issued (or generates) an **Ed25519 keypair**; the **public** key is registered with the appservice at enrollment and published as agent profile state (`mosaic.identity.pubkey`). Private key custody per §8.
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- A gate action event carries `content.signature = { alg: "ed25519", key_id, sig }` over a canonical serialization of the envelope (canonical-JSON of `{macp_type, agent.mxid, subject, verdict, ts, mission_id}`).
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- Verifiers (the appservice gate-watcher, and any agent acting on a verdict) MUST reject an unsigned or bad-signature gate event. Non-gate events are unsigned (keeps the hot path cheap).
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This is deliberately **narrow**: we do not sign every chat line (Buzz signs everything; we take the pattern only where forgery has teeth). Scope may widen post-P5 if warranted.
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### 4.5 Presence & liveness model
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Three visible states plus an explicit heartbeat:
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- **online** — agent set presence online AND last `mosaic.presence` heartbeat within `heartbeat_interval` (default **30s [VERIFY tuning]**) × miss-tolerance (default 2).
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- **away** — presence `unavailable`, or heartbeats late but < dark threshold.
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- **offline / dark** — no heartbeat for `dark_threshold` (default **N minutes**, policy value, §5/§11) OR presence `offline`.
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Why not rely on native Matrix presence alone: Synapse presence is (a) coarse-grained, (b) can be disabled for load reasons, and (c) **degrades across federation** **[VERIFY]**. So MACP layers an explicit heartbeat carried as a lightweight timeline/state event in the **fleet presence room**, giving a deterministic, federation-safe liveness signal the escalation watchdog (§5) can reason about. Native presence EDUs are still emitted (they make Element show the right dot for humans) but the _authoritative_ liveness source is the heartbeat.
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### 4.6 Room / channel taxonomy (orchestrator-owned)
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The **orchestrator** (via the appservice) owns room lifecycle. Agents never create backbone rooms ad hoc.
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| Room | Scope | Membership | Purpose |
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| ----------------------- | ------------------------------------------ | ---------------------------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------- |
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| **Fleet presence room** | one per site (federated view across sites) | every enrolled agent + HIL | heartbeats, the single "who's alive" board. This is the P1 deliverable. |
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| **Per-mission room** | one per mission (e.g. `#mission-KBN-101`) | agents on that mission + Team Lead + HIL | workflow-steps, mission chat, reviews for that mission |
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| **Per-team room** | one per team | team members + Team Lead | intra-team coordination |
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| **HIL room** | one (or one per site) | humans + escalation-privileged agents | where escalations land; Jason's pane on the fleet |
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Rooms are created with orchestrator-controlled power levels: appservice = admin (PL100), Team Leads elevated, worker agents default. Room aliases (`#mission-KBN-101:site-a`) are stable handles.
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### 4.7 tmux ↔ Matrix routing rules (the fast-path/durable boundary)
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MACP mandates this decision per message. **Default bias: if it must survive the agent, be seen by an offline party, cross a host, or be audited — Matrix. If it is same-host, synchronous, and ephemeral — tmux.**
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| Signal | Route | Why |
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||||
| ---------------------------------------------------------------- | ---------------------------------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
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||||
| Same-host, live pane-to-pane prompt/nudge, sub-second need | **tmux (P0)** | lowest latency, no server round-trip; this is the working fast path we keep |
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||||
| Recipient may be offline / on another host | **Matrix** | durability + store-and-forward; tmux can't reach a dark or remote pane |
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||||
| Presence / heartbeat / liveness | **Matrix** | must be observable fleet-wide, including by the watchdog and HIL |
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||||
| Workflow-step, review/approval, escalation | **Matrix** | must be durable, receipted, auditable, signed (gate acts) |
|
||||
| Cross-site anything | **Matrix (federated)** | tmux is same-host only |
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||||
| Bulk log spew / high-frequency scratch between co-located agents | **tmux**, with periodic **Matrix** checkpoints | avoid flooding the durable log; keep an audit checkpoint |
|
||||
|
||||
Rule of thumb encoded in the SDK: `comms.send()` takes a `durability` hint; `ephemeral+same-host` short-circuits to tmux, everything else goes Matrix. A message can be **dual-routed** (tmux for immediacy + a Matrix checkpoint) when both speed and durability matter.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 5. Coordinator-availability + HIL escalation (the 13h-stall / homelab-dark fix)
|
||||
|
||||
**The failure we are killing:** a Team Lead blocked ~13h, polling every 15 min, unable to distinguish "coordinator offline" from "coordinator busy"; and a homelab agent that goes dark taking comms with it.
|
||||
|
||||
**The fix — presence-driven, policy-encoded escalation:**
|
||||
|
||||
1. **Deterministic liveness (§4.5).** Every agent heartbeats into the fleet presence room. The appservice **escalation watchdog** subscribes and maintains `last_seen` per agent. No polling by the Team Lead — it _subscribes_ (Matrix `/sync` long-poll) and is pushed state changes.
|
||||
|
||||
2. **Encoded policy in MACP:** a machine-readable escalation policy attached to each agent/role, e.g.:
|
||||
|
||||
```jsonc
|
||||
{
|
||||
"role": "team-lead",
|
||||
"coordinator": "@mosaic_coordinator-1:site-a",
|
||||
"dark_threshold_min": 10, // OPEN QUESTION §11 — Jason/Mos to set N
|
||||
"on_coordinator_dark": {
|
||||
"action": "escalate",
|
||||
"fallback": "@mosaic_coordinator-2:site-b", // cross-site fallback
|
||||
"then": "notify-HIL",
|
||||
"hil_room": "#hil:site-a",
|
||||
},
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
3. **Detection & action by the Team Lead:** when the watchdog (or the Team Lead's own SDK) observes `coordinator.last_seen > dark_threshold`, it:
|
||||
- emits a `mosaic.escalation` event into the mission room and the HIL room (`reason: "coordinator dark", since_ts, severity`),
|
||||
- **re-routes** to the declared fallback coordinator (possibly on another site — this is why federation matters),
|
||||
- if no fallback answers within a second threshold, pages **HIL** (Jason) in the HIL room.
|
||||
The Team Lead **never sits blocked polling**; a dark coordinator is a _pushed event_, and the fallback/HIL path is automatic.
|
||||
|
||||
4. **Homelab-dark specifically:** because heartbeats are federated into a cross-site fleet room, a whole _site_ going dark is visible from other sites — the watchdog on site-B sees site-A's coordinator stop heartbeating and triggers the same escalation. A dark homelab can no longer silently strand its agents, because the liveness signal and the fallback live _off that host_.
|
||||
|
||||
**Design invariant:** liveness authority and fallback targets must never be co-located with the thing they monitor. The watchdog for site-A's coordinator should also run (or be mirrored) on site-B.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 6. Federation (P4)
|
||||
|
||||
**Model:** each site runs its **own Synapse homeserver** with its **own Mosaic appservice** and its own agents. Sites **federate** with each other over the standard Matrix server-to-server (S2S) API, restricted to Mosaic sites.
|
||||
|
||||
**Why per-site, not one central server:**
|
||||
|
||||
- **No SPOF.** The homelab going dark is the founding trauma of this program. A single central homeserver would recreate exactly that risk at fleet scale. Per-site means a site outage is contained: its agents drop, but every other site's comms and the cross-site fleet room survive.
|
||||
- **Locality.** Same-site agents get low-latency local homeserver traffic; only cross-site events pay the federation cost.
|
||||
- **Blast radius.** A compromised or misbehaving site can be defederated without touching the rest.
|
||||
|
||||
**How federation is wired (real Matrix mechanics):**
|
||||
|
||||
- **Server discovery** via `https://<domain>/.well-known/matrix/server` returning `{"m.server": "matrix.<domain>:443"}`, and/or an `_matrix._tcp` **SRV** record. We control the DNS/domains, so we control the federation graph. **[VERIFY]** current `.well-known` vs SRV precedence for the deployed Synapse version.
|
||||
- **TLS:** federation requires valid TLS on the federation endpoint; we terminate with certs from our own CA/ACME on domains we own.
|
||||
- **Allowlist:** use Synapse `federation_domain_whitelist` to restrict federation to the set of Mosaic site domains — **no public-network federation** (NG5). This is a hard security boundary.
|
||||
- **Cross-site rooms:** the fleet presence room and any cross-mission rooms are federated rooms whose membership spans site homeservers. Room state replicates via S2S; presence heartbeats propagate as events (not relying on lossy presence EDUs across federation, §4.5).
|
||||
|
||||
**Cross-site identity:** an agent on site-B is `@mosaic_<slug>:site-b`. The signed-authorship pubkey travels in profile state, so a site-A verifier can validate a site-B agent's gate action without trusting site-B's homeserver blindly (signature ≠ homeserver trust).
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 7. Buzz-pattern adoption map
|
||||
|
||||
We adopt Buzz's **ideas**, on Matrix rails, phased:
|
||||
|
||||
| Buzz idea | Adopt? | How, on Matrix | Phase |
|
||||
| --------------------------------------------------- | ----------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------- |
|
||||
| **Harness auto-detect / enroll** | **Yes** | `mosaic enroll` detects Claude/Codex/Pi/Goose and self-registers via the appservice (§4.1) | P2 (enroll v1); scan-machine-and-offer-integrate is **v2** |
|
||||
| **Keypair signed identity** | **Yes, scoped** | Ed25519 signed-authorship on **gate actions only** (reviews/merges/approvals), pubkey in profile state (§4.4) | P5 (hardening); keys issued at enroll from P2 |
|
||||
| **Unified event log (humans + agents, one log)** | **Yes** | Matrix room timeline _is_ the unified, receipted, replayable event log; MACP custom events are first-class entries (§4.2) | P2→P3 |
|
||||
| **Humans and agents on the same surface** | **Yes** | HIL uses the same Matrix rooms via Element/custom client; escalations land where Jason already is (§4.6, §5) | P1 (fleet room) → P2 |
|
||||
| **Scan machine, offer to integrate existing tools** | **Deferred (v2)** | enroll v1 auto-detects the _harness_; scanning a host for other integratable tools is explicitly **enroll v2**, post-P5 | v2 |
|
||||
| **Buzz/Nostr as transport** | **No** | transport is Matrix; only patterns are borrowed (NG3) | — |
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 8. Security
|
||||
|
||||
- **Homeserver hardening.** Disable open registration (`enable_registration: false`); agents come only via the appservice. `federation_domain_whitelist` to Mosaic sites only (§6). Rate-limiting on. Media repo locked down or disabled if unused. Admin API bound to localhost / behind auth. Run Synapse behind our reverse proxy with TLS termination we control. **[VERIFY]** current recommended hardening flags for the deployed Synapse version.
|
||||
- **Appservice token custody (`hs_token` / `as_token`).** These are the crown jewels — `as_token` lets the holder act as any user in the namespace; `hs_token` authenticates the homeserver → appservice callbacks. They live **only** in the appservice's secret store (see Vault interaction below), never in an agent process, never in the SDK, never in git. Registration file (which contains them) is a secret artifact, mounted at deploy, not committed. Rotate on suspected exposure; rotation requires updating both Synapse's registration and the appservice.
|
||||
- **Per-agent credentials (the hard part — fleet key management).**
|
||||
- Agents hold **only their own** per-agent `access_token` (minted by the appservice at enroll), not the `as_token`. Compromise of one agent ≠ compromise of the namespace.
|
||||
- **Issuance:** at `mosaic enroll`, the appservice mints the token and returns it over the enroll channel (which must itself be authenticated — enroll requests carry a spin-time bootstrap secret / orchestrator-signed nonce **[VERIFY design in P2]**, so a random process can't enroll a rogue agent).
|
||||
- **Signed-authorship keys:** Ed25519 private keys should be generated agent-side and only the public key leaves the agent (best custody: private key never transits the network). Where agents are ephemeral, keys are minted per-spin and discarded on teardown; the pubkey-in-profile record remains for audit.
|
||||
- **Rotation:** tokens are short-lived where the Synapse version supports refresh **[VERIFY]**; otherwise the appservice supports explicit re-issue on re-enroll. A rotation runbook is a P2 deliverable.
|
||||
- **Federation TLS.** Valid certs on federation endpoints; whitelist-only federation; monitor for cert expiry (a cert lapse silently defederates a site — add to observability).
|
||||
- **Interaction with existing Vault/secrets.** The appservice's `hs_token`/`as_token` and the enroll bootstrap secret are stored in the existing secret manager (Vault or the project's chosen store — **open question §11**) and injected at deploy, consistent with how Gateway/DB secrets are handled today. No new bespoke secret store. Per-agent tokens are _transient runtime_ secrets, not persisted to Vault (they're re-mintable). **[VERIFY]** current Mosaic secret-management choice — the CLAUDE.md notes secrets/KBN work in flight, so align with whatever KBN-101 lands.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 9. Migration — strangler off Hermes
|
||||
|
||||
**Principle:** stand the native layer up _alongside_ Hermes, move channels over **as each is proven at parity**, retire Hermes only when the parity checklist is green. Never a flag-day cutover (NG1).
|
||||
|
||||
**Sequence:**
|
||||
|
||||
1. **Stand alongside.** Native Synapse + appservice + fleet presence room live in parallel; Hermes still carries everything it carries today. Presence (P1) is _additive_ — it gives us something Hermes never had, at zero risk to existing flows.
|
||||
2. **Move channels as proven.** Per channel (fleet presence → mission coordination → reviews/approvals → external-chat edge), cut traffic to Matrix, keep Hermes as hot fallback until the channel meets parity for a soak period.
|
||||
3. **Retire at parity.** When every checklist item is green and soaked, decommission the Hermes MCP bridge as backbone. (External chat platforms, if still needed, can be re-attached as a _bridge at the edge_ of Matrix rather than the spine.)
|
||||
|
||||
**Parity checklist (must all be green before Hermes retires):**
|
||||
|
||||
- [ ] Every message class Hermes carries today has a MACP equivalent (message, review/approval, escalation, workflow-step).
|
||||
- [ ] Presence/liveness is strictly better than today (it is: today = none).
|
||||
- [ ] Cross-site delivery works over federation with no central SPOF.
|
||||
- [ ] HIL (Jason) can see and act on escalations on the Matrix surface.
|
||||
- [ ] Signed-authorship enforced on gate actions (no unsigned merge/approve accepted).
|
||||
- [ ] `mosaic enroll` auto-onboards all four harnesses (Claude/Codex/Pi/Goose) with zero manual identity setup.
|
||||
- [ ] Delivery receipts / durability demonstrably ≥ Hermes (no lost messages over a soak window).
|
||||
- [ ] Runbooks exist: appservice token rotation, site defederation, dark-site escalation, homeserver restore.
|
||||
- [ ] Observability: appservice + Synapse traced into OTEL/Jaeger like the rest of the stack.
|
||||
- [ ] Rollback path documented (re-enable Hermes channel) for the soak period.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 10. Phased delivery plan (P1 → P5) with acceptance criteria
|
||||
|
||||
> This section is the decomposition surface: each phase → one or more missions for the orchestrator.
|
||||
|
||||
### P1 — Presence / availability on a minimal single-site Synapse _(the first standalone shippable slice)_
|
||||
|
||||
**Scope:** one Synapse homeserver, a **minimal** appservice (or even a scripted provisioner) whose only job is: register a handful of agent MXIDs, create the **fleet presence room**, and carry heartbeats; a minimal `packages/comms` slice that sets presence and heartbeats; native presence surfaced to a human via Element.
|
||||
**Acceptance criteria:**
|
||||
|
||||
- A1. Single-site Synapse deployed (`infra/matrix/`), reachable over TLS, open registration OFF.
|
||||
- A2. ≥3 agents enroll (even if semi-manually) and appear in a **fleet presence room** with a live online/away/offline indicator.
|
||||
- A3. `mosaic.presence` heartbeat implemented; an agent killed hard flips to **offline/dark** within `dark_threshold` deterministically (not dependent on native presence timeout alone).
|
||||
- A4. A human (Jason) can open Element, join the fleet room, and see fleet liveness at a glance.
|
||||
- A5. Zero impact to existing tmux + `mos-comms` flows (they still work untouched).
|
||||
|
||||
### P2 — Native appservice + orchestrator auto-enroll / room-provisioning
|
||||
|
||||
**Scope:** full **`apps/matrix-appservice`** registered with Synapse (`hs_token`/`as_token`, namespaces); `mosaic enroll` harness auto-detect; orchestrator-owned room taxonomy; per-agent token minting; introductions.
|
||||
**Acceptance criteria:**
|
||||
|
||||
- B1. Appservice registered with Synapse via registration file; owns `@mosaic_*` user namespace and room-alias namespace.
|
||||
- B2. `mosaic enroll` auto-detects all four harnesses (Claude/Codex/Pi/Goose) and self-registers on spin, idempotently.
|
||||
- B3. On spin, an agent is provisioned an MXID, minted its **own** access token, joined to the correct mission/team/fleet rooms, and posts a `mosaic.introduction`.
|
||||
- B4. Orchestrator can create/destroy mission & team rooms with correct power levels via the appservice.
|
||||
- B5. Enroll bootstrap is authenticated (a rogue local process cannot enroll a rogue agent).
|
||||
- B6. Appservice + Synapse traced into OTEL/Jaeger.
|
||||
|
||||
### P3 — MACP v1 spec ratified
|
||||
|
||||
**Scope:** freeze the standard (§4): envelope, event types + JSON Schemas, identity model, presence model, room taxonomy, tmux↔Matrix routing rules. Spec lives in framework (`~/.config/mosaic/spec/macp`), vendored+pinned into `packages/comms` with CI drift-check.
|
||||
**Acceptance criteria:**
|
||||
|
||||
- C1. MACP v1 document ratified (MS-LEAD sign-off, Jason veto window closed).
|
||||
- C2. JSON Schemas for all five event types published; `packages/comms` validates outbound/inbound against them.
|
||||
- C3. CI fails if framework spec and vendored `packages/comms` copy diverge.
|
||||
- C4. Routing-rule conformance test: SDK provably sends ephemeral+same-host over tmux, everything else over Matrix.
|
||||
- C5. Unknown-`macp_version` graceful-degrade behavior tested.
|
||||
|
||||
### P4 — Federation
|
||||
|
||||
**Scope:** a second site homeserver + appservice; S2S federation over our DNS/TLS; cross-site fleet room; whitelist-only federation; cross-site escalation.
|
||||
**Acceptance criteria:**
|
||||
|
||||
- D1. Two sites federate via `.well-known`/SRV over TLS we control; `federation_domain_whitelist` restricts to Mosaic sites (no public federation).
|
||||
- D2. A cross-site fleet presence room shows agents from both sites; heartbeats propagate as events across federation.
|
||||
- D3. **Homelab-dark test:** killing site-A's coordinator is observed from site-B within `dark_threshold`, and the escalation/fallback fires cross-site (§5).
|
||||
- D4. Cross-site gate action: a site-B agent's signed review is verified by a site-A verifier.
|
||||
- D5. Defederation runbook proven (a site can be cut off cleanly).
|
||||
|
||||
### P5 — Buzz-hardening + signed-authorship + Hermes retired
|
||||
|
||||
**Scope:** Ed25519 signed-authorship enforced on gate actions; security hardening pass; complete the strangler and retire Hermes at parity.
|
||||
**Acceptance criteria:**
|
||||
|
||||
- E1. Every merge/approve/review gate action is signed; unsigned or bad-sig gate events are rejected by the appservice watcher and by consuming agents.
|
||||
- E2. Token/key rotation runbooks executed at least once in anger (rotate `as_token`, rotate a per-agent key).
|
||||
- E3. Security review complete: homeserver hardening flags, token custody, federation TLS/whitelist all verified.
|
||||
- E4. **Parity checklist (§9) fully green + soaked.**
|
||||
- E5. Hermes MCP bridge retired as backbone (optionally re-attached as an edge bridge only).
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 11. Open questions for Jason / Mos (need a human/coordinator ruling)
|
||||
|
||||
1. **DNS / domains per site.** What domain(s) do we own and want to use per site for homeserver names and `.well-known` (e.g. `site-a.mosaicstack.dev`)? Federation identity is permanent-ish once agents mint MXIDs against it — this needs a ruling **before P1 hardens** because MXIDs bake in the domain.
|
||||
2. **Secret-management choice.** Is it Vault, or whatever KBN-101 lands? The appservice `hs_token`/`as_token` and enroll bootstrap secret custody depend on this (§8). CLAUDE.md signals secrets work is in flight — need the authoritative target.
|
||||
3. **N-minute escalation threshold.** What is `dark_threshold_min` for a coordinator, and the second threshold before HIL is paged (§5)? Default proposed: 10 min → fallback, +5 min → HIL. Jason/Mos to confirm per role.
|
||||
4. **HIL client: Element vs custom.** Do humans use off-the-shelf **Element** (fast, free, P1-ready) or do we invest in a custom HIL client? Proposed: **Element for P1–P4**, revisit custom only if HIL ergonomics demand it.
|
||||
5. **Ephemeral vs persistent agent keys.** For signed-authorship, do we mint Ed25519 keys per-spin (simplest custody, no long-term private key at rest) or issue durable per-agent keys (stable identity across spins, but key-at-rest custody problem)? Proposed: **per-spin**, pubkey retained for audit.
|
||||
6. **Federation topology / trust.** Full mesh between all sites, or hub-and-spoke-with-redundancy? Full mesh maximizes no-SPOF but grows O(n²); needs a call once site count is known.
|
||||
7. **Fallback-coordinator assignment authority.** Who assigns each Team Lead's fallback coordinator, and is it always cross-site? (Design invariant §5 wants the fallback off the monitored host — confirm this is acceptable operationally.)
|
||||
8. **Retention / compliance.** How long do we retain the Matrix event log (the unified audit trail)? Affects Synapse storage sizing and any purge policy.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Appendix A — Real Matrix concepts this RFC leans on (quick reference)
|
||||
|
||||
- **Application Service (AS) API** — a privileged service registered with the homeserver via a registration YAML declaring `id`, `url`, `as_token`, `hs_token`, and `namespaces` (users/aliases/rooms regexes). The homeserver pushes events to the AS in transactions; the AS can register/act-as users in its namespace. _(This is our appservice backbone.)_
|
||||
- **`hs_token` / `as_token`** — `hs_token`: homeserver→AS authentication on pushed transactions; `as_token`: AS→homeserver authentication, grants acting-as any namespaced user. Both are high-value secrets (§8).
|
||||
- **Masquerade (`user_id` query param)** — the AS may act as a namespaced user on C-S calls using `as_token` + `?user_id=`. We prefer per-agent tokens for blast-radius; masquerade for AS-internal bulk ops.
|
||||
- **Custom event types** — timeline events via `m.room.message` with a custom `msgtype` (keeps a human-visible `body` fallback) and/or fully custom `type` (dotted, e.g. `mosaic.workflow.step`); **state events** for last-writer-wins current status readable from room state without history replay.
|
||||
- **Presence EDUs** — native online/unavailable/offline signals; coarse and lossy over federation, so MACP adds an explicit heartbeat event as the authoritative liveness source (§4.5).
|
||||
- **Federation (S2S API)** — server-to-server over TLS; discovery via `/.well-known/matrix/server` and/or `_matrix._tcp` SRV; restrictable with `federation_domain_whitelist`.
|
||||
- **Synapse config knobs cited** — `enable_registration`, `federation_domain_whitelist`, appservice registration file, rate-limiting, admin API binding. **[VERIFY]** exact flags/paths against the deployed Synapse version at implementation time.
|
||||
|
||||
_All Matrix mechanics above are cited from architecture knowledge and MUST be re-verified against the actual deployed Synapse version during P1 — every **[VERIFY]** in this document is a checkpoint, not an assumption._
|
||||
622
docs/rfcs/RFC-002-INSTALL-CONFIG-TOPOLOGY.md
Normal file
622
docs/rfcs/RFC-002-INSTALL-CONFIG-TOPOLOGY.md
Normal file
@@ -0,0 +1,622 @@
|
||||
# RFC-002 — Install, Configuration & Topology for the Mosaic Matrix/MACP Comms System
|
||||
|
||||
- **Status:** DRAFT — for Team Lead → Orchestrator staffing
|
||||
- **Author:** MS-LEAD (reviewer identity `ms-lead-reviewer`)
|
||||
- **Sponsor / veto:** Jason (human lead)
|
||||
- **Date:** 2026-07-24
|
||||
- **Program:** Mosaic Stack comms-evolution
|
||||
- **Companion to:** RFC-001 — _MACP: A Mosaic-Native, Matrix-Native Comms Layer_. RFC-001 is the architecture (self-hosted Synapse + Mosaic appservice backbone + `packages/comms` SDK + MACP standard + per-site federation). **RFC-002 is the config substrate the whole thing installs and runs on.**
|
||||
- **Audience:** Team Leads, the Mosaic orchestrator, infra, harness maintainers, and — critically — **strangers who install this open-source product on hardware we will never see.**
|
||||
|
||||
> This is a **design document**. No code ships from this RFC. It is written to be decomposed into missions with per-phase acceptance criteria, and it slots under RFC-001's P1→P5. Every uncertain or must-live-validate claim is flagged **[VERIFY]**.
|
||||
|
||||
> **The one framing that governs every decision below:** this is an **open-source product**. Someone we have never met will `git clone` it and run it on their own domains, their own DNS, their own certs, their own hardware. **NOTHING may hardcode our fleet's topology.** There is no `woltje.com` in the code, no assumption that DNS exists, no assumption that a second site exists. Every topology fact is **user-supplied config**. Where this doc uses `mosaic.woltje.com` / `mosaic.uscllc.com`, those are **illustrative operator values** (Jason's real installs), never defaults and never literals in the product.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 0. TL;DR
|
||||
|
||||
The comms system installs against a **user-supplied topology**, never a baked-in one. At install the operator declares exactly one of **three topology modes**: **(A) split-domain** (identity `server_name` ≠ homeserver host, wired via Matrix delegation — this is Jason's `mosaic.woltje.com` identity + `matrix.woltje.com` host setup), **(B) single-domain** (`server_name` == homeserver host), or **(C) IP-only standalone** (no DNS, no federation, fully supported for local/airgapped). **The PRIMARY/home instance is ALWAYS configured; federation is OPTIONAL.** A single standalone instance MUST work with zero federation.
|
||||
|
||||
**Federation is a hard-gated capability: it REQUIRES DNS + valid certificates. IP-only federation is not possible and is not supported.** IP-only means standalone-only, forever, until the operator acquires DNS + certs.
|
||||
|
||||
Certificates are **one ACME integration** with a user-chosen **directory URL**: either **step-ca** (self-hosted private ACME CA, for total control and private/internal domains public CAs can't issue for) or **Let's Encrypt** (public ACME, ease-of-use). The operator also picks a challenge type (HTTP-01 / DNS-01 / TLS-ALPN-01); **DNS-01 is the answer for private/split-horizon domains.**
|
||||
|
||||
Secrets go through a **pluggable `SecretBackend` interface** — no forced paid dependency. Ships with a **Vault** implementation and a **Vaultwarden** implementation; the operator picks at install. The Vaultwarden model (org + orchestrator enrolled as authority + per-agent scoped access) is designed-for, with an honest **[VERIFY]** on how far Vaultwarden's machine-account coverage has matured.
|
||||
|
||||
Config is **DB-backed with sane defaults and install-time overrides**. Precedence: **install-time → DB override → default.** Config is split into **install-time-immutable** (e.g. `server_name`, which is baked into every MXID and cannot change without re-homing every identity) and **runtime-tunable** (e.g. dark-threshold).
|
||||
|
||||
RFC-002 is the substrate; **RFC-001's P1 (presence) needs only Mode A/B single-instance clean-domain and does NOT require federation, IP-only, or the secret-backend rotation story resolved.**
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 1. Goals / Non-Goals
|
||||
|
||||
### 1.1 Goals
|
||||
|
||||
- **G1 — Installable by a stranger.** A person with no relationship to our fleet can install, configure, and run the comms system from published artifacts and a guided installer, on their own hardware and domains, with no edits to product code.
|
||||
- **G2 — Zero hardcoded topology.** Every topology fact — `server_name`, homeserver host/IP, delegation method, federation peers, cert mode, secret backend — is **user-supplied config**, validated at install, stored in the product DB. No fleet-specific literal ships in the product.
|
||||
- **G3 — Standalone MUST work.** The PRIMARY instance is always fully functional with **zero federation**, including with **no DNS at all** (Mode C, IP-only). Presence, rooms, MACP, HIL-via-Element all work single-instance.
|
||||
- **G4 — Federation is optional but honestly gated.** Federation is opt-in and, when opted into, **requires DNS + valid certificates as a hard precondition.** The installer must refuse to _claim_ federation is working when the DNS/cert preconditions aren't met.
|
||||
- **G5 — One ACME integration, two CA choices.** Build a single ACME cert-provisioning path; the operator selects step-ca or Let's Encrypt by supplying an **ACME directory URL** plus a challenge type. No second, bespoke cert path.
|
||||
- **G6 — No forced paid dependency for secrets.** A pluggable `SecretBackend` with at least Vault and Vaultwarden implementations, chosen at install. Open-source ethos: the free/self-hostable path must be first-class.
|
||||
- **G7 — Defaults that just work, overrides where they matter.** DB-backed config with sane defaults so most operators change little; install-time overrides for the topology-critical values; a clear immutable-vs-tunable boundary so operators can't foot-gun `server_name`.
|
||||
- **G8 — A clean upgrade path.** An operator who starts standalone can later turn on federation with a documented, honest procedure (including the real cost if they started IP-only and must now acquire a stable `server_name`).
|
||||
|
||||
### 1.2 Non-Goals
|
||||
|
||||
- **NG1 — Not hosting a managed service.** This RFC is about _self-install_. We are not building multi-tenant SaaS provisioning; each operator runs their own instance(s).
|
||||
- **NG2 — Not a new cert stack.** We do not write our own CA, our own ACME client protocol, or a non-ACME cert path. We integrate ACME and let the operator point it at step-ca or Let's Encrypt. (We _may_ bundle/recommend step-ca as the self-hosted CA, but via its standard ACME provisioner, not a fork.)
|
||||
- **NG3 — Not a new secret manager.** We define an interface and ship adapters. We do not build a secret store; we do not force one.
|
||||
- **NG4 — Not public-network Matrix federation.** Consistent with RFC-001 NG5: federation is Mosaic-site-to-Mosaic-site over infrastructure the operator controls, allowlisted. No `matrix.org` federation.
|
||||
- **NG5 — Not making IP-only federate.** We will not ship a hack (self-signed S2S trust bundles, `/etc/hosts` federation) that pretends IP-only can federate. IP-only is standalone. This is a deliberate, honest boundary (§2.4, §7).
|
||||
- **NG6 — Not re-homing identities silently.** We will not offer a "just change your `server_name`" button that quietly orphans every MXID. Any path that changes `server_name` is a flagged, gated, documented identity re-home (§5.3, §7).
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 2. The topology model
|
||||
|
||||
### 2.1 The core split: `server_name` vs homeserver host
|
||||
|
||||
Matrix has exactly the split Jason described, natively:
|
||||
|
||||
- **`server_name`** — the Synapse config value that is the server's **identity domain**. It is the part after the colon in every MXID (`@mosaic_agent:mosaic.woltje.com`) and every room alias (`#mission-KBN-101:mosaic.woltje.com`). It is **baked into every identity the moment that identity is minted.** Changing it re-homes everything. This is `server_name` in Synapse's `homeserver.yaml`.
|
||||
- **Homeserver host** — the actual network location (hostname:port or IP:port) where the Synapse process answers federation and (optionally proxied) client traffic. It **can differ** from `server_name`. Matrix reconciles the difference through **delegation**: `https://<server_name>/.well-known/matrix/server` returning `{"m.server": "matrix.woltje.com:443"}`, and/or a `_matrix._tcp.<server_name>` **SRV** record. **[VERIFY]** `.well-known` vs SRV precedence on the deployed Synapse version (RFC-001 §6 flags the same).
|
||||
|
||||
So Jason's "mosaic._ app-domain + matrix._ homeserver-domain" split maps precisely: **`server_name = mosaic.woltje.com` (identity, in MXIDs), homeserver runs at `matrix.woltje.com` (discovered via delegation).** That is **Mode A**.
|
||||
|
||||
### 2.2 The topology config schema
|
||||
|
||||
One canonical config object, stored in the product DB (§5), populated at install (§6). Illustrative shape (field names decomposition-ready, not frozen):
|
||||
|
||||
```jsonc
|
||||
{
|
||||
"topology": {
|
||||
"mode": "split-domain | single-domain | ip-only-standalone", // A | B | C — install-time-immutable
|
||||
|
||||
"identity": {
|
||||
"server_name": "mosaic.woltje.com", // INSTALL-TIME-IMMUTABLE. In MXIDs. Never change without re-home (§5.3).
|
||||
"server_name_kind": "domain | ip", // "ip" only legal in Mode C
|
||||
},
|
||||
|
||||
"homeserver": {
|
||||
"host": "matrix.woltje.com", // where Synapse actually listens (Mode A: differs from server_name)
|
||||
"port": 8448, // federation port (default 8448) or 443 if proxied — [VERIFY] per deploy
|
||||
"client_bind": "https://matrix.woltje.com", // C-S API public URL (proxied)
|
||||
"bind_ip": null, // Mode C: e.g. "192.168.1.50" ; Modes A/B: null (DNS-resolved)
|
||||
},
|
||||
|
||||
"delegation": {
|
||||
"method": "well-known | srv | none", // Mode A: well-known or srv ; Mode B/C: none
|
||||
"well_known_server": { "m.server": "matrix.woltje.com:443" }, // if method=well-known
|
||||
"srv_record": "_matrix._tcp.mosaic.woltje.com. 3600 IN SRV 10 0 443 matrix.woltje.com.", // if method=srv (documented, operator provisions)
|
||||
},
|
||||
|
||||
"federation": {
|
||||
"enabled": true, // OPTIONAL. Mode C forces false.
|
||||
"domain_whitelist": [
|
||||
// Synapse federation_domain_whitelist — allowlist ONLY
|
||||
"mosaic.woltje.com",
|
||||
"mosaic.uscllc.com",
|
||||
],
|
||||
"peers": [
|
||||
// operator-declared peer sites (for room/fleet wiring)
|
||||
{ "server_name": "mosaic.uscllc.com", "role": "secondary", "fleet_room": true },
|
||||
],
|
||||
},
|
||||
|
||||
"tls": {
|
||||
"acme": {
|
||||
"directory_url": "https://acme.mosaic.woltje.com/acme/acme/directory", // step-ca OR https://acme-v02.api.letsencrypt.org/directory
|
||||
"ca_kind": "step-ca | letsencrypt", // informational label; the directory_url is the real switch
|
||||
"challenge": "dns-01 | http-01 | tls-alpn-01",
|
||||
"account_email": "ops@woltje.com", // ACME account contact
|
||||
"eab": { "kid": null, "hmac_key_ref": null }, // External Account Binding if the CA requires it (some step-ca provisioners) — secret via SecretBackend
|
||||
},
|
||||
"client_tls_mode": "acme | self-signed", // Mode C may use self-signed for local C-S TLS (weaker trust, §8)
|
||||
},
|
||||
|
||||
"secrets": {
|
||||
"backend": "vault | vaultwarden", // pluggable, install-time choice (§4)
|
||||
"connection": {
|
||||
"address": "https://vault.woltje.com:8200", // or Vaultwarden/Bitwarden server URL
|
||||
"auth_ref": "…", // how the appservice authenticates to the backend (bootstrap, §4/§8)
|
||||
"namespace_or_org": "mosaic-fleet", // Vault namespace / mount, OR Vaultwarden org id
|
||||
},
|
||||
},
|
||||
},
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### 2.3 The three modes, concretely
|
||||
|
||||
Exactly three supported modes (Jason's ruling — no others):
|
||||
|
||||
**Mode A — split-domain (identity ≠ host, delegated).** _Jason's PRIMARY._ Federation-capable. This is the recommended production shape because it lets identity live on a clean app-domain while the homeserver runs on a separate operational host.
|
||||
|
||||
```jsonc
|
||||
// Mode A — mosaic.woltje.com identity, matrix.woltje.com host, federated with a second site
|
||||
{
|
||||
"topology": {
|
||||
"mode": "split-domain",
|
||||
"identity": { "server_name": "mosaic.woltje.com", "server_name_kind": "domain" },
|
||||
"homeserver": {
|
||||
"host": "matrix.woltje.com",
|
||||
"port": 443,
|
||||
"client_bind": "https://matrix.woltje.com",
|
||||
"bind_ip": null,
|
||||
},
|
||||
"delegation": {
|
||||
"method": "well-known",
|
||||
"well_known_server": { "m.server": "matrix.woltje.com:443" },
|
||||
},
|
||||
"federation": {
|
||||
"enabled": true,
|
||||
"domain_whitelist": ["mosaic.woltje.com", "mosaic.uscllc.com"],
|
||||
"peers": [{ "server_name": "mosaic.uscllc.com", "role": "secondary", "fleet_room": true }],
|
||||
},
|
||||
"tls": {
|
||||
"acme": {
|
||||
"directory_url": "https://acme-v02.api.letsencrypt.org/directory", // public LE, or a step-ca directory
|
||||
"ca_kind": "letsencrypt",
|
||||
"challenge": "dns-01",
|
||||
"account_email": "ops@woltje.com",
|
||||
},
|
||||
"client_tls_mode": "acme",
|
||||
},
|
||||
"secrets": {
|
||||
"backend": "vaultwarden",
|
||||
"connection": { "address": "https://vw.woltje.com", "namespace_or_org": "mosaic-fleet" },
|
||||
},
|
||||
},
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
MXIDs on this instance: `@mosaic_coordinator-1:mosaic.woltje.com`. A human/agent's homeserver is discovered by resolving `.well-known/matrix/server` on `mosaic.woltje.com` → `matrix.woltje.com:443`.
|
||||
|
||||
**Mode B — single-domain (identity == host).** Simpler; the `server_name` _is_ the host. No delegation needed. Federation-capable (still needs DNS + cert on that one domain).
|
||||
|
||||
```jsonc
|
||||
// Mode B — one domain does everything
|
||||
{
|
||||
"topology": {
|
||||
"mode": "single-domain",
|
||||
"identity": { "server_name": "matrix.example.org", "server_name_kind": "domain" },
|
||||
"homeserver": {
|
||||
"host": "matrix.example.org",
|
||||
"port": 8448,
|
||||
"client_bind": "https://matrix.example.org",
|
||||
"bind_ip": null,
|
||||
},
|
||||
"delegation": { "method": "none" },
|
||||
"federation": { "enabled": false, "domain_whitelist": [], "peers": [] }, // optional — off here
|
||||
"tls": {
|
||||
"acme": {
|
||||
"directory_url": "https://acme-v02.api.letsencrypt.org/directory",
|
||||
"ca_kind": "letsencrypt",
|
||||
"challenge": "http-01",
|
||||
"account_email": "admin@example.org",
|
||||
},
|
||||
"client_tls_mode": "acme",
|
||||
},
|
||||
"secrets": {
|
||||
"backend": "vault",
|
||||
"connection": { "address": "https://vault.example.org:8200", "namespace_or_org": "mosaic" },
|
||||
},
|
||||
},
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
MXIDs: `@mosaic_coordinator-1:matrix.example.org`. Here `server_name == host`, so `@:matrix.example.org` is both the identity domain and where Synapse actually answers.
|
||||
|
||||
**Mode C — IP-only standalone (no DNS, no federation).** Fully supported for local/airgapped/homelab-without-DNS. `server_name` is an IP:port literal. **Cannot federate — ever — in this mode** (federation requires a real domain + valid CA cert; §2.4). Client TLS may be self-signed (weaker trust, §8).
|
||||
|
||||
```jsonc
|
||||
// Mode C — airgapped / local, no DNS, standalone only
|
||||
{
|
||||
"topology": {
|
||||
"mode": "ip-only-standalone",
|
||||
"identity": { "server_name": "192.168.1.50:8448", "server_name_kind": "ip" },
|
||||
"homeserver": {
|
||||
"host": "192.168.1.50",
|
||||
"port": 8448,
|
||||
"client_bind": "https://192.168.1.50:8448",
|
||||
"bind_ip": "192.168.1.50",
|
||||
},
|
||||
"delegation": { "method": "none" },
|
||||
"federation": { "enabled": false, "domain_whitelist": [], "peers": [] }, // FORCED false in Mode C
|
||||
"tls": { "acme": null, "client_tls_mode": "self-signed" }, // may use a private step-ca or self-signed for C-S TLS
|
||||
"secrets": {
|
||||
"backend": "vaultwarden",
|
||||
"connection": { "address": "http://192.168.1.51:8080", "namespace_or_org": "mosaic-local" },
|
||||
},
|
||||
},
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
MXIDs: `@mosaic_coordinator-1:192.168.1.50:8448`. **Warning surfaced at install:** this `server_name` is an IP literal; if the operator ever wants federation they must move to a domain, which is an **identity re-home** (§5.3, §7).
|
||||
|
||||
> **[VERIFY]** Synapse accepts an `ip:port` `server_name` and mints usable MXIDs against it for local/standalone use. This is believed workable for non-federated operation but must be validated against the deployed Synapse version; some Synapse versions/tools assume a DNS-resolvable `server_name`. If an IP literal is rejected, Mode C falls back to a **fabricated local domain** (e.g. `mosaic.local`) resolved via `/etc/hosts` or a local resolver — still standalone-only, same re-home caveat.
|
||||
|
||||
### 2.4 The hard federation gate (Jason's HARD STOP)
|
||||
|
||||
**Federation REQUIRES DNS + valid certificates. This is a hard stop, enforced by the installer and by the config validator, not a suggestion.**
|
||||
|
||||
| Precondition | Why | Enforced where |
|
||||
| -------------------------------------------------------------------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
|
||||
| `server_name` resolves in public/peer DNS (or delegated target does) | S2S discovery uses `.well-known`/SRV over DNS; peers must resolve you | installer reachability check (§6); config validator rejects `federation.enabled=true` with `server_name_kind=ip` |
|
||||
| Valid TLS cert on the federation endpoint, chained to a CA the peer trusts | S2S is TLS; a peer validates your cert. Self-signed/untrusted ⇒ peer refuses ⇒ you are defederated | installer cert probe (§6); cert monitor (§3.4) |
|
||||
| Federation `domain_whitelist` non-empty and mutually consistent with peers | allowlist-only federation (RFC-001 NG5/§6) | config validator |
|
||||
|
||||
**IP-only ⇒ federation is impossible.** There is no valid public/peer CA cert for a bare IP in our trust model (and we will not ship a self-signed S2S trust hack — NG5). Therefore **Mode C is standalone-only by construction**, and the config validator makes `mode=ip-only-standalone ∧ federation.enabled=true` an **illegal state that cannot be persisted.**
|
||||
|
||||
This is the honest, load-bearing boundary of the whole topology model:
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
DNS + valid cert?
|
||||
┌─────────────┴─────────────┐
|
||||
YES NO
|
||||
│ │
|
||||
Mode A or B Mode C (IP-only)
|
||||
federation OPTIONAL STANDALONE ONLY
|
||||
(opt-in, allowlisted) (federation impossible)
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 3. Certificate provisioning — one ACME integration
|
||||
|
||||
### 3.1 Single integration, directory-URL as the switch
|
||||
|
||||
We build **exactly one** cert-provisioning integration: an **ACME client integration**. Both supported CAs are ACME CAs. The operator does **not** choose between two code paths; they choose an **ACME directory URL** and a **challenge type**. That is the entire surface.
|
||||
|
||||
| CA choice | What it is | ACME directory URL (illustrative) | Why an operator picks it |
|
||||
| ----------------------- | ------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
|
||||
| **step-ca (Smallstep)** | self-hosted **private** ACME CA | `https://acme.<internal-domain>/acme/<provisioner>/directory` | **Total control**; issues for **private/internal/split-horizon domains** a public CA can't (e.g. `mosaic.internal`, RFC-1918 split-horizon); airgap-friendly; you own the root |
|
||||
| **Let's Encrypt** | public ACME CA | `https://acme-v02.api.letsencrypt.org/directory` (staging: `.../acme-staging-v02...`) | **Ease of use**; universally trusted chain (ISRG Root X1); zero CA to operate; ideal for public domains |
|
||||
|
||||
Because both speak ACME, the same client (account key, order, authorization, challenge, finalize, cert-fetch, renew) drives either. The `ca_kind` label in config is informational for UX; the **`directory_url` is the real determinant**. **[VERIFY]** whether the chosen ACME library requires per-CA quirks (LE rate limits, staging switch; step-ca **External Account Binding** on some provisioners — if EAB is required the `kid`/`hmac_key` come from the SecretBackend, §4).
|
||||
|
||||
### 3.2 Challenge-type matrix (which challenge for which topology)
|
||||
|
||||
The operator picks one challenge type per the domains they're covering. This is the crux for **public vs private/split-horizon**:
|
||||
|
||||
| Challenge | How it proves control | Best for | Cannot / caveat |
|
||||
| --------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
|
||||
| **HTTP-01** | CA GETs `http://<domain>/.well-known/acme-challenge/<token>` on port 80 | **Public, single hostname**, port 80 reachable from CA (Mode B, or Mode A's homeserver host) | Needs inbound :80 from the CA; **cannot** do wildcards; **useless for private domains** a public CA can't reach |
|
||||
| **DNS-01** | CA checks a `_acme-challenge.<domain>` **TXT** record you publish | **Private / split-horizon / internal domains**, **wildcards**, and any domain where inbound HTTP from the CA is impossible | Requires **programmatic DNS API** access to publish TXT (or manual for step-ca where you own the resolver). **This is the answer for step-ca on private domains** and for Mode A when the homeserver host isn't publicly HTTP-reachable |
|
||||
| **TLS-ALPN-01** | CA connects TLS on :443 with ALPN `acme-tls/1` | Public host where **:443 is free** but :80 is blocked | Needs the ACME client to own the :443 TLS handshake briefly; awkward behind some reverse proxies — **[VERIFY]** against our proxy (RFC-001 terminates TLS at a reverse proxy) |
|
||||
|
||||
**Guidance baked into the installer:**
|
||||
|
||||
- **Let's Encrypt + public domain, port 80 open →** HTTP-01 (simplest). Wildcard or no inbound :80 → DNS-01.
|
||||
- **step-ca + private/internal/split-horizon domain →** **DNS-01** (the private CA can validate against a resolver you control; public HTTP reachability is irrelevant). This is the combination that lets a private homelab domain get real certs.
|
||||
- **:443-only public host →** TLS-ALPN-01.
|
||||
|
||||
### 3.3 Delegation setup for split-domain (Mode A)
|
||||
|
||||
For Mode A, the cert and the delegation must agree. Concretely, at install for `server_name=mosaic.woltje.com`, host `matrix.woltje.com`:
|
||||
|
||||
1. **Cert(s):** obtain a valid cert for **`matrix.woltje.com`** (the federation/host endpoint — this is where the TLS handshake actually lands). If serving `.well-known` over HTTPS on `mosaic.woltje.com`, that origin **also** needs a valid cert for `mosaic.woltje.com`. So Mode A typically provisions **two** SANs/certs: identity-domain (`mosaic.woltje.com`, serves `.well-known`) and host (`matrix.woltje.com`, serves S2S+C-S). **[VERIFY]** whether a single multi-SAN cert is preferable operationally.
|
||||
2. **Delegation record**, one of:
|
||||
- **`.well-known`:** serve `https://mosaic.woltje.com/.well-known/matrix/server` → `{"m.server":"matrix.woltje.com:443"}` (and `.well-known/matrix/client` for C-S discovery so agents/Element find the host).
|
||||
- **SRV:** `_matrix._tcp.mosaic.woltje.com. IN SRV 10 0 443 matrix.woltje.com.` The installer **documents and validates** the record but the operator provisions it in their DNS (we don't run their DNS). **[VERIFY]** `.well-known` vs SRV precedence on the deployed Synapse.
|
||||
3. **Validate:** installer fetches the operator's own `.well-known`/SRV and confirms it points at the configured host, and that the host presents a valid cert (§6). Only then does it declare Mode A "federation-ready."
|
||||
|
||||
### 3.4 Renewal & monitoring — a lapsed federation cert silently defederates
|
||||
|
||||
**This is the operational trap and it must alarm.** ACME certs are short-lived (LE = 90 days; step-ca often shorter by policy). A federation cert that lapses does **not** throw a loud error — peers simply **stop trusting the S2S handshake and the site silently drops out of federation.** From inside, everything looks fine; from peers, the site went dark. That is exactly the "homelab went dark and took comms with it" trauma (RFC-001 §5), but caused by a cert, not a host.
|
||||
|
||||
Requirements:
|
||||
|
||||
- **Auto-renew** on the standard ACME schedule (renew at ~⅓ lifetime remaining; LE guidance ~30 days before expiry). The ACME integration owns this loop.
|
||||
- **Expiry monitoring as a first-class alarm.** Emit cert-days-remaining into OTEL/Jaeger metrics (consistent with RFC-001 §8's "monitor for cert expiry — a cert lapse silently defederates"). Alarm thresholds (e.g. warn <14d, critical <3d) are **runtime-tunable** config (§5).
|
||||
- **Federation-health probe:** periodically resolve our own delegation and validate our own cert _as a peer would_ (external vantage where possible), so a broken renewal is caught as "we would fail a peer's validation" before a peer notices.
|
||||
- **Escalation tie-in:** a critical cert-expiry or federation-health failure raises a `mosaic.escalation` (RFC-001 §4.2/§5) into the HIL room. A cert lapse is a fleet-visibility incident, not a silent config drift.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 4. Secret backend interface
|
||||
|
||||
### 4.1 The `SecretBackend` contract
|
||||
|
||||
A single pluggable interface. The appservice and orchestrator depend on the **interface**, never on Vault or Vaultwarden directly. Chosen at install; swappable without touching callers. Illustrative contract (decomposition-ready, not frozen):
|
||||
|
||||
```ts
|
||||
interface SecretBackend {
|
||||
// --- static secret CRUD (appservice tokens, ACME EAB, DB creds) ---
|
||||
get(ref: SecretRef): Promise<SecretValue>;
|
||||
put(ref: SecretRef, value: SecretValue, opts?: { immutable?: boolean }): Promise<void>;
|
||||
rotate(
|
||||
ref: SecretRef,
|
||||
next: SecretValue,
|
||||
): Promise<{ previous: SecretVersion; current: SecretVersion }>;
|
||||
list(prefix: SecretRef): Promise<SecretRef[]>;
|
||||
delete(ref: SecretRef): Promise<void>;
|
||||
|
||||
// --- agent-credential lifecycle (the fleet-identity part) ---
|
||||
enrollAgent(input: {
|
||||
agentSlug: string;
|
||||
scope: CredentialScope; // which rooms/secrets this agent may read
|
||||
ttl?: Duration; // ephemeral-by-default per RFC-001 §8
|
||||
}): Promise<AgentCredentialHandle>; // wraps the per-agent access_token + optional pubkey record
|
||||
|
||||
revokeAgent(agentSlug: string): Promise<void>; // must be authoritative & immediate
|
||||
|
||||
// --- health / bootstrap ---
|
||||
health(): Promise<BackendHealth>;
|
||||
authenticateSelf(bootstrap: BootstrapAuth): Promise<void>; // how the appservice/orchestrator logs into the backend
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Design intent: **`get/put/rotate`** cover the static crown-jewel secrets (appservice `hs_token`/`as_token`, ACME account/EAB keys, DB DSN). **`enrollAgent/revokeAgent`** cover the _fleet-identity_ lifecycle — this is where RFC-001's "mint per-agent token at enroll, discard on teardown" (RFC-001 §4.1, §8) actually lands.
|
||||
|
||||
### 4.2 How appservice / agent tokens map onto it
|
||||
|
||||
RFC-001 defines three tiers of Matrix secret. They map cleanly:
|
||||
|
||||
| RFC-001 secret | Sensitivity | `SecretBackend` treatment |
|
||||
| ------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------ | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
|
||||
| **`as_token`** (AS→HS, acts as any namespaced user) | crown jewel | `put(immutable-ish)` + `rotate`; **only** the appservice may `get` it; stored under a fleet-admin scope; never handed to an agent |
|
||||
| **`hs_token`** (HS→AS callback auth) | crown jewel | same as `as_token`; both live only in appservice scope (RFC-001 §8) |
|
||||
| **enroll bootstrap secret / orchestrator-signed nonce** | high | `get` by orchestrator + appservice only; used to authenticate `POST /enroll` so a rogue process can't enroll a rogue agent (RFC-001 §8, B5) |
|
||||
| **per-agent `access_token`** | transient runtime | minted via `enrollAgent`, scoped to that agent, **short-TTL / re-mintable**, discarded on teardown; **not** durably persisted (RFC-001 §8 says per-agent tokens are transient) — the backend may hold a short-lived handle or a personal-vault entry for the agent's own lifetime |
|
||||
| **Ed25519 signed-authorship keypair** | high (private key) | private key generated **agent-side**, only pubkey leaves the agent (RFC-001 §4.4/§8); the SecretBackend stores the **pubkey record** for audit; per-spin keys need no at-rest custody |
|
||||
|
||||
The key blast-radius property (RFC-001 §8) is preserved: agents receive **only their own** credential via `enrollAgent`; the `as_token` never leaves appservice scope.
|
||||
|
||||
### 4.3 Vault implementation
|
||||
|
||||
Vault maps naturally:
|
||||
|
||||
- Static secrets → **KV v2** at a mount/namespace (`mosaic-fleet/`), with versioning giving `rotate` semantics for free.
|
||||
- **`enrollAgent`** → issue a scoped, TTL'd token or use **AppRole** / a scoped policy per agent; Vault's native TTL + revocation is exactly the transient per-agent model. `revokeAgent` → Vault token/lease revoke (authoritative, immediate).
|
||||
- **`authenticateSelf`** → the appservice authenticates to Vault via AppRole (role_id from config, secret_id injected at deploy) or a platform auth method; consistent with how Gateway/DB secrets are handled today (RFC-001 §8). **[VERIFY]** align with whatever KBN-101 lands for Mosaic secret management (CLAUDE.md flags secrets work in flight).
|
||||
- **Trade-off (honesty):** Vault is the most capable backend but is **not** the free-and-simple default for a hobbyist stranger; hence it must not be _forced_ (G6).
|
||||
|
||||
### 4.4 Vaultwarden implementation + the org/enroll/revoke agent-account model
|
||||
|
||||
Vaultwarden (self-hostable Bitwarden-compatible server) is the **open-source-ethos default candidate** — free, self-hostable, familiar. Jason's model, mapped onto Bitwarden/Vaultwarden's org primitives:
|
||||
|
||||
1. **Operator creates one or more Bitwarden orgs** at install (e.g. `mosaic-fleet`).
|
||||
2. **The orchestrator is enrolled into the org and granted authority** to enroll/revoke agent sessions — it is the org's automation principal (admin/manager over an agents **collection**).
|
||||
3. **Agents get scoped credential access:** each agent gets access to a **collection** (or a personal vault provisioned for its spin) holding exactly the secrets its scope allows. `enrollAgent` = grant the agent principal access to its collection + provision its per-agent Matrix token entry; `revokeAgent` = remove the agent principal / revoke its access, immediately.
|
||||
4. **User + agents share scoped access:** the human operator and the agents both hold credentials in the same org, scoped by collection — humans and agents on one secret surface, mirroring RFC-001's "humans and agents on one comms surface" pattern.
|
||||
|
||||
Mapping to the interface:
|
||||
|
||||
| Interface op | Vaultwarden mechanism |
|
||||
| ------------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
|
||||
| `get/put/rotate` (static) | items in an org **collection**; rotate = new item version / replace + old-version audit |
|
||||
| `enrollAgent` | create/attach agent principal to its **collection**; provision per-agent token item, TTL enforced by our teardown (Vaultwarden itself is not TTL-native — see [VERIFY]) |
|
||||
| `revokeAgent` | revoke the agent principal's org membership / collection access |
|
||||
| `authenticateSelf` | orchestrator authenticates as the org automation principal |
|
||||
|
||||
**HONEST MATURITY FLAG — [VERIFY]:** Bitwarden's clean **machine-account / service-account** primitive lives in **Bitwarden Secrets Manager**, and **Vaultwarden's coverage of Secrets Manager / machine accounts is partial and evolving.** What is known to work today on Vaultwarden: **orgs, collections, per-user (incl. a per-agent "user") vaults, and collection-scoped sharing.** What **may not** be fully there: the polished **machine-account API**, native short-TTL service credentials, and fine-grained programmatic access-token issuance equivalent to hosted Bitwarden Secrets Manager. **[VERIFY]** current Vaultwarden version's Secrets Manager / machine-account support before P-level commitment.
|
||||
|
||||
**Why this is not a blocker:** the interface is designed so **either backend is viable**. If Vaultwarden's machine-account API isn't ready, the Vaultwarden adapter implements `enrollAgent` via the **personal-vault-per-agent + org-collection** model that works _today_ (create an agent principal, share the scoped collection, we enforce TTL via orchestrator teardown rather than backend-native TTL). If an operator needs backend-native short-TTL machine credentials now, they choose the **Vault** adapter. **We are not blocked on Vaultwarden maturing**, because the `SecretBackend` abstraction lets the polished-machine-account behavior land later without changing any caller.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 5. Config system
|
||||
|
||||
### 5.1 Storage & precedence
|
||||
|
||||
Config is **DB-backed** (Postgres, per the stack — CLAUDE.md/RFC-001), with sane defaults compiled into the product and install-time overrides. **Precedence, highest wins:**
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
install-time value > DB override (runtime) > compiled default
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
- **Compiled default** — ships in the product; what a stranger gets with zero config for every non-topology-critical key.
|
||||
- **Install-time value** — captured by the installer (§6), written to DB, and for **install-time-immutable** keys, **locked** (marked non-overridable).
|
||||
- **DB override** — runtime tuning via admin surface, allowed **only** for keys classified runtime-tunable.
|
||||
|
||||
> Nuance: "install-time > DB override" applies to **immutable** keys — the install-time value is frozen and a DB override of it is rejected. For **tunable** keys, the DB override is the live value and the install-time value is just the initial seed. The classification (§5.3) is what makes the precedence unambiguous per key.
|
||||
|
||||
### 5.2 DB schema shape
|
||||
|
||||
Illustrative (Drizzle/Postgres, per stack conventions):
|
||||
|
||||
```sql
|
||||
-- one row per config key
|
||||
CREATE TABLE comms_config (
|
||||
key text PRIMARY KEY, -- e.g. 'topology.identity.server_name'
|
||||
value jsonb NOT NULL, -- current effective value
|
||||
source text NOT NULL, -- 'install' | 'db-override' | 'default'
|
||||
mutability text NOT NULL, -- 'install-immutable' | 'runtime-tunable'
|
||||
set_by text, -- operator/agent/system that set it
|
||||
set_at timestamptz NOT NULL DEFAULT now(),
|
||||
CONSTRAINT immutable_not_overridable
|
||||
CHECK (NOT (mutability = 'install-immutable' AND source = 'db-override'))
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
-- append-only audit of every change (esp. attempted immutable changes)
|
||||
CREATE TABLE comms_config_audit (
|
||||
id bigserial PRIMARY KEY,
|
||||
key text NOT NULL,
|
||||
old_value jsonb,
|
||||
new_value jsonb,
|
||||
actor text NOT NULL,
|
||||
action text NOT NULL, -- 'set' | 'override' | 'rejected-immutable'
|
||||
at timestamptz NOT NULL DEFAULT now()
|
||||
);
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
The DB `CHECK` is a belt-and-braces backstop; the application-layer config service enforces mutability and records rejected immutable-change attempts in the audit table. Secrets are **referenced** here (a `SecretRef`), never stored inline — actual secret values live in the `SecretBackend` (§4).
|
||||
|
||||
### 5.3 Install-time-immutable vs runtime-tunable — the key table
|
||||
|
||||
The single most important classification: **what can never change after install** vs **what an operator tunes anytime.** Getting `server_name` on the wrong side of this line is a foot-gun that orphans every identity.
|
||||
|
||||
| Config key | Mutability | Rationale / cost of change |
|
||||
| ------------------------------------------------ | ------------------------------------------ | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
|
||||
| `topology.mode` (A/B/C) | **install-immutable** | changing mode changes identity/federation semantics; a mode change is effectively a reinstall/re-home |
|
||||
| `topology.identity.server_name` | **install-immutable** | **baked into every MXID and room alias.** Changing it re-homes every identity — see re-home note below. **This is THE immutable value.** |
|
||||
| `topology.identity.server_name_kind` | **install-immutable** | domain↔ip change is a re-home (Mode C→A/B) |
|
||||
| `topology.homeserver.host` | install-immutable (**delegation-tunable**) | in Mode A you _can_ move the host if you update delegation to match — the identity is unchanged; treat as immutable-with-migration, not free |
|
||||
| `topology.homeserver.bind_ip` / `port` | runtime-tunable (ops) | operational network binding; no identity impact |
|
||||
| `topology.delegation.method` / records | tunable-with-care | can switch well-known↔SRV as long as both still resolve to the same host; validated on change |
|
||||
| `topology.federation.enabled` | **runtime-tunable (gated)** | can flip **on** only if DNS+cert preconditions pass (§2.4); flipping standalone→federated is the §7 upgrade path |
|
||||
| `topology.federation.domain_whitelist` / `peers` | runtime-tunable | add/remove peers over time; each add re-validated |
|
||||
| `tls.acme.directory_url` / `ca_kind` | runtime-tunable | can switch CA (e.g. LE→step-ca); triggers re-issue; monitor for trust-chain change |
|
||||
| `tls.acme.challenge` | runtime-tunable | switch challenge type if DNS/HTTP reachability changes |
|
||||
| `tls.client_tls_mode` | tunable-with-care | self-signed→acme is fine; acme→self-signed weakens trust (§8) |
|
||||
| `secrets.backend` | install-immutable (**migration-only**) | switching Vault↔Vaultwarden requires a secret migration; not a live flip |
|
||||
| `secrets.connection.*` | runtime-tunable | rotate backend address/auth without changing which backend |
|
||||
| `presence.heartbeat_interval_ms` | runtime-tunable | RFC-001 §4.5 default ~30s; pure tuning |
|
||||
| `presence.miss_tolerance` | runtime-tunable | RFC-001 §4.5 default 2 |
|
||||
| `escalation.dark_threshold_min` | runtime-tunable | RFC-001 §5/§11 — default 10min → fallback |
|
||||
| `escalation.hil_threshold_min` | runtime-tunable | RFC-001 §5 — default +5min → HIL |
|
||||
| `cert.expiry_warn_days` / `expiry_critical_days` | runtime-tunable | §3.4 alarm thresholds (default 14 / 3) |
|
||||
| `federation.health_probe_interval` | runtime-tunable | §3.4 |
|
||||
|
||||
**Identity re-home note (the cost of changing `server_name`):** because every MXID (`@mosaic_*:server_name`) and room alias (`#…:server_name`) embeds `server_name`, changing it means: every agent gets a **new identity**, all rooms must be **recreated/re-aliased**, signed-authorship pubkey records re-published, and federation peers re-pointed. There is **no in-place rename** in Matrix. Hence `server_name` is install-immutable and the installer gates it behind an explicit warning (§6.7). Changing it is a **migration/reinstall**, honestly (§7).
|
||||
|
||||
### 5.4 How the appservice / homeserver read config
|
||||
|
||||
- **Synapse (homeserver)** reads a _rendered_ `homeserver.yaml`. The config service **renders** Synapse's config (server_name, listeners, `federation_domain_whitelist`, `enable_registration: false`, appservice registration path, TLS/delegation) from the DB-backed config at deploy/reconfigure time. Synapse itself is not DB-config-aware; the source of truth is the product DB, and Synapse config is a **generated artifact**. Certain Synapse values (notably `server_name`) require a **Synapse restart** and are exactly the immutable ones — reinforcing §5.3.
|
||||
- **The appservice** reads config **live** from the DB config service for runtime-tunable values (thresholds, whitelist changes, cert alarm thresholds) and from the `SecretBackend` for secrets. Immutable topology values are read once at boot (they can't change under it).
|
||||
- **`packages/comms` SDK** receives the values it needs (homeserver client URL, presence intervals) from the appservice at enroll (RFC-001 §4.1 returns `{mxid, access_token, homeserver, rooms[]}`), so agents never read the config DB directly.
|
||||
- **Delegation artifacts** (`.well-known/matrix/server`, `.well-known/matrix/client`) are likewise **rendered** from config and served by the reverse proxy / homeserver.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 6. Installer UX flow
|
||||
|
||||
A guided installer (`mosaic comms install` or equivalent) that captures topology, provisions certs, wires secrets, and **validates before declaring success.** It must never report success it hasn't proven. Steps:
|
||||
|
||||
**6.1 — Preflight & detection.** Detect existing DNS records for a candidate domain, existing certs, an existing reachable Synapse, an existing Vault/Vaultwarden. Offer detected values as suggestions (never as silent defaults). Detect whether the host has public inbound :80/:443 (informs challenge-type guidance, §3.2).
|
||||
|
||||
**6.2 — Primary instance (ALWAYS).** The PRIMARY/home instance is always configured — there is no "skip primary." Prompt for its identity. This is non-optional and is what makes standalone work out of the box.
|
||||
|
||||
**6.3 — Pick topology mode (A/B/C).** Ask the shape:
|
||||
|
||||
- Do you have a domain? **No →** Mode C (IP-only standalone); warn federation is impossible here (§2.4) and that `server_name` will be an IP (re-home cost if they later want federation).
|
||||
- Yes, and identity domain differs from the homeserver host? **Yes →** Mode A (split-domain); capture `server_name` + host + delegation method.
|
||||
- Yes, one domain does everything? **→** Mode B (single-domain).
|
||||
|
||||
**6.4 — Pick CA (ACME directory).** step-ca vs Let's Encrypt → capture `directory_url`, account email, and challenge type with the §3.2 guidance surfaced (e.g. "private/internal domain? → DNS-01"). Capture EAB if the CA requires it (→ SecretBackend). For step-ca, offer to point at an existing step-ca or document standing one up.
|
||||
|
||||
**6.5 — Pick secret backend.** Vault vs Vaultwarden → capture connection (address, org/namespace, bootstrap auth). If Vaultwarden, walk the org/collection setup (§4.4) and **surface the machine-account maturity [VERIFY]** honestly so the operator chooses eyes-open.
|
||||
|
||||
**6.6 — Federation (OPTIONAL).** Only offered if Mode A/B. Ask whether to enable federation now; if yes, capture peer `server_name`s and build the `domain_whitelist`. If Mode C, federation is not offered (greyed out with the explanation). Federation-off is a first-class, fully-supported outcome.
|
||||
|
||||
**6.7 — The "what can't be changed later" warning gate.** Before writing immutable config, present an explicit confirmation:
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
⚠ IMMUTABLE CHOICES — read before confirming
|
||||
server_name = "mosaic.woltje.com"
|
||||
This becomes part of every agent identity (e.g. @mosaic_coordinator-1:mosaic.woltje.com)
|
||||
and every room alias. It CANNOT be changed later without re-homing every identity
|
||||
(new MXIDs for all agents, recreating all rooms). There is no in-place rename in Matrix.
|
||||
topology.mode = "split-domain" — changing modes later is a reinstall.
|
||||
secrets.backend = "vaultwarden" — switching backends later requires a secret migration.
|
||||
Type the server_name to confirm you understand it is permanent: ____________
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
The operator must **retype `server_name`** to proceed — a deliberate friction gate on the one truly permanent value.
|
||||
|
||||
**6.8 — Provision & validate (no success claim until proven).** The installer then:
|
||||
|
||||
1. Renders Synapse config + delegation artifacts; brings up Synapse with `enable_registration: false`.
|
||||
2. Runs the ACME flow; obtains cert(s); verifies they're valid and installed.
|
||||
3. Authenticates to the SecretBackend; stores `hs_token`/`as_token`, enroll bootstrap; runs `health()`.
|
||||
4. **Reachability & cert validation** appropriate to mode:
|
||||
- Mode A: fetch our own `.well-known`/SRV, confirm it points at host; TLS-probe host cert as a peer would; confirm C-S discovery.
|
||||
- Mode B: TLS-probe the single domain; confirm C-S + (if federation) S2S.
|
||||
- Mode C: confirm local C-S reachability over the bind IP; confirm (self-signed or private-CA) client TLS; **explicitly report "standalone — federation not available."**
|
||||
- If federation enabled: validate each peer resolves + presents a peer-trusted cert; confirm `domain_whitelist` mutual consistency. If any peer fails, **federation is reported NOT-ready** — the primary still succeeds standalone.
|
||||
5. **Only now** declare success, with a per-capability report: `PRIMARY: ✅ | CERT: ✅ (expires in 90d, auto-renew on) | SECRETS: ✅ (vaultwarden) | FEDERATION: ✅ 1 peer / ⚠ not-ready / ⛔ n-a (Mode C)`.
|
||||
|
||||
**6.9 — Post-install.** Emit the cert-expiry monitor + federation-health probe (§3.4) into OTEL; write config to DB with correct mutability flags; print the immutable-values summary again for the record.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 7. Standalone → federated upgrade path
|
||||
|
||||
An operator who started standalone later wants federation. The path depends on **whether they started with a domain**:
|
||||
|
||||
**Case 1 — started Mode A or B (had a domain), federation was just off.** _Cheap, no re-home._ `server_name` is already a real domain and identities are already minted against it. To federate:
|
||||
|
||||
1. Ensure DNS resolves for peers (their `server_name`s and yours) — likely already true.
|
||||
2. Ensure a **valid, peer-trusted cert** on the federation endpoint (if they were running client-only self-signed, they now need a real ACME cert; if already ACME, done).
|
||||
3. Set `federation.enabled = true`, populate `domain_whitelist` + `peers` (all runtime-tunable, §5.3).
|
||||
4. Re-run the installer's **federation validation** (§6.8 step 4) against each peer. On green, federation is live. **No identity change** — existing MXIDs simply become reachable cross-site. This is the intended, low-friction upgrade.
|
||||
|
||||
**Case 2 — started Mode C (IP-only), now wants federation.** _Expensive — an identity re-home, and we say so plainly._ Federation requires DNS + a valid cert (§2.4), which an IP `server_name` can never satisfy. So the operator must:
|
||||
|
||||
1. **Acquire a domain** and DNS, and provision a **valid ACME cert** (LE public, or step-ca if the domain is private — but note a _private_ domain can only federate with peers who trust that private CA root, §8).
|
||||
2. **Change `server_name` from the IP literal to the domain** — this is the **install-immutable value**, so this is a **re-home, not a config tweak**:
|
||||
- Every agent identity `@mosaic_*:192.168.1.50:8448` becomes `@mosaic_*:newdomain` — **all new MXIDs.**
|
||||
- Every room + alias must be **recreated** under the new `server_name`.
|
||||
- Signed-authorship pubkey records re-published under the new identities.
|
||||
- Any durable references to old MXIDs (escalation policies, fallback-coordinator targets, RFC-001 §5) must be re-pointed.
|
||||
3. Effectively: **treat it as a fresh install in Mode A/B with a data migration of rooms/history**, not an in-place flip. Matrix has **no in-place `server_name` rename**; this cost is intrinsic to Matrix, not to our design.
|
||||
|
||||
**Honest guidance the installer gives Mode C operators up front (§6.3):** "If there is _any_ chance you'll want to federate later, start with a domain (Mode A/B) even if you keep federation off — flipping federation on later is free, but changing an IP `server_name` to a domain later is a full identity re-home." This lets an informed operator avoid the expensive path by choosing Mode B-with-federation-off instead of Mode C.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 8. Security
|
||||
|
||||
**8.1 — Cert trust model per CA choice.**
|
||||
|
||||
- **Let's Encrypt (public):** chains to a universally-trusted root (ISRG). Peers, humans' browsers, and Element trust it with no extra distribution. Best for public domains; nothing to distribute.
|
||||
- **step-ca (private):** chains to a **root you operate**. Nothing trusts it by default. Therefore the **step-ca root must be distributed** to everyone who validates certs: peer homeservers (so cross-site S2S validates — a peer must add your root to its federation trust store, **[VERIFY]** Synapse's mechanism for trusting a custom federation CA), agent hosts, and any human client. This is the price of "total control" and airgap capability. For **federation between two private-CA sites**, both sites must trust each other's roots (or a shared root). Getting this wrong reproduces the silent-defederation failure (§3.4) — a peer that doesn't trust your root silently refuses your S2S.
|
||||
- **Mode C self-signed client TLS:** weakest — see 8.4.
|
||||
|
||||
**8.2 — Federation whitelist.** `federation_domain_whitelist` is a **hard allowlist** (RFC-001 §6/NG5): only listed Mosaic site domains may federate; no public-network federation. The installer/config validator keeps the whitelist consistent with the declared peer list. Adding a peer is an explicit, audited config change.
|
||||
|
||||
**8.3 — Secret-backend auth.** The appservice/orchestrator authenticate to the `SecretBackend` via a **bootstrap credential injected at deploy** (Vault AppRole secret_id, or Vaultwarden org automation principal), never committed, consistent with existing Gateway/DB secret handling (RFC-001 §8). The `as_token`/`hs_token` live **only** in backend + appservice memory; agents get only their own scoped, re-mintable token (§4.2). Enroll is authenticated (RFC-001 B5) so a rogue local process can't enroll a rogue agent. Backend access is scoped: an agent's credential can read only its collection/policy, never the fleet-admin scope holding the crown jewels.
|
||||
|
||||
**8.4 — Honest note: IP-only standalone with self-signed client TLS is a weaker-trust local mode.** In Mode C, client TLS may be self-signed (or a local private CA). This means: no third party vouches for the endpoint; clients must be told to trust the self-signed cert (TOFU or manual root import); there is no external validation of who's on the other end. This is **acceptable and supported for local/airgapped/homelab** use where the network is already trusted, but it is **explicitly a weaker trust posture** than a real CA. The installer states this plainly at install (§6.8 Mode C). It is one more reason Mode C cannot federate: we will not extend this weaker-trust local posture across sites (NG5).
|
||||
|
||||
**8.5 — Homeserver hardening** (inherited from RFC-001 §8, config-rendered here): `enable_registration: false` always (agents come only via the appservice), rate-limiting on, admin API bound to localhost/behind auth, media repo locked/disabled if unused, TLS terminated at our controlled proxy. These are **rendered from config** (§5.4) so a stranger gets them by default, not by remembering to set them. **[VERIFY]** current recommended Synapse hardening flags at implementation.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 9. How RFC-002 integrates with RFC-001's P1–P5
|
||||
|
||||
RFC-002 is the **substrate**. Each RFC-001 phase consumes a subset of it. Critically, **P1 does not need the hard parts** — presence ships on a single clean-domain instance with no federation, no IP-only, and no secret-rotation story resolved.
|
||||
|
||||
| RFC-001 phase | RFC-002 pieces it NEEDS | RFC-002 pieces it does NOT need yet |
|
||||
| ------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
|
||||
| **P1 — Presence (first shippable slice)** | **Mode A or B, single-instance, clean domain** (§2.3). One ACME cert (LE or step-ca) via the single integration (§3). Config system minimal: `server_name` immutable + presence thresholds tunable (§5.3). Installer path 6.1–6.3, 6.4 (cert), 6.7 (immutable gate), 6.8 (validate single-instance). A **minimal** SecretBackend just holding the appservice token. | **No federation** (§2.4 gate irrelevant — single site). **No IP-only** needed for P1 (P1 wants a clean domain so Element/humans connect cleanly). **No agent-credential rotation** maturity. **No peer/whitelist** config. Vaultwarden machine-account [VERIFY] does **not** block P1. |
|
||||
| **P2 — Appservice + auto-enroll** | Full `SecretBackend` **`enrollAgent`/`revokeAgent`** (§4.1), `hs_token`/`as_token` custody (§4.2), enroll-bootstrap secret. Config: room taxonomy, per-agent token classification. Chosen backend (Vault or Vaultwarden) real. | Federation, cross-site, IP-only. |
|
||||
| **P3 — MACP v1 spec** | Config keys for MACP versioning/thresholds as runtime-tunable (§5.3); nothing new topology-wise. | Federation, secret rotation-in-anger. |
|
||||
| **P4 — Federation** | **The whole federation half of RFC-002:** Mode A delegation (§3.3), the hard DNS+cert gate (§2.4), `domain_whitelist`+peers config, cert monitoring/silent-defederation alarm (§3.4), per-CA trust distribution for cross-site (§8.1). This is where standalone→federated (§7 Case 1) and Jason's `mosaic.woltje.com`↔`mosaic.uscllc.com` shape land. | IP-only (federation excludes it by construction). |
|
||||
| **P5 — Hardening + signed-authorship + Hermes retired** | Secret **rotation runbooks** executed in anger (§4, RFC-001 E2), pubkey-record custody for Ed25519 (§4.2), cert-rotation runbook (§3.4), full homeserver hardening validated (§8.5), backend auth review (§8.3). | — |
|
||||
|
||||
**One-line integration statement:** P1 rides on the _smallest_ slice of RFC-002 (single clean-domain instance + one cert + minimal config + minimal secret storage); the federation/IP-only/backend-maturity complexity is deferred to exactly the phases that need it (mostly P4/P5). RFC-002 therefore does not gate P1.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 10. Open questions
|
||||
|
||||
Deliberately few — most topology/cert/secret decisions are resolved by Jason's rulings and baked in above.
|
||||
|
||||
1. **[VERIFY] IP-only `server_name` acceptance.** Does the deployed Synapse version accept an `ip:port` `server_name` and mint usable MXIDs for standalone (§2.3)? If not, Mode C uses a fabricated local domain (`mosaic.local` via local resolver) — confirm which, since it affects the re-home wording for Mode C→A/B (§7).
|
||||
2. **[VERIFY] Vaultwarden machine-account maturity.** Confirm the current Vaultwarden version's Secrets Manager / machine-account coverage (§4.4). Determines whether the Vaultwarden adapter's `enrollAgent` uses native machine accounts or the personal-vault-per-agent + collection model. Does **not** block (interface absorbs either), but sets P2 expectations.
|
||||
3. **[VERIFY] step-ca root distribution for cross-site federation.** Confirm Synapse's supported mechanism for trusting a **custom federation CA root** (§8.1) so two private-CA sites can federate. If Synapse won't easily trust a private federation CA, private-domain federation may in practice require public certs (LE) on the federation SANs even when internal traffic uses step-ca.
|
||||
4. **Default secret backend for the published installer.** Given the open-source ethos (G6), should the installer _default-suggest_ Vaultwarden (free, self-hostable) while clearly offering Vault, or present them neutrally? Recommendation: suggest Vaultwarden as the zero-cost path with the maturity caveat surfaced, Vault as the "I need native short-TTL machine creds now" path. Jason to confirm the framing.
|
||||
5. **Single multi-SAN cert vs two certs in Mode A** (§3.3) — operational preference for identity-domain + host coverage. Minor; validate during P4.
|
||||
6. **Reconfigure-time Synapse restart policy.** Which rendered-config changes (§5.4) require a Synapse restart vs hot-reload on the deployed version, so the config service knows when a tunable change needs a bounce. **[VERIFY]** at implementation.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Appendix A — Real mechanics this RFC leans on (quick reference)
|
||||
|
||||
- **`server_name`** — Synapse identity domain; the `:suffix` of every MXID/alias; install-immutable; changing it = re-home (no in-place rename). Distinct from where Synapse _listens_.
|
||||
- **Delegation** — `https://<server_name>/.well-known/matrix/server` → `{"m.server":"host:port"}` and/or `_matrix._tcp.<server_name>` **SRV**; how identity-domain ≠ host is reconciled (Mode A). **[VERIFY]** precedence on deployed Synapse.
|
||||
- **`.well-known/matrix/client`** — C-S discovery so agents/Element find the homeserver host from the identity domain.
|
||||
- **`federation_domain_whitelist`** — Synapse allowlist; only listed domains federate; our hard no-public-federation boundary.
|
||||
- **ACME** — single provisioning protocol for both CAs; operator supplies **directory URL** (step-ca vs Let's Encrypt) + **challenge type**.
|
||||
- **HTTP-01 / DNS-01 / TLS-ALPN-01** — challenge types; **DNS-01 is the one for private/split-horizon/wildcard**; HTTP-01 for public single host with :80; TLS-ALPN-01 for :443-only public.
|
||||
- **step-ca ACME provisioner** — Smallstep's self-hosted CA exposing an ACME directory; enables private/internal-domain certs and total control; may require **EAB**; root must be distributed to validators.
|
||||
- **Let's Encrypt** — public ACME CA; universally-trusted chain; 90-day certs; staging endpoint for testing.
|
||||
- **Bitwarden/Vaultwarden org + collection + machine/service-account** — org holds collections; collections scope access; machine/service accounts (Bitwarden **Secrets Manager**) are the clean automation primitive but **Vaultwarden coverage is partial/evolving [VERIFY]**; personal-vault-per-agent + org-collection works today.
|
||||
- **Vault KV v2 / AppRole / lease-TTL / revoke** — the capable backend; native versioning=rotate, TTL+revoke=transient per-agent creds.
|
||||
- **Silent defederation** — a lapsed/renewal-failed federation cert causes peers to stop trusting S2S with no local error; must be monitored + alarmed (§3.4).
|
||||
|
||||
_All Matrix/ACME/secret-backend mechanics above are cited from architecture knowledge and MUST be re-verified against the actually deployed versions during implementation — every **[VERIFY]** is a checkpoint, not an assumption. Every illustrative domain (`mosaic.woltje.com`, `mosaic.uscllc.com`, `matrix.woltje.com`) is an operator-supplied example, never a product default or literal._
|
||||
@@ -29,7 +29,6 @@ export default tseslint.config(
|
||||
'apps/web/playwright.config.ts',
|
||||
'apps/gateway/vitest.config.ts',
|
||||
'plugins/discord/vitest.config.ts',
|
||||
'packages/comms/vitest.config.ts',
|
||||
'packages/db/vitest.config.ts',
|
||||
'packages/storage/vitest.config.ts',
|
||||
'packages/mosaic/vitest.config.ts',
|
||||
|
||||
3
infra/matrix/.gitignore
vendored
3
infra/matrix/.gitignore
vendored
@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
|
||||
# DEV runtime state: rendered config, sqlite db, signing key, self-signed
|
||||
# certs, throwaway secrets. Never committed.
|
||||
.data/
|
||||
@@ -1,53 +0,0 @@
|
||||
# infra/matrix — DEV Synapse for RFC-001 P1 (presence)
|
||||
|
||||
> **DEV-ONLY. LOCAL SANDBOX.** This stack is for local presence validation. It
|
||||
> must **never** be pointed at, or run alongside, a live/production homeserver.
|
||||
> It is single-instance, federation-OFF, self-signed TLS — the smallest slice
|
||||
> RFC-002 §9 says P1 needs (Mode B single-domain, no federation, no IP-only, no
|
||||
> secret-rotation story).
|
||||
|
||||
## What this is
|
||||
|
||||
A single Synapse homeserver rendered from committed **templates** (no hardcoded
|
||||
topology — RFC-002 G2). Every topology fact is an environment variable with a
|
||||
dev default:
|
||||
|
||||
| Var | Default | Meaning |
|
||||
| -------------------- | ------------------ | --------------------------------------------------- |
|
||||
| `MATRIX_SERVER_NAME` | `matrix.localhost` | Synapse `server_name` (the `:suffix` of every MXID) |
|
||||
| `MOSAIC_AS_ID` | `mosaic-as` | appservice id / registration filename |
|
||||
| `MATRIX_HTTP_PORT` | `18008` | host port → Synapse 8008 (plain HTTP) |
|
||||
| `MATRIX_TLS_PORT` | `18448` | host port → Synapse 8448 (self-signed TLS) |
|
||||
|
||||
Secrets (`as_token`, `hs_token`, Synapse macaroon/form/registration secrets)
|
||||
are **throwaway values generated at bring-up** into `.data/dev-secrets.env`
|
||||
(gitignored). In production these are crown-jewel secrets held by the
|
||||
SecretBackend (RFC-001 §8 / RFC-002 §4) — never committed.
|
||||
|
||||
## Files
|
||||
|
||||
- `docker-compose.dev.yml` — Synapse (+ optional Element under `--profile element`).
|
||||
- `synapse/homeserver.dev.yaml.tpl` — rendered Synapse config (Mode B, `enable_registration: false`, appservice wired, native TLS).
|
||||
- `synapse/log.config` — Synapse logging.
|
||||
- `appservice/mosaic-as.dev.yaml.tpl` — minimal AS registration (declares the `@agent-*` user namespace).
|
||||
- `dev-up.sh` / `dev-down.sh` — bring up / tear down (`--purge` wipes `.data`).
|
||||
- `.data/` — **gitignored** runtime state (rendered config, sqlite db, signing key, self-signed certs, dev secrets).
|
||||
|
||||
## Usage
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
./dev-up.sh # render config, gen signing key + TLS cert, boot Synapse
|
||||
# ... run the validation harness (tools/matrix-presence-harness/run.sh) ...
|
||||
./dev-down.sh # stop, keep .data
|
||||
./dev-down.sh --purge # stop and wipe .data for a pristine next boot
|
||||
|
||||
# optional human view (A4) — Element pointed at the dev server:
|
||||
docker compose -f docker-compose.dev.yml --profile element up -d element
|
||||
# -> http://127.0.0.1:18080
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
## Acceptance evidence (A1)
|
||||
|
||||
- TLS (self-signed) reachable: `curl -sk https://127.0.0.1:18448/_matrix/client/versions` → `200`.
|
||||
- Open registration OFF: `POST /_matrix/client/v3/register` → `M_FORBIDDEN "Registration has been disabled"`.
|
||||
- AS-token registration bypasses the flag by design (that is how agents are provisioned).
|
||||
@@ -1,30 +0,0 @@
|
||||
# ============================================================================
|
||||
# mosaic-as.dev.yaml.tpl — Mosaic Appservice registration (DEV)
|
||||
# ============================================================================
|
||||
#
|
||||
# *** DEV-ONLY. The tokens below are throwaway placeholders rendered at
|
||||
# bring-up by dev-up.sh. NEVER commit real hs_token/as_token — in
|
||||
# production they are crown-jewel secrets held by the SecretBackend
|
||||
# (RFC-001 §8, RFC-002 §4). ***
|
||||
#
|
||||
# This is the MINIMAL P1 registration: it declares the @agent-* user
|
||||
# namespace so the P1 provisioner can register a few virtual agent MXIDs and
|
||||
# carry heartbeats. It intentionally does NOT model the full P2 taxonomy /
|
||||
# token-minting appservice.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Rendered by infra/matrix/dev-up.sh (envsubst -> .data/${MOSAIC_AS_ID}.yaml).
|
||||
# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
id: "${MOSAIC_AS_ID}"
|
||||
url: null # P1: provisioner drives the AS API directly; Synapse pushes no txns.
|
||||
as_token: "${MOSAIC_AS_TOKEN}"
|
||||
hs_token: "${MOSAIC_HS_TOKEN}"
|
||||
sender_localpart: "mosaic-as"
|
||||
rate_limited: false
|
||||
namespaces:
|
||||
users:
|
||||
- exclusive: true
|
||||
regex: "@agent-.*:${MATRIX_SERVER_NAME}"
|
||||
aliases:
|
||||
- exclusive: false
|
||||
regex: "#mosaic-.*:${MATRIX_SERVER_NAME}"
|
||||
rooms: []
|
||||
@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
|
||||
#!/usr/bin/env bash
|
||||
# dev-down.sh — tear down the DEV Synapse (matrix-p1-dev). DEV-ONLY.
|
||||
# ./dev-down.sh # stop + remove containers, keep ./.data
|
||||
# ./dev-down.sh --purge # also delete ./.data (fresh next bring-up)
|
||||
set -euo pipefail
|
||||
HERE="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
|
||||
docker compose -f "${HERE}/docker-compose.dev.yml" --profile element down -v --remove-orphans || true
|
||||
if [[ "${1:-}" == "--purge" ]]; then
|
||||
rm -rf "${HERE}/.data"
|
||||
echo "[dev-down] purged ${HERE}/.data"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
echo "[dev-down] matrix-p1-dev stopped"
|
||||
@@ -1,108 +0,0 @@
|
||||
#!/usr/bin/env bash
|
||||
# ============================================================================
|
||||
# dev-up.sh — bring up the DEV Synapse for RFC-001 P1 (presence)
|
||||
# ============================================================================
|
||||
#
|
||||
# *** DEV-ONLY. LOCAL SANDBOX. This script must never be pointed at live
|
||||
# infra. It writes only into infra/matrix/.data (gitignored) and drives
|
||||
# a dedicated compose project (matrix-p1-dev). ***
|
||||
#
|
||||
# It renders the Synapse config + appservice registration from the committed
|
||||
# templates (envsubst), generates a DEV signing key + self-signed TLS cert,
|
||||
# and starts Synapse. All topology facts come from the environment with dev
|
||||
# defaults (RFC-002 G2: nothing hardcoded).
|
||||
# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
set -euo pipefail
|
||||
|
||||
HERE="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
|
||||
DATA="${HERE}/.data"
|
||||
COMPOSE=(docker compose -f "${HERE}/docker-compose.dev.yml")
|
||||
|
||||
# ---- Topology inputs (dev defaults; override via env) ----------------------
|
||||
export MATRIX_SERVER_NAME="${MATRIX_SERVER_NAME:-matrix.localhost}"
|
||||
export MOSAIC_AS_ID="${MOSAIC_AS_ID:-mosaic-as}"
|
||||
export MATRIX_HTTP_PORT="${MATRIX_HTTP_PORT:-18008}"
|
||||
export MATRIX_TLS_PORT="${MATRIX_TLS_PORT:-18448}"
|
||||
|
||||
# ---- DEV secrets (throwaway; regenerated if absent) ------------------------
|
||||
SECRETS_ENV="${DATA}/dev-secrets.env"
|
||||
mkdir -p "${DATA}"
|
||||
if [[ ! -f "${SECRETS_ENV}" ]]; then
|
||||
{
|
||||
echo "MOSAIC_AS_TOKEN=devas_$(openssl rand -hex 16)"
|
||||
echo "MOSAIC_HS_TOKEN=devhs_$(openssl rand -hex 16)"
|
||||
echo "SYNAPSE_REG_SHARED_SECRET=devreg_$(openssl rand -hex 16)"
|
||||
echo "SYNAPSE_MACAROON_SECRET=devmac_$(openssl rand -hex 16)"
|
||||
echo "SYNAPSE_FORM_SECRET=devform_$(openssl rand -hex 16)"
|
||||
} > "${SECRETS_ENV}"
|
||||
echo "[dev-up] generated throwaway DEV secrets -> ${SECRETS_ENV}"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
# shellcheck disable=SC1090
|
||||
set -a; source "${SECRETS_ENV}"; set +a
|
||||
|
||||
# DEV: let the synapse container user (uid 991) write the sqlite db / media.
|
||||
chmod 0777 "${DATA}" || true
|
||||
|
||||
# ---- Render config from templates ------------------------------------------
|
||||
envsubst < "${HERE}/synapse/homeserver.dev.yaml.tpl" > "${DATA}/homeserver.yaml"
|
||||
envsubst < "${HERE}/appservice/mosaic-as.dev.yaml.tpl" > "${DATA}/${MOSAIC_AS_ID}.yaml"
|
||||
cp "${HERE}/synapse/log.config" "${DATA}/log.config"
|
||||
echo "[dev-up] rendered homeserver.yaml + ${MOSAIC_AS_ID}.yaml (server_name=${MATRIX_SERVER_NAME})"
|
||||
|
||||
# ---- DEV signing key -------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
# Generate as the synapse container user (uid 991) so the running container
|
||||
# can read it; owned-by-991 mode-600 is fine (the container IS 991).
|
||||
SIGNING_KEY="${DATA}/${MATRIX_SERVER_NAME}.signing.key"
|
||||
if [[ ! -f "${SIGNING_KEY}" ]]; then
|
||||
docker run --rm --user 991:991 -v "${DATA}:/data" --entrypoint generate_signing_key \
|
||||
matrixdotorg/synapse:latest -o "/data/${MATRIX_SERVER_NAME}.signing.key"
|
||||
echo "[dev-up] generated DEV signing key"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
# ---- DEV self-signed TLS cert (A1) -----------------------------------------
|
||||
if [[ ! -f "${DATA}/dev-cert.pem" ]]; then
|
||||
openssl req -x509 -newkey rsa:2048 -nodes \
|
||||
-keyout "${DATA}/dev-key.pem" -out "${DATA}/dev-cert.pem" \
|
||||
-days 90 -subj "/CN=${MATRIX_SERVER_NAME}" \
|
||||
-addext "subjectAltName=DNS:${MATRIX_SERVER_NAME},DNS:localhost,IP:127.0.0.1" >/dev/null 2>&1
|
||||
echo "[dev-up] generated DEV self-signed TLS cert for ${MATRIX_SERVER_NAME}"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
# Files hermes owns must be world-readable so the synapse (uid 991) container
|
||||
# can read them (DEV-only; the signing key stays owned by 991 from above).
|
||||
chmod 0644 "${DATA}/dev-cert.pem" "${DATA}/dev-key.pem" \
|
||||
"${DATA}/homeserver.yaml" "${DATA}/${MOSAIC_AS_ID}.yaml" "${DATA}/log.config" || true
|
||||
|
||||
# ---- Element config (optional human view, A4) ------------------------------
|
||||
cat > "${DATA}/element-config.json" <<JSON
|
||||
{
|
||||
"default_server_config": {
|
||||
"m.homeserver": {
|
||||
"base_url": "https://localhost:${MATRIX_TLS_PORT}",
|
||||
"server_name": "${MATRIX_SERVER_NAME}"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"disable_guests": true,
|
||||
"brand": "Mosaic P1 (DEV)"
|
||||
}
|
||||
JSON
|
||||
|
||||
# ---- Boot ------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
"${COMPOSE[@]}" up -d synapse
|
||||
|
||||
echo -n "[dev-up] waiting for Synapse health"
|
||||
for _ in $(seq 1 60); do
|
||||
status="$("${COMPOSE[@]}" ps --format '{{.Health}}' synapse 2>/dev/null || true)"
|
||||
if [[ "${status}" == "healthy" ]]; then echo " ... healthy"; break; fi
|
||||
echo -n "."; sleep 2
|
||||
done
|
||||
|
||||
if ! curl -fsS "http://127.0.0.1:${MATRIX_HTTP_PORT}/health" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
|
||||
echo "[dev-up] ERROR: Synapse did not become healthy" >&2
|
||||
"${COMPOSE[@]}" logs --tail 60 synapse >&2 || true
|
||||
exit 1
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
echo "[dev-up] Synapse UP:"
|
||||
echo " plain HTTP : http://127.0.0.1:${MATRIX_HTTP_PORT}"
|
||||
echo " TLS : https://127.0.0.1:${MATRIX_TLS_PORT} (self-signed, DEV)"
|
||||
echo " server_name: ${MATRIX_SERVER_NAME} registration: OFF"
|
||||
@@ -1,60 +0,0 @@
|
||||
# ============================================================================
|
||||
# docker-compose.dev.yml — Synapse DEV homeserver for RFC-001 P1 (presence)
|
||||
# ============================================================================
|
||||
#
|
||||
# *** DEV-ONLY. LOCAL SANDBOX. Do NOT point this at, or run alongside, any
|
||||
# live/production homeserver. ***
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Single-instance Synapse (RFC-002 Mode B, federation OFF) + an optional
|
||||
# Element web client for the human view (A4). Brought up by ./dev-up.sh, which
|
||||
# renders config into ./.data (gitignored) first.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Isolated by design: dedicated project name + network + high host ports so it
|
||||
# never collides with other stacks on the box (A5).
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Host ports: ${MATRIX_HTTP_PORT:-18008} -> Synapse 8008 (plain HTTP)
|
||||
# ${MATRIX_TLS_PORT:-18448} -> Synapse 8448 (self-signed TLS)
|
||||
# ${ELEMENT_PORT:-18080} -> Element web (profile: element)
|
||||
# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
name: matrix-p1-dev
|
||||
|
||||
services:
|
||||
synapse:
|
||||
image: matrixdotorg/synapse:latest
|
||||
container_name: matrix-p1-synapse
|
||||
restart: 'no'
|
||||
# Run against the rendered config in /data (dev-up.sh puts it there).
|
||||
environment:
|
||||
SYNAPSE_CONFIG_DIR: /data
|
||||
SYNAPSE_CONFIG_PATH: /data/homeserver.yaml
|
||||
volumes:
|
||||
- ./.data:/data
|
||||
ports:
|
||||
- '127.0.0.1:${MATRIX_HTTP_PORT:-18008}:8008'
|
||||
- '127.0.0.1:${MATRIX_TLS_PORT:-18448}:8448'
|
||||
networks:
|
||||
- matrix-p1-net
|
||||
healthcheck:
|
||||
test: ['CMD-SHELL', 'curl -fsS http://localhost:8008/health || exit 1']
|
||||
interval: 3s
|
||||
timeout: 5s
|
||||
retries: 40
|
||||
start_period: 5s
|
||||
|
||||
# Optional human view (A4). `docker compose --profile element up -d element`.
|
||||
element:
|
||||
image: vectorim/element-web:latest
|
||||
container_name: matrix-p1-element
|
||||
restart: 'no'
|
||||
profiles: [element]
|
||||
volumes:
|
||||
- ./.data/element-config.json:/app/config.json:ro
|
||||
ports:
|
||||
- '127.0.0.1:${ELEMENT_PORT:-18080}:80'
|
||||
networks:
|
||||
- matrix-p1-net
|
||||
|
||||
networks:
|
||||
matrix-p1-net:
|
||||
name: matrix-p1-net
|
||||
driver: bridge
|
||||
@@ -1,84 +0,0 @@
|
||||
# ============================================================================
|
||||
# homeserver.dev.yaml.tpl — Synapse DEV homeserver config (RFC-002 Mode B)
|
||||
# ============================================================================
|
||||
#
|
||||
# *** DEV-ONLY. NOT FOR PRODUCTION. ***
|
||||
#
|
||||
# This is the RFC-001 P1 (presence) single-instance homeserver. It is
|
||||
# RFC-002 "Mode B — single-domain" (server_name == homeserver host), with
|
||||
# federation OFF (standalone), which is all P1 needs (RFC-002 §9 P1 row).
|
||||
#
|
||||
# NOTHING here is a production value. Every topology fact is a variable
|
||||
# rendered by dev-up.sh from the environment; there is no baked-in fleet
|
||||
# domain (RFC-002 G2 "zero hardcoded topology"). The secrets below are
|
||||
# throwaway DEV placeholders rendered at bring-up — never reuse them.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Rendered by: infra/matrix/dev-up.sh (envsubst -> .data/homeserver.yaml)
|
||||
# Variables: MATRIX_SERVER_NAME, MOSAIC_AS_ID (+ dev secrets)
|
||||
# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
server_name: "${MATRIX_SERVER_NAME}"
|
||||
pid_file: /data/homeserver.pid
|
||||
report_stats: false
|
||||
suppress_key_server_warning: true
|
||||
|
||||
# --- Listeners -------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
# 8008: plain HTTP (client + federation) for in-container/local tooling.
|
||||
# 8448: TLS (self-signed in DEV) — satisfies A1 "reachable over TLS".
|
||||
listeners:
|
||||
- port: 8008
|
||||
type: http
|
||||
tls: false
|
||||
bind_addresses: ['0.0.0.0']
|
||||
x_forwarded: true
|
||||
resources:
|
||||
- names: [client, federation]
|
||||
compress: false
|
||||
|
||||
- port: 8448
|
||||
type: http
|
||||
tls: true
|
||||
bind_addresses: ['0.0.0.0']
|
||||
resources:
|
||||
- names: [client, federation]
|
||||
compress: false
|
||||
|
||||
# --- DEV TLS (self-signed; generated by dev-up.sh) -------------------------
|
||||
tls_certificate_path: "/data/dev-cert.pem"
|
||||
tls_private_key_path: "/data/dev-key.pem"
|
||||
|
||||
# --- Store: sqlite is the simplest dev store (RFC-002 §1 allows it) --------
|
||||
database:
|
||||
name: sqlite3
|
||||
args:
|
||||
database: /data/homeserver.db
|
||||
|
||||
log_config: "/data/log.config"
|
||||
media_store_path: /data/media_store
|
||||
signing_key_path: "/data/${MATRIX_SERVER_NAME}.signing.key"
|
||||
|
||||
# --- Hardening (RFC-001 §8 / RFC-002 §8.5), rendered so a dev gets it ------
|
||||
# Registration is OFF: agents come ONLY via the appservice (A1). AS user
|
||||
# registration bypasses this flag, which is exactly the design.
|
||||
enable_registration: false
|
||||
enable_registration_without_verification: false
|
||||
registration_shared_secret: "${SYNAPSE_REG_SHARED_SECRET}"
|
||||
macaroon_secret_key: "${SYNAPSE_MACAROON_SECRET}"
|
||||
form_secret: "${SYNAPSE_FORM_SECRET}"
|
||||
|
||||
# Presence EDUs ON so Element shows the native dot for humans (RFC-001 §4.5);
|
||||
# the AUTHORITATIVE liveness is still the mosaic.presence heartbeat.
|
||||
presence:
|
||||
enabled: true
|
||||
|
||||
# --- Federation: OFF for P1 (standalone). Empty whitelist = federate with
|
||||
# nobody (RFC-002 §2.4 / NG5). No public-network federation. ----------------
|
||||
federation_domain_whitelist: []
|
||||
trusted_key_servers: []
|
||||
|
||||
# --- Appservice registration wired in (A1). The file is rendered next to
|
||||
# this one by dev-up.sh. -----------------------------------------------------
|
||||
app_service_config_files:
|
||||
- "/data/${MOSAIC_AS_ID}.yaml"
|
||||
|
||||
# Keep default rate-limiting ON (RFC-001 §8). No overrides here.
|
||||
@@ -1,16 +0,0 @@
|
||||
# Synapse DEV log config. DEV-ONLY.
|
||||
version: 1
|
||||
formatters:
|
||||
precise:
|
||||
format: '%(asctime)s - %(name)s - %(lineno)d - %(levelname)s - %(request)s - %(message)s'
|
||||
handlers:
|
||||
console:
|
||||
class: logging.StreamHandler
|
||||
formatter: precise
|
||||
loggers:
|
||||
synapse.storage.SQL:
|
||||
level: WARNING
|
||||
root:
|
||||
level: INFO
|
||||
handlers: [console]
|
||||
disable_existing_loggers: false
|
||||
@@ -1,41 +0,0 @@
|
||||
# @mosaicstack/comms
|
||||
|
||||
MACP presence SDK — the **P1 (presence)** slice of RFC-001 (§4.5 liveness,
|
||||
§4.2 event envelope). Minimal by design: set Matrix presence, run the
|
||||
`mosaic.presence` heartbeat, and compute **deterministic** fleet liveness.
|
||||
|
||||
Out of P1 scope (later phases): enrollment/auto-detect, room taxonomy,
|
||||
per-agent token minting, signed-authorship, federation.
|
||||
|
||||
## API
|
||||
|
||||
- `classifyLiveness(ageMs, policy)` / `computeFleetLiveness(observations, now, policy)`
|
||||
— pure, deterministic online/away/offline from heartbeat age. The
|
||||
authoritative liveness source (RFC-001 §4.5): native Matrix presence is _not_
|
||||
relied upon.
|
||||
- `HeartbeatEmitter` / `startHeartbeatLoop(...)` — build and drive the
|
||||
`mosaic.presence` heartbeat (monotonic `seq`, `interval_ms`).
|
||||
- `MinimalMatrixClient` — tiny C-S client: `setPresence`, `sendHeartbeat`,
|
||||
`readHeartbeats`, `joinRoom`. Supports Application-Service masquerade
|
||||
(`actAsUserId`) for the P1 provisioner, or a per-agent `accessToken`.
|
||||
- `PresenceAgent` — high-level: join the fleet room, go present, heartbeat.
|
||||
`pauseHeartbeat()` models a crash (no graceful signal).
|
||||
- `FleetLivenessReader` — reads the fleet room and computes the liveness board
|
||||
(`read()` / `formatBoard()`), the surface a human or watchdog reads.
|
||||
|
||||
## Liveness policy (RFC-001 §4.5)
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
online : age <= heartbeatIntervalMs * missTolerance
|
||||
away : age < darkThresholdMs
|
||||
offline: otherwise (or never-seen / non-finite age -> fail safe to offline)
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Defaults: interval 30s, miss-tolerance 2, dark-threshold 10min
|
||||
(`DEFAULT_LIVENESS_POLICY`). All runtime-tunable per RFC-002 §5.3.
|
||||
|
||||
## Tests
|
||||
|
||||
`pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/comms test` — the liveness core is written
|
||||
RED-FIRST; an end-to-end proof against a real Synapse lives in
|
||||
`tools/matrix-presence-harness`.
|
||||
@@ -1,37 +0,0 @@
|
||||
{
|
||||
"name": "@mosaicstack/comms",
|
||||
"version": "0.0.1",
|
||||
"type": "module",
|
||||
"repository": {
|
||||
"type": "git",
|
||||
"url": "https://git.mosaicstack.dev/mosaicstack/stack.git",
|
||||
"directory": "packages/comms"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"main": "dist/index.js",
|
||||
"types": "dist/index.d.ts",
|
||||
"exports": {
|
||||
".": {
|
||||
"types": "./dist/index.d.ts",
|
||||
"default": "./dist/index.js"
|
||||
}
|
||||
},
|
||||
"scripts": {
|
||||
"build": "tsc",
|
||||
"lint": "eslint src",
|
||||
"typecheck": "tsc --noEmit",
|
||||
"test": "vitest run --passWithNoTests"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"devDependencies": {
|
||||
"@types/node": "^22.0.0",
|
||||
"@vitest/coverage-v8": "^2.0.0",
|
||||
"typescript": "^5.8.0",
|
||||
"vitest": "^2.0.0"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"publishConfig": {
|
||||
"registry": "https://git.mosaicstack.dev/api/packages/mosaicstack/npm/",
|
||||
"access": "public"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"files": [
|
||||
"dist"
|
||||
]
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -1,90 +0,0 @@
|
||||
import { afterEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest';
|
||||
|
||||
import { HeartbeatEmitter, startHeartbeatLoop } from '../heartbeat.js';
|
||||
import type { PresenceHeartbeatContent } from '../types.js';
|
||||
|
||||
const agent = { mxid: '@agent-alpha:matrix.localhost', slug: 'alpha', harness: 'claude-code' };
|
||||
|
||||
describe('HeartbeatEmitter', () => {
|
||||
it('increments seq starting at 1 and stamps the envelope', () => {
|
||||
let t = 1000;
|
||||
const em = new HeartbeatEmitter({ agent, intervalMs: 5000, now: () => t });
|
||||
const a = em.next();
|
||||
t = 6000;
|
||||
const b = em.next('away');
|
||||
|
||||
expect(a.seq).toBe(1);
|
||||
expect(a.ts).toBe(1000);
|
||||
expect(a.status).toBe('online');
|
||||
expect(a.macp_type).toBe('presence');
|
||||
expect(a.msgtype).toBe('mosaic.presence');
|
||||
expect(a.macp_version).toBe('1.0');
|
||||
expect(a.interval_ms).toBe(5000);
|
||||
expect(a.agent).toEqual(agent);
|
||||
expect(a.body).toContain('alpha');
|
||||
|
||||
expect(b.seq).toBe(2);
|
||||
expect(b.ts).toBe(6000);
|
||||
expect(b.status).toBe('away');
|
||||
expect(em.currentSeq).toBe(2);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it('includes mission_id only when provided', () => {
|
||||
const withMission = new HeartbeatEmitter({
|
||||
agent,
|
||||
intervalMs: 1000,
|
||||
missionId: 'KBN-101',
|
||||
}).next();
|
||||
const without = new HeartbeatEmitter({ agent, intervalMs: 1000 }).next();
|
||||
expect(withMission.mission_id).toBe('KBN-101');
|
||||
expect(without.mission_id).toBeUndefined();
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
describe('startHeartbeatLoop', () => {
|
||||
afterEach(() => vi.useRealTimers());
|
||||
|
||||
it('emits immediately, then once per interval, until stopped', () => {
|
||||
vi.useFakeTimers();
|
||||
const sent: PresenceHeartbeatContent[] = [];
|
||||
const em = new HeartbeatEmitter({ agent, intervalMs: 1000, now: () => Date.now() });
|
||||
const loop = startHeartbeatLoop({
|
||||
emitter: em,
|
||||
intervalMs: 1000,
|
||||
send: (c) => {
|
||||
sent.push(c);
|
||||
},
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
expect(sent).toHaveLength(1); // immediate beat
|
||||
vi.advanceTimersByTime(3000);
|
||||
expect(sent).toHaveLength(4); // +3 beats
|
||||
expect(sent.map((s) => s.seq)).toEqual([1, 2, 3, 4]);
|
||||
|
||||
loop.stop();
|
||||
vi.advanceTimersByTime(5000);
|
||||
expect(sent).toHaveLength(4); // no more after stop
|
||||
loop.stop(); // idempotent
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it('routes a rejected async send to onError without killing the loop', async () => {
|
||||
vi.useFakeTimers();
|
||||
const onError = vi.fn();
|
||||
let n = 0;
|
||||
const em = new HeartbeatEmitter({ agent, intervalMs: 1000 });
|
||||
const loop = startHeartbeatLoop({
|
||||
emitter: em,
|
||||
intervalMs: 1000,
|
||||
onError,
|
||||
send: () => {
|
||||
n += 1;
|
||||
return Promise.reject(new Error(`boom ${n}`));
|
||||
},
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
await vi.advanceTimersByTimeAsync(2000); // immediate + 2
|
||||
expect(n).toBe(3);
|
||||
expect(onError).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(3);
|
||||
loop.stop();
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
@@ -1,89 +0,0 @@
|
||||
import { describe, expect, it } from 'vitest';
|
||||
|
||||
import { classifyLiveness, computeFleetLiveness } from '../liveness.js';
|
||||
import type { HeartbeatObservation, LivenessPolicy } from '../types.js';
|
||||
|
||||
// Small, dev-scale policy so the arithmetic is obvious:
|
||||
// online window = interval * missTolerance = 1000 * 2 = 2000ms
|
||||
// dark threshold = 5000ms
|
||||
const policy: LivenessPolicy = {
|
||||
heartbeatIntervalMs: 1000,
|
||||
missTolerance: 2,
|
||||
darkThresholdMs: 5000,
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
describe('classifyLiveness (deterministic, heartbeat-age based — RFC-001 §4.5)', () => {
|
||||
it('is online when age is within interval * missTolerance', () => {
|
||||
expect(classifyLiveness(0, policy)).toBe('online');
|
||||
expect(classifyLiveness(1999, policy)).toBe('online');
|
||||
expect(classifyLiveness(2000, policy)).toBe('online'); // inclusive boundary
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it('is away when past the online window but before dark threshold', () => {
|
||||
expect(classifyLiveness(2001, policy)).toBe('away');
|
||||
expect(classifyLiveness(4999, policy)).toBe('away');
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it('is offline/dark at or past the dark threshold', () => {
|
||||
expect(classifyLiveness(5000, policy)).toBe('offline');
|
||||
expect(classifyLiveness(50_000, policy)).toBe('offline');
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it('treats a never-seen agent (Infinity age) as offline', () => {
|
||||
expect(classifyLiveness(Number.POSITIVE_INFINITY, policy)).toBe('offline');
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it('never returns online for a negative-but-huge misconfig (guards NaN)', () => {
|
||||
// A NaN age must fail safe to offline, not silently report online.
|
||||
expect(classifyLiveness(Number.NaN, policy)).toBe('offline');
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
describe('computeFleetLiveness (A2/A3 core)', () => {
|
||||
const now = 100_000;
|
||||
const obs = (slug: string, lastSeenTs: number, lastSeq = 1): HeartbeatObservation => ({
|
||||
slug,
|
||||
mxid: `@agent-${slug}:matrix.localhost`,
|
||||
lastSeenTs,
|
||||
lastSeq,
|
||||
assertedStatus: 'online',
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it('classifies a live fleet: fresh=online, stale=away, dark=offline', () => {
|
||||
const result = computeFleetLiveness(
|
||||
[
|
||||
obs('alpha', now - 500), // 500ms old -> online
|
||||
obs('bravo', now - 3000), // 3000ms old -> away
|
||||
obs('charlie', now - 8000), // 8000ms old -> offline
|
||||
],
|
||||
now,
|
||||
policy,
|
||||
);
|
||||
const byslug = Object.fromEntries(result.map((r) => [r.slug, r.status]));
|
||||
expect(byslug).toEqual({ alpha: 'online', bravo: 'away', charlie: 'offline' });
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it('A3: a previously-online agent flips to offline once age crosses dark threshold', () => {
|
||||
const lastBeat = 100_000; // agent was hard-killed right after this beat
|
||||
// Just before the threshold it is still merely "away"...
|
||||
const justBefore = computeFleetLiveness([obs('victim', lastBeat, 7)], lastBeat + 4999, policy);
|
||||
expect(justBefore[0]?.status).toBe('away');
|
||||
// ...and the instant age reaches darkThresholdMs it is deterministically offline,
|
||||
// with no dependence on native Matrix presence timeouts.
|
||||
const atThreshold = computeFleetLiveness([obs('victim', lastBeat, 7)], lastBeat + 5000, policy);
|
||||
expect(atThreshold[0]?.status).toBe('offline');
|
||||
expect(atThreshold[0]?.ageMs).toBe(5000);
|
||||
expect(atThreshold[0]?.lastSeq).toBe(7);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it('reports ageMs and preserves mxid/slug/seq for the human view', () => {
|
||||
const [row] = computeFleetLiveness([obs('alpha', now - 1200, 42)], now, policy);
|
||||
expect(row).toMatchObject({
|
||||
slug: 'alpha',
|
||||
mxid: '@agent-alpha:matrix.localhost',
|
||||
ageMs: 1200,
|
||||
lastSeq: 42,
|
||||
status: 'online',
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
@@ -1,131 +0,0 @@
|
||||
import { describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest';
|
||||
|
||||
import { MatrixError, MinimalMatrixClient, toMatrixPresence } from '../matrix-client.js';
|
||||
|
||||
const jsonResponse = (status: number, body: unknown): Response =>
|
||||
new Response(JSON.stringify(body), { status, headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' } });
|
||||
|
||||
// A fetch mock typed with the (URL, RequestInit?) shape the client actually
|
||||
// calls, so mock.calls has a proper tuple type under noUncheckedIndexedAccess.
|
||||
const mkFetch = (impl: (url: URL, init?: RequestInit) => Promise<Response>) => vi.fn(impl);
|
||||
|
||||
const cfg = {
|
||||
homeserverUrl: 'https://matrix.localhost:8448',
|
||||
accessToken: 'as-secret',
|
||||
actAsUserId: '@agent-alpha:matrix.localhost',
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
describe('toMatrixPresence', () => {
|
||||
it('maps liveness states to native presence EDU values', () => {
|
||||
expect(toMatrixPresence('online')).toBe('online');
|
||||
expect(toMatrixPresence('away')).toBe('unavailable');
|
||||
expect(toMatrixPresence('offline')).toBe('offline');
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
describe('MinimalMatrixClient', () => {
|
||||
it('setPresence PUTs native presence and masquerades via user_id', async () => {
|
||||
const fetchMock = mkFetch(async () => jsonResponse(200, {}));
|
||||
const client = new MinimalMatrixClient(cfg, fetchMock as unknown as typeof fetch);
|
||||
await client.setPresence('@agent-alpha:matrix.localhost', 'away', 'hb');
|
||||
|
||||
const [url, init] = fetchMock.mock.calls[0]!;
|
||||
const u = new URL((url as URL).toString());
|
||||
expect(u.pathname).toBe('/_matrix/client/v3/presence/%40agent-alpha%3Amatrix.localhost/status');
|
||||
expect(u.searchParams.get('user_id')).toBe('@agent-alpha:matrix.localhost');
|
||||
expect(JSON.parse((init as RequestInit).body as string)).toEqual({
|
||||
presence: 'unavailable',
|
||||
status_msg: 'hb',
|
||||
});
|
||||
expect((init as RequestInit).method).toBe('PUT');
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it('sendHeartbeat posts an m.room.message and returns the event_id', async () => {
|
||||
const fetchMock = mkFetch(async () => jsonResponse(200, { event_id: '$evt1' }));
|
||||
const client = new MinimalMatrixClient(cfg, fetchMock as unknown as typeof fetch);
|
||||
const id = await client.sendHeartbeat('!room:matrix.localhost', {
|
||||
macp_version: '1.0',
|
||||
macp_type: 'presence',
|
||||
msgtype: 'mosaic.presence',
|
||||
agent: { mxid: cfg.actAsUserId, slug: 'alpha', harness: 'claude-code' },
|
||||
ts: 1,
|
||||
body: 'alpha online (seq 1)',
|
||||
status: 'online',
|
||||
seq: 1,
|
||||
interval_ms: 1000,
|
||||
});
|
||||
expect(id).toBe('$evt1');
|
||||
const [url] = fetchMock.mock.calls[0]!;
|
||||
expect((url as URL).pathname).toContain('/rooms/!room%3Amatrix.localhost/send/m.room.message/');
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it('throws a MatrixError carrying errcode on a non-2xx', async () => {
|
||||
const fetchMock = mkFetch(async () =>
|
||||
jsonResponse(403, { errcode: 'M_FORBIDDEN', error: 'nope' }),
|
||||
);
|
||||
const client = new MinimalMatrixClient(cfg, fetchMock as unknown as typeof fetch);
|
||||
await expect(client.whoami()).rejects.toMatchObject({
|
||||
name: 'MatrixError',
|
||||
status: 403,
|
||||
errcode: 'M_FORBIDDEN',
|
||||
});
|
||||
await expect(client.whoami()).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(MatrixError);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it('readHeartbeats reduces the timeline to the latest beat per agent', async () => {
|
||||
// Timeline (dir=b => most-recent first). alpha has two beats; keep highest seq.
|
||||
const chunk = [
|
||||
{
|
||||
sender: '@agent-bravo:matrix.localhost',
|
||||
origin_server_ts: 9000,
|
||||
content: {
|
||||
msgtype: 'mosaic.presence',
|
||||
agent: { slug: 'bravo', mxid: '@agent-bravo:matrix.localhost' },
|
||||
seq: 5,
|
||||
status: 'online',
|
||||
ts: 8999,
|
||||
},
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
sender: '@agent-alpha:matrix.localhost',
|
||||
origin_server_ts: 8000,
|
||||
content: {
|
||||
msgtype: 'mosaic.presence',
|
||||
agent: { slug: 'alpha', mxid: '@agent-alpha:matrix.localhost' },
|
||||
seq: 12,
|
||||
status: 'online',
|
||||
ts: 7999,
|
||||
},
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
// an ordinary chat message must be ignored
|
||||
sender: '@human:matrix.localhost',
|
||||
origin_server_ts: 7000,
|
||||
content: { msgtype: 'm.text', body: 'hi' },
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
sender: '@agent-alpha:matrix.localhost',
|
||||
origin_server_ts: 6000,
|
||||
content: {
|
||||
msgtype: 'mosaic.presence',
|
||||
agent: { slug: 'alpha', mxid: '@agent-alpha:matrix.localhost' },
|
||||
seq: 11,
|
||||
status: 'online',
|
||||
ts: 5999,
|
||||
},
|
||||
},
|
||||
];
|
||||
const fetchMock = mkFetch(async () => jsonResponse(200, { chunk }));
|
||||
const client = new MinimalMatrixClient(cfg, fetchMock as unknown as typeof fetch);
|
||||
const obs = await client.readHeartbeats('!room:matrix.localhost');
|
||||
|
||||
const bySlug = Object.fromEntries(obs.map((o) => [o.slug, o]));
|
||||
expect(Object.keys(bySlug).sort()).toEqual(['alpha', 'bravo']);
|
||||
expect(bySlug.alpha).toMatchObject({ lastSeq: 12, lastSeenTs: 8000 }); // highest seq wins, server ts
|
||||
expect(bySlug.bravo).toMatchObject({ lastSeq: 5, lastSeenTs: 9000 });
|
||||
|
||||
const [url] = fetchMock.mock.calls[0]!;
|
||||
const u = new URL((url as URL).toString());
|
||||
expect(u.searchParams.get('dir')).toBe('b');
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
@@ -1,151 +0,0 @@
|
||||
import { afterEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest';
|
||||
|
||||
import { FleetLivenessReader } from '../liveness-reader.js';
|
||||
import type { MinimalMatrixClient } from '../matrix-client.js';
|
||||
import { PresenceAgent } from '../presence-agent.js';
|
||||
import type { HeartbeatObservation, LivenessPolicy, PresenceStatus } from '../types.js';
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* An in-memory fake homeserver room: records heartbeats with a controllable
|
||||
* server clock and reduces them exactly like the real readHeartbeats. Lets us
|
||||
* prove the PresenceAgent -> room -> FleetLivenessReader flow (including the A3
|
||||
* hard-kill -> offline transition) deterministically, with no network.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
class FakeRoomClient {
|
||||
readonly beats: Array<{
|
||||
slug: string;
|
||||
mxid: string;
|
||||
seq: number;
|
||||
ts: number;
|
||||
status: PresenceStatus;
|
||||
}> = [];
|
||||
presence: Record<string, PresenceStatus> = {};
|
||||
|
||||
constructor(private readonly clock: () => number) {}
|
||||
|
||||
async joinRoom(roomId: string): Promise<string> {
|
||||
return roomId;
|
||||
}
|
||||
async setPresence(userId: string, status: PresenceStatus): Promise<void> {
|
||||
this.presence[userId] = status;
|
||||
}
|
||||
async sendHeartbeat(
|
||||
_roomId: string,
|
||||
content: { agent: { slug: string; mxid: string }; seq: number; status: PresenceStatus },
|
||||
): Promise<string> {
|
||||
this.beats.push({
|
||||
slug: content.agent.slug,
|
||||
mxid: content.agent.mxid,
|
||||
seq: content.seq,
|
||||
ts: this.clock(), // server receive time
|
||||
status: content.status,
|
||||
});
|
||||
return `$evt${this.beats.length}`;
|
||||
}
|
||||
async readHeartbeats(): Promise<HeartbeatObservation[]> {
|
||||
const bySlug = new Map<string, HeartbeatObservation>();
|
||||
for (const b of this.beats) {
|
||||
const prev = bySlug.get(b.slug);
|
||||
if (!prev || b.seq > prev.lastSeq) {
|
||||
bySlug.set(b.slug, {
|
||||
slug: b.slug,
|
||||
mxid: b.mxid,
|
||||
lastSeenTs: b.ts,
|
||||
lastSeq: b.seq,
|
||||
assertedStatus: b.status,
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
return [...bySlug.values()];
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const policy: LivenessPolicy = {
|
||||
heartbeatIntervalMs: 1000,
|
||||
missTolerance: 2,
|
||||
darkThresholdMs: 5000,
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
describe('presence flow (A2 + A3 at unit level)', () => {
|
||||
afterEach(() => vi.useRealTimers());
|
||||
|
||||
it('shows agents online while beating, then A3: a hard-killed agent goes offline within dark_threshold', async () => {
|
||||
vi.useFakeTimers();
|
||||
vi.setSystemTime(0);
|
||||
|
||||
const fake = new FakeRoomClient(() => Date.now());
|
||||
const client = fake as unknown as MinimalMatrixClient;
|
||||
const reader = new FleetLivenessReader({
|
||||
client,
|
||||
roomId: '!fleet',
|
||||
policy,
|
||||
now: () => Date.now(),
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
const mk = (slug: string) =>
|
||||
new PresenceAgent({
|
||||
client,
|
||||
agent: { mxid: `@agent-${slug}:matrix.localhost`, slug, harness: 'claude-code' },
|
||||
roomId: '!fleet',
|
||||
intervalMs: 1000,
|
||||
policy,
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
const alpha = mk('alpha');
|
||||
const bravo = mk('bravo');
|
||||
const charlie = mk('charlie');
|
||||
|
||||
for (const a of [alpha, bravo, charlie]) {
|
||||
await a.connect();
|
||||
a.start();
|
||||
}
|
||||
// native presence set online for all three (Element dot)
|
||||
expect(fake.presence['@agent-alpha:matrix.localhost']).toBe('online');
|
||||
|
||||
// let a couple of beats flow — all three fresh => online (A2)
|
||||
await vi.advanceTimersByTimeAsync(1500);
|
||||
const board1 = Object.fromEntries((await reader.read()).map((r) => [r.slug, r.status]));
|
||||
expect(board1).toEqual({ alpha: 'online', bravo: 'online', charlie: 'online' });
|
||||
|
||||
// HARD-KILL charlie: stop its loop, no more beats. alpha/bravo keep beating.
|
||||
charlie.pauseHeartbeat(); // hard-kill: no graceful presence signal
|
||||
|
||||
// advance to just before dark threshold from charlie's last beat...
|
||||
await vi.advanceTimersByTimeAsync(3000);
|
||||
const mid = Object.fromEntries((await reader.read()).map((r) => [r.slug, r.status]));
|
||||
expect(mid.alpha).toBe('online');
|
||||
expect(mid.charlie).not.toBe('online'); // already stale (away)
|
||||
|
||||
// ...advance past dark_threshold: charlie is deterministically offline.
|
||||
await vi.advanceTimersByTimeAsync(4000);
|
||||
const final = await reader.read();
|
||||
const byslug = Object.fromEntries(final.map((r) => [r.slug, r]));
|
||||
expect(byslug.charlie!.status).toBe('offline');
|
||||
expect(byslug.alpha!.status).toBe('online');
|
||||
expect(byslug.bravo!.status).toBe('online');
|
||||
|
||||
for (const a of [alpha, bravo]) await a.stop();
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
it('formatBoard renders a human-readable liveness board (A4)', async () => {
|
||||
const fake = new FakeRoomClient(() => 10_000);
|
||||
fake.beats.push({
|
||||
slug: 'alpha',
|
||||
mxid: '@agent-alpha:matrix.localhost',
|
||||
seq: 3,
|
||||
ts: 9_500,
|
||||
status: 'online',
|
||||
});
|
||||
const reader = new FleetLivenessReader({
|
||||
client: fake as unknown as MinimalMatrixClient,
|
||||
roomId: '!fleet',
|
||||
policy,
|
||||
now: () => 10_000,
|
||||
});
|
||||
const board = await reader.formatBoard();
|
||||
expect(board).toContain('Fleet presence');
|
||||
expect(board).toContain('alpha');
|
||||
expect(board).toContain('online');
|
||||
expect(board).toContain('online=1');
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
@@ -1,124 +0,0 @@
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* `mosaic.presence` heartbeat construction and loop (RFC-001 §4.2/§4.5).
|
||||
*
|
||||
* The emitter is deterministic and side-effect free (easy to unit test): it
|
||||
* owns the monotonic `seq` and stamps each beat. The loop wires the emitter to
|
||||
* a sender on an interval; timers are injectable so the loop is testable with
|
||||
* fake clocks.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
import { MACP_VERSION, type PresenceHeartbeatContent, type PresenceStatus } from './types.js';
|
||||
|
||||
export interface HeartbeatAgentIdentity {
|
||||
mxid: string;
|
||||
slug: string;
|
||||
harness: string;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
export interface HeartbeatEmitterOptions {
|
||||
agent: HeartbeatAgentIdentity;
|
||||
/** Nominal interval advertised in each beat (interval_ms). */
|
||||
intervalMs: number;
|
||||
/** Optional mission correlation (RFC-001 §4.2 envelope). */
|
||||
missionId?: string;
|
||||
/** Injectable clock for deterministic tests. Default Date.now. */
|
||||
now?: () => number;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Produces successive heartbeat contents with a monotonically increasing seq.
|
||||
* The first `next()` returns seq=1.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
export class HeartbeatEmitter {
|
||||
private seq = 0;
|
||||
private readonly now: () => number;
|
||||
|
||||
constructor(private readonly opts: HeartbeatEmitterOptions) {
|
||||
this.now = opts.now ?? Date.now;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/** Current sequence number (0 before the first beat). */
|
||||
get currentSeq(): number {
|
||||
return this.seq;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/** Build the next heartbeat content, advancing the sequence. */
|
||||
next(status: PresenceStatus = 'online'): PresenceHeartbeatContent {
|
||||
this.seq += 1;
|
||||
const ts = this.now();
|
||||
const content: PresenceHeartbeatContent = {
|
||||
macp_version: MACP_VERSION,
|
||||
macp_type: 'presence',
|
||||
msgtype: 'mosaic.presence',
|
||||
agent: {
|
||||
mxid: this.opts.agent.mxid,
|
||||
slug: this.opts.agent.slug,
|
||||
harness: this.opts.agent.harness,
|
||||
},
|
||||
ts,
|
||||
body: `${this.opts.agent.slug} ${status} (seq ${this.seq})`,
|
||||
status,
|
||||
seq: this.seq,
|
||||
interval_ms: this.opts.intervalMs,
|
||||
};
|
||||
if (this.opts.missionId !== undefined) {
|
||||
content.mission_id = this.opts.missionId;
|
||||
}
|
||||
return content;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
export type HeartbeatSender = (content: PresenceHeartbeatContent) => void | Promise<void>;
|
||||
|
||||
export interface HeartbeatLoopOptions {
|
||||
emitter: HeartbeatEmitter;
|
||||
send: HeartbeatSender;
|
||||
intervalMs: number;
|
||||
/** Status supplier evaluated each beat. Default: always 'online'. */
|
||||
status?: () => PresenceStatus;
|
||||
/** Called if a beat's send rejects (so a transient failure doesn't kill the loop). */
|
||||
onError?: (err: unknown) => void;
|
||||
/** Injectable timer (tests). Defaults to global setInterval/clearInterval. */
|
||||
setIntervalFn?: (cb: () => void, ms: number) => unknown;
|
||||
clearIntervalFn?: (handle: unknown) => void;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/** A running heartbeat loop; call stop() to end it. */
|
||||
export interface HeartbeatLoopHandle {
|
||||
stop: () => void;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Start a heartbeat loop: emits one beat immediately, then every intervalMs.
|
||||
* Returns a handle whose `stop()` is idempotent.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
export function startHeartbeatLoop(opts: HeartbeatLoopOptions): HeartbeatLoopHandle {
|
||||
const status = opts.status ?? (() => 'online' as PresenceStatus);
|
||||
const onError = opts.onError ?? (() => {});
|
||||
const setIntervalFn = opts.setIntervalFn ?? ((cb, ms) => setInterval(cb, ms));
|
||||
const clearIntervalFn =
|
||||
opts.clearIntervalFn ?? ((h) => clearInterval(h as ReturnType<typeof setInterval>));
|
||||
|
||||
const beat = (): void => {
|
||||
try {
|
||||
const result = opts.send(opts.emitter.next(status()));
|
||||
if (result instanceof Promise) {
|
||||
result.catch(onError);
|
||||
}
|
||||
} catch (err) {
|
||||
onError(err);
|
||||
}
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
beat(); // immediate first beat so liveness is fresh at once
|
||||
const handle = setIntervalFn(beat, opts.intervalMs);
|
||||
|
||||
let stopped = false;
|
||||
return {
|
||||
stop: () => {
|
||||
if (stopped) return;
|
||||
stopped = true;
|
||||
clearIntervalFn(handle);
|
||||
},
|
||||
};
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -1,42 +0,0 @@
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* @mosaicstack/comms — MACP presence SDK (RFC-001 P1).
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Minimal, dev-validated slice: set Matrix presence, run the `mosaic.presence`
|
||||
* heartbeat, and compute deterministic fleet liveness. Enrollment, room
|
||||
* taxonomy, token minting and signed-authorship are explicitly out of P1.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
export { classifyLiveness, computeFleetLiveness } from './liveness.js';
|
||||
|
||||
export {
|
||||
HeartbeatEmitter,
|
||||
startHeartbeatLoop,
|
||||
type HeartbeatAgentIdentity,
|
||||
type HeartbeatEmitterOptions,
|
||||
type HeartbeatSender,
|
||||
type HeartbeatLoopOptions,
|
||||
type HeartbeatLoopHandle,
|
||||
} from './heartbeat.js';
|
||||
|
||||
export {
|
||||
MinimalMatrixClient,
|
||||
MatrixError,
|
||||
toMatrixPresence,
|
||||
type MatrixClientConfig,
|
||||
} from './matrix-client.js';
|
||||
|
||||
export { FleetLivenessReader, type FleetLivenessReaderOptions } from './liveness-reader.js';
|
||||
|
||||
export { PresenceAgent, type PresenceAgentOptions } from './presence-agent.js';
|
||||
|
||||
export {
|
||||
DEFAULT_LIVENESS_POLICY,
|
||||
MACP_VERSION,
|
||||
type AgentLiveness,
|
||||
type HeartbeatObservation,
|
||||
type LivenessPolicy,
|
||||
type MacpEnvelope,
|
||||
type MatrixPresence,
|
||||
type PresenceHeartbeatContent,
|
||||
type PresenceStatus,
|
||||
} from './types.js';
|
||||
@@ -1,58 +0,0 @@
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Fleet liveness reader (RFC-001 §4.5, A2/A4).
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Reads `mosaic.presence` heartbeats from the fleet presence room and computes
|
||||
* deterministic online/away/offline for every agent. This is the surface a
|
||||
* human (or the escalation watchdog, P2+) reads to answer "who's alive?".
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
import { computeFleetLiveness } from './liveness.js';
|
||||
import type { MinimalMatrixClient } from './matrix-client.js';
|
||||
import { DEFAULT_LIVENESS_POLICY, type AgentLiveness, type LivenessPolicy } from './types.js';
|
||||
|
||||
export interface FleetLivenessReaderOptions {
|
||||
client: MinimalMatrixClient;
|
||||
/** The fleet presence room (id or resolved id). */
|
||||
roomId: string;
|
||||
policy?: LivenessPolicy;
|
||||
/** Injectable clock for tests. Default Date.now. */
|
||||
now?: () => number;
|
||||
/** How many timeline events to scan back. Default 200. */
|
||||
scanLimit?: number;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
export class FleetLivenessReader {
|
||||
private readonly policy: LivenessPolicy;
|
||||
private readonly now: () => number;
|
||||
|
||||
constructor(private readonly opts: FleetLivenessReaderOptions) {
|
||||
this.policy = opts.policy ?? DEFAULT_LIVENESS_POLICY;
|
||||
this.now = opts.now ?? Date.now;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/** Read the room and compute current liveness for every seen agent. */
|
||||
async read(): Promise<AgentLiveness[]> {
|
||||
const observations = await this.opts.client.readHeartbeats(
|
||||
this.opts.roomId,
|
||||
this.opts.scanLimit ?? 200,
|
||||
);
|
||||
return computeFleetLiveness(observations, this.now(), this.policy);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/** A compact human-readable liveness board (A4 CLI view). */
|
||||
async formatBoard(): Promise<string> {
|
||||
const rows = await this.read();
|
||||
rows.sort((a, b) => a.slug.localeCompare(b.slug));
|
||||
const dot: Record<string, string> = { online: '🟢', away: '🟡', offline: '🔴' };
|
||||
const lines = rows.map(
|
||||
(r) =>
|
||||
`${dot[r.status] ?? '⚪'} ${r.slug.padEnd(16)} ${r.status.padEnd(8)} ` +
|
||||
`age=${(r.ageMs / 1000).toFixed(1)}s seq=${r.lastSeq} ${r.mxid}`,
|
||||
);
|
||||
const summary =
|
||||
`online=${rows.filter((r) => r.status === 'online').length} ` +
|
||||
`away=${rows.filter((r) => r.status === 'away').length} ` +
|
||||
`offline=${rows.filter((r) => r.status === 'offline').length}`;
|
||||
return [`Fleet presence — ${summary}`, ...lines].join('\n');
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -1,63 +0,0 @@
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Deterministic liveness computation (RFC-001 §4.5).
|
||||
*
|
||||
* The authoritative liveness signal is the `mosaic.presence` heartbeat, NOT
|
||||
* native Matrix presence. Given the age of an agent's last heartbeat and a
|
||||
* policy, these pure functions classify online/away/offline the same way every
|
||||
* time — which is exactly what makes the A3 "hard-killed agent flips to
|
||||
* offline within dark_threshold" guarantee deterministic and testable without
|
||||
* standing up a homeserver.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
import type {
|
||||
AgentLiveness,
|
||||
HeartbeatObservation,
|
||||
LivenessPolicy,
|
||||
PresenceStatus,
|
||||
} from './types.js';
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Classify a single agent from the age (ms) of its last heartbeat.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* - `age <= heartbeatIntervalMs * missTolerance` → **online**
|
||||
* - `age < darkThresholdMs` → **away**
|
||||
* - otherwise (or non-finite age) → **offline / dark**
|
||||
*
|
||||
* A non-finite age (never seen / NaN) fails safe to `offline`: we never assert
|
||||
* a liveness we cannot substantiate.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
export function classifyLiveness(ageMs: number, policy: LivenessPolicy): PresenceStatus {
|
||||
if (!Number.isFinite(ageMs)) {
|
||||
return 'offline';
|
||||
}
|
||||
const onlineWindowMs = policy.heartbeatIntervalMs * policy.missTolerance;
|
||||
if (ageMs <= onlineWindowMs) {
|
||||
return 'online';
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (ageMs < policy.darkThresholdMs) {
|
||||
return 'away';
|
||||
}
|
||||
return 'offline';
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Compute liveness for every observed agent at wall-clock `nowMs`.
|
||||
* The result order mirrors the input order (stable for display).
|
||||
*/
|
||||
export function computeFleetLiveness(
|
||||
observations: readonly HeartbeatObservation[],
|
||||
nowMs: number,
|
||||
policy: LivenessPolicy,
|
||||
): AgentLiveness[] {
|
||||
return observations.map((o) => {
|
||||
const ageMs = nowMs - o.lastSeenTs;
|
||||
return {
|
||||
slug: o.slug,
|
||||
mxid: o.mxid,
|
||||
status: classifyLiveness(ageMs, policy),
|
||||
lastSeenTs: o.lastSeenTs,
|
||||
ageMs,
|
||||
lastSeq: o.lastSeq,
|
||||
};
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -1,204 +0,0 @@
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Minimal Matrix Client-Server API client for the P1 presence slice.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Deliberately tiny: only the calls presence needs (whoami, set native
|
||||
* presence, send a timeline event, read recent timeline). Auth is a single
|
||||
* bearer token; an optional `actAsUserId` enables Application-Service
|
||||
* masquerade (`?user_id=`) so the P1 provisioner can drive several virtual
|
||||
* agents with one as_token in dev (RFC-001 §2.2 step 4/Appendix A). Agents
|
||||
* holding their own access_token simply omit `actAsUserId`.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* `fetch` is injectable for unit tests.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
import crypto from 'node:crypto';
|
||||
|
||||
import type {
|
||||
HeartbeatObservation,
|
||||
MatrixPresence,
|
||||
PresenceHeartbeatContent,
|
||||
PresenceStatus,
|
||||
} from './types.js';
|
||||
|
||||
export interface MatrixClientConfig {
|
||||
/** Client-Server API base, e.g. https://matrix.localhost:8448 */
|
||||
homeserverUrl: string;
|
||||
/** Bearer token (a per-agent access_token, or an as_token for masquerade). */
|
||||
accessToken: string;
|
||||
/** If set, all calls masquerade as this MXID via ?user_id= (AS mode). */
|
||||
actAsUserId?: string;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
export class MatrixError extends Error {
|
||||
constructor(
|
||||
readonly status: number,
|
||||
readonly errcode: string | undefined,
|
||||
message: string,
|
||||
) {
|
||||
super(message);
|
||||
this.name = 'MatrixError';
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
type FetchLike = typeof fetch;
|
||||
|
||||
/** Map our authoritative liveness state to the native Matrix presence EDU. */
|
||||
export function toMatrixPresence(status: PresenceStatus): MatrixPresence {
|
||||
switch (status) {
|
||||
case 'online':
|
||||
return 'online';
|
||||
case 'away':
|
||||
return 'unavailable';
|
||||
case 'offline':
|
||||
return 'offline';
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
export class MinimalMatrixClient {
|
||||
private readonly fetchImpl: FetchLike;
|
||||
|
||||
constructor(
|
||||
private readonly cfg: MatrixClientConfig,
|
||||
fetchImpl?: FetchLike,
|
||||
) {
|
||||
this.fetchImpl = fetchImpl ?? fetch;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
private async request(
|
||||
method: string,
|
||||
path: string,
|
||||
options: { query?: Record<string, string>; body?: unknown } = {},
|
||||
): Promise<Record<string, unknown>> {
|
||||
const url = new URL(this.cfg.homeserverUrl.replace(/\/$/, '') + path);
|
||||
if (this.cfg.actAsUserId) {
|
||||
url.searchParams.set('user_id', this.cfg.actAsUserId);
|
||||
}
|
||||
for (const [k, v] of Object.entries(options.query ?? {})) {
|
||||
url.searchParams.set(k, v);
|
||||
}
|
||||
const res = await this.fetchImpl(url, {
|
||||
method,
|
||||
headers: {
|
||||
Authorization: `Bearer ${this.cfg.accessToken}`,
|
||||
'Content-Type': 'application/json',
|
||||
},
|
||||
body: options.body === undefined ? undefined : JSON.stringify(options.body),
|
||||
});
|
||||
const text = await res.text();
|
||||
const data = (text ? JSON.parse(text) : {}) as Record<string, unknown>;
|
||||
if (!res.ok) {
|
||||
throw new MatrixError(
|
||||
res.status,
|
||||
typeof data.errcode === 'string' ? data.errcode : undefined,
|
||||
`${method} ${path} -> ${res.status}: ${text.slice(0, 300)}`,
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
return data;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/** GET /account/whoami — resolves the acting MXID. */
|
||||
async whoami(): Promise<string> {
|
||||
const data = await this.request('GET', '/_matrix/client/v3/account/whoami');
|
||||
if (typeof data.user_id !== 'string') {
|
||||
throw new MatrixError(500, undefined, 'whoami returned no user_id');
|
||||
}
|
||||
return data.user_id;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Set the native Matrix presence EDU (so Element shows the right dot for
|
||||
* humans). NOT the authoritative liveness signal — the heartbeat is.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
async setPresence(userId: string, status: PresenceStatus, statusMsg?: string): Promise<void> {
|
||||
const user = encodeURIComponent(userId);
|
||||
await this.request('PUT', `/_matrix/client/v3/presence/${user}/status`, {
|
||||
body: {
|
||||
presence: toMatrixPresence(status),
|
||||
...(statusMsg ? { status_msg: statusMsg } : {}),
|
||||
},
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/** Send an arbitrary timeline event; returns its event_id. */
|
||||
async sendEvent(
|
||||
roomId: string,
|
||||
eventType: string,
|
||||
content: Record<string, unknown>,
|
||||
): Promise<string> {
|
||||
const room = encodeURIComponent(roomId);
|
||||
const txn = `mosaic-comms-${crypto.randomUUID()}`;
|
||||
const data = await this.request(
|
||||
'PUT',
|
||||
`/_matrix/client/v3/rooms/${room}/send/${encodeURIComponent(eventType)}/${txn}`,
|
||||
{ body: content },
|
||||
);
|
||||
if (typeof data.event_id !== 'string') {
|
||||
throw new MatrixError(500, undefined, 'send returned no event_id');
|
||||
}
|
||||
return data.event_id;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/** Post a `mosaic.presence` heartbeat (m.room.message carrier) to the room. */
|
||||
async sendHeartbeat(roomId: string, content: PresenceHeartbeatContent): Promise<string> {
|
||||
return this.sendEvent(roomId, 'm.room.message', content as unknown as Record<string, unknown>);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/** Join a room (by id or alias). Idempotent on the server. */
|
||||
async joinRoom(roomIdOrAlias: string): Promise<string> {
|
||||
const data = await this.request(
|
||||
'POST',
|
||||
`/_matrix/client/v3/join/${encodeURIComponent(roomIdOrAlias)}`,
|
||||
{ body: {} },
|
||||
);
|
||||
if (typeof data.room_id !== 'string') {
|
||||
throw new MatrixError(500, undefined, 'join returned no room_id');
|
||||
}
|
||||
return data.room_id;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Read recent `mosaic.presence` heartbeats from a room and reduce them to the
|
||||
* latest observation per agent. Walks the timeline backwards (most-recent
|
||||
* first) and keeps, per slug, the beat with the highest seq.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* `lastSeenTs` uses the server's `origin_server_ts` (honest "when we last
|
||||
* heard from it"), falling back to the agent-stamped envelope `ts`.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
async readHeartbeats(roomId: string, limit = 200): Promise<HeartbeatObservation[]> {
|
||||
const room = encodeURIComponent(roomId);
|
||||
const data = await this.request('GET', `/_matrix/client/v3/rooms/${room}/messages`, {
|
||||
query: { dir: 'b', limit: String(limit) },
|
||||
});
|
||||
const chunk = Array.isArray(data.chunk) ? (data.chunk as Array<Record<string, unknown>>) : [];
|
||||
const bySlug = new Map<string, HeartbeatObservation>();
|
||||
|
||||
for (const ev of chunk) {
|
||||
const content = ev.content as Record<string, unknown> | undefined;
|
||||
if (!content || content.msgtype !== 'mosaic.presence') continue;
|
||||
const agent = content.agent as Record<string, unknown> | undefined;
|
||||
const slug = agent && typeof agent.slug === 'string' ? agent.slug : undefined;
|
||||
const mxid =
|
||||
agent && typeof agent.mxid === 'string'
|
||||
? agent.mxid
|
||||
: typeof ev.sender === 'string'
|
||||
? ev.sender
|
||||
: undefined;
|
||||
if (!slug || !mxid) continue;
|
||||
|
||||
const seq = typeof content.seq === 'number' ? content.seq : 0;
|
||||
const serverTs = typeof ev.origin_server_ts === 'number' ? ev.origin_server_ts : undefined;
|
||||
const envelopeTs = typeof content.ts === 'number' ? content.ts : undefined;
|
||||
const lastSeenTs = serverTs ?? envelopeTs ?? 0;
|
||||
const assertedStatus =
|
||||
content.status === 'online' || content.status === 'away' || content.status === 'offline'
|
||||
? (content.status as PresenceStatus)
|
||||
: 'offline';
|
||||
|
||||
const prev = bySlug.get(slug);
|
||||
if (!prev || seq > prev.lastSeq) {
|
||||
bySlug.set(slug, { slug, mxid, lastSeenTs, lastSeq: seq, assertedStatus });
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
return [...bySlug.values()];
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -1,92 +0,0 @@
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* High-level presence agent (RFC-001 §4.1 steps 10–11, §4.5).
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Ties the pieces together for one agent: join the fleet presence room, set
|
||||
* native Matrix presence online (for Element's dot), and run the authoritative
|
||||
* `mosaic.presence` heartbeat loop. This is the P1 slice of what a harness does
|
||||
* on spin — no enrollment/token-minting/introductions (those are P2).
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
import {
|
||||
HeartbeatEmitter,
|
||||
startHeartbeatLoop,
|
||||
type HeartbeatAgentIdentity,
|
||||
type HeartbeatLoopHandle,
|
||||
} from './heartbeat.js';
|
||||
import type { MinimalMatrixClient } from './matrix-client.js';
|
||||
import { DEFAULT_LIVENESS_POLICY, type LivenessPolicy, type PresenceStatus } from './types.js';
|
||||
|
||||
export interface PresenceAgentOptions {
|
||||
client: MinimalMatrixClient;
|
||||
agent: HeartbeatAgentIdentity;
|
||||
/** Fleet presence room id (or alias) to heartbeat into. */
|
||||
roomId: string;
|
||||
/** Heartbeat cadence; defaults to the policy interval. */
|
||||
intervalMs?: number;
|
||||
policy?: LivenessPolicy;
|
||||
missionId?: string;
|
||||
onError?: (err: unknown) => void;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
export class PresenceAgent {
|
||||
private readonly intervalMs: number;
|
||||
private readonly emitter: HeartbeatEmitter;
|
||||
private loop: HeartbeatLoopHandle | undefined;
|
||||
private resolvedRoomId: string | undefined;
|
||||
|
||||
constructor(private readonly opts: PresenceAgentOptions) {
|
||||
const policy = opts.policy ?? DEFAULT_LIVENESS_POLICY;
|
||||
this.intervalMs = opts.intervalMs ?? policy.heartbeatIntervalMs;
|
||||
this.emitter = new HeartbeatEmitter({
|
||||
agent: opts.agent,
|
||||
intervalMs: this.intervalMs,
|
||||
missionId: opts.missionId,
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/** Join the fleet room and go present. Returns the resolved room id. */
|
||||
async connect(): Promise<string> {
|
||||
this.resolvedRoomId = await this.opts.client.joinRoom(this.opts.roomId);
|
||||
await this.opts.client.setPresence(this.opts.agent.mxid, 'online', 'mosaic.presence heartbeat');
|
||||
return this.resolvedRoomId;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/** Start the heartbeat loop (emits immediately, then every intervalMs). */
|
||||
start(status: () => PresenceStatus = () => 'online'): void {
|
||||
const roomId = this.resolvedRoomId ?? this.opts.roomId;
|
||||
this.loop = startHeartbeatLoop({
|
||||
emitter: this.emitter,
|
||||
intervalMs: this.intervalMs,
|
||||
status,
|
||||
onError: this.opts.onError,
|
||||
send: async (content) => {
|
||||
await this.opts.client.sendHeartbeat(roomId, content);
|
||||
},
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
get currentSeq(): number {
|
||||
return this.emitter.currentSeq;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Stop only the heartbeat loop, sending NO graceful signal. This models a
|
||||
* hard crash/kill: the authoritative liveness path must detect it purely from
|
||||
* the absence of heartbeats (RFC-001 §4.5, A3), not from any native presence
|
||||
* change. Idempotent.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
pauseHeartbeat(): void {
|
||||
this.loop?.stop();
|
||||
this.loop = undefined;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/** Graceful stop: stop heartbeating and drop native presence to offline. */
|
||||
async stop(): Promise<void> {
|
||||
this.pauseHeartbeat();
|
||||
try {
|
||||
await this.opts.client.setPresence(this.opts.agent.mxid, 'offline');
|
||||
} catch (err) {
|
||||
this.opts.onError?.(err);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -1,99 +0,0 @@
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* @mosaicstack/comms — MACP P1 (presence) types.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Implements the presence/liveness slice of RFC-001 §4.5 and the MACP event
|
||||
* envelope of RFC-001 §4.2. P1 scope only: presence heartbeat + deterministic
|
||||
* liveness. No enrollment, room-taxonomy, token-minting or signed-authorship
|
||||
* (those are P2+).
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
/** The three human-visible liveness states (RFC-001 §4.5). */
|
||||
export type PresenceStatus = 'online' | 'away' | 'offline';
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Native Matrix presence EDU states. We still emit these (so Element shows the
|
||||
* right dot for humans, RFC-001 §4.5) but they are NOT the authoritative
|
||||
* liveness source — the heartbeat is.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
export type MatrixPresence = 'online' | 'unavailable' | 'offline';
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Common MACP event envelope carried in `content` on every custom event
|
||||
* (RFC-001 §4.2). P1 uses only the fields the presence heartbeat needs; the
|
||||
* `signature` field (gate actions, §4.4) is intentionally absent in P1.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
export interface MacpEnvelope {
|
||||
macp_version: string;
|
||||
macp_type: string;
|
||||
agent: {
|
||||
mxid: string;
|
||||
slug: string;
|
||||
harness: string;
|
||||
};
|
||||
ts: number;
|
||||
mission_id?: string;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* `mosaic.presence` heartbeat content (RFC-001 §4.2 "presence" row + §4.5).
|
||||
* Carried as an `m.room.message` with `msgtype: "mosaic.presence"` and a
|
||||
* human-visible `body` fallback, posted into the fleet presence room.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
export interface PresenceHeartbeatContent extends MacpEnvelope {
|
||||
macp_type: 'presence';
|
||||
msgtype: 'mosaic.presence';
|
||||
/** Human-visible fallback so the event renders in a stock client. */
|
||||
body: string;
|
||||
/** Liveness state the agent asserts about itself. */
|
||||
status: PresenceStatus;
|
||||
/** Monotonic per-agent sequence number, increments once per beat. */
|
||||
seq: number;
|
||||
/** The agent's configured heartbeat interval, so readers can reason. */
|
||||
interval_ms: number;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Deterministic liveness policy (RFC-001 §4.5). Defaults per §4.5/§5.3:
|
||||
* interval 30s, miss-tolerance 2, dark threshold a policy value (10 min in
|
||||
* prod §5; small in dev harness).
|
||||
*/
|
||||
export interface LivenessPolicy {
|
||||
/** Nominal heartbeat interval in ms. Default 30_000. */
|
||||
heartbeatIntervalMs: number;
|
||||
/** How many intervals may be missed before "away". Default 2. */
|
||||
missTolerance: number;
|
||||
/** Age past which an agent is declared offline/dark. Default 600_000. */
|
||||
darkThresholdMs: number;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/** A single agent's last observed heartbeat, as read from the fleet room. */
|
||||
export interface HeartbeatObservation {
|
||||
slug: string;
|
||||
mxid: string;
|
||||
/** Wall-clock ms of the last heartbeat seen for this agent. */
|
||||
lastSeenTs: number;
|
||||
/** Last seq observed (monotonic per agent). */
|
||||
lastSeq: number;
|
||||
/** The status the agent last asserted about itself. */
|
||||
assertedStatus: PresenceStatus;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/** Computed liveness for one agent (what a human/watchdog reads). */
|
||||
export interface AgentLiveness {
|
||||
slug: string;
|
||||
mxid: string;
|
||||
/** Authoritative, heartbeat-derived status. */
|
||||
status: PresenceStatus;
|
||||
lastSeenTs: number;
|
||||
/** now - lastSeenTs, in ms. */
|
||||
ageMs: number;
|
||||
lastSeq: number;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
export const DEFAULT_LIVENESS_POLICY: LivenessPolicy = {
|
||||
heartbeatIntervalMs: 30_000,
|
||||
missTolerance: 2,
|
||||
darkThresholdMs: 600_000,
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
export const MACP_VERSION = '1.0';
|
||||
@@ -1,9 +0,0 @@
|
||||
{
|
||||
"extends": "../../tsconfig.base.json",
|
||||
"compilerOptions": {
|
||||
"outDir": "dist",
|
||||
"rootDir": "src"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"include": ["src/**/*"],
|
||||
"exclude": ["node_modules", "dist"]
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -1,13 +0,0 @@
|
||||
import { defineConfig } from 'vitest/config';
|
||||
|
||||
export default defineConfig({
|
||||
test: {
|
||||
globals: true,
|
||||
environment: 'node',
|
||||
coverage: {
|
||||
provider: 'v8',
|
||||
include: ['src/**/*.ts'],
|
||||
exclude: ['src/index.ts'],
|
||||
},
|
||||
},
|
||||
});
|
||||
37
pnpm-lock.yaml
generated
37
pnpm-lock.yaml
generated
@@ -372,21 +372,6 @@ importers:
|
||||
specifier: ^2.0.0
|
||||
version: 2.1.9(@types/node@24.12.0)(jsdom@29.0.0(@noble/hashes@2.0.1))(lightningcss@1.31.1)
|
||||
|
||||
packages/comms:
|
||||
devDependencies:
|
||||
'@types/node':
|
||||
specifier: ^22.0.0
|
||||
version: 22.19.15
|
||||
'@vitest/coverage-v8':
|
||||
specifier: ^2.0.0
|
||||
version: 2.1.9(vitest@2.1.9(@types/node@22.19.15)(jsdom@29.0.0(@noble/hashes@2.0.1))(lightningcss@1.31.1))
|
||||
typescript:
|
||||
specifier: ^5.8.0
|
||||
version: 5.9.3
|
||||
vitest:
|
||||
specifier: ^2.0.0
|
||||
version: 2.1.9(@types/node@22.19.15)(jsdom@29.0.0(@noble/hashes@2.0.1))(lightningcss@1.31.1)
|
||||
|
||||
packages/config:
|
||||
dependencies:
|
||||
'@mosaicstack/memory':
|
||||
@@ -811,28 +796,6 @@ importers:
|
||||
specifier: ^2.0.0
|
||||
version: 2.1.9(@types/node@24.12.0)(jsdom@29.0.0(@noble/hashes@2.0.1))(lightningcss@1.31.1)
|
||||
|
||||
tools/matrix-presence-harness:
|
||||
dependencies:
|
||||
'@mosaicstack/appservice':
|
||||
specifier: workspace:*
|
||||
version: link:../../packages/appservice
|
||||
'@mosaicstack/comms':
|
||||
specifier: workspace:*
|
||||
version: link:../../packages/comms
|
||||
devDependencies:
|
||||
'@types/node':
|
||||
specifier: ^22.0.0
|
||||
version: 22.19.15
|
||||
tsx:
|
||||
specifier: ^4.19.0
|
||||
version: 4.21.0
|
||||
typescript:
|
||||
specifier: ^5.8.0
|
||||
version: 5.9.3
|
||||
vitest:
|
||||
specifier: ^2.0.0
|
||||
version: 2.1.9(@types/node@22.19.15)(jsdom@29.0.0(@noble/hashes@2.0.1))(lightningcss@1.31.1)
|
||||
|
||||
packages:
|
||||
|
||||
'@agentclientprotocol/sdk@0.17.0':
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -2,7 +2,6 @@ packages:
|
||||
- 'apps/*'
|
||||
- 'packages/*'
|
||||
- 'plugins/*'
|
||||
- 'tools/matrix-presence-harness'
|
||||
|
||||
ignoredBuiltDependencies:
|
||||
- '@nestjs/core'
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,43 +0,0 @@
|
||||
# tools/matrix-presence-harness — RFC-001 P1 validation (A1–A5)
|
||||
|
||||
> **DEV-ONLY. LOCAL SANDBOX.** Drives the local `infra/matrix` Synapse only.
|
||||
> Never point it at live infra.
|
||||
|
||||
The dev validation harness for the presence slice. It is the **minimal P1
|
||||
provisioner** + an end-to-end demo that proves the acceptance criteria against
|
||||
a real Synapse.
|
||||
|
||||
## Pieces
|
||||
|
||||
- `provision.ts` — the **minimal provisioner**: registers ≥3 agent MXIDs, creates
|
||||
the fleet presence room, joins the agents. Reuses the existing tested
|
||||
`@mosaicstack/appservice` intent library (register / createRoom / join). It is
|
||||
deliberately **not** the P2 appservice (no auto-enroll / taxonomy / token minting).
|
||||
- `agent-proc.ts` — one presence agent as its **own OS process** (via
|
||||
`@mosaicstack/comms`): joins the fleet room and heartbeats `mosaic.presence`.
|
||||
Standalone so the harness can `SIGKILL` it for a true hard-kill (A3).
|
||||
- `validate.ts` — provisions, spawns the agents, then asserts:
|
||||
- **A2** ≥3 agents show **online** in the fleet room.
|
||||
- **A3** a `SIGKILL`'d agent flips to **offline within `dark_threshold`**,
|
||||
deterministically (heartbeat-age based, not native-presence timeout), while
|
||||
survivors stay online.
|
||||
- **A4** prints the human-readable fleet liveness board.
|
||||
- `run.sh` — wires dev secrets + env and runs `validate.ts` over the self-signed
|
||||
TLS endpoint (A1). Exits non-zero on any failed assertion.
|
||||
|
||||
## Usage
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
../../infra/matrix/dev-up.sh # bring Synapse up first
|
||||
./run.sh # provision + validate (A2/A3/A4)
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Tunables (env): `HEARTBEAT_INTERVAL_MS` (1000), `MISS_TOLERANCE` (2),
|
||||
`DARK_THRESHOLD_MS` (6000), `AGENT_SLUGS` (`alpha,bravo,charlie`),
|
||||
`VICTIM_SLUG` (`charlie`), `MATRIX_CS_URL` (defaults to the TLS endpoint).
|
||||
|
||||
## Note on `NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED=0`
|
||||
|
||||
`run.sh` sets this **only** because the dev homeserver uses a self-signed cert.
|
||||
It is a dev convenience for exercising the SDK over TLS and must never be used
|
||||
against a real CA-issued endpoint.
|
||||
@@ -1,70 +0,0 @@
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* tools/matrix-presence-harness/agent-proc.ts
|
||||
*
|
||||
* *** DEV harness — LOCAL SANDBOX ONLY. ***
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Runs ONE presence agent as its own OS process: joins the fleet presence
|
||||
* room and heartbeats `mosaic.presence` via @mosaicstack/comms (RFC-001 P1).
|
||||
* Kept as a standalone process so the validation harness can `kill -9` it to
|
||||
* prove A3 (hard-kill -> offline within dark_threshold) against a real crash,
|
||||
* not a graceful shutdown.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Auth in DEV is Application-Service masquerade: the process presents the
|
||||
* as_token and acts as its own @agent-<slug> MXID. (Per-agent minted tokens
|
||||
* are P2, RFC-001 §2.2/§8.)
|
||||
*
|
||||
* ESM / NodeNext: .js import extensions.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
import { MinimalMatrixClient, PresenceAgent, type LivenessPolicy } from '@mosaicstack/comms';
|
||||
|
||||
const env = (k: string, fallback?: string): string => {
|
||||
const v = process.env[k] ?? fallback;
|
||||
if (v === undefined) throw new Error(`missing env ${k}`);
|
||||
return v;
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
async function main(): Promise<void> {
|
||||
const homeserverUrl = env('MATRIX_CS_URL');
|
||||
const asToken = env('MOSAIC_AS_TOKEN');
|
||||
const serverName = env('MATRIX_SERVER_NAME');
|
||||
const slug = env('AGENT_SLUG');
|
||||
const roomId = env('FLEET_ROOM_ID');
|
||||
const intervalMs = Number(env('HEARTBEAT_INTERVAL_MS', '1000'));
|
||||
|
||||
const mxid = `@agent-${slug}:${serverName}`;
|
||||
const policy: LivenessPolicy = {
|
||||
heartbeatIntervalMs: intervalMs,
|
||||
missTolerance: Number(env('MISS_TOLERANCE', '2')),
|
||||
darkThresholdMs: Number(env('DARK_THRESHOLD_MS', '6000')),
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
const client = new MinimalMatrixClient({
|
||||
homeserverUrl,
|
||||
accessToken: asToken,
|
||||
actAsUserId: mxid,
|
||||
});
|
||||
const agent = new PresenceAgent({
|
||||
client,
|
||||
agent: { mxid, slug, harness: 'claude-code' },
|
||||
roomId,
|
||||
intervalMs,
|
||||
policy,
|
||||
onError: (err) => console.error(`[${slug}] heartbeat error:`, (err as Error).message),
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
await agent.connect();
|
||||
agent.start();
|
||||
console.log(`[${slug}] pid=${process.pid} mxid=${mxid} heartbeating every ${intervalMs}ms`);
|
||||
|
||||
// Graceful stop only on SIGTERM; the A3 test uses SIGKILL (no cleanup runs).
|
||||
process.on('SIGTERM', () => {
|
||||
void agent.stop().finally(() => process.exit(0));
|
||||
});
|
||||
// Keep the event loop alive indefinitely.
|
||||
setInterval(() => {}, 1 << 30);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
main().catch((err) => {
|
||||
console.error('agent-proc fatal:', err);
|
||||
process.exit(1);
|
||||
});
|
||||
@@ -1,24 +0,0 @@
|
||||
{
|
||||
"name": "@mosaicstack/matrix-presence-harness",
|
||||
"version": "0.0.1",
|
||||
"type": "module",
|
||||
"private": true,
|
||||
"description": "DEV-ONLY validation harness for RFC-001 P1 (Matrix presence). Not shipped.",
|
||||
"scripts": {
|
||||
"build": "tsc --noEmit",
|
||||
"lint": "eslint .",
|
||||
"typecheck": "tsc --noEmit",
|
||||
"test": "vitest run --passWithNoTests",
|
||||
"validate": "./run.sh"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"dependencies": {
|
||||
"@mosaicstack/appservice": "workspace:*",
|
||||
"@mosaicstack/comms": "workspace:*"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"devDependencies": {
|
||||
"@types/node": "^22.0.0",
|
||||
"tsx": "^4.19.0",
|
||||
"typescript": "^5.8.0",
|
||||
"vitest": "^2.0.0"
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -1,89 +0,0 @@
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* tools/matrix-presence-harness/provision.ts
|
||||
*
|
||||
* *** DEV harness — LOCAL SANDBOX ONLY. ***
|
||||
*
|
||||
* The MINIMAL P1 provisioner (RFC-001 §10 P1): its ONLY job is to register a
|
||||
* few agent MXIDs, create the fleet presence room, and join the agents. It is
|
||||
* deliberately NOT the P2 appservice (no auto-enroll, no room taxonomy, no
|
||||
* token minting, no introductions).
|
||||
*
|
||||
* It reuses the existing, tested `@mosaicstack/appservice` core library
|
||||
* (AppserviceIntent: register / createRoom / join over the AS API) rather than
|
||||
* reinventing Matrix plumbing.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* ESM / NodeNext: .js import extensions.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
import { AppserviceIntent, type AppserviceConfig } from '@mosaicstack/appservice';
|
||||
|
||||
export interface ProvisionOptions {
|
||||
homeserverUrl: string;
|
||||
serverName: string;
|
||||
asToken: string;
|
||||
hsToken: string;
|
||||
agentSlugs: string[];
|
||||
fleetAlias?: string; // localpart, default "mosaic-fleet"
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
export interface ProvisionResult {
|
||||
roomId: string;
|
||||
senderUserId: string;
|
||||
agents: { slug: string; mxid: string }[];
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/** Register agents, create the fleet presence room, join everyone. Idempotent. */
|
||||
export async function provision(opts: ProvisionOptions): Promise<ProvisionResult> {
|
||||
const cfg: AppserviceConfig = {
|
||||
homeserverUrl: opts.homeserverUrl,
|
||||
domain: opts.serverName,
|
||||
asToken: opts.asToken,
|
||||
hsToken: opts.hsToken,
|
||||
};
|
||||
const intent = new AppserviceIntent(cfg);
|
||||
const fleetAlias = opts.fleetAlias ?? 'mosaic-fleet';
|
||||
|
||||
// 1. Register the virtual agent MXIDs (bypasses enable_registration:false).
|
||||
const agents = [];
|
||||
for (const slug of opts.agentSlugs) {
|
||||
const mxid = await intent.ensureRegistered(slug);
|
||||
await intent.setDisplayName(slug, `agent ${slug} (DEV)`);
|
||||
agents.push({ slug, mxid });
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// 2. Create the single fleet presence room, inviting all agents (RFC-001 §4.6).
|
||||
// Idempotent: if the alias already exists, reuse that room instead.
|
||||
let roomId: string;
|
||||
try {
|
||||
const created = await intent.createRoom({
|
||||
name: 'Fleet Presence (DEV)',
|
||||
alias: fleetAlias,
|
||||
topic: 'RFC-001 P1 — mosaic.presence heartbeats. Who is alive?',
|
||||
invite: agents.map((a) => a.mxid),
|
||||
});
|
||||
roomId = created.roomId;
|
||||
} catch (err) {
|
||||
// Alias already taken (re-run): resolve the existing room id.
|
||||
const aliasFq = `#${fleetAlias}:${opts.serverName}`;
|
||||
roomId = await resolveAlias(opts, aliasFq);
|
||||
void err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// 3. Join every agent into the fleet room (invite + join; idempotent).
|
||||
for (const { slug } of agents) {
|
||||
await intent.ensureJoined(roomId, slug);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return { roomId, senderUserId: intent.senderUserId, agents };
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
async function resolveAlias(
|
||||
opts: Pick<ProvisionOptions, 'homeserverUrl' | 'asToken'>,
|
||||
aliasFq: string,
|
||||
): Promise<string> {
|
||||
const url = `${opts.homeserverUrl.replace(/\/$/, '')}/_matrix/client/v3/directory/room/${encodeURIComponent(aliasFq)}`;
|
||||
const res = await fetch(url, { headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${opts.asToken}` } });
|
||||
if (!res.ok) throw new Error(`resolveAlias ${aliasFq} -> ${res.status}`);
|
||||
const data = (await res.json()) as { room_id?: string };
|
||||
if (!data.room_id) throw new Error(`resolveAlias ${aliasFq} returned no room_id`);
|
||||
return data.room_id;
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -1,47 +0,0 @@
|
||||
#!/usr/bin/env bash
|
||||
# ============================================================================
|
||||
# run.sh — RFC-001 P1 presence validation harness (A1–A5) *** DEV-ONLY ***
|
||||
# ============================================================================
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Assumes the dev Synapse is already up (infra/matrix/dev-up.sh). Provisions 3
|
||||
# agents, heartbeats them, proves A2/A3/A4 against the LOCAL dev homeserver,
|
||||
# exercising @mosaicstack/comms over the self-signed TLS endpoint (A1).
|
||||
#
|
||||
# NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED=0 is set ONLY because the dev cert is
|
||||
# self-signed. This is a DEV convenience and must never be used in prod.
|
||||
# ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
set -euo pipefail
|
||||
HERE="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
|
||||
REPO="$(cd "${HERE}/../.." && pwd)"
|
||||
DATA="${REPO}/infra/matrix/.data"
|
||||
|
||||
if [[ ! -f "${DATA}/dev-secrets.env" ]]; then
|
||||
echo "run.sh: ${DATA}/dev-secrets.env not found — run infra/matrix/dev-up.sh first" >&2
|
||||
exit 1
|
||||
fi
|
||||
# shellcheck disable=SC1091
|
||||
set -a; source "${DATA}/dev-secrets.env"; set +a
|
||||
|
||||
export MATRIX_SERVER_NAME="${MATRIX_SERVER_NAME:-matrix.localhost}"
|
||||
export MATRIX_TLS_PORT="${MATRIX_TLS_PORT:-18448}"
|
||||
# Exercise the SDK over the self-signed TLS listener (A1). Use the plain HTTP
|
||||
# port instead by exporting MATRIX_CS_URL=http://127.0.0.1:18008 before running.
|
||||
export MATRIX_CS_URL="${MATRIX_CS_URL:-https://127.0.0.1:${MATRIX_TLS_PORT}}"
|
||||
export NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED=0
|
||||
|
||||
export HEARTBEAT_INTERVAL_MS="${HEARTBEAT_INTERVAL_MS:-1000}"
|
||||
export MISS_TOLERANCE="${MISS_TOLERANCE:-2}"
|
||||
export DARK_THRESHOLD_MS="${DARK_THRESHOLD_MS:-6000}"
|
||||
export AGENT_SLUGS="${AGENT_SLUGS:-alpha,bravo,charlie}"
|
||||
export VICTIM_SLUG="${VICTIM_SLUG:-charlie}"
|
||||
|
||||
TSX_CLI="$(ls -d "${REPO}"/node_modules/.pnpm/tsx@*/node_modules/tsx/dist/cli.mjs 2>/dev/null | head -1)"
|
||||
if [[ -z "${TSX_CLI}" ]]; then
|
||||
echo "run.sh: tsx not found under node_modules — run pnpm install first" >&2
|
||||
exit 1
|
||||
fi
|
||||
export TSX_CLI
|
||||
|
||||
echo "[run] CS=${MATRIX_CS_URL} server_name=${MATRIX_SERVER_NAME} dark_threshold=${DARK_THRESHOLD_MS}ms"
|
||||
cd "${REPO}"
|
||||
exec node "${TSX_CLI}" "${HERE}/validate.ts"
|
||||
@@ -1,9 +0,0 @@
|
||||
{
|
||||
"extends": "../../tsconfig.base.json",
|
||||
"compilerOptions": {
|
||||
"noEmit": true,
|
||||
"rootDir": "."
|
||||
},
|
||||
"include": ["*.ts"],
|
||||
"exclude": ["node_modules"]
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -1,210 +0,0 @@
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* tools/matrix-presence-harness/validate.ts
|
||||
*
|
||||
* *** DEV harness — LOCAL SANDBOX ONLY. Never point at live infra. ***
|
||||
*
|
||||
* End-to-end proof of RFC-001 P1 acceptance criteria against the local dev
|
||||
* Synapse (infra/matrix):
|
||||
*
|
||||
* A2 provision >=3 agents, they heartbeat, all show ONLINE in the fleet
|
||||
* presence room.
|
||||
* A3 hard-kill (SIGKILL) one agent's process; assert it flips to OFFLINE
|
||||
* within dark_threshold, DETERMINISTICALLY (heartbeat-age based, not
|
||||
* native-presence-timeout), while the survivors stay ONLINE.
|
||||
* A4 dump the human-readable fleet liveness board.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Exits 0 on success, 1 on any failed assertion.
|
||||
* ESM / NodeNext: .js import extensions.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
import { spawn, type ChildProcess } from 'node:child_process';
|
||||
import { fileURLToPath } from 'node:url';
|
||||
import { dirname, resolve } from 'node:path';
|
||||
|
||||
import {
|
||||
FleetLivenessReader,
|
||||
MinimalMatrixClient,
|
||||
type AgentLiveness,
|
||||
type LivenessPolicy,
|
||||
} from '@mosaicstack/comms';
|
||||
|
||||
import { provision } from './provision.js';
|
||||
|
||||
const HERE = dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url));
|
||||
|
||||
const env = (k: string, fallback?: string): string => {
|
||||
const v = process.env[k] ?? fallback;
|
||||
if (v === undefined) throw new Error(`missing env ${k}`);
|
||||
return v;
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
const sleep = (ms: number): Promise<void> => new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, ms));
|
||||
const board = (rows: AgentLiveness[]): Record<string, string> =>
|
||||
Object.fromEntries(rows.map((r) => [r.slug, r.status]));
|
||||
|
||||
async function main(): Promise<void> {
|
||||
const homeserverUrl = env('MATRIX_CS_URL');
|
||||
const asToken = env('MOSAIC_AS_TOKEN');
|
||||
const hsToken = env('MOSAIC_HS_TOKEN', 'unused-in-p1');
|
||||
const serverName = env('MATRIX_SERVER_NAME');
|
||||
const intervalMs = Number(env('HEARTBEAT_INTERVAL_MS', '1000'));
|
||||
const missTolerance = Number(env('MISS_TOLERANCE', '2'));
|
||||
const darkThresholdMs = Number(env('DARK_THRESHOLD_MS', '6000'));
|
||||
const slugs = env('AGENT_SLUGS', 'alpha,bravo,charlie').split(',');
|
||||
const victim = env('VICTIM_SLUG', 'charlie');
|
||||
|
||||
const policy: LivenessPolicy = {
|
||||
heartbeatIntervalMs: intervalMs,
|
||||
missTolerance,
|
||||
darkThresholdMs,
|
||||
};
|
||||
const failures: string[] = [];
|
||||
const assert = (ok: boolean, msg: string): void => {
|
||||
console.log(` ${ok ? 'PASS' : 'FAIL'} ${msg}`);
|
||||
if (!ok) failures.push(msg);
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
// ── Provision (register agents, create fleet room, join) ──────────────────
|
||||
console.log(`\n[validate] provisioning ${slugs.length} agents + fleet presence room...`);
|
||||
const { roomId, senderUserId } = await provision({
|
||||
homeserverUrl,
|
||||
serverName,
|
||||
asToken,
|
||||
hsToken,
|
||||
agentSlugs: slugs,
|
||||
});
|
||||
console.log(`[validate] fleet room ${roomId} (sender ${senderUserId})`);
|
||||
|
||||
// Reader masquerades as the AS sender (a room member) to read heartbeats.
|
||||
const reader = new FleetLivenessReader({
|
||||
client: new MinimalMatrixClient({
|
||||
homeserverUrl,
|
||||
accessToken: asToken,
|
||||
actAsUserId: senderUserId,
|
||||
}),
|
||||
roomId,
|
||||
policy,
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
// ── Spawn each agent as its own OS process ────────────────────────────────
|
||||
const procs = new Map<string, ChildProcess>();
|
||||
for (const slug of slugs) {
|
||||
// `--import tsx` runs agent-proc.ts IN-PROCESS (no tsx grandchild), so the
|
||||
// spawned pid IS the agent — a SIGKILL to it is a true hard-kill (A3).
|
||||
// cwd=HERE so the `tsx` specifier resolves against the harness node_modules.
|
||||
const child = spawn('node', ['--import', 'tsx', resolve(HERE, 'agent-proc.ts')], {
|
||||
cwd: HERE,
|
||||
env: {
|
||||
...process.env,
|
||||
AGENT_SLUG: slug,
|
||||
FLEET_ROOM_ID: roomId,
|
||||
MATRIX_CS_URL: homeserverUrl,
|
||||
MOSAIC_AS_TOKEN: asToken,
|
||||
MATRIX_SERVER_NAME: serverName,
|
||||
HEARTBEAT_INTERVAL_MS: String(intervalMs),
|
||||
MISS_TOLERANCE: String(missTolerance),
|
||||
DARK_THRESHOLD_MS: String(darkThresholdMs),
|
||||
},
|
||||
stdio: ['ignore', 'inherit', 'inherit'],
|
||||
});
|
||||
procs.set(slug, child);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const hardKill = (pid: number): void => {
|
||||
try {
|
||||
process.kill(pid, 'SIGKILL'); // pid is the in-process agent — a true kill
|
||||
} catch {
|
||||
/* already gone */
|
||||
}
|
||||
};
|
||||
const cleanup = (): void => {
|
||||
for (const [, c] of procs) {
|
||||
if (c.pid) hardKill(c.pid);
|
||||
}
|
||||
};
|
||||
process.on('exit', cleanup);
|
||||
|
||||
try {
|
||||
// ── A2: let a few beats flow, assert all online ─────────────────────────
|
||||
console.log(`\n[validate] A2 — waiting for heartbeats (${intervalMs}ms interval)...`);
|
||||
await sleep(intervalMs * 4 + 1000);
|
||||
const a2 = await reader.read();
|
||||
console.log('[validate] board:', board(a2));
|
||||
for (const slug of slugs) {
|
||||
assert(a2.find((r) => r.slug === slug)?.status === 'online', `A2 ${slug} is online`);
|
||||
}
|
||||
assert(a2.length >= 3, 'A2 >=3 agents present in fleet room');
|
||||
|
||||
// ── A4: human-readable board ────────────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
console.log('\n[validate] A4 — fleet liveness board (human view):');
|
||||
console.log(await reader.formatBoard());
|
||||
|
||||
// ── A3: hard-kill the victim, measure flip-to-offline latency ───────────
|
||||
const victimProc = procs.get(victim);
|
||||
if (!victimProc?.pid) throw new Error(`no pid for victim ${victim}`);
|
||||
console.log(
|
||||
`\n[validate] A3 — SIGKILL ${victim} (pid ${victimProc.pid}); dark_threshold=${darkThresholdMs}ms`,
|
||||
);
|
||||
const killTs = Date.now();
|
||||
hardKill(victimProc.pid);
|
||||
|
||||
let victimOffline: AgentLiveness | undefined;
|
||||
let detectMs = 0;
|
||||
const deadline = killTs + darkThresholdMs + 6000;
|
||||
while (Date.now() < deadline) {
|
||||
await sleep(400);
|
||||
const rows = await reader.read();
|
||||
const v = rows.find((r) => r.slug === victim);
|
||||
const elapsed = Date.now() - killTs;
|
||||
if (v) {
|
||||
console.log(
|
||||
` t+${String(elapsed).padStart(5)}ms ${victim}=${v.status} (age=${v.ageMs}ms) ` +
|
||||
`survivors=${slugs
|
||||
.filter((s) => s !== victim)
|
||||
.map((s) => `${s}:${rows.find((r) => r.slug === s)?.status}`)
|
||||
.join(',')}`,
|
||||
);
|
||||
if (v.status === 'offline') {
|
||||
victimOffline = v;
|
||||
detectMs = elapsed;
|
||||
break;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
assert(!!victimOffline, `A3 ${victim} flipped to offline after kill`);
|
||||
if (victimOffline) {
|
||||
// Deterministic: the flip is driven by heartbeat age reaching dark_threshold.
|
||||
assert(
|
||||
victimOffline.ageMs >= darkThresholdMs,
|
||||
`A3 flip is heartbeat-deterministic (age ${victimOffline.ageMs}ms >= dark_threshold ${darkThresholdMs}ms)`,
|
||||
);
|
||||
assert(
|
||||
detectMs <= darkThresholdMs + 2000,
|
||||
`A3 detected within dark_threshold + poll slack (detected at t+${detectMs}ms)`,
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
// Survivors unaffected.
|
||||
const finalRows = await reader.read();
|
||||
for (const slug of slugs.filter((s) => s !== victim)) {
|
||||
assert(
|
||||
finalRows.find((r) => r.slug === slug)?.status === 'online',
|
||||
`A3 survivor ${slug} still online`,
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
console.log('\n[validate] final board after kill:');
|
||||
console.log(await reader.formatBoard());
|
||||
} finally {
|
||||
cleanup();
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
console.log(
|
||||
`\n[validate] ${failures.length === 0 ? 'ALL PASSED ✅' : `FAILED ❌ (${failures.length})`}`,
|
||||
);
|
||||
process.exit(failures.length === 0 ? 0 : 1);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
main().catch((err) => {
|
||||
console.error('[validate] fatal:', err);
|
||||
process.exit(1);
|
||||
});
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user