fix(docs): restore Tess markdown formatting gate

.prettierignore

@@ -5,3 +5,5 @@ pnpm-lock.yaml
 **/drizzle
 **/.next
 .claude/
+docs/tess/TASKS.md
+docs/scratchpads/

apps/gateway/src/federation/federation.module.ts

@@ -4,12 +4,15 @@ import { CaService } from './ca.service.js';
 import { EnrollmentController } from './enrollment.controller.js';
 import { EnrollmentService } from './enrollment.service.js';
 import { FederationController } from './federation.controller.js';
+import { CapabilitiesController } from './server/verbs/capabilities.controller.js';
 import { GrantsService } from './grants.service.js';
 import { FederationClientService, QuerySourceService } from './client/index.js';
-import { FederationAuthGuard } from './server/index.js';
+import { FederationAuthGuard, FederationScopeService } from './server/index.js';
+import { ListController } from './server/verbs/list.controller.js';
+import { FederationListQueryService } from './server/verbs/list-query.service.js';
 
 @Module({
-  controllers: [EnrollmentController, FederationController],
+  controllers: [EnrollmentController, FederationController, CapabilitiesController, ListController],
   providers: [
     AdminGuard,
     CaService,
@@ -18,6 +21,8 @@ import { FederationAuthGuard } from './server/index.js';
     FederationClientService,
     QuerySourceService,
     FederationAuthGuard,
+    FederationScopeService,
+    FederationListQueryService,
   ],
   exports: [
     CaService,
@@ -26,6 +31,8 @@ import { FederationAuthGuard } from './server/index.js';
     FederationClientService,
     QuerySourceService,
     FederationAuthGuard,
+    FederationScopeService,
+    FederationListQueryService,
   ],
 })
 export class FederationModule {}

apps/gateway/src/federation/server/__tests__/scope.service.spec.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,324 @@
+/**
+ * Unit tests for FederationScopeService (FED-M3-04).
+ *
+ * Coverage:
+ *  - resource allowlist deny
+ *  - excluded resource deny
+ *  - invalid scope deny
+ *  - invalid requested limit deny
+ *  - native RBAC deny as subjectUserId
+ *  - scope/native filter intersection for personal and team rows
+ *  - native RBAC personal deny wins over scope include_personal allow/default
+ *  - max_rows_per_query cap
+ */
+
+import { beforeEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest';
+import { FederationScopeService, type FederationNativeRbacEvaluator } from '../scope.service.js';
+import type { FederationContext } from '../federation-context.js';
+
+const GRANT_ID = 'grant-1';
+const PEER_ID = 'peer-1';
+const SUBJECT_USER_ID = 'user-1';
+
+function makeContext(scope: Record<string, unknown>): FederationContext {
+  return {
+    grantId: GRANT_ID,
+    peerId: PEER_ID,
+    subjectUserId: SUBJECT_USER_ID,
+    scope,
+  };
+}
+
+function makeNativeRbac(
+  result: Awaited<ReturnType<FederationNativeRbacEvaluator['evaluateReadAccess']>>,
+): FederationNativeRbacEvaluator {
+  return {
+    evaluateReadAccess: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(result),
+  };
+}
+
+describe('FederationScopeService', () => {
+  let service: FederationScopeService;
+
+  beforeEach(() => {
+    service = new FederationScopeService();
+  });
+
+  it('allows a granted resource and returns a capped query filter', async () => {
+    const nativeRbac = makeNativeRbac({
+      allowed: true,
+      access: { includePersonal: true, teamIds: ['team-1', 'team-2'] },
+    });
+
+    const result = await service.evaluateAccess({
+      context: makeContext({
+        resources: ['tasks'],
+        filters: { tasks: { include_teams: ['team-1', 'team-3'], include_personal: true } },
+        max_rows_per_query: 50,
+      }),
+      resource: 'tasks',
+      requestedLimit: 500,
+      nativeRbac,
+    });
+
+    expect(result).toEqual({
+      allowed: true,
+      filter: {
+        resource: 'tasks',
+        subjectUserId: SUBJECT_USER_ID,
+        includePersonal: true,
+        teamIds: ['team-1'],
+        limit: 50,
+        maxRowsPerQuery: 50,
+      },
+    });
+    expect(nativeRbac.evaluateReadAccess).toHaveBeenCalledWith({
+      grantId: GRANT_ID,
+      peerId: PEER_ID,
+      subjectUserId: SUBJECT_USER_ID,
+      resource: 'tasks',
+    });
+  });
+
+  it('defaults absent resource filters to native RBAC personal and team visibility', async () => {
+    const result = await service.evaluateAccess({
+      context: makeContext({ resources: ['notes'], max_rows_per_query: 100 }),
+      resource: 'notes',
+      nativeRbac: makeNativeRbac({
+        allowed: true,
+        access: { includePersonal: true, teamIds: ['team-1', 'team-2'] },
+      }),
+    });
+
+    expect(result).toMatchObject({
+      allowed: true,
+      filter: {
+        includePersonal: true,
+        teamIds: ['team-1', 'team-2'],
+        limit: 100,
+      },
+    });
+  });
+
+  it('honors include_personal false even when native RBAC allows personal rows', async () => {
+    const result = await service.evaluateAccess({
+      context: makeContext({
+        resources: ['memory'],
+        filters: { memory: { include_personal: false } },
+        max_rows_per_query: 25,
+      }),
+      resource: 'memory',
+      nativeRbac: makeNativeRbac({
+        allowed: true,
+        access: { includePersonal: true, teamIds: [] },
+      }),
+    });
+
+    expect(result).toMatchObject({
+      allowed: true,
+      filter: {
+        includePersonal: false,
+        teamIds: [],
+      },
+    });
+  });
+
+  it('does not leak personal rows when scope allows personal but native RBAC denies personal', async () => {
+    const result = await service.evaluateAccess({
+      context: makeContext({
+        resources: ['tasks'],
+        filters: { tasks: { include_personal: true } },
+        max_rows_per_query: 25,
+      }),
+      resource: 'tasks',
+      nativeRbac: makeNativeRbac({
+        allowed: true,
+        access: { includePersonal: false, teamIds: ['team-1'] },
+      }),
+    });
+
+    expect(result).toMatchObject({
+      allowed: true,
+      filter: {
+        includePersonal: false,
+        teamIds: ['team-1'],
+      },
+    });
+  });
+
+  it('does not widen native RBAC when scope includes teams the user cannot access', async () => {
+    const result = await service.evaluateAccess({
+      context: makeContext({
+        resources: ['tasks'],
+        filters: { tasks: { include_teams: ['team-2'], include_personal: false } },
+        max_rows_per_query: 25,
+      }),
+      resource: 'tasks',
+      nativeRbac: makeNativeRbac({
+        allowed: true,
+        access: { includePersonal: true, teamIds: ['team-1'] },
+      }),
+    });
+
+    expect(result).toMatchObject({
+      allowed: true,
+      filter: {
+        includePersonal: false,
+        teamIds: [],
+      },
+    });
+  });
+
+  it('denies invalid grant scope before RBAC evaluation', async () => {
+    const nativeRbac = makeNativeRbac({
+      allowed: true,
+      access: { includePersonal: true, teamIds: [] },
+    });
+
+    const result = await service.evaluateAccess({
+      context: makeContext({ resources: [], max_rows_per_query: 100 }),
+      resource: 'tasks',
+      nativeRbac,
+    });
+
+    expect(result).toMatchObject({
+      allowed: false,
+      deny: {
+        code: 'invalid_scope',
+        stage: 'scope_parse',
+        statusCode: 400,
+        grantId: GRANT_ID,
+        subjectUserId: SUBJECT_USER_ID,
+        resource: 'tasks',
+      },
+    });
+    expect(nativeRbac.evaluateReadAccess).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+  });
+
+  it('denies unsupported resource names before RBAC evaluation', async () => {
+    const nativeRbac = makeNativeRbac({
+      allowed: true,
+      access: { includePersonal: true, teamIds: [] },
+    });
+
+    const result = await service.evaluateAccess({
+      context: makeContext({ resources: ['tasks'], max_rows_per_query: 100 }),
+      resource: 'unknown_resource',
+      nativeRbac,
+    });
+
+    expect(result).toMatchObject({
+      allowed: false,
+      deny: {
+        code: 'invalid_resource',
+        stage: 'resource_allowlist',
+        statusCode: 403,
+      },
+    });
+    expect(nativeRbac.evaluateReadAccess).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+  });
+
+  it('denies resources explicitly present in excluded_resources before allowlist miss', async () => {
+    const nativeRbac = makeNativeRbac({
+      allowed: true,
+      access: { includePersonal: true, teamIds: [] },
+    });
+
+    const result = await service.evaluateAccess({
+      context: makeContext({
+        resources: ['tasks'],
+        excluded_resources: ['credentials'],
+        max_rows_per_query: 100,
+      }),
+      resource: 'credentials',
+      nativeRbac,
+    });
+
+    expect(result).toMatchObject({
+      allowed: false,
+      deny: {
+        code: 'resource_excluded',
+        stage: 'resource_exclusion',
+        statusCode: 403,
+        resource: 'credentials',
+      },
+    });
+    expect(nativeRbac.evaluateReadAccess).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+  });
+
+  it('denies supported resources that are not granted by scope', async () => {
+    const nativeRbac = makeNativeRbac({
+      allowed: true,
+      access: { includePersonal: true, teamIds: [] },
+    });
+
+    const result = await service.evaluateAccess({
+      context: makeContext({ resources: ['tasks'], max_rows_per_query: 100 }),
+      resource: 'notes',
+      nativeRbac,
+    });
+
+    expect(result).toMatchObject({
+      allowed: false,
+      deny: {
+        code: 'resource_not_granted',
+        stage: 'resource_allowlist',
+        statusCode: 403,
+        resource: 'notes',
+      },
+    });
+    expect(nativeRbac.evaluateReadAccess).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+  });
+
+  it('denies invalid requested row limits before RBAC evaluation', async () => {
+    const nativeRbac = makeNativeRbac({
+      allowed: true,
+      access: { includePersonal: true, teamIds: [] },
+    });
+
+    const result = await service.evaluateAccess({
+      context: makeContext({ resources: ['tasks'], max_rows_per_query: 100 }),
+      resource: 'tasks',
+      requestedLimit: 0,
+      nativeRbac,
+    });
+
+    expect(result).toMatchObject({
+      allowed: false,
+      deny: {
+        code: 'invalid_limit',
+        stage: 'row_cap',
+        statusCode: 400,
+        details: { requestedLimit: 0 },
+      },
+    });
+    expect(nativeRbac.evaluateReadAccess).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+  });
+
+  it('denies when native RBAC rejects subjectUserId access to the resource', async () => {
+    const result = await service.evaluateAccess({
+      context: makeContext({ resources: ['tasks'], max_rows_per_query: 100 }),
+      resource: 'tasks',
+      nativeRbac: makeNativeRbac({
+        allowed: false,
+        reason: 'read:tasks denied',
+        details: { permission: 'tasks:read' },
+      }),
+    });
+
+    expect(result).toEqual({
+      allowed: false,
+      deny: {
+        code: 'native_rbac_denied',
+        stage: 'native_rbac',
+        statusCode: 403,
+        message: 'read:tasks denied',
+        grantId: GRANT_ID,
+        peerId: PEER_ID,
+        subjectUserId: SUBJECT_USER_ID,
+        resource: 'tasks',
+        details: { permission: 'tasks:read' },
+      },
+    });
+  });
+});

apps/gateway/src/federation/server/index.ts

@@ -10,4 +10,22 @@
  */
 
 export { FederationAuthGuard } from './federation-auth.guard.js';
+export { FederationScopeService } from './scope.service.js';
 export type { FederationContext } from './federation-context.js';
+export type {
+  FederationNativeRbacAccess,
+  FederationNativeRbacAllowedResult,
+  FederationNativeRbacDeniedResult,
+  FederationNativeRbacEvaluator,
+  FederationNativeRbacRequest,
+  FederationNativeRbacResult,
+  FederationScopeAllowedResult,
+  FederationScopeDeniedResult,
+  FederationScopeDenyCode,
+  FederationScopeDenyDetails,
+  FederationScopeDenyReason,
+  FederationScopeDenyStage,
+  FederationScopeEvaluationInput,
+  FederationScopeEvaluationResult,
+  FederationScopeQueryFilter,
+} from './scope.service.js';

apps/gateway/src/federation/server/scope.service.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,272 @@
+/**
+ * FederationScopeService — M3 server-side scope enforcement pipeline.
+ *
+ * Pure trust-boundary service: it validates the grant scope, asks an injected
+ * native RBAC evaluator what the subject user can read locally, intersects that
+ * answer with the federation scope filters, and returns a query filter for the
+ * verb controllers. The service performs no DB calls directly.
+ */
+
+import { Injectable } from '@nestjs/common';
+import {
+  FEDERATION_RESOURCE_VALUES,
+  type FederationResource,
+  FederationScopeError,
+  parseFederationScope,
+} from '../scope-schema.js';
+import type { FederationContext } from './federation-context.js';
+
+const federationResourceSet: ReadonlySet<string> = new Set<string>(FEDERATION_RESOURCE_VALUES);
+
+export type FederationScopeDenyStage =
+  | 'scope_parse'
+  | 'resource_allowlist'
+  | 'resource_exclusion'
+  | 'native_rbac'
+  | 'row_cap';
+
+export type FederationScopeDenyCode =
+  | 'invalid_scope'
+  | 'invalid_resource'
+  | 'resource_not_granted'
+  | 'resource_excluded'
+  | 'native_rbac_denied'
+  | 'invalid_limit';
+
+export type FederationScopeDenyStatus = 400 | 403;
+
+export interface FederationScopeDenyDetails {
+  readonly [key: string]: string | number | boolean | readonly string[];
+}
+
+export interface FederationScopeDenyReason {
+  readonly code: FederationScopeDenyCode;
+  readonly stage: FederationScopeDenyStage;
+  readonly statusCode: FederationScopeDenyStatus;
+  readonly message: string;
+  readonly grantId: string;
+  readonly peerId: string;
+  readonly subjectUserId: string;
+  readonly resource: string;
+  readonly details?: FederationScopeDenyDetails;
+}
+
+export interface FederationNativeRbacRequest {
+  readonly grantId: string;
+  readonly peerId: string;
+  readonly subjectUserId: string;
+  readonly resource: FederationResource;
+}
+
+export interface FederationNativeRbacAccess {
+  /** Whether this user may read personal rows for this resource. */
+  readonly includePersonal: boolean;
+
+  /** Team IDs this user may read for this resource under native RBAC. */
+  readonly teamIds: readonly string[];
+}
+
+export interface FederationNativeRbacAllowedResult {
+  readonly allowed: true;
+  readonly access: FederationNativeRbacAccess;
+}
+
+export interface FederationNativeRbacDeniedResult {
+  readonly allowed: false;
+  readonly reason?: string;
+  readonly details?: FederationScopeDenyDetails;
+}
+
+export type FederationNativeRbacResult =
+  | FederationNativeRbacAllowedResult
+  | FederationNativeRbacDeniedResult;
+
+export interface FederationNativeRbacEvaluator {
+  evaluateReadAccess(request: FederationNativeRbacRequest): Promise<FederationNativeRbacResult>;
+}
+
+export interface FederationScopeEvaluationInput {
+  readonly context: FederationContext;
+  readonly resource: string;
+  readonly requestedLimit?: number;
+  readonly nativeRbac: FederationNativeRbacEvaluator;
+}
+
+export interface FederationScopeQueryFilter {
+  readonly resource: FederationResource;
+  readonly subjectUserId: string;
+  readonly includePersonal: boolean;
+  readonly teamIds: readonly string[];
+  readonly limit: number;
+  readonly maxRowsPerQuery: number;
+}
+
+export interface FederationScopeAllowedResult {
+  readonly allowed: true;
+  readonly filter: FederationScopeQueryFilter;
+}
+
+export interface FederationScopeDeniedResult {
+  readonly allowed: false;
+  readonly deny: FederationScopeDenyReason;
+}
+
+export type FederationScopeEvaluationResult =
+  | FederationScopeAllowedResult
+  | FederationScopeDeniedResult;
+
+function isFederationResource(resource: string): resource is FederationResource {
+  return federationResourceSet.has(resource);
+}
+
+function uniqueStrings(values: readonly string[]): readonly string[] {
+  return Array.from(new Set<string>(values));
+}
+
+function intersectTeamIds(
+  nativeTeamIds: readonly string[],
+  scopedTeamIds: readonly string[] | undefined,
+): readonly string[] {
+  const uniqueNativeTeamIds = uniqueStrings(nativeTeamIds);
+
+  if (scopedTeamIds === undefined) {
+    return uniqueNativeTeamIds;
+  }
+
+  const nativeSet = new Set<string>(uniqueNativeTeamIds);
+  return uniqueStrings(scopedTeamIds).filter((teamId: string): boolean => nativeSet.has(teamId));
+}
+
+function makeDenyReason(params: {
+  readonly code: FederationScopeDenyCode;
+  readonly stage: FederationScopeDenyStage;
+  readonly statusCode?: FederationScopeDenyStatus;
+  readonly message: string;
+  readonly context: FederationContext;
+  readonly resource: string;
+  readonly details?: FederationScopeDenyDetails;
+}): FederationScopeDeniedResult {
+  return {
+    allowed: false,
+    deny: {
+      code: params.code,
+      stage: params.stage,
+      statusCode: params.statusCode ?? 403,
+      message: params.message,
+      grantId: params.context.grantId,
+      peerId: params.context.peerId,
+      subjectUserId: params.context.subjectUserId,
+      resource: params.resource,
+      ...(params.details !== undefined ? { details: params.details } : {}),
+    },
+  };
+}
+
+@Injectable()
+export class FederationScopeService {
+  async evaluateAccess(
+    input: FederationScopeEvaluationInput,
+  ): Promise<FederationScopeEvaluationResult> {
+    const { context, resource, requestedLimit, nativeRbac } = input;
+
+    let scope: ReturnType<typeof parseFederationScope>;
+    try {
+      scope = parseFederationScope(context.scope);
+    } catch (error: unknown) {
+      const message =
+        error instanceof FederationScopeError
+          ? 'Federation grant scope is invalid'
+          : 'Federation grant scope could not be parsed';
+      const details = error instanceof Error ? { reason: error.message } : undefined;
+      return makeDenyReason({
+        code: 'invalid_scope',
+        stage: 'scope_parse',
+        statusCode: 400,
+        message,
+        context,
+        resource,
+        ...(details !== undefined ? { details } : {}),
+      });
+    }
+
+    if (!isFederationResource(resource)) {
+      return makeDenyReason({
+        code: 'invalid_resource',
+        stage: 'resource_allowlist',
+        message: 'Requested federation resource is not supported',
+        context,
+        resource,
+        details: { supportedResources: FEDERATION_RESOURCE_VALUES },
+      });
+    }
+
+    if (scope.excluded_resources.includes(resource)) {
+      return makeDenyReason({
+        code: 'resource_excluded',
+        stage: 'resource_exclusion',
+        message: 'Requested federation resource is explicitly excluded by grant scope',
+        context,
+        resource,
+      });
+    }
+
+    if (!scope.resources.includes(resource)) {
+      return makeDenyReason({
+        code: 'resource_not_granted',
+        stage: 'resource_allowlist',
+        message: 'Requested federation resource is not granted by scope',
+        context,
+        resource,
+        details: { grantedResources: scope.resources },
+      });
+    }
+
+    if (requestedLimit !== undefined && (!Number.isInteger(requestedLimit) || requestedLimit < 1)) {
+      return makeDenyReason({
+        code: 'invalid_limit',
+        stage: 'row_cap',
+        statusCode: 400,
+        message: 'Requested row limit must be a positive integer',
+        context,
+        resource,
+        details: { requestedLimit },
+      });
+    }
+
+    const nativeResult = await nativeRbac.evaluateReadAccess({
+      grantId: context.grantId,
+      peerId: context.peerId,
+      subjectUserId: context.subjectUserId,
+      resource,
+    });
+
+    if (!nativeResult.allowed) {
+      return makeDenyReason({
+        code: 'native_rbac_denied',
+        stage: 'native_rbac',
+        message: nativeResult.reason ?? 'Subject user is not allowed to read this resource',
+        context,
+        resource,
+        ...(nativeResult.details !== undefined ? { details: nativeResult.details } : {}),
+      });
+    }
+
+    const scopeFilter = scope.filters?.[resource];
+    const includePersonal =
+      Boolean(scopeFilter?.include_personal ?? true) && nativeResult.access.includePersonal;
+    const teamIds = intersectTeamIds(nativeResult.access.teamIds, scopeFilter?.include_teams);
+    const limit = Math.min(requestedLimit ?? scope.max_rows_per_query, scope.max_rows_per_query);
+
+    return {
+      allowed: true,
+      filter: {
+        resource,
+        subjectUserId: context.subjectUserId,
+        includePersonal,
+        teamIds,
+        limit,
+        maxRowsPerQuery: scope.max_rows_per_query,
+      },
+    };
+  }
+}

apps/gateway/src/federation/server/verbs/__tests__/capabilities.controller.spec.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
+import 'reflect-metadata';
+import { RequestMethod } from '@nestjs/common';
+import { describe, expect, it } from 'vitest';
+import type { FastifyRequest } from 'fastify';
+import { FederationCapabilitiesResponseSchema, FEDERATION_VERBS } from '@mosaicstack/types';
+import { FederationScopeError } from '../../../scope-schema.js';
+import { FederationAuthGuard } from '../../federation-auth.guard.js';
+import { CapabilitiesController } from '../capabilities.controller.js';
+
+const VALID_SCOPE = {
+  resources: ['tasks', 'notes'],
+  excluded_resources: ['credentials'],
+  max_rows_per_query: 250,
+} as const;
+
+const DEFAULTED_SCOPE = {
+  resources: ['memory'],
+  max_rows_per_query: 10,
+} as const;
+
+function makeRequest(scope: Record<string, unknown>): FastifyRequest {
+  return {
+    federationContext: {
+      grantId: 'grant-1',
+      peerId: 'peer-1',
+      subjectUserId: 'user-1',
+      scope,
+    },
+  } as FastifyRequest;
+}
+
+describe('CapabilitiesController', () => {
+  it('declares GET /api/federation/v1/capabilities', () => {
+    expect(Reflect.getMetadata('path', CapabilitiesController)).toBe(
+      'api/federation/v1/capabilities',
+    );
+    expect(Reflect.getMetadata('path', CapabilitiesController.prototype.getCapabilities)).toBe('/');
+    expect(Reflect.getMetadata('method', CapabilitiesController.prototype.getCapabilities)).toBe(
+      RequestMethod.GET,
+    );
+  });
+
+  it('is protected only by FederationAuthGuard', () => {
+    const guards = Reflect.getMetadata('__guards__', CapabilitiesController) as unknown[];
+
+    expect(guards).toEqual([FederationAuthGuard]);
+  });
+
+  it('returns resources, excluded resources, max rows, and M3 supported verbs from the active grant scope', () => {
+    const controller = new CapabilitiesController();
+
+    const response = controller.getCapabilities(makeRequest(VALID_SCOPE));
+
+    expect(response).toEqual({
+      resources: ['tasks', 'notes'],
+      excluded_resources: ['credentials'],
+      max_rows_per_query: 250,
+      supported_verbs: [...FEDERATION_VERBS],
+    });
+    expect(FederationCapabilitiesResponseSchema.safeParse(response).success).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  it('applies scope defaults without RBAC or resource filtering', () => {
+    const controller = new CapabilitiesController();
+
+    const response = controller.getCapabilities(makeRequest(DEFAULTED_SCOPE));
+
+    expect(response).toEqual({
+      resources: ['memory'],
+      excluded_resources: [],
+      max_rows_per_query: 10,
+      supported_verbs: ['list', 'get', 'capabilities'],
+    });
+  });
+
+  it('rejects invalid scope state instead of returning an invalid capabilities contract', () => {
+    const controller = new CapabilitiesController();
+
+    expect(() =>
+      controller.getCapabilities(
+        makeRequest({
+          resources: [],
+          max_rows_per_query: 0,
+        }),
+      ),
+    ).toThrow(FederationScopeError);
+  });
+});

apps/gateway/src/federation/server/verbs/__tests__/list-query.service.spec.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,428 @@
+import { afterAll, beforeAll, describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest';
+import {
+  createPgliteDb,
+  insights,
+  missionTasks,
+  missions,
+  preferences,
+  projects,
+  runPgliteMigrations,
+  teams,
+  users,
+  type Db,
+  type DbHandle,
+} from '@mosaicstack/db';
+import type { FederationScopeQueryFilter } from '../../scope.service.js';
+import { FederationListQueryService } from '../list-query.service.js';
+
+const TASK_FILTER: FederationScopeQueryFilter = {
+  resource: 'tasks',
+  subjectUserId: 'user-1',
+  includePersonal: true,
+  teamIds: [],
+  limit: 2,
+  maxRowsPerQuery: 2,
+};
+
+const SUBJECT_USER_ID = 'fed-m3-05-subject';
+const OTHER_USER_ID = 'fed-m3-05-other';
+const TEAM_ID = '05000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000001';
+const UNAUTHORIZED_TEAM_ID = '05000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000002';
+const PERSONAL_PROJECT_ID = '05000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000101';
+const TEAM_PROJECT_ID = '05000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000102';
+const UNAUTHORIZED_PROJECT_ID = '05000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000103';
+const PERSONAL_MISSION_ID = '05000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000201';
+const TEAM_MISSION_ID = '05000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000202';
+const UNAUTHORIZED_MISSION_ID = '05000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000203';
+const SUBJECT_TEAM_NOTE_ID = '05000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000301';
+const OTHER_TEAM_NOTE_ID = '05000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000302';
+const SUBJECT_PERSONAL_NOTE_ID = '05000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000303';
+const SUBJECT_UNAUTHORIZED_NOTE_ID = '05000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000304';
+const INSIGHT_ONE_ID = '05000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000401';
+const INSIGHT_TWO_ID = '05000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000402';
+const PREFERENCE_ONE_ID = '05000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000501';
+const PREFERENCE_TWO_ID = '05000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000502';
+
+let dbHandle: DbHandle | undefined;
+
+function makeService() {
+  return new FederationListQueryService({} as Db);
+}
+
+function makeDbService() {
+  if (!dbHandle) {
+    throw new Error('test DB not initialized');
+  }
+  return new FederationListQueryService(dbHandle.db);
+}
+
+async function seedNotesFixture() {
+  if (!dbHandle) {
+    throw new Error('test DB not initialized');
+  }
+
+  await dbHandle.db.insert(users).values([
+    {
+      id: SUBJECT_USER_ID,
+      name: 'Federation Subject',
+      email: `${SUBJECT_USER_ID}@example.test`,
+      emailVerified: false,
+    },
+    {
+      id: OTHER_USER_ID,
+      name: 'Federation Other',
+      email: `${OTHER_USER_ID}@example.test`,
+      emailVerified: false,
+    },
+  ]);
+
+  await dbHandle.db.insert(teams).values([
+    {
+      id: TEAM_ID,
+      name: 'FED-M3-05 Team',
+      slug: 'fed-m3-05-team',
+      ownerId: SUBJECT_USER_ID,
+      managerId: SUBJECT_USER_ID,
+    },
+    {
+      id: UNAUTHORIZED_TEAM_ID,
+      name: 'FED-M3-05 Unauthorized Team',
+      slug: 'fed-m3-05-unauthorized-team',
+      ownerId: OTHER_USER_ID,
+      managerId: OTHER_USER_ID,
+    },
+  ]);
+
+  await dbHandle.db.insert(projects).values([
+    {
+      id: PERSONAL_PROJECT_ID,
+      name: 'FED-M3-05 Personal Project',
+      ownerId: SUBJECT_USER_ID,
+      ownerType: 'user',
+    },
+    {
+      id: TEAM_PROJECT_ID,
+      name: 'FED-M3-05 Team Project',
+      teamId: TEAM_ID,
+      ownerType: 'team',
+    },
+    {
+      id: UNAUTHORIZED_PROJECT_ID,
+      name: 'FED-M3-05 Unauthorized Project',
+      teamId: UNAUTHORIZED_TEAM_ID,
+      ownerType: 'team',
+    },
+  ]);
+
+  await dbHandle.db.insert(missions).values([
+    {
+      id: PERSONAL_MISSION_ID,
+      name: 'FED-M3-05 Personal Mission',
+      projectId: PERSONAL_PROJECT_ID,
+      userId: SUBJECT_USER_ID,
+    },
+    {
+      id: TEAM_MISSION_ID,
+      name: 'FED-M3-05 Team Mission',
+      projectId: TEAM_PROJECT_ID,
+      userId: SUBJECT_USER_ID,
+    },
+    {
+      id: UNAUTHORIZED_MISSION_ID,
+      name: 'FED-M3-05 Unauthorized Mission',
+      projectId: UNAUTHORIZED_PROJECT_ID,
+      userId: SUBJECT_USER_ID,
+    },
+  ]);
+
+  await dbHandle.db.insert(missionTasks).values([
+    {
+      id: SUBJECT_TEAM_NOTE_ID,
+      missionId: TEAM_MISSION_ID,
+      userId: SUBJECT_USER_ID,
+      notes: 'subject note on team mission',
+      createdAt: new Date('2026-06-24T03:00:00.000Z'),
+      updatedAt: new Date('2026-06-24T03:00:00.000Z'),
+    },
+    {
+      id: OTHER_TEAM_NOTE_ID,
+      missionId: TEAM_MISSION_ID,
+      userId: OTHER_USER_ID,
+      notes: 'other user note on team mission',
+      createdAt: new Date('2026-06-24T02:00:00.000Z'),
+      updatedAt: new Date('2026-06-24T02:00:00.000Z'),
+    },
+    {
+      id: SUBJECT_PERSONAL_NOTE_ID,
+      missionId: PERSONAL_MISSION_ID,
+      userId: SUBJECT_USER_ID,
+      notes: 'subject note on personal mission',
+      createdAt: new Date('2026-06-24T01:00:00.000Z'),
+      updatedAt: new Date('2026-06-24T01:00:00.000Z'),
+    },
+    {
+      id: SUBJECT_UNAUTHORIZED_NOTE_ID,
+      missionId: UNAUTHORIZED_MISSION_ID,
+      userId: SUBJECT_USER_ID,
+      notes: 'subject note outside grant-visible missions',
+      createdAt: new Date('2026-06-24T04:00:00.000Z'),
+      updatedAt: new Date('2026-06-24T04:00:00.000Z'),
+    },
+  ]);
+
+  const memoryCreatedAt = new Date('2026-06-24T05:00:00.000Z');
+  await dbHandle.db.insert(insights).values([
+    {
+      id: INSIGHT_ONE_ID,
+      userId: SUBJECT_USER_ID,
+      content: 'first insight',
+      source: 'agent',
+      createdAt: memoryCreatedAt,
+      updatedAt: memoryCreatedAt,
+    },
+    {
+      id: INSIGHT_TWO_ID,
+      userId: SUBJECT_USER_ID,
+      content: 'second insight',
+      source: 'agent',
+      createdAt: memoryCreatedAt,
+      updatedAt: memoryCreatedAt,
+    },
+  ]);
+
+  await dbHandle.db.insert(preferences).values([
+    {
+      id: PREFERENCE_ONE_ID,
+      userId: SUBJECT_USER_ID,
+      key: 'fed-m3-05-pref-1',
+      value: { enabled: true },
+      createdAt: memoryCreatedAt,
+      updatedAt: memoryCreatedAt,
+    },
+    {
+      id: PREFERENCE_TWO_ID,
+      userId: SUBJECT_USER_ID,
+      key: 'fed-m3-05-pref-2',
+      value: { enabled: false },
+      createdAt: memoryCreatedAt,
+      updatedAt: memoryCreatedAt,
+    },
+  ]);
+}
+
+function stubRows(
+  service: FederationListQueryService,
+  ...pages: Array<Array<Record<string, unknown>>>
+) {
+  const mock = vi.fn();
+  for (const page of pages) {
+    mock.mockResolvedValueOnce(page);
+  }
+  (
+    service as unknown as {
+      listAllRows: (
+        _filter: FederationScopeQueryFilter,
+        _rowLimit: number,
+        _cursor: unknown,
+      ) => Promise<Array<Record<string, unknown>>>;
+    }
+  ).listAllRows = mock;
+  return mock;
+}
+
+describe('FederationListQueryService', () => {
+  beforeAll(async () => {
+    dbHandle = createPgliteDb(`memory://fed-m3-05-list-${Date.now()}`);
+    await runPgliteMigrations(dbHandle);
+    await seedNotesFixture();
+  });
+
+  afterAll(async () => {
+    await dbHandle?.close();
+    dbHandle = undefined;
+  });
+
+  it('denies sensitive resources in native RBAC for M3 list reads', async () => {
+    const service = makeService();
+
+    await expect(
+      service.evaluateReadAccess({
+        grantId: 'grant-1',
+        peerId: 'peer-1',
+        subjectUserId: 'user-1',
+        resource: 'credentials',
+      }),
+    ).resolves.toMatchObject({
+      allowed: false,
+      reason: 'credentials federation list access is not implemented in M3',
+    });
+  });
+
+  it('allows personal memory reads without requiring team lookup', async () => {
+    const service = makeService();
+
+    await expect(
+      service.evaluateReadAccess({
+        grantId: 'grant-1',
+        peerId: 'peer-1',
+        subjectUserId: 'user-1',
+        resource: 'memory',
+      }),
+    ).resolves.toEqual({
+      allowed: true,
+      access: { includePersonal: true, teamIds: [] },
+    });
+  });
+
+  it('applies the scope row cap and returns an opaque next cursor when truncated', async () => {
+    const service = makeService();
+    const listAllRows = stubRows(
+      service,
+      [
+        { id: '3', createdAt: new Date('2026-06-24T03:00:00.000Z') },
+        { id: '2', createdAt: new Date('2026-06-24T02:00:00.000Z') },
+        { id: '1', createdAt: new Date('2026-06-24T01:00:00.000Z') },
+      ],
+      [{ id: '1', createdAt: new Date('2026-06-24T01:00:00.000Z') }],
+    );
+
+    const firstPage = await service.list({ filter: TASK_FILTER });
+
+    expect(firstPage).toEqual({
+      items: [
+        { id: '3', createdAt: new Date('2026-06-24T03:00:00.000Z') },
+        { id: '2', createdAt: new Date('2026-06-24T02:00:00.000Z') },
+      ],
+      truncated: true,
+      nextCursor: expect.any(String),
+    });
+
+    expect(listAllRows).toHaveBeenNthCalledWith(1, TASK_FILTER, 3, undefined);
+
+    const secondPage = await service.list({ filter: TASK_FILTER, cursor: firstPage.nextCursor });
+    expect(secondPage).toEqual({
+      items: [{ id: '1', createdAt: new Date('2026-06-24T01:00:00.000Z') }],
+      truncated: false,
+    });
+    expect(listAllRows).toHaveBeenNthCalledWith(
+      2,
+      TASK_FILTER,
+      3,
+      expect.objectContaining({ id: '2' }),
+    );
+  });
+
+  it('rejects invalid cursors instead of falling back to the first page', async () => {
+    const service = makeService();
+    stubRows(service, [{ id: '1' }]);
+
+    await expect(service.list({ filter: TASK_FILTER, cursor: 'not-base64-json' })).rejects.toThrow(
+      'Invalid federation list cursor',
+    );
+  });
+
+  it('throws when a truncated page cannot encode a resumable cursor', async () => {
+    const service = makeService();
+    stubRows(service, [
+      { id: '2', createdAt: 'not-a-date' },
+      { id: '1', createdAt: 'not-a-date' },
+    ]);
+
+    await expect(service.list({ filter: { ...TASK_FILTER, limit: 1 } })).rejects.toThrow(
+      'Federation list cursor cannot be encoded',
+    );
+  });
+
+  it('throws on unsupported resources instead of crashing pagination', async () => {
+    const service = makeService();
+
+    await expect(
+      service.list({
+        filter: {
+          ...TASK_FILTER,
+          resource: 'unknown-resource' as FederationScopeQueryFilter['resource'],
+        },
+      }),
+    ).rejects.toThrow('Unsupported federation list resource');
+  });
+
+  it('does not leak another user mission task notes through team-scoped note reads', async () => {
+    const service = makeDbService();
+
+    const result = await service.list({
+      filter: {
+        resource: 'notes',
+        subjectUserId: SUBJECT_USER_ID,
+        includePersonal: false,
+        teamIds: [TEAM_ID],
+        limit: 10,
+        maxRowsPerQuery: 10,
+      },
+    });
+
+    const ids = result.items.map((item) => item['id']);
+    expect(ids).toEqual([SUBJECT_TEAM_NOTE_ID]);
+    expect(ids).not.toContain(OTHER_TEAM_NOTE_ID);
+  });
+
+  it('does not return subject personal mission task notes when includePersonal is false', async () => {
+    const service = makeDbService();
+
+    const result = await service.list({
+      filter: {
+        resource: 'notes',
+        subjectUserId: SUBJECT_USER_ID,
+        includePersonal: false,
+        teamIds: [TEAM_ID],
+        limit: 10,
+        maxRowsPerQuery: 10,
+      },
+    });
+
+    expect(result.items.map((item) => item['id'])).not.toContain(SUBJECT_PERSONAL_NOTE_ID);
+  });
+
+  it('does not return subject notes from missions outside the grant-visible project set', async () => {
+    const service = makeDbService();
+
+    const result = await service.list({
+      filter: {
+        resource: 'notes',
+        subjectUserId: SUBJECT_USER_ID,
+        includePersonal: true,
+        teamIds: [TEAM_ID],
+        limit: 10,
+        maxRowsPerQuery: 10,
+      },
+    });
+
+    const ids = result.items.map((item) => item['id']);
+    expect(ids).toContain(SUBJECT_PERSONAL_NOTE_ID);
+    expect(ids).toContain(SUBJECT_TEAM_NOTE_ID);
+    expect(ids).not.toContain(SUBJECT_UNAUTHORIZED_NOTE_ID);
+    expect(ids).not.toContain(OTHER_TEAM_NOTE_ID);
+  });
+
+  it('paginates memory deterministically across insights and preferences', async () => {
+    const service = makeDbService();
+    const filter: FederationScopeQueryFilter = {
+      resource: 'memory',
+      subjectUserId: SUBJECT_USER_ID,
+      includePersonal: true,
+      teamIds: [],
+      limit: 2,
+      maxRowsPerQuery: 2,
+    };
+
+    const firstPage = await service.list({ filter });
+    const secondPage = await service.list({ filter, cursor: firstPage.nextCursor });
+    const firstPageIds = firstPage.items.map((item) => item['id']);
+    const secondPageIds = secondPage.items.map((item) => item['id']);
+    const allIds = [...firstPageIds, ...secondPageIds];
+
+    expect(firstPage).toMatchObject({ truncated: true, nextCursor: expect.any(String) });
+    expect(firstPageIds).toEqual([INSIGHT_TWO_ID, INSIGHT_ONE_ID]);
+    expect(secondPageIds).toEqual([PREFERENCE_TWO_ID, PREFERENCE_ONE_ID]);
+    expect(new Set(allIds).size).toBe(allIds.length);
+  });
+});

apps/gateway/src/federation/server/verbs/__tests__/list.controller.spec.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,188 @@
+import 'reflect-metadata';
+import { RequestMethod } from '@nestjs/common';
+import type { FastifyRequest } from 'fastify';
+import { beforeEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest';
+import { FederationAuthGuard } from '../../federation-auth.guard.js';
+import type {
+  FederationScopeEvaluationResult,
+  FederationScopeQueryFilter,
+} from '../../scope.service.js';
+import { ListController } from '../list.controller.js';
+import type { FederationListQueryResult } from '../list-query.service.js';
+
+const FEDERATION_CONTEXT = {
+  grantId: 'grant-1',
+  peerId: 'peer-1',
+  subjectUserId: 'user-1',
+  scope: { resources: ['tasks'], max_rows_per_query: 25 },
+};
+
+const TASK_FILTER: FederationScopeQueryFilter = {
+  resource: 'tasks',
+  subjectUserId: 'user-1',
+  includePersonal: true,
+  teamIds: ['team-1'],
+  limit: 10,
+  maxRowsPerQuery: 25,
+};
+
+function makeRequest(): FastifyRequest {
+  return { federationContext: FEDERATION_CONTEXT } as unknown as FastifyRequest;
+}
+
+function allowedScope(
+  filter: FederationScopeQueryFilter = TASK_FILTER,
+): FederationScopeEvaluationResult {
+  return { allowed: true, filter };
+}
+
+function makeController(opts?: {
+  scopeResult?: FederationScopeEvaluationResult;
+  queryResult?: FederationListQueryResult;
+}) {
+  const scope = {
+    evaluateAccess: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(opts?.scopeResult ?? allowedScope()),
+  };
+  const query = {
+    evaluateReadAccess: vi.fn(),
+    list: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(
+      opts?.queryResult ?? {
+        items: [
+          {
+            id: 'task-1',
+            title: 'Federated task',
+            createdAt: new Date('2026-06-24T00:00:00.000Z'),
+          },
+        ],
+        truncated: false,
+      },
+    ),
+  };
+
+  return {
+    controller: new ListController(scope as never, query as never),
+    scope,
+    query,
+  };
+}
+
+describe('ListController', () => {
+  beforeEach(() => {
+    vi.clearAllMocks();
+  });
+
+  it('declares POST /api/federation/v1/list/:resource protected only by FederationAuthGuard', () => {
+    expect(Reflect.getMetadata('path', ListController)).toBe('api/federation/v1/list');
+    expect(Reflect.getMetadata('path', ListController.prototype.list)).toBe(':resource');
+    expect(Reflect.getMetadata('method', ListController.prototype.list)).toBe(RequestMethod.POST);
+    expect(Reflect.getMetadata('__guards__', ListController)).toEqual([FederationAuthGuard]);
+  });
+
+  it('runs AuthGuard context through ScopeService and returns local-source tagged rows', async () => {
+    const { controller, scope, query } = makeController();
+
+    const response = await controller.list('tasks', makeRequest(), { limit: 10 });
+
+    expect(scope.evaluateAccess).toHaveBeenCalledWith({
+      context: FEDERATION_CONTEXT,
+      resource: 'tasks',
+      requestedLimit: 10,
+      nativeRbac: query,
+    });
+    expect(query.list).toHaveBeenCalledWith({ filter: TASK_FILTER, cursor: undefined });
+    expect(response).toEqual({
+      items: [
+        {
+          id: 'task-1',
+          title: 'Federated task',
+          createdAt: new Date('2026-06-24T00:00:00.000Z'),
+          _source: 'local',
+        },
+      ],
+    });
+  });
+
+  it('preserves pagination metadata when row cap truncates the query layer result', async () => {
+    const { controller } = makeController({
+      queryResult: {
+        items: [{ id: 'task-1' }],
+        nextCursor: 'cursor-2',
+        truncated: true,
+      },
+    });
+
+    const response = await controller.list('tasks', makeRequest(), { cursor: 'cursor-1' });
+
+    expect(response).toEqual({
+      items: [{ id: 'task-1', _source: 'local' }],
+      nextCursor: 'cursor-2',
+      _truncated: true,
+    });
+  });
+
+  it('returns a federation error envelope when auth guard context is missing', async () => {
+    const { controller, scope, query } = makeController();
+
+    await expect(
+      controller.list('tasks', {} as unknown as FastifyRequest, {}),
+    ).rejects.toMatchObject({
+      response: {
+        error: {
+          code: 'unauthorized',
+          message: 'Federation context missing',
+        },
+      },
+      status: 401,
+    });
+    expect(scope.evaluateAccess).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+    expect(query.list).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+  });
+
+  it('returns a federation error envelope when scope evaluation denies access', async () => {
+    const { controller, query } = makeController({
+      scopeResult: {
+        allowed: false,
+        deny: {
+          code: 'resource_excluded',
+          stage: 'resource_exclusion',
+          statusCode: 403,
+          message: 'Requested federation resource is explicitly excluded by grant scope',
+          grantId: 'grant-1',
+          peerId: 'peer-1',
+          subjectUserId: 'user-1',
+          resource: 'credentials',
+        },
+      },
+    });
+
+    await expect(controller.list('credentials', makeRequest(), {})).rejects.toMatchObject({
+      response: {
+        error: {
+          code: 'scope_violation',
+          message: 'Requested federation resource is explicitly excluded by grant scope',
+        },
+      },
+      status: 403,
+    });
+    expect(query.list).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+  });
+
+  it('rejects malformed request body fields before querying storage', async () => {
+    const { controller, scope, query } = makeController();
+
+    await expect(controller.list('tasks', makeRequest(), { cursor: 123 })).rejects.toMatchObject({
+      response: { error: { code: 'invalid_request' } },
+      status: 400,
+    });
+    await expect(controller.list('tasks', makeRequest(), { limit: false })).rejects.toMatchObject({
+      response: { error: { code: 'invalid_request' } },
+      status: 400,
+    });
+    await expect(controller.list('tasks', makeRequest(), { limit: 'abc' })).rejects.toMatchObject({
+      response: { error: { code: 'invalid_request' } },
+      status: 400,
+    });
+    expect(scope.evaluateAccess).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+    expect(query.list).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+  });
+});

apps/gateway/src/federation/server/verbs/capabilities.controller.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+/**
+ * Federation capabilities verb (FED-M3-07).
+ *
+ * Returns the read-only capability envelope for the active grant attached by
+ * FederationAuthGuard. This endpoint intentionally does not invoke native RBAC
+ * or ScopeService: an active grant is enough to ask what the grant allows.
+ */
+
+import { Controller, Get, Req, UseGuards } from '@nestjs/common';
+import type { FastifyRequest } from 'fastify';
+import {
+  FEDERATION_VERBS,
+  type FederationCapabilitiesResponse,
+  type FederationVerb,
+} from '@mosaicstack/types';
+import { parseFederationScope } from '../../scope-schema.js';
+import { FederationAuthGuard } from '../federation-auth.guard.js';
+import '../federation-context.js';
+
+@Controller('api/federation/v1/capabilities')
+@UseGuards(FederationAuthGuard)
+export class CapabilitiesController {
+  @Get()
+  getCapabilities(@Req() request: FastifyRequest): FederationCapabilitiesResponse {
+    if (!request.federationContext) {
+      throw new Error('Federation context missing after auth guard');
+    }
+
+    const scope = parseFederationScope(request.federationContext.scope);
+
+    return {
+      resources: [...scope.resources],
+      excluded_resources: [...scope.excluded_resources],
+      max_rows_per_query: scope.max_rows_per_query,
+      supported_verbs: [...FEDERATION_VERBS] satisfies FederationVerb[],
+    };
+  }
+}

apps/gateway/src/federation/server/verbs/list-query.service.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,408 @@
+/**
+ * Federation list query layer (FED-M3-05).
+ *
+ * Read-only DB adapter used by ListController after FederationAuthGuard and
+ * FederationScopeService have established the subject user, allowed resource,
+ * native-RBAC intersection, and row cap. Audit writes are intentionally
+ * deferred to M4.
+ */
+
+import { Inject, Injectable } from '@nestjs/common';
+import {
+  and,
+  desc,
+  eq,
+  inArray,
+  insights,
+  isNotNull,
+  lt,
+  missionTasks,
+  missions,
+  or,
+  preferences,
+  projects,
+  tasks,
+  teamMembers,
+  type Db,
+} from '@mosaicstack/db';
+import type {
+  FederationNativeRbacEvaluator,
+  FederationNativeRbacRequest,
+  FederationNativeRbacResult,
+  FederationScopeQueryFilter,
+} from '../scope.service.js';
+import { DB } from '../../../database/database.module.js';
+
+export interface FederationListQueryRequest {
+  readonly filter: FederationScopeQueryFilter;
+  readonly cursor?: string;
+}
+
+export interface FederationListQueryResult<T extends object = Record<string, unknown>> {
+  readonly items: T[];
+  readonly nextCursor?: string;
+  readonly truncated: boolean;
+}
+
+type CursorSource = 'insights' | 'preferences';
+const CURSOR_SOURCE = Symbol('federationCursorSource');
+
+type RowObject = Record<string, unknown> & { readonly [CURSOR_SOURCE]?: CursorSource };
+
+interface KeysetCursor {
+  readonly createdAt: Date;
+  readonly id: string;
+  readonly source?: CursorSource;
+}
+
+function encodeCursor(row: RowObject): string {
+  const createdAt = row['createdAt'];
+  const id = row['id'];
+  if (!(createdAt instanceof Date) || typeof id !== 'string') {
+    throw new Error('Federation list cursor cannot be encoded');
+  }
+
+  const source = row[CURSOR_SOURCE];
+  return Buffer.from(
+    JSON.stringify({ createdAt: createdAt.toISOString(), id, ...(source ? { source } : {}) }),
+    'utf8',
+  ).toString('base64url');
+}
+
+function decodeCursor(cursor: string | undefined): KeysetCursor | undefined {
+  if (cursor === undefined) {
+    return undefined;
+  }
+
+  try {
+    const parsed = JSON.parse(Buffer.from(cursor, 'base64url').toString('utf8')) as unknown;
+    if (typeof parsed !== 'object' || parsed === null) {
+      throw new Error('cursor must be an object');
+    }
+
+    const { createdAt, id, source } = parsed as {
+      createdAt?: unknown;
+      id?: unknown;
+      source?: unknown;
+    };
+    if (typeof createdAt !== 'string' || typeof id !== 'string' || id.length === 0) {
+      throw new Error('cursor is missing createdAt or id');
+    }
+    if (source !== undefined && source !== 'insights' && source !== 'preferences') {
+      throw new Error('cursor source is invalid');
+    }
+
+    const date = new Date(createdAt);
+    if (Number.isNaN(date.getTime())) {
+      throw new Error('cursor createdAt is invalid');
+    }
+
+    return { createdAt: date, id, ...(source ? { source } : {}) };
+  } catch {
+    throw new Error('Invalid federation list cursor');
+  }
+}
+
+function paginate<T extends RowObject>(rows: T[], limit: number): FederationListQueryResult<T> {
+  const page = rows.slice(0, limit);
+  const hasMore = rows.length > limit;
+  const nextCursor = hasMore ? encodeCursor(page[page.length - 1] ?? {}) : undefined;
+
+  return {
+    items: page,
+    truncated: hasMore,
+    ...(nextCursor !== undefined ? { nextCursor } : {}),
+  };
+}
+
+function markCursorSource<T extends RowObject>(row: T, source: CursorSource): T {
+  Object.defineProperty(row, CURSOR_SOURCE, {
+    value: source,
+    enumerable: false,
+    configurable: false,
+  });
+  return row;
+}
+
+function sortRows(rows: RowObject[]): RowObject[] {
+  return [...rows].sort((a, b) => {
+    const aTime = a['createdAt'] instanceof Date ? a['createdAt'].getTime() : 0;
+    const bTime = b['createdAt'] instanceof Date ? b['createdAt'].getTime() : 0;
+    if (aTime !== bTime) {
+      return bTime - aTime;
+    }
+    return String(b['id'] ?? '').localeCompare(String(a['id'] ?? ''));
+  });
+}
+
+@Injectable()
+export class FederationListQueryService implements FederationNativeRbacEvaluator {
+  constructor(@Inject(DB) private readonly db: Db) {}
+
+  async evaluateReadAccess(
+    request: FederationNativeRbacRequest,
+  ): Promise<FederationNativeRbacResult> {
+    if (request.resource === 'credentials' || request.resource === 'api_keys') {
+      return {
+        allowed: false,
+        reason: `${request.resource} federation list access is not implemented in M3`,
+        details: { resource: request.resource },
+      };
+    }
+
+    if (request.resource === 'memory') {
+      return { allowed: true, access: { includePersonal: true, teamIds: [] } };
+    }
+
+    const teamIds = await this.listSubjectTeamIds(request.subjectUserId);
+    return { allowed: true, access: { includePersonal: true, teamIds } };
+  }
+
+  async list<T extends RowObject = RowObject>(
+    request: FederationListQueryRequest,
+  ): Promise<FederationListQueryResult<T>> {
+    const cursor = decodeCursor(request.cursor);
+    const rows = await this.listAllRows(request.filter, request.filter.limit + 1, cursor);
+    return paginate(rows as T[], request.filter.limit);
+  }
+
+  private async listAllRows(
+    filter: FederationScopeQueryFilter,
+    rowLimit: number,
+    cursor: KeysetCursor | undefined,
+  ): Promise<RowObject[]> {
+    switch (filter.resource) {
+      case 'tasks':
+        return this.listTasks(filter, rowLimit, cursor);
+      case 'notes':
+        return this.listNotes(filter, rowLimit, cursor);
+      case 'memory':
+        return this.listMemory(filter, rowLimit, cursor);
+      case 'credentials':
+      case 'api_keys':
+        return [];
+      default:
+        throw new Error(`Unsupported federation list resource: ${String(filter.resource)}`);
+    }
+  }
+
+  private async listSubjectTeamIds(subjectUserId: string): Promise<string[]> {
+    const rows = await this.db
+      .select({ teamId: teamMembers.teamId })
+      .from(teamMembers)
+      .where(eq(teamMembers.userId, subjectUserId));
+
+    return rows.map((row) => row.teamId);
+  }
+
+  private async listAccessibleProjectIds(filter: FederationScopeQueryFilter): Promise<string[]> {
+    const clauses = [];
+    if (filter.includePersonal) {
+      clauses.push(and(eq(projects.ownerType, 'user'), eq(projects.ownerId, filter.subjectUserId)));
+    }
+    if (filter.teamIds.length > 0) {
+      clauses.push(
+        and(eq(projects.ownerType, 'team'), inArray(projects.teamId, [...filter.teamIds])),
+      );
+    }
+
+    if (clauses.length === 0) {
+      return [];
+    }
+
+    const rows = await this.db
+      .select({ id: projects.id })
+      .from(projects)
+      .where(clauses.length === 1 ? clauses[0] : or(...clauses));
+
+    return rows.map((row) => row.id);
+  }
+
+  private async listMissionIds(projectIds: readonly string[]): Promise<string[]> {
+    if (projectIds.length === 0) {
+      return [];
+    }
+
+    const rows = await this.db
+      .select({ id: missions.id })
+      .from(missions)
+      .where(inArray(missions.projectId, [...projectIds]));
+
+    return rows.map((row) => row.id);
+  }
+
+  private async listTasks(
+    filter: FederationScopeQueryFilter,
+    rowLimit: number,
+    cursor: KeysetCursor | undefined,
+  ): Promise<RowObject[]> {
+    const projectIds = await this.listAccessibleProjectIds(filter);
+    const missionIds = await this.listMissionIds(projectIds);
+    const clauses = [];
+
+    if (projectIds.length > 0) {
+      clauses.push(inArray(tasks.projectId, projectIds));
+    }
+    if (missionIds.length > 0) {
+      clauses.push(inArray(tasks.missionId, missionIds));
+    }
+
+    if (clauses.length === 0) {
+      return [];
+    }
+
+    const scopeClause = clauses.length === 1 ? clauses[0] : or(...clauses);
+    const cursorClause = cursor
+      ? or(
+          lt(tasks.createdAt, cursor.createdAt),
+          and(eq(tasks.createdAt, cursor.createdAt), lt(tasks.id, cursor.id)),
+        )
+      : undefined;
+
+    const rows = await this.db
+      .select({
+        id: tasks.id,
+        title: tasks.title,
+        description: tasks.description,
+        status: tasks.status,
+        priority: tasks.priority,
+        projectId: tasks.projectId,
+        missionId: tasks.missionId,
+        assignee: tasks.assignee,
+        tags: tasks.tags,
+        dueDate: tasks.dueDate,
+        metadata: tasks.metadata,
+        createdAt: tasks.createdAt,
+        updatedAt: tasks.updatedAt,
+      })
+      .from(tasks)
+      .where(and(scopeClause, cursorClause))
+      .orderBy(desc(tasks.createdAt), desc(tasks.id))
+      .limit(rowLimit);
+
+    return sortRows(rows as RowObject[]);
+  }
+
+  private async listNotes(
+    filter: FederationScopeQueryFilter,
+    rowLimit: number,
+    cursor: KeysetCursor | undefined,
+  ): Promise<RowObject[]> {
+    const projectIds = await this.listAccessibleProjectIds(filter);
+    const missionIds = await this.listMissionIds(projectIds);
+
+    if (missionIds.length === 0) {
+      return [];
+    }
+
+    // mission_tasks rows are user-scoped even when the mission belongs to a team.
+    // Team visibility can narrow the mission set, but it must never widen the
+    // query to other users' mission task notes.
+    const scopeClause = and(
+      eq(missionTasks.userId, filter.subjectUserId),
+      inArray(missionTasks.missionId, missionIds),
+    );
+    const cursorClause = cursor
+      ? or(
+          lt(missionTasks.createdAt, cursor.createdAt),
+          and(eq(missionTasks.createdAt, cursor.createdAt), lt(missionTasks.id, cursor.id)),
+        )
+      : undefined;
+
+    const rows = await this.db
+      .select({
+        id: missionTasks.id,
+        missionId: missionTasks.missionId,
+        taskId: missionTasks.taskId,
+        status: missionTasks.status,
+        content: missionTasks.notes,
+        createdAt: missionTasks.createdAt,
+        updatedAt: missionTasks.updatedAt,
+      })
+      .from(missionTasks)
+      .where(and(scopeClause, cursorClause, isNotNull(missionTasks.notes)))
+      .orderBy(desc(missionTasks.createdAt), desc(missionTasks.id))
+      .limit(rowLimit);
+
+    return sortRows(rows.filter((row) => row.content !== '') as RowObject[]);
+  }
+
+  private async listMemory(
+    filter: FederationScopeQueryFilter,
+    rowLimit: number,
+    cursor: KeysetCursor | undefined,
+  ): Promise<RowObject[]> {
+    if (!filter.includePersonal) {
+      return [];
+    }
+    if (cursor && cursor.source === undefined) {
+      throw new Error('Invalid federation list cursor');
+    }
+
+    const rows: RowObject[] = [];
+
+    // Memory spans two physical tables. To keep pagination deterministic and
+    // resumable without a SQL UNION, M3 emits a fixed block order: all insights
+    // first, then preferences. The opaque cursor records which table produced
+    // the boundary row, so the next page never re-applies one table's keyset to
+    // the other table (which could duplicate/skip rows at equal timestamps).
+    if (cursor?.source !== 'preferences') {
+      const insightCursorClause = cursor
+        ? or(
+            lt(insights.createdAt, cursor.createdAt),
+            and(eq(insights.createdAt, cursor.createdAt), lt(insights.id, cursor.id)),
+          )
+        : undefined;
+      const insightRows = await this.db
+        .select({
+          id: insights.id,
+          kind: insights.source,
+          content: insights.content,
+          category: insights.category,
+          relevanceScore: insights.relevanceScore,
+          metadata: insights.metadata,
+          createdAt: insights.createdAt,
+          updatedAt: insights.updatedAt,
+        })
+        .from(insights)
+        .where(and(eq(insights.userId, filter.subjectUserId), insightCursorClause))
+        .orderBy(desc(insights.createdAt), desc(insights.id))
+        .limit(rowLimit);
+
+      rows.push(...(insightRows as RowObject[]).map((row) => markCursorSource(row, 'insights')));
+    }
+
+    const remaining = rowLimit - rows.length;
+    if (remaining <= 0) {
+      return rows;
+    }
+
+    const preferenceCursorClause =
+      cursor?.source === 'preferences'
+        ? or(
+            lt(preferences.createdAt, cursor.createdAt),
+            and(eq(preferences.createdAt, cursor.createdAt), lt(preferences.id, cursor.id)),
+          )
+        : undefined;
+    const preferenceRows = await this.db
+      .select({
+        id: preferences.id,
+        kind: preferences.category,
+        key: preferences.key,
+        value: preferences.value,
+        source: preferences.source,
+        mutable: preferences.mutable,
+        createdAt: preferences.createdAt,
+        updatedAt: preferences.updatedAt,
+      })
+      .from(preferences)
+      .where(and(eq(preferences.userId, filter.subjectUserId), preferenceCursorClause))
+      .orderBy(desc(preferences.createdAt), desc(preferences.id))
+      .limit(remaining);
+
+    rows.push(
+      ...(preferenceRows as RowObject[]).map((row) => markCursorSource(row, 'preferences')),
+    );
+    return rows;
+  }
+}

apps/gateway/src/federation/server/verbs/list.controller.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,147 @@
+/**
+ * Federation list verb (FED-M3-05).
+ *
+ * POST /api/federation/v1/list/:resource
+ *
+ * Pipeline: FederationAuthGuard attaches the active grant context, then
+ * FederationScopeService enforces grant scope + native RBAC intersection, then
+ * the read-only query layer returns capped rows tagged with `_source`. Read
+ * audit-log writes are deferred to M4; this controller does not persist request
+ * or response bodies.
+ */
+
+import {
+  Body,
+  Controller,
+  HttpException,
+  Inject,
+  Param,
+  Post,
+  Req,
+  UseGuards,
+} from '@nestjs/common';
+import type { FastifyRequest } from 'fastify';
+import {
+  FederationInvalidRequestError,
+  FederationScopeViolationError,
+  FederationUnauthorizedError,
+  SOURCE_LOCAL,
+  tagWithSource,
+  type FederationListResponse,
+  type SourceTag,
+} from '@mosaicstack/types';
+import { FederationAuthGuard } from '../federation-auth.guard.js';
+import '../federation-context.js';
+import { FederationScopeService } from '../scope.service.js';
+import { FederationListQueryService } from './list-query.service.js';
+
+interface FederationListRequestBody {
+  readonly limit?: unknown;
+  readonly cursor?: unknown;
+}
+
+type FederatedRow = Record<string, unknown> & SourceTag;
+
+function parseLimit(body: FederationListRequestBody | undefined): number | undefined {
+  if (body?.limit === undefined) {
+    return undefined;
+  }
+
+  const parsed =
+    typeof body.limit === 'number'
+      ? body.limit
+      : typeof body.limit === 'string' && body.limit.trim().length > 0
+        ? Number(body.limit)
+        : Number.NaN;
+
+  if (!Number.isSafeInteger(parsed) || parsed < 1) {
+    throw new HttpException(
+      new FederationInvalidRequestError(
+        'Federation list limit must be a positive integer',
+      ).toEnvelope(),
+      400,
+    );
+  }
+
+  return parsed;
+}
+
+function parseCursor(body: FederationListRequestBody | undefined): string | undefined {
+  if (body?.cursor === undefined) {
+    return undefined;
+  }
+  if (typeof body.cursor === 'string') {
+    return body.cursor;
+  }
+  throw new HttpException(
+    new FederationInvalidRequestError('Federation list cursor must be a string').toEnvelope(),
+    400,
+  );
+}
+
+@Controller('api/federation/v1/list')
+@UseGuards(FederationAuthGuard)
+export class ListController {
+  constructor(
+    @Inject(FederationScopeService) private readonly scope: FederationScopeService,
+    @Inject(FederationListQueryService) private readonly query: FederationListQueryService,
+  ) {}
+
+  @Post(':resource')
+  async list(
+    @Param('resource') resource: string,
+    @Req() request: FastifyRequest,
+    @Body() body?: FederationListRequestBody,
+  ): Promise<FederationListResponse<FederatedRow>> {
+    if (!request.federationContext) {
+      throw new HttpException(
+        new FederationUnauthorizedError('Federation context missing').toEnvelope(),
+        401,
+      );
+    }
+
+    const requestedLimit = parseLimit(body);
+    const cursor = parseCursor(body);
+    const scopeResult = await this.scope.evaluateAccess({
+      context: request.federationContext,
+      resource,
+      requestedLimit,
+      nativeRbac: this.query,
+    });
+
+    if (!scopeResult.allowed) {
+      const ErrorClass =
+        scopeResult.deny.statusCode === 400
+          ? FederationInvalidRequestError
+          : FederationScopeViolationError;
+      throw new HttpException(
+        new ErrorClass(scopeResult.deny.message, scopeResult.deny).toEnvelope(),
+        scopeResult.deny.statusCode,
+      );
+    }
+
+    let result: Awaited<ReturnType<FederationListQueryService['list']>>;
+    try {
+      result = await this.query.list({ filter: scopeResult.filter, cursor });
+    } catch (error: unknown) {
+      if (error instanceof Error && error.message === 'Invalid federation list cursor') {
+        throw new HttpException(
+          new FederationInvalidRequestError('Federation list cursor is invalid').toEnvelope(),
+          400,
+        );
+      }
+      throw error;
+    }
+
+    const response: FederationListResponse<FederatedRow> = {
+      items: tagWithSource(result.items, SOURCE_LOCAL),
+    };
+    if (result.nextCursor !== undefined) {
+      response.nextCursor = result.nextCursor;
+    }
+    if (result.truncated) {
+      response._truncated = true;
+    }
+    return response;
+  }
+}

docs/MISSION-MANIFEST.md

@@ -67,10 +67,11 @@ The MVP is complete when ALL declared workstreams are complete AND every cross-c
 
 ## Workstreams
 
-| #   | ID  | Name                                        | Status            | Manifest                                                                | Notes                                               |
-| --- | --- | ------------------------------------------- | ----------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------- | --------------------------------------------------- |
-| W1  | FED | Federation v1                               | planning-complete | [docs/federation/MISSION-MANIFEST.md](./federation/MISSION-MANIFEST.md) | 7 milestones, ~175K tokens, issues #460–#466 filed  |
-| W2+ | TBD | (additional workstreams declared as scoped) | —                 | —                                                                       | Scope creep is expected and explicitly accommodated |
+| #   | ID   | Name                                        | Status            | Manifest                                                                | Notes                                               |
+| --- | ---- | ------------------------------------------- | ----------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------- | --------------------------------------------------- |
+| W1  | FED  | Federation v1                               | planning-complete | [docs/federation/MISSION-MANIFEST.md](./federation/MISSION-MANIFEST.md) | 7 milestones, ~175K tokens, issues #460–#466 filed  |
+| W2  | TESS | Tess interaction agent                      | planning-complete | [docs/tess/MISSION-MANIFEST.md](./tess/MISSION-MANIFEST.md)             | 5 milestones; issue #706; M1 issue #707 ready       |
+| W3+ | TBD  | (additional workstreams declared as scoped) | —                 | —                                                                       | Scope creep is expected and explicitly accommodated |
 
 ### Likely Additional Workstreams (Not Yet Declared)
 

docs/PRD.md

@@ -79,6 +79,102 @@ Jarvis (v0.2.0) is a self-hosted AI assistant with a Python FastAPI backend and
 
 ---
 
+## Tess Interaction Agent Workstream (TESS)
+
+### Problem and Objective
+
+Jason needs one durable, operator-facing Mosaic agent outside Hermes that is reachable through a dedicated Discord channel and CLI, can attach to and operate the Mosaic fleet and transitional Hermes agents, and preserves context across restarts and compaction. Mos remains the coding/general fleet orchestrator; Tess is the complementary human interaction, visibility, control, and migration agent.
+
+The objective is to ship **Tess** (from _tessera_, a piece of a mosaic) as a Pi-native, GPT-5.6 Sol agent with high reasoning. Tess must use Mosaic-owned contracts and plugins so Hermes can be replaced incrementally rather than becoming a permanent architectural dependency.
+
+### Scope
+
+#### In Scope
+
+1. `TESS-ARP-001`: A runtime-neutral `AgentRuntimeProvider` contract supporting `listSessions`, `streamSession`, `sendMessage`, `terminate`, `getSessionTree`, `attach`, health, capability discovery, and normalized events/errors.
+2. `TESS-PI-001`: A long-running Pi-native Tess agent profile/service pinned to GPT-5.6 Sol with high reasoning, explicit tool policy, lifecycle hooks, durable checkpoints, and restart recovery.
+3. `TESS-DSC-001`: Dedicated Discord channel binding to Tess through the Mosaic gateway, with allowlists/RBAC, thread/reply policy, streaming, attachments, approvals, and correlation IDs.
+4. `TESS-CLI-001`: `mosaic tess` CLI commands for chat, status, session listing, attach/detach, send/steer/stop, provider health, and recovery.
+5. `TESS-FLT-001`: Fleet plugin capabilities for roster/status/heartbeat inspection, message delivery, session hierarchy, safe attach, and controlled restart/recovery.
+6. `TESS-MOS-001`: Explicit Mos coordination boundary and tools: hand off orchestration requests, observe mission/task state, receive results, and never silently compete for orchestration authority.
+7. `TESS-HRM-001`: Transitional Hermes adapter for profiles/agents, sessions, streaming/messages, Kanban, skills, memory, tools, cron, and health, using capability negotiation and fail-closed unsupported operations.
+8. `TESS-MEM-001`: Unified memory/retrieval plugin with scoped search/recent/capture/stats, startup context injection, provenance, redaction, namespace isolation, and flat-file/project truth precedence.
+9. `TESS-STA-001`: Durable agent state, inbox, handoff, compaction-recovery, and resume reconstruction.
+10. `TESS-PLG-001`: Plugin/tool catalog covering runtime bootstrap, repository/PR workflow, fleet diagnostics, incident-safe read operations, Discord interaction, and extensible MCP/skill discovery.
+11. `TESS-TRN-001`: Replaceable transport providers: tmux/fleet now, Matrix/native Mosaic transport later, with no Discord/CLI business logic coupled to transport details.
+12. `TESS-SEC-001`: RBAC, per-operation authorization, explicit approval for destructive/privileged/customer-visible actions, audit events, secret/PII redaction, tenant isolation, and bounded command execution.
+13. `TESS-SEC-002`: Command execution SHALL enforce declared scope/role server-side; admin/system and destructive operations SHALL require policy-bound durable approval.
+14. `TESS-SEC-003`: Every session list/read/attach/send/terminate operation SHALL enforce server-derived owner and tenant scope; guessed or client-supplied IDs SHALL grant no authority.
+15. `TESS-SEC-004`: MCP tools SHALL derive actor/tenant from authenticated context and SHALL NOT accept caller-controlled identity fields.
+16. `TESS-SEC-005`: Discord plugin ingress SHALL authenticate service identity, enforce guild/channel/user allowlists, propagate correlation/message IDs, and reject replay.
+17. `TESS-SEC-006`: Secret/PII classification and redaction SHALL occur before persistence and before channel egress, including tool metadata and authentication flows.
+18. `TESS-SEC-007`: Approvals SHALL be one-time, expiring, actor/tenant-bound, and cryptographically bound to the exact structured action digest.
+19. `TESS-SEC-008`: Ingress, provider sends, tool side effects, and responses SHALL use durable inbox/outbox/checkpoints and idempotency records for restart-safe replay.
+20. `TESS-SEC-009`: Garbage collection and retention SHALL be session/tenant scoped unless executed as a separately authorized and audited system-wide job.
+21. `TESS-OBS-001`: Structured logs, traces, health/readiness, provider latency/errors, session lifecycle, tool audit, and actionable recovery diagnostics.
+22. `TESS-MIG-001`: Capability inventory and staged Hermes-to-Mosaic migration matrix with coexistence, cutover, rollback, and deprecation gates.
+
+#### Out of Scope
+
+1. Replacing Mos as coding/general fleet orchestrator.
+2. Making Hermes the Mosaic core or coupling Mosaic domain logic to Hermes schemas.
+3. Migrating every historical chat verbatim; only policy-compliant indexed summaries and user-selected sessions are migrated.
+4. Unrestricted shell execution from Discord.
+5. Full web UI parity in the first Tess operational milestone; gateway contracts must remain web-consumable.
+6. Replacing tmux before Matrix/native transport reaches operational parity.
+
+### Stakeholder and User Requirements
+
+- Jason must be able to converse with the same Tess session from Discord and CLI.
+- Jason must be able to see what is running, stale, blocked, or unhealthy without attaching manually to every session.
+- Jason must be able to attach to Tess and authorized fleet sessions through supported CLI controls.
+- Tess must collaborate with Mos and the fleet while preserving a single clear orchestration authority.
+- The system must migrate useful Hermes/OpenClaw capabilities intentionally, with evidence, instead of copying implementations wholesale.
+
+### Non-Functional Requirements
+
+1. **Security:** default-deny provider/tool capabilities, least privilege, no secrets in logs/prompts/commits, Discord user/channel authorization, and auditable approvals.
+2. **Reliability:** durable inbox/checkpoints; idempotent message handling; reconnect with bounded backoff; no message loss or duplicate execution across gateway restart.
+3. **Performance:** first acknowledgement within 2 seconds when connected; streamed agent output begins within 5 seconds excluding model/provider delay; status reads return within 2 seconds under nominal local conditions.
+4. **Observability:** every ingress message and resulting provider/tool operation carries a correlation ID across Discord, gateway, Tess, provider, and audit events.
+5. **Maintainability:** channel, runtime, transport, memory, and external-agent integrations remain adapter-based with contract tests.
+6. **Privacy:** only scoped context enters external runtimes; persisted messages/memories follow retention and redaction policy.
+7. **Portability:** Tess runs through Pi/Mosaic contracts and does not require Hermes to start or serve native Mosaic operations.
+
+### Acceptance Criteria
+
+1. `AC-TESS-01`: A dedicated Discord channel and `mosaic tess chat` connect to one durable Tess session and stream responses bidirectionally.
+2. `AC-TESS-02`: `mosaic tess status|sessions|tree|attach|send|stop` operate against authorized provider capabilities with stable typed outputs and actionable errors.
+3. `AC-TESS-03`: Tess runs GPT-5.6 Sol at high reasoning and its effective runtime/model/tool policy is visible through status without exposing credentials.
+4. `AC-TESS-04`: Tess can inspect and message the Mosaic fleet, hand orchestration work to Mos, and demonstrate that Tess does not independently claim Mos-owned orchestration work.
+5. `AC-TESS-05`: Hermes adapter demonstrates session listing, streaming/message delivery, hierarchy mapping, and at least one approved capability in each of Kanban, skills, memory, tools, and cron—or reports unsupported capabilities fail-closed.
+6. `AC-TESS-06`: Restart/compaction test preserves session identity, pending inbox, last durable checkpoint, and a resumable handoff without duplicate side effects.
+7. `AC-TESS-07`: Unauthorized Discord users/channels, cross-tenant access, unsafe tool calls, forged approvals, and sensitive-output cases are denied and audited.
+8. `AC-TESS-08`: tmux/fleet and Matrix/native transport implementations pass the same provider contract suite; Matrix may remain non-default until readiness gates pass.
+9. `AC-TESS-09`: Baseline quality gates, unit/integration/contract tests, Discord+CLI E2E, restart/recovery tests, independent code review, and security review are green.
+10. `AC-TESS-10`: Migration matrix documents every audited Hermes/OpenClaw capability as native, adapted, deferred, or rejected, with cutover and rollback evidence.
+11. `AC-TESS-11`: User, admin, developer, API/OpenAPI, operations/recovery, and plugin-authoring documentation is current and linked from the sitemap.
+
+### Constraints, Dependencies, Risks, and Assumptions
+
+- Dependency: Mosaic gateway remains the single API surface; Pi is the native runtime; Valkey/PostgreSQL provide canonical durable state where required.
+- Dependency: Discord bot credentials and dedicated channel ID are deployment secrets provisioned outside source control.
+- Risk: Tess could drift into a second orchestrator. Mitigation: explicit role policy, Mos handoff contract, authority checks, and E2E boundary tests.
+- Risk: broad Hermes compatibility can freeze legacy semantics into Mosaic. Mitigation: Mosaic-owned normalized contracts and capability negotiation.
+- Risk: Discord creates a privileged remote-control surface. Mitigation: pairing/allowlists, RBAC, approvals, rate limits, audit, and safe tool classes.
+- Risk: transcript ingestion can violate privacy or overload memory. Mitigation: scoped opt-in import, redacted summaries, provenance, retention, and deduplication.
+- Risk: current root filesystem has limited headroom. Mitigation: isolated worktrees, no duplicated dependency installation unless required, and cleanup only after active-lane verification.
+- `ASSUMPTION:` The public name is **Tess**, because the user requested a name and the tessera/Mosaic relationship is distinctive; config must permit later display-name changes without renaming APIs or storage keys.
+- `ASSUMPTION:` The dedicated Discord channel ID and final guild policy will be supplied/provisioned during deployment, so implementation uses explicit configuration and fail-fast startup validation.
+- `ASSUMPTION:` tmux/fleet is the production transport for the first operational milestone; Matrix/native transport is implemented behind the same contract and promoted only after parity/reliability verification.
+- `ASSUMPTION:` Project/task truth remains in canonical Mosaic/project stores; semantic memory systems are retrieval/mirror layers, not hidden authorities.
+
+### Testing and Delivery Intent
+
+Delivery uses five gated milestones: runtime contracts/security; Pi service/state; Discord/CLI; fleet/Hermes/plugin suite; migration/Matrix/recovery/qualification. Every source-code task requires tests, independent review, a PR to `main`, terminal-green CI, and issue/task closure. Production activation additionally requires a clean-host Pi launch, dedicated Discord channel smoke test, CLI attach test, restart/recovery drill, and rollback procedure.
+
+---
+
 ## Architecture
 
 ### High-Level System Diagram

docs/TASKS.md

@@ -14,9 +14,10 @@
 
 ## Workstream Rollup
 
-| id  | status            | workstream          | progress         | tasks file                                        | notes                                                           |
-| --- | ----------------- | ------------------- | ---------------- | ------------------------------------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------- |
-| W1  | planning-complete | Federation v1 (FED) | 0 / 7 milestones | [docs/federation/TASKS.md](./federation/TASKS.md) | M1 task breakdown populated; M2–M7 deferred to mission planning |
+| id  | status            | workstream             | progress         | tasks file                                        | notes                                                           |
+| --- | ----------------- | ---------------------- | ---------------- | ------------------------------------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| W1  | planning-complete | Federation v1 (FED)    | 0 / 7 milestones | [docs/federation/TASKS.md](./federation/TASKS.md) | M1 task breakdown populated; M2–M7 deferred to mission planning |
+| W2  | planning-complete | Tess interaction agent | 0 / 5 milestones | [docs/tess/TASKS.md](./tess/TASKS.md)             | Issue #706; independent planning gate PASS; M1 issue #707 ready |
 
 ## Cross-Cutting Tracking
 

docs/federation/TASKS.md

@@ -91,22 +91,22 @@ Goal: Two federated gateways exchange real data over mTLS. Inbound requests pass
 >
 > **Tracking issue:** #462.
 
-| id        | status      | description                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            | issue | agent  | branch                               | depends_on       | estimate | notes                                                                                                                                                    |
-| --------- | ----------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | ----- | ------ | ------------------------------------ | ---------------- | -------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
-| FED-M3-01 | not-started | `packages/types/src/federation/` — request/response DTOs for `list`, `get`, `capabilities` verbs. Wire-format zod schemas + inferred TS types. Includes `FederationRequest`, `FederationListResponse<T>`, `FederationGetResponse<T>`, `FederationCapabilitiesResponse`, error envelope, `_source` tag. | #462  | sonnet | feat/federation-m3-types             | —                | 4K       | Reusable from gateway server + client + harness. Pure types — no I/O, no NestJS.                                                                         |
-| FED-M3-02 | not-started | `tools/federation-harness/` scaffold: `docker-compose.two-gateways.yml` (Server A + Server B + step-CA), `seed.ts` (provisions grants, peers, sample tasks/notes/credentials per scope variant), `harness.ts` helper (boots stack, returns typed clients). README documents harness use.               | #462  | sonnet | feat/federation-m3-harness           | DEPLOY-04 (soft) | 8K       | Falls back to local docker-compose if `mos-test-1/-2` not yet redeployed (DEPLOY chain blocked on IMG-FIX). Permanent test infra used by M3+.            |
-| FED-M3-03 | not-started | `apps/gateway/src/federation/server/federation-auth.guard.ts` (NestJS guard). Validates inbound client cert from Fastify TLS context, extracts `grantId` + `subjectUserId` from custom OIDs, loads grant from DB, asserts `status='active'`, attaches `FederationContext` to request.                  | #462  | sonnet | feat/federation-m3-auth-guard        | M3-01            | 8K       | Reuses OID parsing logic mirrored from `ca.service.ts` post-issuance verification. 401 on malformed/missing OIDs; 403 on revoked/expired/missing grant.  |
-| FED-M3-04 | not-started | `apps/gateway/src/federation/server/scope.service.ts`. Pipeline: (1) resource allowlist + excluded check, (2) native RBAC eval as `subjectUserId`, (3) scope filter intersection (`include_teams`, `include_personal`), (4) `max_rows_per_query` cap. Pure service — DB calls injected.                | #462  | sonnet | feat/federation-m3-scope-service     | M3-01            | 10K      | Hardest correctness target in M3. Reuses `parseFederationScope` (M2-03). Returns either `{ allowed: true, filter }` or structured deny reason for audit. |
-| FED-M3-05 | not-started | `apps/gateway/src/federation/server/verbs/list.controller.ts`. Wires AuthGuard → ScopeService → tasks/notes/memory query layer; applies row cap; tags rows with `_source`. Resource selector via path param.                                                                                           | #462  | sonnet | feat/federation-m3-verb-list         | M3-03, M3-04     | 6K       | Routes: `POST /api/federation/v1/list/:resource`. No body persistence. Audit write deferred to M4.                                                       |
-| FED-M3-06 | not-started | `apps/gateway/src/federation/server/verbs/get.controller.ts`. Single-resource fetch by id; same pipeline as list. 404 on not-found, 403 on RBAC/scope deny — both audited the same way.                                                                                                                | #462  | sonnet | feat/federation-m3-verb-get          | M3-03, M3-04     | 6K       | `POST /api/federation/v1/get/:resource/:id`. Mirrors list controller patterns.                                                                           |
-| FED-M3-07 | not-started | `apps/gateway/src/federation/server/verbs/capabilities.controller.ts`. Read-only enumeration: returns `{ resources, excluded_resources, max_rows_per_query, supported_verbs }` derived from grant scope. Always allowed for an active grant — no RBAC eval.                                            | #462  | sonnet | feat/federation-m3-verb-capabilities | M3-03            | 4K       | `GET /api/federation/v1/capabilities`. Smallest verb; useful sanity check that mTLS + auth guard work end-to-end.                                        |
-| FED-M3-08 | not-started | `apps/gateway/src/federation/client/federation-client.service.ts`. Outbound mTLS dialer: picks `(certPem, sealed clientKey)` from `federation_peers`, unwraps key, builds undici Agent with mTLS, calls peer verb, parses typed response, wraps non-2xx into `FederationClientError`.                  | #462  | sonnet | feat/federation-m3-client            | M3-01            | 8K       | Independent of server stream — can land in parallel with M3-03/04. Cert/key cached per-peer; flushed by future M5/M6 logic.                              |
-| FED-M3-09 | not-started | `apps/gateway/src/federation/client/query-source.service.ts`. Accepts `source: "local" \| "federated:<host>" \| "all"` from gateway query layer; for `"all"` fans out to local + each peer in parallel; merges results; tags every row with `_source`.                                                 | #462  | sonnet | feat/federation-m3-query-source      | M3-08            | 8K       | Per-peer failure surfaces as `_partial: true` in response, not hard failure (sets up M5 offline UX). M5 adds caching + circuit breaker on top.           |
-| FED-M3-10 | not-started | Integration tests for MILESTONES.md M3 acceptance #6 (malformed OIDs → 401; valid cert + revoked grant → 403) and #7 (`max_rows_per_query` cap). Real PG, mocked TLS context (Fastify req shim).                                                                                                       | #462  | sonnet | feat/federation-m3-integration       | M3-05, M3-06     | 8K       | Vitest profile gated by `FEDERATED_INTEGRATION=1`. Single-gateway suite; no harness required.                                                            |
-| FED-M3-11 | not-started | E2E tests for MILESTONES.md M3 acceptance #1, #2, #3, #4, #5, #8, #9, #10 (8 cases). Uses harness from M3-02; two real gateways, real Step-CA, real mTLS. Each test asserts both happy-path response and audit/no-persist invariants.                                                                  | #462  | sonnet | feat/federation-m3-e2e               | M3-02, M3-09     | 12K      | Largest single task. Each acceptance gets its own `it(...)` for clear failure attribution.                                                               |
-| FED-M3-12 | not-started | Independent security review (sonnet, not author of M3-03/04/05/06/07/08/09): focus on cert-SAN spoofing, OID extraction edge cases, scope-bypass via filter manipulation, RBAC-bypass via subjectUser swap, response leakage when scope deny.                                                          | #462  | sonnet | feat/federation-m3-security-review   | M3-11            | 10K      | Two review rounds budgeted. PRD requires explicit test for every 401/403 path — review verifies coverage.                                                |
-| FED-M3-13 | not-started | Docs update: `docs/federation/SETUP.md` mTLS handshake section, new `docs/federation/HARNESS.md` for federation-harness usage, OID reference table in SETUP.md, scope enforcement pipeline diagram. Runbook still M7-deferred.                                                                         | #462  | haiku  | feat/federation-m3-docs              | M3-12            | 5K       | One ASCII diagram for the auth-guard → scope → RBAC pipeline; helps future reviewers reason about denial paths.                                          |
-| FED-M3-14 | not-started | PR aggregate close, CI green, merge to main, close #462. Release tag `fed-v0.3.0-m3`. Update mission manifest M3 row → done; M4 row → in-progress when work begins.                                                                                                                                    | #462  | sonnet | chore/federation-m3-close            | M3-13            | 3K       | Same close pattern as M1-12 / M2-13.                                                                                                                     |
+| id        | status      | description                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            | issue | agent  | branch                               | depends_on                        | estimate | notes                                                                                                                                                    |
+| --------- | ----------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | ----- | ------ | ------------------------------------ | --------------------------------- | -------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| FED-M3-01 | done        | `packages/types/src/federation/` — request/response DTOs for `list`, `get`, `capabilities` verbs. Wire-format zod schemas + inferred TS types. Includes `FederationRequest`, `FederationListResponse<T>`, `FederationGetResponse<T>`, `FederationCapabilitiesResponse`, error envelope, `_source` tag. | #462  | sonnet | feat/federation-m3-types             | —                                 | 4K       | Reusable from gateway server + client + harness. Pure types — no I/O, no NestJS.                                                                         |
+| FED-M3-02 | done        | `tools/federation-harness/` scaffold: `docker-compose.two-gateways.yml` (Server A + Server B + step-CA), `seed.ts` (provisions grants, peers, sample tasks/notes/credentials per scope variant), `harness.ts` helper (boots stack, returns typed clients). README documents harness use.               | #462  | sonnet | feat/federation-m3-harness           | DEPLOY-04 (soft)                  | 8K       | Falls back to local docker-compose if `mos-test-1/-2` not yet redeployed (DEPLOY chain blocked on IMG-FIX). Permanent test infra used by M3+.            |
+| FED-M3-03 | done        | `apps/gateway/src/federation/server/federation-auth.guard.ts` (NestJS guard). Validates inbound client cert from Fastify TLS context, extracts `grantId` + `subjectUserId` from custom OIDs, loads grant from DB, asserts `status='active'`, attaches `FederationContext` to request.                  | #462  | sonnet | feat/federation-m3-auth-guard        | M3-01                             | 8K       | Reuses OID parsing logic mirrored from `ca.service.ts` post-issuance verification. 401 on malformed/missing OIDs; 403 on revoked/expired/missing grant.  |
+| FED-M3-04 | in-progress | `apps/gateway/src/federation/server/scope.service.ts`. Pipeline: (1) resource allowlist + excluded check, (2) native RBAC eval as `subjectUserId`, (3) scope filter intersection (`include_teams`, `include_personal`), (4) `max_rows_per_query` cap. Pure service — DB calls injected.                | #462  | sonnet | feat/federation-m3-scope-service     | M3-01                             | 10K      | Hardest correctness target in M3. Reuses `parseFederationScope` (M2-03). Returns either `{ allowed: true, filter }` or structured deny reason for audit. |
+| FED-M3-05 | in-progress | `apps/gateway/src/federation/server/verbs/list.controller.ts`. Wires AuthGuard → ScopeService → tasks/notes/memory query layer; applies row cap; tags rows with `_source`. Resource selector via path param.                                                                                           | #462  | sonnet | feat/federation-m3-verb-list         | M3-03, M3-04                      | 6K       | Routes: `POST /api/federation/v1/list/:resource`. No body persistence. Audit write deferred to M4.                                                       |
+| FED-M3-06 | not-started | `apps/gateway/src/federation/server/verbs/get.controller.ts`. Single-resource fetch by id; same pipeline as list. 404 on not-found, 403 on RBAC/scope deny — both audited the same way.                                                                                                                | #462  | sonnet | feat/federation-m3-verb-get          | M3-03, M3-04                      | 6K       | `POST /api/federation/v1/get/:resource/:id`. Mirrors list controller patterns.                                                                           |
+| FED-M3-07 | done        | `apps/gateway/src/federation/server/verbs/capabilities.controller.ts`. Read-only enumeration: returns `{ resources, excluded_resources, max_rows_per_query, supported_verbs }` derived from grant scope. Always allowed for an active grant — no RBAC eval.                                            | #462  | sonnet | feat/federation-m3-verb-capabilities | M3-03                             | 4K       | `GET /api/federation/v1/capabilities`. Smallest verb; useful sanity check that mTLS + auth guard work end-to-end.                                        |
+| FED-M3-08 | done        | `apps/gateway/src/federation/client/federation-client.service.ts`. Outbound mTLS dialer: picks `(certPem, sealed clientKey)` from `federation_peers`, unwraps key, builds undici Agent with mTLS, calls peer verb, parses typed response, wraps non-2xx into `FederationClientError`.                  | #462  | sonnet | feat/federation-m3-client            | M3-01                             | 8K       | Independent of server stream — can land in parallel with M3-03/04. Cert/key cached per-peer; flushed by future M5/M6 logic.                              |
+| FED-M3-09 | done        | `apps/gateway/src/federation/client/query-source.service.ts`. Accepts `source: "local" \| "federated:<host>" \| "all"` from gateway query layer; for `"all"` fans out to local + each peer in parallel; merges results; tags every row with `_source`.                                                 | #462  | sonnet | feat/federation-m3-query-source      | M3-08                             | 8K       | Per-peer failure surfaces as `_partial: true` in response, not hard failure (sets up M5 offline UX). M5 adds caching + circuit breaker on top.           |
+| FED-M3-10 | not-started | Integration tests for MILESTONES.md M3 acceptance #6 (malformed OIDs → 401; valid cert + revoked grant → 403) and #7 (`max_rows_per_query` cap). Real PG, mocked TLS context (Fastify req shim).                                                                                                       | #462  | sonnet | feat/federation-m3-integration       | M3-05, M3-06                      | 8K       | Vitest profile gated by `FEDERATED_INTEGRATION=1`. Single-gateway suite; no harness required.                                                            |
+| FED-M3-11 | not-started | E2E tests for MILESTONES.md M3 acceptance #1, #2, #3, #4, #5, #8, #9, #10 (8 cases). Uses harness from M3-02; two real gateways, real Step-CA, real mTLS. Each test asserts both happy-path response and audit/no-persist invariants.                                                                  | #462  | sonnet | feat/federation-m3-e2e               | M3-02, M3-04, M3-05, M3-06, M3-09 | 12K      | Largest single task. Each acceptance gets its own `it(...)` for clear failure attribution.                                                               |
+| FED-M3-12 | not-started | Independent security review (sonnet, not author of M3-03/04/05/06/07/08/09): focus on cert-SAN spoofing, OID extraction edge cases, scope-bypass via filter manipulation, RBAC-bypass via subjectUser swap, response leakage when scope deny.                                                          | #462  | sonnet | feat/federation-m3-security-review   | M3-11                             | 10K      | Two review rounds budgeted. PRD requires explicit test for every 401/403 path — review verifies coverage.                                                |
+| FED-M3-13 | not-started | Docs update: `docs/federation/SETUP.md` mTLS handshake section, new `docs/federation/HARNESS.md` for federation-harness usage, OID reference table in SETUP.md, scope enforcement pipeline diagram. Runbook still M7-deferred.                                                                         | #462  | haiku  | feat/federation-m3-docs              | M3-12                             | 5K       | One ASCII diagram for the auth-guard → scope → RBAC pipeline; helps future reviewers reason about denial paths.                                          |
+| FED-M3-14 | not-started | PR aggregate close, CI green, merge to main, close #462. Release tag `fed-v0.3.0-m3`. Update mission manifest M3 row → done; M4 row → in-progress when work begins.                                                                                                                                    | #462  | sonnet | chore/federation-m3-close            | M3-13                             | 3K       | Same close pattern as M1-12 / M2-13.                                                                                                                     |
 
 **M3 estimate:** ~100K tokens (vs MILESTONES.md 40K — same per-task breakdown pattern as M1/M2: tests, review, and docs split out from implementation cost). Largest milestone in the federation mission.
 
@@ -118,6 +118,10 @@ Goal: Two federated gateways exchange real data over mTLS. Inbound requests pass
 
 **Test bed fallback:** If `mos-test-1.woltje.com` / `mos-test-2.woltje.com` are still blocked on `FED-M2-DEPLOY-IMG-FIX` when M3-11 is ready to run, the harness's local `docker-compose.two-gateways.yml` is a sufficient stand-in. Production-host validation moves to M7 acceptance suite (PRD AC-12).
 
+**Backlog sync — 2026-06-24 (orchestrator):** Status reconciled against `origin/main` (release 0.0.48). Landed on main: **FED-M3-01** (DTOs, PR #506), **FED-M3-02** (harness scaffold, PR #505), **FED-M3-03** (mTLS auth-guard, PR #509 — CRIT-1/2 + HIGH-1..4 remediated in-PR), **FED-M3-08** (outbound mTLS client, PR #508). With M3-01/03/08 merged, three cards became dependency-clear and were dispatched to the idle coder lane: **FED-M3-04** scope.service → coder0 (`feat/federation-m3-scope-service`); **FED-M3-09** query-source + **FED-M3-07** capabilities verb → coder1 (`feat/federation-m3-query-source` first). Reviewer warmed for the M3 trust-boundary PRs. Remaining blocked-by-DAG: M3-05/06 (await M3-04), M3-10 (await M3-05/06), M3-11 (await M3-09), M3-12→14 (tail). Deploy chain (DEPLOY-IMG-FIX → 03/04) still independent of M3 code — harness local docker-compose fallback covers M3-11.
+
+**Backlog sync #2 — 2026-06-24 (orchestrator):** **FED-M3-09** (query-source) merged via PR #673 and **FED-M3-07** (capabilities) merged via PR #674 — both squash-merged on independent agent review-of-record + green CI (formal Gitea approve unavailable under the shared service account; merge is not gated by the self-approve guard). **FED-M3-05** (list verb) dispatched to coder1 (based on the M3-04 branch, rebase onto main once #672 lands). **FED-M3-04** (scope.service, PR #672) is in review-changes (one include_personal no-leak test outstanding). **DAG fix:** corrected `FED-M3-11` depends_on from `M3-02, M3-09` → `M3-02, M3-04, M3-05, M3-06, M3-09` — the E2E acceptance cases (#1–#5, #8–#10) exercise list/get over mTLS, so the server verbs + scope service are hard prerequisites; the original edge set omitted them and caused a premature M3-11 dispatch. Note: M3 read-path invariant for M3-11 is **no-persist + existing enrollment audit only** — read-verb audit-log writes are deferred to M4 (see M3-05/06 notes), so M3-11 must not assert read-audit-log entries.
+
 ## Milestone 4 — search + audit + rate limit (FED-M4)
 
 _Deferred. Issue #463._

docs/scratchpads/462-fed-m3-04-scope-service.md

@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
+# Scratchpad — FED-M3-04 Scope Service
+
+## Objective
+
+Implement `apps/gateway/src/federation/server/scope.service.ts` for the M3 inbound federation scope-enforcement pipeline.
+
+## Scope / Constraints
+
+- Task: FED-M3-04, issue #462.
+- Branch: `feat/federation-m3-scope-service` from `origin/main` @ 0.0.48.
+- Pure service: no direct DB access; native RBAC/data access is injected per evaluation call.
+- Reuse `parseFederationScope` from M2-03.
+- Workers do not edit `docs/federation/TASKS.md` per repo AGENTS.md.
+
+## Acceptance Criteria
+
+1. Resource allowlist and `excluded_resources` enforced.
+2. Native RBAC evaluated as `subjectUserId` through an injected evaluator.
+3. Scope filter intersection supports `include_teams` and `include_personal` without widening native RBAC.
+4. `max_rows_per_query` caps requested limits.
+5. Service returns `{ allowed: true, filter }` or a structured deny reason usable by M4 audit.
+6. Unit tests cover every deny path.
+
+## Plan
+
+1. Inspect existing federation scope/schema/auth guard contracts.
+2. Add pure `FederationScopeService` plus typed result/filter/deny interfaces.
+3. Add focused unit tests for happy paths, filter intersection, row cap, and deny paths.
+4. Export/register service for future verb controllers.
+5. Run situational tests, baseline gates, code review, then PR.
+
+## Budget
+
+- Provided model tier: sonnet.
+- Estimate from task row: 10K tokens.
+- Working cap assumption: keep implementation focused to FED-M3-04 surfaces only.
+
+## Progress
+
+- Intake complete; dirty base worktree avoided by creating isolated worktree at `/home/jarvis/src/mosaic-mono-v1-fed-m3-04`.
+- Project PRD and federation task spec reviewed.
+- Added `FederationScopeService` with structured allow/deny result types and injected native RBAC evaluator contract.
+- Added unit coverage for happy path, row cap, filter intersection, and every deny path.
+- Exported/registered the service for upcoming M3 verb controllers.
+
+## Verification Evidence
+
+- `pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/gateway test -- src/federation/server/__tests__/scope.service.spec.ts` — pass (10 tests before review update; 11 tests after adding include_personal no-leak coverage).
+- `pnpm build` — pass (23 successful tasks).
+- `pnpm typecheck` — pass (41 successful tasks; re-run after review update).
+- `pnpm lint` — pass (23 successful tasks; re-run after review update).
+- `pnpm format:check` — pass (re-run after review update).
+- `pnpm test` — pass after starting local `postgres`/`valkey` and running `pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/db db:push` for the DB-backed cross-user isolation suite (41 successful tasks; gateway 477 passed / 11 skipped).
+- Code review: `~/.config/mosaic/tools/codex/codex-code-review.sh --uncommitted` — approve, 0 findings.
+- Security review: `~/.config/mosaic/tools/codex/codex-security-review.sh --uncommitted` — risk none, 0 findings.
+
+## Risks / Blockers
+
+- Issue #462 is already closed in provider output; likely milestone tracking mismatch. Will still reference #462 in PR body unless orchestrator redirects.
+- Local full-test setup required `docker compose up -d postgres valkey` + `db:push`; containers were stopped with `docker compose down` after verification.

docs/scratchpads/561-python-is-python3.md

@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+# Issue #561 — Bare python on agent hosts
+
+## Objective
+
+Make the durable bootstrap/provisioning guidance ensure agent hosts provide a bare `python` command that resolves to Python 3.
+
+## Scope
+
+- Add Debian/Ubuntu `python-is-python3` to agent-host prerequisites in bootstrap docs.
+- Check for actual OS package provisioning scripts and update only if an existing agent-host package install path exists.
+- Do not touch live host state.
+- Do not update `docs/TASKS.md`; repo guidance says workers read it but never modify it.
+
+## Recon
+
+- Issue #561 confirms repeated `python: command not found` failures from fleet agents that emit `python foo.py`.
+- `guides/BOOTSTRAP.md` and `packages/mosaic/framework/guides/BOOTSTRAP.md` are the source and packaged framework copies of the bootstrap guide.
+- Targeted repo sweep found no agent-host Debian package provisioning script. Existing `apt-get install` hits are CI/test helper paths or unrelated deployment docs.
+
+## Plan
+
+1. Add a host prerequisite section to both bootstrap guide copies.
+2. Include `python-is-python3` in the Debian/Ubuntu package list with an issue comment.
+3. Note the non-Debian equivalent as a `/usr/bin/python -> python3` symlink.
+4. Validate markdown/diff, run shell syntax checks where applicable, run required review, commit, queue guard, and push.
+
+## Validation Log
+
+- `rg` recon: no existing agent-host Debian package provisioning script; only CI/test helper `apt-get install` paths and unrelated deployment docs.
+- `git diff --check`: passed.
+- `bash -n packages/mosaic/framework/install.sh tools/install.sh packages/mosaic/framework/tools/bootstrap/init-project.sh packages/mosaic/framework/tools/_scripts/mosaic-bootstrap-repo`: passed. No touched shell scripts.
+- `~/.config/mosaic/tools/codex/codex-code-review.sh --uncommitted`: approved, 0 findings.
+- `pnpm format:check`: initially blocked because `node_modules` was absent and `prettier` was unavailable; `pnpm install --frozen-lockfile` initially hit an invalid `/root` pnpm store path. Reran install with `--store-dir /home/hermes/agent-work/.pnpm-store`, then `pnpm format:check` passed.

docs/scratchpads/672-fleet-personas-timeout.md

@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+# Scratchpad — fleet-personas spec timeout
+
+## Objective
+
+Raise the `@mosaicstack/mosaic` Vitest timeout to 30s at config level so filesystem-backed fleet drift-guard specs (`fleet-personas`, `fleet-profiles`, and siblings) stop false-reding under contended CI.
+
+## Plan
+
+1. Move timeout policy into `packages/mosaic/vitest.config.ts` with `testTimeout: 30_000`.
+2. Remove the narrower `fleet-personas.spec.ts` local override so PR #677 fixes the suite class, not one file.
+3. Run targeted fleet specs plus typecheck/lint/format gates.
+4. Commit, queue guard, push, PR update.
+
+## Evidence
+
+- `pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/mosaic test -- src/commands/fleet-personas.spec.ts` — pass (8 tests; initial narrow fix).
+- `pnpm typecheck` — pass (41 tasks; initial narrow fix).
+- `pnpm lint` — pass (23 tasks; initial narrow fix).
+- `pnpm format:check` — pass after formatting this scratchpad (initial narrow fix).
+- Package-wide timeout follow-up:
+  - `pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/mosaic test -- src/commands/fleet-personas.spec.ts src/commands/fleet-profiles.spec.ts` — pass (24 tests).
+  - `pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/mosaic test` — pass (44 files / 618 tests).
+  - `pnpm typecheck` — pass (41 tasks).
+  - `pnpm lint` — pass (23 tasks).
+  - `pnpm format:check` — pass.

docs/scratchpads/FED-M3-05-list-verb.md

@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+# FED-M3-05 — Federation List Verb Scratchpad
+
+## Objective
+
+Implement `POST /api/federation/v1/list/:resource`.
+
+## Scope
+
+- Wire `FederationAuthGuard` → `FederationScopeService` → read-only list query layer.
+- Apply `max_rows_per_query` row cap and return pagination metadata when truncated.
+- Tag returned rows with `_source: "local"`.
+- Keep audit writes deferred to M4.
+- No request/response body persistence.
+
+## Base / branch
+
+- Branch: `feat/federation-m3-verb-list`
+- Base: `main` after M3-04 scope service merged via PR #672 (`c739256a`).
+
+## Implementation notes
+
+- Added `ListController` under `apps/gateway/src/federation/server/verbs/`.
+- Added `FederationListQueryService` as the read-only query layer and native RBAC evaluator.
+- Query resources supported in M3 list path:
+  - `tasks`: project/mission scoped tasks visible through personal/team project access.
+  - `notes`: non-empty `mission_tasks.notes` rows visible through personal/team mission access.
+  - `memory`: user-owned `insights` and `preferences` rows.
+  - `credentials` / `api_keys`: denied by native RBAC in M3 even if present in scope; sensitive-resource implementation is not part of FED-M3-05.
+- Cursor pagination uses an opaque base64url keyset cursor over `(createdAt, id)`; DB reads fetch at most `limit + 1` rows per resource query.
+- Reviewer isolation fix: `mission_tasks.notes` rows are always constrained by `missionTasks.userId = subjectUserId` and accessible mission IDs; team scope narrows missions but never widens to other users' mission task notes.
+- Follow-up review fix: memory listing now uses deterministic table-block pagination (`insights` first, then `preferences`) with cursor source metadata, so one table's cursor is never applied to the other.
+- Follow-up hardening: missing auth-guard context returns a structured federation `unauthorized` envelope; unsupported resources and non-encodable truncated cursors throw instead of silently crashing/truncating.
+
+## Tests
+
+- `pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/gateway test -- list.controller.spec.ts list-query.service.spec.ts` — PASS (16 tests, including PGlite regression coverage for team-scoped notes isolation, unauthorized mission notes exclusion, `includePersonal: false`, deterministic memory pagination, missing context envelope, unsupported resource, and cursor encode failure).
+- `pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/gateway typecheck` — PASS.
+- `pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/gateway lint` — PASS.
+- `pnpm format:check` — PASS.
+- `pnpm typecheck` — PASS (41/41 turbo tasks).
+- `pnpm lint` — PASS (23/23 turbo tasks).
+- `pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/gateway test` — FAIL in pre-existing/live-DB integration suite: `apps/gateway/src/__tests__/cross-user-isolation.test.ts` cleanup cannot connect to local PostgreSQL on `localhost:5433`. New list tests pass; failure is outside FED-M3-05.
+
+## Review evidence
+
+- `~/.config/mosaic/tools/codex/codex-code-review.sh --uncommitted` — PASS after follow-up remediation; approve, no findings.
+- `~/.config/mosaic/tools/codex/codex-security-review.sh --uncommitted` — PASS after follow-up remediation; risk level none, no findings.
+- Security-review note: read-path audit logging remains intentionally deferred to M4 per orchestrator clarification and FED-M3-05 scope.
+
+## Risks / follow-up
+
+- Read-path audit logging remains intentionally deferred to M4.

docs/scratchpads/FED-M3-07-capabilities.md

@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
+# FED-M3-07 — Capabilities Verb Scratchpad
+
+## Objective
+
+Implement `GET /api/federation/v1/capabilities` in `apps/gateway/src/federation/server/verbs/capabilities.controller.ts`.
+
+## Scope
+
+- Add read-only capabilities controller under federation server verbs.
+- Use `FederationAuthGuard` only; active grant is sufficient and no native RBAC/scope-service eval runs.
+- Response shape: `{ resources, excluded_resources, max_rows_per_query, supported_verbs }` derived from grant scope.
+- Register controller in `FederationModule`.
+- Unit-test happy path, defaults, no-context guard seam, and invalid scope handling.
+
+## Constraints / assumptions
+
+- Issue: #462.
+- Branch: `feat/federation-m3-verb-capabilities` from `origin/main` (`3eeed04e`).
+- Depends on M3-03 auth guard; guard attaches `request.federationContext.scope` after active-grant validation.
+- ASSUMPTION: `supported_verbs` is the M3 verb set from `@mosaicstack/types` (`list`, `get`, `capabilities`).
+- ASSUMPTION: `filters`/`rate_limit` are intentionally omitted for FED-M3-07 because the card’s response shape lists only the four required fields.
+- Budget: no explicit hard cap from orchestrator; working cap ~4K-8K tokens for card implementation + tests + PR cycle.
+
+## Plan
+
+1. Write controller unit tests first.
+2. Implement controller and module registration.
+3. Run scoped tests + typecheck/lint/format.
+4. Run Codex code/security review and remediate.
+5. Commit, queue guard, push, PR via wrapper.
+
+## Progress
+
+- 2026-06-24: Intake complete; fresh worktree created from origin/main.
+- 2026-06-24: Added `CapabilitiesController`, registered it in `FederationModule`, and added 5 unit tests.
+- 2026-06-24: Code/security reviews passed with no findings.
+
+## Tests run
+
+- `pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/gateway test -- capabilities.controller.spec.ts` — PASS (5 tests).
+- `pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/gateway typecheck` — PASS.
+- `pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/gateway lint` — PASS.
+- `pnpm format:check` — PASS.
+- `pnpm typecheck` — PASS (41/41 turbo tasks).
+- `pnpm lint` — PASS (23/23 turbo tasks).
+- `pnpm test` — FAIL in pre-existing/live-DB integration suite: `apps/gateway/src/__tests__/cross-user-isolation.test.ts` cleanup hit PostgreSQL connection/schema state for the `messages` table. Changed capabilities tests passed; failure is outside FED-M3-07 surface. No `fleet-personas.spec` flake encountered.
+
+## Review evidence
+
+- `~/.config/mosaic/tools/codex/codex-code-review.sh --uncommitted` — PASS/approve, no findings.
+- `~/.config/mosaic/tools/codex/codex-security-review.sh --uncommitted` — PASS, risk level none, no findings.
+
+## Risks / blockers
+
+- Full repo `pnpm test` may hit known `fleet-personas.spec` flake per orchestrator; ignore that specific flake if encountered.
+- Previous card saw local DB schema issue in `cross-user-isolation.test.ts`; scoped capabilities tests should be authoritative for this surface.
+
+## Acceptance evidence mapping
+
+| Acceptance criterion                                                       | Evidence                                                                                                                   |
+| -------------------------------------------------------------------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| GET `/api/federation/v1/capabilities` exists                               | Route metadata test in `capabilities.controller.spec.ts`; scoped test PASS                                                 |
+| Uses active-grant auth guard and no RBAC eval                              | Guard metadata test confirms only `FederationAuthGuard`; controller has no service injections/RBAC calls; scoped test PASS |
+| Response enumerates resources/excluded/max rows/supported verbs from scope | Happy-path/default scope tests + response schema parse; scoped test PASS                                                   |
+| Read-only/no persistence side effects                                      | Controller only parses request `federationContext.scope` and returns a DTO; no DB/service dependency; code review PASS     |

docs/scratchpads/tess-20260712.md

@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
+# Scratchpad — Tess Interaction Agent
+
+## 2026-07-12 — Mission intake
+
+**Objective:** Build a Pi-native GPT-5.6 Sol high-reasoning Mosaic interaction agent, named Tess, as Jason's primary Discord/CLI access point for Mosaic fleet and transitional Hermes capabilities. Tess complements Mos and must not become a competing orchestrator.
+
+**Issue:** #706
+
+**Budget:** No explicit cap provided. Original working estimate was 290K implementation/review tokens. That estimate is superseded after six security prerequisite tasks were added; revised arithmetic total is pending because the calculation tool was blocked by runtime consent. Run at most two workers; prefer one implementation lane plus one independent review/discovery lane. Re-estimate after planning approval and each milestone.
+
+**Evidence gathered:**
+- Mosaic already provides Pi lifecycle hooks, fleet/tmux sessions, Matrix connector/controller pieces, typed chat events, Discord/Telegram channel plugins, and command/plugin registries.
+- Current `IProviderAdapter` is an LLM model/completion abstraction, not an external agent/session provider.
+- Required new seam is `AgentRuntimeProvider`: sessions, stream, message, terminate, hierarchy, attach, health, capabilities.
+- Recurring cross-runtime needs: unified memory/retrieval, Discord routing/approvals, agent state/inbox/compaction recovery, runtime bootstrap, fleet/incident controls, and GitOps workflow.
+- Project truth must remain in canonical project/Mosaic stores; semantic memory is retrieval/mirror.
+
+**Decisions:**
+1. Name: Tess (tessera). Stable machine key `tess`; display name configurable.
+2. Mos owns orchestration; Tess delegates Mos-owned work through an explicit coordination contract.
+3. Gateway owns ingress/auth/routing; Discord and CLI remain thin clients.
+4. tmux/fleet ships first behind an adapter; Matrix/native Mosaic is the forward transport.
+5. Hermes integration is transitional and capability-negotiated; unsupported operations fail closed.
+6. No unrestricted Discord shell. Privileged/destructive/customer-visible actions require authorization and approval.
+
+**Plan:**
+1. Land requirements/architecture/task graph.
+2. Deliver runtime contracts and security model.
+3. Deliver durable Pi service/state.
+4. Deliver Discord and CLI.
+5. Deliver fleet/Mos/Hermes/memory/tool plugins.
+6. Deliver Matrix/native transport, migration matrix, recovery, docs, and qualification.
+
+**Progress:** Issue #706 created. PRD/manifest/tasks initialized on clean branch `feat/tess-interaction-agent` from `origin/main`.
+
+**Risks:** 14 GB root filesystem headroom; active fleet lanes; broad migration scope; Discord privilege boundary; possible duplicate orchestration authority.
+
+## 2026-07-12 — Independent planning and threat review
+
+**Verdict received:** BLOCK TESS-PLAN-001. Coding remains stopped.
+
+**Blocking findings:** formal threat model absent; verification matrix absent; migration inventory implied but absent; non-existent task paths; AC-TESS-03 lacked a crisp test. Security review also identified command scope bypass, cross-tenant session attachment, MCP actor impersonation, unsafe Discord service ingress, pre-persistence/egress secret leakage, non-durable replay, and globally scoped GC.
+
+**Remediation applied:**
+- Added `docs/tess/ARCHITECTURE.md`.
+- Added `docs/tess/THREAT-MODEL.md` with TM-01..12.
+- Added `docs/tess/VERIFICATION-MATRIX.md` mapping AC-TESS-01..11.
+- Added `docs/tess/MIGRATION-INVENTORY.md`.
+- Added hard requirements TESS-SEC-002..009.
+- Added six prerequisite security tasks before provider/ingress implementation.
+- Corrected task paths to existing package surfaces.
+- Added explicit GPT-5.6 Sol/high/tool-policy status verification for AC-TESS-03.
+
+**Re-review 1:** BLOCK only on composite `repo` values that looked like nonexistent paths. Remediated by declaring comma-separated roots and validating every root.
+
+**Final focused review:** PASS. Deterministic audit validated all task repository roots with zero missing paths; no planning placeholders remained; security prerequisites still gate Tess exposure; observability traceability is explicit.
+
+**Current gate:** planning PR must merge to `main` with terminal-green CI before any source-code worker starts.

docs/tess/ARCHITECTURE.md

@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
+# Tess Architecture
+
+## Purpose
+
+Tess is the Mosaic operator interaction plane. Mos remains the coding/general fleet orchestration authority. Tess receives authorized operator intent, presents fleet/session state, delegates Mos-owned work to Mos, and exposes native Mosaic plus transitional external-agent capabilities through normalized providers.
+
+## Component Boundaries
+
+```text
+Discord plugin ─┐
+                ├─ authenticated ingress envelope ─> Mosaic Gateway
+mosaic tess CLI ┘                                  │
+                                                   ├─ policy/approval/audit
+                                                   ├─ Tess durable session service (Pi GPT-5.6 Sol high)
+                                                   ├─ AgentRuntimeProvider registry
+                                                   │   ├─ native Pi provider
+                                                   │   ├─ fleet/tmux provider
+                                                   │   ├─ Hermes adapter
+                                                   │   └─ Matrix/native transport provider
+                                                   ├─ memory/state/inbox plugins
+                                                   └─ Mos coordination adapter ─> Mos / fleet queue
+```
+
+## Core Contract
+
+`AgentRuntimeProvider` is separate from the existing model-completion `IProviderAdapter`. It normalizes external and native agent runtimes without leaking provider-specific schemas.
+
+Required operations:
+
+- `capabilities()` and `health()`
+- `listSessions(scope)`
+- `getSessionTree(scope)`
+- `streamSession(sessionRef, cursor, scope)`
+- `sendMessage(sessionRef, message, idempotencyKey, scope)`
+- `attach(sessionRef, mode, scope)` / `detach()`
+- `terminate(sessionRef, approvalRef, scope)`
+
+Every call receives an immutable, server-derived actor/tenant/channel scope and correlation ID. Caller-supplied actor IDs are forbidden. Unsupported capabilities fail closed with typed errors.
+
+## Authority Model
+
+| Intent                                                                      | Owner                   | Tess behavior                                                          |
+| --------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ----------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| Conversation, status, retrieval, safe diagnostics                           | Tess                    | Execute within policy                                                  |
+| Code/project decomposition, worker assignment, reviews, merge orchestration | Mos                     | Create a correlated handoff and observe result                         |
+| Destructive, privileged, external/customer-visible action                   | Human approval + policy | Propose, wait for durable one-time approval, then execute idempotently |
+| Provider-specific unsupported action                                        | None                    | Fail closed; never emulate silently                                    |
+
+## Session and State Model
+
+A Tess session has stable `sessionId`, `tenantId`, `ownerId`, provider/runtime identity, ingress bindings, cursor, checkpoint, inbox/outbox, and idempotency records. Discord and CLI bind to the same authorized session. Ownership is verified server-side on every list/read/attach/send/terminate operation.
+
+Valkey may hold ephemeral coordination state; PostgreSQL is canonical for durable session bindings, approvals, audit, checkpoints, inbox/outbox, and idempotency. Pi session files are replay sources, not cross-agent truth.
+
+## Transport Strategy
+
+- **Initial:** fleet/tmux provider, including exact target, socket, identity, heartbeat, and safe attach semantics.
+- **Forward:** Matrix/native Mosaic provider using authenticated identity, idempotent transaction IDs, replay cursors, and the same contract suite.
+- Discord/CLI never call tmux or Matrix directly.
+
+## Plugin Families
+
+1. Channel: Discord now; other channels later.
+2. Runtime: Pi, fleet/tmux, Hermes, Matrix/native.
+3. Operator tools: fleet health, Mos handoff, GitOps wrappers, incident-safe diagnostics.
+4. Memory/state: search/recent/capture, durable inbox, checkpoint, handoff, compaction recovery.
+5. Migration: capability inventory, adapters, cutover, rollback, telemetry.
+
+## Deployment
+
+Tess runs as a rostered, systemd-supervised Pi agent using GPT-5.6 Sol and high reasoning. Secrets are supplied through approved runtime secret mechanisms. Startup fails when required model, gateway identity, Discord binding, or durable-state dependencies are missing. Health reports effective model/reasoning/tool policy without credential material.

docs/tess/MIGRATION-INVENTORY.md

@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+# Tess Capability Migration Inventory
+
+Status values: `native` · `adapt` · `defer` · `reject`. This is the initial inventory; M5 requires implementation and evidence fields to be completed before cutover.
+
+| Capability                               | Current source                           | Target                                     | Initial status | Cutover/rollback intent                                                 |
+| ---------------------------------------- | ---------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------ | -------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| Interactive agent chat/session streaming | Hermes/Pi/OpenClaw                       | Mosaic Tess session service                | native         | Dual-run per channel; revert binding to legacy gateway                  |
+| Discord dedicated-channel routing        | Hermes/Claude/OpenClaw plugins           | Mosaic Discord plugin + gateway            | native         | Per-channel binding switch; legacy bot disabled only after soak         |
+| CLI/TUI session interaction and attach   | Hermes/Pi/tmux                           | `mosaic tess` + AgentRuntimeProvider       | native         | Keep direct tmux attach as break-glass rollback                         |
+| Session list/tree/send/terminate         | Hermes/fleet                             | AgentRuntimeProvider                       | native         | Capability-negotiated adapter remains during migration                  |
+| Mos/fleet orchestration handoff          | tmux messaging/Mosaic fleet              | Mosaic coord/fleet provider                | native         | tmux handoff remains initial transport                                  |
+| Kanban/projects/tasks                    | Hermes Kanban                            | Mosaic queue/coord/project providers       | adapt          | Read projection first; mutating cutover after parity/audit              |
+| Skills catalog/load/manage               | Hermes skills/Pi skills                  | Mosaic skill registry/provider             | adapt          | Import metadata/provenance; preserve source skill until validated       |
+| Tools and MCP                            | Hermes/OpenClaw/MCP                      | Mosaic tool registry/MCP                   | adapt          | Default deny; migrate allowlisted tools one capability at a time        |
+| Cron/scheduled work                      | Hermes cron                              | Mosaic scheduler/queue                     | adapt          | Shadow schedules; prevent duplicate execution; rollback owner field     |
+| Memory search/recent/capture             | jarvis-brain/OpenViking/OpenBrain/Hermes | Mosaic memory provider                     | adapt          | Flat/project stores remain truth; semantic systems are mirrors          |
+| User/profile preferences                 | Hermes memory/user profile               | Mosaic user/memory domain                  | adapt          | Provenance + explicit conflict rules; exportable rollback snapshot      |
+| Agent state/inbox/handoff                | OpenClaw extensions/session files        | Mosaic durable state service               | native         | Read legacy handoff during coexistence; write Mosaic only after cutover |
+| Runtime contract/bootstrap               | Mosaic framework/Hermes/OpenClaw         | Mosaic compose/runtime provider            | native         | Legacy launchers remain until clean-host parity passes                  |
+| Repository/PR workflow                   | Mosaic wrappers/Hermes tools             | Mosaic operator plugin                     | native         | Wrapper-only; no raw-provider fallback                                  |
+| Incident-safe diagnostics                | Hermes skills/tools                      | Mosaic scoped operator plugin              | adapt          | Read-only first; privileged recovery requires approval                  |
+| Broad unrestricted shell from Discord    | Hermes/OpenClaw configurations           | None                                       | reject         | No cutover; replace with allowlisted typed operations                   |
+| Raw full transcript bulk migration       | Hermes/Claude/OpenClaw histories         | Indexed summaries/selective import         | reject         | Keep source archives subject to retention; no automatic copy            |
+| Voice/video interaction                  | Hermes optional tools                    | Future Mosaic channel plugins              | defer          | Not required for Tess operational release                               |
+| Matrix transport                         | Mosaic connector                         | AgentRuntimeProvider Matrix implementation | native         | Non-default until contract/reliability parity; tmux rollback            |
+
+## Cutover Gates
+
+1. Capability contract and security tests pass.
+2. Data mapping/provenance and retention are documented.
+3. Shadow or dual-run shows no unauthorized access, loss, or duplicate effects.
+4. Operator runbook and rollback are exercised.
+5. Channel/provider binding changes are reversible without schema rollback.
+6. Legacy capability is disabled only after a defined soak period and evidence review.

docs/tess/MISSION-MANIFEST.md

@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+# Mission Manifest — Tess Interaction Agent
+
+## Mission
+
+- **ID:** tess-20260712
+- **Issue:** #706
+- **Branch:** `feat/tess-interaction-agent`
+- **Phase:** Execution
+- **Current Milestone:** TESS-M1 — Runtime contracts and security foundation
+- **Progress:** 0 / 5 delivery milestones complete
+- **Status:** active
+- **Owner:** Mosaic orchestrator; Mos is coordinating fleet authority
+- **Source PRD:** `docs/PRD.md` — `TESS-*` requirements
+- **Scratchpad:** `docs/scratchpads/tess-20260712.md`
+
+## Mission Statement
+
+Ship Tess as Jason's durable Pi-native GPT-5.6 Sol high-reasoning interaction agent for Discord and CLI, with safe visibility/control of Mosaic fleet and transitional Hermes capabilities, while Mos remains the coding/general orchestration authority.
+
+## Invariants
+
+1. Mosaic is the enterprise AI hub; Hermes is a reference migration adapter.
+2. Gateway is the single API surface.
+3. Mos owns coding/general fleet orchestration; Tess owns human interaction, visibility, mediation, and migration access.
+4. Runtime, transport, channel, memory, and external-agent integrations are replaceable adapters.
+5. No source task completes before merged PR, terminal-green CI, independent review, and linked task/issue closure.
+
+## Milestones
+
+| ID      | Issue | Name                                                                | Status      | Exit gate                                                                                                         |
+| ------- | ----- | ------------------------------------------------------------------- | ----------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| TESS-M1 | #707  | Runtime contracts and security foundation                           | ready       | AgentRuntimeProvider, normalized events/capabilities/errors, RBAC/audit contracts and contract tests merged       |
+| TESS-M2 | #708  | Durable Pi Tess service and state                                   | not-started | GPT-5.6 Sol high service starts, resumes, checkpoints, and passes restart/compaction tests                        |
+| TESS-M3 | #709  | Discord and CLI interaction surfaces                                | not-started | One durable session works through dedicated Discord binding and `mosaic tess`, including attach and approvals     |
+| TESS-M4 | #710  | Fleet, Mos, Hermes, memory, state, and tool plugins                 | not-started | Fleet/Mos boundary and transitional capability matrix demonstrated end-to-end                                     |
+| TESS-M5 | #711  | Matrix/native migration, recovery, documentation, and qualification | not-started | Transport parity, migration/rollback matrix, security review, docs, greenfield and deployment validation complete |
+
+## Success Criteria
+
+All `AC-TESS-*` criteria in `docs/PRD.md` are mapped to reproducible evidence. The final operational test must prove Discord + CLI session continuity, fleet/Mos coordination, authorized Hermes transition capabilities, denial/audit paths, restart recovery, and rollback.
+
+## Session History
+
+| Session | Date       | Runtime              | Outcome                                                                                                                                     |
+| ------- | ---------- | -------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| S1      | 2026-07-12 | Hermes / GPT-5.6 Sol | User commission captured; Mosaic/OpenViking/session/code archaeology completed; issue #706 created; PRD and task control plane initialized. |

docs/tess/TASKS.md

@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+# Tasks — Tess Interaction Agent
+
+> Mission: `tess-20260712` · Issue: #706 · PRD requirements: `TESS-*`
+> Orchestrator is sole writer. Workers must not modify this file.
+> `repo` contains one or more comma-separated repository-relative roots; every listed root must exist before dispatch.
+
+| id | status | description | issue | agent | repo | branch | depends_on | estimate | notes |
+| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
+| TESS-PLAN-001 | done | Finalize PRD, architecture, authority boundary, threat model, migration inventory, and verification matrix | #706 | sonnet | docs, packages/types, apps/gateway | feat/tess-interaction-agent | — | 22K | Independent gate PASS after two remediation rounds; completion effective when planning PR merges |
+| TESS-M1-SEC-001 | not-started | Enforce command scopes/roles and durable exact-action approval for privileged/destructive commands | #707 | codex | apps/gateway | fix/tess-command-authz | TESS-PLAN-001 | 25K | TESS-SEC-002; security TDD |
+| TESS-M1-SEC-002 | not-started | Enforce owner/tenant binding on session list/read/attach/send/terminate across REST and WS | #707 | codex | apps/gateway | fix/tess-session-ownership | TESS-PLAN-001 | 30K | TESS-SEC-003; security TDD |
+| TESS-M1-SEC-003 | not-started | Bind MCP actor/tenant to authenticated context and add per-tool scopes | #707 | codex | apps/gateway | fix/tess-mcp-identity | TESS-PLAN-001 | 22K | TESS-SEC-004; security TDD |
+| TESS-M1-SEC-004 | not-started | Add authenticated Discord service ingress, allowlists, correlation and replay protection | #707 | codex | plugins/discord, apps/gateway | fix/tess-discord-ingress | TESS-PLAN-001 | 28K | TESS-SEC-005; security TDD |
+| TESS-M1-SEC-005 | not-started | Redact/classify secret and PII before persistence/egress; harden provider login flow | #707 | codex | apps/gateway, packages/log | fix/tess-redaction | TESS-PLAN-001 | 28K | TESS-SEC-006; seeded canary tests |
+| TESS-M1-SEC-006 | not-started | Scope session GC/retention or separate authorized global retention job | #707 | codex | apps/gateway, packages/log | fix/tess-session-gc-scope | TESS-PLAN-001 | 18K | TESS-SEC-009; isolation TDD |
+| TESS-M1-001 | not-started | Define AgentRuntimeProvider, capabilities, session tree, normalized stream events/errors, attach semantics | #707 | codex | packages/types, packages/agent | feat/tess-runtime-contract | TESS-PLAN-001 | 25K | TESS-ARP-001, TESS-TRN-001; contract TDD |
+| TESS-M1-002 | not-started | Implement provider registry/service with immutable actor scope, approval, audit and correlation boundaries | #707 | codex | apps/gateway, packages/agent | feat/tess-provider-registry | TESS-M1-001,TESS-M1-SEC-001,TESS-M1-SEC-002,TESS-M1-SEC-003 | 30K | TESS-SEC-001..004,007; security TDD |
+| TESS-M1-003 | not-started | Implement tmux/fleet runtime provider and safe attach/message/terminate capability policy | #707 | codex | packages/mosaic, packages/agent | feat/tess-fleet-provider | TESS-M1-002 | 30K | TESS-FLT-001; exact target/identity tests |
+| TESS-M1-OBS-001 | not-started | Implement correlation propagation, structured runtime/provider/tool audit, health/readiness and safe effective-policy status | #707 | codex | apps/gateway, packages/agent, packages/log | feat/tess-observability | TESS-M1-002 | 24K | TESS-OBS-001; no credential material |
+| TESS-M1-V | not-started | Independent architecture/security review and complete contract/abuse-suite verification | #707 | sonnet | apps/gateway, packages/agent, packages/log, plugins/discord | review/tess-m1 | TESS-M1-SEC-001,TESS-M1-SEC-002,TESS-M1-SEC-003,TESS-M1-SEC-004,TESS-M1-SEC-005,TESS-M1-SEC-006,TESS-M1-003,TESS-M1-OBS-001 | 20K | Gate M2 |
+| TESS-M2-001 | not-started | Add Tess roster/profile/service pinned to GPT-5.6 Sol high with fail-fast config and observable effective policy | #708 | codex | packages/mosaic/framework | feat/tess-pi-service | TESS-M1-V | 22K | TESS-PI-001; explicit AC-TESS-03 test |
+| TESS-M2-002 | not-started | Implement durable session identity, inbox/outbox, approval, checkpoint, handoff, compaction and restart recovery | #708 | codex | apps/gateway, packages/agent, packages/db | feat/tess-durable-state | TESS-M2-001 | 38K | TESS-STA-001, TESS-SEC-007..008; recovery TDD |
+| TESS-M2-V | not-started | Clean-host Pi launch plus model/policy status and restart/compaction/duplicate-side-effect verification | #708 | sonnet | apps/gateway/src/__tests__/integration, packages/mosaic/src | review/tess-m2 | TESS-M2-002 | 18K | Gate M3; AC-TESS-03/06 |
+| TESS-M3-001 | not-started | Bind dedicated Tess Discord channel with streaming, threads, attachments, pairing/RBAC and approvals | #709 | codex | plugins/discord, apps/gateway | feat/tess-discord | TESS-M2-V,TESS-M1-SEC-004 | 35K | TESS-DSC-001 |
+| TESS-M3-002 | not-started | Implement `mosaic tess` chat/status/sessions/tree/attach/send/stop/health/recover CLI | #709 | codex | packages/mosaic | feat/tess-cli | TESS-M2-V | 30K | TESS-CLI-001 |
+| TESS-M3-V | not-started | Discord+CLI same-session E2E, denial/approval tests, and operator-flow review | #709 | sonnet | apps/gateway/src/__tests__/integration, plugins/discord, packages/mosaic/src | review/tess-m3 | TESS-M3-001,TESS-M3-002 | 20K | Gate M4 |
+| TESS-M4-001 | not-started | Implement Mos coordination handoff/observe/result contract with authority-boundary tests | #710 | codex | packages/coord, apps/gateway | feat/tess-mos-coordination | TESS-M3-V | 25K | TESS-MOS-001 |
+| TESS-M4-002 | not-started | Implement transitional Hermes runtime/capability adapter | #710 | codex | packages/agent, apps/gateway | feat/tess-hermes-adapter | TESS-M3-V | 40K | TESS-HRM-001; no legacy schema in core contracts |
+| TESS-M4-003 | not-started | Implement memory/retrieval, state/inbox, runtime bootstrap, fleet diagnostics and GitOps plugin foundations | #710 | codex | packages/memory, packages/agent, packages/mosaic | feat/tess-operator-plugins | TESS-M3-V | 40K | TESS-MEM-001, TESS-PLG-001 |
+| TESS-M4-V | not-started | Cross-provider capability, privacy, authority and failure-path qualification | #710 | sonnet | apps/gateway/src/__tests__/integration, packages/agent | review/tess-m4 | TESS-M4-001,TESS-M4-002,TESS-M4-003 | 22K | Gate M5 |
+| TESS-M5-001 | not-started | Implement Matrix/native runtime provider behind common contracts and parity suite | #711 | codex | packages/mosaic, packages/agent | feat/tess-matrix-provider | TESS-M4-V | 30K | TESS-TRN-001 |
+| TESS-M5-002 | not-started | Complete migration inventory, cutover, rollback, retention and deprecation evidence | #711 | sonnet | docs/tess | feat/tess-migration-docs | TESS-M4-V | 18K | TESS-MIG-001 |
+| TESS-M5-003 | not-started | Complete OpenAPI, user/admin/developer/plugin/operations docs and checklist | #711 | codex | docs | feat/tess-docs | TESS-M5-001,TESS-M5-002 | 22K | Documentation hard gate |
+| TESS-M5-V | not-started | Full baseline, contract, integration, Discord/CLI E2E, security review, recovery drill and rollback qualification | #711 | sonnet | apps/gateway, packages/agent, plugins/discord, packages/mosaic | review/tess-final | TESS-M5-003 | 35K | Maps AC-TESS-01..11 to evidence |

docs/tess/THREAT-MODEL.md

@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+# Tess Threat Model
+
+## Assets and Trust Boundaries
+
+Assets: operator identity, tenant/project data, agent sessions, fleet control, approvals, credentials, memories, tool outputs, audit evidence, and provider transports.
+
+Trust boundaries: Discord→plugin, CLI→gateway, plugin→gateway service identity, gateway→Pi/provider, Tess→Mos/fleet, Tess→Hermes, MCP→gateway, persistence, and tmux/Matrix transports.
+
+## Threat Matrix
+
+| ID    | Severity | Threat                                                                   | Required control                                                                                                                     | Required verification                                                     |
+| ----- | -------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------ | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | ------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| TM-01 | critical | Client invokes admin/system command without role                         | Server-side scope/role enforcement in executor; durable approval for privileged/destructive commands                                 | Authenticated non-admin and forged-scope tests deny and audit             |
+| TM-02 | critical | Cross-user/tenant list, attach, send, or terminate by guessed session ID | Owner/tenant binding on every session operation; admin override is explicit and audited                                              | Cross-tenant matrix for REST, WS, CLI, Discord and provider methods       |
+| TM-03 | high     | MCP caller supplies another `userId`                                     | Remove actor IDs from schemas; derive actor/tenant from authenticated context; per-tool scopes                                       | Forged actor/tool calls deny; no victim data returned                     |
+| TM-04 | high     | Discord ingress impersonates user/channel or bypasses gateway auth       | Service-to-service identity, guild/channel/user allowlists, signed/correlated envelope, replay protection                            | Invalid service identity, unlisted IDs, replayed message IDs all deny     |
+| TM-05 | high     | Secrets/PII leak in chat, auth links, tool args, logs, memory, or DB     | Redact before persistence/egress; DM/out-of-band auth flow; short-lived hashed token state; output classification                    | Seeded secret/PII canary absent from durable stores/logs/public channel   |
+| TM-06 | high     | Prompt/tool injection escalates from content to privileged action        | Treat messages/files/tool output as untrusted data; structured proposals only; allowlisted tools; approval binds exact action digest | Injection corpus cannot invoke unapproved tools or alter authority        |
+| TM-07 | high     | Approval forged, replayed, or applied to modified action                 | One-time approval with actor, tenant, action digest, expiry, correlation and consumption record                                      | Forged/replayed/expired/mutated approvals deny and audit                  |
+| TM-08 | medium   | Restart causes message loss or duplicate side effects                    | Durable inbox/outbox/checkpoint; idempotency keys; transactional state transitions; bounded replay                                   | Kill/restart at each state transition; exactly-once effect or safe dedupe |
+| TM-09 | medium   | Session GC/retention crosses tenant/session scope                        | Session/user-scoped GC or separately authorized global retention job                                                                 | GC one session; unrelated logs/memory remain unchanged                    |
+| TM-10 | high     | tmux/Matrix transport target or identity spoofing                        | Exact target/socket binding, peer identity verification, Matrix whoami, authenticated transport metadata                             | Wrong socket/peer/room/identity refuses delivery/attach                   |
+| TM-11 | medium   | Hermes adapter exposes unsupported or broader legacy powers              | Capability negotiation, default deny, normalized scopes, adapter sandbox/timeouts                                                    | Unsupported and over-scoped operations fail closed                        |
+| TM-12 | medium   | Tess competes with Mos or bypasses orchestration gates                   | Authority policy and correlated Mos handoff; no Tess worker-claim capability by default                                              | Coding/decomposition intent produces handoff, not direct claim            |
+
+## Security Invariants
+
+1. Authentication is not authorization; every command/tool/provider operation is authorized server-side.
+2. Actor, tenant, roles, and channel bindings come only from authenticated gateway context.
+3. No client-provided session ID grants ownership or attachment.
+4. No privileged action executes without a matching, unexpired, one-time approval when policy requires it.
+5. Redaction occurs before persistence and before channel egress.
+6. Every externally caused operation is replay-safe and correlated.
+7. Provider capability absence is a denial, not an invitation to shell around it.
+
+## Existing Findings That Block Tess
+
+- Command executor lacks server-side enforcement for declared scopes.
+- Session list/reuse/destroy surfaces are not owner-filtered consistently.
+- MCP schemas accept caller-supplied user identity.
+- Discord plugin lacks a complete authenticated service ingress and user/channel allowlists.
+- Chat/tool persistence lacks mandatory redaction.
+- Sessions/pending Discord output are in-memory and not restart-safe.
+- Session GC currently performs globally scoped promotion.
+
+These are tracked as M1 security prerequisites and must pass independent security review before Tess ingress is enabled.

docs/tess/VERIFICATION-MATRIX.md

@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+# Tess Verification Matrix
+
+| Acceptance criterion | Requirements                             | Planned evidence                                                                                                                | Gate             |
+| -------------------- | ---------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ---------------- |
+| AC-TESS-01           | TESS-PI-001, TESS-DSC-001, TESS-CLI-001  | Discord/CLI same-session integration and streaming E2E                                                                          | M3-V             |
+| AC-TESS-02           | TESS-ARP-001, TESS-CLI-001, TESS-FLT-001 | CLI contract tests for status/sessions/tree/attach/send/stop, typed denial/error snapshots                                      | M3-V             |
+| AC-TESS-03           | TESS-PI-001, TESS-OBS-001                | Clean service launch; status asserts GPT-5.6 Sol, high reasoning and effective tool policy with secret canaries absent          | M2-V, M3-V       |
+| AC-TESS-04           | TESS-MOS-001, TESS-FLT-001               | Authority E2E: coding request creates Mos handoff; safe status runs in Tess; no competing worker claim                          | M4-V             |
+| AC-TESS-05           | TESS-HRM-001                             | Hermes capability contract suite: sessions/stream/send/tree plus Kanban/skills/memory/tools/cron supported-or-denied matrix     | M4-V             |
+| AC-TESS-06           | TESS-STA-001, TESS-SEC-008               | Kill/restart/compaction fault injection across inbox/outbox/checkpoint transitions; duplicate side-effect detector              | M2-V, M5-V       |
+| AC-TESS-07           | TESS-SEC-001..009                        | Threat-model abuse suite: authz, tenant isolation, forged identity/approval, injection, redaction, transport identity, GC scope | M1-V, M3-V, M5-V |
+| AC-TESS-08           | TESS-TRN-001                             | Common provider contract suite against tmux/fleet and Matrix/native; identity and replay tests                                  | M5-V             |
+| AC-TESS-09           | all                                      | `pnpm typecheck`, lint, format, unit/integration/contract/E2E; independent code and security reviews; CI URLs                   | Every milestone  |
+| AC-TESS-10           | TESS-MIG-001                             | Completed capability inventory with native/adapted/deferred/rejected state, owner, cutover/rollback evidence                    | M5-V             |
+| AC-TESS-11           | TESS-PLG-001, TESS-OBS-001               | OpenAPI and user/admin/developer/plugin/ops docs, sitemap links, documentation checklist                                        | M5-V             |
+
+## Security Abuse Suite Minimum
+
+- Role/scope matrix for every command and provider capability.
+- Cross-tenant and cross-user session ID matrix across REST, WS, Discord, CLI, MCP, and providers.
+- Discord service identity, guild/channel/user allowlist, replay, attachment, and mention/DM policy cases.
+- Prompt/tool injection corpus and structured-proposal enforcement.
+- Approval action-digest mutation, replay, expiry, tenant, and actor mismatch cases.
+- Secret/PII canaries through message, attachment, tool args/output, logs, memory, audit, and error paths.
+- Restart fault injection before/after enqueue, provider send, side effect, response persistence, and acknowledgement.
+- Wrong tmux socket/target and Matrix identity/room/replay cases.
+
+## Evidence Rules
+
+Evidence must include command/test name, terminal result, CI run URL, PR/merge reference, environment, and artifact/log location. A worker self-report is not evidence until independently verified.

eslint.config.mjs

@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ export default tseslint.config(
             'apps/gateway/vitest.config.ts',
             'packages/db/vitest.config.ts',
             'packages/storage/vitest.config.ts',
+            'packages/mosaic/vitest.config.ts',
             'packages/mosaic/__tests__/*.ts',
             'tools/federation-harness/*.ts',
           ],

guides/BOOTSTRAP.md

@@ -15,6 +15,22 @@ This guide covers how to bootstrap a project so AI agents (Claude, Codex, etc.)
 7. Branching/merging is consistent: `branch -> main` via PR with squash-only merges
 8. Steered-autonomy execution is enabled so agents can run end-to-end with escalation-only human intervention
 
+## Agent Host Prerequisites
+
+Agent hosts must provide the Python runtime shape that runtime agents and
+Mosaic automation assume is present.
+
+For Debian/Ubuntu hosts:
+
+```bash
+sudo apt-get update
+# #561: bare python invocations from agents must resolve.
+sudo apt-get install -y python3 python-is-python3
+```
+
+For non-Debian hosts, install the equivalent Python 3 runtime and ensure
+`/usr/bin/python` resolves to `python3` (for example, via a managed symlink).
+
 ## Quick Start
 
 ```bash

packages/mosaic/framework/guides/BOOTSTRAP.md

@@ -15,6 +15,22 @@ This guide covers how to bootstrap a project so AI agents (Claude, Codex, etc.)
 7. Branching/merging is consistent: `branch -> main` via PR with squash-only merges
 8. Steered-autonomy execution is enabled so agents can run end-to-end with escalation-only human intervention
 
+## Agent Host Prerequisites
+
+Agent hosts must provide the Python runtime shape that runtime agents and
+Mosaic automation assume is present.
+
+For Debian/Ubuntu hosts:
+
+```bash
+sudo apt-get update
+# #561: bare python invocations from agents must resolve.
+sudo apt-get install -y python3 python-is-python3
+```
+
+For non-Debian hosts, install the equivalent Python 3 runtime and ensure
+`/usr/bin/python` resolves to `python3` (for example, via a managed symlink).
+
 ## Quick Start
 
 ```bash

packages/mosaic/framework/tools/_lib/credentials.sh

@@ -15,13 +15,23 @@
 #
 # After loading, service-specific env vars are exported.
 # Run `load_credentials --help` for details.
+#
+# Resolution order (first match wins):
+#   1. $MOSAIC_CREDENTIALS_FILE (explicit override — never second-guessed)
+#   2. $HOME/.config/mosaic/credentials.json
+#   3. /etc/mosaic/credentials.json (host-level fallback)
+# The /etc fallback exists for HOME-redirected profile environments, where
+# $HOME points at a per-profile directory that has no credentials file.
+# Operators symlink /etc/mosaic/credentials.json to the host's canonical
+# file once, instead of exporting MOSAIC_CREDENTIALS_FILE per invocation.
 
 if [[ -z "${MOSAIC_CREDENTIALS_FILE:-}" ]]; then
-  for _cand in "$HOME/.config/mosaic/credentials.json"; do
+  for _cand in "$HOME/.config/mosaic/credentials.json" "/etc/mosaic/credentials.json"; do
     if [[ -f "$_cand" ]]; then MOSAIC_CREDENTIALS_FILE="$_cand"; break; fi
   done
   : "${MOSAIC_CREDENTIALS_FILE:=$HOME/.config/mosaic/credentials.json}"
 fi
+export MOSAIC_CREDENTIALS_FILE
 
 _mosaic_require_jq() {
   if ! command -v jq &>/dev/null; then

packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/detect-platform.sh

@@ -86,7 +86,16 @@ gitea_url_matches_host() {
 
 get_gitea_service_for_host() {
     local host="$1"
-    local cred_file="${MOSAIC_CREDENTIALS_FILE:-$HOME/.config/mosaic/credentials.json}"
+    local cred_file="${MOSAIC_CREDENTIALS_FILE:-}"
+    if [[ -z "$cred_file" ]]; then
+        # Same resolution chain as _lib/credentials.sh: profile HOME, then
+        # host-level /etc only if it exists; neither existing keeps the
+        # $HOME default (matches the lib's final := fallback).
+        cred_file="$HOME/.config/mosaic/credentials.json"
+        if [[ ! -f "$cred_file" && -f /etc/mosaic/credentials.json ]]; then
+            cred_file="/etc/mosaic/credentials.json"
+        fi
+    fi
 
     case "$host" in
         git.mosaicstack.dev)

packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/issue-assign.sh

@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ Examples:
     $(basename "$0") -i 42 -l "in-progress" -m "0.2.0"
     $(basename "$0") -i 42 -a @me
 EOF
-    exit 1
+    exit "${1:-1}"
 }
 
 # Parse arguments
@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ while [[ $# -gt 0 ]]; do
             shift
             ;;
         -h|--help)
-            usage
+            usage 0
             ;;
         *)
             echo "Unknown option: $1" >&2

packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/issue-create.sh

@@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ Examples:
     $(basename "$0") -t "Fix login bug" -l "bug,priority-high"
     $(basename "$0") -t "Add dark mode" -b "Implement theme switching" -m "0.2.0"
 EOF
-    exit 1
+    exit "${1:-1}"
 }
 
 # Parse arguments
@@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ while [[ $# -gt 0 ]]; do
             shift 2
             ;;
         -h|--help)
-            usage
+            usage 0
             ;;
         *)
             echo "Unknown option: $1" >&2

packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/issue-list.sh

@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ Examples:
     $(basename "$0") -m "0.2.0"               # Issues in milestone 0.2.0
     $(basename "$0") --repo ddk/ai-bma         # List issues from anywhere
 EOF
-    exit 1
+    exit "${1:-1}"
 }
 
 # Parse arguments
@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ while [[ $# -gt 0 ]]; do
             shift 2
             ;;
         -h|--help)
-            usage
+            usage 0
             ;;
         *)
             echo "Unknown option: $1" >&2

packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/milestone-create.sh

@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ Examples:
     $(basename "$0") -t "0.0.1" -d "Pre-MVP Foundation Sprint"
     $(basename "$0") -t "0.1.0" -d "MVP Release" --due "2025-03-01"
 EOF
-    exit 1
+    exit "${1:-1}"
 }
 
 # Parse arguments
@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ while [[ $# -gt 0 ]]; do
             shift
             ;;
         -h|--help)
-            usage
+            usage 0
             ;;
         *)
             echo "Unknown option: $1" >&2

packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/pr-create.sh

@@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ Examples:
     $(basename "$0") -i 42 -b "Implements the feature described in #42"
     $(basename "$0") -t "WIP: New feature" --draft
 EOF
-    exit 1
+    exit "${1:-1}"
 }
 
 # Parse arguments
@@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ while [[ $# -gt 0 ]]; do
             shift
             ;;
         -h|--help)
-            usage
+            usage 0
             ;;
         *)
             echo "Unknown option: $1" >&2

packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/pr-list.sh

@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ Examples:
     $(basename "$0") -s merged -a username    # Merged PRs by user
     $(basename "$0") --repo ddk/ai-bma         # List PRs from anywhere
 EOF
-    exit 1
+    exit "${1:-1}"
 }
 
 # Parse arguments
@@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ while [[ $# -gt 0 ]]; do
             shift 2
             ;;
         -h|--help)
-            usage
+            usage 0
             ;;
         *)
             echo "Unknown option: $1" >&2

packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/pr-merge.sh

@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ Examples:
     $(basename "$0") -n 42 -d                 # Squash merge and delete branch
     $(basename "$0") -n 42 --skip-queue-guard # Skip queue guard wait
 EOF
-    exit 1
+    exit "${1:-1}"
 }
 
 # Parse arguments
@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ while [[ $# -gt 0 ]]; do
             shift
             ;;
         -h|--help)
-            usage
+            usage 0
             ;;
         *)
             echo "Unknown option: $1" >&2

packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/test-help-exit-code.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+# Regression harness for #701: -h/--help must exit 0, bad args must still exit nonzero.
+#
+# Covers the 7 wrappers whose usage() previously hard-coded `exit 1`, so every
+# --help invocation exited nonzero and logged a phantom isError across fleet lanes.
+# Asserts, per wrapper:
+#   1. `--help` exits 0 and prints usage.
+#   2. `-h` exits 0 and prints usage.
+#   3. A genuine unknown flag still exits nonzero (usage() default path untouched).
+
+set -euo pipefail
+
+SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
+
+WRAPPERS=(
+    issue-assign.sh
+    issue-create.sh
+    issue-list.sh
+    milestone-create.sh
+    pr-create.sh
+    pr-list.sh
+    pr-merge.sh
+)
+
+fail=0
+
+for wrapper in "${WRAPPERS[@]}"; do
+    path="$SCRIPT_DIR/$wrapper"
+
+    if ! output=$(bash "$path" --help 2>&1); then
+        echo "FAIL: $wrapper --help exited nonzero" >&2
+        fail=1
+    elif [[ "$output" != Usage:* ]]; then
+        echo "FAIL: $wrapper --help did not print usage" >&2
+        fail=1
+    fi
+
+    if ! bash "$path" -h >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+        echo "FAIL: $wrapper -h exited nonzero" >&2
+        fail=1
+    fi
+
+    if bash "$path" --this-is-not-a-real-flag >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+        echo "FAIL: $wrapper accepted an unknown flag (should have exited nonzero)" >&2
+        fail=1
+    fi
+done
+
+if [[ "$fail" -eq 0 ]]; then
+    echo "help-exit-code regression passed (7/7 wrappers)"
+fi
+
+exit "$fail"

packages/mosaic/framework/tools/tmux/README.md

@@ -87,6 +87,10 @@ message crosses the wire as base64 (`-b`) to avoid all shell-quoting hazards.
 
 - `agent-send.sh` — inter-agent wrapper (preamble + local/remote dispatch).
 - `send-message.sh` — low-level reliable single-pane submitter (`-b` base64 input).
+- `auto-submit-drafts.sh` — watchdog that flushes stable unsubmitted prompt
+  drafts on a coordinator pane (default target `mos-claude`); run it as a
+  long-lived process alongside the coordinator session.
+- `agent-send.test.sh` — regression + grammar lock for `agent-send.sh`.
 - `test-send-message-socket.sh` — smoke test for named-socket isolation.
 
 ## Distribution

packages/mosaic/framework/tools/tmux/auto-submit-drafts.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+# auto-submit-drafts.sh — watchdog for Claude Code panes that receive channel
+# messages but leave them as unsubmitted prompt drafts. Intended for Mos only.
+set -uo pipefail
+
+TARGET="${1:-mos-claude}"
+INTERVAL="${INTERVAL:-2}"
+STABLE_SECONDS="${STABLE_SECONDS:-4}"
+LOG_PREFIX="[auto-submit-drafts:$TARGET]"
+
+last_prompt=""
+first_seen=0
+
+prompt_text() {
+  tmux capture-pane -t "$TARGET" -p 2>/dev/null | python3 -c '
+import sys, re
+lines = sys.stdin.read().splitlines()
+idx = None
+for i in range(len(lines)-1, -1, -1):
+    if "❯" in lines[i]:
+        idx = i
+        break
+if idx is None:
+    raise SystemExit
+parts = []
+after = lines[idx].split("❯", 1)[1]
+parts.append(after)
+for line in lines[idx+1:]:
+    # Stop at Claude Code separator/border lines.
+    if "─" in line or "╰" in line or "╭" in line:
+        break
+    s = line.replace("\u00a0", " ")
+    s = re.sub(r"[\x00-\x1f\x7f]", "", s).strip()
+    if s:
+        parts.append(s)
+text = " ".join(parts).replace("\u00a0", " ")
+text = re.sub(r"[\x00-\x1f\x7f]", "", text).strip()
+print(text)
+'
+}
+
+while true; do
+  if ! tmux has-session -t "$TARGET" 2>/dev/null; then
+    echo "$LOG_PREFIX target missing; waiting" >&2
+    sleep "$INTERVAL"
+    last_prompt=""
+    first_seen=0
+    continue
+  fi
+
+  current="$(prompt_text || true)"
+  now="$(date +%s)"
+
+  if [[ -z "$current" ]]; then
+    last_prompt=""
+    first_seen=0
+    sleep "$INTERVAL"
+    continue
+  fi
+
+  if [[ "$current" != "$last_prompt" ]]; then
+    last_prompt="$current"
+    first_seen="$now"
+    sleep "$INTERVAL"
+    continue
+  fi
+
+  age=$(( now - first_seen ))
+  if (( age >= STABLE_SECONDS )); then
+    echo "$LOG_PREFIX submitting stable draft after ${age}s: ${current:0:120}" >&2
+    tmux send-keys -t "$TARGET" C-j
+    sleep 0.8
+    tmux send-keys -t "$TARGET" C-m
+    sleep 2
+    last_prompt=""
+    first_seen=0
+  else
+    sleep "$INTERVAL"
+  fi
+done

packages/mosaic/framework/tools/tmux/send-message.sh

@@ -77,10 +77,20 @@ snippet=$(printf '%s' "$MSG" | tr '\n' ' ' | tr -s ' ' | sed 's/[^[:print:]]//g'
 
 # 1) Paste the body as a bracketed paste so multi-line content does not submit
 #    line-by-line. load-buffer/paste-buffer is far safer than `send-keys -l`.
-printf '%s' "$MSG" | "${tmux_cmd[@]}" load-buffer -b __mosaic_send -
+# Buffer name MUST be unique per invocation: concurrent senders on the shared
+# tmux server race a fixed name (load overwrites load, -d deletes underneath),
+# cross-delivering or dropping messages — bit the fleet on the 2026-07-09
+# simultaneous restart (briefs swapped between sessions).
+BUF="__mosaic_send_$$_$(date +%s%N)"
+printf '%s' "$MSG" | "${tmux_cmd[@]}" load-buffer -b "$BUF" -
 # -p = bracketed paste when the client supports it; fall back if not.
-"${tmux_cmd[@]}" paste-buffer -d -p -b __mosaic_send -t "$EFFECTIVE_TARGET" 2>/dev/null \
-  || "${tmux_cmd[@]}" paste-buffer -d -b __mosaic_send -t "$EFFECTIVE_TARGET"
+"${tmux_cmd[@]}" paste-buffer -d -p -b "$BUF" -t "$EFFECTIVE_TARGET" 2>/dev/null \
+  || "${tmux_cmd[@]}" paste-buffer -d -b "$BUF" -t "$EFFECTIVE_TARGET" \
+  || "${tmux_cmd[@]}" delete-buffer -b "$BUF" 2>/dev/null
+# ^ -d deletes the buffer only on a SUCCESSFUL paste; if both attempts fail
+#   (e.g. the target vanished since the liveness check), delete explicitly —
+#   named buffers are exempt from tmux's buffer-limit eviction, so orphans
+#   would otherwise accumulate forever.
 sleep 0.5
 
 # 2) Submit, then verify; flush with another Enter if it is still a draft.

packages/mosaic/framework/tools/tmux/test-send-message-socket.sh

@@ -47,4 +47,32 @@ if capture_default | grep -qF "agent socket hello"; then
   fail "agent-send.sh leaked named-socket message to default tmux server"
 fi
 
+# Concurrency: parallel senders on one server must not cross-deliver or drop.
+# Locks the unique-per-invocation paste buffer (a fixed buffer name raced:
+# load overwrote load, -d deleted underneath — messages swapped between panes).
+CONC_N=5
+for i in $(seq 1 "$CONC_N"); do
+  tmux -L "$SOCKET" new-session -d -s "conc-$i" -c "$TMPDIR" 'bash --noprofile --norc -i'
+done
+pids=()
+for i in $(seq 1 "$CONC_N"); do
+  "$SEND_MESSAGE" -L "$SOCKET" -t "=conc-$i" -m "CONCPAYLOAD-${i}-END" >/dev/null &
+  pids+=($!)
+done
+for pid in "${pids[@]}"; do
+  wait "$pid" || fail "concurrent send-message.sh invocation exited non-zero"
+done
+sleep 0.2
+for i in $(seq 1 "$CONC_N"); do
+  pane=$(tmux -L "$SOCKET" capture-pane -t "=conc-$i:0.0" -p)
+  printf '%s' "$pane" | grep -qF "CONCPAYLOAD-${i}-END" \
+    || fail "concurrent send dropped payload for pane conc-$i"
+  for j in $(seq 1 "$CONC_N"); do
+    [ "$j" = "$i" ] && continue
+    if printf '%s' "$pane" | grep -qF "CONCPAYLOAD-${j}-END"; then
+      fail "concurrent send cross-delivered payload $j to pane conc-$i"
+    fi
+  done
+done
+
 echo "ok - named tmux socket send tools"

packages/mosaic/src/commands/fleet.spec.ts

@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ import { dirname, join, resolve } from 'node:path';
 import { Command } from 'commander';
 import { afterEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest';
 import {
+  acquireRestartLock,
   addAgentToRoster,
   buildAgentSendCommand,
   buildAgentWatchAttachCommand,
@@ -45,6 +46,8 @@ import {
   removeAgentFromRoster,
   resolveFleetPaths,
   resolvePresetFilename,
+  restartLockPath,
+  RESTART_LOCK_STALE_MS,
   RUNTIME_ACCEPTABLE_COMMANDS,
   serializeRosterToYaml,
   VERIFY_DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_MS,
@@ -678,6 +681,364 @@ describe('fleet command construction', () => {
     }
   });
 
+  it('waits for an in-flight restart to clear before relaunching (re-entry guard)', async () => {
+    const home = await tempDir();
+    const rosterPath = join(home, 'fleet', 'roster.yaml');
+    await mkdir(join(home, 'fleet'), { recursive: true });
+    await writeFile(
+      rosterPath,
+      ['version: 1', 'transport: tmux', 'agents:', '  - name: coder0', '    runtime: codex'].join(
+        '\n',
+      ),
+    );
+
+    // Simulate another `mosaic fleet restart` process mid-teardown: a fresh lock
+    // (recent timestamp, so it is NOT treated as stale) already held.
+    const lockPath = restartLockPath(home);
+    await mkdir(dirname(lockPath), { recursive: true });
+    await writeFile(lockPath, `4242\n${Date.now()}\n`);
+
+    const events: string[] = [];
+    const runner: CommandRunner = async (command, args) => {
+      events.push(`run:${args[args.length - 1]}`);
+      return { stdout: '', stderr: '', exitCode: 0 };
+    };
+    // The injected sleep stands in for time passing while we wait; the in-flight
+    // restart "finishes" (releases its lock) after the first poll.
+    let sleeps = 0;
+    const sleepFn: SleepFn = async () => {
+      sleeps += 1;
+      events.push(`sleep:${sleeps}`);
+      await rm(lockPath, { force: true });
+    };
+
+    const program = new Command();
+    program.exitOverride();
+    registerFleetCommand(program, { runner, sleepFn, mosaicHome: home });
+
+    try {
+      await program.parseAsync(['node', 'mosaic', 'fleet', 'restart']);
+
+      // It must have waited at least once before issuing any systemctl restart.
+      expect(sleeps).toBeGreaterThan(0);
+      const firstSleep = events.findIndex((e) => e.startsWith('sleep:'));
+      const firstRun = events.findIndex((e) => e.startsWith('run:'));
+      expect(firstSleep).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(0);
+      expect(firstRun).toBeGreaterThan(firstSleep);
+
+      // And it still performs the full restart once the lock clears.
+      expect(events).toContain('run:mosaic-tmux-holder.service');
+      expect(events).toContain('run:mosaic-agent@coder0.service');
+
+      // The lock is released after the restart completes.
+      await expect(readFile(lockPath, 'utf8')).rejects.toMatchObject({ code: 'ENOENT' });
+    } finally {
+      await rm(home, { recursive: true, force: true });
+    }
+  });
+
+  it('breaks a stale restart lock and proceeds without waiting', async () => {
+    const home = await tempDir();
+    const rosterPath = join(home, 'fleet', 'roster.yaml');
+    await mkdir(join(home, 'fleet'), { recursive: true });
+    await writeFile(
+      rosterPath,
+      ['version: 1', 'transport: tmux', 'agents:', '  - name: coder0', '    runtime: codex'].join(
+        '\n',
+      ),
+    );
+
+    // A lock left behind by a crashed owner: timestamp older than the stale window.
+    const lockPath = restartLockPath(home);
+    await mkdir(dirname(lockPath), { recursive: true });
+    await writeFile(lockPath, `4242\n${Date.now() - RESTART_LOCK_STALE_MS - 1_000}\n`);
+
+    const calls: string[][] = [];
+    const runner: CommandRunner = async (command, args) => {
+      calls.push([command, ...args]);
+      return { stdout: '', stderr: '', exitCode: 0 };
+    };
+    const sleepFn = vi.fn<SleepFn>(async () => {});
+
+    const program = new Command();
+    program.exitOverride();
+    registerFleetCommand(program, { runner, sleepFn, mosaicHome: home });
+
+    try {
+      await program.parseAsync(['node', 'mosaic', 'fleet', 'restart']);
+
+      // Stale lock is broken immediately — no waiting.
+      expect(sleepFn).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+      expect(calls).toEqual([
+        ['systemctl', '--user', 'restart', 'mosaic-tmux-holder.service'],
+        ['systemctl', '--user', 'restart', 'mosaic-agent@coder0.service'],
+      ]);
+      // The stale lock is gone once the restart completes.
+      await expect(readFile(lockPath, 'utf8')).rejects.toMatchObject({ code: 'ENOENT' });
+    } finally {
+      await rm(home, { recursive: true, force: true });
+    }
+  });
+
+  it('releases the restart lock so a subsequent restart is not blocked', async () => {
+    const home = await tempDir();
+    const rosterPath = join(home, 'fleet', 'roster.yaml');
+    await mkdir(join(home, 'fleet'), { recursive: true });
+    await writeFile(
+      rosterPath,
+      ['version: 1', 'transport: tmux', 'agents:', '  - name: coder0', '    runtime: codex'].join(
+        '\n',
+      ),
+    );
+
+    const calls: string[][] = [];
+    const runner: CommandRunner = async (command, args) => {
+      calls.push([command, ...args]);
+      return { stdout: '', stderr: '', exitCode: 0 };
+    };
+    const sleepFn = vi.fn<SleepFn>(async () => {});
+
+    const program = new Command();
+    program.exitOverride();
+    registerFleetCommand(program, { runner, sleepFn, mosaicHome: home });
+
+    try {
+      await program.parseAsync(['node', 'mosaic', 'fleet', 'restart']);
+      await program.parseAsync(['node', 'mosaic', 'fleet', 'restart']);
+
+      // Two sequential restarts both run fully and neither has to wait.
+      expect(sleepFn).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+      expect(calls).toEqual([
+        ['systemctl', '--user', 'restart', 'mosaic-tmux-holder.service'],
+        ['systemctl', '--user', 'restart', 'mosaic-agent@coder0.service'],
+        ['systemctl', '--user', 'restart', 'mosaic-tmux-holder.service'],
+        ['systemctl', '--user', 'restart', 'mosaic-agent@coder0.service'],
+      ]);
+    } finally {
+      await rm(home, { recursive: true, force: true });
+    }
+  });
+
+  it('guards the single-agent restart path behind the in-flight restart lock', async () => {
+    const home = await tempDir();
+    const rosterPath = join(home, 'fleet', 'roster.yaml');
+    await mkdir(join(home, 'fleet'), { recursive: true });
+    await writeFile(
+      rosterPath,
+      ['version: 1', 'transport: tmux', 'agents:', '  - name: coder0', '    runtime: codex'].join(
+        '\n',
+      ),
+    );
+
+    // A full restart is mid-flight (lock held); a single-agent restart re-enters.
+    const lockPath = restartLockPath(home);
+    await mkdir(dirname(lockPath), { recursive: true });
+    await writeFile(lockPath, `4242\n${Date.now()}\n`);
+
+    const events: string[] = [];
+    const runner: CommandRunner = async (command, args) => {
+      events.push(`run:${args[args.length - 1]}`);
+      return { stdout: '', stderr: '', exitCode: 0 };
+    };
+    let sleeps = 0;
+    const sleepFn: SleepFn = async () => {
+      sleeps += 1;
+      events.push(`sleep:${sleeps}`);
+      await rm(lockPath, { force: true });
+    };
+
+    const program = new Command();
+    program.exitOverride();
+    registerFleetCommand(program, { runner, sleepFn, mosaicHome: home });
+
+    try {
+      await program.parseAsync(['node', 'mosaic', 'fleet', 'restart', 'coder0']);
+
+      // The single-agent restart waits for the in-flight restart before acting.
+      expect(sleeps).toBeGreaterThan(0);
+      const firstSleep = events.findIndex((e) => e.startsWith('sleep:'));
+      const firstRun = events.findIndex((e) => e.startsWith('run:'));
+      expect(firstSleep).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(0);
+      expect(firstRun).toBeGreaterThan(firstSleep);
+      // Only the named agent is restarted; the holder is untouched.
+      expect(events).toContain('run:mosaic-agent@coder0.service');
+      expect(events).not.toContain('run:mosaic-tmux-holder.service');
+    } finally {
+      await rm(home, { recursive: true, force: true });
+    }
+  });
+
+  it('does not let a timed-out owner drop a lock another restart broke and re-owned', async () => {
+    const home = await tempDir();
+    const runDir = join(home, 'fleet', 'run');
+    await mkdir(runDir, { recursive: true });
+    const lockPath = restartLockPath(home);
+    const tokenOf = async (): Promise<string> => {
+      const raw = await readFile(lockPath, 'utf8');
+      return raw.split('\n')[2]?.trim() ?? '';
+    };
+    const sleepFn = vi.fn<SleepFn>(async () => {});
+
+    // R1 acquires the lock and begins a restart that then hangs.
+    const r1 = await acquireRestartLock(home, sleepFn);
+    const tokenR1 = await tokenOf();
+    expect(tokenR1).not.toBe('');
+
+    // The hung R1 leaves a stale lock: rewrite its timestamp into the past while
+    // preserving R1's token — exactly the on-disk state a stuck owner leaves.
+    await writeFile(lockPath, `4242\n${Date.now() - RESTART_LOCK_STALE_MS - 1_000}\n${tokenR1}\n`);
+
+    // R2 re-enters, sees the stale lock, and atomically takes ownership.
+    const r2 = await acquireRestartLock(home, sleepFn);
+    const tokenR2 = await tokenOf();
+    expect(tokenR2).not.toBe(tokenR1);
+    expect(sleepFn).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+
+    // R1 finally finishes and releases. It must NOT delete R2's lock — otherwise
+    // a third restart (R3) could acquire and interleave with R2 still running.
+    await r1.release();
+    expect(await tokenOf()).toBe(tokenR2);
+
+    // R2 releases cleanly and the lock is gone.
+    await r2.release();
+    await expect(readFile(lockPath, 'utf8')).rejects.toMatchObject({ code: 'ENOENT' });
+
+    await rm(home, { recursive: true, force: true });
+  });
+
+  it('lets only one of several concurrent breakers proceed past a stale lock', async () => {
+    const home = await tempDir();
+    const lockPath = restartLockPath(home);
+    await mkdir(dirname(lockPath), { recursive: true });
+
+    // A stale lock left by a crashed owner: every concurrent re-entrant restart
+    // will judge it stale and try to break it at the same instant. Breaking must
+    // NOT grant ownership — only the atomic re-create may — so exactly one
+    // contender can ever hold the lock at a time. (The v2 fix wrote our own token
+    // during the break and read it back, so two breakers each saw their own token
+    // and BOTH proceeded; this guards that regression.)
+    await writeFile(
+      lockPath,
+      `4242\n${Date.now() - RESTART_LOCK_STALE_MS - 1_000}\nstale-owner-token\n`,
+    );
+
+    // Yielding sleep so a waiting contender lets the current owner finish and
+    // release before it re-contends, instead of spinning the microtask queue.
+    const sleepFn: SleepFn = async () => {
+      await new Promise((res) => setTimeout(res, 0));
+    };
+
+    let active = 0;
+    let maxActive = 0;
+    const tokens: string[] = [];
+    const tokenOf = async (): Promise<string> => {
+      const raw = await readFile(lockPath, 'utf8');
+      return raw.split('\n')[2]?.trim() ?? '';
+    };
+
+    // One "restart" = acquire the lock, do work in the critical section, release.
+    const restartOnce = async (): Promise<void> => {
+      const guard = await acquireRestartLock(home, sleepFn);
+      active += 1;
+      maxActive = Math.max(maxActive, active);
+      // Record the token we own while we hold it, then yield to interleave with
+      // any other contender that might (wrongly) believe it owns the lock too.
+      tokens.push(await tokenOf());
+      await new Promise((res) => setTimeout(res, 0));
+      active -= 1;
+      await guard.release();
+    };
+
+    try {
+      // Three breakers race the single stale lock simultaneously.
+      await Promise.all([restartOnce(), restartOnce(), restartOnce()]);
+
+      // Mutual exclusion held: never two owners at once despite concurrent breaks.
+      expect(maxActive).toBe(1);
+      // Each acquire owned with its own distinct token — no two ever shared it.
+      expect(new Set(tokens).size).toBe(3);
+      // The lock is fully released at the end.
+      await expect(readFile(lockPath, 'utf8')).rejects.toMatchObject({ code: 'ENOENT' });
+    } finally {
+      await rm(home, { recursive: true, force: true });
+    }
+  });
+
+  it('lets exactly one of two breakers take over a stale lock while the other waits', async () => {
+    const home = await tempDir();
+    const lockPath = restartLockPath(home);
+    await mkdir(dirname(lockPath), { recursive: true });
+
+    // A single stale lock both contenders will judge stale at the same instant.
+    // Every transition runs under the registry mutex, so only one may take the
+    // lock over; the other must observe a now-fresh owner and WAIT/re-evaluate
+    // rather than also taking over. (A content-blind clobber let both believe
+    // they owned it — this asserts the mutex-gated CAS takeover instead.)
+    await writeFile(
+      lockPath,
+      `4242\n${Date.now() - RESTART_LOCK_STALE_MS - 1_000}\nstale-owner-token\n`,
+    );
+
+    // Barrier the winner holds against until the loser has observed the lock
+    // fresh and waited at least once — forcing the exact interleaving where one
+    // proceeds while the other waits, deterministically rather than by timing.
+    let resolveLoserWaited: () => void = () => {};
+    const loserWaited = new Promise<void>((res) => {
+      resolveLoserWaited = res;
+    });
+    let sleeps = 0;
+    const sleepFn: SleepFn = async () => {
+      sleeps += 1;
+      resolveLoserWaited();
+      await new Promise((res) => setTimeout(res, 0));
+    };
+
+    let active = 0;
+    let maxActive = 0;
+    const tokens: string[] = [];
+    const tokenOf = async (): Promise<string> => {
+      const raw = await readFile(lockPath, 'utf8');
+      return raw.split('\n')[2]?.trim() ?? '';
+    };
+
+    let firstOwner = true;
+    const restartOnce = async (): Promise<void> => {
+      const guard = await acquireRestartLock(home, sleepFn);
+      active += 1;
+      maxActive = Math.max(maxActive, active);
+      tokens.push(await tokenOf());
+      if (firstOwner) {
+        // Winner: keep holding the lock until the loser has waited once, so the
+        // loser is guaranteed to see a FRESH owner (not the stale one) and back
+        // off — proving it could not also take over.
+        firstOwner = false;
+        await loserWaited;
+      } else {
+        await new Promise((res) => setTimeout(res, 0));
+      }
+      active -= 1;
+      await guard.release();
+    };
+
+    try {
+      // Exactly two breakers race the single stale lock.
+      await Promise.all([restartOnce(), restartOnce()]);
+
+      // Mutual exclusion: never two owners at once (if both took over the stale
+      // lock, this would be 2).
+      expect(maxActive).toBe(1);
+      // Both eventually owned, each with its own distinct token.
+      expect(new Set(tokens).size).toBe(2);
+      // The loser observed the winner's fresh lock and waited — it did NOT also
+      // take over the stale lock.
+      expect(sleeps).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(1);
+      // The lock is fully released at the end.
+      await expect(readFile(lockPath, 'utf8')).rejects.toMatchObject({ code: 'ENOENT' });
+    } finally {
+      await rm(home, { recursive: true, force: true });
+    }
+  });
+
   it('attempts every agent and the holder during fleet stop even when an agent stop fails', async () => {
     const home = await tempDir();
     const rosterPath = join(home, 'fleet', 'roster.yaml');

packages/mosaic/src/commands/fleet.ts

@@ -1,5 +1,16 @@
 import { constants } from 'node:fs';
-import { access, chmod, copyFile, mkdir, readFile, unlink, writeFile } from 'node:fs/promises';
+import {
+  access,
+  chmod,
+  copyFile,
+  mkdir,
+  open,
+  readFile,
+  stat,
+  unlink,
+  writeFile,
+} from 'node:fs/promises';
+import { randomUUID } from 'node:crypto';
 import { homedir, hostname, userInfo } from 'node:os';
 import { dirname, join, resolve } from 'node:path';
 import { fileURLToPath } from 'node:url';
@@ -533,6 +544,295 @@ export function buildFleetServiceCommand(action: FleetServiceAction, agentName?:
   return ['systemctl', '--user', action, service];
 }
 
+/** Poll interval (ms) while waiting for an in-flight restart's lock to clear. */
+export const RESTART_LOCK_POLL_INTERVAL_MS = 250;
+/**
+ * Maximum time (ms) a re-entrant restart waits for the in-flight restart to
+ * finish before it breaks the lock and proceeds anyway. A bound is required so
+ * a crashed holder of the lock can never deadlock the fleet permanently.
+ */
+export const RESTART_LOCK_MAX_WAIT_MS = 30_000;
+/**
+ * Age (ms) past which a restart lock is treated as stale (its owner died
+ * without releasing it) and is broken immediately rather than waited on.
+ */
+export const RESTART_LOCK_STALE_MS = 60_000;
+
+/**
+ * Resolves the path of the cross-process restart lock for a given Mosaic home.
+ * Kept strictly under `<mosaicHome>/fleet/run` (not the heartbeat env override)
+ * so the lock is scoped to the same fleet the restart acts on.
+ */
+export function restartLockPath(mosaicHome: string): string {
+  return join(mosaicHome, 'fleet', 'run', 'restart.lock');
+}
+
+/** A held restart lock; `release()` removes the lock file iff we still own it. */
+interface RestartGuard {
+  release(): Promise<void>;
+}
+
+/** Lock-file contents: pid (informational), timestamp, and a unique owner token. */
+function formatRestartLockContent(token: string): string {
+  return `${process.pid}\n${Date.now()}\n${token}\n`;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Reads the owner token (line 3) from a lock file, or null if the file is
+ * missing/unreadable/tokenless. The token is what makes release and break
+ * ownership-safe: a process only ever acts on a lock whose token matches its own.
+ */
+async function readRestartLockToken(lockPath: string): Promise<string | null> {
+  let raw: string;
+  try {
+    raw = await readFile(lockPath, 'utf8');
+  } catch {
+    return null;
+  }
+  const token = raw.split('\n')[2]?.trim();
+  return token ? token : null;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Returns true when a lock's contents are stale: older than RESTART_LOCK_STALE_MS,
+ * or unparseable (a corrupt or partially written lock left by a crashed owner).
+ */
+function isRestartLockContentStale(raw: string, now: number): boolean {
+  const stampLine = raw.split('\n')[1] ?? '';
+  const stamp = Number.parseInt(stampLine.trim(), 10);
+  if (!Number.isFinite(stamp)) {
+    return true;
+  }
+  return now - stamp >= RESTART_LOCK_STALE_MS;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Path of the short-lived registry mutex that guards EVERY transition of the
+ * restart lock (acquire, release, takeover). Held only across a few filesystem
+ * ops — never across the restart itself — so contention clears in microseconds.
+ */
+function restartMutexPath(lockPath: string): string {
+  return `${lockPath}.mutex`;
+}
+
+/** Brief back-off between registry-mutex acquisition attempts (held microseconds). */
+const RESTART_MUTEX_RETRY_MS = 20;
+
+/**
+ * Staleness for the internal mutex / reclaim locks, judged by the file's mtime
+ * rather than its CONTENT. `open(path, 'wx')` creates the inode (with a fresh
+ * mtime) before any token/timestamp is written into it, so a content-based check
+ * would momentarily see that empty file as corrupt-and-stale and could reap a
+ * lock another contender is still acquiring. mtime is set atomically at creation,
+ * so a just-created lock always reads as live; only a lock whose holder died and
+ * stopped touching it ages past the threshold. These locks are never held across
+ * the restart itself (only a couple of filesystem ops), so any mtime this old can
+ * belong only to a dead holder.
+ */
+async function isRestartLockPathStale(path: string, now: number): Promise<boolean> {
+  try {
+    const info = await stat(path);
+    return now - info.mtimeMs >= RESTART_LOCK_STALE_MS;
+  } catch (err) {
+    if ((err as NodeJS.ErrnoException).code === 'ENOENT') {
+      return false; // Gone, not stale — the caller will re-contend.
+    }
+    return false; // Can't stat — treat as live and back off rather than reap.
+  }
+}
+
+/** Path of the reclaim lock that serializes reaping of a crashed-holder mutex. */
+function restartReclaimPath(mutexPath: string): string {
+  return `${mutexPath}.reclaim`;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Reap a registry mutex left behind by a process that CRASHED mid-transition —
+ * one whose file has aged past RESTART_LOCK_STALE_MS. Because the mutex is held
+ * only for a couple of filesystem ops (no sleeps, never across the restart), a
+ * mutex this old can only belong to a dead holder.
+ *
+ * The reap removes the dead mutex but never CREATES/holds it — acquisition stays
+ * the single `open('wx')` create in {@link acquireRestartMutex}, so exactly one
+ * contender wins ownership no matter how the reap and acquires interleave. The
+ * removal is made conditional by a dedicated reclaim lock: while it is held the
+ * dead mutex is stable (its dead holder will never touch it, and no other
+ * reclaimer can race), so re-reading it and removing it only if it is STILL stale
+ * is a true compare — a live holder's fresh mutex is never removed. This closes
+ * the reclaim race a content-blind rename-and-restore left open (a third
+ * contender slipping into the gap while a fresh mutex was moved aside).
+ */
+async function reclaimStaleRestartMutex(mutexPath: string): Promise<void> {
+  const reclaimPath = restartReclaimPath(mutexPath);
+  let handle: Awaited<ReturnType<typeof open>>;
+  try {
+    handle = await open(reclaimPath, 'wx');
+  } catch (err) {
+    if ((err as NodeJS.ErrnoException).code !== 'EEXIST') {
+      throw err;
+    }
+    // Someone is already reclaiming. If their reclaim lock is itself stale by
+    // mtime, its holder crashed mid-reap (the lock spans only a stat + unlink,
+    // microseconds) — clear it so a later pass can retry. Otherwise a live
+    // reclaimer has it; back off. Either way we do not reap the mutex this pass.
+    if (await isRestartLockPathStale(reclaimPath, Date.now())) {
+      await unlink(reclaimPath).catch(() => {});
+    }
+    return;
+  }
+  try {
+    // Re-check the mutex UNDER the reclaim lock and remove it only if it is STILL
+    // stale by mtime. A live holder's mutex is fresh and is left untouched; a dead
+    // holder's mutex is stable here (its holder is gone and no other reclaimer can
+    // race us), so this re-check is authoritative.
+    if (await isRestartLockPathStale(mutexPath, Date.now())) {
+      await unlink(mutexPath).catch(() => {});
+    }
+  } finally {
+    await handle.close();
+    await unlink(reclaimPath).catch(() => {});
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Acquire the registry mutex, BLOCKING (with brief back-offs) until held, and
+ * return a token-gated release. This is the single point of mutual exclusion for
+ * the restart lock: acquire, release, and stale/timeout takeover all run under it,
+ * so "read the lock, then mutate it" is atomic — no acquirer, releaser, or breaker
+ * can ever interleave with another. A mutex left by a crashed holder is reclaimed
+ * once it ages past the stale threshold.
+ */
+async function acquireRestartMutex(
+  mutexPath: string,
+  token: string,
+): Promise<RestartGuard['release']> {
+  for (;;) {
+    let handle: Awaited<ReturnType<typeof open>>;
+    try {
+      handle = await open(mutexPath, 'wx');
+    } catch (err) {
+      if ((err as NodeJS.ErrnoException).code !== 'EEXIST') {
+        throw err;
+      }
+      // Staleness is judged by mtime, not content, so a mutex that exists but has
+      // not yet had its token written (the open-before-write window) reads as live
+      // and is never wrongly reaped.
+      if (!(await isRestartLockPathStale(mutexPath, Date.now()))) {
+        // A live holder has it — it will be gone in microseconds. Back off briefly.
+        await new Promise((resolve) => setTimeout(resolve, RESTART_MUTEX_RETRY_MS));
+        continue;
+      }
+      await reclaimStaleRestartMutex(mutexPath);
+      continue;
+    }
+    // We created the mutex. Populate it with our token; if writing fails, clean up
+    // our own file so we never leak an empty mutex that a peer would have to reap.
+    try {
+      await handle.writeFile(formatRestartLockContent(token));
+      await handle.close();
+    } catch (err) {
+      await handle.close().catch(() => {});
+      await unlink(mutexPath).catch(() => {});
+      throw err;
+    }
+    return async (): Promise<void> => {
+      if ((await readRestartLockToken(mutexPath)) !== token) return;
+      await unlink(mutexPath).catch(() => {});
+    };
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Acquire the fleet restart lock, serializing concurrent `mosaic fleet restart`
+ * invocations across processes. Each restart tears the tmux holder (and the
+ * agent sessions inside it) down and back up; without this guard a re-entrant
+ * restart relaunches agents against a half-torn-down holder, which fails and
+ * tight-loops. A re-entrant caller waits for the in-flight restart to release
+ * the lock (clean shutdown settled) before proceeding, breaks a stale lock left
+ * by a crashed owner, and after RESTART_LOCK_MAX_WAIT_MS breaks the lock to
+ * avoid a permanent deadlock.
+ *
+ * Correctness rests on a single invariant: EVERY transition of the lock — taking
+ * a free lock, taking over a stale/timed-out one, and releasing — happens under
+ * the registry mutex. Because the check ("is the lock free / stale / fresh?") and
+ * the mutation that follows it both run while the mutex is held, they are atomic:
+ * no other acquirer, releaser, or breaker can slip in between. That is what makes
+ * takeover a true compare-and-swap rather than a content-blind clobber — a normal
+ * `open('wx')` acquirer cannot create a fresh lock in a gap, and the original
+ * owner's `release()` (also mutex-gated and token-checked) cannot drop a lock a
+ * breaker already took over. So no interleaving lets two restarts both own the
+ * lock and run concurrently.
+ */
+export async function acquireRestartLock(
+  mosaicHome: string,
+  sleepFn: SleepFn,
+): Promise<RestartGuard> {
+  const token = randomUUID();
+  const lockPath = restartLockPath(mosaicHome);
+  const mutexPath = restartMutexPath(lockPath);
+  await mkdir(dirname(lockPath), { recursive: true });
+  const release = async (): Promise<void> => {
+    // Mutex-gated and token-gated: only remove the lock if it is still ours. If
+    // another caller took it over (after a stale/timeout break) the token no
+    // longer matches and we leave their lock intact.
+    const releaseMutex = await acquireRestartMutex(mutexPath, token);
+    try {
+      if ((await readRestartLockToken(lockPath)) === token) {
+        await unlink(lockPath).catch(() => {});
+      }
+    } finally {
+      await releaseMutex();
+    }
+  };
+  const deadline = Date.now() + RESTART_LOCK_MAX_WAIT_MS;
+  for (;;) {
+    let owned = false;
+    const releaseMutex = await acquireRestartMutex(mutexPath, token);
+    try {
+      // Read and (if appropriate) mutate the lock atomically under the mutex.
+      let current: string | null = null;
+      let absent = false;
+      try {
+        current = await readFile(lockPath, 'utf8');
+      } catch (readErr) {
+        if ((readErr as NodeJS.ErrnoException).code === 'ENOENT') {
+          absent = true;
+        } else {
+          current = null; // Unreadable/corrupt: treat as stale.
+        }
+      }
+      const now = Date.now();
+      if (absent) {
+        // Lock is free — take it.
+        await writeFile(lockPath, formatRestartLockContent(token));
+        owned = true;
+      } else {
+        const stale = current === null || isRestartLockContentStale(current, now);
+        const timedOut = now >= deadline;
+        if (stale || timedOut) {
+          process.stderr.write(
+            stale
+              ? 'Breaking stale fleet restart lock.\n'
+              : `Timed out after ${RESTART_LOCK_MAX_WAIT_MS}ms waiting for the in-flight fleet ` +
+                  'restart; breaking the lock.\n',
+          );
+          // Takeover is just an overwrite — safe because we hold the mutex, so no
+          // acquirer or releaser can touch the lock between our read and this write.
+          await writeFile(lockPath, formatRestartLockContent(token));
+          owned = true;
+        }
+        // else: a fresh restart owns it — wait below and re-evaluate.
+      }
+    } finally {
+      await releaseMutex();
+    }
+    if (owned) {
+      return { release };
+    }
+    await sleepFn(RESTART_LOCK_POLL_INTERVAL_MS);
+  }
+}
+
 /**
  * Returns the systemctl --user enable command for a given unit.
  * Used by the install auto-enable step to persist units across reboots.
@@ -1172,6 +1472,7 @@ export function isSendAccepted(capturedOutput: string): SendVerifyResult {
 
 export function registerFleetCommand(program: Command, deps: FleetCommandDeps = {}): Command {
   const runner = deps.runner ?? runCommand;
+  const sleepFn = deps.sleepFn ?? defaultSleep;
   const paths = resolveFleetPaths(deps.mosaicHome);
   const frameworkRoot = deps.frameworkRoot ?? resolveFrameworkRoot();
 
@@ -1285,9 +1586,22 @@ export function registerFleetCommand(program: Command, deps: FleetCommandDeps =
       .command(`${action} [agent]`)
       .description(`${action} the fleet holder or one agent`)
       .action(async (agent?: string) => {
+        const commandOpts = cmd.opts<{ mosaicHome: string; roster?: string }>();
+        const activePaths = resolveFleetPaths(commandOpts.mosaicHome);
         const roster = await loadRosterForCommand(cmd);
         if (agent) {
           getRosterAgent(roster, agent);
+          // Single-agent restart is guarded too: it can race a full restart that
+          // is tearing the shared holder down.
+          if (action === 'restart') {
+            const guard = await acquireRestartLock(activePaths.mosaicHome, sleepFn);
+            try {
+              await runChecked(runner, buildFleetServiceCommand(action, agent));
+            } finally {
+              await guard.release();
+            }
+            return;
+          }
           await runChecked(runner, buildFleetServiceCommand(action, agent));
           return;
         }
@@ -1298,6 +1612,21 @@ export function registerFleetCommand(program: Command, deps: FleetCommandDeps =
           );
           return;
         }
+        if (action === 'restart') {
+          // Serialize the holder+agents teardown/relaunch behind the restart lock
+          // so a re-entrant restart waits for clean shutdown before relaunching,
+          // instead of racing a half-torn-down holder into a tight loop.
+          const guard = await acquireRestartLock(activePaths.mosaicHome, sleepFn);
+          try {
+            await runChecked(runner, buildFleetServiceCommand(action));
+            for (const rosterAgent of roster.agents) {
+              await runChecked(runner, buildFleetServiceCommand(action, rosterAgent.name));
+            }
+          } finally {
+            await guard.release();
+          }
+          return;
+        }
         await runChecked(runner, buildFleetServiceCommand(action));
         for (const rosterAgent of roster.agents) {
           await runChecked(runner, buildFleetServiceCommand(action, rosterAgent.name));

packages/mosaic/vitest.config.ts

@@ -4,5 +4,6 @@ export default defineConfig({
   test: {
     globals: true,
     environment: 'node',
+    testTimeout: 30_000,
   },
 });

tools/install.sh

@@ -16,6 +16,10 @@
 #   --framework       Install/upgrade framework only (skip npm CLI)
 #   --cli             Install/upgrade npm CLI only (skip framework)
 #   --ref <branch>    Git ref for framework archive (default: main)
+#   --dev             Build CLI + gateway FROM SOURCE at --ref instead of the
+#                     registry @latest. Zero registry writes — packs local
+#                     tarballs and installs them globally. Use to test a branch
+#                     end-to-end before cutting a release.
 #   --yes             Accept all defaults; headless/non-interactive install
 #   --no-auto-launch  Skip automatic mosaic wizard + gateway install on first install
 #   --uninstall       Reverse the install: remove framework dir, CLI package, and npmrc line
@@ -27,6 +31,7 @@
 #   MOSAIC_PREFIX       — npm global prefix          (default: ~/.npm-global)
 #   MOSAIC_NO_COLOR     — disable colour             (set to 1)
 #   MOSAIC_REF          — git ref for framework      (default: main)
+#   MOSAIC_DEV          — equivalent to --dev         (set to 1)
 #   MOSAIC_ASSUME_YES   — equivalent to --yes        (set to 1)
 # ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 #
@@ -43,6 +48,7 @@ FLAG_CLI=true
 FLAG_NO_AUTO_LAUNCH=false
 FLAG_YES=false
 FLAG_UNINSTALL=false
+FLAG_DEV=false
 GIT_REF="${MOSAIC_REF:-main}"
 
 # MOSAIC_ASSUME_YES env var acts the same as --yes
@@ -50,12 +56,18 @@ if [[ "${MOSAIC_ASSUME_YES:-0}" == "1" ]]; then
   FLAG_YES=true
 fi
 
+# MOSAIC_DEV env var acts the same as --dev
+if [[ "${MOSAIC_DEV:-0}" == "1" ]]; then
+  FLAG_DEV=true
+fi
+
 while [[ $# -gt 0 ]]; do
   case "$1" in
     --check)          FLAG_CHECK=true; shift ;;
     --framework)      FLAG_CLI=false; shift ;;
     --cli)            FLAG_FRAMEWORK=false; shift ;;
     --ref)            GIT_REF="${2:-main}"; shift 2 ;;
+    --dev)            FLAG_DEV=true; shift ;;
     --yes|-y)         FLAG_YES=true; shift ;;
     --no-auto-launch) FLAG_NO_AUTO_LAUNCH=true; shift ;;
     --uninstall)      FLAG_UNINSTALL=true; shift ;;
@@ -72,6 +84,17 @@ CLI_PKG="${SCOPE}/mosaic"
 REPO_BASE="https://git.mosaicstack.dev/mosaicstack/stack"
 ARCHIVE_URL="${REPO_BASE}/archive/${GIT_REF}.tar.gz"
 
+# In dev (build-from-source) mode the gateway is installed globally from a
+# locally-built tarball. Tell the wizard / gateway-config stage NOT to overwrite
+# it with the registry @latest build (honored by gatewayConfigStage).
+if [[ "$FLAG_DEV" == "true" ]]; then
+  export MOSAIC_GATEWAY_SKIP_NPM_INSTALL=1
+fi
+
+# Shared monorepo checkout (populated on demand by ensure_monorepo).
+WORK_DIR=""
+EXTRACTED_DIR=""
+
 # ─── uninstall path ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 # Shell-level uninstall for when the CLI is broken or not available.
 # Handles: framework directory, npm CLI package, npmrc scope line.
@@ -239,6 +262,99 @@ framework_version() {
   fi
 }
 
+# Download + extract the monorepo archive at $GIT_REF exactly once per run.
+# Sets the script-level EXTRACTED_DIR to the repo root. Reused by both the
+# framework install (Part 1) and the dev build-from-source path (Part 2).
+ensure_monorepo() {
+  if [[ -n "$EXTRACTED_DIR" ]] && [[ -d "$EXTRACTED_DIR" ]]; then
+    return 0
+  fi
+
+  require_cmd tar
+
+  WORK_DIR="$(mktemp -d "${TMPDIR:-/tmp}/mosaic-install-XXXXXX")"
+  # shellcheck disable=SC2317
+  cleanup_work() { [[ -n "$WORK_DIR" ]] && rm -rf "$WORK_DIR"; }
+  trap cleanup_work EXIT
+
+  info "Downloading source from ${GIT_REF}…"
+  if command -v curl &>/dev/null; then
+    curl -fsSL "$ARCHIVE_URL" | tar xz -C "$WORK_DIR"
+  elif command -v wget &>/dev/null; then
+    wget -qO- "$ARCHIVE_URL" | tar xz -C "$WORK_DIR"
+  else
+    fail "curl or wget required to download source."
+    exit 1
+  fi
+
+  # Gitea archives extract to <repo-name>/ inside the work dir
+  EXTRACTED_DIR="$(find "$WORK_DIR" -maxdepth 1 -mindepth 1 -type d | head -1)"
+  if [[ -z "$EXTRACTED_DIR" ]] || [[ ! -d "$EXTRACTED_DIR" ]]; then
+    fail "Could not locate extracted source in archive."
+    ls -la "$WORK_DIR" >&2
+    exit 1
+  fi
+}
+
+# Build @mosaicstack/mosaic + @mosaicstack/gateway from source and install both
+# globally from locally-packed tarballs. ZERO registry writes. Workspace deps
+# (brain/config/db/…) are pulled from the registry at the versions pinned in
+# each package.json — `pnpm pack` rewrites `workspace:*` to those versions.
+install_cli_from_source() {
+  local src="$EXTRACTED_DIR"
+  local out_dir="$WORK_DIR/dist-tarballs"
+  mkdir -p "$out_dir"
+
+  # pnpm via corepack (ships with Node >= 16.9; required by Node >= 20 preflight).
+  # Pin to the repo's packageManager version so the build matches CI. Surface
+  # corepack failures so the fresh-machine case gives an actionable error
+  # instead of a bare "command not found".
+  if ! command -v pnpm &>/dev/null; then
+    info "Activating pnpm via corepack…"
+    corepack enable 2>&1 | sed 's/^/  /' || warn "corepack enable failed — pnpm may need manual install."
+    corepack prepare pnpm@10.6.2 --activate 2>&1 | sed 's/^/  /' \
+      || warn "corepack prepare failed — pnpm may need manual install."
+  fi
+  if ! command -v pnpm &>/dev/null; then
+    fail "pnpm not available after corepack activation."
+    echo "  Install pnpm manually (https://pnpm.io/installation) and re-run with --dev."
+    exit 1
+  fi
+
+  info "Installing workspace dependencies (pnpm install)…"
+  ( cd "$src" && pnpm install ) 2>&1 | sed 's/^/  /'
+
+  info "Building CLI + gateway from source…"
+  ( cd "$src" && pnpm --filter "@mosaicstack/mosaic..." --filter "@mosaicstack/gateway..." run build ) 2>&1 | sed 's/^/  /'
+
+  info "Packing local tarballs…"
+  ( cd "$src/packages/mosaic" && pnpm pack --pack-destination "$out_dir" ) 2>&1 | sed 's/^/  /'
+  ( cd "$src/apps/gateway"    && pnpm pack --pack-destination "$out_dir" ) 2>&1 | sed 's/^/  /'
+
+  local cli_tgz gw_tgz
+  cli_tgz="$(ls -1t "$out_dir"/mosaicstack-mosaic-*.tgz 2>/dev/null | head -1)"
+  gw_tgz="$(ls -1t "$out_dir"/mosaicstack-gateway-*.tgz 2>/dev/null | head -1)"
+
+  if [[ ! -f "$cli_tgz" ]]; then
+    fail "CLI tarball was not produced by pnpm pack."
+    exit 1
+  fi
+  if [[ ! -f "$gw_tgz" ]]; then
+    fail "Gateway tarball was not produced by pnpm pack."
+    exit 1
+  fi
+
+  # Gateway first so it is present globally before the CLI's wizard runs (which
+  # skips its own gateway install via MOSAIC_GATEWAY_SKIP_NPM_INSTALL=1).
+  info "Installing gateway from source tarball (global)…"
+  npm install -g "$gw_tgz" --prefix="$PREFIX" 2>&1 | sed 's/^/  /'
+
+  info "Installing CLI from source tarball (global)…"
+  npm install -g "$cli_tgz" --prefix="$PREFIX" 2>&1 | sed 's/^/  /'
+
+  ok "Installed from source: CLI $(installed_cli_version)"
+}
+
 # ─── preflight ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 
 require_cmd node
@@ -282,25 +398,8 @@ if [[ "$FLAG_FRAMEWORK" == "true" ]]; then
       warn "Framework not installed."
     fi
   else
-    # Download repo archive and extract framework
-    require_cmd tar
-
-    WORK_DIR="$(mktemp -d "${TMPDIR:-/tmp}/mosaic-install-XXXXXX")"
-    cleanup_work() { rm -rf "$WORK_DIR"; }
-    trap cleanup_work EXIT
-
-    info "Downloading framework from ${GIT_REF}…"
-    if command -v curl &>/dev/null; then
-      curl -fsSL "$ARCHIVE_URL" | tar xz -C "$WORK_DIR"
-    elif command -v wget &>/dev/null; then
-      wget -qO- "$ARCHIVE_URL" | tar xz -C "$WORK_DIR"
-    else
-      fail "curl or wget required to download framework."
-      exit 1
-    fi
-
-    # Gitea archives extract to <repo-name>/ inside the work dir
-    EXTRACTED_DIR="$(find "$WORK_DIR" -maxdepth 1 -mindepth 1 -type d | head -1)"
+    # Download repo archive and extract framework (shared with the dev build)
+    ensure_monorepo
     FRAMEWORK_SRC="$EXTRACTED_DIR/packages/mosaic/framework"
 
     if [[ ! -d "$FRAMEWORK_SRC" ]]; then
@@ -356,7 +455,11 @@ if [[ "$FLAG_CLI" == "true" ]]; then
   fi
 
   CURRENT="$(installed_cli_version)"
-  LATEST="$(latest_cli_version)"
+  if [[ "$FLAG_DEV" == "true" ]]; then
+    LATEST=""
+  else
+    LATEST="$(latest_cli_version)"
+  fi
 
   if [[ -n "$CURRENT" ]]; then
     dim "  Installed: ${CLI_PKG}@${CURRENT}"
@@ -364,7 +467,9 @@ if [[ "$FLAG_CLI" == "true" ]]; then
     dim "  Installed: (none)"
   fi
 
-  if [[ -n "$LATEST" ]]; then
+  if [[ "$FLAG_DEV" == "true" ]]; then
+    dim "  Source:    ${REPO_BASE} (ref: ${GIT_REF}, build-from-source)"
+  elif [[ -n "$LATEST" ]]; then
     dim "  Latest:    ${CLI_PKG}@${LATEST}"
   else
     dim "  Latest:    (registry unreachable)"
@@ -372,7 +477,9 @@ if [[ "$FLAG_CLI" == "true" ]]; then
   echo ""
 
   if [[ "$FLAG_CHECK" == "true" ]]; then
-    if [[ -z "$LATEST" ]]; then
+    if [[ "$FLAG_DEV" == "true" ]]; then
+      info "Dev mode: installed version is ${CURRENT:-(none)} (no registry comparison)."
+    elif [[ -z "$LATEST" ]]; then
       warn "Could not reach registry."
     elif [[ -z "$CURRENT" ]]; then
       warn "Not installed."
@@ -383,6 +490,16 @@ if [[ "$FLAG_CLI" == "true" ]]; then
     else
       ok "Up to date (or ahead of registry)."
     fi
+  elif [[ "$FLAG_DEV" == "true" ]]; then
+    info "Dev mode — building CLI + gateway from source at ref ${GIT_REF}…"
+    ensure_monorepo
+    install_cli_from_source
+
+    # PATH check for npm prefix
+    if [[ ":$PATH:" != *":$PREFIX/bin:"* ]]; then
+      warn "$PREFIX/bin is not on your PATH"
+      dim "  Add to your shell rc:  export PATH=\"$PREFIX/bin:\$PATH\""
+    fi
   else
     if [[ -z "$LATEST" ]]; then
       warn "Could not reach registry at $REGISTRY — skipping npm CLI."