docs(wake): #953 dead-letter retention recorded as load-bearing at the write site (#968 )

Closes #953. GATE RECORD: review CLEAR at this exact head (author != reviewer, pre-registered diff-blind checks) + terminal-green CI at this exact head + queue guard clear. CI CAVEAT (#973): green on the wake suites is currently WEAKER THAN IT LOOKS, IN BOTH DIRECTIONS. grep error/spawn exit codes are read as absence across 257 assertion sites in six idiom forms; 36 inverted (&&-fail) sites — including 19 credential-security canaries — fail toward GREEN under load. These greens were obtained on solo reruns after load-correlated FALSE reds (2115/2116/2118; main itself was red). This merge's safety therefore rests on the CONTENT review, not on the green. Remediation charter fa551c2d0 is authored and in flight. Co-authored-by: mos-dt-0 <[email protected]>
fix(wake): #952 quarantine-audit clean sweep names BOTH unprovable residual classes (#967 )
2026-07-30 23:25:38 +00:00 · 2026-07-30 23:25:34 +00:00 · 2026-07-30 21:48:06 +00:00
12 changed files with 1324 additions and 154 deletions
@@ -39,7 +39,6 @@ overwritten on upgrade. (Layer model: `constitution/LAYER-MODEL.md`.)
 | TypeScript strict typing                           | `guides/TYPESCRIPT.md`             |
 | QA / test strategy                                 | `guides/QA-TESTING.md`             |
 | Documentation (any code/API/auth/infra change)     | `guides/DOCUMENTATION.md`          |
-| Writing style (docs, comms, any prose)             | `guides/WRITING-STYLE.md`          |
 | Secrets / vault usage                              | `guides/VAULT-SECRETS.md`          |
 | Tool/credential reference (service CLIs, wrappers) | `guides/TOOLS-REFERENCE.md`        |
 | Memory protocol (OpenBrain capture/recall)         | `guides/MEMORY.md`                 |
@@ -27,14 +27,6 @@ Master/slave model:
 - Do not perform destructive git/file actions without explicit instruction.
 - Browser automation (Playwright, Cypress, Puppeteer) MUST run in headless mode. Never launch a visible browser — it collides with the user's display and active session.

-### Output standards (writing + code)
-
- Technical documentation follows **MOS-STE** (Mosaic Simplified Technical English — an adapted ASD-STE100 profile): short sentences, one instruction per sentence, active voice, one word per meaning, one term per concept. Full rules: `~/.config/mosaic/guides/WRITING-STYLE.md`.
- Apply MOS-STE **hardest to verification artifacts** (acceptance criteria, witness predicates, gate/alarm conditions). There an ambiguous term produces a false green, not just a confused reader.
- Source code follows the **Google Style Guide** for the language.
- User-facing comms follow the user's declared `communicationStyle` in `USER.md` "Communication Preferences" (`direct` | `friendly` | `formal`, default `direct`); `guides/WRITING-STYLE.md` §5 maps each value to output. The documentation standard does not change with user preference.
- **Carve-out:** MOS-STE does NOT apply to content that must carry a specific human voice (letters, personal or marketing prose, voice-matched output). A declared voice profile wins.
-
 ### Secrets handling (HARD RULE)

 - Vault is the canonical source-of-truth for every secret in every environment. No exceptions.
@@ -1,134 +0,0 @@
-# Writing Style Standard — MOS-STE (MANDATORY)
-
-This guide defines how agents write. It sets one style standard per output type.
-It is written in the standard it defines, as a worked example.
-
-**Adapted, not compliant.** MOS-STE (Mosaic Simplified Technical English) is an
-adapted profile of ASD-STE100. Mosaic does not license or certify against
-ASD-STE100. Mosaic uses the load-bearing rules and fits them to agent work. This
-is the same stance Mosaic takes toward DO-178B/C: use the rigor, do not claim the
-certification.
-
-## Scope — which standard governs which output
-
-| Output type | Standard |
-|---|---|
-| Technical documentation (READMEs, runbooks, PRDs, procedures, ADRs, guides, acceptance criteria, design docs) | **MOS-STE** (this guide) |
-| Source code and code comments | **Google Style Guide** for the language (§4) |
-| Inter-agent comms | MOS-STE by default (concise, structured) |
-| User-facing comms | **Per-user style choice** — read `USER.md` "Communication Preferences" (§5) |
-| End-user prose the user owns (marketing, letters, personal writing, voice-matched content) | The user's declared voice. MOS-STE does NOT apply. |
-
-**The user-voice carve-out is absolute.** Do not apply MOS-STE to content that
-must carry a specific human voice (for example a cover letter, a personal
-message, or marketing copy). That content needs the user's voice. MOS-STE would
-damage it. When a project declares a voice profile, that profile wins.
-
-## 1. Why one standard
-
-Agent documentation drifts across projects. Different agents use different terms,
-sentence styles, and structures for the same concept. Readers lose time.
-Assumptions hide in ambiguous prose. One standard gives agents a clear target. It
-gives reviewers a clear test.
-
-## 2. Where MOS-STE matters most — verification artifacts
-
-Apply MOS-STE hardest to acceptance criteria, witness predicates, gate
-definitions, and alarm conditions. In prose, an ambiguous term produces a
-confused reader. In a verification artifact, an ambiguous term produces a false
-green — a check that passes without testing the claim.
-
-The one-term-one-concept rule (rule 9) is the guard. When one word names two
-concepts in one predicate, the check can test the wrong concept and still pass.
-
-**Worked failure.** A rename used a witness predicate with three clauses: ref A
-present, ref B absent, tip committed from this host. Every clause tested the git
-*ref* (the channel). The claim under test was about a *field inside the payload*.
-The word "beacon" named two concepts in one sentence. Deleting ref B was the next
-scheduled step. That step flips the last clause green and certifies a state in
-which the payload still names the wrong host. The predicate was one planned action
-away from a false green on its normal path. The payload field was never tested.
-
-Rule: when N failure modes share one observable, the observable is not a
-diagnostic. In a verification artifact, that ambiguity does not confuse a reader —
-it certifies the defect.
-
-## 3. MOS-STE rules
-
-### 3.1 Sentence rules
-
-1. Keep sentences short. Use 20 words or fewer for a procedure. Use 25 words or
-   fewer for a description. (Reasoning and doctrine prose relaxes this limit —
-   see §3.4. A future lint enforces §3.1, not §3.4.)
-2. Write one instruction per sentence. In a procedure, give one command per step.
-3. Use the active voice. Write "Run the script." Do not write "The script should
-   be run."
-4. Use the imperative for instructions. Start the sentence with the verb.
-5. Use simple verb tenses. Prefer the present tense. Avoid the perfect and
-   progressive tenses when a simple tense works.
-6. Do not use an `-ing` form when it makes the meaning unclear.
-7. Write positive statements. State what to do, not only what to avoid.
-
-### 3.2 Word rules
-
-8. Use one word for one meaning. Do not use the same word in two senses.
-9. Use one term for one concept. Do not use synonyms for variety. Example: choose
-   `secret`, `credential`, or `key` for each concept, and keep it.
-10. Use articles (`a`, `the`). Do not drop words to save space.
-11. Keep an approved-terms glossary per project. Add each domain noun and each
-    chosen verb. Technical names (for example `Vault`, `cgroup`, `systemd`) are
-    always allowed.
-12. Define an abbreviation at its first use. Then use it consistently.
-
-### 3.3 Structure rules
-
-13. Use a list for parallel items or sequential steps. Do not put them in one long
-    sentence.
-14. Use a table for data with more than two dimensions.
-15. Use parallel structure in headings and steps.
-16. Repeat the noun. Do not use a pronoun when the reference is unclear.
-
-### 3.4 Adaptation notes (where MOS-STE deviates from ASD-STE100, and why)
-
- **No licensed dictionary.** ASD-STE100 ships a controlled dictionary under
-  copyright. MOS-STE uses per-project glossaries instead (rule 11).
- **Domain terms are allowed.** MOS-STE keeps every term the work needs.
- **Reasoning prose gets structure, not amputation.** Apply the sentence and word
-  rules to design and doctrine writing. Allow the length a subtle argument needs.
-  Readable-first beats rule-strict when the two conflict.
-
-## 4. Code — Google Style Guide
-
-Write source code to the Google Style Guide for the language (Python, TypeScript,
-Shell, Go, and so on). Match the existing file when a local convention already
-exists. Keep code comments to the MOS-STE sentence and word rules.
-
-## 5. User-facing comms — a per-user choice
-
-Mosaic is multi-user. Different users want different comms styles. The framework
-already carries the selectable setting: `communicationStyle` (`direct` |
-`friendly` | `formal`, default `direct`). `mosaic init` writes it, and the
-builder renders it into the generated `USER.md` "Communication Preferences"
-section. This guide adds the OUTPUT meaning of each value; do not invent new
-values.
-
-The builder renders the style as prose bullets, not the token name, so match on
-the leading bullet the generated `USER.md` actually contains:
-
-| `USER.md` leading bullet | Style | User-facing output |
-|---|---|---|
-| "Direct and concise" | `direct` (default) | MOS-STE structure — short, active, defined terms, tables for overview. |
-| "Warm and conversational" | `friendly` | Warmer register. Full sentences, explain reasoning, fewer tables. |
-| "Professional and structured" | `formal` | Professional and structured. Thorough, with explicit recommendations. |
-
-This setting governs **user-facing comms only**. It does not change the
-documentation standard (§3), which is always MOS-STE regardless of the value.
-
-## 6. Enforcement
-
- **Now:** human review only. **No mechanical prose check exists today.** The
-  pre-push gate runs typecheck, lint, build, and tests; it inspects no prose.
-  Reviewers check output against the scope table and the MOS-STE rules by hand.
- **Future:** an MOS-STE lint check (built from the §3.1 sentence rules) and a
-  Google-style linter in the pre-push gate. A future linter enforces §3.1, not
-  §3.4 — see the note at rule 1.
@@ -414,6 +414,22 @@ cmd_poll_once() {
  _wake_clean_stale_tmp "$STATE_DIR"
  mkdir -p "$DET_DIR"

+  local failed=0
+
+  # #958 preimage provenance: check the OPERATOR-SIDE preimage definition (the
+  # source adapter file, the watch-list, operator-declared extras) BEFORE
+  # observing any source. A changed preimage re-baselines EVERY source at once;
+  # running the check first means its first-class cause line is enqueued at a
+  # LOWER observed_seq than the N per-source deltas it explains, so the digest
+  # shows the cause, not just the flood. An infrastructure failure of the check
+  # is LOUD and marks this pass failed (G2a discipline — never read as "no
+  # change"), but source observation still proceeds: provenance must not be
+  # able to starve wake delivery.
+  if ! "$SCRIPT_DIR/preimage.sh" check --enqueue; then
+    echo "detector.sh: FAIL LOUD — preimage provenance check failed (see preimage.sh above); source observation continues but this pass exits non-zero." >&2
+    failed=1
+  fi
+
  # Iterate the DECLARED source-coverage inventory (§4/G3): only sources listed
  # in watches[].sources[] are polled. An omitted source is not observed (and so
  # cannot make anything pass vacuously); a referenced-but-undefined source is a
@@ -427,7 +443,7 @@ cmd_poll_once() {
    exit 2
  fi

-  local failed=0 kind id def class
+  local kind id def class
  while IFS=$'\t' read -r kind id; do
    [ -n "$kind" ] || continue
    # Resolve the source definition from its top-level collection by id.
@@ -488,6 +488,19 @@ _dlq_alarm_offhost() {
 # A dead-letter write failure is itself alarmed (both legs) but never aborts the
 # drain — the good entries MUST still deliver (availability is the whole point of
 # #920).
+#
+# RETENTION IS LOAD-BEARING (#953) — read BEFORE adding rotation/pruning/caps:
+# this ledger is append-only history AND the SOLE evidence base for
+# store.sh quarantine-audit's conviction predicate (#946): a false
+# consumed-hashes witness row is provable ONLY while its matching entry
+# survives HERE. Any rotation, pruning, or size cap — however locally correct
+# — silently converts provable rows into unprovable ones, and the audit's
+# clean sweep reads IDENTICALLY before and after the evidence disappears (no
+# signal at either end; the audit never guesses, by design). If retention
+# limits ever become genuinely necessary, they MUST ship with (a) a loud
+# signal at prune time naming what evidence is being given up, and (b) the
+# audit's residual-class reporting updated IN THE SAME CHANGE. Until then:
+# nothing prunes this file, and that is a recorded decision, not an omission.
 _quarantine_entry() {
  local line="$1" seq="$2" dlq="$STATE_DIR/dead-letter.jsonl"
  if [ ! -f "$dlq" ] || ! grep -qxF "$line" "$dlq" 2>/dev/null; then
@@ -374,8 +374,99 @@
 #              Changed: store.sh, digest.sh, ack.sh
 #              (+ test-wake-store-ack.sh T13-T16,
 #              test-wake-digest-quarantine.sh Q12-Q16).
+#   0.7.0  #958 A11 preimage.sh — durable provenance for the OPERATOR-SIDE
+#              preimage definition (wake-pilot finding: source-adapter.sh was
+#              unversioned, so the operator-owned bytes every observed_hash is
+#              computed FROM had thinner provenance than any hash they feed;
+#              attribution required an agent transcript). NEW tool + two
+#              pre-step integrations, ADDITIVE: (1) preimage.sh derives the
+#              preimage set from the RUNTIME env (the resolved
+#              WAKE_DETECTOR_SOURCE_CMD file, WAKE_WATCH_LIST, optional
+#              WAKE_PREIMAGE_EXTRA paths) and, per file, records
+#              {ts,path,sha256,size,mtime,prev} to an append-only ledger +
+#              captures the bytes CONTENT-ADDRESSED under
+#              $STATE_DIR/preimage/objects/<sha256> — prior bytes + change
+#              time are answerable from durable state alone, no transcript
+#              (acceptance a). A git-repo-in-operator-dir design was REJECTED:
+#              its who/why claim is false under shared-author fleets, and
+#              .gitignore is pattern-based where acceptance (b) demands
+#              fail-closed. (2) CREDENTIAL HARD GATE (acceptance b), FOUR
+#              LAYERS (#964 re-verdict: B2 cases C+D): (i) POLARITY — extras
+#              (WAKE_PREIMAGE_EXTRA) are RECORD-ONLY by default (ledger row +
+#              cause line, NO bytes); byte capture for an extra requires the
+#              path listed in WAKE_PREIMAGE_CAPTURE (colon-separated opt-in);
+#              only the core set (adapter, watch-list) is capture-eligible by
+#              default — a shape list can only refuse the secrets someone
+#              already enumerated, so safety may not rest on one (#964-D).
+#              (ii) PATH DENY evaluated on BOTH the raw and realpath-resolved
+#              candidate forms against BOTH unresolved and resolved
+#              mosaic-home anchors (credentials.json,
+#              tools/_lib/credentials.json, credentials/**, any basename
+#              credentials.json) — a deny list written in unresolved paths
+#              cannot match a path resolved before it arrived (#964-C), and a
+#              symlinked opt-in entry cannot smuggle a denied target (deny
+#              runs FIRST, independent of what the opt-in matched). (iii)
+#              CONTENT DENY on the opt-in path only, defense-in-depth NOT the
+#              safety mechanism: digest.sh's six scrub shapes + a
+#              named-assignment probe (key/token/secret/passw/hmac/credential/
+#              bearer = unbroken value >=16 chars); probe ERROR fails TOWARD
+#              refusal (an error exit is not a negative result); false
+#              positives are acceptable — a false match only withholds byte
+#              capture, never tracking. (iv) size cap WAKE_PREIMAGE_MAX_BYTES
+#              (default 1 MiB). Deny ALWAYS wins over the opt-in. A refused
+#              file still gets its hash/size/mtime row (captured:false +
+#              refused reason) so change TIME survives even when content must
+#              not. (3) FIRST-CLASS CAUSE LINE
+#              (acceptance c): on a change (or deletion — ABSENT is a state,
+#              not an error), one class=actionable entry is enqueued via the
+#              store allocator with locators {kind:preimage, path (§2.1 hard
+#              locator — never quarantined), observed_hash, prev_hash,
+#              preimage:true, reason:preimage-definition-changed}. Both
+#              detector.sh cmd_poll_once and reconcile.sh cmd_reconcile run
+#              the check as a PRE-step, so the cause line lands at a LOWER
+#              observed_seq than the N per-source deltas/enumerations it
+#              explains — "preimage definition changed" reads first, not N
+#              UNACCOUNTED lines. (4) FAIL-LOUD discipline (D2/#955 class):
+#              an unresolvable adapter, unreadable watch-list, corrupt ledger
+#              (REFUSES to compare or re-baseline over corrupt history), failed
+#              object/ledger write, or failed enqueue is a loud non-zero —
+#              never read as "no change"; in both integrations the pass exits
+#              non-zero but source observation still proceeds (no starvation).
+#              An ABSENT/EMPTY ledger with objects/ NON-empty is a loud
+#              non-zero REFUSAL to re-baseline (#964-B11: objects with no
+#              ledger cannot be a first install — history was deleted; the
+#              first-install path must not silently absorb it). First-seen on
+#              a genuinely clean state dir is a SILENT baseline (detector
+#              first-poll idiom).
+#              The installer is UNCHANGED — Gate A auto-enumerates the new
+#              file from the filesystem; the recording site is the runtime
+#              tick, which is where the env-derived preimage set exists.
+#              store.sh/digest.sh/beacon.sh UNCHANGED; watch-list schema
+#              UNTOUCHED ([1,1]). Changed: preimage.sh (new), detector.sh,
+#              reconcile.sh (+ test-wake-preimage.sh P1-P17; P13-P17 are the
+#              #964 re-verdict regression needles: symlinked store, live
+#              secret value, polarity, ledger deletion, allowlist-symlink).
+#   0.7.1  #952 quarantine-audit clean-sweep message named only ONE of the
+#              two unprovable residual classes ("rows without surviving
+#              dead-letter evidence"), so an operator reading the OK concluded
+#              NO evidence exists when evidence can exist and be UNUSABLE: a
+#              surviving dead-letter row whose locator extracts an empty
+#              observed_hash (live specimen: mos-dt seq 13,
+#              bench/malformed-locator-test, "deliberately non-conformant")
+#              can never satisfy the four-field conviction match, because
+#              _record_last_consumed only writes rows with a NON-empty hash.
+#              WORDING-ONLY fix (measurement defect, #951 review finding 1):
+#              THREE surfaces — the clean-sweep message, the PROVABILITY
+#              BOUND comment, and (second commit, author-side self-catch)
+#              the usage() help text — now name both classes; the
+#              conviction predicate is UNCHANGED.
+#              Test T17 drives the real writer flow and plants the verbatim
+#              live specimen (nested .locators.*, NO observed_hash key) —
+#              never a hand-built flat dead-letter row, which would make the
+#              audit's correct non-conviction look exactly like the defect
+#              under hunt (the #951 review's false-defect near-miss).
 component=wake
-version=0.6.15
+version=0.7.1

 # Watch-list schema this component consumes, and the INCLUSIVE range of
 # schema_version values it supports. A wake-watch-list.json whose schema_version
@@ -446,6 +537,19 @@ schema_max=1
 #                    seed) instead of a bare source error, and LINKS the unit into
 #                    the user systemd search path + post-install-validates it
 #                    resolves (#913).                                       (W7, #913)
+#   preimage.sh A11 — operator-side PREIMAGE-DEFINITION provenance: derives the
+#                    preimage set from the runtime env (resolved adapter file,
+#                    watch-list, WAKE_PREIMAGE_EXTRA), appends
+#                    {ts,path,sha256,size,mtime,prev} rows to an append-only
+#                    ledger, captures bytes content-addressed under
+#                    preimage/objects/<sha256>, and enqueues a FIRST-CLASS
+#                    "preimage-definition-changed" actionable (path = §2.1 hard
+#                    locator) BEFORE the deltas it explains (detector +
+#                    reconcile pre-step). Credential HARD GATE: capture is
+#                    REFUSED (hash/mtime still recorded) for credential-store
+#                    paths, secret-shaped content, and oversized files —
+#                    refusal, never redaction. Fail-loud on any infra failure;
+#                    a corrupt ledger refuses re-baseline.        (#958)
 # Companion (framework subtree, not under tools/wake/): systemd/user/mosaic-wake.service
 #                    — the long-lived detector daemon unit (per-class SLO lives in
 #                    the daemon, NOT a systemd interval).                          (W7)
@@ -0,0 +1,571 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+# preimage.sh — A11 of the wake canon (#958): durable PROVENANCE for the
+# OPERATOR-SIDE preimage definition.
+#
+# THE GAP THIS CLOSES (#958): every observed_hash in the lane store is
+# sha256(adapter stdout) — the operator's source adapter (plus the watch-list
+# and any operator-declared preimage files) IS the preimage definition for
+# every hash the pipeline ever records. Those files live OUTSIDE the versioned
+# wake component, so a byte change to them was attributable only through agent
+# transcripts: provenance thinner than any hash it feeds. A changed preimage
+# also re-baselines EVERY source at once, which previously surfaced only as N
+# per-source deltas / UNACCOUNTED lines with no first-class cause.
+#
+# WHAT THIS TOOL DOES:
+#   - Derives the PREIMAGE SET generically (no operator paths baked in):
+#       * the resolved file behind WAKE_DETECTOR_SOURCE_CMD (first word),
+#       * the WAKE_WATCH_LIST file,
+#       * operator-declared extras via WAKE_PREIMAGE_EXTRA (colon-separated —
+#         e.g. sink/feed scripts). Extras are RECORD-ONLY by default (see the
+#         credential hard gate below); never list key-material files.
+#   - Records each file's (sha256, size, mtime, ts) as an APPEND-ONLY ledger
+#     row in <state>/preimage/preimage-ledger.jsonl and stores the full bytes
+#     CONTENT-ADDRESSED at <state>/preimage/objects/<sha256> — so a change is
+#     attributable (prior bytes + change time) from durable state alone, with
+#     no transcript required. Acceptance (a) of #958.
+#   - On a CHANGE (not first-seen), `check --enqueue` enqueues ONE first-class
+#     class=actionable entry per changed file via the store's single allocator
+#     (#908), carrying a §2.1 hard locator (`path`), BEFORE the per-source
+#     deltas it explains are observed — so the digest shows the cause line,
+#     not just N re-baselined sources. Acceptance (c).
+#
+# CREDENTIAL HARD GATE — acceptance (b): the mechanism must be UNABLE to
+# capture credential material even by operator error. Layered, every layer
+# fail-closed toward NOT capturing bytes (the hash/size/mtime row is still
+# written — change-time attribution survives, content capture does not;
+# a sha256 discloses nothing about the bytes):
+#   1. POLARITY (#964 review, case D): byte capture is DENY-BY-DEFAULT for
+#      operator extras. WAKE_PREIMAGE_EXTRA paths are RECORD-ONLY (rows +
+#      first-class change entries, no bytes) unless explicitly listed in
+#      WAKE_PREIMAGE_CAPTURE — a shape list can only refuse the secrets
+#      someone already enumerated, so arbitrary operator-pointed files must
+#      not default to capture. The CORE set (the resolved adapter file, the
+#      watch-list) is capture-eligible: it IS the preimage definition this
+#      tool exists to snapshot, and the deny layers below still apply to it.
+#   2. PATH deny: the mosaic credential store locations
+#      (<mosaic-home>/credentials.json, <mosaic-home>/tools/_lib/
+#      credentials.json, anything under <mosaic-home>/credentials/, and any
+#      file literally named credentials.json) are refused. Evaluated on BOTH
+#      the operator-supplied form AND the symlink-resolved form, against BOTH
+#      the unresolved and resolved forms of the mosaic-home anchor — a deny
+#      list written only in unresolved paths cannot match a path that was
+#      resolved before it arrived (#964 review, case C).
+#   3. CONTENT deny: a candidate whose bytes match the well-known secret-token
+#      shapes (same conservative set digest.sh redacts: PAT/Slack/AKIA/JWT/PEM)
+#      OR a named-assignment secret shape (key/token/secret/passw/hmac/
+#      credential/bearer = long unbroken value — catches prefix-less
+#      high-entropy keys, e.g. an HMAC key in an env file) is refused —
+#      refusal, not redaction: a redacted preimage would be a false witness,
+#      and secret bytes must never land in the object store. Deliberately
+#      conservative toward REFUSAL: a false match only withholds byte capture,
+#      never tracking.
+#   Plus a size cap (WAKE_PREIMAGE_MAX_BYTES, default 1 MiB) so a stray extra
+#   pointing at a large binary cannot turn provenance into data hoovering.
+#   Deny ALWAYS wins over the WAKE_PREIMAGE_CAPTURE opt-in.
+#
+# FAIL-LOUD DISCIPLINE (the D2/#955 class, both layers): an infrastructure
+# failure of THIS tool (unresolvable adapter, unreadable/corrupt ledger,
+# failed durable write, failed enqueue) exits NON-ZERO and is never read as
+# "no change". A corrupt ledger REFUSES to compare (and to re-baseline):
+# silently restarting history would erase the very attribution this exists
+# to provide. Likewise (#964 review, B11) an ABSENT/EMPTY ledger while
+# objects/ still holds prior captures is DELETED HISTORY, not a first
+# install — it refuses loudly instead of re-baselining, because a silent
+# restart would absorb the next real change as first-seen.
+#
+# Operator-agnostic (framework firewall): all state via XDG/env; the deny
+# list names only framework-defined credential locations, no operator hosts/
+# names/secrets. This tool never prints file CONTENT to any stream.
+set -uo pipefail
+
+SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
+# shellcheck source=./_wake-common.sh disable=SC1091
+. "$SCRIPT_DIR/_wake-common.sh"
+
+STATE_DIR="$(wake_state_dir)"
+STORE_SH="$SCRIPT_DIR/store.sh"
+PRE_DIR="$STATE_DIR/preimage"
+LEDGER="$PRE_DIR/preimage-ledger.jsonl"
+OBJECTS="$PRE_DIR/objects"
+
+_need_jq() {
+  command -v jq >/dev/null 2>&1 || {
+    echo "preimage.sh: jq is required" >&2
+    exit 3
+  }
+}
+
+# _hash_stdin — sha256 of stdin, first field only (portable, same fallback
+# chain as detector.sh).
+_hash_stdin() {
+  if command -v sha256sum >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+    sha256sum | awk '{print $1}'
+  elif command -v shasum >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+    shasum -a 256 | awk '{print $1}'
+  elif command -v openssl >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+    openssl dgst -sha256 | awk '{print $NF}'
+  else
+    echo "preimage.sh: no sha256 tool (sha256sum/shasum/openssl) available" >&2
+    exit 3
+  fi
+}
+
+usage() {
+  cat >&2 <<'EOF'
+Usage: preimage.sh <command>
+
+Commands:
+  check [--enqueue]   Compare every preimage-set file against the ledger head.
+                      A changed file gets a new ledger row (+ captured bytes
+                      when capture-eligible and not denied — see Environment);
+                      with --enqueue each change (not first-seen) also enqueues
+                      ONE first-class class=actionable store entry (hard
+                      locator: path). First-seen files baseline SILENTLY (row,
+                      no enqueue — same idiom as the detector's first-seen).
+                      Exit 0 whether or not changes were found; non-zero ONLY
+                      on infrastructure failure (never read as "no change").
+  record              Alias of `check` without enqueue (baseline/refresh).
+  set                 Print the derived preimage set, one resolved path per
+                      line (diagnostic).
+  status              Print the ledger head row for every tracked path.
+
+Environment:
+  WAKE_DETECTOR_SOURCE_CMD  Adapter command; its resolved file joins the set.
+  WAKE_WATCH_LIST           Watch-list path; joins the set when set.
+  WAKE_PREIMAGE_EXTRA       Colon-separated additional operator preimage files
+                            (e.g. sink/feed scripts). Extras are RECORD-ONLY
+                            by default: changes get a hash/size/mtime row and
+                            a first-class change entry, but their BYTES are
+                            never captured unless the path is also listed in
+                            WAKE_PREIMAGE_CAPTURE. A listed path that does not
+                            exist is tracked as ABSENT (deletion of a preimage
+                            file is a change, not an error).
+  WAKE_PREIMAGE_CAPTURE     Colon-separated allowlist of extras whose bytes
+                            MAY be captured. The credential deny rules ALWAYS
+                            win over this list. NEVER list files that can hold
+                            key material (env files with keys/HMACs, credential
+                            stores): the deny gate is a backstop, not a
+                            license.
+  WAKE_PREIMAGE_MAX_BYTES   Byte-capture cap (default 1048576). Larger files:
+                            hash/size/mtime recorded, bytes refused.
+  WAKE_STATE_HOME/WAKE_AGENT  store namespace (see store.sh).
+EOF
+}
+
+# --- preimage-set derivation (generic; no operator paths baked in) ----------
+
+# _realpath_or_self PATH — resolved form when resolvable, the input otherwise.
+_realpath_or_self() {
+  local p="$1"
+  if command -v realpath >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+    realpath -- "$p" 2>/dev/null || printf '%s' "$p"
+  else
+    printf '%s' "$p"
+  fi
+}
+
+# _resolve_cmd_file CMD — resolve the FIRST WORD of an adapter command string
+# to a real file; prints `raw<TAB>resolved`. Non-zero (loud) if it cannot be
+# resolved: an adapter the detector will invoke but provenance cannot see is
+# an infrastructure failure, not a smaller set. BOTH forms are kept: the deny
+# gate must see the pre-resolution form too (#964 review, case C).
+_resolve_cmd_file() {
+  local cmd="$1" word path
+  # shellcheck disable=SC2086
+  set -- $cmd
+  word="${1:-}"
+  [ -n "$word" ] || return 1
+  if [ -f "$word" ]; then
+    path="$word"
+  else
+    path="$(command -v -- "$word" 2>/dev/null)" || return 1
+    [ -f "$path" ] || return 1
+  fi
+  # realpath so the ledger keys on the actual file, not a symlink alias.
+  printf '%s\t%s' "$path" "$(_realpath_or_self "$path")"
+}
+
+# _preimage_set — print the derived set, one member per line as
+# `origin<TAB>raw<TAB>resolved` (origin: core|extra). BOTH path forms travel
+# with every member so the deny gate and the capture allowlist are evaluated
+# on the SAME candidate in BOTH its forms — resolving before denying is the
+# #964 case-C ordering defect. Paths from WAKE_PREIMAGE_EXTRA are printed
+# EVEN IF ABSENT (deletion is a tracked state); the adapter and watch-list
+# must resolve (loud failure otherwise — see _resolve_cmd_file rationale).
+_preimage_set() {
+  local failed=0
+  if [ -n "${WAKE_DETECTOR_SOURCE_CMD:-}" ]; then
+    local af
+    if af="$(_resolve_cmd_file "$WAKE_DETECTOR_SOURCE_CMD")"; then
+      printf 'core\t%s\n' "$af"
+    else
+      echo "preimage.sh: FAIL LOUD — WAKE_DETECTOR_SOURCE_CMD ('$WAKE_DETECTOR_SOURCE_CMD') does not resolve to a file; the preimage definition cannot be observed (NOT treated as 'no change')." >&2
+      failed=1
+    fi
+  fi
+  if [ -n "${WAKE_WATCH_LIST:-}" ]; then
+    if [ -f "$WAKE_WATCH_LIST" ]; then
+      printf 'core\t%s\t%s\n' "$WAKE_WATCH_LIST" "$(_realpath_or_self "$WAKE_WATCH_LIST")"
+    else
+      echo "preimage.sh: FAIL LOUD — WAKE_WATCH_LIST ('$WAKE_WATCH_LIST') is not a file; the preimage definition cannot be observed." >&2
+      failed=1
+    fi
+  fi
+  if [ -n "${WAKE_PREIMAGE_EXTRA:-}" ]; then
+    local IFS=':' p
+    for p in $WAKE_PREIMAGE_EXTRA; do
+      [ -n "$p" ] || continue
+      # Extras are tracked even when absent (ABSENT is a state). Resolve the
+      # realpath only when the file exists; otherwise track the literal path.
+      if [ -e "$p" ]; then
+        printf 'extra\t%s\t%s\n' "$p" "$(_realpath_or_self "$p")"
+      else
+        printf 'extra\t%s\t%s\n' "$p" "$p"
+      fi
+    done
+  fi
+  return "$failed"
+}
+
+# --- credential hard gate (acceptance (b)) ----------------------------------
+
+# _deny_path RAW RESOLVED — 0 (deny) iff EITHER form of the candidate names a
+# known credential-store location. Framework-defined locations only
+# (firewall): the mosaic credential store, the tools/_lib credential file the
+# framework-manifest itself carves out of tools/**, the credentials/ operator
+# subtree, and any file literally named credentials.json.
+#
+# Evaluated on BOTH the operator-supplied (raw) form and the symlink-resolved
+# form, against BOTH the unresolved and resolved forms of the mosaic-home
+# anchor: a deny list written only in unresolved paths cannot match a path
+# that was resolved before it arrived (#964 review, case C — a symlink whose
+# target was renamed slipped every path rule because the candidate had
+# already been realpath'd but the anchors never were).
+_deny_path() {
+  local raw="$1" resolved="$2"
+  local home="${MOSAIC_HOME:-$HOME/.config/mosaic}" rhome p a
+  rhome="$(_realpath_or_self "$home")"
+  for p in "$raw" "$resolved"; do
+    [ -n "$p" ] || continue
+    for a in "$home" "$rhome"; do
+      case "$p" in
+      "$a/credentials.json") return 0 ;;
+      "$a/tools/_lib/credentials.json") return 0 ;;
+      "$a/credentials/"*) return 0 ;;
+      esac
+    done
+    case "$(basename -- "$p")" in
+    credentials.json) return 0 ;;
+    esac
+  done
+  return 1
+}
+
+# _deny_content FILE — 0 (deny) iff FILE's bytes look secret-shaped.
+# Two probes: (a) the well-known vendor-token shapes digest.sh redacts
+# (PAT / Slack / AKIA / JWT / PEM — conservative: a 40-hex git sha never
+# matches); (b) a named-assignment shape (key/token/secret/passw/hmac/
+# credential/bearer = long unbroken value) that catches prefix-less
+# high-entropy keys, e.g. an HMAC key in an env file (#964 review, case D).
+#
+# (b) is defense-in-depth for the OPT-IN path only, NOT the thing that keeps
+# case D safe — polarity does that (extras are record-only unless allowlisted;
+# a shape list can only refuse the secrets someone already enumerated). It is
+# deliberately conservative toward REFUSAL: a false match (a checksum in a
+# config, a path that happens to be long and unbroken) only withholds byte
+# capture — the hash/size/mtime row and change entry still land. A variable
+# REFERENCE (token="$GITEA_TOKEN") never matches: `$` is not in the value
+# class — only literal secret values do.
+#
+# FAILS TOWARD REFUSAL: if a probe itself errors (unreadable file, grep
+# failure — rc >= 2), the answer is DENY, not capture. An error exit is not a
+# negative result.
+_deny_content() {
+  local rc
+  LC_ALL=C grep -Eq \
+    -e 'gh[pousr]_[A-Za-z0-9]{16,}' \
+    -e 'github_pat_[A-Za-z0-9_]{16,}' \
+    -e 'xox[baprs]-[A-Za-z0-9-]{10,}' \
+    -e 'AKIA[0-9A-Z]{16}' \
+    -e 'eyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}' \
+    -e '-----BEGIN[A-Z ]*PRIVATE KEY-----' \
+    -- "$1" 2>/dev/null
+  rc=$?
+  [ "$rc" -eq 1 ] || return 0
+  LC_ALL=C grep -Eiq \
+    -e "[A-Za-z0-9_]*(key|token|secret|passw|hmac|credential|bearer)[A-Za-z0-9_]*[[:space:]]*[=:][[:space:]]*[\"']?[A-Za-z0-9+/=_-]{16,}" \
+    -- "$1" 2>/dev/null
+  rc=$?
+  [ "$rc" -eq 1 ] || return 0
+  return 1
+}
+
+# _capture_allowed ORIGIN RAW RESOLVED — 0 iff byte capture may even be
+# ATTEMPTED for this member (the deny gate still runs after, and wins).
+# POLARITY (#964 review, case D): core members (the adapter file, the
+# watch-list) are capture-eligible — they ARE the preimage definition this
+# tool exists to snapshot (acceptance (a)). Extras are RECORD-ONLY unless
+# listed in WAKE_PREIMAGE_CAPTURE.
+#
+# The allowlist is matched with the SAME both-forms discipline as the deny
+# list (entry raw/resolved vs candidate raw/resolved): two lists keyed on
+# different strings would let a symlink alias slip between them. "Deny wins
+# over opt-in" is a precedence rule, not a guarantee both lists see the same
+# path — the guarantee comes from _check_one running _deny_path on both forms
+# FIRST, independent of anything matched here.
+_capture_allowed() {
+  local origin="$1" raw="$2" resolved="$3"
+  [ "$origin" = "core" ] && return 0
+  [ -n "${WAKE_PREIMAGE_CAPTURE:-}" ] || return 1
+  local IFS=':' e er
+  for e in $WAKE_PREIMAGE_CAPTURE; do
+    [ -n "$e" ] || continue
+    er="$e"
+    [ -e "$e" ] && er="$(_realpath_or_self "$e")"
+    if [ "$e" = "$raw" ] || [ "$e" = "$resolved" ] ||
+      [ "$er" = "$raw" ] || [ "$er" = "$resolved" ]; then
+      return 0
+    fi
+  done
+  return 1
+}
+
+# --- ledger primitives ------------------------------------------------------
+
+# _ledger_head PATH — print the LAST ledger row for PATH (empty if none).
+# Non-zero (loud) if the ledger exists but is unparseable: a corrupt ledger
+# must REFUSE to compare, never silently re-baseline (that would erase the
+# attribution history this tool exists to keep).
+_ledger_head() {
+  local path="$1"
+  [ -f "$LEDGER" ] || return 0
+  if [ -s "$LEDGER" ] && ! jq -cn 'inputs' <"$LEDGER" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+    echo "preimage.sh: FAIL LOUD — preimage ledger $LEDGER is unparseable; REFUSING to compare or re-baseline over corrupt history. Investigate/restore the ledger." >&2
+    return 1
+  fi
+  jq -c --arg p "$path" 'select(.path == $p)' "$LEDGER" 2>/dev/null | tail -n 1
+}
+
+# _ledger_append ROW_JSON — append one row atomically (read + append + rename;
+# rows are small and the writer is serialized by the preimage lock).
+_ledger_append() {
+  local row="$1"
+  {
+    [ -f "$LEDGER" ] && cat "$LEDGER"
+    printf '%s\n' "$row"
+  } | _atomic_write "$LEDGER"
+}
+
+# --- the check itself -------------------------------------------------------
+
+# _check_one ORIGIN RAW PATH ENQUEUE — compare PATH (the resolved form; the
+# ledger keys on it) to its ledger head; on change record (+bytes only if
+# capture-eligible and not denied) and optionally enqueue. Prints nothing on
+# no-change. Returns: 0 ok (changed or not), 1 infrastructure failure.
+_check_one() {
+  local origin="$1" raw="$2" path="$3" enqueue="$4"
+  local cur_sha size mtime denied="" refused=""
+
+  if [ -f "$path" ]; then
+    cur_sha="$(_hash_stdin <"$path")" || return 1
+    [ -n "$cur_sha" ] || {
+      echo "preimage.sh: FAIL LOUD — could not hash $path" >&2
+      return 1
+    }
+    size="$(wc -c <"$path" | tr -d '[:space:]')"
+    # Portable mtime (GNU stat -c / BSD stat -f).
+    mtime="$(stat -c %Y -- "$path" 2>/dev/null || stat -f %m -- "$path" 2>/dev/null || echo 0)"
+    local cap="${WAKE_PREIMAGE_MAX_BYTES:-1048576}"
+    case "$cap" in '' | *[!0-9]*) cap=1048576 ;; esac
+    # Gate order matters: path deny FIRST, on BOTH forms, INDEPENDENT of the
+    # capture allowlist — so an allowlisted symlink whose target is denied
+    # refuses no matter what string the allowlist matched (a known credential
+    # store is refused without a content probe; the hash read above is
+    # deliberate: a sha256 discloses nothing about the bytes). Then polarity
+    # (record-only extras never reach the content probe — case D must be safe
+    # WITHOUT the shape list), then size cap (never content-grep an oversized
+    # file), content shape last.
+    if _deny_path "$raw" "$path"; then
+      denied="credential-store path (deny list)"
+    elif ! _capture_allowed "$origin" "$raw" "$path"; then
+      denied="extra is record-only by default (byte capture requires WAKE_PREIMAGE_CAPTURE; deny rules still win)"
+    elif [ "$size" -gt "$cap" ]; then
+      denied="exceeds WAKE_PREIMAGE_MAX_BYTES ($size > $cap)"
+    elif _deny_content "$path"; then
+      denied="secret-shaped content"
+    fi
+  else
+    # ABSENT is a state (deletion of a preimage file is a change to record).
+    cur_sha="ABSENT"
+    size=0
+    mtime=0
+  fi
+
+  local head prev_sha=""
+  head="$(_ledger_head "$path")" || return 1
+  [ -n "$head" ] && prev_sha="$(jq -r '.sha256 // ""' <<<"$head")"
+
+  if [ "$cur_sha" = "$prev_sha" ]; then
+    return 0 # unchanged — no row, no enqueue (idempotent)
+  fi
+
+  # --- capture bytes (content-addressed) unless the hard gate refuses -------
+  local captured=true
+  if [ "$cur_sha" != "ABSENT" ]; then
+    if [ -n "$denied" ]; then
+      captured=false
+      refused="$denied"
+      echo "preimage.sh: byte capture WITHHELD for $path ($denied) — hash/size/mtime recorded, content NOT stored (#958)." >&2
+    else
+      mkdir -p "$OBJECTS" || return 1
+      if [ ! -f "$OBJECTS/$cur_sha" ]; then
+        if ! _atomic_write "$OBJECTS/$cur_sha" <"$path"; then
+          echo "preimage.sh: FAIL LOUD — durable object write failed for $path ($OBJECTS/$cur_sha); NO ledger row recorded (a row whose bytes were never durably kept would be a false witness)." >&2
+          return 1
+        fi
+      fi
+    fi
+  fi
+
+  local ts row
+  ts="$(date +%s)"
+  row="$(jq -cn \
+    --arg path "$path" \
+    --arg sha "$cur_sha" \
+    --arg prev "$prev_sha" \
+    --argjson size "$size" \
+    --argjson mtime "$mtime" \
+    --argjson ts "$ts" \
+    --argjson captured "$captured" \
+    --arg refused "$refused" \
+    '{ts:$ts, path:$path, sha256:$sha, size:$size, mtime:$mtime, captured:$captured}
+       + (if $prev != "" then {prev:$prev} else {} end)
+       + (if $refused != "" then {refused:$refused} else {} end)')" || return 1
+  if ! _ledger_append "$row"; then
+    echo "preimage.sh: FAIL LOUD — durable ledger append failed ($LEDGER)" >&2
+    return 1
+  fi
+
+  if [ -z "$head" ]; then
+    # First-seen: baseline SILENTLY (row only, no enqueue) — the same idiom as
+    # the detector's first-seen source baseline.
+    return 0
+  fi
+
+  echo "preimage.sh: preimage definition CHANGED — $path ($prev_sha -> $cur_sha); prior bytes: $OBJECTS/$prev_sha" >&2
+
+  if [ "$enqueue" = "1" ]; then
+    # First-class cause line (acceptance (c)): ONE class=actionable entry per
+    # changed preimage file, allocated by the store's single allocator (#908).
+    # `path` is a §2.1 hard locator, so the digest renders it — never
+    # quarantined. Callers run this BEFORE polling sources, so this seq is
+    # LOWER than the per-source deltas the change explains.
+    local locators
+    locators="$(jq -cn \
+      --arg path "$path" \
+      --arg sha "$cur_sha" \
+      --arg prev "$prev_sha" \
+      '{kind:"preimage", id:$path, path:$path, observed_hash:$sha, prev_hash:$prev,
+        preimage:true, reason:"preimage-definition-changed"}')"
+    if ! "$STORE_SH" enqueue --class actionable --locators "$locators" --emit-ts "$(date +%s)" >/dev/null; then
+      echo "preimage.sh: FAIL LOUD — store enqueue of the preimage-change entry FAILED for $path (the change IS recorded in the ledger; the first-class wake line is NOT — treat as infrastructure failure)." >&2
+      return 1
+    fi
+  fi
+  return 0
+}
+
+cmd_check() {
+  local enqueue=0
+  while [ $# -gt 0 ]; do
+    case "$1" in
+    --enqueue)
+      enqueue=1
+      shift
+      ;;
+    *)
+      echo "preimage.sh check: unknown option '$1'" >&2
+      exit 2
+      ;;
+    esac
+  done
+  _need_jq
+
+  local set_list
+  if ! set_list="$(_preimage_set)"; then
+    exit 1
+  fi
+  if [ -z "$set_list" ]; then
+    # Nothing declared (no adapter/watch-list/extras in env) — an empty set is
+    # a no-op, not an error: standalone invocations outside a wake runtime
+    # must not fail loud for lacking one.
+    return 0
+  fi
+
+  mkdir -p "$PRE_DIR" || exit 1
+  # Serialize concurrent checks (detector tick vs reconcile vs manual) — the
+  # ledger append is read+rewrite, so two writers must not interleave.
+  if ! _wake_lock_acquire "$PRE_DIR/preimage.lock"; then
+    echo "preimage.sh: FAIL LOUD — cannot acquire preimage lock" >&2
+    exit 1
+  fi
+  # #964 review (B11): an ABSENT/EMPTY ledger while objects/ still holds
+  # prior captures is DELETED HISTORY, not a first install — the asymmetry is
+  # locally detectable and is the whole detection. Re-baselining here would
+  # silently absorb the next real change as first-seen (the exact erasure
+  # this tool exists to prevent). ABSENT is not CORRUPT: it must not take the
+  # first-install path either.
+  if [ ! -s "$LEDGER" ] && [ -d "$OBJECTS" ] && [ -n "$(ls -A -- "$OBJECTS" 2>/dev/null)" ]; then
+    echo "preimage.sh: FAIL LOUD — preimage ledger $LEDGER is ABSENT/EMPTY but $OBJECTS still holds prior objects: history was deleted; REFUSING to re-baseline over it (a silent restart would absorb the next real change as first-seen). Restore the ledger, or move objects/ aside explicitly after investigation." >&2
+    _wake_lock_release
+    exit 1
+  fi
+  local failed=0 origin raw resolved
+  while IFS=$'\t' read -r origin raw resolved; do
+    [ -n "$resolved" ] || continue
+    _check_one "$origin" "$raw" "$resolved" "$enqueue" || failed=1
+  done <<EOF
+$set_list
+EOF
+  _wake_lock_release
+  [ "$failed" -eq 0 ] || exit 1
+}
+
+cmd_status() {
+  _need_jq
+  [ -f "$LEDGER" ] || {
+    echo "preimage.sh: no ledger yet ($LEDGER)" >&2
+    return 0
+  }
+  # Head row per path (last wins).
+  jq -cs 'group_by(.path) | map(last) | .[]' "$LEDGER"
+}
+
+cmd_set() {
+  local s
+  s="$(_preimage_set)" || exit 1
+  [ -n "$s" ] && printf '%s\n' "$s" | cut -f3
+}
+
+main() {
+  [ $# -ge 1 ] || {
+    usage
+    exit 2
+  }
+  local cmd="$1"
+  shift
+  case "$cmd" in
+  check) cmd_check "$@" ;;
+  record) cmd_check ;;
+  set) cmd_set "$@" ;;
+  status) cmd_status "$@" ;;
+  -h | --help | help) usage ;;
+  *)
+    echo "preimage.sh: unknown command '$cmd'" >&2
+    usage
+    exit 2
+    ;;
+  esac
+}
+
+main "$@"
@@ -440,6 +440,17 @@ cmd_reconcile() {
  : "$allow_enumerate"

  local pairs kind id failed=0 unaccounted=0 enumerated=0
+
+  # #958 preimage provenance: same pre-step as the detector's poll tick, for
+  # the path where the preimage changed while the detector was down — without
+  # it, a changed adapter surfaces here only as N UNACCOUNTED enumerations
+  # with no first-class cause line. Run BEFORE observing any source so the
+  # cause entry's observed_seq precedes the enumerations it explains. Loud
+  # infrastructure failure marks the reconcile failed but does not stop it.
+  if ! "$SCRIPT_DIR/preimage.sh" check --enqueue; then
+    echo "reconcile.sh: FAIL LOUD — preimage provenance check failed (see preimage.sh above); reconcile continues but exits non-zero." >&2
+    failed=1
+  fi
  pairs="$(printf '%s' "$json" | jq -r '[ .watches[].sources[] | "\(.kind)\t\(.id)" ] | unique | .[]')"
  if [ -z "$pairs" ]; then
    echo "reconcile.sh: watch-list declares no sources under watches[].sources[]" >&2
@@ -110,9 +110,13 @@ Commands:
                                         found); --repair removes exactly those
                                         rows (atomic, loud). The dead-letter
                                         ledger itself is NEVER modified (it is
-                                         history). Rows whose dead-letter evidence
-                                         was pruned are NOT provable and are
-                                         never touched.
+                                         history). TWO residual classes are
+                                         unprovable and never touched (#952):
+                                         rows whose dead-letter evidence was
+                                         pruned away, AND rows whose surviving
+                                         evidence extracts an empty
+                                         observed_hash (it can never satisfy
+                                         the four-field conviction match).
  cursors                                Print observed_seq / consumed_seq / depth.

 Environment:
@@ -563,10 +567,17 @@ cmd_quarantine_sync() {
 # it on (kind, id, observed_seq, observed_hash) AND row.observed_seq <=
 # consumed_seq: the per-key max_by merge means the surviving row's provenance IS
 # that quarantined entry (a healed row differs in seq/hash and never matches).
-# PROVABILITY BOUND: a row whose dead-letter evidence was pruned/rotated away is
-# NOT provable and is never touched — this audit only ever removes what the
-# ledger can convict. The dead-letter ledger itself is history and is NEVER
-# modified here.
+# PROVABILITY BOUND — TWO residual classes, both unprovable (#952): (1) a row
+# whose dead-letter evidence was pruned/rotated away — no evidence to convict
+# on; (2) a row whose dead-letter evidence SURVIVES but extracts an empty
+# observed_hash (e.g. a deliberately non-conformant locator: nested
+# .locators.* with no observed_hash key) — evidence exists but can never
+# satisfy the four-field match, because _record_last_consumed only ever writes
+# rows with a NON-empty hash. Neither class is touched — this audit only ever
+# removes what the ledger can convict, and the clean-sweep message names BOTH
+# classes: "no evidence" and "evidence unusable" are different operator
+# conclusions. The dead-letter ledger itself is history and is NEVER modified
+# here.
 cmd_quarantine_audit() {
  local repair=0
  while [ $# -gt 0 ]; do
@@ -605,7 +616,7 @@ cmd_quarantine_audit() {
      )) | length) > 0)
  ' "$rec" 2>/dev/null || true)"
  if [ -z "$false_rows" ]; then
-    echo "store.sh quarantine-audit: OK — no provably-false consumed-hash rows (rows without surviving dead-letter evidence are not provable and were not judged)"
+    echo "store.sh quarantine-audit: OK — no provably-false consumed-hash rows. Two residual classes are unprovable and were NOT judged: rows whose dead-letter evidence was pruned/rotated away (no evidence to convict on), and rows whose surviving dead-letter evidence extracts an empty observed_hash (evidence exists but can never satisfy the four-field conviction match)."
    return 0
  fi
  local n row
@@ -0,0 +1,534 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+# test-wake-preimage.sh — RED-FIRST invariant harness for A11 (#958): durable
+# provenance for the OPERATOR-SIDE preimage definition (preimage.sh).
+#
+# Each test asserts ONE #958 invariant and is designed to go RED if it
+# regresses:
+#   P1  first-seen -> SILENT baseline (ledger rows, NO enqueue)   (detector idiom)
+#   P2  change -> attributable from durable state alone: new ledger row with
+#       prev, PRIOR BYTES retrievable content-addressed, first-class actionable
+#       enqueued with a §2.1 hard locator (path)                 (acceptance a+c)
+#   P3  detector ordering: the preimage cause line is enqueued at a LOWER
+#       observed_seq than the per-source delta it explains        (acceptance c)
+#   P4  credential-store PATH is refused — bytes NEVER captured, even when the
+#       operator lists it by error (hash/mtime row still written) (acceptance b)
+#   P5  secret-SHAPED content is refused — refusal, not redaction (acceptance b)
+#   P6  deletion of a preimage file is a tracked CHANGE (ABSENT), not an error
+#   P7  no-change is idempotent (no row growth, no enqueue)
+#   P8  unresolvable adapter command -> FAIL LOUD, never "no change" (D2/#955 class)
+#   P9  corrupt ledger -> REFUSE to compare/re-baseline (loud, no append)
+#   P10 oversized file -> bytes refused, hash still recorded (no data hoovering)
+#   P11 reconcile pre-step: a preimage change surfaces as a first-class line
+#       BEFORE the UNACCOUNTED enumerations it explains           (acceptance c)
+#   P12 detector: preimage infra failure is LOUD (pass exits non-zero) but does
+#       NOT starve source observation
+#
+# Regression needles from the #964 NOT-CLEAR review (decoy method: plant the
+# bytes, grep the WHOLE state dir — the decoy does not know what the code
+# believes):
+#   P13 case C: symlinked/renamed credential store (mosaic-home itself behind
+#       a symlink; a renamed target outside every path rule) — refused on BOTH
+#       path forms / by content, bytes grep-absent          (acceptance b)
+#   P14 case D: prefix-less high-entropy key (detector.env class) — safe
+#       WITHOUT opt-in by POLARITY alone (must hold with the shape list
+#       deleted), and refused WITH opt-in by the named-assignment shape
+#   P15 polarity: extras are RECORD-ONLY by default (change row + enqueue, no
+#       bytes); byte capture requires explicit WAKE_PREIMAGE_CAPTURE opt-in
+#   P16 case B11: ledger deleted while objects/ survives — LOUD refusal to
+#       re-baseline; the v2->v3 change is NOT absorbed as first-seen
+#   P17 allowlist symmetry: an allowlisted symlink whose TARGET is denied
+#       refuses (deny runs first, on both forms — precedence is not path
+#       agreement); a symlink to an ALLOWED target still captures (the fix
+#       must not close case C by breaking every symlinked path)
+#
+# Uses FAKE/STUB sources only (no live network). Isolated per test.
+# shellcheck disable=SC2030,SC2031
+set -uo pipefail
+
+SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
+PRE="$SCRIPT_DIR/preimage.sh"
+STORE="$SCRIPT_DIR/store.sh"
+DET="$SCRIPT_DIR/detector.sh"
+RECON="$SCRIPT_DIR/reconcile.sh"
+
+command -v jq >/dev/null 2>&1 || {
+  echo "SKIP: jq not available" >&2
+  exit 0
+}
+
+TMP_ROOT="$(mktemp -d)"
+trap 'rm -rf "$TMP_ROOT"' EXIT
+
+FAILFILE="$TMP_ROOT/failures"
+: >"$FAILFILE"
+pass=0
+fail_msg() {
+  echo "  FAIL: $*" >&2
+  echo "x" >>"$FAILFILE"
+}
+ok() { pass=$((pass + 1)); }
+
+fresh_state() {
+  local d="$TMP_ROOT/$1"
+  rm -rf "$d"
+  mkdir -p "$d"
+  printf '%s' "$d"
+}
+depth() { "$STORE" cursors | sed -n 's/pending_depth=//p'; }
+state_dir() { printf '%s/default' "$WAKE_STATE_HOME"; }
+ledger_rows() {
+  local f
+  f="$(state_dir)/preimage/preimage-ledger.jsonl"
+  [ -f "$f" ] && wc -l <"$f" | tr -d '[:space:]' || echo 0
+}
+
+# make_stub DIR — a source adapter reading $DIR/<kind>_<id> (same shape as the
+# reconcile harness stub).
+make_stub() {
+  local dir="$1"
+  cat >"$dir/adapter.sh" <<EOF
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+set -u
+kind="\$1"; id="\$2"; base="$dir/\${kind}_\${id}"; rc=0
+[ -f "\$base.rc" ] && rc="\$(cat "\$base.rc")"
+[ -f "\$base" ] && cat "\$base"
+exit "\$rc"
+EOF
+  chmod +x "$dir/adapter.sh"
+}
+
+make_wl() { # make_wl FILE — one repo source r1
+  cat >"$1" <<'EOF'
+{ "schema_version": 1,
+  "repos": [ { "id": "r1" } ],
+  "watches": [ { "lane": "L", "sources": [ { "kind": "repo", "id": "r1" } ] } ] }
+EOF
+}
+
+echo "== P1: first-seen -> SILENT baseline (rows, no enqueue) =="
+(
+  WAKE_STATE_HOME="$(fresh_state p1)"
+  export WAKE_STATE_HOME
+  unset WAKE_AGENT
+  fx="$TMP_ROOT/p1fx"; mkdir -p "$fx"
+  make_stub "$fx"; make_wl "$fx/wl.json"
+  printf 'extra v1\n' >"$fx/extra.env"
+  export WAKE_DETECTOR_SOURCE_CMD="$fx/adapter.sh" WAKE_WATCH_LIST="$fx/wl.json" WAKE_PREIMAGE_EXTRA="$fx/extra.env"
+  out="$("$PRE" check --enqueue 2>&1)"; rc=$?
+  [ "$rc" -eq 0 ] || fail_msg "P1: baseline check must exit 0 (rc=$rc) [$out]"
+  [ "$(ledger_rows)" -eq 3 ] || fail_msg "P1: expected 3 baseline rows (adapter, watch-list, extra), got $(ledger_rows)"
+  [ "$(depth)" = "0" ] || fail_msg "P1: first-seen must NOT enqueue (depth=$(depth))"
+) && ok
+
+echo "== P2: adapter change -> prior bytes + first-class hard-locator enqueue =="
+(
+  WAKE_STATE_HOME="$(fresh_state p2)"
+  export WAKE_STATE_HOME
+  unset WAKE_AGENT
+  fx="$TMP_ROOT/p2fx"; mkdir -p "$fx"
+  make_stub "$fx"; make_wl "$fx/wl.json"
+  # Acceptance (a) names the OPERATOR ADAPTER — a core member. Core members
+  # capture by default (they ARE the preimage definition); extras do not (P15).
+  export WAKE_DETECTOR_SOURCE_CMD="$fx/adapter.sh" WAKE_WATCH_LIST="$fx/wl.json"
+  unset WAKE_PREIMAGE_EXTRA WAKE_PREIMAGE_CAPTURE MOSAIC_HOME
+  "$PRE" check --enqueue >/dev/null 2>&1 || fail_msg "P2: baseline failed"
+  cp "$fx/adapter.sh" "$fx/adapter.v1"
+  old_sha="$(sha256sum "$fx/adapter.sh" | awk '{print $1}')"
+  printf '# adapter v2 CHANGED\n' >>"$fx/adapter.sh"
+  new_sha="$(sha256sum "$fx/adapter.sh" | awk '{print $1}')"
+  out="$("$PRE" check --enqueue 2>&1)"; rc=$?
+  [ "$rc" -eq 0 ] || fail_msg "P2: change check must exit 0 (rc=$rc) [$out]"
+  sd="$(state_dir)"
+  row="$(jq -c --arg p "$(realpath "$fx/adapter.sh")" 'select(.path == $p)' "$sd/preimage/preimage-ledger.jsonl" | tail -n1)"
+  [ "$(jq -r '.prev // ""' <<<"$row")" = "$old_sha" ] || fail_msg "P2: new row must carry prev=<old sha> [$row]"
+  [ "$(jq -r '.sha256' <<<"$row")" = "$new_sha" ] || fail_msg "P2: new row sha mismatch [$row]"
+  # Acceptance (a): the PRIOR BYTES are retrievable from durable state alone.
+  cmp -s "$sd/preimage/objects/$old_sha" "$fx/adapter.v1" || fail_msg "P2: prior bytes missing or not byte-exact"
+  cmp -s "$sd/preimage/objects/$new_sha" "$fx/adapter.sh" || fail_msg "P2: current bytes object missing or mismatched"
+  # Acceptance (c): ONE first-class actionable with a §2.1 hard locator (path).
+  [ "$(depth)" = "1" ] || fail_msg "P2: exactly one enqueue expected (depth=$(depth))"
+  ent="$(tail -n1 "$sd/pending.jsonl")"
+  [ "$(jq -r '.class' <<<"$ent")" = "actionable" ] || fail_msg "P2: entry class must be actionable [$ent]"
+  [ "$(jq -r '.locators.kind' <<<"$ent")" = "preimage" ] || fail_msg "P2: locator kind must be preimage [$ent]"
+  [ -n "$(jq -r '.locators.path // ""' <<<"$ent")" ] || fail_msg "P2: locator must carry path (hard locator) [$ent]"
+  [ "$(jq -r '.locators.observed_hash' <<<"$ent")" = "$new_sha" ] || fail_msg "P2: locator observed_hash mismatch [$ent]"
+  [ "$(jq -r '.locators.prev_hash' <<<"$ent")" = "$old_sha" ] || fail_msg "P2: locator prev_hash mismatch [$ent]"
+) && ok
+
+echo "== P3: detector orders the cause line BEFORE the delta it explains =="
+(
+  WAKE_STATE_HOME="$(fresh_state p3)"
+  export WAKE_STATE_HOME
+  unset WAKE_AGENT
+  fx="$TMP_ROOT/p3fx"; mkdir -p "$fx"
+  make_stub "$fx"; make_wl "$fx/wl.json"
+  printf 'r1 state v1\n' >"$fx/repo_r1"
+  export WAKE_DETECTOR_SOURCE_CMD="$fx/adapter.sh" WAKE_WATCH_LIST="$fx/wl.json"
+  unset WAKE_PREIMAGE_EXTRA
+  "$DET" poll-once >/dev/null 2>&1 || fail_msg "P3: baseline poll failed"
+  [ "$(depth)" = "0" ] || fail_msg "P3: baseline poll must enqueue nothing (depth=$(depth))"
+  # Change the ADAPTER (preimage) and the source state in the same window.
+  printf '# comment: adapter changed\n' >>"$fx/adapter.sh"
+  printf 'r1 state v2\n' >"$fx/repo_r1"
+  "$DET" poll-once >/dev/null 2>&1 || fail_msg "P3: second poll failed"
+  sd="$(state_dir)"
+  pre_seq="$(jq -r 'select(.locators.kind == "preimage") | .observed_seq' "$sd/pending.jsonl" | head -n1)"
+  src_seq="$(jq -r 'select(.locators.kind == "repo") | .observed_seq' "$sd/pending.jsonl" | head -n1)"
+  [ -n "$pre_seq" ] || fail_msg "P3: no preimage cause entry enqueued"
+  [ -n "$src_seq" ] || fail_msg "P3: no source delta entry enqueued"
+  if [ -n "$pre_seq" ] && [ -n "$src_seq" ]; then
+    [ "$pre_seq" -lt "$src_seq" ] || fail_msg "P3: cause line must precede the delta (preimage seq=$pre_seq, source seq=$src_seq)"
+  fi
+) && ok
+
+echo "== P4: credential-store PATH refused — bytes never captured (acceptance b) =="
+(
+  WAKE_STATE_HOME="$(fresh_state p4)"
+  export WAKE_STATE_HOME
+  unset WAKE_AGENT
+  fx="$TMP_ROOT/p4fx"; mkdir -p "$fx"
+  export MOSAIC_HOME="$fx/mosaic-home"
+  mkdir -p "$MOSAIC_HOME"
+  secret='cred-value-P4-do-not-capture'
+  printf '{"svc":{"token":"%s"}}\n' "$secret" >"$MOSAIC_HOME/credentials.json"
+  # Operator error: the credential store listed as a preimage extra — AND
+  # explicitly opted in to capture. Deny must win over the opt-in (#964: a
+  # path both denied and allowlisted must refuse).
+  export WAKE_PREIMAGE_EXTRA="$MOSAIC_HOME/credentials.json"
+  export WAKE_PREIMAGE_CAPTURE="$MOSAIC_HOME/credentials.json"
+  unset WAKE_DETECTOR_SOURCE_CMD WAKE_WATCH_LIST
+  out="$("$PRE" check --enqueue 2>&1)"; rc=$?
+  [ "$rc" -eq 0 ] || fail_msg "P4: refusal is not an infra failure (rc=$rc) [$out]"
+  sd="$(state_dir)"
+  row="$(tail -n1 "$sd/preimage/preimage-ledger.jsonl")"
+  [ "$(jq -r '.captured' <<<"$row")" = "false" ] || fail_msg "P4: row must record captured=false [$row]"
+  jq -r '.refused // ""' <<<"$row" | grep -qi 'path' || fail_msg "P4: refusal must name the path deny [$row]"
+  # THE invariant: the secret bytes exist NOWHERE under the wake state dir.
+  if grep -rq "$secret" "$sd" 2>/dev/null; then
+    fail_msg "P4: credential bytes leaked into the wake state dir"
+  fi
+) && ok
+
+echo "== P5: secret-SHAPED content refused (refusal, not redaction) =="
+(
+  WAKE_STATE_HOME="$(fresh_state p5)"
+  export WAKE_STATE_HOME
+  unset WAKE_AGENT
+  fx="$TMP_ROOT/p5fx"; mkdir -p "$fx"
+  tok='ghp_abcdefghijklmnop0123456789ABCDEF'
+  printf 'export MY_TOKEN=%s\n' "$tok" >"$fx/leaky.env"
+  # Opted in, so the CONTENT gate (not record-only polarity) is what refuses.
+  export WAKE_PREIMAGE_EXTRA="$fx/leaky.env" WAKE_PREIMAGE_CAPTURE="$fx/leaky.env"
+  unset WAKE_DETECTOR_SOURCE_CMD WAKE_WATCH_LIST MOSAIC_HOME
+  out="$("$PRE" check --enqueue 2>&1)"; rc=$?
+  [ "$rc" -eq 0 ] || fail_msg "P5: refusal is not an infra failure (rc=$rc) [$out]"
+  sd="$(state_dir)"
+  row="$(tail -n1 "$sd/preimage/preimage-ledger.jsonl")"
+  [ "$(jq -r '.captured' <<<"$row")" = "false" ] || fail_msg "P5: row must record captured=false [$row]"
+  jq -r '.refused // ""' <<<"$row" | grep -qi 'secret' || fail_msg "P5: refusal must name secret-shaped content [$row]"
+  if grep -rq "$tok" "$sd" 2>/dev/null; then
+    fail_msg "P5: secret-shaped bytes leaked into the wake state dir"
+  fi
+) && ok
+
+echo "== P6: deletion is a tracked CHANGE (ABSENT), not an error =="
+(
+  WAKE_STATE_HOME="$(fresh_state p6)"
+  export WAKE_STATE_HOME
+  unset WAKE_AGENT
+  fx="$TMP_ROOT/p6fx"; mkdir -p "$fx"
+  printf 'to be deleted\n' >"$fx/gone.env"
+  export WAKE_PREIMAGE_EXTRA="$fx/gone.env"
+  unset WAKE_DETECTOR_SOURCE_CMD WAKE_WATCH_LIST MOSAIC_HOME
+  "$PRE" check --enqueue >/dev/null 2>&1 || fail_msg "P6: baseline failed"
+  rm -f "$fx/gone.env"
+  out="$("$PRE" check --enqueue 2>&1)"; rc=$?
+  [ "$rc" -eq 0 ] || fail_msg "P6: deletion check must exit 0 (rc=$rc) [$out]"
+  sd="$(state_dir)"
+  row="$(tail -n1 "$sd/preimage/preimage-ledger.jsonl")"
+  [ "$(jq -r '.sha256' <<<"$row")" = "ABSENT" ] || fail_msg "P6: deletion must record sha256=ABSENT [$row]"
+  [ "$(depth)" = "1" ] || fail_msg "P6: deletion is a change and must enqueue (depth=$(depth))"
+) && ok
+
+echo "== P7: no-change is idempotent =="
+(
+  WAKE_STATE_HOME="$(fresh_state p7)"
+  export WAKE_STATE_HOME
+  unset WAKE_AGENT
+  fx="$TMP_ROOT/p7fx"; mkdir -p "$fx"
+  printf 'stable\n' >"$fx/stable.env"
+  export WAKE_PREIMAGE_EXTRA="$fx/stable.env"
+  unset WAKE_DETECTOR_SOURCE_CMD WAKE_WATCH_LIST MOSAIC_HOME
+  "$PRE" check --enqueue >/dev/null 2>&1 || fail_msg "P7: baseline failed"
+  r1="$(ledger_rows)"
+  "$PRE" check --enqueue >/dev/null 2>&1 || fail_msg "P7: second check failed"
+  [ "$(ledger_rows)" = "$r1" ] || fail_msg "P7: no-change must not append rows ($r1 -> $(ledger_rows))"
+  [ "$(depth)" = "0" ] || fail_msg "P7: no-change must not enqueue (depth=$(depth))"
+) && ok
+
+echo "== P8: unresolvable adapter -> FAIL LOUD, never 'no change' (D2 class) =="
+(
+  WAKE_STATE_HOME="$(fresh_state p8)"
+  export WAKE_STATE_HOME
+  unset WAKE_AGENT
+  export WAKE_DETECTOR_SOURCE_CMD="$TMP_ROOT/does-not-exist-adapter"
+  unset WAKE_WATCH_LIST WAKE_PREIMAGE_EXTRA MOSAIC_HOME
+  out="$("$PRE" check --enqueue 2>&1)"; rc=$?
+  [ "$rc" -ne 0 ] || fail_msg "P8: an unobservable preimage definition must FAIL LOUD (rc=0)"
+  echo "$out" | grep -qi 'does not resolve' || fail_msg "P8: the failure must name the unresolvable adapter [$out]"
+) && ok
+
+echo "== P9: corrupt ledger -> REFUSE to compare/re-baseline =="
+(
+  WAKE_STATE_HOME="$(fresh_state p9)"
+  export WAKE_STATE_HOME
+  unset WAKE_AGENT
+  fx="$TMP_ROOT/p9fx"; mkdir -p "$fx"
+  printf 'v1\n' >"$fx/f.env"
+  export WAKE_PREIMAGE_EXTRA="$fx/f.env"
+  unset WAKE_DETECTOR_SOURCE_CMD WAKE_WATCH_LIST MOSAIC_HOME
+  "$PRE" check --enqueue >/dev/null 2>&1 || fail_msg "P9: baseline failed"
+  sd="$(state_dir)"
+  printf 'NOT-JSON-GARBAGE{{{\n' >>"$sd/preimage/preimage-ledger.jsonl"
+  r1="$(wc -l <"$sd/preimage/preimage-ledger.jsonl")"
+  printf 'v2 changed\n' >"$fx/f.env"
+  out="$("$PRE" check --enqueue 2>&1)"; rc=$?
+  [ "$rc" -ne 0 ] || fail_msg "P9: a corrupt ledger must FAIL LOUD (rc=0)"
+  echo "$out" | grep -qi 'unparseable' || fail_msg "P9: the failure must name the corrupt ledger [$out]"
+  [ "$(wc -l <"$sd/preimage/preimage-ledger.jsonl")" = "$r1" ] || fail_msg "P9: nothing may be appended over corrupt history"
+) && ok
+
+echo "== P10: oversized file -> bytes refused, hash still recorded =="
+(
+  WAKE_STATE_HOME="$(fresh_state p10)"
+  export WAKE_STATE_HOME
+  unset WAKE_AGENT
+  fx="$TMP_ROOT/p10fx"; mkdir -p "$fx"
+  head -c 200 /dev/zero | tr '\0' 'A' >"$fx/big.bin"
+  # Opted in, so the SIZE gate (not record-only polarity) is what refuses.
+  export WAKE_PREIMAGE_EXTRA="$fx/big.bin" WAKE_PREIMAGE_MAX_BYTES=64
+  export WAKE_PREIMAGE_CAPTURE="$fx/big.bin"
+  unset WAKE_DETECTOR_SOURCE_CMD WAKE_WATCH_LIST MOSAIC_HOME
+  out="$("$PRE" check --enqueue 2>&1)"; rc=$?
+  [ "$rc" -eq 0 ] || fail_msg "P10: size refusal is not an infra failure (rc=$rc) [$out]"
+  sd="$(state_dir)"
+  row="$(tail -n1 "$sd/preimage/preimage-ledger.jsonl")"
+  [ "$(jq -r '.captured' <<<"$row")" = "false" ] || fail_msg "P10: row must record captured=false [$row]"
+  jq -r '.refused // ""' <<<"$row" | grep -qi 'MAX_BYTES' || fail_msg "P10: refusal must name the size cap [$row]"
+  sha="$(jq -r '.sha256' <<<"$row")"
+  [ "$sha" = "$(sha256sum "$fx/big.bin" | awk '{print $1}')" ] || fail_msg "P10: hash must still be recorded [$row]"
+  [ ! -f "$sd/preimage/objects/$sha" ] || fail_msg "P10: oversized bytes must NOT be stored"
+) && ok
+
+echo "== P11: reconcile surfaces the cause line before its enumerations =="
+(
+  WAKE_STATE_HOME="$(fresh_state p11)"
+  export WAKE_STATE_HOME
+  unset WAKE_AGENT
+  fx="$TMP_ROOT/p11fx"; mkdir -p "$fx"
+  make_stub "$fx"; make_wl "$fx/wl.json"
+  printf 'r1 state\n' >"$fx/repo_r1"
+  export WAKE_DETECTOR_SOURCE_CMD="$fx/adapter.sh" WAKE_WATCH_LIST="$fx/wl.json"
+  unset WAKE_PREIMAGE_EXTRA MOSAIC_HOME
+  # Baseline the preimage set, then change the adapter while "the detector is
+  # down" — the reconcile path must still produce the first-class cause line.
+  "$PRE" check >/dev/null 2>&1 || fail_msg "P11: preimage baseline failed"
+  printf '# adapter changed while detector down\n' >>"$fx/adapter.sh"
+  "$RECON" reconcile >/dev/null 2>&1 # rc 1 expected (unaccounted enumerated)
+  sd="$(state_dir)"
+  pre_seq="$(jq -r 'select(.locators.kind == "preimage") | .observed_seq' "$sd/pending.jsonl" | head -n1)"
+  enum_seq="$(jq -r 'select(.locators.reconciled == true) | .observed_seq' "$sd/pending.jsonl" | head -n1)"
+  [ -n "$pre_seq" ] || fail_msg "P11: reconcile must enqueue the preimage cause line"
+  [ -n "$enum_seq" ] || fail_msg "P11: reconcile must still enumerate the unaccounted source"
+  if [ -n "$pre_seq" ] && [ -n "$enum_seq" ]; then
+    [ "$pre_seq" -lt "$enum_seq" ] || fail_msg "P11: cause line must precede the enumeration (preimage seq=$pre_seq, enum seq=$enum_seq)"
+  fi
+) && ok
+
+echo "== P12: detector — preimage infra failure is LOUD but does not starve observation =="
+(
+  WAKE_STATE_HOME="$(fresh_state p12)"
+  export WAKE_STATE_HOME
+  unset WAKE_AGENT
+  fx="$TMP_ROOT/p12fx"; mkdir -p "$fx"
+  make_stub "$fx"; make_wl "$fx/wl.json"
+  printf 'r1 state\n' >"$fx/repo_r1"
+  export WAKE_DETECTOR_SOURCE_CMD="$fx/adapter.sh" WAKE_WATCH_LIST="$fx/wl.json"
+  unset WAKE_PREIMAGE_EXTRA MOSAIC_HOME
+  # Corrupt the ledger BEFORE the first poll: the preimage check fails loud,
+  # but the poll must still observe + baseline the source.
+  sd="$(state_dir)"
+  mkdir -p "$sd/preimage"
+  printf 'NOT-JSON-GARBAGE{{{\n' >"$sd/preimage/preimage-ledger.jsonl"
+  out="$("$DET" poll-once 2>&1)"; rc=$?
+  [ "$rc" -ne 0 ] || fail_msg "P12: the pass must exit non-zero on preimage infra failure"
+  echo "$out" | grep -qi 'preimage' || fail_msg "P12: the failure must name the preimage check [$out]"
+  n="$(find "$sd/detector" -name 'watch-*.hash' 2>/dev/null | wc -l | tr -d '[:space:]')"
+  [ "$n" -ge 1 ] || fail_msg "P12: source observation must still proceed (no watch hash baselined)"
+) && ok
+
+echo "== P13: symlinked/renamed credential store refused on BOTH path forms (#964 C) =="
+(
+  WAKE_STATE_HOME="$(fresh_state p13)"
+  export WAKE_STATE_HOME
+  unset WAKE_AGENT
+  fx="$TMP_ROOT/p13fx"; mkdir -p "$fx"
+  # The mosaic home is ITSELF behind a symlink: a deny list written in
+  # unresolved paths cannot match a candidate that was realpath'd before the
+  # deny saw it — unless the anchors are resolved too.
+  mkdir -p "$fx/real-store/credentials"
+  ln -s "$fx/real-store" "$fx/mh"
+  export MOSAIC_HOME="$fx/mh"
+  s1='decoy-P13a-renamed-target-under-store'
+  printf 'x_token=%s\n' "$s1" >"$fx/mh/credentials/brain-creds.json"
+  # And a renamed target OUTSIDE every known store location, reached via a
+  # benign-looking symlink: no path rule can name it — the content gate must
+  # hold on the resolved file.
+  s2='0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdefP13b'
+  printf 'service_hmac_key=%s\n' "$s2" >"$fx/renamed-anywhere.cfg"
+  ln -s "$fx/renamed-anywhere.cfg" "$fx/link-b.env"
+  export WAKE_PREIMAGE_EXTRA="$fx/mh/credentials/brain-creds.json:$fx/link-b.env"
+  # Explicit opt-in for BOTH: deny must win over the allowlist.
+  export WAKE_PREIMAGE_CAPTURE="$fx/mh/credentials/brain-creds.json:$fx/link-b.env"
+  unset WAKE_DETECTOR_SOURCE_CMD WAKE_WATCH_LIST
+  out="$("$PRE" check --enqueue 2>&1)"; rc=$?
+  [ "$rc" -eq 0 ] || fail_msg "P13: refusal is not an infra failure (rc=$rc) [$out]"
+  sd="$(state_dir)"
+  n="$(jq -r 'select(.captured == false) | .path' "$sd/preimage/preimage-ledger.jsonl" | wc -l | tr -d '[:space:]')"
+  [ "$n" = "2" ] || fail_msg "P13: both decoys must record captured=false (got $n)"
+  # THE invariant (decoy method): the planted bytes exist NOWHERE in state.
+  if grep -rq "$s1" "$sd" 2>/dev/null; then
+    fail_msg "P13: renamed-target store bytes leaked into the wake state dir"
+  fi
+  if grep -rq "$s2" "$sd" 2>/dev/null; then
+    fail_msg "P13: prefix-less key bytes leaked into the wake state dir"
+  fi
+) && ok
+
+echo "== P14: detector.env-class key — safe WITHOUT opt-in by polarity, refused WITH opt-in by shape (#964 D) =="
+(
+  WAKE_STATE_HOME="$(fresh_state p14)"
+  export WAKE_STATE_HOME
+  unset WAKE_AGENT
+  fx="$TMP_ROOT/p14fx"; mkdir -p "$fx"
+  hm='9f8e7d6c5b4a39281706f5e4d3c2b1a09f8e7d6c'
+  printf 'WAKE_HMAC_KEY=%s\n' "$hm" >"$fx/detector.env"
+  export WAKE_PREIMAGE_EXTRA="$fx/detector.env"
+  unset WAKE_DETECTOR_SOURCE_CMD WAKE_WATCH_LIST MOSAIC_HOME WAKE_PREIMAGE_CAPTURE
+  # (a) NO opt-in: polarity alone keeps the bytes out. This leg must hold even
+  # with the content shape list deleted — the shape is defense-in-depth for
+  # the opt-in path, never the thing that makes case D read safe.
+  out="$("$PRE" check --enqueue 2>&1)"; rc=$?
+  [ "$rc" -eq 0 ] || fail_msg "P14a: record-only tracking must succeed (rc=$rc) [$out]"
+  sd="$(state_dir)"
+  row="$(tail -n1 "$sd/preimage/preimage-ledger.jsonl")"
+  [ "$(jq -r '.captured' <<<"$row")" = "false" ] || fail_msg "P14a: extra must be record-only without opt-in [$row]"
+  if grep -rq "$hm" "$sd" 2>/dev/null; then
+    fail_msg "P14a: key bytes leaked without any opt-in"
+  fi
+  # (b) The operator opts the env file in (the exact error the old usage text
+  # invited): the named-assignment shape must still refuse the bytes.
+  export WAKE_PREIMAGE_CAPTURE="$fx/detector.env"
+  printf 'WAKE_HMAC_KEY=%s\nrotated=1\n' "$hm" >"$fx/detector.env"
+  out="$("$PRE" check --enqueue 2>&1)"; rc=$?
+  [ "$rc" -eq 0 ] || fail_msg "P14b: refusal is not an infra failure (rc=$rc) [$out]"
+  row="$(tail -n1 "$sd/preimage/preimage-ledger.jsonl")"
+  [ "$(jq -r '.captured' <<<"$row")" = "false" ] || fail_msg "P14b: opted-in key material must still refuse [$row]"
+  jq -r '.refused // ""' <<<"$row" | grep -qi 'secret' || fail_msg "P14b: refusal must name secret-shaped content [$row]"
+  if grep -rq "$hm" "$sd" 2>/dev/null; then
+    fail_msg "P14b: key bytes leaked despite refusal"
+  fi
+) && ok
+
+echo "== P15: extras are RECORD-ONLY by default; capture requires explicit opt-in =="
+(
+  WAKE_STATE_HOME="$(fresh_state p15)"
+  export WAKE_STATE_HOME
+  unset WAKE_AGENT
+  fx="$TMP_ROOT/p15fx"; mkdir -p "$fx"
+  printf 'plain v1\n' >"$fx/notes.cfg"
+  export WAKE_PREIMAGE_EXTRA="$fx/notes.cfg"
+  unset WAKE_DETECTOR_SOURCE_CMD WAKE_WATCH_LIST MOSAIC_HOME WAKE_PREIMAGE_CAPTURE
+  "$PRE" check --enqueue >/dev/null 2>&1 || fail_msg "P15: baseline failed"
+  printf 'plain v2\n' >"$fx/notes.cfg"
+  sha2="$(sha256sum "$fx/notes.cfg" | awk '{print $1}')"
+  "$PRE" check --enqueue >/dev/null 2>&1 || fail_msg "P15: change check failed"
+  sd="$(state_dir)"
+  row="$(tail -n1 "$sd/preimage/preimage-ledger.jsonl")"
+  [ "$(jq -r '.captured' <<<"$row")" = "false" ] || fail_msg "P15: default must be record-only [$row]"
+  [ ! -f "$sd/preimage/objects/$sha2" ] || fail_msg "P15: bytes captured without opt-in"
+  [ "$(depth)" = "1" ] || fail_msg "P15: record-only must still track the change (depth=$(depth))"
+  # Opt in -> the next change captures.
+  export WAKE_PREIMAGE_CAPTURE="$fx/notes.cfg"
+  printf 'plain v3\n' >"$fx/notes.cfg"
+  sha3="$(sha256sum "$fx/notes.cfg" | awk '{print $1}')"
+  "$PRE" check --enqueue >/dev/null 2>&1 || fail_msg "P15: opted-in change check failed"
+  row="$(tail -n1 "$sd/preimage/preimage-ledger.jsonl")"
+  [ "$(jq -r '.captured' <<<"$row")" = "true" ] || fail_msg "P15: opt-in must capture [$row]"
+  cmp -s "$sd/preimage/objects/$sha3" "$fx/notes.cfg" || fail_msg "P15: opted-in bytes missing or mismatched"
+) && ok
+
+echo "== P16: deleted ledger over surviving objects/ — REFUSE to re-baseline (#964 B11) =="
+(
+  WAKE_STATE_HOME="$(fresh_state p16)"
+  export WAKE_STATE_HOME
+  unset WAKE_AGENT
+  fx="$TMP_ROOT/p16fx"; mkdir -p "$fx"
+  make_stub "$fx"
+  export WAKE_DETECTOR_SOURCE_CMD="$fx/adapter.sh"
+  unset WAKE_WATCH_LIST WAKE_PREIMAGE_EXTRA WAKE_PREIMAGE_CAPTURE MOSAIC_HOME
+  "$PRE" check >/dev/null 2>&1 || fail_msg "P16: v1 baseline failed"
+  printf '# v2\n' >>"$fx/adapter.sh"
+  "$PRE" check >/dev/null 2>&1 || fail_msg "P16: v2 change failed"
+  sd="$(state_dir)"
+  nobj="$(ls "$sd/preimage/objects" | wc -l | tr -d '[:space:]')"
+  # Delete the ledger; objects/ survives. ABSENT is not CORRUPT — and it is
+  # not a first install either: that asymmetry is locally detectable.
+  rm -f "$sd/preimage/preimage-ledger.jsonl"
+  printf '# v3\n' >>"$fx/adapter.sh"
+  out="$("$PRE" check --enqueue 2>&1)"; rc=$?
+  [ "$rc" -ne 0 ] || fail_msg "P16: absent ledger over prior objects must FAIL LOUD (rc=0) [$out]"
+  echo "$out" | grep -qi 'REFUSING to re-baseline' || fail_msg "P16: the failure must name the refusal [$out]"
+  [ ! -e "$sd/preimage/preimage-ledger.jsonl" ] || fail_msg "P16: the ledger must NOT be silently recreated over deleted history"
+  [ "$(ls "$sd/preimage/objects" | wc -l | tr -d '[:space:]')" = "$nobj" ] || fail_msg "P16: prior objects must remain untouched"
+  [ "$(depth)" = "0" ] || fail_msg "P16: the v2->v3 change must NOT be absorbed or enqueued from an unverifiable baseline (depth=$(depth))"
+) && ok
+
+echo "== P17: allowlist symmetry — symlink to a DENIED target refuses; symlink to an allowed target captures =="
+(
+  WAKE_STATE_HOME="$(fresh_state p17)"
+  export WAKE_STATE_HOME
+  unset WAKE_AGENT
+  fx="$TMP_ROOT/p17fx"; mkdir -p "$fx"
+  export MOSAIC_HOME="$fx/mh"
+  mkdir -p "$MOSAIC_HOME"
+  s='decoy-P17-cred-behind-benign-alias'
+  printf '{"svc":{"token":"%s"}}\n' "$s" >"$MOSAIC_HOME/credentials.json"
+  # A benign-looking alias whose TARGET is denied: the allowlist matches the
+  # alias string, but deny runs FIRST and on BOTH forms — "deny wins over
+  # opt-in" is a precedence rule, path agreement is what makes it hold.
+  ln -s "$MOSAIC_HOME/credentials.json" "$fx/settings.json"
+  # And a symlink to an ALLOWED target: the fix must not close case C by
+  # breaking every symlinked path outright.
+  printf 'benign payload v1\n' >"$fx/target.cfg"
+  ln -s "$fx/target.cfg" "$fx/alias.cfg"
+  export WAKE_PREIMAGE_EXTRA="$fx/settings.json:$fx/alias.cfg"
+  export WAKE_PREIMAGE_CAPTURE="$fx/settings.json:$fx/alias.cfg"
+  unset WAKE_DETECTOR_SOURCE_CMD WAKE_WATCH_LIST
+  out="$("$PRE" check --enqueue 2>&1)"; rc=$?
+  [ "$rc" -eq 0 ] || fail_msg "P17: check must exit 0 (rc=$rc) [$out]"
+  sd="$(state_dir)"
+  crow="$(jq -c --arg p "$(realpath "$fx/settings.json")" 'select(.path == $p)' "$sd/preimage/preimage-ledger.jsonl" | tail -n1)"
+  [ "$(jq -r '.captured' <<<"$crow")" = "false" ] || fail_msg "P17: allowlisted symlink to a denied target must refuse [$crow]"
+  if grep -rq "$s" "$sd" 2>/dev/null; then
+    fail_msg "P17: credential bytes leaked via an allowlisted alias"
+  fi
+  brow="$(jq -c --arg p "$(realpath "$fx/alias.cfg")" 'select(.path == $p)' "$sd/preimage/preimage-ledger.jsonl" | tail -n1)"
+  [ "$(jq -r '.captured' <<<"$brow")" = "true" ] || fail_msg "P17: symlink to an allowed target must still capture [$brow]"
+) && ok
+
+echo
+total=$((pass + $(wc -l <"$FAILFILE")))
+echo "== test-wake-preimage: $pass/$total passed =="
+[ -s "$FAILFILE" ] && exit 1
+exit 0
@@ -28,6 +28,15 @@
 #   T16 #946 quarantine-audit: consumed-hashes rows provably false against the
 #      dead-letter ledger are reported (exit 1) and removed only under --repair;
 #      healed rows and the ledger itself are untouched
+#   T17 #952 quarantine-audit clean sweep names BOTH unprovable residual
+#      classes: evidence pruned (no evidence) AND evidence surviving with an
+#      empty observed_hash (evidence unusable). Fixture is the VERBATIM live
+#      specimen (mos-dt lane dead-letter seq 13, bench/malformed-locator-test)
+#      — a nested .locators.* row with NO observed_hash key. Do NOT hand-build
+#      a FLAT dead-letter fixture here: consumed-hashes rows are genuinely
+#      flat, dead-letter rows are genuinely nested, and a flat fixture makes
+#      the audit's CORRECT non-conviction look exactly like the defect under
+#      hunt (this false-defect near-miss actually happened in the #951 review)
 #
 # Isolated: every test runs against a fresh WAKE_STATE_HOME temp dir.
 set -uo pipefail
@@ -680,6 +689,50 @@ echo "== T16: #946 — quarantine-audit: a consumed-hash row matching a dead-let
  grep -qi 'OK' "$TMP_ROOT/t16.ok" || fail_msg "T16: a clean audit must say OK [$(cat "$TMP_ROOT/t16.ok")]"
 ) && ok

+echo "== T17: #952 — the clean-sweep message names BOTH unprovable residual classes; a surviving-but-empty-hash dead-letter row is correctly NOT convicted =="
+(
+  WAKE_STATE_HOME="$(fresh_state t17)"
+  export WAKE_STATE_HOME
+  unset WAKE_AGENT
+  STATE_DIR="$WAKE_STATE_HOME/default"
+  rec="$STATE_DIR/consumed-hashes.jsonl"
+  dl="$STATE_DIR/dead-letter.jsonl"
+  # Drive the REAL flow so the consumed-hashes row is produced by the actual
+  # writer (_record_last_consumed), not hand-built: 12 fillers, then the bench
+  # key lands at observed_seq 13 — the same seq as the live specimen below.
+  i=1
+  while [ "$i" -le 12 ]; do
+    "$STORE" enqueue --class actionable --locators "{\"kind\":\"filler\",\"id\":\"f$i\",\"observed_hash\":\"HF$i\"}" >/dev/null || fail_msg "T17: filler enqueue $i failed"
+    i=$((i + 1))
+  done
+  "$STORE" enqueue --class actionable --locators '{"kind":"bench","id":"malformed-locator-test","observed_hash":"H-REAL-CONSUMED"}' >/dev/null
+  "$STORE" consume --upto 13 >/dev/null 2>&1 || fail_msg "T17: baseline consume failed"
+  jq_any "$rec" '.kind=="bench" and .id=="malformed-locator-test" and .observed_seq==13 and .observed_hash=="H-REAL-CONSUMED"' ||
+    fail_msg "T17: fixture broken — the real writer did not record the bench@13 row"
+  # VERBATIM live specimen: mos-dt lane dead-letter.jsonl line 1 (2026-07-26).
+  # Copied byte-for-byte per the #952 fixture constraint — nested .locators.*
+  # with NO observed_hash key, so the audit's extraction yields "".
+  printf '%s\n' '{"observed_seq":13,"locators":{"kind":"bench","id":"malformed-locator-test","note":"deliberately non-conformant"},"class":"actionable","emit_ts":1785055610,"hmac":""}' >"$dl"
+  # Guard the near-miss trap: the specimen must be genuinely NESTED (no
+  # top-level kind) and must extract an EMPTY hash via the audit's own paths.
+  jq -e '(has("kind") | not) and .locators.kind=="bench" and ((.locators.observed_hash // "") == "")' "$dl" >/dev/null ||
+    fail_msg "T17: specimen fixture is not the genuine nested shape — rebuild it from the live lane, not the schema"
+  # Evidence SURVIVES (kind/id/seq all match the row) but extracts hash "";
+  # _record_last_consumed never writes an empty-hash row, so the four-field
+  # match can never fire: this is unprovable class 2, NOT a false witness.
+  rep="$TMP_ROOT/t17.rep"
+  "$STORE" quarantine-audit >"$rep" 2>&1 || fail_msg "T17: the audit must exit 0 — nothing here is provable [$(cat "$rep")]"
+  grep -q 'FALSE WITNESS' "$rep" && fail_msg "T17: the empty-hash evidence must NOT convict (the predicate is correct and must not change) [$(cat "$rep")]"
+  # The wording under test (#952): BOTH residual classes, named.
+  grep -qi 'pruned' "$rep" || fail_msg "T17: clean sweep must name residual class 1 — evidence pruned away [$(cat "$rep")]"
+  grep -qi 'empty observed_hash' "$rep" || fail_msg "T17: clean sweep must name residual class 2 — surviving evidence with an empty observed_hash [$(cat "$rep")]"
+  # --repair on a clean sweep removes nothing: the unprovable row survives.
+  "$STORE" quarantine-audit --repair >"$TMP_ROOT/t17.fix" 2>&1 || fail_msg "T17: --repair on a clean sweep must exit 0 [$(cat "$TMP_ROOT/t17.fix")]"
+  jq_any "$rec" '.kind=="bench" and .observed_seq==13 and .observed_hash=="H-REAL-CONSUMED"' ||
+    fail_msg "T17: --repair must NOT remove the unprovable bench@13 row — the audit only removes what the ledger can convict"
+  [ "$(grep -c . "$dl")" = "1" ] || fail_msg "T17: the dead-letter LEDGER must be untouched"
+) && ok
+
 echo
 if [ -s "$FAILFILE" ]; then
  echo "wake store/ack harness: FAILED ($(grep -c . "$FAILFILE") assertion(s))" >&2
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@
    "lint": "eslint src",
    "typecheck": "tsc --noEmit",
    "test": "vitest run --passWithNoTests && pnpm run test:framework-shell",
-    "test:framework-shell": "python3 src/lease-broker/daemon_deadline_unittest.py && python3 src/lease-broker/normative_fragments_unittest.py && python3 src/lease-broker/receipt_challenge_unittest.py && python3 src/lease-broker/context_recovery_unittest.py && python3 src/lease-broker/recovery_runtime_unittest.py && python3 src/lease-broker/recovery_b1_adversarial_unittest.py && python3 src/lease-broker/framework_skill_portability_unittest.py && python3 src/mutator-gate/runtime_tools_unittest.py && python3 src/mutator-gate/runtime_launch_guard_unittest.py && python3 src/mutator-gate/version_coupling_unittest.py && python3 framework/tools/lease-broker/check-runtime-launches.py --root ../.. && bash framework/tools/codex/test-pr-diff-context.sh && bash framework/tools/qa/test-deps-preflight.sh && bash framework/tools/git/test-pr-review-gitea-comment.sh && bash framework/tools/git/test-pr-review-repo-host-override.sh && bash framework/tools/git/test-ci-queue-wait-branch-absent.sh && bash framework/tools/git/test-git-credential-mosaic.sh && bash framework/tools/git/test-gitea-token-identity.sh && bash framework/tools/_scripts/test-install-ordering-guard.sh && bash framework/tools/tmux/agent-send.test.sh && bash framework/tools/wake/test-wake-store-ack.sh && bash framework/tools/wake/test-wake-store-enqueue-race.sh && bash framework/tools/wake/test-wake-digest-hmac.sh && bash framework/tools/wake/test-wake-digest-quarantine.sh && bash framework/tools/wake/test-wake-detector.sh && bash framework/tools/wake/test-wake-fn-oracle.sh && bash framework/tools/wake/test-wake-reconcile.sh && bash framework/tools/wake/test-wake-beacon.sh && bash framework/tools/wake/test-wake-install.sh"
+    "test:framework-shell": "python3 src/lease-broker/daemon_deadline_unittest.py && python3 src/lease-broker/normative_fragments_unittest.py && python3 src/lease-broker/receipt_challenge_unittest.py && python3 src/lease-broker/context_recovery_unittest.py && python3 src/lease-broker/recovery_runtime_unittest.py && python3 src/lease-broker/recovery_b1_adversarial_unittest.py && python3 src/lease-broker/framework_skill_portability_unittest.py && python3 src/mutator-gate/runtime_tools_unittest.py && python3 src/mutator-gate/runtime_launch_guard_unittest.py && python3 src/mutator-gate/version_coupling_unittest.py && python3 framework/tools/lease-broker/check-runtime-launches.py --root ../.. && bash framework/tools/codex/test-pr-diff-context.sh && bash framework/tools/qa/test-deps-preflight.sh && bash framework/tools/git/test-pr-review-gitea-comment.sh && bash framework/tools/git/test-pr-review-repo-host-override.sh && bash framework/tools/git/test-ci-queue-wait-branch-absent.sh && bash framework/tools/git/test-git-credential-mosaic.sh && bash framework/tools/git/test-gitea-token-identity.sh && bash framework/tools/_scripts/test-install-ordering-guard.sh && bash framework/tools/tmux/agent-send.test.sh && bash framework/tools/wake/test-wake-store-ack.sh && bash framework/tools/wake/test-wake-store-enqueue-race.sh && bash framework/tools/wake/test-wake-digest-hmac.sh && bash framework/tools/wake/test-wake-digest-quarantine.sh && bash framework/tools/wake/test-wake-detector.sh && bash framework/tools/wake/test-wake-fn-oracle.sh && bash framework/tools/wake/test-wake-reconcile.sh && bash framework/tools/wake/test-wake-beacon.sh && bash framework/tools/wake/test-wake-preimage.sh && bash framework/tools/wake/test-wake-install.sh"
  },
  "dependencies": {
    "@mosaicstack/brain": "workspace:*",