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Author SHA1 Message Date
veronica 98f3384554 docs(W4): mark the Applied table as first-pass and point it forward (fred's F1)
ci/woodpecker/pr/ci Pipeline was successful
The Applied table carried 107 stamped and 17 held, the counts from the first
pass, with nothing telling a reader they had moved. The re-closed arithmetic at
the end of the document was already correct, so the document was not wrong
overall, but a reader hitting the table got a stale count with no forward
pointer. In this PR specifically that is the defect the PR exists to remove,
appearing in the PR's own worklist.

The first-pass numbers are left standing and labelled rather than overwritten,
matching every other correction in this document: a record of what a pass
produced is worth more than a number silently updated to still look right. The
current census follows it, re-measured: 108 stamped + 16 + 3 + 1 = 128, kinds 54
guide / 34 record / 13 spec / 7 tracking, status 106 active / 2 completed, and
the two files carrying source_of_truth: true named.
2026-08-20 20:46:16 -05:00
veronica 4211fb87f8 docs(W4): withdraw the test count from the method paragraph, do not replace it
ci/woodpecker/pr/ci Pipeline was canceled
The paragraph arguing 'run the suite before concluding a docs change has no code
consumers' carried a number: 'CI 2592 ran 1617 tests, 1 failed, 1616 passed'.
That number is wrong and is withdrawn in place rather than deleted.

Extracting per-test totals from these pipeline logs is not a reliable method:
the same regex over the same log format returns 1003 for 2592, 1022 for 2593
and 3471 for 2594, which are runs of the same suite. Three irreconcilable
answers from one method is proof the method does not measure what it claims,
so no corrected count is substituted.

The claim is restated in what the log carries reliably, the named FAIL list and
the turbo task line. The count was decoration on a claim already carried by a
specific name: one named failing spec is what refuted three hand-searches.
2026-08-20 20:41:52 -05:00
veronica ff40794bfe docs(W4): revert channel-protocol to guide (F withdrawn), stamp docs/README.md as the contract's source of truth (Q1)
ci/woodpecker/pr/ci Pipeline was successful
fred withdrew decision F after re-measuring channel-protocol.md with a control:
zero uppercase RFC2119 terms, seven lowercase 'must' all disclaiming authority,
under a banner refusing requirements status. F rested on 'the doc graph outranks
the page's own banner', which contradicts decision D, 'kind follows content'.
D is the rule; F was its counterexample. Neither rescue (vision's adjective edit
on the citing docs, or a banner edit) was taken: a kind that survives only by
editing the evidence around it is not a classification.

Q1 answered: docs/README.md prescribes the contract, so by D its content is a
spec, and by B it is the source of truth for that contract. A plan never
outranks the artifact it planned, so the flatten plan's stale 7-value enum is
corrected there rather than competing here.

128 live docs = 108 stamped + 16 operator-held + 3 supersede deferrals + 1 generated.
2026-08-20 20:21:06 -05:00
veronica 94a7d5b692 test(mosaic): pin quickstart.md to status: active, the contract's value for in-force
ci/woodpecker/pr/ci Pipeline failed
CI 2592 proved the old front-matter schema HAD a consumer. vision's C2 concluded "no consumer
found", fred's decision A rested on "no installed base to protect", and I accepted both. All three
of us were wrong.

installation-documentation.spec.ts:39 asserted a raw regex over the markdown text:

    expect(markdown).toMatch(/^---\n[\s\S]*?\nstatus: current\n[\s\S]*?\n---\n/);

Not a front-matter parse and not a key lookup, which is why a search organised around parsing
primitives could not see it. Stamping docs/USER-GUIDE/getting-started/quickstart.md replaced
`status: current` with `status: active` and turned it red.

Updated to the contract's vocabulary, intent unchanged: the page must still declare itself in
force, and must still teach no curl-pipe-to-shell install. Verified by evaluating both regexes
against the real file: old false, new true. Control: a page carrying `superseded-by` still fails
the new regex, so the assertion still asserts something.

2592 also confirms the NORTH_STAR revert took: the north-star drift test is green, `format` and
`lint` are green, and this was the only failure in 1617 tests.

Method point worth keeping: the full suite is a stronger consumer search than any grep, because it
does not depend on guessing how a consumer reads the file.
2026-08-20 20:04:35 -05:00
veronica 12d5258e20 docs(W4): apply fred's six contract decisions from PR #1350 comment 23693
A - docs/README.md:149-190 rewritten. It prescribed a competing front-matter schema
    (title/type/audience/status/source_of_truth) adopted by 4 of 128 live documents. Two
    documented conventions in one repo is the defect this pass removes, so the README now
    documents the contract and the 4 files convert in the same commit: `type` dropped
    (kind replaces it), `title`/`audience`/`source_of_truth` kept.
B - source-of-truth leaves the kind enum, which is now 6 values, and returns as an orthogonal
    boolean. kind was carrying two independent facts. docs/requirements/native-kanban-sot.md
    is stamped `kind: spec` + `source_of_truth: true`, which is what it always was.
C - status gains `completed`. Applied to the two executed plans, on artifact evidence rather
    than on their own say-so: --purpose push|merge ships in ci-queue-wait.sh, and every section
    the README plan specifies exists in docs/README.md today.
D - kind follows content, never filename. docs/native-kanban-sot/TASKS.md is `kind: spec`
    because its body says "a build plan, not a task tracker". The name stays wrong; that is a
    rename and it is out of scope here.
E - the contract covers .md only, written into the README as a decision with vision's
    YAML.parse measurement as the reason, so the omission does not read as an oversight.
F - channel-protocol.md guide -> spec. Applied, with a correction the reviewer should see: the
    ruling cites "7 normative MUSTs" and there are ZERO uppercase RFC2119 terms in that file.
    Control: the identical grep returns 25 lines in docs/requirements/native-kanban-sot.md. The
    citation half of the finding does hold and is larger than stated. Consequence recorded in
    the worklist: the file's own banner now contradicts its header.

Verified: 128 live .md under docs/ (127 baseline + this PR's worklist), 107 stamped, 0 invalid
kinds, 17 operator-held + 3 supersede-stamp deferrals + 1 generated = 21 unstamped. 107+21=128.
Control: the verifier reports valid=False when a kind is corrupted to `nonsense`, so the
0-invalid result is a real result. prettier --check clean across docs/.
2026-08-20 19:58:17 -05:00
veronica f6fbeaf57a docs(W4): response to the W5 adversarial pass, in the diff rather than a PR comment
pr-review.sh -n 1350 -a comment fails with HTTP 401 'invalid username, password or token'.
Measured cause with a control: veronica's seat token returns 200 on /api/v1/user and the shared
broker credential gitea-mosaicstack returns 401 on the same endpoint. The wrapper logic is fine,
the credential it is handed is dead, so the PR wrappers are down for every seat on this host.
MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY appears nowhere in credentials.sh, which is FD-9.

Constitution gate 8 makes that operation blocked, so the corrections land in the branch instead,
where they survive the PR anyway.
2026-08-20 19:55:23 -05:00
veronica 8a55c04108 docs(W4): prettier the worklist table padding
ci/woodpecker/pr/ci Pipeline failed
CI 2589 step `format` failed on exactly one file: this one, the plan document I hand-wrote.
prettier --check reproduces locally, rc=1, same single file.

That is worth stating for the review: the other 103 stamped documents pass
`prettier --check` unchanged, so the `---\nkind:\nstatus:\n---` front matter block is
already prettier-clean. The formatting failure was in my prose, not in the contract header.

Diff is 31 lines in, 31 out, all table column padding. No content change.
2026-08-20 19:48:07 -05:00
veronica bea47543f3 docs(W4): revert the NORTH_STAR.md stamp; a projection cannot carry a hand-added header
ci/woodpecker/pr/ci Pipeline was canceled
Found by vision's adversarial pass (W5) and re-measured here. The finding was raised as
latent; it is live in this PR.

docs/fleet/NORTH_STAR.md is generated by renderNorthStarMarkdown()
(packages/mosaic/src/commands/fleet.ts:373), whose first emitted line is the H1 and which
emits no front matter at all. fleet-north-star.spec.ts:110-114 is a drift test that reads
the committed file from disk and asserts full-string equality against the renderer output:

    expect(rendered).toBe(committed);

Stamping the file changed line 1 from '# Mosaic Fleet - NORTH STAR' to '---', so the
assertion fails. vitest could not be run in this worktree (node_modules empty, 'Cannot find
package yaml'), which is a harness gap and not a test result, so this is shown by
construction: the assertion above, the renderer's first lines.push, and line 1 before
versus after.

Reverted to origin/next verbatim: git diff origin/next -- docs/fleet/NORTH_STAR.md is 0
lines. Control on docs/fleet/reference/cli.md returns 13 lines, so the diff command does
report differences when they exist.

The header for a projection has to come from the renderer, not the file. That is a code
change and belongs in the flatten PR beside the resolveNorthStarPaths() fix.

Stamped count 104 -> 103. Untouched 23 -> 24. Worklist records it as a fourth held row.
2026-08-20 19:46:24 -05:00
veronica 37cd00e60d docs(W4): operator worklist for the 19 held rows, plus two contract conflicts
ci/woodpecker/pr/ci Pipeline failed
Records what the stamping pass applied, what it held and why, and the two
places where the contract contradicts itself or the repository:

- docs/native-kanban-sot/TASKS.md declares itself a build plan; the contract
  says TASKS.md is tracking and never a spec.
- docs/requirements/native-kanban-sot.md is hand-authored prose canon; plan
  section 5.2 calls that source-of-truth, the contract table requires
  source-of-truth to be machine-readable.
- docs/README.md already documents a competing front-matter convention on a
  colliding status key, applied to 4 files, with no code consumer.
- The contract has no defined form for a .yaml document, including
  docs/fleet/NORTH_STAR.yaml itself.
2026-08-20 19:31:25 -05:00
veronica f0d2dd9920 docs(W4): stamp kind and status front matter on 104 live documents
Applies the document contract from
docs/plans/2026-08-20_stack-docs-flatten-and-alignment.md section 3, partially:
`kind` and `status` only. `parent` is deliberately held until the flatten in
section 4 lands, so that 127 documents do not have to be re-pointed by hand
when docs/fleet/NORTH_STAR.yaml moves to docs/NORTH_STAR.yaml.

Scope, measured on origin/next at 63069149:

  127 live docs   = all *.md under docs/ minus docs/archive/ minus docs/_old_structure/
  104 stamped     here
   19 held        operator judgement (plan section 9), worklist in the same PR
    3 held        the SUPERSEDED TASKS.md stamps, which cite the moving path
    1 untouched   docs/fleet/FLEET-DOCTRINE.md, already stamped in W1

Kinds applied: 54 guide, 34 record, 9 spec, 6 tracking, 1 projection.
Every row carries a confidence and a one-line rationale in the worklist.

Two collisions with the existing state, both flagged rather than resolved:

1. docs/README.md:150-160 already documents a front-matter convention
   (title/type/audience/status/source_of_truth) with its own allowed values.
   It is applied to 4 of 127 files. Its `status` vocabulary is
   current|draft|deprecated|historical; the new contract's is active|superseded-by.
   The key collides. This commit lets the new contract win and rewrites
   `status: current` to `status: active` on those 4 files, keeping their other
   legacy keys untouched. No code reads any of them: `git grep source_of_truth`
   outside docs/ returns nothing. docs/README.md still prescribes the old
   convention and is an operator row, so it is not edited here.

2. Two of the plan's 20 operator rows are YAML files, not markdown
   (docs/fleet/examples/roster-v2.yaml, docs/openapi-tess.yaml), and the
   contract's front-matter form has no defined meaning for a .yaml document.
   That gap also applies to docs/fleet/NORTH_STAR.yaml, the source of truth
   itself. Raised in the worklist.

A third row from the plan, docs/fleet/north-star.md, no longer exists: W1
renamed it to docs/fleet/FLEET-DOCTRINE.md.

Verification: 104/104 parse with the expected kind and status in front matter;
the check was shown to reject a wrong kind before it was trusted. The diff
removes 4 lines total, all of them `status: current`.
2026-08-20 19:30:25 -05:00
164 changed files with 4033 additions and 19374 deletions
+3 -6
View File
@@ -40,12 +40,9 @@ BETTER_AUTH_SECRET=change-me-to-a-random-32-char-string
BETTER_AUTH_URL=http://localhost:14242
# ─── Web App (SPA) ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Directory holding the built SPA bundle (vite build output). When set, the
# gateway serves the SPA same-origin; when unset (dev), run the Vite dev
# server (pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/web dev), which proxies to the gateway.
# safe-default: unset in dev — SPA serving is an opt-in production concern
#WEB_DIST_DIR=apps/web/dist
# ─── Web App (Next.js) ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Public gateway URL — accessible from the browser, not just the server.
NEXT_PUBLIC_GATEWAY_URL=http://localhost:14242
# ─── OpenTelemetry ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+1 -8
View File
@@ -1,11 +1,4 @@
{
"schema_version": 2,
"integration_trunk": "next",
"release_branch": "main",
"flow": "trunk-release",
"canonical_remote": "https://git.mosaicstack.dev/mosaicstack/stack",
"canonical_clone": "host:/src/mosaic-stack",
"worktree_root": "host:/src/mosaic-stack-worktrees",
"worktree_policy": "orchestrator-precreated",
"notes": "next=development/integration; main=production release. Never branch work off main. worktree_policy is TRANSITIONAL: the wrapper worktree consumer is BLOCKED on the J3/#1174 amendment (checked roots + capacity guard); pre-creation is the interim orchestration choice, not closed policy — it becomes a timing choice only after the wrapper can validate this root."
"release_branch": "main"
}
+4 -49
View File
@@ -38,12 +38,10 @@ when:
- event: push
branch: main
# Turbo remote cache (turbo.mosaicstack.dev) is wired in publish.yml via the
# org-level Woodpecker secret `turbo_token` (events: push/tag/cron/manual/
# deployment — never pull_request). This PR pipeline deliberately gets no
# remote-cache credentials: an untrusted PR must not be able to write to (or
# poison) the shared cache. Without TURBO_* env vars turbo falls back to
# local cache only, which is the intended behavior here.
# Turbo remote cache (turbo.mosaicstack.dev) is configured via Woodpecker
# repository-level environment variables (TURBO_API, TURBO_TEAM, TURBO_TOKEN).
# This avoids from_secret which is blocked on pull_request events.
# If the env vars aren't set, turbo falls back to local cache only.
steps:
install:
@@ -93,15 +91,6 @@ steps:
# and sandboxes a throwaway git repo, so it resolves no real credentials and
# joins CI directly rather than the exclusions file.
- bash packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/test-issue-close-fail-closed.sh
# Hermetic regression for the git identity ladder (#1356): mock tea on PATH,
# sandboxed repo, no real credentials (3/3 green under an empty HOME). Pins
# fail-closed: a seat whose login is missing gets a named error, never a
# borrowed identity. Joins CI directly; its #1007 exclusion is burned down.
- bash packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/test-gitea-login-resolution.sh
# Hermetic regression for issue-view.sh (#1357): mock tea/curl, sandboxed
# repo. Pins that comment BODIES render on both paths and that a tea
# failure is named as what it was (git-config vs credential).
- bash packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/test-issue-view-comments.sh
# Hermetic behavioural regression for the PreToolUse wrapper guard: proves
# it still blocks the three mistakes AND still lets reads, unwrapped
# endpoints and ordinary commands through. Both directions are asserted —
@@ -115,40 +104,6 @@ steps:
# stub supplies the scale instead of the host's own checkout.
- bash packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/test-mosaic-worktree-large-repo.sh
# Canonical repo-structure declaration gate (T51 WP5c, spec §5.4 point 2):
# .mosaic/repo.json is the machine-readable structure SSOT consumed by git
# wrappers and the T32 gate seat; this is its repo-side CI enforcement.
# Path-conditional: runs when the declaration, the vendored validator, or this
# pipeline config changes (manual runs always include it). Fails the pipeline
# on any VALIDATION_ERROR and enforces the schema_version 2 authoring rule
# (--require-v2: edited/new declarations may not stay v1). The validator is
# vendored into the framework tree (spec §5.1 final home) — provenance in its
# header; the hostile-input suite (101 arms, hermetic) runs alongside so the
# gate's own instrument ships in the same commit as the gate.
structure-declaration:
image: *node_image
commands:
- apk add --no-cache bash git
# MOSAIC_HOST_ROOT is a runtime anchor (spec §1.2a: unset fails closed
# for managed validation). CI has no host, so the step provisions an
# EXPLICIT fixture root — honest configuration for the resolution path,
# never a guess about a real host; the per-host containment checks are
# runtime concerns and do not run against a fixture. Grammar, schema,
# refs, flow, remote normalization, and path grammar all prove here.
- mkdir -p /tmp/t51-ci-hostroot
- bash packages/mosaic/framework/tools/structure/validate-repo-json.sh .mosaic/repo.json --require-v2
- bash packages/mosaic/framework/tools/structure/test-validate-repo-json.sh
environment:
MOSAIC_HOST_ROOT: /tmp/t51-ci-hostroot
when:
- event: pull_request
path:
include:
- '.mosaic/repo.json'
- 'packages/mosaic/framework/tools/structure/**'
- '.woodpecker/ci.yml'
- event: manual
# Canonical verify:release stage `upgrade-guard`.
# Blocking gate (#791): a framework upgrade must never write or delete an
# operator-owned path. The HARD GATE proves an unanticipated operator sentinel
+46 -197
View File
@@ -32,11 +32,6 @@ variables:
# non-excluded change still builds, so no transitive dep can silently go stale.
# (Woodpecker: `when` entries are OR'd; `path` applies to push/PR only — hence
# the separate `event: tag` entry.)
# #1407: ONE shared anchor for all three image steps. A second main-only
# anchor previously gated build-web/build-appservice, so next-lane pushes
# published gateway sha images with no web/appservice counterpart — no
# sha-parity set existed for next-lane containerized deploys. Every image
# step now builds on next too (sha-only destinations, enforced per step).
- &image_build_when
- event: tag
- event: [push, manual]
@@ -49,6 +44,16 @@ variables:
- '.woodpecker/**'
- event: [push, manual]
branch: next
- &main_image_build_when
- event: tag
- event: [push, manual]
branch: main
path:
exclude:
- 'packages/mosaic/**'
- 'docs/**'
- '**/*.md'
- '.woodpecker/**'
when:
- branch: [main, next]
@@ -68,13 +73,6 @@ steps:
# being empty) and on any incomplete verification.
verify:
image: *node_image
environment:
# Turbo remote cache (see .woodpecker/ci.yml header comment): org-level
# secret, exposed only on trusted events (push/tag/cron/manual/deployment).
TURBO_API: https://turbo.mosaicstack.dev
TURBO_TEAM: mosaic
TURBO_TOKEN:
from_secret: turbo_token
commands:
- *enable_pnpm
# (a) Commit identity: the provider's claimed SHA must equal the actual
@@ -110,13 +108,6 @@ steps:
build:
image: *node_image
environment:
# Turbo remote cache (see .woodpecker/ci.yml header comment): org-level
# secret, exposed only on trusted events (push/tag/cron/manual/deployment).
TURBO_API: https://turbo.mosaicstack.dev
TURBO_TEAM: mosaic
TURBO_TOKEN:
from_secret: turbo_token
commands:
- *enable_pnpm
- pnpm build
@@ -211,20 +202,6 @@ steps:
echo "@mosaicstack:registry=https://git.mosaicstack.dev/api/packages/mosaicstack/npm/" >> ~/.npmrc
DIST_TAGS_JSON="$(npm view @mosaicstack/mosaic dist-tags --registry https://git.mosaicstack.dev/api/packages/mosaicstack/npm/ --json)"
DIST_TAGS_JSON="$DIST_TAGS_JSON" node -e 'const tags = JSON.parse(process.env.DIST_TAGS_JSON || "{}"); if (!tags || typeof tags !== "object" || !Object.hasOwn(tags, "latest")) { throw new Error("Gitea npm registry did not return a usable dist-tags object"); } console.log("[publish-next] registry dist-tags OK: latest=" + tags.latest);'
# #1404: snapshot every publishable manifest BEFORE the transform so the
# workspace can be restored byte-exact after publish. The transform
# rewrites package.json in place (needed: pnpm publish reads the
# workspace manifests); without restore, later steps in this pipeline
# (build-gateway kaniko COPY + pnpm install --frozen-lockfile) see
# manifests that no longer match pnpm-lock.yaml and fail
# ERR_PNPM_OUTDATED_LOCKFILE. Snapshot dir is step-local tmp.
SNAPSHOT_DIR="$(mktemp -d /tmp/publish-next-manifests.XXXXXX)"
export SNAPSHOT_DIR
find apps packages plugins -name package.json -not -path "*/node_modules/*" -not -path "*/dist/*" | while read -r mf; do
mkdir -p "$SNAPSHOT_DIR/$(dirname "$mf")"
cp -p "$mf" "$SNAPSHOT_DIR/$mf"
done
echo "[publish-next] snapshotted $(find "$SNAPSHOT_DIR" -name package.json | wc -l) manifests to $SNAPSHOT_DIR"
node <<'NODE'
const fs = require('node:fs');
const path = require('node:path');
@@ -232,38 +209,23 @@ steps:
const pipelineNumber = process.env.CI_PIPELINE_NUMBER;
const roots = ['apps', 'packages', 'plugins'];
const updated = [];
const exactVersions = new Map(); // name -> bumped next version
function walk(dir, visit) {
function walk(dir) {
if (!fs.existsSync(dir)) return;
for (const entry of fs.readdirSync(dir, { withFileTypes: true })) {
if (entry.name === 'node_modules' || entry.name === 'dist' || entry.name === '.turbo') continue;
const fullPath = path.join(dir, entry.name);
if (entry.isDirectory()) {
const packagePath = path.join(fullPath, 'package.json');
if (fs.existsSync(packagePath)) {
const manifest = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(packagePath, 'utf8'));
if (manifest.name?.startsWith('@mosaicstack/') && !manifest.private) {
visit(manifest, packagePath);
}
}
walk(fullPath, visit);
if (fs.existsSync(packagePath)) updatePackage(packagePath);
walk(fullPath);
}
}
}
// #1389: two passes. Pass 1 bumps every publishable manifest to
// <stable+1>-next.<pipeline> exactly as before, recording name ->
// bumped version. Pass 2 rewrites every published manifest's
// @mosaicstack/* dependency entries (dependencies, devDependencies,
// peerDependencies, optionalDependencies) to the EXACT same-pipeline
// build. A caret range like ^0.0.3-next.2636 leaves the resolver free
// to pick any later build — and on a host with a stale cache, an
// installer-side scaffold pinned at stable, or a registry hiccup, that
// freedom is how a "next" install ends up executing stable-era code
// (web1 evidence: old tier validator, missing migrations). Exact pins
// make the defect class unrepresentable regardless of resolver path.
function bump(manifest, packagePath) {
function updatePackage(packagePath) {
const manifest = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(packagePath, 'utf8'));
if (!manifest.name?.startsWith('@mosaicstack/') || manifest.private) return;
const stableMatch = /^(\d+)\.(\d+)\.(\d+)(?:[-+].*)?$/.exec(manifest.version);
if (!stableMatch) {
throw new Error(manifest.name + " has unsupported semver version '" + manifest.version + "'");
@@ -272,40 +234,13 @@ steps:
const oldVersion = manifest.version;
manifest.version = major + '.' + minor + '.' + (Number(patch) + 1) + '-next.' + pipelineNumber;
fs.writeFileSync(packagePath, JSON.stringify(manifest, null, 2) + '\n');
exactVersions.set(manifest.name, manifest.version);
updated.push(manifest.name + ' ' + oldVersion + ' -> ' + manifest.version);
}
const DEP_FIELDS = ['dependencies', 'devDependencies', 'peerDependencies', 'optionalDependencies'];
let pinnedEntries = 0;
function pin(manifest, packagePath) {
let changed = false;
for (const field of DEP_FIELDS) {
const deps = manifest[field];
if (!deps || typeof deps !== 'object') continue;
for (const [name, range] of Object.entries(deps)) {
if (!name.startsWith('@mosaicstack/')) continue;
const exact = exactVersions.get(name);
if (!exact) {
throw new Error(
manifest.name + ' depends on ' + name +
' which has no bumped version in this publish set — cannot pin');
}
if (range === exact) continue;
deps[name] = exact;
pinnedEntries++;
changed = true;
}
}
if (changed) fs.writeFileSync(packagePath, JSON.stringify(manifest, null, 2) + '\n');
}
for (const root of roots) walk(root, bump);
for (const root of roots) walk(root, pin);
for (const root of roots) walk(root);
if (updated.length === 0) throw new Error('No publishable @mosaicstack/* packages found');
console.log('[publish-next] computed prerelease versions for ' + updated.length + ' packages:');
for (const line of updated) console.log('[publish-next] ' + line);
console.log('[publish-next] pinned ' + pinnedEntries + ' @mosaicstack/* dep entries to exact same-pipeline versions across ' + updated.length + ' manifests');
NODE
pnpm --filter "@mosaicstack/*" --filter "!@mosaicstack/web" --filter "!@mosaicstack/mosaic-as" publish --no-git-checks --access public --tag next
EXPECTED_VERSION="$(node -p "require('./packages/mosaic/package.json').version")"
@@ -315,94 +250,6 @@ steps:
exit 1
fi
echo "[publish-next] @mosaicstack/mosaic@next resolves to $RESOLVED_VERSION"
# #1389 post-publish guard: every freshly published manifest must carry
# EXACT same-pipeline @mosaicstack/* dep pins (no ranges, no stable
# fallback). A leak here fails the pipeline instead of shipping.
node <<'GUARD'
const { execFileSync } = require('node:child_process');
const fs = require('node:fs');
const path = require('node:path');
const pipelineNumber = process.env.CI_PIPELINE_NUMBER;
const registry = 'https://git.mosaicstack.dev/api/packages/mosaicstack/npm/';
const roots = ['apps', 'packages', 'plugins'];
const published = [];
function walk(dir) {
if (!fs.existsSync(dir)) return;
for (const entry of fs.readdirSync(dir, { withFileTypes: true })) {
if (entry.name === 'node_modules' || entry.name === 'dist' || entry.name === '.turbo') continue;
const fullPath = path.join(dir, entry.name);
if (entry.isDirectory()) {
const packagePath = path.join(fullPath, 'package.json');
if (fs.existsSync(packagePath)) {
const m = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(packagePath, 'utf8'));
if (m.name?.startsWith('@mosaicstack/') && !m.private) published.push(m.name);
}
walk(fullPath);
}
}
}
for (const root of roots) walk(root);
let failures = 0;
for (const name of published) {
let manifest;
try {
const out = execFileSync('npm', ['view', name + '@next', '--json', '--registry', registry],
{ encoding: 'utf8', maxBuffer: 16 * 1024 * 1024 });
const arr = JSON.parse(out);
manifest = Array.isArray(arr) ? arr[arr.length - 1] : arr;
} catch (e) {
console.error('[publish-next-guard] FAIL ' + name + ': npm view failed: ' + e.message);
failures++;
continue;
}
const fields = ['dependencies', 'devDependencies', 'peerDependencies', 'optionalDependencies'];
for (const field of fields) {
const deps = manifest[field];
if (!deps || typeof deps !== 'object') continue;
for (const [dep, range] of Object.entries(deps)) {
if (!dep.startsWith('@mosaicstack/')) continue;
const expected = dep === name ? manifest.version : null;
const isExactPin = /^\d+\.\d+\.\d+-next\./.test(range);
const samePipeline = range.endsWith('-next.' + pipelineNumber);
if (!isExactPin) {
console.error('[publish-next-guard] FAIL ' + name + ' -> ' + dep + ' range "' + range + '" is not an exact -next pin (stable-leak class, #1389)');
failures++;
} else if (!samePipeline) {
console.error('[publish-next-guard] FAIL ' + name + ' -> ' + dep + ' pinned "' + range + '" but this pipeline published -next.' + pipelineNumber + ' (cross-pipeline pin)');
failures++;
}
}
}
}
if (failures > 0) {
console.error('[publish-next-guard] FATAL: ' + failures + ' dep-pin violation(s) — stable-dep leak into next publish (#1389)');
process.exit(1);
}
console.log('[publish-next-guard] OK: all ' + published.length + ' published manifests carry exact same-pipeline @mosaicstack/* dep pins');
GUARD
# #1404 restore: put the workspace manifests back byte-exact so later
# steps (build-gateway frozen-lockfile install) see the committed tree.
RESTORE_FAIL=0
while read -r mf; do
if [ -f "$SNAPSHOT_DIR/$mf" ]; then
cp -p "$SNAPSHOT_DIR/$mf" "$mf"
else
echo "[publish-next] FATAL: no snapshot for $mf — cannot restore (snapshot incomplete?)" >&2
RESTORE_FAIL=1
fi
done < <(find apps packages plugins -name package.json -not -path "*/node_modules/*" -not -path "*/dist/*")
# Pristine guard (#1404 red-first control): the publish step must leave
# the workspace byte-identical to the checkout for every manifest.
# git diff is the arbiter — any residual mutation fails THIS step
# instead of surfacing as ERR_PNPM_OUTDATED_LOCKFILE in build-gateway.
if ! git diff --exit-code -- '**/package.json' >/dev/null 2>&1; then
echo "[publish-next] FATAL: workspace package.json files still differ from HEAD after restore (#1404 class)" >&2
git diff --stat -- '**/package.json' >&2 || true
RESTORE_FAIL=1
fi
rm -rf "$SNAPSHOT_DIR"
if [ "$RESTORE_FAIL" -ne 0 ]; then exit 1; fi
echo "[publish-next] workspace manifests restored byte-exact (git diff clean); later steps see the committed tree"
depends_on:
- build
- verify
@@ -458,18 +305,10 @@ steps:
depends_on:
- build
- verify
# #1411: publish-next-npm mutates workspace manifests in place during
# its transform window and restores them at step end. Any step that
# reads the pipeline workspace (kaniko COPY of manifests, later
# installs) must run AFTER publish-next-npm, never concurrently —
# pipeline 2648 raced a COPY inside the window and failed
# ERR_PNPM_OUTDATED_LOCKFILE despite a clean restore. This edge is the
# serialization invariant; add it to every new workspace consumer.
- publish-next-npm
build-appservice:
image: gcr.io/kaniko-project/executor:debug
when: *image_build_when
when: *main_image_build_when
environment:
REGISTRY_USER:
from_secret: REGISTRY_USERNAME
@@ -483,17 +322,8 @@ steps:
- echo "{\"auths\":{\"git.mosaicstack.dev\":{\"username\":\"$REGISTRY_USER\",\"password\":\"$REGISTRY_PASS\"}}}" > /kaniko/.docker/config.json
- |
DESTINATIONS="--destination git.mosaicstack.dev/mosaicstack/stack/appservice:sha-${CI_COMMIT_SHA:0:7}"
if [ "$CI_COMMIT_BRANCH" = "next" ]; then
if [ -n "$CI_COMMIT_TAG" ]; then
echo "[publish] FATAL: next appservice publish must be sha-only; refusing tag '$CI_COMMIT_TAG'" >&2
exit 1
fi
echo "[publish] next appservice publish is sha-only"
elif [ "$CI_COMMIT_BRANCH" = "main" ]; then
if [ "$CI_COMMIT_BRANCH" = "main" ]; then
DESTINATIONS="$DESTINATIONS --destination git.mosaicstack.dev/mosaicstack/stack/appservice:latest"
elif [ -z "$CI_COMMIT_TAG" ]; then
echo "[publish] FATAL: appservice image publish may only run for main, next, or tag events" >&2
exit 1
fi
if [ -n "$CI_COMMIT_TAG" ]; then
DESTINATIONS="$DESTINATIONS --destination git.mosaicstack.dev/mosaicstack/stack/appservice:$CI_COMMIT_TAG"
@@ -502,11 +332,30 @@ steps:
depends_on:
- build
- verify
# #1411: publish-next-npm mutates workspace manifests in place during
# its transform window and restores them at step end. Any step that
# reads the pipeline workspace (kaniko COPY of manifests, later
# installs) must run AFTER publish-next-npm, never concurrently —
# pipeline 2648 raced a COPY inside the window and failed
# ERR_PNPM_OUTDATED_LOCKFILE despite a clean restore. This edge is the
# serialization invariant; add it to every new workspace consumer.
- publish-next-npm
build-web:
image: gcr.io/kaniko-project/executor:debug
when: *main_image_build_when
environment:
REGISTRY_USER:
from_secret: REGISTRY_USERNAME
REGISTRY_PASS:
from_secret: REGISTRY_PASSWORD
CI_COMMIT_BRANCH: ${CI_COMMIT_BRANCH}
CI_COMMIT_TAG: ${CI_COMMIT_TAG}
CI_COMMIT_SHA: ${CI_COMMIT_SHA}
commands:
- mkdir -p /kaniko/.docker
- echo "{\"auths\":{\"git.mosaicstack.dev\":{\"username\":\"$REGISTRY_USER\",\"password\":\"$REGISTRY_PASS\"}}}" > /kaniko/.docker/config.json
- |
DESTINATIONS="--destination git.mosaicstack.dev/mosaicstack/stack/web:sha-${CI_COMMIT_SHA:0:7}"
if [ "$CI_COMMIT_BRANCH" = "main" ]; then
DESTINATIONS="$DESTINATIONS --destination git.mosaicstack.dev/mosaicstack/stack/web:latest"
fi
if [ -n "$CI_COMMIT_TAG" ]; then
DESTINATIONS="$DESTINATIONS --destination git.mosaicstack.dev/mosaicstack/stack/web:$CI_COMMIT_TAG"
fi
/kaniko/executor --context . --dockerfile docker/web.Dockerfile $DESTINATIONS
depends_on:
- build
- verify
-1
View File
@@ -28,7 +28,6 @@
"dependencies": {
"@anthropic-ai/sdk": "^0.80.0",
"@fastify/helmet": "^13.0.2",
"@fastify/static": "^8.3.0",
"@mariozechner/pi-ai": "^0.65.0",
"@mariozechner/pi-coding-agent": "^0.65.0",
"@modelcontextprotocol/sdk": "^1.27.1",
@@ -1,71 +0,0 @@
import { describe, it, expect, vi } from 'vitest';
// The module under test imports @mosaicstack/db at module scope; we replace only the
// pieces DatabaseModule uses (partial mock — the real module also exports the
// schema the storage adapter's import chain needs) so the test pins the #1392
// contract (refuse to start on an incomplete schema) without a live database.
vi.mock('@mosaicstack/db', async (importOriginal) => {
const actual: object = await importOriginal();
return {
...actual,
createDb: vi.fn(),
createPgliteDb: vi.fn(),
getMigrationStatus: vi.fn(),
runPgliteMigrations: vi.fn(),
};
});
import { DatabaseModule } from './database.module.js';
import { getMigrationStatus } from '@mosaicstack/db';
import type { DbHandle } from '@mosaicstack/db';
import type { StorageAdapter } from '@mosaicstack/storage';
import type { MosaicConfig } from '@mosaicstack/config';
function makeModule(storageType: 'postgres' | 'pglite', tier: string) {
const storageAdapter = {
name: storageType,
migrate: vi.fn(),
close: vi.fn(),
} as unknown as StorageAdapter;
const handle = { close: vi.fn() } as unknown as DbHandle;
const config = {
tier,
storage: { type: storageType, url: 'postgresql://x' },
} as unknown as MosaicConfig;
return {
mod: new DatabaseModule(handle, storageAdapter, config),
storageAdapter,
};
}
describe('DatabaseModule.onModuleInit — #1392 schema verification', () => {
it('refuses to start when the postgres schema is incomplete', async () => {
const { mod, storageAdapter } = makeModule('postgres', 'standalone');
vi.mocked(getMigrationStatus).mockResolvedValue({
appliedCount: 15,
expectedCount: 17,
expectedLastTag: '0016_salty_morlocks',
complete: false,
});
await expect(mod.onModuleInit()).rejects.toThrow('Database schema incomplete: 15/17');
expect(storageAdapter.migrate).toHaveBeenCalled(); // migrations attempted first
});
it('starts normally when the schema is complete', async () => {
const { mod } = makeModule('postgres', 'standalone');
vi.mocked(getMigrationStatus).mockResolvedValue({
appliedCount: 17,
expectedCount: 17,
expectedLastTag: '0016_salty_morlocks',
complete: true,
});
await expect(mod.onModuleInit()).resolves.toBeUndefined();
});
it('does not verify postgres status for the local tier (PGlite migrates itself)', async () => {
const { mod } = makeModule('pglite', 'local');
vi.mocked(getMigrationStatus).mockClear();
await expect(mod.onModuleInit()).resolves.toBeUndefined();
expect(getMigrationStatus).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
});
@@ -12,7 +12,6 @@ import {
import {
createDb,
createPgliteDb,
getMigrationStatus,
runPgliteMigrations,
type Db,
type DbHandle,
@@ -75,11 +74,6 @@ export class DatabaseModule implements OnApplicationShutdown, OnModuleInit {
// the same DATABASE_URL, so a single call covers both the gateway DB and
// the storage tables. We deliberately do NOT call runMigrations() here to
// avoid opening a second short-lived connection and doubling startup cost.
//
// #1392: we DO verify afterwards (getMigrationStatus opens one short-lived
// connection) and refuse to start on an incomplete schema. A gateway that
// boots "healthy" on an empty or partial database is precisely the failure
// that shipped in the T63 batch: silent at startup, catastrophic later.
async onModuleInit(): Promise<void> {
if (this.config.tier === 'local') {
this.logger.log('Applying PGlite schema migrations...');
@@ -87,24 +81,6 @@ export class DatabaseModule implements OnApplicationShutdown, OnModuleInit {
}
this.logger.log(`Initializing storage adapter (${this.storageAdapter.name})...`);
await this.storageAdapter.migrate();
if (this.config.storage.type === 'postgres') {
const status = await getMigrationStatus(this.config.storage.url);
if (!status.complete) {
this.logger.error(
`Database schema incomplete: ${status.appliedCount.toString()}/${status.expectedCount.toString()} migrations applied ` +
`(last expected: ${status.expectedLastTag}). ` +
'Refusing to start on a partial schema — see issues #1392/#1402. ' +
"Remediation: re-run 'mosaic gateway install' (it now verifies), or apply migrations manually.",
);
throw new Error(
`Database schema incomplete: ${status.appliedCount.toString()}/${status.expectedCount.toString()} migrations applied`,
);
}
this.logger.log(
`Database schema verified: ${status.appliedCount.toString()}/${status.expectedCount.toString()} migrations applied.`,
);
}
}
async onApplicationShutdown(): Promise<void> {
-8
View File
@@ -12,19 +12,12 @@ import { AppModule } from './app.module.js';
import { mountAuthHandler } from './auth/auth.controller.js';
import { mountMcpHandler } from './mcp/mcp.controller.js';
import { McpService } from './mcp/mcp.service.js';
import { mountSpaStatic } from './spa/serve-spa.js';
import { detectAndAssertTier, TierDetectionError } from '@mosaicstack/storage';
import { resolveGatewayConfigPath } from './env.js';
import { assertValidationPipeSeesDtoDecorators } from './validation-pipe-check.js';
async function bootstrap(): Promise<void> {
const logger = new Logger('Bootstrap');
// Fail loud BEFORE anything else if the global ValidationPipe cannot see
// the guarded DTOs' decorated properties (#1391): a broken metatype turns
// every request body into a 400 at first use; this surfaces it at boot.
assertValidationPipeSeesDtoDecorators();
if (!process.env['BETTER_AUTH_SECRET']) {
throw new Error('BETTER_AUTH_SECRET is required');
}
@@ -69,7 +62,6 @@ async function bootstrap(): Promise<void> {
mountAuthHandler(app);
mountMcpHandler(app, app.get(McpService));
await mountSpaStatic(app);
const port = Number(process.env['GATEWAY_PORT'] ?? 14242);
await app.listen(port, '0.0.0.0');
-75
View File
@@ -1,75 +0,0 @@
import { existsSync } from 'node:fs';
import path from 'node:path';
import { Logger } from '@nestjs/common';
import fastifyStatic from '@fastify/static';
import type { NestFastifyApplication } from '@nestjs/platform-fastify';
/** Request paths that belong to the backend, never to the SPA fallback. */
const BACKEND_PREFIXES = ['/api', '/mcp', '/socket.io'] as const;
function isBackendPath(url: string): boolean {
return BACKEND_PREFIXES.some((prefix) => url === prefix || url.startsWith(`${prefix}/`));
}
/**
* Serve the built web SPA bundle (Phase P5 cutover, #1444).
*
* WEB_DIST_DIR unset: SPA serving is disabled — dev runs the Vite dev server,
* which proxies /api and /socket.io here. WEB_DIST_DIR set but not holding a
* built bundle: fail at boot, because a gateway configured to serve the UI
* silently serving 404s is an outage, not a degraded mode.
*
* Static files get exact routes (wildcard: false, so nothing shadows the API
* routes); every other GET/HEAD outside the backend prefixes falls back to
* index.html so client-side routes deep-link correctly.
*/
export async function mountSpaStatic(app: NestFastifyApplication): Promise<void> {
const logger = new Logger('SpaStatic');
const distDir = process.env['WEB_DIST_DIR'];
if (!distDir) {
logger.log('WEB_DIST_DIR not set; SPA serving disabled (dev mode uses the Vite dev server)');
return;
}
const root = path.resolve(distDir);
const indexFile = path.join(root, 'index.html');
if (!existsSync(indexFile)) {
throw new Error(`WEB_DIST_DIR is '${distDir}' but '${indexFile}' does not exist`);
}
// Default cache semantics: public, max-age=0 with ETag/Last-Modified, so
// every response revalidates (304 when unchanged). Always correct, including
// for index.html after a deploy; immutable caching for hashed /assets/ files
// is a P6 optimization.
await app.register(
fastifyStatic as never,
{
root,
wildcard: false,
index: false,
} as never,
);
// A wildcard route, not setNotFoundHandler: Nest installs its own not-found
// handler during init and Fastify allows only one. find-my-way matches
// most-specific-first, so every declared route (API, static files) wins over
// this catch-all; non-GET unmatched requests keep Fastify's stock 404.
const fastify = app.getHttpAdapter().getInstance();
fastify.get('/*', (req, reply) => {
const url = req.raw.url ?? '';
if (isBackendPath(url)) {
// An unknown backend path is an API 404, never the SPA page.
void reply.code(404).send({
message: `Route ${req.raw.method ?? 'GET'}:${url} not found`,
error: 'Not Found',
statusCode: 404,
});
return;
}
// sendFile is decorated by @fastify/static; its type augmentation targets
// a different fastify copy in the pnpm tree than the Nest adapter's.
(reply as unknown as { sendFile: (file: string) => unknown }).sendFile('index.html');
});
logger.log(`Serving SPA bundle from ${root}`);
}
@@ -1,104 +0,0 @@
/**
* Boot-time ValidationPipe metatype self-check (#1391).
*
* The check exists to fail loud at boot when the global pipe cannot see a
* guarded DTO's decorated properties — the #436 class-erasure signature and
* its dependency-graph cousins. Red/green arms:
*
* GREEN real module state: BootstrapSetupDto's three properties are
* decorated and visible through the globalThis-shared storage.
* RED a control class with NO decorators (the erasure shape): the
* check throws PipeMetatypeCheckError naming every property.
* RED-2 a control where one property is decorated and two are not: the
* error names exactly the missing two — the miss list is precise,
* not a blanket failure.
*/
import { describe, expect, it } from 'vitest';
import { IsString } from 'class-validator';
import {
assertValidationPipeSeesDtoDecorators,
PipeMetatypeCheckError,
} from './validation-pipe-check.js';
describe('assertValidationPipeSeesDtoDecorators (#1391 boot check)', () => {
it('GREEN: passes on real module state (decorated DTO visible to the pipe)', () => {
expect(() => assertValidationPipeSeesDtoDecorators()).not.toThrow();
});
it('RED control: a class whose properties lost their decorators throws, naming them', async () => {
// Simulate metatype erasure: an undecorated class standing where a
// decorated DTO should be. Redefine the guard table for the test by
// importing the module and pointing its table at the eroded class —
// the check reads the table at call time, so a fresh module instance
// with a swapped table reproduces the boot failure deterministically.
const { PIPE_GUARDED_DTOS } = await import('./validation-pipe-check.js');
class ErodedDto {
name?: string;
email?: string;
password?: string;
}
const original = PIPE_GUARDED_DTOS[0];
expect(original).toBeDefined();
// Swap in the eroded target (same declared properties, zero decorators).
(
PIPE_GUARDED_DTOS as unknown as Array<{ name: string; target: object; properties: string[] }>
).splice(0, PIPE_GUARDED_DTOS.length, {
name: 'ErodedDto',
target: ErodedDto,
properties: ['name', 'email', 'password'],
});
try {
expect(() => assertValidationPipeSeesDtoDecorators()).toThrow(PipeMetatypeCheckError);
try {
assertValidationPipeSeesDtoDecorators();
} catch (err) {
const message = err instanceof Error ? err.message : '';
expect(message).toContain('ErodedDto.name');
expect(message).toContain('ErodedDto.email');
expect(message).toContain('ErodedDto.password');
}
} finally {
// Restore real module state for any later test in this file.
(PIPE_GUARDED_DTOS as unknown as unknown[]).splice(0, PIPE_GUARDED_DTOS.length, original);
}
// And confirm the restore is real.
expect(() => assertValidationPipeSeesDtoDecorators()).not.toThrow();
});
it('RED-2 control: a partially decorated class names exactly the missing properties', async () => {
const { PIPE_GUARDED_DTOS } = await import('./validation-pipe-check.js');
class HalfErodedDto {
@IsString()
name?: string;
email?: string;
password?: string;
}
const original = PIPE_GUARDED_DTOS[0];
(
PIPE_GUARDED_DTOS as unknown as Array<{ name: string; target: object; properties: string[] }>
).splice(0, PIPE_GUARDED_DTOS.length, {
name: 'HalfErodedDto',
target: HalfErodedDto,
properties: ['name', 'email', 'password'],
});
try {
try {
assertValidationPipeSeesDtoDecorators();
expect.unreachable('partially decorated DTO must fail the boot check');
} catch (err) {
const message = err instanceof Error ? err.message : '';
expect(message).toContain('HalfErodedDto.email');
expect(message).toContain('HalfErodedDto.password');
expect(message).not.toContain('HalfErodedDto.name has no');
}
} finally {
(PIPE_GUARDED_DTOS as unknown as unknown[]).splice(0, PIPE_GUARDED_DTOS.length, original);
}
});
});
-94
View File
@@ -1,94 +0,0 @@
import 'reflect-metadata';
import { getMetadataStorage } from 'class-validator';
import { BootstrapSetupDto } from './admin/bootstrap.dto.js';
/**
* Boot-time self-check: the global ValidationPipe must be able to SEE the
* decorated properties of the DTOs it guards (#1391, #436 class).
*
* WHY THIS EXISTS. When Nest resolves a @Body() metatype to Object — via
* `import type` class erasure (#436), or a dependency graph where the
* controller's decorators and the application's route enhancers disagree
* (#1391's hypothesized dual-@nestjs/common on a mixed install) — the
* ValidationPipe's whitelist treats every property as forbidden. The first
* symptom is a 400 on the FIRST bootstrap attempt of a fresh install, the
* worst place to discover wiring damage: the operator cannot tell a broken
* payload from a broken daemon.
*
* This check fails LOUD at boot instead: if the pipe cannot see the DTO's
* decorated properties, the gateway refuses to start with a named cause.
* It catches the whole class — erasure, decorator metadata loss — on every
* host, at the moment the damage exists rather than at first use.
*
* Storage sharing note: class-validator keys its metadata storage on
* globalThis, so duplicate package copies do NOT hide metadata (measured,
* #1391 diagnosis). What hides it is losing the metatype itself, which is
* what this asserts against.
*/
/**
* DTOs the global pipe guards, mapped to the properties the whitelist must
* admit. Target is the CONSTRUCTOR (the object class itself): class-validator
* decorators register metadata keyed on the constructor, and its executor
* looks up `object.constructor` (ValidationExecutor.js:50) — the probe
* through `prototype` returns zero. Extend when adding DTOs to the app.
*/
export const PIPE_GUARDED_DTOS: Array<{
name: string;
target: abstract new (...args: never[]) => unknown;
properties: string[];
}> = [
{
name: 'BootstrapSetupDto',
target: BootstrapSetupDto,
properties: ['name', 'email', 'password'],
},
];
export class PipeMetatypeCheckError extends Error {
constructor(missing: string[]) {
super(
'ValidationPipe metatype check failed: ' +
missing.join('; ') +
'. The global ValidationPipe cannot see decorated DTO properties — ' +
'every request body would be rejected as non-whitelisted. ' +
'Check for import-type erasure or decorator metadata loss in the ' +
'dependency graph (see issues #436, #1391).',
);
this.name = 'PipeMetatypeCheckError';
}
}
/**
* Assert the pipe's whitelist can see every guarded DTO's decorated
* properties. Throws PipeMetatypeCheckError (fail-loud at boot) listing
* each miss. Pure function of module state: no I/O, safe to call twice.
*/
export function assertValidationPipeSeesDtoDecorators(): void {
const storage = getMetadataStorage();
const missing: string[] = [];
for (const dto of PIPE_GUARDED_DTOS) {
// class-validator records constraints keyed on the DTO's constructor
// (decorators run on the class), and its executor resolves them via
// object.constructor. A property with no recorded metadata is invisible
// to the whitelist — whatever the cause — and fails here.
// Signature mirrors ValidationExecutor.js:50 — (constructor, schema, always,
// strictGroups, groups?). No schema, always=true, no groups: every
// constraint regardless of grouping, which is what the whitelist sees.
const metadatas = storage.getTargetValidationMetadatas(dto.target, '', true, false);
const decorated = new Set(metadatas.map((m) => m.propertyName));
for (const property of dto.properties) {
if (!decorated.has(property)) {
missing.push(
`${dto.name}.${property} has no class-validator constraints visible to the pipe`,
);
}
}
}
if (missing.length > 0) {
throw new PipeMetatypeCheckError(missing);
}
}
@@ -1,123 +0,0 @@
import 'reflect-metadata';
import { type CanActivate, type ExecutionContext, type INestApplication } from '@nestjs/common';
import { FastifyAdapter, type NestFastifyApplication } from '@nestjs/platform-fastify';
import { Test } from '@nestjs/testing';
import request from 'supertest';
import { afterAll, beforeAll, beforeEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest';
import { AuthGuard } from '../auth/auth.guard.js';
import { TeamsController } from './teams.controller.js';
import { TeamsService } from './teams.service.js';
const teamAlpha = { id: 'team-alpha', name: 'Alpha' };
const teamBeta = { id: 'team-beta', name: 'Beta' };
// user-1 is a member of team-alpha only; admin-1 has role admin.
let currentUser: { id: string; role?: string } = { id: 'user-1' };
const teamsServiceMock = {
findAll: vi.fn(() => Promise.resolve([teamAlpha, teamBeta])),
findAllForUser: vi.fn((userId: string) =>
Promise.resolve(userId === 'user-1' ? [teamAlpha] : []),
),
findById: vi.fn((id: string) => Promise.resolve([teamAlpha, teamBeta].find((t) => t.id === id))),
listMembers: vi.fn(() => Promise.resolve([{ teamId: 'team-alpha', userId: 'user-1' }])),
isMember: vi.fn((teamId: string, userId: string) =>
Promise.resolve(teamId === 'team-alpha' && userId === 'user-1'),
),
};
const authGuard: CanActivate = {
canActivate(context: ExecutionContext): boolean {
const requestContext = context
.switchToHttp()
.getRequest<{ user?: { id: string; role?: string } }>();
requestContext.user = currentUser;
return true;
},
};
describe('teams endpoints are scoped to membership', () => {
let app: INestApplication;
beforeAll(async () => {
const moduleRef = await Test.createTestingModule({
controllers: [TeamsController],
providers: [{ provide: TeamsService, useValue: teamsServiceMock }],
})
.overrideGuard(AuthGuard)
.useValue(authGuard)
.compile();
app = moduleRef.createNestApplication<NestFastifyApplication>(new FastifyAdapter());
await app.init();
await app.getHttpAdapter().getInstance().ready();
});
beforeEach(() => {
currentUser = { id: 'user-1' };
vi.clearAllMocks();
});
afterAll(async () => {
await app.close();
});
it('GET /api/teams returns only the teams the user belongs to', async () => {
const response = await request(app.getHttpServer()).get('/api/teams');
expect(response.status).toBe(200);
expect(response.body).toEqual([teamAlpha]);
expect(teamsServiceMock.findAll).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it('GET /api/teams returns every team for an admin', async () => {
currentUser = { id: 'admin-1', role: 'admin' };
const response = await request(app.getHttpServer()).get('/api/teams');
expect(response.status).toBe(200);
expect(response.body).toEqual([teamAlpha, teamBeta]);
expect(teamsServiceMock.findAllForUser).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it('GET /api/teams/:teamId returns 403 for a non-member', async () => {
const response = await request(app.getHttpServer()).get('/api/teams/team-beta');
expect(response.status).toBe(403);
});
it('GET /api/teams/:teamId returns 404 for a missing team', async () => {
const response = await request(app.getHttpServer()).get('/api/teams/team-missing');
expect(response.status).toBe(404);
});
it('GET /api/teams/:teamId returns the team for a member', async () => {
const response = await request(app.getHttpServer()).get('/api/teams/team-alpha');
expect(response.status).toBe(200);
expect(response.body).toEqual(teamAlpha);
});
it('GET /api/teams/:teamId/members returns 403 for a non-member and members for a member', async () => {
const denied = await request(app.getHttpServer()).get('/api/teams/team-beta/members');
expect(denied.status).toBe(403);
expect(teamsServiceMock.listMembers).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
const allowed = await request(app.getHttpServer()).get('/api/teams/team-alpha/members');
expect(allowed.status).toBe(200);
expect(allowed.body).toEqual([{ teamId: 'team-alpha', userId: 'user-1' }]);
});
it('GET /api/teams/:teamId/members/:userId allows a self-lookup on any team', async () => {
const response = await request(app.getHttpServer()).get('/api/teams/team-beta/members/user-1');
expect(response.status).toBe(200);
expect(response.body).toEqual({ isMember: false });
});
it('GET /api/teams/:teamId/members/:userId denies looking up another user on a foreign team', async () => {
const response = await request(app.getHttpServer()).get('/api/teams/team-beta/members/user-2');
expect(response.status).toBe(403);
});
it('an admin can look up any membership', async () => {
currentUser = { id: 'admin-1', role: 'admin' };
const response = await request(app.getHttpServer()).get('/api/teams/team-alpha/members/user-1');
expect(response.status).toBe(200);
expect(response.body).toEqual({ isMember: true });
});
});
+7 -45
View File
@@ -1,68 +1,30 @@
import {
Controller,
ForbiddenException,
Get,
NotFoundException,
Param,
UseGuards,
} from '@nestjs/common';
import { Controller, Get, Param, UseGuards } from '@nestjs/common';
import { AuthGuard } from '../auth/auth.guard.js';
import { CurrentUser } from '../auth/current-user.decorator.js';
import { TeamsService } from './teams.service.js';
type RequestUser = { id: string; role?: string };
@Controller('api/teams')
@UseGuards(AuthGuard)
export class TeamsController {
constructor(private readonly teams: TeamsService) {}
@Get()
async list(@CurrentUser() user: RequestUser) {
if (user.role === 'admin') {
return this.teams.findAll();
}
return this.teams.findAllForUser(user.id);
async list() {
return this.teams.findAll();
}
@Get(':teamId')
async findOne(@Param('teamId') teamId: string, @CurrentUser() user: RequestUser) {
return this.getAccessibleTeam(teamId, user);
async findOne(@Param('teamId') teamId: string) {
return this.teams.findById(teamId);
}
@Get(':teamId/members')
async listMembers(@Param('teamId') teamId: string, @CurrentUser() user: RequestUser) {
await this.getAccessibleTeam(teamId, user);
async listMembers(@Param('teamId') teamId: string) {
return this.teams.listMembers(teamId);
}
@Get(':teamId/members/:userId')
async checkMembership(
@Param('teamId') teamId: string,
@Param('userId') userId: string,
@CurrentUser() user: RequestUser,
) {
// A user may always ask about their own membership; anything else is
// team-scoped like the other routes.
if (userId !== user.id) {
await this.getAccessibleTeam(teamId, user);
}
async checkMembership(@Param('teamId') teamId: string, @Param('userId') userId: string) {
const isMember = await this.teams.isMember(teamId, userId);
return { isMember };
}
/**
* Team-scoped access: admins see any team; everyone else only teams they
* are a member of. NotFoundException when the team does not exist and
* ForbiddenException when the user lacks access (same convention as the
* projects controller).
*/
private async getAccessibleTeam(teamId: string, user: RequestUser) {
const team = await this.teams.findById(teamId);
if (!team) throw new NotFoundException('Team not found');
if (user.role === 'admin') return team;
const isMember = await this.teams.isMember(teamId, user.id);
if (!isMember) throw new ForbiddenException('Not a member of this team');
return team;
}
}
+1 -16
View File
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
import { Inject, Injectable, Logger } from '@nestjs/common';
import { eq, and, inArray, type Db, teams, teamMembers, projects } from '@mosaicstack/db';
import { eq, and, type Db, teams, teamMembers, projects } from '@mosaicstack/db';
import { DB } from '../database/database.module.js';
@Injectable()
@@ -56,21 +56,6 @@ export class TeamsService {
return this.db.select().from(teams);
}
/**
* List only the teams the user is a member of.
*/
async findAllForUser(userId: string) {
const memberRows = await this.db
.select({ teamId: teamMembers.teamId })
.from(teamMembers)
.where(eq(teamMembers.userId, userId));
const teamIds = memberRows.map((r) => r.teamId);
if (teamIds.length === 0) return [];
return this.db.select().from(teams).where(inArray(teams.id, teamIds));
}
/**
* Find a team by ID.
*/
+6
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
/// <reference types="next" />
/// <reference types="next/image-types/global" />
import "./.next/types/routes.d.ts";
// NOTE: This file should not be edited
// see https://nextjs.org/docs/app/api-reference/config/typescript for more information.
+32
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
import type { NextConfig } from 'next';
const nextConfig: NextConfig = {
output: 'standalone',
transpilePackages: ['@mosaicstack/design-tokens'],
// Enable gzip/brotli compression for all responses.
compress: true,
// Reduce bundle size: disable source maps in production builds.
productionBrowserSourceMaps: false,
// Image optimisation: allow the gateway origin as an external image source.
images: {
formats: ['image/avif', 'image/webp'],
remotePatterns: [
{
protocol: 'https',
hostname: '**',
},
],
},
// Experimental: enable React compiler for automatic memoisation (Next 15+).
// Falls back gracefully if the compiler plugin is not installed.
experimental: {
// Turbopack is the default in dev for Next 15; keep it opt-in for now.
// turbo: {},
},
};
export default nextConfig;
+7 -4
View File
@@ -3,19 +3,22 @@
"version": "0.0.2",
"private": true,
"scripts": {
"build": "vite build",
"dev": "vite",
"preview": "vite preview",
"build": "node ../../scripts/build-web.mjs",
"build:vite": "vite build",
"dev": "next dev -p 3101",
"dev:vite": "vite",
"lint": "eslint src",
"typecheck": "tsc --noEmit",
"test": "vitest run --passWithNoTests",
"test:e2e": "playwright test"
"test:e2e": "playwright test",
"start": "next start -p 3101"
},
"dependencies": {
"@mosaicstack/design-tokens": "workspace:^",
"@mosaicstack/types": "workspace:^",
"better-auth": "^1.5.5",
"clsx": "^2.1.0",
"next": "^16.0.0",
"react": "^19.0.0",
"react-dom": "^19.0.0",
"react-markdown": "^10.1.0",
+14
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
import type { ReactNode } from 'react';
import { GuestGuard } from '@/components/guest-guard';
export default function AuthLayout({ children }: { children: ReactNode }): React.ReactElement {
return (
<GuestGuard>
<div className="flex min-h-screen items-center justify-center bg-surface-bg">
<div className="w-full max-w-md rounded-xl border border-surface-border bg-surface-card p-8 shadow-lg">
{children}
</div>
</div>
</GuestGuard>
);
}
+139
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,139 @@
'use client';
import { useEffect, useState } from 'react';
import { useRouter } from 'next/navigation';
import Link from 'next/link';
import { api } from '@/lib/api';
import { authClient, signIn } from '@/lib/auth-client';
import type { SsoProviderDiscovery } from '@/lib/sso';
import { SsoProviderButtons } from '@/components/auth/sso-provider-buttons';
export default function LoginPage(): React.ReactElement {
const router = useRouter();
const [error, setError] = useState<string | null>(null);
const [loading, setLoading] = useState(false);
const [ssoProviders, setSsoProviders] = useState<SsoProviderDiscovery[]>([]);
const [ssoLoadingProviderId, setSsoLoadingProviderId] = useState<
SsoProviderDiscovery['id'] | null
>(null);
useEffect(() => {
api<SsoProviderDiscovery[]>('/api/sso/providers')
.catch(() => [] as SsoProviderDiscovery[])
.then((providers) => setSsoProviders(providers.filter((provider) => provider.configured)));
}, []);
async function handleSubmit(e: React.FormEvent<HTMLFormElement>): Promise<void> {
e.preventDefault();
setError(null);
setLoading(true);
const form = new FormData(e.currentTarget);
const email = form.get('email') as string;
const password = form.get('password') as string;
const result = await signIn.email({ email, password });
if (result.error) {
setError(result.error.message ?? 'Sign in failed');
setLoading(false);
return;
}
router.push('/chat');
}
async function handleSsoSignIn(providerId: SsoProviderDiscovery['id']): Promise<void> {
setError(null);
setSsoLoadingProviderId(providerId);
try {
const result = await authClient.signIn.oauth2({
providerId,
callbackURL: '/chat',
newUserCallbackURL: '/chat',
});
if (result.error) {
setError(result.error.message ?? `Sign in with ${providerId} failed`);
setSsoLoadingProviderId(null);
}
} catch (err: unknown) {
setError(err instanceof Error ? err.message : `Sign in with ${providerId} failed`);
setSsoLoadingProviderId(null);
}
}
return (
<div>
<h1 className="text-2xl font-semibold">Sign in</h1>
<p className="mt-1 text-sm text-text-secondary">Sign in to your Mosaic account</p>
{error && (
<div
role="alert"
className="mt-4 rounded-lg border border-error/30 bg-error/10 px-4 py-3 text-sm text-error"
>
{error}
</div>
)}
<form className="mt-6 space-y-4" onSubmit={handleSubmit}>
<div>
<label htmlFor="email" className="block text-sm font-medium text-text-secondary">
Email
</label>
<input
id="email"
name="email"
type="email"
autoComplete="email"
required
disabled={loading}
className="mt-1 block w-full rounded-lg border border-surface-border bg-surface-elevated px-3 py-2 text-sm text-text-primary placeholder:text-text-muted focus:border-blue-500 focus:outline-none focus:ring-1 focus:ring-blue-500 disabled:opacity-50"
placeholder="[email protected]"
/>
</div>
<div>
<label htmlFor="password" className="block text-sm font-medium text-text-secondary">
Password
</label>
<input
id="password"
name="password"
type="password"
autoComplete="current-password"
required
disabled={loading}
className="mt-1 block w-full rounded-lg border border-surface-border bg-surface-elevated px-3 py-2 text-sm text-text-primary placeholder:text-text-muted focus:border-blue-500 focus:outline-none focus:ring-1 focus:ring-blue-500 disabled:opacity-50"
placeholder="••••••••"
/>
</div>
<button
type="submit"
disabled={loading}
className="w-full rounded-lg bg-blue-600 px-4 py-2.5 text-sm font-medium text-white transition-colors hover:bg-blue-700 focus:outline-none focus:ring-2 focus:ring-blue-500 focus:ring-offset-2 focus:ring-offset-surface-card disabled:opacity-50"
>
{loading ? 'Signing in...' : 'Sign in'}
</button>
</form>
<SsoProviderButtons
providers={ssoProviders}
loadingProviderId={ssoLoadingProviderId}
onOidcSignIn={(providerId) => {
void handleSsoSignIn(providerId);
}}
/>
<p className="mt-4 text-center text-sm text-text-muted">
Don&apos;t have an account?{' '}
<Link href="/register" className="text-blue-400 hover:text-blue-300">
Sign up
</Link>
</p>
</div>
);
}
+114
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,114 @@
'use client';
import { useState } from 'react';
import { useRouter } from 'next/navigation';
import Link from 'next/link';
import { signUp } from '@/lib/auth-client';
export default function RegisterPage(): React.ReactElement {
const router = useRouter();
const [error, setError] = useState<string | null>(null);
const [loading, setLoading] = useState(false);
async function handleSubmit(e: React.FormEvent<HTMLFormElement>): Promise<void> {
e.preventDefault();
setError(null);
setLoading(true);
const form = new FormData(e.currentTarget);
const name = form.get('name') as string;
const email = form.get('email') as string;
const password = form.get('password') as string;
const result = await signUp.email({ name, email, password });
if (result.error) {
setError(result.error.message ?? 'Registration failed');
setLoading(false);
return;
}
router.push('/chat');
}
return (
<div>
<h1 className="text-2xl font-semibold">Create account</h1>
<p className="mt-1 text-sm text-text-secondary">Get started with Mosaic</p>
{error && (
<div
role="alert"
className="mt-4 rounded-lg border border-error/30 bg-error/10 px-4 py-3 text-sm text-error"
>
{error}
</div>
)}
<form className="mt-6 space-y-4" onSubmit={handleSubmit}>
<div>
<label htmlFor="name" className="block text-sm font-medium text-text-secondary">
Name
</label>
<input
id="name"
name="name"
type="text"
autoComplete="name"
required
disabled={loading}
className="mt-1 block w-full rounded-lg border border-surface-border bg-surface-elevated px-3 py-2 text-sm text-text-primary placeholder:text-text-muted focus:border-blue-500 focus:outline-none focus:ring-1 focus:ring-blue-500 disabled:opacity-50"
placeholder="Your name"
/>
</div>
<div>
<label htmlFor="email" className="block text-sm font-medium text-text-secondary">
Email
</label>
<input
id="email"
name="email"
type="email"
autoComplete="email"
required
disabled={loading}
className="mt-1 block w-full rounded-lg border border-surface-border bg-surface-elevated px-3 py-2 text-sm text-text-primary placeholder:text-text-muted focus:border-blue-500 focus:outline-none focus:ring-1 focus:ring-blue-500 disabled:opacity-50"
placeholder="[email protected]"
/>
</div>
<div>
<label htmlFor="password" className="block text-sm font-medium text-text-secondary">
Password
</label>
<input
id="password"
name="password"
type="password"
autoComplete="new-password"
required
disabled={loading}
className="mt-1 block w-full rounded-lg border border-surface-border bg-surface-elevated px-3 py-2 text-sm text-text-primary placeholder:text-text-muted focus:border-blue-500 focus:outline-none focus:ring-1 focus:ring-blue-500 disabled:opacity-50"
placeholder="••••••••"
/>
</div>
<button
type="submit"
disabled={loading}
className="w-full rounded-lg bg-blue-600 px-4 py-2.5 text-sm font-medium text-white transition-colors hover:bg-blue-700 focus:outline-none focus:ring-2 focus:ring-blue-500 focus:ring-offset-2 focus:ring-offset-surface-card disabled:opacity-50"
>
{loading ? 'Creating account...' : 'Create account'}
</button>
</form>
<p className="mt-4 text-center text-sm text-text-muted">
Already have an account?{' '}
<Link href="/login" className="text-blue-400 hover:text-blue-300">
Sign in
</Link>
</p>
</div>
);
}
@@ -1,4 +1,7 @@
'use client';
import { useEffect, useState, useCallback } from 'react';
import { AdminRoleGuard } from '@/components/admin-role-guard';
import { api } from '@/lib/api';
import { cn } from '@/lib/cn';
@@ -44,9 +47,15 @@ interface HealthStatusDto {
// ── Admin Page ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
// Route-level access control lives in AdminGuard (spa/guards.tsx); this page
// assumes an authenticated admin session.
export function AdminPage(): React.ReactElement {
export default function AdminPage(): React.ReactElement {
return (
<AdminRoleGuard>
<AdminContent />
</AdminRoleGuard>
);
}
function AdminContent(): React.ReactElement {
const [activeTab, setActiveTab] = useState<'users' | 'health'>('users');
return (
+365
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,365 @@
'use client';
import { useCallback, useEffect, useRef, useState } from 'react';
import { api } from '@/lib/api';
import { destroySocket, getSocket } from '@/lib/socket';
import type { Conversation, Message } from '@/lib/types';
import {
ConversationSidebar,
type ConversationSidebarRef,
} from '@/components/chat/conversation-sidebar';
import { MessageBubble } from '@/components/chat/message-bubble';
import { ChatInput } from '@/components/chat/chat-input';
import { StreamingMessage } from '@/components/chat/streaming-message';
interface ModelInfo {
id: string;
provider: string;
name: string;
reasoning: boolean;
contextWindow: number;
maxTokens: number;
inputTypes: ('text' | 'image')[];
cost: { input: number; output: number; cacheRead: number; cacheWrite: number };
}
interface ProviderInfo {
id: string;
name: string;
available: boolean;
models: ModelInfo[];
}
export default function ChatPage(): React.ReactElement {
const [activeId, setActiveId] = useState<string | null>(null);
const [messages, setMessages] = useState<Message[]>([]);
const [streamingText, setStreamingText] = useState('');
const [isStreaming, setIsStreaming] = useState(false);
const [isSidebarOpen, setIsSidebarOpen] = useState(true);
const [models, setModels] = useState<ModelInfo[]>([]);
const [selectedModelId, setSelectedModelId] = useState('');
const messagesEndRef = useRef<HTMLDivElement>(null);
const sidebarRef = useRef<ConversationSidebarRef>(null);
// Track the active conversation ID in a ref so socket event handlers always
// see the current value without needing to be re-registered.
const activeIdRef = useRef<string | null>(null);
activeIdRef.current = activeId;
// Accumulate streamed text in a ref so agent:end can read the full content
// without stale-closure issues.
const streamingTextRef = useRef('');
useEffect(() => {
const savedState = window.localStorage.getItem('mosaic-sidebar-open');
if (savedState !== null) {
setIsSidebarOpen(savedState === 'true');
}
}, []);
useEffect(() => {
window.localStorage.setItem('mosaic-sidebar-open', String(isSidebarOpen));
}, [isSidebarOpen]);
useEffect(() => {
api<ProviderInfo[]>('/api/providers')
.then((providers) => {
const availableModels = providers
.filter((provider) => provider.available)
.flatMap((provider) => provider.models);
setModels(availableModels);
setSelectedModelId((current) => current || availableModels[0]?.id || '');
})
.catch(() => {
setModels([]);
setSelectedModelId('');
});
}, []);
// Load messages when active conversation changes
useEffect(() => {
if (!activeId) {
setMessages([]);
return;
}
// Clear streaming state when switching conversations
setIsStreaming(false);
setStreamingText('');
streamingTextRef.current = '';
api<Message[]>(`/api/conversations/${activeId}/messages`)
.then(setMessages)
.catch(() => {});
}, [activeId]);
// Auto-scroll to bottom
useEffect(() => {
messagesEndRef.current?.scrollIntoView({ behavior: 'smooth' });
}, [messages, streamingText]);
// Socket.io setup — connect once for the page lifetime
useEffect(() => {
const socket = getSocket();
function onAgentStart(data: { conversationId: string }): void {
// Only update state if the event belongs to the currently viewed conversation
if (activeIdRef.current !== data.conversationId) return;
setIsStreaming(true);
setStreamingText('');
streamingTextRef.current = '';
}
function onAgentText(data: { conversationId: string; text: string }): void {
if (activeIdRef.current !== data.conversationId) return;
streamingTextRef.current += data.text;
setStreamingText((prev) => prev + data.text);
}
function onAgentEnd(data: { conversationId: string }): void {
if (activeIdRef.current !== data.conversationId) return;
const finalText = streamingTextRef.current;
setIsStreaming(false);
setStreamingText('');
streamingTextRef.current = '';
// Append the completed assistant message to the local message list.
// The Pi agent session is in-memory so the assistant response is not
// persisted to the DB — we build the local UI state instead.
if (finalText) {
setMessages((prev) => [
...prev,
{
id: `assistant-${Date.now()}`,
conversationId: data.conversationId,
role: 'assistant' as const,
content: finalText,
createdAt: new Date().toISOString(),
},
]);
sidebarRef.current?.refresh();
}
}
function onError(data: { error: string; conversationId?: string }): void {
setIsStreaming(false);
setStreamingText('');
streamingTextRef.current = '';
setMessages((prev) => [
...prev,
{
id: `error-${Date.now()}`,
conversationId: data.conversationId ?? '',
role: 'system' as const,
content: `Error: ${data.error}`,
createdAt: new Date().toISOString(),
},
]);
}
socket.on('agent:start', onAgentStart);
socket.on('agent:text', onAgentText);
socket.on('agent:end', onAgentEnd);
socket.on('error', onError);
// Connect if not already connected
if (!socket.connected) {
socket.connect();
}
return () => {
socket.off('agent:start', onAgentStart);
socket.off('agent:text', onAgentText);
socket.off('agent:end', onAgentEnd);
socket.off('error', onError);
// Fully tear down the socket when the chat page unmounts so we get a
// fresh authenticated connection next time the page is visited.
destroySocket();
};
}, []);
const handleNewConversation = useCallback(async (projectId?: string | null) => {
const conv = await api<Conversation>('/api/conversations', {
method: 'POST',
body: { title: 'New conversation', projectId: projectId ?? null },
});
sidebarRef.current?.addConversation({
id: conv.id,
title: conv.title,
projectId: conv.projectId,
updatedAt: conv.updatedAt,
archived: conv.archived,
});
setActiveId(conv.id);
setMessages([]);
setIsSidebarOpen(true);
}, []);
const handleSend = useCallback(
async (content: string, options?: { modelId?: string }) => {
let convId = activeId;
// Auto-create conversation if none selected
if (!convId) {
const autoTitle = content.slice(0, 60);
const conv = await api<Conversation>('/api/conversations', {
method: 'POST',
body: { title: autoTitle },
});
sidebarRef.current?.addConversation({
id: conv.id,
title: conv.title,
projectId: conv.projectId,
updatedAt: conv.updatedAt,
archived: conv.archived,
});
setActiveId(conv.id);
convId = conv.id;
} else if (messages.length === 0) {
// Auto-title the initial placeholder conversation from the first user message.
const autoTitle = content.slice(0, 60);
api<Conversation>(`/api/conversations/${convId}`, {
method: 'PATCH',
body: { title: autoTitle },
})
.then(() => sidebarRef.current?.refresh())
.catch(() => {});
}
// Optimistic user message in local UI state
setMessages((prev) => [
...prev,
{
id: `user-${Date.now()}`,
conversationId: convId,
role: 'user' as const,
content,
createdAt: new Date().toISOString(),
},
]);
// Persist the user message to the DB so conversation history is
// available when the page is reloaded or a new session starts.
api<Message>(`/api/conversations/${convId}/messages`, {
method: 'POST',
body: { role: 'user', content },
}).catch(() => {
// Non-fatal: the agent can still process the message even if
// REST persistence fails.
});
// Send to WebSocket — gateway creates/resumes the agent session and
// streams the response back via agent:start / agent:text / agent:end.
const socket = getSocket();
if (!socket.connected) {
socket.connect();
}
socket.emit('message', {
conversationId: convId,
content,
modelId: (options?.modelId ?? selectedModelId) || undefined,
});
},
[activeId, messages, selectedModelId],
);
return (
<div
className="-m-6 flex h-[calc(100vh-3.5rem)] overflow-hidden"
style={{ background: 'var(--bg-deep, var(--color-surface-bg, #0a0f1a))' }}
>
<ConversationSidebar
ref={sidebarRef}
isOpen={isSidebarOpen}
onClose={() => setIsSidebarOpen(false)}
currentConversationId={activeId}
onSelectConversation={(conversationId) => {
setActiveId(conversationId);
setMessages([]);
if (conversationId && window.innerWidth < 768) {
setIsSidebarOpen(false);
}
}}
onNewConversation={(projectId) => {
void handleNewConversation(projectId);
}}
/>
<div className="flex min-w-0 flex-1 flex-col">
<div
className="flex items-center gap-3 border-b px-4 py-3"
style={{ borderColor: 'var(--border)' }}
>
<button
type="button"
onClick={() => setIsSidebarOpen((open) => !open)}
className="rounded-lg border p-2 transition-colors"
style={{
borderColor: 'var(--border)',
background: 'var(--surface)',
color: 'var(--text)',
}}
aria-label={isSidebarOpen ? 'Close conversation sidebar' : 'Open conversation sidebar'}
>
<svg viewBox="0 0 24 24" className="h-4 w-4" fill="none" stroke="currentColor">
<path strokeWidth="2" strokeLinecap="round" d="M4 7h16M4 12h16M4 17h16" />
</svg>
</button>
<div>
<h1 className="text-sm font-semibold" style={{ color: 'var(--text)' }}>
Mosaic Chat
</h1>
<p className="text-xs" style={{ color: 'var(--muted)' }}>
{activeId ? 'Active conversation selected' : 'Choose or start a conversation'}
</p>
</div>
</div>
{activeId ? (
<>
<div className="flex-1 space-y-4 overflow-y-auto p-6">
{messages.map((msg) => (
<MessageBubble key={msg.id} message={msg} />
))}
{isStreaming && <StreamingMessage text={streamingText} />}
<div ref={messagesEndRef} />
</div>
<ChatInput
onSend={handleSend}
isStreaming={isStreaming}
models={models}
selectedModelId={selectedModelId}
onModelChange={setSelectedModelId}
/>
</>
) : (
<div className="flex flex-1 items-center justify-center px-6">
<div
className="max-w-md rounded-2xl border px-8 py-10 text-center"
style={{
borderColor: 'var(--border)',
background: 'var(--surface)',
}}
>
<h2 className="text-lg font-medium" style={{ color: 'var(--text)' }}>
Welcome to Mosaic Chat
</h2>
<p className="mt-1 text-sm" style={{ color: 'var(--muted)' }}>
Select a conversation or start a new one
</p>
<button
type="button"
onClick={() => {
void handleNewConversation();
}}
className="mt-4 rounded-lg px-4 py-2 text-sm font-medium text-white transition-colors"
style={{ background: 'var(--primary)' }}
>
Start new conversation
</button>
</div>
</div>
)}
</div>
</div>
);
}
+11
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
import type { ReactNode } from 'react';
import { AppShell } from '@/components/layout/app-shell';
import { AuthGuard } from '@/components/auth-guard';
export default function DashboardLayout({ children }: { children: ReactNode }): React.ReactElement {
return (
<AuthGuard>
<AppShell>{children}</AppShell>
</AuthGuard>
);
}
@@ -0,0 +1,338 @@
'use client';
import { useCallback, useEffect, useState } from 'react';
import { useParams, useRouter } from 'next/navigation';
import { api } from '@/lib/api';
import { cn } from '@/lib/cn';
import type { Mission, Project, Task, TaskStatus } from '@/lib/types';
import { MissionTimeline } from '@/components/projects/mission-timeline';
import { PrdViewer } from '@/components/projects/prd-viewer';
import { TaskDetailModal } from '@/components/tasks/task-detail-modal';
import { TaskListView } from '@/components/tasks/task-list-view';
import { TaskStatusSummary } from '@/components/tasks/task-status-summary';
type Tab = 'overview' | 'tasks' | 'missions' | 'prd';
const statusColors: Record<string, string> = {
active: 'bg-success/20 text-success',
paused: 'bg-warning/20 text-warning',
completed: 'bg-blue-600/20 text-blue-400',
archived: 'bg-gray-600/20 text-gray-400',
};
interface TabButtonProps {
id: Tab;
label: string;
activeTab: Tab;
onClick: (tab: Tab) => void;
}
function TabButton({ id, label, activeTab, onClick }: TabButtonProps): React.ReactElement {
return (
<button
type="button"
onClick={() => onClick(id)}
className={cn(
'border-b-2 px-4 py-2 text-sm transition-colors',
activeTab === id
? 'border-text-primary text-text-primary'
: 'border-transparent text-text-muted hover:text-text-secondary',
)}
>
{label}
</button>
);
}
export default function ProjectDetailPage(): React.ReactElement {
const params = useParams();
const router = useRouter();
const id = typeof params['id'] === 'string' ? params['id'] : '';
const [project, setProject] = useState<Project | null>(null);
const [missions, setMissions] = useState<Mission[]>([]);
const [tasks, setTasks] = useState<Task[]>([]);
const [loading, setLoading] = useState(true);
const [error, setError] = useState<string | null>(null);
const [activeTab, setActiveTab] = useState<Tab>('overview');
const [taskFilter, setTaskFilter] = useState<TaskStatus | 'all'>('all');
const [selectedTask, setSelectedTask] = useState<Task | null>(null);
useEffect(() => {
if (!id) return;
setLoading(true);
setError(null);
Promise.all([
api<Project>(`/api/projects/${id}`),
api<Mission[]>('/api/missions').catch(() => [] as Mission[]),
api<Task[]>(`/api/tasks?projectId=${id}`).catch(() => [] as Task[]),
])
.then(([proj, allMissions, tks]) => {
setProject(proj);
setMissions(allMissions.filter((m) => m.projectId === id));
setTasks(tks);
})
.catch((err: Error) => {
setError(err.message ?? 'Failed to load project');
})
.finally(() => setLoading(false));
}, [id]);
const handleTaskClick = useCallback((task: Task) => {
setSelectedTask(task);
}, []);
const handleCloseTaskModal = useCallback(() => {
setSelectedTask(null);
}, []);
if (loading) {
return (
<div className="py-16 text-center">
<p className="text-sm text-text-muted">Loading project...</p>
</div>
);
}
if (error || !project) {
return (
<div className="py-16 text-center">
<p className="text-sm text-error">{error ?? 'Project not found'}</p>
<button
type="button"
onClick={() => router.push('/projects')}
className="mt-4 text-sm text-text-muted underline hover:text-text-secondary"
>
Back to projects
</button>
</div>
);
}
const filteredTasks = taskFilter === 'all' ? tasks : tasks.filter((t) => t.status === taskFilter);
const prdContent = getPrdContent(project);
const hasPrd = Boolean(prdContent);
const tabs: { id: Tab; label: string }[] = [
{ id: 'overview', label: 'Overview' },
{ id: 'tasks', label: `Tasks (${tasks.length})` },
{ id: 'missions', label: `Missions (${missions.length})` },
...(hasPrd ? [{ id: 'prd' as Tab, label: 'PRD' }] : []),
];
return (
<div>
{/* Breadcrumb */}
<nav className="mb-4 flex items-center gap-2 text-sm text-text-muted">
<button
type="button"
onClick={() => router.push('/projects')}
className="hover:text-text-secondary"
>
Projects
</button>
<span>/</span>
<span className="text-text-primary">{project.name}</span>
</nav>
{/* Project header */}
<div className="mb-6 flex items-start justify-between gap-4">
<div>
<div className="flex items-center gap-3">
<h1 className="text-2xl font-semibold text-text-primary">{project.name}</h1>
<span
className={cn(
'rounded-full px-2 py-0.5 text-xs',
statusColors[project.status] ?? 'bg-gray-600/20 text-gray-400',
)}
>
{project.status}
</span>
</div>
{project.description && (
<p className="mt-1 text-sm text-text-muted">{project.description}</p>
)}
<p className="mt-2 text-xs text-text-muted">
Created {new Date(project.createdAt).toLocaleDateString()} · Updated{' '}
{new Date(project.updatedAt).toLocaleDateString()}
</p>
</div>
</div>
{/* Stats bar */}
<div className="mb-6 grid grid-cols-2 gap-3 sm:grid-cols-4">
<StatCard label="Tasks" value={String(tasks.length)} />
<StatCard
label="Done"
value={String(tasks.filter((t) => t.status === 'done').length)}
valueClass="text-success"
/>
<StatCard
label="In Progress"
value={String(tasks.filter((t) => t.status === 'in-progress').length)}
valueClass="text-blue-400"
/>
<StatCard
label="Blocked"
value={String(tasks.filter((t) => t.status === 'blocked').length)}
valueClass={tasks.some((t) => t.status === 'blocked') ? 'text-error' : undefined}
/>
</div>
{/* Tabs */}
<div className="mb-6 flex gap-0 border-b border-surface-border">
{tabs.map((tab) => (
<TabButton
key={tab.id}
id={tab.id}
label={tab.label}
activeTab={activeTab}
onClick={setActiveTab}
/>
))}
</div>
{/* Tab content */}
{activeTab === 'overview' && (
<OverviewTab project={project} missions={missions} tasks={tasks} />
)}
{activeTab === 'tasks' && (
<div>
<div className="mb-4">
<TaskStatusSummary
tasks={tasks}
activeFilter={taskFilter}
onFilterChange={setTaskFilter}
/>
</div>
<TaskListView tasks={filteredTasks} onTaskClick={handleTaskClick} />
</div>
)}
{activeTab === 'missions' && <MissionTimeline missions={missions} />}
{activeTab === 'prd' && prdContent && (
<div className="rounded-lg border border-surface-border bg-surface-card p-6">
<PrdViewer content={prdContent} />
</div>
)}
{/* Task detail modal */}
{selectedTask && <TaskDetailModal task={selectedTask} onClose={handleCloseTaskModal} />}
</div>
);
}
interface OverviewTabProps {
project: Project;
missions: Mission[];
tasks: Task[];
}
function OverviewTab({ project, missions, tasks }: OverviewTabProps): React.ReactElement {
const recentTasks = [...tasks]
.sort((a, b) => new Date(b.updatedAt).getTime() - new Date(a.updatedAt).getTime())
.slice(0, 5);
return (
<div className="grid gap-6 lg:grid-cols-2">
{/* Recent tasks */}
<section>
<h2 className="mb-3 text-sm font-semibold text-text-secondary">Recent Tasks</h2>
{recentTasks.length === 0 ? (
<div className="rounded-lg border border-surface-border bg-surface-card p-4 text-center">
<p className="text-sm text-text-muted">No tasks yet</p>
</div>
) : (
<div className="space-y-2">
{recentTasks.map((task) => (
<TaskSummaryRow key={task.id} task={task} />
))}
</div>
)}
</section>
{/* Mission summary */}
<section>
<h2 className="mb-3 text-sm font-semibold text-text-secondary">Missions</h2>
{missions.length === 0 ? (
<div className="rounded-lg border border-surface-border bg-surface-card p-4 text-center">
<p className="text-sm text-text-muted">No missions yet</p>
</div>
) : (
<MissionTimeline missions={missions.slice(0, 4)} />
)}
</section>
{/* Metadata */}
{project.metadata && Object.keys(project.metadata).length > 0 && (
<section className="lg:col-span-2">
<h2 className="mb-3 text-sm font-semibold text-text-secondary">Project Metadata</h2>
<div className="rounded-lg border border-surface-border bg-surface-card p-4">
<pre className="overflow-x-auto text-xs text-text-muted">
{JSON.stringify(project.metadata, null, 2)}
</pre>
</div>
</section>
)}
</div>
);
}
const taskStatusColors: Record<string, string> = {
'not-started': 'bg-gray-600/20 text-gray-300',
'in-progress': 'bg-blue-600/20 text-blue-400',
blocked: 'bg-error/20 text-error',
done: 'bg-success/20 text-success',
cancelled: 'bg-gray-600/20 text-gray-500',
};
function TaskSummaryRow({ task }: { task: Task }): React.ReactElement {
return (
<div className="flex items-center justify-between gap-2 rounded-lg border border-surface-border bg-surface-card px-3 py-2">
<span className="truncate text-sm text-text-primary">{task.title}</span>
<span
className={cn(
'shrink-0 rounded-full px-2 py-0.5 text-xs',
taskStatusColors[task.status] ?? 'bg-gray-600/20 text-gray-400',
)}
>
{task.status}
</span>
</div>
);
}
function StatCard({
label,
value,
valueClass,
}: {
label: string;
value: string;
valueClass?: string;
}): React.ReactElement {
return (
<div className="rounded-lg border border-surface-border bg-surface-card p-3">
<p className="text-xs text-text-muted">{label}</p>
<p className={cn('mt-1 text-lg font-semibold', valueClass ?? 'text-text-primary')}>{value}</p>
</div>
);
}
function getPrdContent(project: Project): string | null {
if (!project.metadata) return null;
const prd = project.metadata['prd'];
if (typeof prd === 'string' && prd.trim().length > 0) return prd;
const prdContent = project.metadata['prdContent'];
if (typeof prdContent === 'string' && prdContent.trim().length > 0) return prdContent;
return null;
}
@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
'use client';
import { useCallback, useEffect, useState } from 'react';
import { useRouter } from 'next/navigation';
import { api } from '@/lib/api';
import type { Project } from '@/lib/types';
import { ProjectCard } from '@/components/projects/project-card';
export default function ProjectsPage(): React.ReactElement {
const [projects, setProjects] = useState<Project[]>([]);
const [loading, setLoading] = useState(true);
const router = useRouter();
useEffect(() => {
api<Project[]>('/api/projects')
.then(setProjects)
.catch(() => {})
.finally(() => setLoading(false));
}, []);
const handleProjectClick = useCallback(
(project: Project) => {
router.push(`/projects/${project.id}`);
},
[router],
);
return (
<div>
<div className="mb-6 flex items-center justify-between">
<h1 className="text-2xl font-semibold">Projects</h1>
</div>
{loading ? (
<p className="py-8 text-center text-sm text-text-muted">Loading projects...</p>
) : projects.length === 0 ? (
<div className="py-12 text-center">
<h2 className="text-lg font-medium text-text-secondary">No projects yet</h2>
<p className="mt-1 text-sm text-text-muted">
Projects will appear here when created via the gateway API
</p>
</div>
) : (
<div className="grid gap-4 sm:grid-cols-2 lg:grid-cols-3">
{projects.map((project) => (
<ProjectCard key={project.id} project={project} onClick={handleProjectClick} />
))}
</div>
)}
{/* Mission status section */}
<MissionStatus />
</div>
);
}
function MissionStatus(): React.ReactElement {
const [mission, setMission] = useState<Record<string, unknown> | null>(null);
const [loading, setLoading] = useState(true);
useEffect(() => {
api<Record<string, unknown>>('/api/coord/status')
.then(setMission)
.catch(() => setMission(null))
.finally(() => setLoading(false));
}, []);
return (
<section className="mt-8">
<h2 className="mb-4 text-lg font-semibold">Active Mission</h2>
{loading ? (
<p className="text-sm text-text-muted">Loading mission status...</p>
) : !mission ? (
<div className="rounded-lg border border-surface-border bg-surface-card p-6 text-center">
<p className="text-sm text-text-muted">No active mission detected</p>
</div>
) : (
<div className="rounded-lg border border-surface-border bg-surface-card p-4">
<div className="grid gap-4 sm:grid-cols-2 lg:grid-cols-4">
<StatCard label="Mission" value={String(mission['missionId'] ?? 'Unknown')} />
<StatCard label="Phase" value={String(mission['currentPhase'] ?? '—')} />
<StatCard
label="Tasks"
value={`${mission['completedTasks'] ?? 0} / ${mission['totalTasks'] ?? 0}`}
/>
<StatCard label="Status" value={String(mission['status'] ?? '—')} />
</div>
</div>
)}
</section>
);
}
function StatCard({ label, value }: { label: string; value: string }): React.ReactElement {
return (
<div className="rounded-lg bg-surface-elevated p-3">
<p className="text-xs text-text-muted">{label}</p>
<p className="mt-1 text-sm font-medium text-text-primary">{value}</p>
</div>
);
}
@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@
'use client';
import { useCallback, useEffect, useState } from 'react';
import { api } from '@/lib/api';
import { authClient, useSession } from '@/lib/auth-client';
@@ -59,7 +61,7 @@ function prefValue<T>(prefs: Preference[], key: string, fallback: T): T {
// ─── Main Page ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
export function SettingsPage(): React.ReactElement {
export default function SettingsPage(): React.ReactElement {
const { data: session } = useSession();
const [activeTab, setActiveTab] = useState<Tab>('profile');
@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
'use client';
import { useCallback, useEffect, useState } from 'react';
import { api } from '@/lib/api';
import { cn } from '@/lib/cn';
import type { Task } from '@/lib/types';
import { KanbanBoard } from '@/components/tasks/kanban-board';
import { TaskListView } from '@/components/tasks/task-list-view';
type ViewMode = 'list' | 'kanban';
export default function TasksPage(): React.ReactElement {
const [tasks, setTasks] = useState<Task[]>([]);
const [view, setView] = useState<ViewMode>('kanban');
const [loading, setLoading] = useState(true);
useEffect(() => {
api<Task[]>('/api/tasks')
.then(setTasks)
.catch(() => {})
.finally(() => setLoading(false));
}, []);
const handleTaskClick = useCallback((task: Task) => {
// Task detail view will be added in future iteration
console.log('Task clicked:', task.id);
}, []);
return (
<div>
<div className="mb-6 flex items-center justify-between">
<h1 className="text-2xl font-semibold">Tasks</h1>
<div className="flex items-center gap-2">
<div className="flex rounded-lg border border-surface-border">
<button
type="button"
onClick={() => setView('list')}
className={cn(
'px-3 py-1.5 text-xs transition-colors',
view === 'list'
? 'bg-surface-elevated text-text-primary'
: 'text-text-muted hover:text-text-secondary',
)}
>
List
</button>
<button
type="button"
onClick={() => setView('kanban')}
className={cn(
'px-3 py-1.5 text-xs transition-colors',
view === 'kanban'
? 'bg-surface-elevated text-text-primary'
: 'text-text-muted hover:text-text-secondary',
)}
>
Kanban
</button>
</div>
</div>
</div>
{loading ? (
<p className="py-8 text-center text-sm text-text-muted">Loading tasks...</p>
) : view === 'kanban' ? (
<KanbanBoard tasks={tasks} onTaskClick={handleTaskClick} />
) : (
<TaskListView tasks={tasks} onTaskClick={handleTaskClick} />
)}
</div>
);
}
@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
'use client';
import Link from 'next/link';
import { useEffect, useState } from 'react';
import { useParams, useSearchParams } from 'next/navigation';
import { api } from '@/lib/api';
import { resolveAuthCallbackURL } from '@/lib/auth-redirect';
import { signIn } from '@/lib/auth-client';
import type { SsoProviderDiscovery } from '@/lib/sso';
export default function AuthProviderRedirectPage(): React.ReactElement {
const params = useParams<{ provider: string }>();
const searchParams = useSearchParams();
const providerId = typeof params.provider === 'string' ? params.provider : '';
const requestedCallbackURL = searchParams.get('callbackURL');
const [providerName, setProviderName] = useState<string | null>(null);
const [error, setError] = useState<string | null>(null);
useEffect(() => {
let cancelled = false;
async function redirectToProvider(): Promise<void> {
try {
const callbackURL = resolveAuthCallbackURL(requestedCallbackURL, window.location.origin);
const providers = await api<SsoProviderDiscovery[]>('/api/sso/providers');
if (cancelled) return;
const provider = providers.find((candidate) => candidate.id === providerId);
if (!provider) {
setError('Unknown SSO provider.');
return;
}
setProviderName(provider.name);
if (!provider.configured) {
setError(`${provider.name} is not enabled in this deployment.`);
return;
}
if (provider.loginMode !== 'oidc') {
setError(`${provider.name} is not available for OIDC sign in.`);
return;
}
const result = await signIn.oauth2({
providerId: provider.id,
callbackURL,
});
if (!cancelled && result?.error) {
setError(result.error.message ?? `${provider.name} sign in failed.`);
}
} catch (caught: unknown) {
if (!cancelled) {
setError(caught instanceof Error ? caught.message : 'Unable to start single sign-on.');
}
}
}
void redirectToProvider();
return () => {
cancelled = true;
};
}, [providerId, requestedCallbackURL]);
return (
<div className="mx-auto flex min-h-[50vh] max-w-md flex-col justify-center">
<h1 className="text-2xl font-semibold text-text-primary">Single sign-on</h1>
<p className="mt-2 text-sm text-text-secondary">
{providerName
? `Redirecting you to ${providerName}...`
: 'Preparing your sign-in request...'}
</p>
{error ? (
<div
role="alert"
className="mt-6 rounded-lg border border-error/30 bg-error/10 px-4 py-3 text-sm text-error"
>
<p>{error}</p>
<Link
href="/login"
className="mt-3 inline-block font-medium text-blue-400 hover:text-blue-300"
>
Return to login
</Link>
</div>
) : (
<div className="mt-6 rounded-lg border border-surface-border bg-surface-elevated px-4 py-3 text-sm text-text-secondary">
If the redirect does not start automatically, return to the login page and try again.
</div>
)}
</div>
);
}
+41
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
import type { Metadata } from 'next';
import type { ReactNode } from 'react';
import { ThemeProvider } from '@/providers/theme-provider';
import './globals.css';
export const metadata: Metadata = {
title: 'Mosaic',
description: 'Mosaic Stack Dashboard',
};
function themeScript(): string {
return `
(function () {
try {
var theme = window.localStorage.getItem('mosaic-theme') || 'dark';
document.documentElement.setAttribute('data-theme', theme === 'light' ? 'light' : 'dark');
} catch (error) {
document.documentElement.setAttribute('data-theme', 'dark');
}
})();
`;
}
export default function RootLayout({ children }: { children: ReactNode }): React.ReactElement {
return (
<html lang="en" suppressHydrationWarning>
<head>
<link rel="preconnect" href="https://fonts.googleapis.com" />
<link rel="preconnect" href="https://fonts.gstatic.com" crossOrigin="anonymous" />
<link
rel="stylesheet"
href="https://fonts.googleapis.com/css2?family=Outfit:wght@300;400;500;600;700&family=Fira+Code:wght@400;500&display=swap"
/>
<script dangerouslySetInnerHTML={{ __html: themeScript() }} />
</head>
<body>
<ThemeProvider>{children}</ThemeProvider>
</body>
</html>
);
}
+5
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
import { redirect } from 'next/navigation';
export default function HomePage(): never {
redirect('/chat');
}
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
'use client';
import { useRouter } from 'next/navigation';
import { useEffect } from 'react';
import { useSession } from '@/lib/auth-client';
interface AdminRoleGuardProps {
children: React.ReactNode;
}
export function AdminRoleGuard({ children }: AdminRoleGuardProps): React.ReactElement | null {
const { data: session, isPending } = useSession();
const router = useRouter();
const user = session?.user as
| (NonNullable<typeof session>['user'] & { role?: string })
| undefined;
useEffect(() => {
if (!isPending && !session) {
router.replace('/login');
} else if (!isPending && session && user?.role !== 'admin') {
router.replace('/');
}
}, [isPending, session, user?.role, router]);
if (isPending) {
return (
<div className="flex min-h-screen items-center justify-center">
<div className="text-sm text-text-muted">Loading...</div>
</div>
);
}
if (!session || user?.role !== 'admin') {
return null;
}
return <>{children}</>;
}
+34
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
'use client';
import { useRouter } from 'next/navigation';
import { useEffect } from 'react';
import { useSession } from '@/lib/auth-client';
interface AuthGuardProps {
children: React.ReactNode;
}
export function AuthGuard({ children }: AuthGuardProps): React.ReactElement | null {
const { data: session, isPending } = useSession();
const router = useRouter();
useEffect(() => {
if (!isPending && !session) {
router.replace('/login');
}
}, [isPending, session, router]);
if (isPending) {
return (
<div className="flex min-h-screen items-center justify-center">
<div className="text-sm text-text-muted">Loading...</div>
</div>
);
}
if (!session) {
return null;
}
return <>{children}</>;
}
@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@
'use client';
import { useEffect, useMemo, useRef, useState } from 'react';
import type { ModelInfo } from '@/lib/types';
@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@
'use client';
import { useCallback, useRef, useState } from 'react';
import { cn } from '@/lib/cn';
import type { Conversation } from '@/lib/types';
@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@
'use client';
import {
forwardRef,
useCallback,
@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@
'use client';
import { useCallback, useMemo, useState } from 'react';
import ReactMarkdown from 'react-markdown';
import { cn } from '@/lib/cn';
@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@
'use client';
import { useEffect, useMemo, useState } from 'react';
interface StreamingMessageProps {
@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@
'use client';
import type { ReactElement } from 'react';
import { formatAge, type FreshnessLabel } from '@/lib/freshness/model';
+35
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
'use client';
import { useRouter } from 'next/navigation';
import { useEffect } from 'react';
import { useSession } from '@/lib/auth-client';
interface GuestGuardProps {
children: React.ReactNode;
}
/** Redirects authenticated users away from auth pages. */
export function GuestGuard({ children }: GuestGuardProps): React.ReactElement | null {
const { data: session, isPending } = useSession();
const router = useRouter();
useEffect(() => {
if (!isPending && session) {
router.replace('/chat');
}
}, [isPending, session, router]);
if (isPending) {
return (
<div className="flex min-h-screen items-center justify-center">
<div className="text-sm text-text-muted">Loading...</div>
</div>
);
}
if (session) {
return null;
}
return <>{children}</>;
}
@@ -0,0 +1,239 @@
'use client';
import Link from 'next/link';
import { useCallback, useEffect, useMemo, useState } from 'react';
import { signOut, useSession } from '@/lib/auth-client';
interface AppHeaderProps {
conversationTitle?: string | null;
isSidebarOpen: boolean;
onToggleSidebar: () => void;
}
type ThemeMode = 'dark' | 'light';
const THEME_STORAGE_KEY = 'mosaic-chat-theme';
export function AppHeader({
conversationTitle,
isSidebarOpen,
onToggleSidebar,
}: AppHeaderProps): React.ReactElement {
const { data: session } = useSession();
const [currentTime, setCurrentTime] = useState('');
const [version, setVersion] = useState<string | null>(null);
const [menuOpen, setMenuOpen] = useState(false);
const [theme, setTheme] = useState<ThemeMode>('dark');
useEffect(() => {
function updateTime(): void {
setCurrentTime(
new Date().toLocaleTimeString([], {
hour: '2-digit',
minute: '2-digit',
}),
);
}
updateTime();
const interval = window.setInterval(updateTime, 60_000);
return () => window.clearInterval(interval);
}, []);
useEffect(() => {
fetch('/version.json')
.then(async (res) => res.json() as Promise<{ version?: string; commit?: string }>)
.then((data) => {
if (data.version) {
setVersion(data.commit ? `${data.version}+${data.commit}` : data.version);
}
})
.catch(() => setVersion(null));
}, []);
useEffect(() => {
const storedTheme = window.localStorage.getItem(THEME_STORAGE_KEY);
const nextTheme = storedTheme === 'light' ? 'light' : 'dark';
applyTheme(nextTheme);
setTheme(nextTheme);
}, []);
const handleThemeToggle = useCallback(() => {
const nextTheme = theme === 'dark' ? 'light' : 'dark';
applyTheme(nextTheme);
window.localStorage.setItem(THEME_STORAGE_KEY, nextTheme);
setTheme(nextTheme);
}, [theme]);
const handleSignOut = useCallback(async (): Promise<void> => {
await signOut();
window.location.href = '/login';
}, []);
const userLabel = session?.user.name ?? session?.user.email ?? 'Mosaic User';
const initials = useMemo(() => getInitials(userLabel), [userLabel]);
return (
<header
className="sticky top-0 z-20 border-b backdrop-blur-xl"
style={{
backgroundColor: 'color-mix(in srgb, var(--color-surface) 82%, transparent)',
borderColor: 'var(--color-border)',
}}
>
<div className="flex items-center justify-between gap-3 px-4 py-3 md:px-6">
<div className="flex min-w-0 items-center gap-3">
<button
type="button"
onClick={onToggleSidebar}
className="inline-flex h-10 w-10 items-center justify-center rounded-2xl border transition-colors hover:bg-white/5"
style={{ borderColor: 'var(--color-border)', color: 'var(--color-text)' }}
aria-label="Toggle conversation sidebar"
aria-expanded={isSidebarOpen}
>
</button>
<Link href="/chat" className="flex min-w-0 items-center gap-3">
<div
className="flex h-10 w-10 items-center justify-center rounded-2xl text-sm font-semibold text-white shadow-[var(--shadow-ms-md)]"
style={{
background:
'linear-gradient(135deg, var(--color-ms-blue-500), var(--color-ms-teal-500))',
}}
>
M
</div>
<div className="flex min-w-0 items-center gap-3">
<div className="text-sm font-semibold text-[var(--color-text)]">Mosaic</div>
<div className="hidden h-5 w-px bg-[var(--color-border)] md:block" />
<div className="hidden items-center gap-2 md:flex">
<span className="relative flex h-2.5 w-2.5">
<span className="absolute inline-flex h-full w-full animate-ping rounded-full bg-[var(--color-ms-teal-500)] opacity-60" />
<span className="relative inline-flex h-2.5 w-2.5 rounded-full bg-[var(--color-ms-teal-500)]" />
</span>
<span className="text-xs uppercase tracking-[0.18em] text-[var(--color-muted)]">
Online
</span>
</div>
</div>
</Link>
</div>
<div className="hidden min-w-0 items-center gap-3 md:flex">
<div className="rounded-full border border-[var(--color-border)] px-3 py-1.5 text-xs text-[var(--color-text-2)]">
{currentTime || '--:--'}
</div>
<div className="max-w-[24rem] truncate text-sm font-medium text-[var(--color-text)]">
{conversationTitle?.trim() || 'New Session'}
</div>
{version ? (
<div className="rounded-full border border-[var(--color-border)] px-3 py-1.5 text-xs text-[var(--color-muted)]">
v{version}
</div>
) : null}
</div>
<div className="flex items-center gap-2">
<div className="hidden items-center gap-2 lg:flex">
<ShortcutHint label="⌘/" text="focus" />
<ShortcutHint label="⌘K" text="focus" />
</div>
<button
type="button"
onClick={handleThemeToggle}
className="inline-flex h-10 items-center justify-center rounded-2xl border px-3 text-sm transition-colors hover:bg-white/5"
style={{ borderColor: 'var(--color-border)', color: 'var(--color-text)' }}
aria-label="Toggle theme"
>
{theme === 'dark' ? '☀︎' : '☾'}
</button>
<div className="relative">
<button
type="button"
onClick={() => setMenuOpen((prev) => !prev)}
className="inline-flex h-10 w-10 items-center justify-center rounded-full border text-sm font-semibold transition-colors hover:bg-white/5"
style={{
backgroundColor: 'var(--color-surface-2)',
borderColor: 'var(--color-border)',
color: 'var(--color-text)',
}}
aria-expanded={menuOpen}
aria-label="Open user menu"
>
{session?.user.image ? (
<img
src={session.user.image}
alt={userLabel}
className="h-full w-full rounded-full object-cover"
/>
) : (
initials
)}
</button>
{menuOpen ? (
<div
className="absolute right-0 top-12 min-w-56 rounded-3xl border p-2 shadow-[var(--shadow-ms-lg)]"
style={{
backgroundColor: 'var(--color-surface)',
borderColor: 'var(--color-border)',
}}
>
<div className="border-b px-3 py-2" style={{ borderColor: 'var(--color-border)' }}>
<div className="text-sm font-medium text-[var(--color-text)]">{userLabel}</div>
{session?.user.email ? (
<div className="text-xs text-[var(--color-muted)]">{session.user.email}</div>
) : null}
</div>
<div className="p-1">
<Link
href="/settings"
className="flex rounded-2xl px-3 py-2 text-sm text-[var(--color-text-2)] transition-colors hover:bg-white/5"
onClick={() => setMenuOpen(false)}
>
Settings
</Link>
<button
type="button"
onClick={() => void handleSignOut()}
className="flex w-full rounded-2xl px-3 py-2 text-left text-sm text-[var(--color-text-2)] transition-colors hover:bg-white/5"
>
Sign out
</button>
</div>
</div>
) : null}
</div>
</div>
</div>
</header>
);
}
function ShortcutHint({ label, text }: { label: string; text: string }): React.ReactElement {
return (
<span className="inline-flex items-center gap-2 rounded-full border border-[var(--color-border)] px-3 py-1.5 text-xs text-[var(--color-muted)]">
<span className="font-medium text-[var(--color-text-2)]">{label}</span>
<span>{text}</span>
</span>
);
}
function getInitials(label: string): string {
const words = label.split(/\s+/).filter(Boolean).slice(0, 2);
if (words.length === 0) return 'M';
return words.map((word) => word.charAt(0).toUpperCase()).join('');
}
function applyTheme(theme: ThemeMode): void {
const root = document.documentElement;
if (theme === 'light') {
root.setAttribute('data-theme', 'light');
root.classList.remove('dark');
} else {
root.removeAttribute('data-theme');
root.classList.add('dark');
}
}
@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@
'use client';
import type { ReactNode } from 'react';
import { SidebarProvider, useSidebar } from './sidebar-context';
import { Sidebar } from './sidebar';
@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@
'use client';
import { createContext, useContext, useEffect, useState, type ReactNode } from 'react';
interface SidebarContextValue {
+6 -3
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,7 @@
import { Link, useLocation } from 'react-router-dom';
'use client';
import Link from 'next/link';
import { usePathname } from 'next/navigation';
import { cn } from '@/lib/cn';
import { MosaicLogo } from '@/components/ui/mosaic-logo';
import { useSidebar } from './sidebar-context';
@@ -96,7 +99,7 @@ const navItems: NavItem[] = [
];
export function Sidebar(): React.ReactElement {
const { pathname } = useLocation();
const pathname = usePathname();
const { mobileOpen, setMobileOpen } = useSidebar();
return (
@@ -134,7 +137,7 @@ export function Sidebar(): React.ReactElement {
return (
<Link
key={item.href}
to={item.href}
href={item.href}
onClick={() => setMobileOpen(false)}
className={cn(
'group flex items-center gap-3 rounded-xl px-3 py-2.5 text-sm transition-all duration-150',
@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@
'use client';
import { useTheme } from '@/providers/theme-provider';
interface ThemeToggleProps {
+5 -3
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,6 @@
import { useNavigate } from 'react-router-dom';
'use client';
import { useRouter } from 'next/navigation';
import { signOut, useSession } from '@/lib/auth-client';
import { ThemeToggle } from './theme-toggle';
import { useSidebar } from './sidebar-context';
@@ -20,12 +22,12 @@ function MenuIcon(): React.JSX.Element {
export function Topbar(): React.ReactElement {
const { data: session } = useSession();
const navigate = useNavigate();
const router = useRouter();
const { isMobile, mobileOpen, setMobileOpen, toggleCollapsed } = useSidebar();
async function handleSignOut(): Promise<void> {
await signOut();
navigate('/login', { replace: true });
router.replace('/login');
}
function handleSidebarToggle(): void {
@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@
'use client';
import { cn } from '@/lib/cn';
import type { Mission, MissionStatus } from '@/lib/types';
@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@
'use client';
interface PrdViewerProps {
content: string;
}
@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@
'use client';
import { cn } from '@/lib/cn';
import type { Project } from '@/lib/types';
@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@
'use client';
import type { Task, TaskStatus } from '@/lib/types';
import { TaskCard } from './task-card';
@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@
'use client';
import { cn } from '@/lib/cn';
import type { Task } from '@/lib/types';
@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@
'use client';
import { useEffect, useRef } from 'react';
import type { ReactNode } from 'react';
import { cn } from '@/lib/cn';
@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@
'use client';
import { cn } from '@/lib/cn';
import type { Task } from '@/lib/types';
@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@
'use client';
import { cn } from '@/lib/cn';
import type { Task, TaskStatus } from '@/lib/types';
@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@
'use client';
import type { CSSProperties } from 'react';
export interface MosaicLogoProps {
+1 -1
View File
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ import { createRoot } from 'react-dom/client';
import { RouterProvider } from 'react-router-dom';
import { ThemeProvider } from '@/providers/theme-provider';
import { createAppRouter } from '@/routes';
import '@/globals.css';
import '@/app/globals.css';
const container = document.getElementById('root');
if (!container) {
@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@
'use client';
import { createContext, useContext, useEffect, useMemo, useState, type ReactNode } from 'react';
export type Theme = 'dark' | 'light';
+15 -33
View File
@@ -13,18 +13,8 @@ import {
TasksRouteErrorBoundary,
} from '@/spa/pages/resource-route-error-boundaries';
import { TasksPage } from '@/spa/pages/tasks';
import { SettingsPage } from '@/spa/pages/settings';
import { AdminPage } from '@/spa/pages/admin';
import { AdminGuard, AuthGuard, GuestGuard } from '@/spa/guards';
import { AppShell } from '@/components/layout/app-shell';
function DashboardLayout(): ReactElement {
return (
<AppShell>
<Outlet />
</AppShell>
);
}
import { AuthGuard, GuestGuard } from '@/spa/guards';
import { Placeholder } from '@/spa/placeholder';
function GuestLayout(): ReactElement {
return (
@@ -53,29 +43,21 @@ export const routes: RouteObject[] = [
{
element: <AuthGuard />,
children: [
{ path: '/', element: <Navigate to="/chat" replace /> },
{ path: '/chat', element: <ChatPage />, errorElement: <ChatRouteErrorBoundary /> },
{
element: <DashboardLayout />,
children: [
{ path: '/', element: <Navigate to="/chat" replace /> },
{ path: '/chat', element: <ChatPage />, errorElement: <ChatRouteErrorBoundary /> },
{
path: '/projects',
element: <ProjectsPage />,
errorElement: <ProjectsRouteErrorBoundary />,
},
{
path: '/projects/:id',
element: <ProjectDetailPage />,
errorElement: <ProjectDetailRouteErrorBoundary />,
},
{ path: '/tasks', element: <TasksPage />, errorElement: <TasksRouteErrorBoundary /> },
{ path: '/settings', element: <SettingsPage /> },
{
element: <AdminGuard />,
children: [{ path: '/admin', element: <AdminPage /> }],
},
],
path: '/projects',
element: <ProjectsPage />,
errorElement: <ProjectsRouteErrorBoundary />,
},
{
path: '/projects/:id',
element: <ProjectDetailPage />,
errorElement: <ProjectDetailRouteErrorBoundary />,
},
{ path: '/tasks', element: <TasksPage />, errorElement: <TasksRouteErrorBoundary /> },
{ path: '/settings', element: <Placeholder title="Settings" /> },
{ path: '/admin', element: <Placeholder title="Admin" /> },
],
},
];
-20
View File
@@ -21,23 +21,3 @@ export function AuthGuard(): ReactElement {
return session ? <Outlet /> : <Navigate to="/login" replace />;
}
export function AdminGuard(): ReactElement {
const { data: session, isPending } = useSession();
if (isPending) {
return (
<div className="flex min-h-screen items-center justify-center">
<div className="text-sm text-text-muted">Loading...</div>
</div>
);
}
if (!session) {
return <Navigate to="/login" replace />;
}
const user = session.user as typeof session.user & { role?: string };
return user.role === 'admin' ? <Outlet /> : <Navigate to="/" replace />;
}
-206
View File
@@ -1,206 +0,0 @@
import { act } from 'react';
import { createRoot, type Root } from 'react-dom/client';
import { createMemoryRouter, RouterProvider, type RouteObject } from 'react-router-dom';
import { afterAll, afterEach, beforeAll, describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest';
const { apiMock, useSessionMock } = vi.hoisted(() => ({
apiMock: vi.fn(),
useSessionMock: vi.fn(),
}));
vi.mock('@/lib/api', () => ({
api: apiMock,
}));
vi.mock('@/lib/auth-client', () => ({
useSession: useSessionMock,
authClient: {},
}));
import { AdminPage } from './admin';
import { AdminGuard } from '@/spa/guards';
const userFixtures = {
users: [
{
id: 'u-admin',
name: 'Ada Admin',
email: '[email protected]',
role: 'admin',
banned: false,
banReason: null,
createdAt: '2026-08-01T00:00:00.000Z',
updatedAt: '2026-08-01T00:00:00.000Z',
},
{
id: 'u-member',
name: 'Mel Member',
email: '[email protected]',
role: 'member',
banned: true,
banReason: 'spam',
createdAt: '2026-08-02T00:00:00.000Z',
updatedAt: '2026-08-02T00:00:00.000Z',
},
],
total: 2,
};
let root: Root | null = null;
let container: HTMLDivElement;
beforeAll(() => {
Object.defineProperty(globalThis, 'IS_REACT_ACT_ENVIRONMENT', {
configurable: true,
value: true,
});
});
afterAll(() => {
Reflect.deleteProperty(globalThis, 'IS_REACT_ACT_ENVIRONMENT');
});
afterEach(async () => {
await act(async () => {
root?.unmount();
});
document.body.replaceChildren();
root = null;
apiMock.mockReset();
useSessionMock.mockReset();
});
async function renderAdminRoute(): Promise<void> {
const routes: RouteObject[] = [
{
element: <AdminGuard />,
children: [{ path: '/admin', element: <AdminPage /> }],
},
{ path: '/', element: <div>home page</div> },
{ path: '/login', element: <div>login page</div> },
];
const router = createMemoryRouter(routes, { initialEntries: ['/admin'] });
container = document.createElement('div');
document.body.append(container);
root = createRoot(container);
await act(async () => {
root?.render(<RouterProvider router={router} />);
});
}
function sessionWithRole(role: string | undefined): { data: unknown; isPending: boolean } {
return {
data: { user: { id: 'u-1', name: 'Test', email: '[email protected]', role } },
isPending: false,
};
}
describe('AdminGuard', () => {
it('redirects unauthenticated visitors to /login', async () => {
useSessionMock.mockReturnValue({ data: null, isPending: false });
await renderAdminRoute();
expect(container.textContent).toContain('login page');
expect(apiMock).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it('redirects non-admin users to /', async () => {
useSessionMock.mockReturnValue(sessionWithRole('member'));
await renderAdminRoute();
expect(container.textContent).toContain('home page');
expect(apiMock).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it('renders the admin page for admin users', async () => {
useSessionMock.mockReturnValue(sessionWithRole('admin'));
apiMock.mockResolvedValueOnce(userFixtures);
await renderAdminRoute();
expect(container.textContent).toContain('Admin Panel');
});
});
describe('AdminPage users tab', () => {
it('lists users with role and ban status after load', async () => {
useSessionMock.mockReturnValue(sessionWithRole('admin'));
apiMock.mockResolvedValueOnce(userFixtures);
await renderAdminRoute();
expect(apiMock).toHaveBeenCalledWith('/api/admin/users');
expect(container.textContent).toContain('Ada Admin');
expect(container.textContent).toContain('Mel Member');
expect(container.textContent).toContain('Banned');
expect(container.textContent).toContain('2 user(s)');
});
it('shows the load error with a retry control', async () => {
useSessionMock.mockReturnValue(sessionWithRole('admin'));
apiMock.mockRejectedValueOnce(new Error('gateway unavailable'));
await renderAdminRoute();
expect(container.textContent).toContain('gateway unavailable');
apiMock.mockResolvedValueOnce(userFixtures);
const retry = [...container.querySelectorAll('button')].find((b) =>
b.textContent?.includes('Retry'),
);
expect(retry).toBeTruthy();
await act(async () => {
retry?.dispatchEvent(new MouseEvent('click', { bubbles: true }));
});
expect(container.textContent).toContain('Ada Admin');
});
it('posts to the ban endpoint and reloads on Ban', async () => {
useSessionMock.mockReturnValue(sessionWithRole('admin'));
apiMock.mockResolvedValue(userFixtures);
await renderAdminRoute();
const banButton = [...container.querySelectorAll('button')].find(
(b) => b.textContent === 'Ban',
);
expect(banButton).toBeTruthy();
await act(async () => {
banButton?.dispatchEvent(new MouseEvent('click', { bubbles: true }));
});
expect(apiMock).toHaveBeenCalledWith('/api/admin/users/u-admin/ban', { method: 'POST' });
});
});
describe('AdminPage health tab', () => {
it('loads health status when the tab is opened', async () => {
useSessionMock.mockReturnValue(sessionWithRole('admin'));
apiMock.mockResolvedValueOnce(userFixtures).mockResolvedValueOnce({
status: 'ok',
database: { status: 'ok', latencyMs: 3 },
cache: { status: 'ok', latencyMs: 1 },
agentPool: { activeSessions: 2 },
providers: [{ id: 'ollama', name: 'Ollama', available: true, modelCount: 4 }],
checkedAt: '2026-08-26T00:00:00.000Z',
});
await renderAdminRoute();
const healthTab = [...container.querySelectorAll('button')].find((b) =>
b.textContent?.includes('System Health'),
);
await act(async () => {
healthTab?.dispatchEvent(new MouseEvent('click', { bubbles: true }));
});
expect(apiMock).toHaveBeenCalledWith('/api/admin/health');
expect(container.textContent).toContain('Database (PostgreSQL)');
expect(container.textContent).toContain('Active sessions: 2');
expect(container.textContent).toContain('4 models');
});
});
@@ -11,7 +11,6 @@ vi.mock('@/lib/auth-client', () => ({
useSession: useSessionMock,
}));
import { ThemeProvider } from '@/providers/theme-provider';
import { routes } from '@/routes';
beforeAll(() => {
@@ -74,11 +73,7 @@ describe('ChatRouteErrorBoundary', () => {
const consoleErrorSpy = vi.spyOn(console, 'error').mockImplementation(() => {});
try {
await act(async () => {
root?.render(
<ThemeProvider>
<RouterProvider router={router} />
</ThemeProvider>,
);
root?.render(<RouterProvider router={router} />);
});
expect(consoleErrorSpy).toHaveBeenCalled();
@@ -11,7 +11,6 @@ vi.mock('@/lib/auth-client', () => ({
useSession: useSessionMock,
}));
import { ThemeProvider } from '@/providers/theme-provider';
import { routes } from '@/routes';
function Boom(): never {
@@ -72,11 +71,7 @@ describe('resource route error boundaries', () => {
const consoleErrorSpy = vi.spyOn(console, 'error').mockImplementation(() => {});
try {
await act(async () => {
root?.render(
<ThemeProvider>
<RouterProvider router={router} />
</ThemeProvider>,
);
root?.render(<RouterProvider router={router} />);
});
expect(consoleErrorSpy).toHaveBeenCalled();
-178
View File
@@ -1,178 +0,0 @@
import { act } from 'react';
import { createRoot, type Root } from 'react-dom/client';
import { createMemoryRouter, RouterProvider, type RouteObject } from 'react-router-dom';
import { afterAll, afterEach, beforeAll, describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest';
const { apiMock, useSessionMock, updateUserMock } = vi.hoisted(() => ({
apiMock: vi.fn(),
useSessionMock: vi.fn(),
updateUserMock: vi.fn(),
}));
vi.mock('@/lib/api', () => ({
api: apiMock,
}));
vi.mock('@/lib/auth-client', () => ({
useSession: useSessionMock,
authClient: { updateUser: updateUserMock },
}));
import { SettingsPage } from './settings';
let root: Root | null = null;
let container: HTMLDivElement;
beforeAll(() => {
Object.defineProperty(globalThis, 'IS_REACT_ACT_ENVIRONMENT', {
configurable: true,
value: true,
});
});
afterAll(() => {
Reflect.deleteProperty(globalThis, 'IS_REACT_ACT_ENVIRONMENT');
});
afterEach(async () => {
await act(async () => {
root?.unmount();
});
document.body.replaceChildren();
root = null;
apiMock.mockReset();
useSessionMock.mockReset();
updateUserMock.mockReset();
});
async function renderSettingsPage(): Promise<void> {
const routes: RouteObject[] = [{ path: '/settings', element: <SettingsPage /> }];
const router = createMemoryRouter(routes, { initialEntries: ['/settings'] });
container = document.createElement('div');
document.body.append(container);
root = createRoot(container);
await act(async () => {
root?.render(<RouterProvider router={router} />);
});
}
function clickButtonByText(text: string): Promise<void> {
const button = [...container.querySelectorAll('button')].find((candidate) =>
candidate.textContent?.includes(text),
);
if (!button) {
throw new Error(`Button containing "${text}" not found`);
}
return act(async () => {
button.dispatchEvent(new MouseEvent('click', { bubbles: true }));
});
}
const session = {
user: { id: 'u-1', name: 'Test User', email: '[email protected]', image: null },
};
describe('SettingsPage profile tab', () => {
it('renders the profile form from the session and saves via authClient', async () => {
useSessionMock.mockReturnValue({ data: session, isPending: false });
updateUserMock.mockResolvedValue({});
await renderSettingsPage();
const nameInput = container.querySelector<HTMLInputElement>('#profile-name');
const emailInput = container.querySelector<HTMLInputElement>('#profile-email');
expect(nameInput?.value).toBe('Test User');
expect(emailInput?.value).toBe('[email protected]');
expect(emailInput?.disabled).toBe(true);
await clickButtonByText('Save changes');
expect(updateUserMock).toHaveBeenCalledWith({ name: 'Test User', image: null });
expect(container.textContent).toContain('Saved!');
});
it('surfaces an update failure without clearing the form', async () => {
useSessionMock.mockReturnValue({ data: session, isPending: false });
updateUserMock.mockResolvedValue({ error: { message: 'name rejected' } });
await renderSettingsPage();
await clickButtonByText('Save changes');
expect(container.textContent).toContain('name rejected');
expect(container.querySelector<HTMLInputElement>('#profile-name')?.value).toBe('Test User');
});
});
describe('SettingsPage appearance tab', () => {
it('loads preferences and posts each changed preference on save', async () => {
useSessionMock.mockReturnValue({ data: session, isPending: false });
apiMock.mockImplementation((path: string) =>
path.startsWith('/api/memory/preferences?')
? Promise.resolve([{ key: 'ui.theme', value: 'dark', category: 'appearance' }])
: Promise.resolve({}),
);
await renderSettingsPage();
await clickButtonByText('Appearance');
expect(apiMock).toHaveBeenCalledWith('/api/memory/preferences?category=appearance');
await clickButtonByText('Save changes');
expect(apiMock).toHaveBeenCalledWith('/api/memory/preferences', {
method: 'POST',
body: { key: 'ui.theme', value: 'dark', category: 'appearance', source: 'user' },
});
});
});
describe('SettingsPage providers tab', () => {
it('loads LLM and SSO providers and runs a connection test', async () => {
useSessionMock.mockReturnValue({ data: session, isPending: false });
apiMock.mockImplementation((path: string, opts?: { method?: string }) => {
if (path === '/api/providers' && opts === undefined) {
return Promise.resolve([
{
id: 'ollama',
name: 'Ollama',
available: true,
models: [
{
id: 'llama3.2',
provider: 'ollama',
name: 'Llama 3.2',
reasoning: false,
contextWindow: 128_000,
maxTokens: 4096,
inputTypes: ['text'],
cost: { input: 0, output: 0, cacheRead: 0, cacheWrite: 0 },
},
],
},
]);
}
if (path === '/api/sso/providers') {
return Promise.resolve([]);
}
if (path === '/api/providers/test') {
return Promise.resolve({ providerId: 'ollama', reachable: true, latencyMs: 12 });
}
return Promise.resolve([]);
});
await renderSettingsPage();
await clickButtonByText('Providers');
expect(container.textContent).toContain('Ollama');
expect(container.textContent).toContain('1 model');
await clickButtonByText('Test');
expect(apiMock).toHaveBeenCalledWith('/api/providers/test', {
method: 'POST',
body: { providerId: 'ollama' },
});
expect(container.textContent).toContain('Reachable');
});
});
-20
View File
@@ -21,23 +21,3 @@ for (const target of [globalThis, window]) {
},
});
}
// jsdom (v29) does not implement window.matchMedia; the sidebar layout uses it
// for its mobile breakpoint. Minimal always-desktop stub.
if (typeof window.matchMedia !== 'function') {
Object.defineProperty(window, 'matchMedia', {
configurable: true,
writable: true,
value: (query: string): MediaQueryList =>
({
matches: false,
media: query,
onchange: null,
addEventListener: () => undefined,
removeEventListener: () => undefined,
addListener: () => undefined,
removeListener: () => undefined,
dispatchEvent: () => false,
}) as unknown as MediaQueryList,
});
}
+4 -4
View File
@@ -1,16 +1,16 @@
{
"extends": "../../tsconfig.base.json",
"compilerOptions": {
"target": "ES2022",
"target": "ES2017",
"lib": ["dom", "dom.iterable", "ES2022"],
"module": "ESNext",
"moduleResolution": "Bundler",
"jsx": "react-jsx",
"types": ["vite/client"],
"jsx": "preserve",
"plugins": [{ "name": "next" }],
"paths": {
"@/*": ["./src/*"]
}
},
"include": ["src", "vite.config.ts", "vitest.config.ts"],
"include": ["next-env.d.ts", "**/*.ts", "**/*.tsx", ".next/types/**/*.ts"],
"exclude": ["node_modules", "e2e", "playwright.config.ts"]
}
+4
View File
@@ -7,6 +7,10 @@ export default defineConfig({
'@': fileURLToPath(new URL('./src', import.meta.url)),
},
},
// tsconfig uses "jsx": "preserve" for Next; tests need esbuild to compile it
esbuild: {
jsx: 'automatic',
},
test: {
globals: true,
environment: 'jsdom',
-2
View File
@@ -10,8 +10,6 @@ COPY pnpm-workspace.yaml pnpm-lock.yaml package.json ./
COPY apps/appservice/package.json ./apps/appservice/
COPY packages/ ./packages/
COPY plugins/ ./plugins/
# the root prepare script runs scripts/install-hooks.mjs on install
COPY scripts/ ./scripts/
RUN pnpm install --frozen-lockfile
COPY . .
RUN pnpm turbo run build --filter @mosaicstack/mosaic-as...
+2 -7
View File
@@ -8,16 +8,14 @@ WORKDIR /app
# Copy workspace manifests first for layer-cached install
COPY pnpm-workspace.yaml pnpm-lock.yaml package.json ./
COPY apps/gateway/package.json ./apps/gateway/
COPY apps/web/package.json ./apps/web/
COPY packages/ ./packages/
COPY plugins/ ./plugins/
# the root prepare script runs scripts/install-hooks.mjs on install
COPY scripts/ ./scripts/
RUN pnpm install --frozen-lockfile
COPY . .
# Build gateway, the web SPA bundle it serves (#1444), and all of their
# workspace dependencies via the turbo dependency graph
RUN pnpm turbo run build --filter @mosaicstack/gateway... --filter @mosaicstack/web...
# Build gateway and all of its workspace dependencies via turbo dependency graph
RUN pnpm turbo run build --filter @mosaicstack/gateway...
# Produce a self-contained deploy artifact: flat node_modules, no pnpm symlinks
# --legacy is required for pnpm v10 when inject-workspace-packages is not set
RUN pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/gateway --prod deploy --legacy /deploy
@@ -40,9 +38,6 @@ COPY --chown=node:node --from=builder /deploy/package.json ./package.json
# dist is declared in package.json "files" so pnpm deploy copies it into /deploy;
# copy from builder explicitly as belt-and-suspenders
COPY --chown=node:node --from=builder /app/apps/gateway/dist ./dist
# The built web SPA bundle; served by the gateway (apps/gateway/src/spa/serve-spa.ts)
COPY --chown=node:node --from=builder /app/apps/web/dist ./web-dist
ENV WEB_DIST_DIR=/app/web-dist
# gateway defaults to port 14242 (apps/gateway/src/main.ts)
EXPOSE 14242
USER node
+24
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
FROM node:22-alpine AS base
ENV PNPM_HOME="/pnpm"
ENV PATH="$PNPM_HOME:$PATH"
RUN corepack enable
FROM base AS builder
WORKDIR /app
COPY pnpm-workspace.yaml pnpm-lock.yaml package.json ./
COPY apps/web/package.json ./apps/web/
COPY packages/ ./packages/
# the root prepare script runs scripts/install-hooks.mjs on install
COPY scripts/ ./scripts/
RUN pnpm install --frozen-lockfile
COPY . .
RUN pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/web build
FROM base AS runner
WORKDIR /app
ENV NODE_ENV=production
COPY --from=builder /app/apps/web/.next/standalone ./
COPY --from=builder /app/apps/web/.next/static ./apps/web/.next/static
COPY --from=builder /app/apps/web/public ./apps/web/public
EXPOSE 3000
CMD ["node", "apps/web/server.js"]
+1014 -242
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-77
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@@ -1,77 +0,0 @@
---
kind: spec
status: active
---
# Mosaic Stack Roadmap
Companion to [docs/PRD.md](./PRD.md). Governed by the D11 rule: **every planned
phase appears here from day one, even as a placeholder** — nothing exists only
in heads. A phase marked _placeholder_ is a commitment to design it, not a
design; scoping one requires its own PRD section or requirements doc plus
review.
Phases are product phases. The in-flight platform workstreams (KBN-100/101
kanban SOT implementation, FCM #758, FCOM #766, TESS, RI #1275, and the other
Part II contracts in the PRD) run as parallel tracks under their own issues
and are prerequisites where noted.
| Phase | Scope | Status |
| ----- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | ----------------------------------------- |
| P0 | Current state on `next`: read-only dashboard, chat, auth/SSO login, admin tabs | shipped, evolving |
| P1 | **v1 slice** (PRD Part I §9) | next up |
| P2 | Connectors + comms + wizard expansion | placeholder |
| P3 | Full onboarding profile + M365 | placeholder |
| P4 | Enterprise mode + one-way conversion | placeholder |
| P5 | Federation | placeholder (deliberately undesigned, D3) |
## P0 — current state
What exists on `next` today: web dashboard (login/register/SSO, chat,
read-only projects/tasks, settings, admin user/system-health tabs), the
Gateway, the CLI-first framework tooling, and the fleet control plane. The
webUI audit (USC estate, webui-audit lane) measures the gap between this and
P1.
## P1 — v1 slice (D11)
1. Standalone onboarding wizard: system/company name, component choices,
initial user, initial estate + project, seeded examples, re-runnable.
2. Hierarchy core: company → estate → project → workspace → kanban, read-only
task bubble-up (kanban SOT Amendment A1 is the schema contract).
3. Basic RBAC on the hierarchy.
4. Minimal agent enrollment: one harness, API key, name/persona.
Prerequisites: KBN-100/101 schema foundation; the D8 tool inventory and
webUI→tool mapping (any missing tool is built first, D12).
## P2 — connectors + comms + wizard expansion (placeholder)
Email and drive connectors (Gmail/IMAP, Google Drive/OneDrive/Dropbox) with
granular agentic-access consent; comms integrations (Matrix/Discord/Slack)
including agent auto-enroll. Wizard gains the corresponding tabs (D4), plus
the D4 capabilities deferred out of P1's minimal slice: expanded agent
enrollment (OAuth login, multi-account, model choice with recommendation,
account assignment, comms auto-enroll) and the Standalone SSO/OIDC
configuration tab.
## P3 — full onboarding profile + M365 (placeholder)
Complete user onboarding profile (communication-style capture, optional
voice-matching interview) under the D14 custody rule; M365 connectors,
available to both deployment modes as ordinary connectors (same consent model
as the P2 connector class). The Enterprise install flow's M365 prominence
(D4) arrives with the Enterprise phase, P4.
## P4 — Enterprise mode + conversion (placeholder)
Enterprise install flow (org chart, RBAC focus, immediate OIDC, SSO
prominent); per-user brains with architectural isolation (D14); Vault
required; the one-way Standalone → Enterprise conversion (D3).
## P5 — federation (placeholder)
Connecting deployments: system-level config, assigned users, rights and
data-access control, trusts with boundaries, strict data access, exfiltration
monitoring. Explicitly not designed yet (D3); nothing in earlier phases may
foreclose it. Requires its own PRD + threat model before any scoping.
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-328
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@@ -1,328 +0,0 @@
# Identity Account-Lifecycle Contract
Status: DRAFT — awaiting ratification (webui-audit S2, contract 4 of 9).
Authority: PRD D10 (better-auth is the account system of record), Q1 ruled O1
by Jason 2026-08-26 (webui-audit T10). This document turns that ruling into
enforceable policy. It also carries the bootstrap/first-admin invariant from
issue #1430, folded in here after PR #1431's independent review showed the
quick-fix approach was insufficient.
Revision 2: addresses the 9 findings of the independent review
(`fleet/lanes/webui-audit/findings/pr1433-review.md`) — epoch enforcement
tightened (§3), canonical email split from provider claims (§5), external
principal keyed by issuer+subject with DB uniqueness and link step-up (§6),
JIT default precedence and first-admin SSO path defined (§2, §4),
deactivation made measurable (§7.1), deletion kept in scope and the existing
hard-delete endpoint required to fail closed (§7.3), workspace identity
reconciled with the native-kanban SOT (§1.4), verification matrix expanded
(§8), factual labels corrected (§7.3, §8.1).
Revision 3: addresses the residuals and new findings of the revision-2
re-review (`fleet/lanes/webui-audit/findings/pr1433-review-r2.md`) —
`users.emailVerified` added to the canonical set with a defined reset rule on
email change (§5.15.2), external-principal uniqueness moved to
(issuer, subject) (§6.1), "can actually use" defined (§6.5), the shipped
delete affordances (web admin page, `mosaic auth users delete`) required to
be removed or disabled with a defined user-visible state (§7.3), the
admin-creation switch removed in favor of plain admin authorization (§2.3),
and §8 extended with observables for IdP removal, forward-auth non-use,
first-admin SSO, wizard-recorded JIT choice, the admin-guide statement, and
positive/expiry-bound step-up cases.
Scope: account creation, bootstrap, federated login, account linking, claim
mapping, deactivation, and (minimally) deletion gating. Out of scope: RBAC
grant semantics (contract 2), wizard UX flow (contract 3), hierarchy schema
(contract 1), sensitive-data custody (contract 7 / D14).
## 1. System of record
1. better-auth's tables (`users`, `accounts`, `sessions`, `verifications`) are
the only account system of record. All foreign keys reference `users.id`.
2. External IdPs (Authentik or any OIDC provider) are login methods, attached
through better-auth's generic-OAuth plugin (`packages/auth/src/sso.ts`).
They never own accounts. Removing an IdP removes a login method, not users.
3. The forward-auth perimeter shim is a deployment measure. Once in-app OIDC
is configured for a deployment, the shim is demoted: it may stay as network
perimeter, but no application code may read identity from its headers.
4. **Account ≠ workspace membership.** Creating an account (by any path:
bootstrap, sign-up, invite, JIT, admin creation) creates no workspace, no
hierarchy grant, and no workspace-scoped authority (native-kanban SOT
REQ-TEN-001 / REQ-ID-001). The better-auth `role` field is a platform/auth
role (`member` | `admin`), not workspace membership. Workspace grants are
defined by contract 2; until then a fresh account can authenticate and
holds no workspace authority.
## 2. Registration gating
Measured current state on `next`: `emailAndPassword.enabled: true` with no
gating — anyone who can reach the Gateway can create an account via
`POST /api/auth/sign-up/email` and receives role `member`.
Contract:
1. A single server-side setting `registration_mode` with values
`open | invite | closed`. It lives in the database (admin-mutable at
runtime), not in env config.
2. Default after bootstrap: `closed`. The wizard (contract 3) may set a
different mode during setup, recorded as an explicit operator choice.
While the bootstrap epoch is open (§3), the effective mode is `closed`
regardless of any stored value: the setting takes effect only after the
epoch completes.
3. `closed` blocks self-service email/password sign-up. It does not block
admin-created users or OIDC JIT (§4). Post-bootstrap admin creation is
gated by admin authorization alone — there is no separate switch for it.
JIT is gated by its per-provider flag (§4.1). All user-creating paths are
closed while the bootstrap epoch is open (§3).
4. `invite` requires a single-use, expiring invite token bound to an email
address. Invite issuance is an admin operation and is audit-logged.
5. Enforcement point: a better-auth hook (or equivalent middleware executed
inside the auth handler path), not a Gateway route guard in front of it —
the raw `/api/auth/*` handler must be incapable of bypassing the gate.
## 3. Bootstrap / first-admin invariant (from #1430)
Invariant: **the system transitions from zero users to one admin user exactly
once per bootstrap epoch, atomically, regardless of concurrency or which code
path writes users.**
Constraints any implementation MUST satisfy (each traces to a verified defect
in PR #1431's review, `fleet/lanes/webui-audit/findings/pr1431-review.md`):
1. **Durable fail-closed epoch state, obeyed by every writer.** The epoch
lives in a constraint-backed one-row `bootstrap_state` table. While the
epoch is open, every non-bootstrap user-creating writer — better-auth
sign-up, OIDC JIT, admin creation — refuses, fail-closed, enforced inside
the writer's own path (better-auth hook for the raw handler; guard for
admin routes). A partial unique index or a winning epoch-transition row is
necessary but not sufficient on its own: neither stops an untagged insert
from a writer that never consulted the epoch. Both layers are required:
database-level transition safety (the epoch-completing write races safely
and at most one wins) and writer-level refusal (no path can create a user
without reading epoch state).
2. **Atomic first-admin transition.** The admin user, its credential account,
the initial admin token, and the epoch-completed transition commit in one
database transaction or not at all. A better-auth call through
`drizzleAdapter(db)` runs on the root pool and is NOT part of any caller
transaction; it may be used inside the bootstrap transition only if the
adapter is explicitly bound to the transaction handle. Otherwise the
bootstrap writer must create the user rows itself within the transaction.
3. **Pool safety.** No design may hold a pooled connection inside a
transaction while awaiting a write that acquires a second connection from
the same pool (`DB_POOL_MAX=1` is a supported configuration).
4. **Re-runnability (D4).** Bootstrap is not a one-shot: after the first-admin
epoch completes, re-running the wizard reconfigures the system but never
re-opens the zero-user transition. "Setup already completed" is a stable,
testable state, and factory-reset (a future, explicitly destructive
operation) is the only way to open a new epoch.
5. **No stranded partial outcome.** A failure at any point in the transition
leaves nothing observable (no admin user without its token, no completed
epoch without an admin) and setup remains retryable — this follows from
§3.2 and is stated separately because it is the pre-existing failure mode
the #1431 review verified.
6. **First-admin via SSO (D4).** When the operator chooses SSO for the
initial user, the wizard executes the OIDC login as part of the bootstrap
transition itself: the bootstrap writer creates the account from the
asserted identity inside the §3.2 transaction. This path is the bootstrap
writer, not JIT — §4's JIT gate stays closed during the epoch and is not
an obstacle to D4.
## 4. JIT provisioning (OIDC first login)
1. A successful OIDC login with no matching account creates a user
just-in-time only when `jit_provisioning` is enabled for that provider.
The flag is per-provider and defaults off, always. There is no
mode-implied default: Enterprise setup enables JIT only when the wizard
records it as an explicit operator choice for a named provider (this
replaces revision 1's "Enterprise mode defaults to closed with OIDC JIT
enabled", which contradicted the per-provider default).
2. JIT users receive platform role `member`, never an elevated role,
regardless of IdP claims (§5), and no workspace authority (§1.4).
3. An optional per-provider email-domain allowlist constrains JIT. The
allowlist matches only when the IdP asserts the email with
`email_verified: true`; an unverified address never satisfies the
allowlist. Empty allowlist with JIT on means any authenticated subject at
that IdP gets an account — permitted, but the wizard must present it as an
explicit choice.
4. JIT is disabled while the bootstrap epoch is open (§3.1). The first-admin
SSO path is §3.6, not JIT.
## 5. Claim mapping
1. **Two stores, not one.** Provider-observed claims (`email`,
`email_verified`, display name, avatar) are recorded per external
principal — keyed by issuer + subject (§6.1) — at first login and
refreshed at each login. The canonical account fields (`users.email`,
`users.emailVerified`, `users.name`, `users.image`) are set exactly once
at account creation and are never silently overwritten by a later login.
For SSO-created accounts (JIT or first-admin SSO), `users.emailVerified`
is set from the provider's `email_verified` claim at creation; for
password-created accounts it is false until the address completes
verification.
2. **Canonical email changes only through an explicit workflow.** Either the
user-initiated email change (with verification of the new address) or an
admin edit. Any canonical email change — user- or admin-initiated — sets
`users.emailVerified` to false until the new address completes
verification; an admin may instead explicitly attest the address as
verified in the same operation, and that attestation is audit-logged. A
provider-claim refresh never rebinds `users.email` or
`users.emailVerified`; a divergence between canonical email and the latest
provider-observed email is surfaced per §6.4.
3. Never mapped from IdP claims: `role` and any future authorization
attribute. Authorization lives in the system of record and in the RBAC
layer (contract 2). An IdP group/role claim may at most be recorded for
audit; it grants nothing.
## 6. Account linking trust
1. **External principal identity is issuer + subject.** A linked identity is
keyed by the OIDC issuer and subject claims, not by an unqualified
provider subject id and not by email. The linked-identity row stores the
issuer, and the database enforces at most one local account per
**(issuer, subject)** with a unique constraint on those stored columns —
uniqueness on (provider, subject) is insufficient because provider →
issuer is not one-to-one: two provider configurations can point at the
same issuer, and the identity must not alias across them. The current
non-unique `(provider_id, account_id)` index satisfies neither;
application-level checks without a uniqueness witness lose
concurrent-callback races. Each configured provider additionally binds to
exactly one issuer, immutable after creation (changing the issuer means
creating a new provider).
2. Linking an OIDC identity to an existing account happens only in one of two
ways: (a) explicit link initiated by the logged-in user from settings,
which requires step-up: a fresh reauthentication (password or existing
linked method) no older than a short bound the implementation defines
(≤ 10 minutes) — a session cookie alone is insufficient, so a stolen
session cannot quietly attach a durable login method; or (b) automatic
link when the IdP asserts a verified email exactly matching an existing
account **and** the provider is marked `trusted_for_linking`
(per-provider flag, default off).
3. Untrusted-provider email collision produces a login error naming the
conflict, not an auto-link and not a duplicate account.
4. A linked identity whose IdP-observed email later diverges from the
canonical account email keeps working (the link is by issuer + subject,
§6.1) but the divergence is surfaced in the user's settings and audit log
(the per-principal claim store in §5.1 is what makes the divergence
representable).
5. Unlinking a login method is refused when it would leave the account with
no **usable** login method. Usable means: a set password, or a linked
identity whose provider is currently configured and enabled on this
deployment. A linked identity whose provider has been removed or disabled
(§1.2) is not usable and does not count; setting a password first lifts
the refusal.
## 7. Deactivation propagation
1. **Deactivation (better-auth admin ban) is authoritative and bounded.**
Concretely:
- Ban and session revocation are one operation: the ban commit revokes all
better-auth sessions for the user. If revocation partially fails, the
ban itself must already be committed and every guard denies from that
point (fail closed); the operation is retryable.
- Every authenticated entry path checks banned state: HTTP session guards,
the admin bearer-token path (which today does not test `banned` — an
implementation defect this contract makes non-conformant), MCP, and
Socket.IO.
- Active socket connections are terminated or denied within 30 seconds of
the ban commit, or at the next inbound message on that socket, whichever
comes first (socket auth at connect-time only, as today, does not
satisfy this).
- The current admin ban route updates only the user row; it does not
conform to this section until revocation and guard coverage land.
- Admin tokens owned by the banned user are revoked in the same operation.
2. Deactivation at an external IdP does not propagate automatically in this
contract's scope (no SCIM). Operational rule: removing a user from the IdP
without banning them in Mosaic leaves any password or other linked login
method usable — the admin guide must state this. SCIM/webhook-driven
propagation is future work and out of scope here.
3. **Deletion is not deactivation, and deletion is gated here.** Account
deletion semantics (FK fan-out across the 21 foreign-key constraints to
`users.id`, spread over 19 referencing tables) require their own
deletion-and-retention contract, chartered as an addition to the S2 list —
contract 7 is the D14 sensitive-data custody contract and does not cover
account deletion. Until that deletion contract is ratified: the existing
hard-delete endpoint (`DELETE /api/admin/users/:id`) is disabled and fails
closed, and deactivation is the only supported removal operation. A
contract that merely declared deactivation "the only supported removal"
while the endpoint stayed live would be false on its face.
Disabling the endpoint alone is insufficient — its shipped callers must
not be left as advertised operations that now fail generically:
- The admin web UI delete action (`apps/web/src/app/(dashboard)/admin/page.tsx`
and any SPA port of it) is removed, or replaced by a disabled control
whose visible text states that deletion is unavailable pending the
deletion-and-retention contract and points at deactivation.
- The CLI command `mosaic auth users delete`
(`packages/mosaic/src/commands/auth.ts`) is removed, or exits non-zero
with a message stating the same and naming the deactivation command.
- Both surfaces expose deactivation as the supported operation.
## 8. Verification requirements
Every MUST above needs a bounded observable. The matrix:
1. **Bootstrap invariant (§3).** Real-PostgreSQL concurrency tests using two
distinct physical connections (pattern:
`apps/gateway/src/agent/connector-lease.postgres.integration.test.ts`,
which runs in the `test` CI step against the `ci-postgres` PostgreSQL
service — note that pattern multiplexes one pooled handle, so the tests
here must explicitly open separate connections). Races to cover:
setup-vs-setup, setup-vs-raw-sign-up, setup-vs-JIT, setup-vs-admin-create.
Plus: liveness under `DB_POOL_MAX=1`; fault injection after each write in
the transition (user, credential, token, epoch) proving nothing observable
leaks and setup retries; wizard re-run after completion proving the
zero-user transition never re-opens. Mocked-transaction specs are
supplementary; they cannot prove serialization.
2. **Registration gating (§2).** Spec coverage of all three modes against the
raw `/api/auth/` handler path, not only Gateway controllers; invite
lifecycle (single-use, expiry, email binding); effective-`closed` while
the epoch is open regardless of stored mode.
3. **JIT (§4).** Provider flag off → no account on first OIDC login; on →
account with platform role `member` and no workspace grant; domain
allowlist rejects an unverified email claim even when the domain matches;
JIT refused while the epoch is open.
4. **Claim mapping (§5).** Login refresh updates the per-principal claim
store and touches none of the canonical fields (`users.email`,
`users.emailVerified`, name, image); explicit email-change workflow is the
only path that rebinds canonical email; every canonical email change
resets `users.emailVerified` to false unless the admin attestation path
is taken, and that attestation appears in the audit log.
5. **Linking (§6).** Unique-constraint witness: concurrent first-login
callbacks for the same (issuer, subject) yield exactly one account, and
two provider configurations sharing one issuer cannot create two accounts
for the same subject; trusted auto-link; untrusted collision error;
step-up both ways: an explicit link succeeds immediately after a fresh
reauthentication and is refused once the implementation's chosen bound
(≤ 10 minutes) has elapsed, and refused with no reauthentication at all;
unlink refusal when no remaining method is usable per §6.5, including the
removed-provider case, and acceptance after a password is set; divergence
surfaced after IdP email change.
6. **Deactivation (§7).** Ban revokes sessions atomically or fails closed
(partial-failure injection); guard denial post-ban on each transport:
HTTP session, admin bearer token, MCP, Socket.IO; active socket terminated
within the 30-second/next-message bound; banned user's admin tokens
unusable; hard-delete endpoint returns a fail-closed error while the
deletion contract is unratified; the admin web UI renders no live delete
action (absent, or disabled with the §7.3 text) and `mosaic auth users
delete` exits non-zero with the §7.3 message — both asserted by spec.
7. **System of record and bootstrap edges (§1, §3.6, §4.3).** IdP removal:
deleting a provider configuration leaves every user row intact and every
other login method working (spec over the provider-config removal path).
Forward-auth non-use: with in-app OIDC configured, a request carrying
forward-auth identity headers and no session is treated as anonymous —
no code path derives identity from those headers (negative spec at the
Gateway entry). First-admin SSO: the §3.6 transition commits account,
token, and epoch atomically from the asserted identity, and fault
injection mid-transition leaves nothing observable (same harness as §8.1).
Wizard-recorded JIT choice: enabling JIT for a provider writes an
explicit per-provider operator-choice record, and no mode selection
enables it implicitly (assert the stored record, not UI behavior).
8. **Documentation observable (§7.2).** The admin guide contains the
IdP-removal-does-not-deactivate statement; verified by a docs assertion
(content check in CI or an enumerated review-checklist item on the
implementing PR) — a MUST about documentation needs a checkable artifact,
not intent.
## Ruling request
Ratify sections 18 as written, with one decision embedded: registration
defaults to `closed` after bootstrap (§2.2) — say "agreed" or name the mode
you want as the default.
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@@ -372,87 +372,3 @@ The P0P3 canon does not authorize:
## 7. Global release evidence
P0P3 may close only when requirements traceability maps every requirement above to automated and situational evidence, including cross-workspace denials, DB/Valkey fault injection, concurrent leases, stale fencing, generated-file immutability, UI conflict/reconnect behavior, migration reconciliation, independent review, mandatory SecReview, and final Certifier evidence.
## 8. Amendment A1 — hierarchy parentage and RBAC chain above workspaces
**Status:** amendment to the ratified canon, added by reviewed PR under
decision D13 (operator ruling, 2026-08-25; decision owner Jason). It adds
parent structure ABOVE workspaces. Sections 17, every invariant in §3, and
every REQ above remain binding verbatim, with exactly one express modification:
the narrow portfolio-analytics carve-out stated in §8.2.4. Nothing else below
this line is weakened.
### 8.1 What is added
1. A platform hierarchy exists above workspaces:
**company/organization → estate → platform-project → workspace**. Each
workspace belongs to exactly one platform-project, each platform-project to
exactly one estate, each estate to exactly one company.
2. **Record class.** Hierarchy records (company, estate, platform-project,
their parentage edges, and hierarchy-level access grants) are a new,
explicitly named record class: **tenancy/authorization structure records**.
They are not business or orchestration records, so §3 invariant 10 and
REQ-TEN-001 do not apply to them and are not weakened by them — those two
requirements bind business/orchestration rows exactly as before.
Constraints on the new class:
- Hierarchy tables MUST NOT carry task, plan, or any other
business/orchestration payload — parentage, naming, and grant data only.
- A hierarchy record can never be the subject of work: it cannot be
claimed, ordered, gated, or referenced as a dependency by any
business/orchestration row.
- Hierarchy mutations flow through the same sole-writable-SOT, fail-closed,
audited mutation path as everything else (§8.2.3).
3. The hierarchy serves exactly two runtime functions, plus audited
maintenance of its own structure:
- **RBAC evaluation:** access grants are declared per company, estate, or
platform-project and evaluate down the chain to workspace-scoped
authorization. Tenant context continues to be derived from authenticated
authority (REQ-TEN-001); the chain adds where grants can be declared,
not a bypass of workspace authorization.
- **Read-only roll-ups:** task and status visualization bubbles up the
hierarchy as aggregation over workspaces the reader is authorized on.
- **Chain maintenance (not a third runtime function):** re-parenting an
asset — moving a workspace to another platform-project, a
platform-project to another estate, and so on ("assets are transferable
subject to the structure", PRD Part I §4) — is an audited edit of the
hierarchy records themselves under §8.3. It never modifies
business/orchestration rows and never crosses a workspace boundary for
them; the workspace's contents move with the workspace untouched.
4. Naming: this amendment says **platform-project** for the hierarchy level
above workspaces, because §5 REQ-PLAN-001 already defines `projects` as
planning entities INSIDE a workspace. The two are different objects. Final
terminology (rename of one or the other) is an implementation-PR decision
under this amendment's review; the schema MUST NOT merge them.
### 8.2 What is explicitly unchanged
1. `workspace_id` remains the hard mechanical isolation unit (§2 D2,
REQ-TEN-001). Hierarchy tables carry parentage; they do not create
cross-workspace relationships between business/orchestration rows, which
remain rejected (§3 invariant 10).
2. Roll-up is **never a write**: no aggregation path may mutate, claim, order,
or gate work in any workspace. Bubble-up views are generated projections in
the sense of §3 invariant 5 — non-authoritative and never import sources.
3. Fail-closed mutation health (§3 invariants 34), sole writable PostgreSQL
SOT, fencing, audit, and the Coordinator/Certifier authority rules are
untouched.
4. No §6 non-goal is authorized, with one express, narrow carve-out that this
amendment makes to the "portfolio analytics" non-goal: the read-only
roll-up of §8.1 — per-workspace task counts and statuses aggregated up the
parent chain, over workspaces the reader is authorized on — is in scope.
Everything beyond that boundary (metrics, trends, forecasting, scoring,
dashboards computed across workspaces, any derived analytic that is not a
direct count/status aggregation) remains a non-goal. This is an explicit
narrowing by amendment, not a claim that §6 is unchanged; every other §6
non-goal is untouched.
### 8.3 Acceptance (binding on the implementing PRs)
- Schema tests prove each workspace resolves to exactly one
platform-project/estate/company chain and that chain edits are audited.
- Authorization tests prove a grant at each hierarchy level yields exactly the
workspace permissions the chain implies, and that revocation up the chain
propagates.
- Negative tests prove roll-up endpoints cannot mutate state and that a
reader sees aggregates only over workspaces they are authorized on
(no cross-tenant existence oracles).
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# Roll-up Projection Contract (S2 contract 8)
Status: DRAFT — awaiting ratification (webui-audit S2, contract 8 of 9).
Authority: `native-kanban-sot.md` §8 (A1 amendment) — "task and status
visualization bubbles up the hierarchy as aggregation over workspaces
the reader is authorized on" (§8.1.3); roll-up is never a write and
bubble-up views are generated projections, non-authoritative and never
import sources (§8.2.2); the express, narrow carve-out from the
portfolio-analytics non-goal covers per-workspace task counts and
statuses aggregated up the parent chain over readable workspaces, and
nothing beyond that boundary (§8.2.4); acceptance requires that roll-up
endpoints cannot mutate state and that a reader sees aggregates only
over workspaces they are authorized on, with no cross-tenant existence
oracles (§8.3). A5 rank 5 names the deliverable: an authorized
read-only roll-up query over only readable workspaces, at every
hierarchy level, as its own non-mutating query tool, dependent on ranks
13.
Revision 2 (terra review F1F7): membership-only readability is now
workspace-local — it contributes at the workspace node only and never
promotes ancestor visibility; upward aggregation requires an effective
chain role, and §1 defines direct vs effective grants in contract 2's
terms (F1). The no-oracle rule gains a defined equivalence predicate
(normalized byte equality with an enumerated volatile-field set) and a
partial-scope hidden-sibling witness (F2). §2.5 enumerates the closed
semantic result and denial schemas field-by-field, including the
explicit-zero representation (F3). Cache invalidation, when a cache
exists, is witnessed per invalidator class (F4). Non-authoritative and
never-gate rules gain an import-graph/data-flow witness, and the
mutation check is aligned to contract 1 §6.7's both-table zero-write
assertion (F5). The fixture gains a second estate with distinct counts
and explicit company-, estate-, project-grant, and membership cases
(F6). The §5.3 legacy-row exclusion and pre-rank no-obligation rules
are disclosed as drafting additions (F7).
Revision 3 (terra re-review residuals): the partial-scope witnesses are
reconstructed at levels where chain grants can actually differ —
platform-project siblings under one estate and estate siblings under
one company — because contract 1 §3.1/§3.4 defines no workspace-level
grant target, so no reader can hold a chain grant on two of three
sibling workspaces (F2). §2.5 now defines one field-exact recursive
record — every node, including the queried node and every leaf, is the
same five-field shape with a required, deterministically ordered
`children` array that is empty at workspaces — and the whole-result
rules (no optional fields, denial envelope, wire faithfulness) are
their own §2.6 at section scope (F3). The fixture assigns workspaces
to named platform-projects, and §6.1's grant-level cases are the three
levels contract 1 defines, with workspace-level access covered by the
membership case and stated as having no direct chain grant (F6).
This contract binds the projection semantics (§2), reader authorization
semantics (§3), read-only enforcement (§4), dependencies and phase
timing (§5), witnesses (§6), and disclosed drafting additions (§7). It
defines the roll-up only: hierarchy shape stays with contract 1
(`hierarchy-schema.md`), grant vocabulary and evaluation with contract 2
(`rbac-grant-model.md`), the task lifecycle and status taxonomy with
`native-kanban-sot.md`'s typed surface, and the tool↔Gateway mapping
row with contract 5 (`tool-gateway-mapping.md`).
## 1. Definitions
1. **Roll-up**: the read-only projection of per-workspace task counts
by status, aggregated up the contract 1 parent chain (workspace →
platform-project → estate → company).
2. **Effective chain role** (at a node, for a reader): the role
contract 2 §3 evaluation yields at that node — from a grant on the
node itself (a **direct grant**) or from a grant on an ancestor
whose domain covers it (an **inherited grant**, contract 2 §3.2).
The role vocabulary is contract 2 §2's; this contract adds no role
and no new authority source.
3. **Chain-readable workspace** (for a reader): a workspace where the
reader's effective chain role permits reading task state.
4. **Member-readable workspace** (for a reader): a workspace readable
only through workspace membership under the SOT's own membership
rules (REQ-ID-001), with no effective chain role. Membership
confers workspace-local semantics only (contract 2 §3.1, §7.4): it
never contributes authority, visibility, or aggregation upward.
5. **Aggregation scope** (of a hierarchy node, for a reader): the set
of chain-readable workspaces in that node's descendant subtree;
plus, when the node is itself a workspace, that workspace if it is
chain-readable or member-readable. A member-readable workspace
therefore contributes to exactly one node's aggregation scope: its
own.
6. **Projection**: a generated, non-authoritative view in the sense of
`native-kanban-sot.md` §3 invariant 5 — derived from SOT rows,
never an import source, never authoritative.
## 2. Projection semantics
1. **Aggregate content.** The roll-up for a node reports, per
workspace in the reader's aggregation scope and as subtree totals:
task counts keyed by the typed lifecycle's status values (owned by
`native-kanban-sot.md`; this contract introduces no status), and
nothing else. Direct count/status aggregation is the entire
surface.
2. **Every level.** The roll-up is queryable at workspace,
platform-project, estate, and company level. A node's totals equal
the sum over its aggregation scope; chain resolution is contract 1
§2.5's (every workspace resolves to exactly one chain), so no
workspace is counted twice and none is orphaned.
3. **Carve-out boundary.** Everything beyond direct count/status
aggregation — metrics, trends, forecasting, scoring, velocity,
cross-workspace derived analytics, dashboards computed across
workspaces — remains a `native-kanban-sot.md` §6 non-goal
(§8.2.4). The response schema is closed (§2.5; §6.7 witness):
adding any field is an amendment to this contract.
4. **Non-authoritative.** No consumer may treat roll-up output as a
source of record; it is recomputable at any time from SOT rows and
is never imported, persisted as authoritative state, or used to
gate or deny work (witness §6.8 — both the write-path and the
decision-path prohibitions are witnessed).
5. **Closed semantic schema.** The successful result is exactly one
**roll-up node record**, a single recursive shape used at every
depth. A roll-up node record consists of exactly these five
fields, and no others:
- `id`: the node's identifier.
- `type`: one of the four contract 1 levels.
- `name`: the node's name.
- `totals`: one entry per status value of the typed lifecycle —
every status key present, a count of zero represented explicitly
as `0`, never by key absence. At a workspace node, `totals` is
that workspace's own counts; at any other node, `totals` is the
sum over the node's aggregation scope (§2.2). This is how §2.1's
"per workspace and as subtree totals" content is carried:
per-workspace counts are the leaf records' `totals`, subtree
totals are the interior records' `totals`.
- `children`: a required array, present on EVERY node record. Its
elements are the reader-visible (§3.2) child nodes of this node,
each itself a complete roll-up node record, recursing down to
the workspaces in the reader's aggregation scope. At a workspace
node the array is exactly `[]` — a workspace record never has
children. The array is ordered deterministically, ascending by
`id`; the implementing PR asserts that ordering. A node outside
§3.2 visibility never appears at any depth.
The queried node's record IS the whole result — there is no
wrapper field around it.
6. **Whole-result rules.** There are no optional result fields at any
depth. The denial/nonexistent response is the contract 5 §4.2
not-found-class error envelope with no fields beyond that
envelope. The wire DTO is expressed under contract 5 §4.1, and
MUST be a faithful serialization of exactly the §2.5 recursive
record: a wire field with no corresponding semantic field is a
conformance defect.
## 3. Reader authorization semantics
1. **Scope rule.** A reader's roll-up over any node aggregates ONLY
the reader's aggregation scope (§1.5). An unreadable workspace
contributes nothing to any total — not a count, not a row, not a
presence marker. A member-readable workspace contributes only at
the workspace node itself (§1.4–§1.5): querying it directly
succeeds; it never appears in, and never adds to, any ancestor's
response for that reader.
2. **Node visibility.** A node appears in a roll-up response iff the
reader's aggregation scope at that node is non-empty, or the
reader holds an effective chain role at the node (§1.2 — direct or
inherited; contract 2 §3.2 makes a grant's domain the node and its
subtree, so an ancestor grant makes empty descendants visible per
the ruling). Per the ruling below, a node with an effective chain
role but an empty aggregation scope appears with zero counts.
Workspace membership alone never makes any non-workspace node
visible. A node where the reader has neither an effective chain
role nor a non-empty aggregation scope does not appear at all.
3. **No existence oracle.** The response MUST NOT disclose the
existence, count, name, or any property of unreadable workspaces
or of nodes outside §3.2 visibility — no "N workspaces hidden"
fields, no total-vs-visible discrepancy fields. A query naming a
node outside §3.2 visibility MUST satisfy the §3.4 response
equivalence with a query naming a nonexistent node (fail closed,
`rbac-grant-model.md` §3.5 pattern: a decision path that cannot
read grant state denies).
4. **Response equivalence predicate.** Two responses are equivalent
when they carry the identical HTTP status, the identical contract
5 §4.2 error code, and byte-identical bodies after normalizing
exactly the declared volatile envelope fields — correlation id and
response timestamp, and nothing else. The implementing PR declares
that volatile-field list in the witness; any additional
normalization is a conformance defect. This is contract 5 §4.2's
same code/status/shape rule made executable.
5. **Live evaluation.** Readability is evaluated per contract 2 §3.5
(live rows or transactionally-invalidated cache). Revocation
propagates per contract 2 §6: the next roll-up query decided after
the revoking transaction commits excludes the revoked scope.
## 4. Read-only enforcement
1. **Never a write.** No roll-up path may mutate, claim, order, or
gate work in any workspace (§8.2.2). The roll-up ships as a
non-mutating query tool (A5 rank 5) — a query surface with no
command counterpart.
2. **Mechanical enforcement.** The implementing PR executes roll-up
database work inside read-only transactions (or an equivalently
privilege-restricted path), so a mutation attempt fails at the
database boundary, not only by convention.
3. **Freshness.** v1 computes the roll-up live from SOT rows at query
time. A cache is an implementation option only if it is
invalidated in the same transaction as any task, hierarchy, grant,
or membership mutation that affects it (each invalidator class
witnessed, §6.5), and it is never authoritative (§1.6).
## 5. Dependencies and phase timing
1. The roll-up depends on A5 ranks 13: contract 1's hierarchy tables
(the parent chain), contract 2's evaluator (readability), and the
typed Kanban lifecycle (the task state being counted). It ships
after them and reads their surfaces; it defines none of them.
2. The roll-up query is one tool with one Gateway mapping row under
contract 5's regime (request/result/error/audit contracts there);
this contract binds its semantics (§2.5 defines the semantic
fields the contract 5 §4.1 DTO serializes), not its wire encoding.
3. Legacy task rows outside the typed lifecycle are not aggregated;
the roll-up begins counting a workspace's tasks when they exist in
the typed surface. No roll-up obligation attaches to v1 before
ranks 13 exist. Both rules are drafting additions disclosed in §7
(they trace to no §8 sentence).
## 6. Verification requirements
Binding on the implementing PRs. Every witness names, in its
implementation, the exact endpoints/tools, tables, and fixtures it
exercises. The base fixture seeds two companies; under company A **two
estates with distinct, non-identical count profiles**: estate A1 with
two platform-projects — P1 holding workspaces W1 and W2, P2 holding
workspace W3 — and estate A2 with one platform-project P3 holding one
workspace W4, all with known task counts across at least three
statuses; under company B one workspace.
1. **Correctness witnesses:** for a reader holding a direct company-A
grant, roll-up totals at every level equal the seeded sums — each
workspace, each platform-project, estate A1 and estate A2
separately (their distinct profiles asserted distinct), and the
company total equal to A1+A2 — keyed by the typed status values,
with no double count across the chain. For a reader holding a
direct estate-A1 grant, the estate-A1 result equals the A1 sum and
a company-A query returns company A with exactly A1's contribution
(estate A2 invisible). Each of the three chain grant levels
contract 1 §3.1 defines — company, estate, platform-project
(below, §6.2) — has an explicit direct-grant case, none simulated
by unioning lower access. Workspace-level access has NO direct
chain grant (contract 1 §3.1/§3.4 define no workspace grant
target) and is covered by the §6.2 membership case.
2. **Scope witnesses:** a reader with a direct grant on
platform-project P1 only sees exactly P1's subtree counts
(W1+W2): a P1 query returns W1+W2; an estate-A1 query returns the
estate node with exactly P1's contribution, sibling project P2 and
its workspace W3 absent at every depth; a company-A query likewise
carries only P1's contribution. An estate-sibling case: a reader
with a direct grant on estate A1 only queries company A and
receives exactly A1's contribution, estate A2 absent. (Chain
grants exist only at company, estate, and platform-project —
contract 1 §3.1 — so partial scope among SIBLING WORKSPACES of
one project is not constructible by grants and is not witnessed;
the constructible partial-scope cases are the project- and
estate-sibling ones above.) **Membership locality (§1.4):** a member-only reader queries
the workspace directly and receives its counts; the same reader
querying the workspace's parent (or any ancestor) receives the
§3.4-equivalent nonexistent-node response, and no ancestor
response for any other reader changes because of that membership.
3. **No-oracle witnesses:** the P1-only reader's estate-A1 response
above contains no field disclosing P2's or W3's existence
(closed-schema comparison against an estate-A1-granted reader's
response: identical field set, differing only in counts and
visible nodes). **Partial-scope hidden node:** the P1-only reader
— who sees estate A1 and the P1 subtree — queries hidden sibling
project P2 by its real id, and separately hidden workspace W3 by
its real id; each response satisfies the §3.4 equivalence
predicate against the same query naming a nonexistent id, under
one fixed request context with the declared volatile-field
normalization. **Cross-tenant:** an unauthorized reader naming company B receives
a response §3.4-equivalent to naming a nonexistent id. Each
equivalence check is executable byte comparison after the declared
normalization, not a shape judgment.
4. **Empty-vs-hidden witness (ruling):** a reader granted (direct
chain grant) on an empty platform-project receives it with zero
counts — every status key present at `0` (§2.5); with the grant
deleted, the same query returns the §3.4-equivalent
nonexistent-node response. An inherited-grant case: a company
grant makes an empty descendant platform-project visible with zero
counts.
5. **Cache-invalidation witnesses (conditional):** bound only if the
implementation caches — for EACH invalidator class, prime the
cache, commit one mutation of that class, and assert the next
query reflects it: a task status change, a task creation, a
membership removal (the member-readable workspace disappears from
its own node's next query), a workspace reparenting (both old and
new parent totals correct), and a grant revocation. A live
(cacheless) v1 implementation records that fact and the witnesses
bind at the PR that introduces a cache.
6. **Mutation witnesses:** the roll-up surface rejects every mutating
verb/command; a crafted attempt to issue a write through the
roll-up's database path fails at the read-only boundary (§4.2);
after any roll-up query, the row diff is empty across BOTH the
workspace tables and the hierarchy tables (contract 1 §6.7's
both-table zero-write assertion).
7. **Closed-schema witness:** the response is asserted field-exact
against the §2.5 recursive record at every depth — exactly
`id`/`type`/`name`/`totals`/`children` on every node, every typed
status present with explicit zeros, `children: []` at every
workspace record, the declared ascending-`id` ordering, no
wrapper field — and a response carrying any field outside the
record at any depth fails the assertion (carve-out boundary,
§2.3). The denial envelope is asserted field-exact against
contract 5 §4.2's envelope (§2.6).
8. **Non-authoritative and never-gate witnesses:** (a) a static
production import-graph inventory (hierarchy contract §6.3 style,
production code over `apps/` and `packages/`, tests excluded)
shows no production module imports the roll-up query module or its
result DTO into any SOT write path, any authorization/gating
decision path, or any persistence beyond the response lifetime —
asserted in both directions (the roll-up module's consumers are
enumerated and each is a presentation surface); (b) a behavioral
probe: with roll-up output artificially perturbed (test double),
no authorization outcome and no work-gating decision anywhere in
the fixture suite changes — proving no gate consumes it.
9. **Revocation witness:** after revoking the grant that made a
subtree readable, the next roll-up query excludes it (contract 2
§6.2 bound).
## 7. Drafting additions (PRD §12.1 disclosure)
Proposed drafting additions, visible here for ratification, each
severable; the aggregation itself, its authorization scope, its
read-only nature, and the no-oracle acceptance are traced to
`native-kanban-sot.md` §8 and are not additions:
1. The §3.2 node-visibility rule and the granted-but-empty behavior
(the ruling below).
2. The §3.3–§3.4 nonexistent-node response equivalence, with its
normalized-byte-equality predicate, as the concrete no-oracle
mechanism.
3. The §4.2 read-only-transaction mechanical enforcement.
4. The §4.3 cache option with transactional invalidation and the
§6.5 per-invalidator witnesses.
5. The §2.5 closed response schema as an amendment boundary.
6. The §1.4 membership-locality rule — membership-only readability
contributes at the workspace node only (this contract's
reconciliation of `native-kanban-sot.md` §8.1.3 "authorized on"
with contract 2 §3.1/§7.4's workspace-local membership).
7. The §5.3 legacy-row exclusion and the §5.3 pre-rank no-obligation
rule.
## Ruling request
Ruling requested (one decision): shall a node the reader holds an
effective chain role on (direct or inherited, §1.2) but whose
aggregation scope is empty appear in the roll-up with zero counts
(recommended — it lets the UI show a granted-but-empty subtree
honestly) — or, as the alternative, be indistinguishable from a
nonexistent node until it contains a readable workspace?
+1
View File
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@
"dev": "turbo run dev",
"lint": "turbo run lint",
"preflight": "node scripts/preflight.mjs",
"clean:generated": "node scripts/clean-generated.mjs",
"typecheck": "pnpm preflight && turbo run typecheck",
"verify:release": "node scripts/verify-release.mjs",
"test:checkout": "node --test scripts/*.test.mjs",
@@ -1,9 +0,0 @@
ALTER TABLE "accounts" ADD COLUMN "issuer" text;
--> statement-breakpoint
-- Backfill (#1395): better-auth >=1.7 sign-in filters accounts on
-- (provider_id = 'credential' AND issuer = 'local:credential'). Existing
-- credential rows predate the column and would fail that filter on upgraded
-- installs. Credential rows ONLY: better-auth owns issuer semantics for
-- oauth/sso rows going forward (each provider's real issuer value), so those
-- stay NULL until the provider's next flow writes them.
UPDATE "accounts" SET "issuer" = 'local:credential' WHERE "provider_id" = 'credential' AND "issuer" IS NULL;
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
+1 -8
View File
@@ -120,13 +120,6 @@
"when": 1784050648841,
"tag": "0016_salty_morlocks",
"breakpoints": true
},
{
"idx": 17,
"version": "7",
"when": 1787609223282,
"tag": "0017_accounts_issuer",
"breakpoints": true
}
]
}
}
+1 -10
View File
@@ -1,15 +1,6 @@
export { createDb, type Db, type DbHandle } from './client.js';
export { createPgliteDb } from './client-pglite.js';
export {
runMigrations,
runPgliteMigrations,
getMigrationStatus,
readJournalTags,
applyMigrationsByHash,
type HashLedgerDeps,
type MigrationPlanEntry,
type MigrationStatus,
} from './migrate.js';
export { runMigrations, runPgliteMigrations } from './migrate.js';
export * from './schema.js';
export * from './federation.js';
export {
-169
View File
@@ -1,169 +0,0 @@
import { describe, it, expect } from 'vitest';
import { readFileSync } from 'node:fs';
import { resolve } from 'node:path';
import {
applyMigrationsByHash,
readJournalTags,
type HashLedgerDeps,
type MigrationPlanEntry,
} from './migrate.js';
/* ------------------------------------------------------------------ */
/* In-memory hash-ledger harness */
/* ------------------------------------------------------------------ */
interface LedgerHarness extends HashLedgerDeps {
ledger: Map<string, number>;
/** Recorded statement executions in order: `${hashPrefix}:${stmtIndex}`. */
executed: string[];
/** Optional: statements that should throw when executed. */
failOn?: (migrationHash: string, stmtIdx: number) => boolean;
}
function makeHarness(plan: MigrationPlanEntry[]): LedgerHarness {
const hashToEntry = new Map(plan.map((p) => [p.hash, p]));
const h: LedgerHarness = {
ledger: new Map(),
executed: [],
ensureLedger: async () => {},
appliedHashes: async () => [...h.ledger.keys()],
recordApplied: async (hash, folderMillis) => {
h.ledger.set(hash, folderMillis);
},
runStatement: async (statement) => {
void statement;
// runStatement does not know which migration it belongs to; the
// executed log is filled by the wrapper below.
},
};
// Wrap runStatement so the executed log records migration context. We
// reconstruct context by tracking a cursor the core advances per migration.
let cursor = 0;
const flat: Array<{ hash: string; idx: number }> = [];
for (const m of plan)
for (const [i] of m.statements.entries()) flat.push({ hash: m.hash, idx: i });
h.runStatement = async () => {
const at = flat[cursor] ?? { hash: '??', idx: -1 };
cursor += 1;
if (h.failOn && at.hash !== '??' && h.failOn(at.hash, at.idx)) {
throw new Error(`simulated failure in ${at.hash} #${at.idx.toString()}`);
}
h.executed.push(`${at.hash.slice(0, 6)}:${at.idx.toString()}`);
};
void hashToEntry;
return h;
}
/* ------------------------------------------------------------------ */
/* Fixtures */
/* ------------------------------------------------------------------ */
// Reproduces the REAL journal defect shape (#1402 D1): 0009/0010 carry
// `when` timestamps BELOW 0008's. Under the old drizzle postgres-js
// migrator these were silently skipped on any upgrade whose ledger was
// last stamped in the 0008 era.
const JOURNAL_FIXTURE: MigrationPlanEntry[] = [
{ hash: 'aaaa0000', folderMillis: 1773368153122, statements: ['CREATE TABLE a (id int)'] },
{ hash: 'bbbb0008', folderMillis: 1776822435828, statements: ['CREATE TABLE b (id int)'] },
// Backdated entries, exactly as shipped:
{
hash: 'cccc0009',
folderMillis: 1745280000000,
statements: ['ALTER TYPE t ADD VALUE', "CREATE TABLE c (s t DEFAULT 'pending')"],
},
{ hash: 'dddd0010', folderMillis: 1745366400000, statements: ['CREATE TABLE d (id int)'] },
];
/** A ledger last stamped at the 0008 era: only pre-0009 hashes recorded. */
const LEDGER_AT_0008_ERA = new Map<string, number>([
['aaaa0000', 1773368153122],
['bbbb0008', 1776822435828],
]);
/* ------------------------------------------------------------------ */
/* The core: apply-by-hash in journal order */
/* ------------------------------------------------------------------ */
describe('applyMigrationsByHash', () => {
it('applies backdated journal entries that a timestamp-based migrator would skip (#1402 D1)', async () => {
const h = makeHarness(JOURNAL_FIXTURE);
h.ledger = new Map(LEDGER_AT_0008_ERA);
const result = await applyMigrationsByHash(h, JOURNAL_FIXTURE);
// D1 in one sentence: 0009 and 0010 applied despite folderMillis < 0008.
expect(result).toEqual({ applied: 2, skipped: 2 });
expect(h.ledger.has('cccc0009')).toBe(true);
expect(h.ledger.has('dddd0010')).toBe(true);
});
it('executes statements individually (ALTER TYPE visibility, #1402 D2 shape)', async () => {
const h = makeHarness(JOURNAL_FIXTURE);
await applyMigrationsByHash(h, JOURNAL_FIXTURE);
// 0009's two statements recorded as separate executions, in order.
expect(h.executed).toContain('cccc00:0');
expect(h.executed).toContain('cccc00:1');
expect(h.executed.indexOf('cccc00:0')).toBeLessThan(h.executed.indexOf('cccc00:1'));
});
it('is idempotent: a fully-applied ledger applies nothing', async () => {
const h = makeHarness(JOURNAL_FIXTURE);
const first = await applyMigrationsByHash(h, JOURNAL_FIXTURE);
const second = await applyMigrationsByHash(h, JOURNAL_FIXTURE);
expect(first.applied).toBe(4);
expect(second).toEqual({ applied: 0, skipped: 4 });
expect(h.executed).toHaveLength(5); // 5 statements; second run executed NONE (not 10)
});
it('records no ledger row when a statement fails (crash prefix replays loudly)', async () => {
const h = makeHarness(JOURNAL_FIXTURE);
h.failOn = (hash, idx) => hash === 'cccc0009' && idx === 1;
await expect(applyMigrationsByHash(h, JOURNAL_FIXTURE)).rejects.toThrow(
/cccc0009 statement #1 failed: simulated failure/,
);
// Statement 0 of 0009 executed, but NO ledger row for 0009: the next run
// replays it and fails loudly on "already exists" instead of silently
// believing 0009 applied.
expect(h.ledger.has('cccc0009')).toBe(false);
expect(h.executed).toContain('cccc00:0');
});
it('applies in JOURNAL order, not timestamp order', async () => {
const h = makeHarness(JOURNAL_FIXTURE);
await applyMigrationsByHash(h, JOURNAL_FIXTURE);
// 5 statements total (0009 has two); prefix per migration: journal order,
// so 0009's pair sits between 0008 and 0010.
const order = h.executed.map((e) => e.slice(0, 4));
expect(order).toEqual(['aaaa', 'bbbb', 'cccc', 'cccc', 'dddd']);
});
});
/* ------------------------------------------------------------------ */
/* Journal integrity against the shipped folder */
/* ------------------------------------------------------------------ */
describe('readJournalTags', () => {
it('reads the shipped journal in order and sees the known backdated pair', () => {
const folder = resolve(__dirname, '../drizzle');
const tags = readJournalTags(folder);
expect(tags.length).toBeGreaterThan(0);
// The shipped defect (#1402 D1): these two entries carry April-2025
// timestamps below 0008's June-2026 one. If this assertion ever fails
// because the journal was FIXED (timestamps corrected or drizzle-kit
// regenerated), update #1402 — the hash-ledger core stays correct either
// way; this test pins the shipped reality the core was built for.
const t9 = tags.find((t) => t.startsWith('0009_'));
const t10 = tags.find((t) => t.startsWith('0010_'));
const t8 = tags.find((t) => t.startsWith('0008_'));
expect([t8, t9, t10]).toBeDefined();
const journal = JSON.parse(readFileSync(resolve(folder, 'meta', '_journal.json'), 'utf8')) as {
entries: Array<{ tag: string; when: number }>;
};
const when = new Map(journal.entries.map((e) => [e.tag, e.when]));
if (t8 && t9 && t10) {
expect(when.get(t9)!).toBeLessThan(when.get(t8)!); // backdated below 0008
expect(when.get(t10)!).toBeLessThan(when.get(t8)!); // backdated below 0008
}
});
});
-69
View File
@@ -51,75 +51,6 @@ describe('runPgliteMigrations', () => {
await expect(runPgliteMigrations(handle)).resolves.toBeUndefined();
});
it('gives accounts an issuer column (#1395) — better-auth >=1.7 requires it', async () => {
await runPgliteMigrations(handle);
const result = (await handle.db.execute(sql`
SELECT column_name, is_nullable, data_type
FROM information_schema.columns
WHERE table_name = 'accounts' AND column_name = 'issuer'
`)) as unknown as {
rows: Array<{ column_name: string; is_nullable: string; data_type: string }>;
};
// Nullable by design: the 1.5.x line this repo's lockfile resolves to does
// not write the field; 1.7+ populates it. One schema serves both.
expect(result.rows).toHaveLength(1);
expect(result.rows[0]?.is_nullable).toBe('YES');
expect(result.rows[0]?.data_type).toBe('text');
});
it('backfills ONLY credential rows with the synthetic issuer (#1395 upgrade path)', async () => {
// Simulate an upgraded install: migrate through 0016 only, seed pre-issuer
// rows (one credential, one oauth), then apply 0017 and discriminate.
const client = (handle.db as unknown as { $client: PgliteExec }).$client;
// Migrate to 0016 by replaying every ledger file except 0017 — the ledger
// table gates re-application, so a plain replay of 0000..0016 is enough.
const fs = await import('node:fs');
const path = await import('node:path');
const dir = path.join(import.meta.dirname, '..', 'drizzle');
const files = fs
.readdirSync(dir)
.filter((f) => /^\d{4}_.*\.sql$/.test(f) && f < '0017')
.sort();
for (const f of files) {
const raw = fs.readFileSync(path.join(dir, f), 'utf-8');
for (const stmt of raw.split('--> statement-breakpoint')) {
const trimmed = stmt.trim();
if (trimmed) await client.exec(trimmed);
}
}
await client.exec(`
INSERT INTO users (id, name, email, email_verified, created_at, updated_at)
VALUES ('u1', 'Legacy User', '[email protected]', true, now(), now());
INSERT INTO accounts (id, account_id, provider_id, user_id, created_at, updated_at)
VALUES
('a1', '[email protected]', 'credential', 'u1', now(), now()),
('a2', 'oauth-provider-1', 'google', 'u1', now(), now());
`);
// Apply 0017 (column + backfill).
const sql0017 = fs.readFileSync(path.join(dir, '0017_accounts_issuer.sql'), 'utf-8');
for (const stmt of sql0017.split('--> statement-breakpoint')) {
const trimmed = stmt.trim();
if (trimmed) await client.exec(trimmed);
}
const rows = (await handle.db.execute(sql`
SELECT provider_id, issuer FROM accounts ORDER BY id
`)) as unknown as { rows: Array<{ provider_id: string; issuer: string | null }> };
const byProvider = new Map(rows.rows.map((r) => [r.provider_id, r.issuer]));
// Credential rows get better-auth's synthetic local issuer — the value
// sign-in filters on (better-auth dist createLocalAccountIssuer).
expect(byProvider.get('credential')).toBe('local:credential');
// OAuth rows are LEFT NULL: better-auth owns their issuer semantics going
// forward (each provider's real issuer on its next flow).
expect(byProvider.get('google')).toBeNull();
});
it('surfaces statement-level error context on failure and leaves no ledger row', async () => {
// Pre-create a `users` table that conflicts with migration 0000's CREATE TABLE,
// forcing it to fail without IF NOT EXISTS.
+69 -222
View File
@@ -1,7 +1,8 @@
import { readFileSync } from 'node:fs';
import { dirname, resolve } from 'node:path';
import { fileURLToPath } from 'node:url';
import { sql } from 'drizzle-orm';
import { drizzle as drizzlePostgres } from 'drizzle-orm/postgres-js';
import { migrate as migratePostgres } from 'drizzle-orm/postgres-js/migrator';
import { readMigrationFiles } from 'drizzle-orm/migrator';
import postgres from 'postgres';
import { DEFAULT_DATABASE_URL } from './defaults.js';
@@ -20,243 +21,89 @@ function migrationsFolder(): string {
return resolve(here, '../drizzle');
}
/* ------------------------------------------------------------------ */
/* Shared hash-ledger migration core (#1392 / #1402) */
/* ------------------------------------------------------------------ */
//
// Both tiers migrate through this single core, which applies migrations in
// JOURNAL ORDER, one statement at a time, and skips by HASH — never by
// folderMillis timestamp. The previous postgres path delegated to drizzle's
// postgres-js migrator, which:
//
// * applies only migrations with folderMillis > last-applied, silently
// skipping journal entries whose `when` is older than the ledger's newest
// stamp — 0009/0010 carry April-2025 timestamps below 0008's June-2026
// one, so any database last migrated in the 0008 era silently loses
// 0009/0010 forever (#1402 D1); and
// * wraps each migration in ONE transaction, which breaks migrations that
// do `ALTER TYPE ADD VALUE` and then reference the new value in the same
// migration (0009) — Postgres' check_safe_enum_use rejects it (#1402 D2).
//
// Per-statement execution (each statement autocommits) and skip-by-hash fix
// both. The PGlite path has run this way since it was written; this is the
// TODO it left behind, now shared instead of duplicated.
/** One migration as loaded from the shipped drizzle/ folder. */
export interface MigrationPlanEntry {
hash: string;
folderMillis: number;
statements: string[];
}
/** The persistence operations the hash-ledger core needs, per tier. */
export interface HashLedgerDeps {
/** Create the drizzle schema + ledger table if absent (idempotent). */
ensureLedger(): Promise<void>;
/** Hashes already recorded in the ledger. */
appliedHashes(): Promise<string[]>;
/** Record one fully-applied migration in the ledger. */
recordApplied(hash: string, folderMillis: number): Promise<void>;
/** Execute one SQL statement, autocommitting (never inside a wider tx). */
runStatement(statement: string): Promise<void>;
}
function loadPlan(): MigrationPlanEntry[] {
return readMigrationFiles({ migrationsFolder: migrationsFolder() }).map((m) => ({
hash: m.hash,
folderMillis: m.folderMillis,
statements: m.sql.map((s) => s.trim()).filter((s) => s.length > 0),
}));
}
/**
* Apply every unapplied migration in journal order, skipping by hash.
*
* Failure model: each statement autocommits, and the ledger row is written
* only after all statements of a migration succeed. A crash mid-migration
* leaves the prefix applied with no ledger entry, so the next boot replays
* those statements and fails loudly on "already exists". Recovery: drop the
* partially-applied objects, or insert the migration's hash into
* `drizzle.__drizzle_migrations` manually. The thrown error identifies the
* statement and migration that failed.
*/
export async function applyMigrationsByHash(
deps: HashLedgerDeps,
plan: MigrationPlanEntry[] = loadPlan(),
): Promise<{ applied: number; skipped: number }> {
await deps.ensureLedger();
const alreadyApplied = new Set(await deps.appliedHashes());
let applied = 0;
let skipped = 0;
for (const migration of plan) {
if (alreadyApplied.has(migration.hash)) {
skipped += 1;
continue;
}
for (const [stmtIdx, stmt] of migration.statements.entries()) {
try {
await deps.runStatement(stmt);
} catch (err) {
const cause = err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err);
throw new Error(
`migration hash=${migration.hash} statement #${stmtIdx} failed: ${cause}\n` +
`Statement: ${stmt.slice(0, 200)}${stmt.length > 200 ? '…' : ''}`,
{ cause: err },
);
}
}
await deps.recordApplied(migration.hash, migration.folderMillis);
applied += 1;
}
return { applied, skipped };
}
const LEDGER_DDL = [
'CREATE SCHEMA IF NOT EXISTS drizzle',
`CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS drizzle.__drizzle_migrations (
id SERIAL PRIMARY KEY,
hash text NOT NULL,
created_at bigint
)`,
];
function connectionString(url?: string): string {
return url ?? process.env['DATABASE_URL'] ?? DEFAULT_DATABASE_URL;
}
/**
* Apply Drizzle migrations against a postgres database, hash-ledger style.
* Idempotent: re-running against a fully-migrated database applies nothing.
*/
export async function runMigrations(url?: string): Promise<void> {
const sqlClient = postgres(connectionString(url), { max: 1 });
const connectionString = url ?? process.env['DATABASE_URL'] ?? DEFAULT_DATABASE_URL;
const sqlClient = postgres(connectionString, { max: 1 });
const db = drizzlePostgres(sqlClient);
try {
await applyMigrationsByHash({
ensureLedger: async () => {
for (const ddl of LEDGER_DDL) await sqlClient.unsafe(ddl);
},
appliedHashes: async () => {
const rows = (await sqlClient.unsafe(
'SELECT hash FROM drizzle.__drizzle_migrations',
)) as Array<{ hash: string }>;
return rows.map((r) => String(r.hash));
},
recordApplied: async (hash, folderMillis) => {
await sqlClient.unsafe(
'INSERT INTO drizzle.__drizzle_migrations (hash, created_at) VALUES ($1, $2)',
[hash, folderMillis],
);
},
runStatement: async (stmt) => {
await sqlClient.unsafe(stmt);
},
});
// TODO: postgres-tier first-install also fails because (a) Drizzle wraps every
// migration in one transaction (breaks 0009's ALTER TYPE ADD VALUE → SET DEFAULT
// sequence) and (b) drizzle/meta/_journal.json has 0009 ordered before 0008,
// which the postgres-js migrator skips by `created_at < folderMillis`. The
// PGlite path below sidesteps both. A follow-up should either share the
// per-statement loop (see runPgliteMigrations) or fix the journal ordering.
await migratePostgres(db, { migrationsFolder: migrationsFolder() });
} finally {
await sqlClient.end();
}
}
/**
* Apply Drizzle migrations against an embedded PGlite database.
*
* We don't reuse drizzle's pglite migrator for the same reasons as the
* postgres path (single-transaction wrap; folderMillis skip). PGlite's
* `exec()` runs each statement under the Simple Query protocol,
* autocommitting between them exactly the semantics the shared core needs.
*
* The ledger rows this writes are interoperable with the postgres path (same
* schema, same hashes), because both consume the same shipped migrations.
*/
// Apply Drizzle migrations against an embedded PGlite database.
//
// We don't reuse drizzle's pglite migrator because it wraps ALL migrations in
// one outer transaction, which breaks Postgres' `check_safe_enum_use` rule —
// e.g. migration 0009 does `ALTER TYPE ADD VALUE 'pending'` then references
// `'pending'` as a default in the same tx. PGlite's `exec()` runs each
// statement under the Simple Query protocol, autocommitting between them.
//
// We still write to the standard `drizzle.__drizzle_migrations` ledger so the
// result is interoperable with `runMigrations()` on a postgres-backed deploy
// (modulo the journal-ordering bug noted above).
//
// We skip-by-hash rather than skip-by-folderMillis (which is what Drizzle's
// postgres-js migrator does). That's deliberate — out-of-order timestamps in
// `_journal.json` won't silently drop migrations.
//
// Failure model: each statement autocommits, and the ledger row is written
// only after all statements in a migration succeed. A crash mid-migration
// leaves the prefix applied with no ledger entry, so the next boot will
// replay those statements and fail loudly on "already exists". Recovery:
// drop the partially-applied objects, or insert the migration's hash into
// `drizzle.__drizzle_migrations` manually. The error log identifies which
// statement of which migration was the culprit.
export async function runPgliteMigrations(handle: DbHandle): Promise<void> {
const client = (handle.db as unknown as { $client?: PgliteExecutor }).$client;
if (!client || typeof client.exec !== 'function') {
throw new Error('runPgliteMigrations: handle.db is not backed by a PGlite client');
}
await applyMigrationsByHash({
ensureLedger: async () => {
for (const ddl of LEDGER_DDL) await client.exec(ddl);
},
appliedHashes: async () => {
const rows = (await handle.db.execute(
sql`SELECT hash FROM drizzle.__drizzle_migrations`,
)) as unknown as ExecuteRows<{ hash: string }>;
return rows.rows.map((r) => String(r.hash));
},
recordApplied: async (hash, folderMillis) => {
await handle.db.execute(
sql`INSERT INTO drizzle.__drizzle_migrations (hash, created_at) VALUES (${hash}, ${folderMillis})`,
);
},
runStatement: async (stmt) => {
await client.exec(stmt);
},
});
}
await client.exec('CREATE SCHEMA IF NOT EXISTS drizzle');
await client.exec(`
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS drizzle.__drizzle_migrations (
id SERIAL PRIMARY KEY,
hash text NOT NULL,
created_at bigint
)
`);
/* ------------------------------------------------------------------ */
/* Migration status (#1392: the installer must VERIFY, not assume) */
/* ------------------------------------------------------------------ */
const appliedRows = (await handle.db.execute(
sql`SELECT hash FROM drizzle.__drizzle_migrations`,
)) as unknown as ExecuteRows<{ hash: string }>;
const applied = new Set(appliedRows.rows.map((r) => r.hash));
/** Read the journal tags (migration folder names) in journal order. */
export function readJournalTags(folder: string = migrationsFolder()): string[] {
const journal = JSON.parse(readFileSync(resolve(folder, 'meta', '_journal.json'), 'utf8')) as {
entries?: Array<{ tag?: string }>;
};
return (journal.entries ?? []).map((e) => e.tag ?? '').filter((t) => t.length > 0);
}
const migrations = readMigrationFiles({ migrationsFolder: migrationsFolder() });
for (const migration of migrations) {
if (applied.has(migration.hash)) continue;
export interface MigrationStatus {
/** Hashes recorded in the database's ledger (0 if no ledger exists). */
appliedCount: number;
/** Migrations shipped in this package's drizzle/ folder. */
expectedCount: number;
/** The tag (folder name) of the last journal entry, for error messages. */
expectedLastTag: string;
/** True iff every shipped migration's hash is in the ledger. */
complete: boolean;
}
/**
* Report whether a postgres database carries the full shipped schema.
*
* Read-only apart from `ensureLedger` semantics: it never creates the ledger
* (unlike the migrators), so a database with NO ledger reports
* appliedCount=0 / complete=false the exact #1392/#1389 signature (an
* install whose dependency set shipped no migrations at all).
*/
export async function getMigrationStatus(url?: string): Promise<MigrationStatus> {
const sqlClient = postgres(connectionString(url), { max: 1 });
try {
const plan = loadPlan();
const tags = readJournalTags();
const expectedHashes = new Set(plan.map((m) => m.hash));
let appliedHashes: string[] = [];
const regRows = (await sqlClient.unsafe(
"SELECT to_regclass('drizzle.__drizzle_migrations') AS reg",
)) as Array<{ reg: string | null }>;
if (regRows[0]?.reg) {
const rows = (await sqlClient.unsafe(
'SELECT hash FROM drizzle.__drizzle_migrations',
)) as Array<{ hash: string }>;
appliedHashes = rows.map((r) => String(r.hash));
// Run each statement-breakpoint chunk in its own exec() call so PGlite
// commits between statements — this is what lets `ALTER TYPE ADD VALUE`
// become visible before a subsequent statement references the new value.
for (const [stmtIdx, stmt] of migration.sql.entries()) {
const trimmed = stmt.trim();
if (!trimmed) continue;
try {
await client.exec(trimmed);
} catch (err) {
const cause = err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err);
throw new Error(
`runPgliteMigrations: migration hash=${migration.hash} statement #${stmtIdx} failed: ${cause}\n` +
`Statement: ${trimmed.slice(0, 200)}${trimmed.length > 200 ? '…' : ''}`,
{ cause: err },
);
}
}
const appliedSet = new Set(appliedHashes);
return {
appliedCount: appliedHashes.length,
expectedCount: plan.length,
expectedLastTag: tags[tags.length - 1] ?? '',
complete:
plan.length > 0 &&
plan.every((m) => appliedSet.has(m.hash)) &&
// A ledger with entries OUTSIDE the shipped plan means the database
// came from a different (e.g. newer) build — not "complete" either.
appliedHashes.every((h) => expectedHashes.has(h)),
};
} finally {
await sqlClient.end();
await handle.db.execute(
sql`INSERT INTO drizzle.__drizzle_migrations (hash, created_at) VALUES (${migration.hash}, ${migration.folderMillis})`,
);
}
}
-6
View File
@@ -63,12 +63,6 @@ export const accounts = pgTable(
id: text('id').primaryKey(),
accountId: text('account_id').notNull(),
providerId: text('provider_id').notNull(),
// better-auth >=1.7 requires an issuer on every account row: credential
// sign-up writes the synthetic 'local:credential', OAuth rows carry the
// provider's real issuer, and sign-in filters on (providerId, issuer).
// Nullable because the 1.5.x line this repo's lockfile resolves to does
// not know the field — 1.5 ignores it, 1.7 populates it (#1395).
issuer: text('issuer'),
userId: text('user_id')
.notNull()
.references(() => users.id, { onDelete: 'cascade' }),
@@ -23,14 +23,8 @@ absent. Do not use raw `tmux send-keys` for fleet messaging.
```bash
tools/git/pr-create.sh ... tools/git/issue-create.sh ... tools/git/pr-merge.sh ...
tools/git/ci-queue-wait.sh --purpose push|merge # REQUIRED before any push/merge
tools/git/repo-decl.sh # shared .mosaic/repo.json consumption lib (sourced)
```
**Reviewer grants** — `tools/git/grant-reviewer.sh -u <user> [-r <owner>/<repo>] [-t <team>]` adds a
review seat to an org repo through an org team (Gitea only; code read + issues/pulls write, verified
by read-back). Team approvals do not count as official under branch protection unless the team is
whitelisted — see the tool header.
**GITEA_LOGIN gotcha** — the wrappers default to login `mosaicstack`; on a USC repo that fails with
`gitea / Error: GetUserByName ... not found`. Pick the login from the repo's `origin` host first:
@@ -49,10 +49,6 @@ supply it explicitly on any host where the provider CLI's default account is an
| `milestone-list.sh` | List milestones |
| `milestone-close.sh` | Close a milestone |
| Access grants | |
| ------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| `grant-reviewer.sh` | Grant a review seat on an org repo via an org team (Gitea only): code read + issues/pulls write, verified by read-back. Team approvals count as official only if branch protection whitelists the team — see the tool header |
| Gates and guards | |
| ----------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| `ci-queue-wait.sh` | CI queue guard — required before push/merge (see below) |
@@ -115,7 +111,7 @@ approve path carries the trap.) `pr-review.sh` sends the correct token for the d
Whatever you use, re-read `GET /pulls/{n}/reviews` and assert the state before reporting a verdict
placed.
The guard exits nonzero for any provider-asserted non-green, missing, or malformed CI state. If credentials or the provider are unavailable, it emits `CANNOT_ASSERT` and writes a JSONL audit record. Push degrades to exit 0 so recovery work is not bricked; merge holds with retryable exit 75 until the provider recovers, then self-clears without manual reset. Neither outcome is evidence that CI was clear. For a repository with no CI configured at all, `pr-merge.sh --no-ci-expected` is the sanctioned merge path: it forwards to `ci-queue-wait.sh --no-ci-expected`, which reclassifies a zero-context merge head as queue-clear only when the acting token holds repository admin and `MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY` names the asserting identity (a caller without one is refused with exit 78 before the admin lookup), and records the assertion (or its refusal) in the same JSONL audit log. `pr-merge.sh` automatically inspects the exact PR head repository and full commit SHA rather than its `main` base; this also handles fork PRs without branch-name ambiguity. Pass `--expect-head <approved-full-sha>` to bind a commit-specific review or merge-gate verdict; Gitea uses atomic `head_commit_id` and GitHub uses `--match-head-commit`.
The guard exits nonzero for any provider-asserted non-green, missing, or malformed CI state. If credentials or the provider are unavailable, it emits `CANNOT_ASSERT` and writes a JSONL audit record. Push degrades to exit 0 so recovery work is not bricked; merge holds with retryable exit 75 until the provider recovers, then self-clears without manual reset. Neither outcome is evidence that CI was clear. `pr-merge.sh` automatically inspects the exact PR head repository and full commit SHA rather than its `main` base; this also handles fork PRs without branch-name ambiguity. Pass `--expect-head <approved-full-sha>` to bind a commit-specific review or merge-gate verdict; Gitea uses atomic `head_commit_id` and GitHub uses `--match-head-commit`.
### Code Review (Codex)
@@ -223,23 +219,6 @@ Multi-instance support: `-a <instance>` selects a named instance (e.g. `personal
~/.config/mosaic/tools/health/stack-health.sh -f json
```
### Repo Structure Declaration (T51)
```bash
# Validate a .mosaic/repo.json declaration (schema v1/v2, host:/ grammar,
# ref grammar, cross-field rules, remote normalization; spec §5)
~/.config/mosaic/tools/structure/validate-repo-json.sh <repo>/.mosaic/repo.json
# CI authoring rule: new/edited declarations must be schema_version 2
~/.config/mosaic/tools/structure/validate-repo-json.sh <repo>/.mosaic/repo.json --require-v2
# Display mode (warns and omits root-dependent checks when MOSAIC_HOST_ROOT unset)
~/.config/mosaic/tools/structure/validate-repo-json.sh <repo>/.mosaic/repo.json --mode display
# Hermetic hostile-input suite (101 arms)
~/.config/mosaic/tools/structure/test-validate-repo-json.sh
```
### Shared Credential Loader
```bash
@@ -11,17 +11,7 @@ PartOf=mosaic-tmux-holder.service
# launcher would fail the unit. A skipped unit is the honest state for "enabled
# but not yet configured"; systemd re-evaluates the condition on every start, so
# the seat comes up on the next start once the reconciler has written env.
#
# #1408: the reconciler writes projections into the BRAIN home when one is
# active (~/.mosaic/fleet/agents, mirroring start-agent-session.sh's brain-home
# resolution), and into MOSAIC_HOME on a legacy single-tree host. A single
# config-home condition therefore skipped every seat on brain-home estates —
# measured on two estates: 27 projections vs 0, and 5 vs 0, gate never fired.
# Two TRIGGERING conditions (the `|` prefix ORs same-type conditions, which
# otherwise AND): either shape arms the unit; the launcher still resolves the
# authoritative copy itself.
ConditionPathExists=|%h/.config/mosaic/fleet/agents/%i.env.generated
ConditionPathExists=|%h/.mosaic/fleet/agents/%i.env.generated
ConditionPathExists=%h/.config/mosaic/fleet/agents/%i.env.generated
[Service]
Type=oneshot
@@ -32,17 +32,6 @@ if grep -qF -- '/bin/bash -lc' "$HOLDER"; then
fail "holder must not start tmux through a login shell"
fi
grep -qF 'Requires=mosaic-tmux-holder.service' "$AGENT" || fail "agent does not require holder"
# #1408: the projection condition must arm on EITHER home shape. Both lines must
# carry the `|` triggering prefix — same-type conditions without it AND together,
# which can never be true (one file cannot exist at two paths), so a bare-spelling
# regression would disable autostart everywhere while reading as "has a condition".
grep -qF 'ConditionPathExists=|%h/.config/mosaic/fleet/agents/%i.env.generated' "$AGENT" || \
fail "agent lacks triggering condition for the config home projection"
grep -qF 'ConditionPathExists=|%h/.mosaic/fleet/agents/%i.env.generated' "$AGENT" || \
fail "agent lacks triggering condition for the brain home projection (#1408)"
if grep -qE '^ConditionPathExists=[^|]' "$AGENT"; then
fail "agent has a non-triggering ConditionPathExists — same-type conditions AND, re-arming #1408"
fi
grep -qF 'start-agent-session.sh' "$AGENT" || fail "agent unit does not call start-agent-session.sh"
if grep -qE '^Environment(File)?=' "$AGENT" "$INTERACTION"; then
fail "agent units must not accept ambient or projection environment before strict parsing"
@@ -379,54 +379,8 @@ check_fleet_transport() {
fi
}
check_structure_anchor_provisioning() {
# T51 WP0b (spec §1.2a + PHASE2-MAP F7): audit the two declaration anchors.
# Doctor runs from operator shells and CI where the launcher exports do not
# exist, so this is an AUDIT ONLY — it never exports, writes, or fabricates
# values for consumption. Four states (charter):
# both present+nonempty PASS (values reported as paths only)
# one missing/empty WARN naming the var + the launcher as authority
# neither present INFORMATIONAL launcher-equivalent derivation,
# explicitly non-authoritative, + launcher warning;
# never an error by design (F7(b))
# Severity follows the doctor's existing conventions: pass/note are quiet
# (note unless --verbose), warn counts toward --fail-on-warn.
local host_root="${MOSAIC_HOST_ROOT:-}" brain_home="${MOSAIC_BRAIN_HOME:-}"
# T51P2WP0BRW B1: presence is tracked SEPARATELY from value — `${VAR:-}`
# collapses exported-empty into genuinely-unset, which mis-filed both-empty
# and the mixed empty/unset states as informational. Only BOTH-genuinely-
# absent may be informational (charter state 3); any present-but-empty or
# single-present state warns.
local host_set=0 brain_set=0
[[ -v MOSAIC_HOST_ROOT ]] && host_set=1
[[ -v MOSAIC_BRAIN_HOME ]] && brain_set=1
if [[ "$host_set" -eq 1 && "$brain_set" -eq 1 && -n "$host_root" && -n "$brain_home" ]]; then
pass "Structure anchors provisioned: MOSAIC_HOST_ROOT=$host_root MOSAIC_BRAIN_HOME=$brain_home (paths reported only; not expanded, not consumed)"
return
fi
if [[ "$host_set" -eq 0 && "$brain_set" -eq 0 ]]; then
note "Structure anchors not provisioned in this environment. Launcher-equivalent derivation (INFORMATIONAL, NON-AUTHORITATIVE — seats receive the authoritative values from the launchers): MOSAIC_HOST_ROOT would default to the operator home; MOSAIC_BRAIN_HOME would default to the brain tree resolved at launch. Doctor does not guess values for consumption; it audits provisioning."
note "Provision both anchors via the seat launchers (launch-seat.sh / launch-seat-claude.sh export them; see T51 spec §1.2a)."
return
fi
# At least one variable is present (possibly empty), or exactly one exists:
# every missing/empty anchor gets its own loud WARN naming the launchers.
if [[ "$host_set" -eq 0 ]]; then
warn "MOSAIC_HOST_ROOT is not set in this environment while MOSAIC_BRAIN_HOME is — declaration consumers fail closed without it (spec §1.2a). The seat launchers are the authoritative source."
elif [[ -z "$host_root" ]]; then
warn "MOSAIC_HOST_ROOT is present but EMPTY in this environment — declaration consumers fail closed without a usable value (spec §1.2a). The seat launchers are the authoritative source."
fi
if [[ "$brain_set" -eq 0 ]]; then
warn "MOSAIC_BRAIN_HOME is not set in this environment while MOSAIC_HOST_ROOT is — the projects/ mirror and brain declaration resolve from it (spec §1.2a). The seat launchers are the authoritative source."
elif [[ -z "$brain_home" ]]; then
warn "MOSAIC_BRAIN_HOME is present but EMPTY in this environment — the projects/ mirror and brain declaration resolve from it (spec §1.2a). The seat launchers are the authoritative source."
fi
}
check_fleet_transport
check_structure_anchor_provisioning
check_brain_home
# Legacy migration surfaces should no longer contain symlink trees.
@@ -1,131 +0,0 @@
#!/usr/bin/env bash
# Covers the structure-anchor provisioning check in `mosaic-doctor` (T51 WP0b).
#
# Same discipline as test-brain-home-check.sh: functions are extracted from the
# shipped script (exact header + closing brace), never copied — a test carrying
# its own copy of the logic keeps passing after the shipped copy changes.
#
# Four contract states (charter T51P2WP0B-20260824):
# 1. both present+nonempty -> pass ([OK]), no warns, no notes
# 2a. host missing, brain set -> warn naming MOSAIC_HOST_ROOT + launchers
# 2b. brain missing, host set -> warn naming MOSAIC_BRAIN_HOME + launchers
# 2c. present-but-EMPTY counts as missing (warns; NEVER informational)
# 3. neither present -> informational notes, NON-AUTHORITATIVE, never warn
# Arms include genuinely-UNSET (env -u) forms, not only empty strings.
# Red control: empty-vs-unset distinction removed in a mutated copy -> suite red.
set -euo pipefail
SCRIPT_DIR=$(cd -- "$(dirname "$0")" && pwd)
DOCTOR="$SCRIPT_DIR/mosaic-doctor"
fail() {
echo "FAIL: $*" >&2
exit 1
}
[ -f "$DOCTOR" ] || fail "missing mosaic-doctor at $DOCTOR"
extract_function() {
local name="$1"
local extracted
extracted=$(sed -n "/^${name}() {/,/^}/p" "$DOCTOR")
[ -n "$extracted" ] || fail "could not extract ${name}() from mosaic-doctor — script reshaped?"
printf '%s\n' "$extracted"
}
for fn in check_structure_anchor_provisioning; do
extract_function "$fn" >/dev/null
done
# run_case LABEL EXPECT(ok|warn|note) [env assignments as args; -u VAR tokens for unset]
run_case() {
local label="$1" expect="$2"
shift 2
local envs=() unsets=()
local a
for a in "$@"; do
case "$a" in
-u:*) unsets+=("${a#-u:}") ;;
*) envs+=("$a") ;;
esac
done
local out warns notes oks
# build the env command with proper -u flags (array expansion must not
# glue '-u VAR' into one word)
local cmd=(env)
local e u
# env(1) parses options only before the first assignment — -u flags FIRST
for u in "${unsets[@]:-}"; do [ -n "$u" ] && cmd+=(-u "$u"); done
for e in "${envs[@]:-}"; do [ -n "$e" ] && cmd+=("$e"); done
cmd+=(bash -c "warn() { echo \"[WARN] \$*\"; }; note() { echo \"[NOTE] \$*\"; return 0; }; pass() { echo \"[OK] \$*\"; return 0; }; $(extract_function check_structure_anchor_provisioning); check_structure_anchor_provisioning")
out=$("${cmd[@]}" 2>&1)
warns=$(printf '%s\n' "$out" | grep -c '^\[WARN\]' || true)
notes=$(printf '%s\n' "$out" | grep -c '^\[NOTE\]' || true)
oks=$(printf '%s\n' "$out" | grep -c '^\[OK\]' || true)
if [[ "$expect" == ok && "$oks" -gt 0 && "$warns" -eq 0 && "$notes" -eq 0 ]]; then
echo "ok - $label"
elif [[ "$expect" == warn && "$warns" -ge 1 && "$notes" -eq 0 ]]; then
echo "ok - $label (warned x$warns)"
elif [[ "$expect" == note && "$notes" -gt 0 && "$warns" -eq 0 ]]; then
echo "ok - $label (noted)"
else
echo "output: $out" >&2
fail "$label: expected $expect (oks=$oks warns=$warns notes=$notes)"
fi
}
ROOT=$(mktemp -d)
trap 'rm -rf "$ROOT"' EXIT
HOST="$ROOT/host"
BRAIN="$ROOT/brain"
# ── state 1: both present + nonempty → pass ────────────────────────────────
run_case "both anchors present passes" ok \
MOSAIC_HOST_ROOT="$HOST" MOSAIC_BRAIN_HOME="$BRAIN"
# ── state 2a: host missing (unset), brain set → exactly one warn ───────────
run_case "unset host root warns" warn \
-u:MOSAIC_HOST_ROOT MOSAIC_BRAIN_HOME="$BRAIN"
# ── state 2b: brain missing (unset), host set → exactly one warn ───────────
run_case "unset brain home warns" warn \
MOSAIC_HOST_ROOT="$HOST" -u:MOSAIC_BRAIN_HOME
# ── state 2c-empty: present-but-empty counts as missing ────────────────────
run_case "empty-string host root warns (empty != set)" warn \
MOSAIC_HOST_ROOT= MOSAIC_BRAIN_HOME="$BRAIN"
run_case "empty-string brain home warns (empty != set)" warn \
MOSAIC_HOST_ROOT="$HOST" MOSAIC_BRAIN_HOME=
# ── state 3: neither present (genuinely unset) → notes, never warn ─────────
run_case "both unset yields non-authoritative notes" note \
-u:MOSAIC_HOST_ROOT -u:MOSAIC_BRAIN_HOME
run_case "both empty-string warns (empty is present, not absent)" warn \
MOSAIC_HOST_ROOT= MOSAIC_BRAIN_HOME=
run_case "host empty + brain unset warns" warn \
MOSAIC_HOST_ROOT= -u:MOSAIC_BRAIN_HOME
run_case "host unset + brain empty warns" warn \
-u:MOSAIC_HOST_ROOT MOSAIC_BRAIN_HOME=
# ── red control (mutation): presence tracking removed → red ────────────────
# Mutant regresses to the reviewed defect shape: presence derived from
# NONEMPTINESS (the `${VAR:-}` collapse) instead of true -v tracking. Both-empty
# then looks genuinely-absent and is mis-filed as informational; the both-empty
# warn arm above finds no WARN and the suite reds.
MUT="$ROOT/mosaic-doctor.mutant"
sed 's/\[\[ -v MOSAIC_HOST_ROOT \]\] \&\& host_set=1/[[ -n "${MOSAIC_HOST_ROOT:-}" ]] \&\& host_set=1/; s/\[\[ -v MOSAIC_BRAIN_HOME \]\] \&\& brain_set=1/[[ -n "${MOSAIC_BRAIN_HOME:-}" ]] \&\& brain_set=1/' \
"$DOCTOR" > "$MUT"
if cmp -s "$DOCTOR" "$MUT"; then
echo "SKIP red control (mutation anchor not found — sed pattern drifted)" >&2
else
mut_fn=$(sed -n "/^check_structure_anchor_provisioning() {/,/^}/p" "$MUT")
outm=$(env MOSAIC_HOST_ROOT= MOSAIC_BRAIN_HOME= bash -c \
"warn() { echo \"[WARN] \$*\"; }; note() { echo \"[NOTE] \$*\"; return 0; }; pass() { echo \"[OK] \$*\"; return 0; }; $mut_fn; check_structure_anchor_provisioning" 2>&1)
if printf '%s\n' "$outm" | grep -q '^\[NOTE\]'; then
echo "ok - red control bites (mutant collapses empty into informational; shipped does not)"
else
fail "red control did not reproduce the regression shape (mutant output unexpected)"
fi
fi
echo "structure anchor doctor check: all arms passed"
@@ -1,181 +0,0 @@
#!/usr/bin/env bash
# seat-logins.sh — project seat credentials into tea's login config.
#
# Issue: mosaicstack/stack#1356 (tea login resolution fails open).
#
# WHY THIS EXISTS. tea 0.14.0 has no --token on its operations; it can only use a
# login already stored in ~/.config/tea/config.yml. So the wrappers cannot read the
# seat secrets dir on the tea path. The secrets dir stays authoritative and this
# script projects it into tea's config, which is a DERIVED CACHE: regenerate it,
# never hand-edit it. Same shape as the config-registry projector, same reason —
# a third-party tool that cannot read our store has to be fed.
#
# Canonical login name is "<instance>-<seat>", which is what the identity ladder in
# detect-platform.sh computes from the seat name. A login the ladder cannot compute
# is a fail-open surface, so an ad-hoc name is a defect, not a style.
#
# COLLISIONS. tea refuses to store one token under two names ("token already been
# used, delete login 'X' first"). A hand-made alias holding a seat's token there-
# fore BLOCKS its canonical name. Detected up front by hashing, so a dry run shows
# it; --adopt resolves it by deleting the alias and re-minting canonically. Same
# token, same access, only the label changes.
#
# Tokens are never printed, never logged, and never passed on a visible command
# line beyond tea's own --token, which is unavoidable with this client. tea's
# stderr is echoed on failure with any token-shaped string redacted.
#
# Usage:
# seat-logins.sh # dry run, all seats (default: changes nothing)
# seat-logins.sh --apply # mint/refresh all seats
# seat-logins.sh --seat <seat> # limit to one seat
# seat-logins.sh --apply --adopt # also rename ad-hoc aliases to canonical names
set -euo pipefail
BRAIN_HOME="${MOSAIC_BRAIN_HOME:-$HOME/.mosaic}"
TEA_CONFIG="${TEA_CONFIG:-$HOME/.config/tea/config.yml}"
APPLY=0
ADOPT=0
ONLY_SEAT=""
# Instance -> server URL.
#
# Instances are named here because there is no registry to read them from yet.
# Override per-instance without editing this file, which is how a deployment adds
# its own hosts: MOSAIC_GITEA_URL_<INSTANCE>=https://...
declare -A INSTANCE_URL=(
[mosaicstack]="https://git.mosaicstack.dev"
[usc]="https://git.uscllc.com"
)
while [ $# -gt 0 ]; do
case "$1" in
--apply) APPLY=1; shift ;;
--adopt) ADOPT=1; shift ;;
--seat) ONLY_SEAT="${2:?--seat needs a name}"; shift 2 ;;
-h|--help) sed -n '2,33p' "$0"; exit 0 ;;
*) echo "seat-logins.sh: unknown argument '$1'" >&2; exit 2 ;;
esac
done
command -v tea >/dev/null || { echo "seat-logins.sh: tea not on PATH" >&2; exit 1; }
url_for() {
local inst="$1" ovr
ovr="MOSAIC_GITEA_URL_$(printf '%s' "$inst" | tr '[:lower:]-' '[:upper:]_')"
if [ -n "${!ovr:-}" ]; then printf '%s' "${!ovr}"; return 0; fi
printf '%s' "${INSTANCE_URL[$inst]:-}"
}
# Redact anything token-shaped before any tea output reaches a log.
redact() { sed -E 's/[A-Za-z0-9]{30,}/<REDACTED>/g'; }
# token sha256 -> login name, for every login tea already holds. This is what
# makes collisions visible in a DRY RUN instead of only as an apply-time error.
declare -A TOKEN_OWNER=()
if [ -r "$TEA_CONFIG" ]; then
while read -r sha lname; do
[ -n "${sha:-}" ] && TOKEN_OWNER["$sha"]="$lname"
done < <(python3 - "$TEA_CONFIG" <<'PY'
import sys, yaml, hashlib
try:
cfg = yaml.safe_load(open(sys.argv[1])) or {}
except Exception:
sys.exit(0)
for l in (cfg.get('logins') or []):
t = l.get('token')
if t:
print(hashlib.sha256(t.encode()).hexdigest(), l.get('name'))
PY
)
fi
minted=0; refreshed=0; skipped=0; failed=0; planned=0; adopted=0; blocked=0
existing="$(tea login list --output simple 2>/dev/null | awk '{print $1}' || true)"
shopt -s nullglob
for tokfile in "$BRAIN_HOME"/fleet/agents/*/secrets/gitea-*.token; do
seat="${tokfile#"$BRAIN_HOME"/fleet/agents/}"; seat="${seat%%/*}"
[ -n "$ONLY_SEAT" ] && [ "$seat" != "$ONLY_SEAT" ] && continue
base="$(basename "$tokfile" .token)" # gitea-<instance>-<seat>
inst="${base#gitea-}"; inst="${inst%-"$seat"}"
name="${inst}-${seat}"
url="$(url_for "$inst")"
if [ -z "$url" ]; then
echo " SKIP $name — no URL known for instance '$inst' (set MOSAIC_GITEA_URL_${inst^^})"
skipped=$((skipped+1)); continue
fi
if [ ! -r "$tokfile" ]; then
echo " SKIP $name — token not readable"
skipped=$((skipped+1)); continue
fi
action="mint"
grep -qx "$name" <<<"$existing" && action="refresh"
# Is this exact token already stored under some OTHER name?
tsha="$(sha256sum < "$tokfile" | awk '{print $1}')"
owner="${TOKEN_OWNER[$tsha]:-}"
collision=""
[ -n "$owner" ] && [ "$owner" != "$name" ] && collision="$owner"
if [ "$APPLY" -eq 0 ]; then
if [ -n "$collision" ]; then
if [ "$ADOPT" -eq 1 ]; then
echo " PLAN adopt $collision -> $name ($url)"
else
echo " BLOCK $name — token already stored as '$collision'; re-run with --adopt"
blocked=$((blocked+1)); continue
fi
else
echo " PLAN $action $name -> $url"
fi
planned=$((planned+1)); continue
fi
if [ -n "$collision" ]; then
if [ "$ADOPT" -eq 0 ]; then
echo " BLOCK $name — token already stored as '$collision'; re-run with --adopt"
blocked=$((blocked+1)); continue
fi
tea login delete "$collision" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
action="adopt"
fi
# tea has no idempotent add; refresh is delete-then-add so a rotated token lands.
[ "$action" = refresh ] && tea login delete "$name" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
if err="$(tea login add --name "$name" --url "$url" \
--token "$(cat "$tokfile")" --no-version-check 2>&1 >/dev/null)"; then
case "$action" in
mint) minted=$((minted+1)) ;;
refresh) refreshed=$((refreshed+1)) ;;
adopt) adopted=$((adopted+1)) ;;
esac
if [ "$action" = adopt ]; then
echo " OK adopt $collision -> $name ($url)"
else
echo " OK $action $name -> $url"
fi
else
# A failure here is real information: the seat's token is dead, or the server
# refused it. Do not paper over it; the seat cannot act until it is reminted.
# tea's own words, redacted — a summarised FAIL hides whether the cause is the
# credential or the client, which cost a diagnosis on 2026-08-21.
echo " FAIL $action $name -> $url"
echo " tea: $(printf '%s' "$err" | redact | head -1)"
failed=$((failed+1))
fi
done
echo
if [ "$APPLY" -eq 0 ]; then
echo "dry run: $planned login(s) would be written, $skipped skipped, $blocked blocked."
[ "$blocked" -gt 0 ] && echo "re-run with --adopt to rename ad-hoc aliases to canonical names."
echo "no changes made. re-run with --apply."
else
echo "minted=$minted adopted=$adopted refreshed=$refreshed skipped=$skipped blocked=$blocked failed=$failed"
fi
[ "$failed" -eq 0 ] && [ "$blocked" -eq 0 ]
@@ -257,36 +257,8 @@ assert_owned_tmux_server() {
fail "tmux server ownership or environment validation failed"
}
# Lease-broker socket preflight (#1292). The gated runtime (`mosaic yolo …` →
# launch-runtime.py) registers with the broker or dies ~4 seconds in, with the
# diagnostic invisible because tmux destroys the dead pane. This check runs
# BEFORE any tmux effect — including the ownership probe below — so a host
# without a broker produces a named, surviving refusal instead of a doomed
# pane. Exit 75 (EX_TEMPFAIL), distinct from 64 (bad projection) and 69 (host
# not ready for other reasons); the agent@ unit is Type=oneshot with no
# Restart=, so the failed unit keeps its message instead of looping. Socket
# resolution matches launch.ts's defaultLeaseBrokerSocket precedence exactly.
# This preflight DETECTS and REFUSES — it never starts the broker (activation
# belongs to the fleet control plane; a component that both detects and fixes
# cannot be used to measure whether the fix worked).
broker_socket_path() {
if [ -n "${MOSAIC_LEASE_BROKER_SOCKET:-}" ]; then
printf '%s\n' "$MOSAIC_LEASE_BROKER_SOCKET"
return 0
fi
local runtime_dir="${XDG_RUNTIME_DIR:-/run/user/$(id -u)}"
printf '%s\n' "${runtime_dir}/mosaic-lease/broker.sock"
}
if [ "$MODE" = "launch" ]; then
_broker_socket=$(broker_socket_path)
if [ ! -S "$_broker_socket" ]; then
echo "[fleet] FAIL_LAUNCH broker-absent: lease broker socket ${_broker_socket} missing; runtime launch denied (#1292)." >&2
echo "[fleet] remedy: systemctl --user enable --now mosaic-lease-broker.service (or reinstall via: mosaic fleet install)" >&2
exit 75
fi
fi
# Validate exact server ownership before querying, cleaning, or creating any
# managed session. An unmanaged or contaminated named socket is never repaired.
assert_owned_tmux_server
if [ "$MODE" = interaction ]; then
@@ -304,17 +276,6 @@ if [ "$MODE" = stop ]; then
exit 0
fi
# #1408 hazard: a seat still living on the DEFAULT tmux socket is invisible to the
# declared-socket guard below, and launching over it creates a same-name duplicate that
# name-addressed comms delivery cannot tell apart. Refuse with a distinct code (76,
# after 75 broker-absent) so a cutover wave script can branch on "seat still on legacy
# socket" vs "already running" (0) vs "broker absent" (75). Stopping the legacy session
# belongs to the cutover procedure, never to this launcher.
if [ -n "$MOSAIC_TMUX_SOCKET" ] && tmux has-session -t "=${AGENT_NAME}" 2>/dev/null; then
echo "[fleet] FAIL_LAUNCH seat-on-legacy-socket: session '${AGENT_NAME}' exists on the DEFAULT tmux socket; stop it before launching on '${MOSAIC_TMUX_SOCKET}'." >&2
exit 76
fi
if _tmux has-session -t "=${AGENT_NAME}:0.0" 2>/dev/null; then
echo "Mosaic agent session already running: $AGENT_NAME on socket ${MOSAIC_TMUX_SOCKET:-(default)}"
exit 0
@@ -432,22 +393,9 @@ if [ "$MOSAIC_AGENT_RUNTIME" = claude ]; then
echo "WARNING: could not pre-trust workdir for claude agent $AGENT_NAME" >&2
fi
# #1408 hazard: prefer the seat's own launch.sh when the brain provides one. It is the
# path that binds the auth profile (CLAUDE_SECURESTORAGE_CONFIG_DIR) and seeds the seat
# config; `mosaic yolo` relocates CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR to the seat dir (launch.ts
# activeSeatDir/harnessEnv) but performs neither, so a yolo-launched seat points its
# config at a directory holding no credentials. The env -i allowlist below still
# applies: launch.sh reads its own launch.env.
SEAT_LAUNCH="${BRAIN_HOME}/fleet/agents/${AGENT_NAME}/launch.sh"
if [ -x "$SEAT_LAUNCH" ]; then
LAUNCH_COMMAND=("$SEAT_LAUNCH")
echo "[fleet] launch path: seat launch.sh ($SEAT_LAUNCH)"
else
LAUNCH_COMMAND=(mosaic yolo "$MOSAIC_AGENT_RUNTIME")
if [ -n "$MOSAIC_AGENT_MODEL" ]; then LAUNCH_COMMAND+=(--model "$MOSAIC_AGENT_MODEL"); fi
if [ -n "$MOSAIC_AGENT_REASONING" ]; then LAUNCH_COMMAND+=(--thinking "$MOSAIC_AGENT_REASONING"); fi
echo "[fleet] launch path: mosaic yolo (no executable seat launch.sh)"
fi
LAUNCH_COMMAND=(mosaic yolo "$MOSAIC_AGENT_RUNTIME")
if [ -n "$MOSAIC_AGENT_MODEL" ]; then LAUNCH_COMMAND+=(--model "$MOSAIC_AGENT_MODEL"); fi
if [ -n "$MOSAIC_AGENT_REASONING" ]; then LAUNCH_COMMAND+=(--thinking "$MOSAIC_AGENT_REASONING"); fi
# The tmux holder owns a named server. Explicitly clear the pane environment
# so server/session variables cannot cross the launch boundary; retain only
@@ -1,222 +0,0 @@
#!/usr/bin/env bash
# CI-fit regression suite for the #1292 lease-broker socket preflight in
# start-agent-session.sh.
#
# WHY THIS SUITE IS CI-FIT WHERE test-start-agent-session.sh IS NOT (#1017/#1270
# context): that older suite's precondition is "the host does not have the pi
# binary", which a CI image that ships pi violates — its guard correctly
# refuses to report a pass there, so it is excluded from the chain. THIS suite
# controls its own preconditions instead of inheriting them from the host: a
# fake tmux on PATH, a fake mosaic on PATH, a real unix socket created in a
# tmpdir, a hermetic env (env -i, fake HOME, GIT_CONFIG_GLOBAL severed). It
# never depends on what the host has installed, so a green here means the same
# thing on every host. Anyone adding cases: keep that property — no case may
# depend on host state.
#
# The failure this suite is written down to catch (#1292): a seat launched on a
# host with no lease broker dies ~4 seconds in at registration, with the
# diagnostic invisible because tmux destroys the dead pane. The preflight runs
# BEFORE any tmux effect and refuses with a NAMED code (exit 75, EX_TEMPFAIL)
# so the message survives. The agent@ unit is Type=oneshot with no Restart=,
# so a failed unit keeps its output instead of looping.
#
# Cases:
# 1. absent socket -> exit 75, message names broker-absent + socket path +
# remedy, and NO tmux session was ever created (the doomed-pane half).
# 2. present socket (real unix socket in tmpdir) -> proceeds PAST the
# preflight (the suite then stops at the next precondition, proving the
# preflight was not the refusal).
# 3. explicit MOSAIC_LEASE_BROKER_SOCKET wins over XDG_RUNTIME_DIR default.
# 4. --stop mode does NOT require the broker (teardown must not be fenced on
# a component whose absence is exactly what teardown may follow).
#
# Sabotage control, run by the developer (not in-suite): remove the preflight
# block from start-agent-session.sh, re-run — case 1 fails (a tmux session is
# created / exit is not 75), cases 2-4 still pass; restore byte-identically.
set -euo pipefail
SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
WORK_DIR="${MOSAIC_TEST_WORK_DIR:-$PWD/.mosaic-test-work/agent-session-broker-preflight}"
FAKE_HOME="$WORK_DIR/home"
BIN_DIR="$WORK_DIR/bin"
ENV_DIR="$WORK_DIR/env"
SOCK_DIR="$WORK_DIR/sockets"
LOG_FILE="$WORK_DIR/tmux-calls.log"
rm -rf "$WORK_DIR"
# The script asserts a managed directory tree under MOSAIC_HOME: mosaic/,
# mosaic/fleet/, mosaic/fleet/agents/ — private (0700/0750-style) modes, no
# symlinks — plus a per-agent env projection. Build the full tree the launcher
# expects so the suite reaches the BROKER preflight rather than dying at
# environment validation.
mkdir -p "$FAKE_HOME/.config/mosaic/fleet/agents" "$BIN_DIR" "$SOCK_DIR"
chmod 700 "$FAKE_HOME/.config/mosaic" "$FAKE_HOME/.config/mosaic/fleet/agents"
chmod 750 "$FAKE_HOME/.config/mosaic/fleet"
cat > "$FAKE_HOME/.config/mosaic/fleet/agents/preflight-test.env.generated" <<'ENVEOF'
MOSAIC_AGENT_NAME=preflight-test
MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY=preflight-test
MOSAIC_AGENT_CLASS=worker
MOSAIC_AGENT_RUNTIME=pi
MOSAIC_AGENT_MODEL=
MOSAIC_AGENT_REASONING=
MOSAIC_AGENT_TOOL_POLICY=code
MOSAIC_AGENT_WORKDIR=/tmp
MOSAIC_TMUX_SOCKET=mosaic-fleet
ENVEOF
chmod 600 "$FAKE_HOME/.config/mosaic/fleet/agents/preflight-test.env.generated"
# ─── Fake tmux: records every invocation; new-session marks the marker. ────
: > "$LOG_FILE"
cat > "$BIN_DIR/tmux" <<SH
#!/usr/bin/env bash
printf 'tmux %s\n' "\$*" >> "$LOG_FILE"
if [[ "\$*" == *new-session* ]]; then
echo "TMUX-NEW-SESSION-INVOKED" >> "$LOG_FILE"
fi
exit 0
SH
chmod +x "$BIN_DIR/tmux"
# ─── Fake mosaic/pi binaries so the script proceeds past its own lookups. ───
for bin in mosaic pi claude; do
printf '#!/usr/bin/env bash\nexit 0\n' > "$BIN_DIR/$bin"
chmod +x "$BIN_DIR/$bin"
done
# ─── Minimal launch environment the script expects. ────────────────────────
# (Enough for the preflight to be reached; later stages will still fail in
# case 2 — that is expected and asserted.)
run_session_script() {
local mode="$1"; shift
(
cd "$WORK_DIR"
env -i HOME="$FAKE_HOME" PATH="$BIN_DIR:/usr/bin:/bin" \
GIT_CONFIG_GLOBAL=/dev/null GIT_CONFIG_SYSTEM=/dev/null \
MOSAIC_HOME="$FAKE_HOME/.config/mosaic" \
AGENT_NAME=preflight-test \
"$@" \
bash "$SCRIPT_DIR/start-agent-session.sh" $mode preflight-test
)
}
fail=0
assert() {
local desc="$1" expected="$2" actual="$3"
if [[ "$expected" != "$actual" ]]; then
echo "FAIL: $desc — expected '$expected', got '$actual'" >&2
fail=1
fi
}
assert_contains() {
local desc="$1" haystack="$2" needle="$3"
[[ "$haystack" == *"$needle"* ]] || { echo "FAIL: $desc — missing '$needle' in: $haystack" >&2; fail=1; }
}
assert_not_contains() {
local desc="$1" haystack="$2" needle="$3"
if [[ "$haystack" == *"$needle"* ]]; then
echo "FAIL: $desc — must not contain '$needle'" >&2
fail=1
fi
return 0
}
# ─── 1. Absent socket → named refusal, NO tmux session. ────────────────────
: > "$LOG_FILE"
stderr_file="$WORK_DIR/stderr-1.tmp"
set +e
out=$(run_session_script "" MOSAIC_LEASE_BROKER_SOCKET="$SOCK_DIR/absent.sock" 2>"$stderr_file")
rc=$?
set -e
assert "absent socket exit code" "75" "$rc"
err=$(cat "$stderr_file")
assert_contains "absent socket names the failure" "$err" "FAIL_LAUNCH broker-absent"
assert_contains "absent socket names the socket path" "$err" "$SOCK_DIR/absent.sock"
assert_contains "absent socket names a remedy" "$err" "mosaic fleet install"
log1=$(cat "$LOG_FILE")
assert_not_contains "absent socket must not create a tmux session" "$log1" "TMUX-NEW-SESSION-INVOKED"
# ─── 2. Present socket → passes the preflight. ─────────────────────────────
# Expected: ownership/env checks AFTER the preflight may refuse (fixture is
# minimal by design); the assertion is only that the refusal is NOT
# broker-absent and the exit is NOT 75.
# Create a REAL unix socket: a detached python holder binds it and stays alive
# for the duration (bash cannot create sockets; a foreground python would
# close the socket on exit and -S on a closed-but-unlinked path fails). Written
# as a script file + setsid nohup so no job-control/heredoc interaction with
# set -e can silently kill the suite.
# AF_UNIX binds cap at 108 path bytes; the suite's workdir exceeds that, so
# the live socket lives at a SHORT path under /tmp (unique per run, cleaned
# with the suite). The preflight takes its socket path explicitly, so this
# stays fully controlled.
# A real unix socket at a SHORT absolute path (AF_UNIX limit is 108 bytes,
# so the repo-deep SOCK_DIR cannot host it). The name is composed, not
# `mktemp -u`: the CI image's mktemp dialect rejects that invocation
# (pipeline 2562: "mktemp: : Invalid argument"), and no pre-existing file is
# wanted anyway — the holder binds it fresh.
LIVE_SOCK="/tmp/mosaic-preflight-$RANDOM-$$.sock"
trap 'rm -f "$LIVE_SOCK"' EXIT
rm -f "$SOCK_DIR/live.sock" "$LIVE_SOCK"
cat > "$SOCK_DIR/holder.py" <<'PY'
import socket, sys, time
path = sys.argv[1]
s = socket.socket(socket.AF_UNIX, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
s.bind(path)
s.listen(1)
time.sleep(120)
PY
python3 "$SOCK_DIR/holder.py" "$LIVE_SOCK" >/dev/null 2>"$SOCK_DIR/holder.err" &
HOLDER_PID=$!
# Wait for the socket object to exist (bind is near-instant, but do not race it).
for _ in $(seq 1 50); do
[ -S "$LIVE_SOCK" ] && break
sleep 0.1
done
if [ ! -S "$LIVE_SOCK" ]; then
echo "FAIL: could not create live socket fixture (holder pid $HOLDER_PID)" >&2
ps -p "$HOLDER_PID" -o pid,stat,cmd --no-headers >&2 || echo "(holder exited)" >&2
cat "$SOCK_DIR/holder.err" >&2 || true
exit 1
fi
: > "$LOG_FILE"
set +e
out=$(run_session_script "" MOSAIC_LEASE_BROKER_SOCKET="$LIVE_SOCK" 2>"$WORK_DIR/stderr-2.tmp")
rc=$?
set -e
# The preflight PASSED if the failure (whatever later stage refused) is NOT
# the broker refusal, and tmux was reached or a later precondition named
# something else.
err2=$(cat "$WORK_DIR/stderr-2.tmp")
assert_not_contains "live socket must not refuse broker-absent" "$err2" "broker-absent"
if [[ "$rc" == "75" ]]; then
echo "FAIL: live socket — preflight still refused (exit 75) with a live socket" >&2
fail=1
fi
# ─── 3. Explicit socket env wins over XDG default. ─────────────────────────
set +e
out=$(run_session_script "" XDG_RUNTIME_DIR="$SOCK_DIR/no-runtime-here" MOSAIC_LEASE_BROKER_SOCKET="$SOCK_DIR/absent2.sock" 2>"$WORK_DIR/stderr-3.tmp")
rc=$?
set -e
assert "explicit env wins (exit 75)" "75" "$rc"
assert_contains "explicit env path named" "$(cat "$WORK_DIR/stderr-3.tmp")" "$SOCK_DIR/absent2.sock"
# ─── 4. --stop is not fenced on the broker. ────────────────────────────────
: > "$LOG_FILE"
set +e
out=$(run_session_script "--stop" MOSAIC_LEASE_BROKER_SOCKET="$SOCK_DIR/absent3.sock" 2>"$WORK_DIR/stderr-4.tmp")
rc=$?
set -e
err4=$(cat "$WORK_DIR/stderr-4.tmp")
assert_not_contains "--stop must not refuse broker-absent" "$err4" "broker-absent"
if [[ "$rc" == "75" ]]; then
echo "FAIL: --stop — exit 75 means teardown was fenced on the broker" >&2
fail=1
fi
kill "$HOLDER_PID" 2>/dev/null || true
if [[ "$fail" -eq 0 ]]; then
echo "start-agent-session lease-broker preflight regression passed"
fi
exit "$fail"
@@ -1,216 +0,0 @@
#!/usr/bin/env bash
# CI-fit regression suite for the #1408 legacy-socket guard in
# start-agent-session.sh.
#
# Same hermeticity contract as test-agent-session-broker-preflight.sh: a fake
# tmux on PATH that scripts its own answers, a real unix socket in a tmpdir so
# the broker preflight passes, env -i with a fake HOME. No case depends on host
# state.
#
# The failure this suite is written down to catch: during a socket cutover a
# seat's session still lives on the DEFAULT tmux socket while the launcher
# targets the named one. The declared-socket has-session check cannot see the
# legacy session (measured 2026-08-24: rc=1, script proceeds), so launch
# creates a same-name duplicate — and comms delivery, which addresses sessions
# by NAME, cannot tell the two apart. The guard refuses with its own code
# (exit 76, after 75 broker-absent) BEFORE any tmux mutation.
#
# Cases:
# 1. legacy session present -> exit 76, message names seat-on-legacy-socket
# + both sockets' roles, and NO tmux session was created.
# 2. legacy session absent -> proceeds PAST the guard (the run then stops at
# a later precondition; asserted: exit != 76, stderr lacks the guard's
# code, proving the guard was not the refusal).
# 3. MOSAIC_TMUX_SOCKET empty (single-socket host) -> guard is inert: the
# default-socket probe must not fire at all.
#
# Sabotage control, run by the developer (not in-suite): remove the guard
# block, re-run — case 1 fails (exit is not 76), cases 2-3 still pass;
# restore byte-identically.
set -euo pipefail
SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
WORK_DIR="${MOSAIC_TEST_WORK_DIR:-$PWD/.mosaic-test-work/agent-session-legacy-socket-guard}"
FAKE_HOME="$WORK_DIR/home"
BIN_DIR="$WORK_DIR/bin"
SOCK_DIR="$WORK_DIR/sockets"
LOG_FILE="$WORK_DIR/tmux-calls.log"
LEGACY_FLAG="$WORK_DIR/legacy-session-present"
rm -rf "$WORK_DIR"
mkdir -p "$FAKE_HOME/.config/mosaic/fleet/agents" "$BIN_DIR" "$SOCK_DIR"
chmod 700 "$FAKE_HOME/.config/mosaic" "$FAKE_HOME/.config/mosaic/fleet/agents"
chmod 750 "$FAKE_HOME/.config/mosaic/fleet"
cat > "$FAKE_HOME/.config/mosaic/fleet/agents/lsguard-test.env.generated" <<'ENVEOF'
MOSAIC_AGENT_NAME=lsguard-test
MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY=lsguard-test
MOSAIC_AGENT_CLASS=worker
MOSAIC_AGENT_RUNTIME=pi
MOSAIC_AGENT_MODEL=
MOSAIC_AGENT_REASONING=
MOSAIC_AGENT_TOOL_POLICY=code
MOSAIC_AGENT_WORKDIR=/tmp
MOSAIC_TMUX_SOCKET=mosaic-fleet
ENVEOF
chmod 600 "$FAKE_HOME/.config/mosaic/fleet/agents/lsguard-test.env.generated"
# A projection with NO named socket, for case 3. Same file minus the socket line.
sed '/^MOSAIC_TMUX_SOCKET=/d; s/lsguard-test/lsguard-nosock/' \
"$FAKE_HOME/.config/mosaic/fleet/agents/lsguard-test.env.generated" \
> "$FAKE_HOME/.config/mosaic/fleet/agents/lsguard-nosock.env.generated"
echo 'MOSAIC_TMUX_SOCKET=' >> "$FAKE_HOME/.config/mosaic/fleet/agents/lsguard-nosock.env.generated"
chmod 600 "$FAKE_HOME/.config/mosaic/fleet/agents/lsguard-nosock.env.generated"
# Ownership identity the launcher validates before anything touches tmux:
# a 0600 uuid file plus a tmux global environment that matches it exactly.
mkdir -p "$FAKE_HOME/.config/mosaic/fleet/run"
chmod 750 "$FAKE_HOME/.config/mosaic/fleet/run"
OWNER_UUID="aaaaaaaa-aaaa-4aaa-8aaa-aaaaaaaaaaaa"
printf '%s' "$OWNER_UUID" > "$FAKE_HOME/.config/mosaic/fleet/run/holder-owner"
chmod 600 "$FAKE_HOME/.config/mosaic/fleet/run/holder-owner"
# The exact env block assert_owned_tmux_server expects; the socket value differs
# per case, so cases rewrite it via write_tmux_env before each run.
write_tmux_env() {
printf '%s\n' \
"HOME=$FAKE_HOME" \
'PATH=/usr/bin:/bin' \
"PWD=$FAKE_HOME" \
"MOSAIC_FLEET_OWNER=$OWNER_UUID" \
'MOSAIC_TMUX_HOLDER=_holder' \
"MOSAIC_TMUX_SOCKET=$1" > "$WORK_DIR/tmux-env"
}
# ─── Fake tmux ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Scripted answers: a DEFAULT-socket has-session (argv carries no -L) answers
# by the flag file; every named-socket call succeeds (holder present, no
# existing session is fine for these cases since refusal happens first).
cat > "$BIN_DIR/tmux" <<SH
#!/usr/bin/env bash
printf 'tmux %s\n' "\$*" >> "$LOG_FILE"
if [[ "\$*" == *new-session* ]]; then
echo "TMUX-NEW-SESSION-INVOKED" >> "$LOG_FILE"
fi
if [[ "\$*" == *show-environment* ]]; then
cat "$WORK_DIR/tmux-env"
exit 0
fi
if [[ "\$*" == *has-session* ]]; then
# holder session always present; the seat's DEFAULT-socket presence is the
# flag file; the seat is never already-running on the NAMED socket.
[[ "\$*" == *_holder* ]] && exit 0
if [[ "\$1" == "-L" ]]; then exit 1; fi
[[ -e "$LEGACY_FLAG" ]] && exit 0 || exit 1
fi
exit 0
SH
chmod +x "$BIN_DIR/tmux"
for bin in mosaic pi claude; do
printf '#!/usr/bin/env bash\nexit 0\n' > "$BIN_DIR/$bin"
chmod +x "$BIN_DIR/$bin"
done
# Real socket so the #1292 broker preflight passes and the run reaches the guard.
# Same idiom as the broker-preflight suite: AF_UNIX binds cap at 108 path bytes,
# so the socket lives at a SHORT /tmp path held by a detached python holder (a
# foreground bind would close on exit; -S on a closed-but-unlinked path fails).
LIVE_SOCK="/tmp/mosaic-lsguard-$RANDOM-$$.sock"
trap 'rm -f "$LIVE_SOCK"' EXIT
rm -f "$LIVE_SOCK"
cat > "$SOCK_DIR/holder.py" <<'PY'
import socket, sys, time
path = sys.argv[1]
s = socket.socket(socket.AF_UNIX, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
s.bind(path)
s.listen(1)
time.sleep(120)
PY
python3 "$SOCK_DIR/holder.py" "$LIVE_SOCK" >/dev/null 2>"$SOCK_DIR/holder.err" &
for _ in $(seq 1 50); do
[ -S "$LIVE_SOCK" ] && break
sleep 0.1
done
[ -S "$LIVE_SOCK" ] || { echo "FAIL: could not create live socket" >&2; exit 1; }
run_session_script() {
local agent="$1"; shift
(
cd "$WORK_DIR"
env -i HOME="$FAKE_HOME" PATH="$BIN_DIR:/usr/bin:/bin" \
GIT_CONFIG_GLOBAL=/dev/null GIT_CONFIG_SYSTEM=/dev/null \
MOSAIC_HOME="$FAKE_HOME/.config/mosaic" \
MOSAIC_LEASE_BROKER_SOCKET="$LIVE_SOCK" \
"$@" \
bash "$SCRIPT_DIR/start-agent-session.sh" "$agent"
)
}
fail=0
assert() {
local desc="$1" expected="$2" actual="$3"
[[ "$expected" == "$actual" ]] || { echo "FAIL: $desc — expected '$expected', got '$actual'" >&2; fail=1; }
}
assert_contains() {
local desc="$1" haystack="$2" needle="$3"
[[ "$haystack" == *"$needle"* ]] || { echo "FAIL: $desc — missing '$needle'" >&2; fail=1; }
}
assert_not_contains() {
local desc="$1" haystack="$2" needle="$3"
if [[ "$haystack" == *"$needle"* ]]; then
echo "FAIL: $desc — must not contain '$needle'" >&2
fail=1
fi
return 0
}
# ─── 1. Legacy session present → exit 76, no tmux mutation. ─────────────────
write_tmux_env "mosaic-fleet"
: > "$LOG_FILE"; touch "$LEGACY_FLAG"
stderr_file="$WORK_DIR/stderr-1.tmp"
set +e
run_session_script lsguard-test >/dev/null 2>"$stderr_file"
rc=$?
set -e
err=$(cat "$stderr_file")
assert "legacy present exit code" "76" "$rc"
assert_contains "names the failure" "$err" "FAIL_LAUNCH seat-on-legacy-socket"
assert_contains "names the agent" "$err" "lsguard-test"
assert_contains "names the target socket" "$err" "mosaic-fleet"
assert_not_contains "no session created" "$(cat "$LOG_FILE")" "TMUX-NEW-SESSION-INVOKED"
# ─── 2. Legacy session absent → guard is not the refusal. ───────────────────
write_tmux_env "mosaic-fleet"
: > "$LOG_FILE"; rm -f "$LEGACY_FLAG"
stderr_file="$WORK_DIR/stderr-2.tmp"
set +e
run_session_script lsguard-test >/dev/null 2>"$stderr_file"
rc=$?
set -e
err=$(cat "$stderr_file")
if [[ "$rc" == "76" ]]; then
echo "FAIL: legacy absent must not exit 76" >&2; fail=1
fi
assert_not_contains "guard code absent from stderr" "$err" "seat-on-legacy-socket"
# ─── 3. Empty MOSAIC_TMUX_SOCKET → guard inert, no default-socket probe. ────
write_tmux_env ""
: > "$LOG_FILE"; touch "$LEGACY_FLAG" # even with a legacy session present
stderr_file="$WORK_DIR/stderr-3.tmp"
set +e
run_session_script lsguard-nosock >/dev/null 2>"$stderr_file"
rc=$?
set -e
err=$(cat "$stderr_file")
if [[ "$rc" == "76" ]]; then
echo "FAIL: empty socket must never exit 76 (single-socket host)" >&2; fail=1
fi
assert_not_contains "guard code absent on single-socket host" "$err" "seat-on-legacy-socket"
rm -f "$LEGACY_FLAG"
if [[ "$fail" -ne 0 ]]; then
echo "start-agent-session legacy-socket guard regression FAILED" >&2
exit 1
fi
echo "start-agent-session legacy-socket guard regression passed"
+1 -59
View File
@@ -30,9 +30,7 @@ The Gitea API token is **never passed on a curl command line.** An `Authorizatio
### `--login` override
Both `pr-review.sh` and `issue-comment.sh` accept an optional `--login <name>` flag that overrides the automatically detected Gitea login for that single invocation. The override selects **which credential the REST write, the `/user` identity lookup, and the read-back all use** — its token is resolved from the tea config for that login name (`get_gitea_token_for_login`).
**With no `--login`, there is no tea lookup at all.** The acting credential is the calling identity's own, resolved by `get_gitea_token` (see "Per-agent Gitea identity" below), and there is deliberately no fallback from it. These wrappers previously _guessed_ a login from the repo host and looked that guess up in the tea config; on a shared-account host the guess resolved to the shared login, so an unqualified call authored its write as that account rather than as the caller. Since `get_gitea_token_for_login` matches by login **name** and performs no authentication check, a dead shared credential still resolved at rc=0 and the identity-aware resolver was never reached. A caller passing no `--login` is asking to act as itself, so `--login` is now the only route to the tea store (#1351). The resolved login is **host- and port-bound**: the login's configured URL host **and effective port** (the scheme's default port — 80 for `http`, 443 for `https` — applies when a port is omitted, symmetrically on both sides) must match the repo remote's, so a login name shared across hosts (or an override configured for a different Gitea, including one on a different port of the same host) can never send one host's credential to another — a host or port mismatch fails closed rather than leaking a cross-host token. Resolving the acting identity and the read-back from the _same_ login that performs the write is essential: a write performed under an overridden login must be verified against that login's identity, not the host default's. Callers who need a different login than the host default should pass `--login <reviewer-login>`.
Both `pr-review.sh` and `issue-comment.sh` accept an optional `--login <name>` flag that overrides the automatically detected Gitea login for that single invocation. The override selects **which credential the REST write, the `/user` identity lookup, and the read-back all use** — its token is resolved from the tea config for that login name (`get_gitea_token_for_login`), falling back to the repo host's credential when no login is named. The resolved login is **host- and port-bound**: the login's configured URL host **and effective port** (the scheme's default port — 80 for `http`, 443 for `https` — applies when a port is omitted, symmetrically on both sides) must match the repo remote's, so a login name shared across hosts (or an override configured for a different Gitea, including one on a different port of the same host) can never send one host's credential to another — a host or port mismatch fails closed rather than leaking a cross-host token. Resolving the acting identity and the read-back from the _same_ login that performs the write is essential: a write performed under an overridden login must be verified against that login's identity, not the host default's. Callers who need a different login than the host default should pass `--login <reviewer-login>`.
As a durable successor to this mechanism, consider giving each reviewer/approver slot its own dedicated Gitea login credential, so that author≠reviewer holds at the credential level rather than relying on wrapper-level `--login` bookkeeping. This is a recommendation for future hardening, not something implemented by this flag.
@@ -102,36 +100,6 @@ of their own — `MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY=<id>` with a provisioned slot. There is de
environment variable that restores the fallback; one would reintroduce exactly the
substitution this removes.
### The tea path: login resolution (#1356)
The wrappers that go through `tea` (`issue-list.sh`, `pr-list.sh`, `pr-view.sh`,
`lane-brief.sh`, and the tea half of `issue-close.sh`) cannot use a token directly: tea
0.14 only acts as a **login** already stored in `~/.config/tea/config.yml`. Those wrappers
therefore resolve a login name, not a token, and the resolution follows the same identity
as above:
1. Resolve the identity (`MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY`, then `git config mosaic.gitIdentity`).
2. Derive the Gitea instance from the repo host (`git.mosaicstack.dev``mosaicstack`,
`git.uscllc.com``usc`), or from the owner when `--repo owner/name` is given.
3. The canonical login is `<instance>-<identity>`. If tea has it, that login acts.
4. If the identity is set but that login is missing, the wrapper **fails closed**: nonzero
exit, empty stdout, and a stderr line naming the login it wanted and the source of the
identity. When `tea` itself is not installed the message says so instead, since "no such
login" would send the reader to create a login they cannot create.
5. With **no identity set**, the old host-default behaviour is unchanged (first login
configured for that host, else the API fallback).
Step 4 replaced a fallback that picked any login configured for the host, which meant a
seat with no login of its own silently acted as whichever seat had configured one. That
satisfied the author≠reviewer gate on paper while one actor held both names.
**Provisioning the logins.** `tools/fleet/seat-logins.sh` projects each seat's token from
its secrets store into tea's config under the canonical name. tea's config is a derived
cache of the secrets store: regenerate it with the script, never hand-edit it. Run it with
`--seat <seat>` for one seat (all seats when omitted), dry-run by default, `--apply` to write. A hand-made
alias holding a seat's token blocks its canonical name (tea refuses one token under two
names); `--adopt` renames it.
### Enabling it for a clone
The framework installer syncs `git-credential-mosaic` to
@@ -157,32 +125,6 @@ otherwise careful never to touch. Because identity is already resolved per-workt
(`mosaic.gitIdentity`), the correct granularity for registering the helper is per-clone
too, so a documented manual step is the right shape here, not a global auto-write.
### Running these tests
`MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY` is inherited into each test's sandbox `HOME`, and **the tests disagree
about which value they need**, so no single ambient value passes all 29. Measured on `next` at
`a480ee83`, two full passes differing only in that variable:
| tests | identity exported | identity unset |
| ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ----------------- | -------------- |
| `gitea-login-resolution`, `issue-comment-readback`, `issue-create-interactive-auth`, `pr-edit`, `pr-merge-gitea-empty-uid`, `pr-metadata-gitea` | **fail** | pass |
| `issue-close-fail-closed` | pass | **fail** |
| remaining 22 | pass | pass |
The six fail because inside a sandbox `HOME` the identity has no `fleet/agents/<id>/`
directory, so it is classified as a **service identity**, its store is unpopulated, and the
resolver correctly refuses with `Refusing to borrow another slot's token`. That is the
documented fail-closed behaviour above, reached from a state the test never intended.
`issue-close-fail-closed` is the mirror image: it asserts that no comment POST is attempted, so
it needs an identity resolving to an empty slot, and with the variable unset the shared account
answers and the POST goes through.
These read as wrapper regressions rather than as environment. Two seats independently
misdiagnosed them as a patch defect while reviewing #1352. Until each test controls its own
value (#1353), `env -u MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY` is the closest thing to a clean run at 28/29, with
`issue-close-fail-closed` the expected failure — and **"the suite passes" is not a statement
anyone can make here without naming the ambient value that produced it.**
### PowerShell parity
`detect-platform.ps1`'s Gitea wrappers authenticate through `tea` CLI logins
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
#!/bin/bash
# ci-queue-wait.sh - Wait until project CI queue is clear (no running/queued pipeline on branch head)
# Usage: ci-queue-wait.sh [-B branch] [-t timeout_sec] [-i interval_sec] [--purpose push|merge] [--require-status] [--no-ci-expected]
# Usage: ci-queue-wait.sh [-B branch] [-t timeout_sec] [-i interval_sec] [--purpose push|merge] [--require-status]
set -euo pipefail
@@ -14,11 +14,10 @@ TIMEOUT_SEC=900
INTERVAL_SEC=15
PURPOSE="merge"
REQUIRE_STATUS=0
NO_CI_EXPECTED=0
usage() {
cat <<EOF
Usage: $(basename "$0") [-B branch] [-R owner/repo] [--sha full-40] [-t timeout_sec] [-i interval_sec] [--purpose push|merge] [--require-status] [--no-ci-expected]
Usage: $(basename "$0") [-B branch] [-R owner/repo] [--sha full-40] [-t timeout_sec] [-i interval_sec] [--purpose push|merge] [--require-status]
Options:
-B, --branch BRANCH Branch head to inspect (default: current branch)
@@ -28,7 +27,6 @@ Options:
-i, --interval SECONDS Poll interval in seconds (default: 15)
--purpose VALUE Log context: push|merge (default: merge)
--require-status Fail if no CI status contexts are present
--no-ci-expected Assert this repository has no CI configured: a merge guard on a zero-context head becomes queue-clear (requires the acting token to hold repository admin); refused with exit 78 when MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY is unset or empty
-h, --help Show this help
Examples:
@@ -177,50 +175,6 @@ PY
return 0
}
# Durable audit record for an explicit no-CI assertion event (granted or
# refused). Same JSONL sink and field shape as record_cannot_assert so one
# reader covers all three outcomes; the outcome value distinguishes them.
# rc 70 on an unwritable sink: a merge pass that cannot be audited must not
# be reachable, mirroring record_cannot_assert's refusal of a degraded pass.
record_assertion_event() {
local outcome="$1" reason="$2" asserted_by="$3"
local audit_log="${MOSAIC_CI_QUEUE_AUDIT_LOG:-${XDG_STATE_HOME:-${HOME:-}/.local/state}/mosaic/audit/ci-queue-wait.jsonl}"
if [[ -z "$audit_log" ]] || ! mkdir -p "$(dirname "$audit_log")"; then
echo "Error: could not write ${outcome} audit record (audit directory unavailable at ${audit_log})." >&2
return 70
fi
if ! python3 - "$audit_log" "$outcome" "$reason" "$asserted_by" "${PLATFORM:-unknown}" "$PURPOSE" "${BRANCH:-unknown}" "${OWNER:-unknown}/${REPO:-unknown}" <<'PY'
import datetime
import json
import os
import sys
path, outcome, reason, asserted_by, platform, purpose, branch, repo = sys.argv[1:]
record = {
"timestamp": datetime.datetime.now(datetime.timezone.utc).isoformat(),
"outcome": outcome,
"reason": reason,
"platform": platform,
"purpose": purpose,
"branch": branch,
"repo": repo,
"asserted_by": asserted_by,
}
fd = os.open(path, os.O_WRONLY | os.O_CREAT | os.O_APPEND, 0o600)
try:
os.write(fd, (json.dumps(record, separators=(",", ":")) + "\n").encode())
finally:
os.close(fd)
PY
then
echo "Error: could not write ${outcome} audit record at ${audit_log}; refusing to proceed unaudited." >&2
return 70
fi
return 0
}
github_get_branch_head_sha() {
local owner="$1"
local repo="$2"
@@ -228,24 +182,6 @@ github_get_branch_head_sha() {
gh api "repos/${owner}/${repo}/branches/${branch}" --jq '.commit.sha'
}
# Repository-admin state for the acting credential, GitHub flavor. The
# repository object's permissions.admin is the field; read through the same
# gh CLI the guard already authenticates with. rc 0 = admin, 1 = not admin
# (or field absent), 2 = indeterminate (transport/API failure).
github_repo_admin_state() {
local owner="$1"
local repo="$2"
local perm
if ! perm=$(gh api "repos/${owner}/${repo}" --jq '.permissions.admin' 2>/dev/null); then
return 2
fi
case "$perm" in
true) return 0 ;;
false|null|"") return 1 ;;
*) return 2 ;;
esac
}
github_get_commit_status_json() {
local owner="$1"
local repo="$2"
@@ -370,41 +306,6 @@ gitea_get_commit_status_json() {
curl -fsSL -H "User-Agent: curl/8" -H "Authorization: token ${token}" "$url"
}
# Repository-admin state for the acting credential, Gitea flavor. The guard's
# existing fetches (branch head, combined status) carry no permissions object
# (measured: neither response includes one), so the elevation check reads the
# repository object's permissions.admin, the one documented carrier of that
# field. rc 0 = admin, 1 = not admin (or field absent), 2 = indeterminate
# (non-200 or unparseable).
gitea_repo_admin_state() {
local host="$1"
local repo="$2"
local token="$3"
local url="https://${host}/api/v1/repos/${repo}"
local resp code body
resp=$(curl -sS -H "User-Agent: curl/8" -H "Authorization: token ${token}" -w $'\n%{http_code}' "$url") || return 2
code="${resp##*$'\n'}"
body="${resp%$'\n'*}"
if [[ "$code" != "200" ]]; then
return 2
fi
printf '%s' "$body" | python3 -c '
import json
import sys
try:
payload = json.load(sys.stdin)
except Exception:
raise SystemExit(2)
if not isinstance(payload, dict):
raise SystemExit(2)
permissions = payload.get("permissions")
if not isinstance(permissions, dict) or permissions.get("admin") is not True:
raise SystemExit(1)
raise SystemExit(0)
'
}
while [[ $# -gt 0 ]]; do
case "$1" in
-B|--branch)
@@ -435,10 +336,6 @@ while [[ $# -gt 0 ]]; do
REQUIRE_STATUS=1
shift
;;
--no-ci-expected)
NO_CI_EXPECTED=1
shift
;;
-h|--help)
usage
exit 0
@@ -468,10 +365,6 @@ if [[ "$PURPOSE" != "push" && "$PURPOSE" != "merge" ]]; then
echo "Error: --purpose must be push or merge." >&2
exit 1
fi
if [[ "$NO_CI_EXPECTED" -eq 1 && "$REQUIRE_STATUS" -eq 1 ]]; then
echo "Error: --no-ci-expected and --require-status contradict each other: one asserts the repository has no CI, the other demands status contexts. Pass at most one." >&2
exit 1
fi
OWNER="unknown"
REPO="unknown"
@@ -503,28 +396,6 @@ if [[ -z "$BRANCH" ]]; then
fi
fi
# T51 WP5b (spec 4.1, review ruling C4/F8): the declaration adds ROUTE CONTEXT only.
# Branch-selection semantics are UNCHANGED — the guard keeps inspecting the
# exact head above. No declaration dependency gates the wait (4.3/DR2 R9:
# blocking here adds a blocker with no safety gain); absence is silent.
# shellcheck source=packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/ci-queue-wait.sh
if git rev-parse --show-toplevel >/dev/null 2>&1 \
&& [ -f "$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)/repo-decl.sh" ]; then
source "$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)/repo-decl.sh"
repo_decl_load
if [[ "$DECL_STATE" == invalid ]]; then
repo_decl_report_invalid
elif [[ "$DECL_STATE" == valid && "$DECL_SCHEMA" == 2 ]]; then
route="feature"
if [[ "$BRANCH" == "$DECL_TRUNK" ]]; then
route="trunk (integration head)"
elif [[ "$BRANCH" == "$DECL_RELEASE" ]]; then
route="release branch"
fi
echo "repo-decl: route context flow=$DECL_FLOW trunk=$DECL_TRUNK release=$DECL_RELEASE; guarded head '$BRANCH' is a $route head (spec 4.1)" >&2
fi
fi
if [[ "$PLATFORM" == "github" ]]; then
if ! command -v gh >/dev/null 2>&1; then
record_cannot_assert "github-cli-unavailable"
@@ -613,48 +484,6 @@ while true; do
echo "[ci-queue-wait] queue-clear state=no-status purpose=push branch=${BRANCH}; no queued or running CI."
exit 0
fi
if [[ "$NO_CI_EXPECTED" -eq 1 ]]; then
# Explicit, elevated, audit-visible assertion that this
# repository has no CI to wait on. The zero-context case is
# the ONLY state the flag reclassifies: a pending or failed
# context still holds or fails exactly as without it, and a
# non-admin token is refused rather than trusted.
# The assertion must name an asserting identity: "unknown"
# attributes nothing, so a caller with MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY
# unset or empty is refused (exit 78) BEFORE the permission
# lookup -- an unattributable caller never triggers that
# network call.
if [[ -z "${MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY:-}" ]]; then
record_assertion_event "ASSERTION_UNATTRIBUTABLE" "actor-unattributable" "unknown" \
|| echo "Warning: could not write the ASSERTION_UNATTRIBUTABLE audit record; the refusal itself stands." >&2
echo "Error: ASSERTION_UNATTRIBUTABLE state=no-status purpose=merge asserted-by=unknown reason=no-ci-expected branch=${BRANCH}; --no-ci-expected requires MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY to name the asserting identity and it is unset or empty (exit 78)." >&2
exit 78
fi
ASSERTED_BY="${MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY}"
ADMIN_STATE=2
if [[ "$PLATFORM" == "github" ]]; then
if github_repo_admin_state "$OWNER" "$REPO"; then ADMIN_STATE=0; else ADMIN_STATE=$?; fi
else
if gitea_repo_admin_state "$HOST" "$OWNER/$REPO" "$TOKEN"; then ADMIN_STATE=0; else ADMIN_STATE=$?; fi
fi
case "$ADMIN_STATE" in
0)
record_assertion_event "NO_CI_ASSERTED" "no-ci-expected" "$ASSERTED_BY" || exit $?
echo "[ci-queue-wait] queue-clear state=no-status purpose=merge asserted-by=${ASSERTED_BY} reason=no-ci-expected branch=${BRANCH}"
exit 0
;;
1)
record_assertion_event "ASSERTION_REFUSED" "actor-not-repo-admin" "$ASSERTED_BY" \
|| echo "Warning: could not write the ASSERTION_REFUSED audit record; the refusal itself stands." >&2
echo "Error: ASSERTION_REFUSED state=no-status purpose=merge asserted-by=${ASSERTED_BY} reason=no-ci-expected branch=${BRANCH}; --no-ci-expected requires repository admin and the acting token is not an admin of ${OWNER}/${REPO} (exit 77)." >&2
exit 77
;;
*)
record_cannot_assert "repo-permissions-unavailable"
exit $?
;;
esac
fi
echo "Error: ASSERTED_NOT_READY state=no-status purpose=${PURPOSE} branch=${BRANCH}." >&2
exit 3
;;
@@ -180,66 +180,6 @@ raise SystemExit(1)
PY
}
# Map a host to the instance prefix used in canonical tea login names
# ("<instance>-<identity>"). This deliberately mirrors the _idpfx case in
# get_gitea_token(): the two credential paths must agree on what a host is called,
# or an agent authenticates as itself on one path and as somebody else on the other.
gitea_instance_for_host() {
case "${1:-}" in
git.uscllc.com) echo usc ;;
git.mosaicstack.dev) echo mosaicstack ;;
*) return 1 ;;
esac
}
# Resolve the acting git identity, same precedence as get_gitea_token() step 0.
# Prints "<identity>\t<source>" so the caller can name the source in an error.
resolve_git_identity() {
local ident src
ident="${MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY:-}"
src="MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY"
if [[ -z "$ident" ]]; then
ident="$(git config --get mosaic.gitIdentity 2>/dev/null || true)"
src="git config mosaic.gitIdentity"
fi
[[ -n "$ident" ]] || return 1
printf '%s\t%s\n' "$ident" "$src"
}
# Map a repo owner to an instance. Used only by the --repo override path, which
# has an owner and no host. Previously lived inline in lane-brief.sh; one copy so
# the two override callers cannot drift apart.
gitea_instance_for_owner() {
local owner="${1:-}"
owner="${owner%%/*}"
case "$owner" in
usc|USC) echo usc ;;
mosaicstack|mosaic) echo mosaicstack ;;
*) return 1 ;;
esac
}
# Does a login of this name exist at all? The --repo override path cannot check
# host agreement, because it has no host.
tea_login_exists() {
local login_name="$1"
local logins_json
command -v tea >/dev/null 2>&1 || return 1
logins_json=$(tea login list --output json 2>/dev/null) || return 1
TEA_LOGINS_JSON="$logins_json" python3 - "$login_name" <<'PY_INNER'
import json, os, sys
want = sys.argv[1]
try:
logins = json.loads(os.environ.get("TEA_LOGINS_JSON", "[]"))
except Exception:
raise SystemExit(1)
for login in logins if isinstance(logins, list) else []:
if str(login.get("name") or login.get("Name") or "") == want:
raise SystemExit(0)
raise SystemExit(1)
PY_INNER
}
tea_login_matches_host() {
local login_name="$1" host="$2"
local logins_json
@@ -336,40 +276,6 @@ get_gitea_login_for_host() {
fi
fi
# IDENTITY LADDER (#1356). Below this point the old code took the FIRST login
# matching the host, which is not an identity — with 43 logins on a fleet host,
# ~22 match one server, so a seat with no login of its own silently acted as
# whichever happened to be first in ~/.config/tea/config.yml. Gate 16 depends on
# author != reviewer, and borrowing satisfies it mechanically while violating it
# in fact. The token path already refuses to borrow; this is the same refusal.
#
# Enforced ONLY when an identity is resolvable, exactly like get_gitea_token():
# no identity means a human at a terminal, and neither path enforces there.
local ident ident_src inst canon
if IFS=$'\t' read -r ident ident_src < <(resolve_git_identity); then
if inst=$(gitea_instance_for_host "$host"); then
canon="${inst}-${ident}"
if tea_login_matches_host "$canon" "$host"; then
echo "$canon"
return 0
fi
# Say which of the two it is. "No such login" when tea is simply not
# installed is a diagnosis of a cause that was never checked, and it
# sends the reader off to create a login they cannot create.
if ! command -v tea >/dev/null 2>&1; then
echo "Error: git identity '$ident' requested (via $ident_src) for host '$host', but tea is not installed," >&2
echo " so no login can be resolved. Refusing to guess an identity." >&2
return 1
fi
echo "Error: git identity '$ident' requested (via $ident_src) for host '$host', but no tea login named '$canon' exists." >&2
echo " Refusing to borrow another login. Acting as a different identity would satisfy gate 16 mechanically while violating it." >&2
echo " Create it with: ~/.config/mosaic/tools/fleet/seat-logins.sh --apply --seat $ident" >&2
return 1
fi
# Identity known but the host is not a Mosaic instance. Fall through: the
# canonical name is undefined for it, so there is nothing to enforce.
fi
login=$(find_tea_login_for_host "$host" || true)
if [[ -n "$login" ]]; then
echo "$login"
@@ -445,49 +351,14 @@ raise SystemExit(1)
PY
}
# Resolve a login for an explicit --repo override, which supplies an owner and no
# host. Takes "owner" or "owner/repo".
#
# The old body fell through to get_default_tea_login(), which returns the
# default-marked login or, failing that, the first login of ANY host — arbitrary
# identity, chosen by config file order. That is the #1356 fail-open in its worst
# form, because unlike the host path it does not even constrain the server.
get_gitea_login_for_repo_override() {
local owner="${1:-}"
local login ident ident_src inst canon
local login
if [[ -n "${GITEA_LOGIN:-}" ]]; then
echo "$GITEA_LOGIN"
return 0
fi
if IFS=$'\t' read -r ident ident_src < <(resolve_git_identity); then
if inst=$(gitea_instance_for_owner "$owner"); then
canon="${inst}-${ident}"
if tea_login_exists "$canon"; then
echo "$canon"
return 0
fi
# Same split as the host path above (#1357 S1): a missing tea binary
# is not a missing login, and the "create it with" advice cannot be
# followed without tea.
if ! command -v tea >/dev/null 2>&1; then
echo "Error: git identity '$ident' (via $ident_src) requested for owner '${owner%%/*}', but tea is not installed," >&2
echo " so no login can be resolved. Refusing to guess an identity." >&2
return 1
fi
echo "Error: git identity '$ident' (via $ident_src) has no tea login '$canon' for owner '${owner%%/*}'." >&2
echo " Create it with: ~/.config/mosaic/tools/fleet/seat-logins.sh --apply --seat $ident" >&2
return 1
fi
echo "Error: git identity '$ident' (via $ident_src) is set, but owner '${owner%%/*}' maps to no known instance," >&2
echo " so the login name cannot be derived. Refusing to fall back to an arbitrary login." >&2
echo " Set GITEA_LOGIN to name the login explicitly." >&2
return 1
fi
# No identity: a human at a terminal. Unchanged, and the same place the token
# path stops enforcing.
login=$(get_default_tea_login || true)
if [[ -n "$login" ]]; then
echo "$login"
@@ -1,343 +0,0 @@
#!/bin/bash
# grant-reviewer.sh - Grant a reviewer read + review access to an org-owned
# Gitea repository via an org team (default: fleet-reviewers).
#
# Usage: grant-reviewer.sh -u <user> [-r <owner>/<repo>] [-t <team>]
#
# The team carries `permission: read` with per-unit overrides
# {repo.code: read, repo.issues: write, repo.pulls: write}: the reviewer can
# read code and write issues/PR reviews, but cannot push. The grant is
# idempotent — the team is looked up before it is created, and member/repo
# additions are PUTs.
#
# KNOWN LIMITATION — branch protection counts these reviews as UNOFFICIAL.
# Gitea computes a review's `official` flag at SUBMISSION time, from write
# permission on the repo or from membership in the protected branch's
# approvals whitelist (disabled by default). A team granted through this
# script has read permission on code, so under branch protection with
# required_approvals the reviewer's approval shows but does NOT count toward
# the required total — the merge still fails with "not enough approvals".
# Enabling the approvals whitelist and adding this team to it is review
# policy (who counts as an official approver), an operator decision made in
# the repo's branch-protection settings, deliberately NOT automated here.
# Because `official` is fixed at submission, whitelisting after the fact
# requires the review to be re-submitted before it counts.
#
# Platform: Gitea only. On a GitHub-remoted repo this script refuses to run —
# GitHub review access is granted through collaborator/team facilities that
# have no equivalent to Gitea's org-team unit map.
#
# Identity: the acting credential resolves exactly as in issue-comment.sh —
# GITEA_LOGIN (when set) names a tea login whose token MUST resolve for the
# remote host (fail closed, never downgrade to the host default identity);
# otherwise the per-seat identity ladder in detect-platform.sh applies
# (MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY / git config mosaic.gitIdentity → per-slot token,
# fail-loud on fleet hosts). Managing org teams requires org owner/admin:
# an HTTP 403 from any step is reported as "org admin required on <org>",
# never as a silent partial grant.
#
# Verification is fail-closed: after the member and repo PUTs, the script
# GETs the single resources back (GET /teams/{id}/members/{user} and
# GET /teams/{id}/repos/{owner}/{repo}) and refuses to report success unless
# both confirm the grant. A PUT that returns success without persisting
# (the #865 defect class: an exit code is not evidence of a durable write)
# therefore fails the run instead of reporting a grant that does not exist.
set -e
SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
source "$SCRIPT_DIR/detect-platform.sh"
usage() {
echo "Usage: grant-reviewer.sh -u <user> [-r <owner>/<repo>] [-t <team>]"
echo ""
echo "Options:"
echo " -u, --user Gitea username to grant reviewer access (required)"
echo " -r, --repo Target repository as <owner>/<repo>; defaults to the"
echo " current repository's origin. The owner must be an"
echo " organization."
echo " -t, --team Org team to use/create (default: fleet-reviewers)"
echo " -h, --help Show this help"
echo ""
echo "Environment:"
echo " GITEA_LOGIN Override the acting identity with a named tea login"
echo " (must resolve for the remote host; fails closed)."
echo ""
echo "Grants: code read + issues/pulls write via an org team. Gitea only."
echo ""
echo "LIMITATION: under branch protection with required approvals, reviews"
echo "from a read-permission team are official=false and do not count"
echo "toward the required total. Making them count means enabling the"
echo "protected branch's approvals whitelist and adding the team — an"
echo "operator review-policy decision this script does not automate. The"
echo "official flag is computed at review submission, so a review made"
echo "before whitelisting must be re-submitted afterwards."
}
REVIEWER=""
REPO_OVERRIDE=""
TEAM="fleet-reviewers"
while [[ $# -gt 0 ]]; do
case $1 in
-u|--user)
REVIEWER="$2"
shift 2
;;
-r|--repo)
REPO_OVERRIDE="$2"
shift 2
;;
-t|--team)
TEAM="$2"
shift 2
;;
-h|--help)
usage
exit 0
;;
*)
echo "Unknown option: $1" >&2
exit 1
;;
esac
done
if [[ -z "$REVIEWER" ]]; then
echo "Error: reviewer username is required (-u)" >&2
exit 1
fi
# Gitea usernames and team names are AlphaDashDot. Validating here keeps the
# values safe to interpolate into API paths without URL-encoding.
NAME_RE='^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._-]*$'
if ! [[ "$REVIEWER" =~ $NAME_RE ]]; then
echo "Error: invalid reviewer username '$REVIEWER'" >&2
exit 1
fi
if ! [[ "$TEAM" =~ $NAME_RE ]]; then
echo "Error: invalid team name '$TEAM'" >&2
exit 1
fi
if [[ -n "$REPO_OVERRIDE" ]] && ! [[ "$REPO_OVERRIDE" =~ ^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._-]*/[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._-]*$ ]]; then
echo "Error: -r expects <owner>/<repo>, got '$REPO_OVERRIDE'" >&2
exit 1
fi
detect_platform >/dev/null
if [[ "$PLATFORM" != "gitea" ]]; then
echo "Error: grant-reviewer.sh is Gitea only (detected platform: $PLATFORM)." >&2
echo " On GitHub, grant review access via repository collaborators or org teams in the GitHub UI/CLI." >&2
exit 1
fi
HOST=$(get_remote_host) || {
echo "Error: could not resolve the remote host from origin" >&2
exit 1
}
# Acting credential: GITEA_LOGIN (explicit, fail closed) or the identity
# ladder. Same ordering contract as issue-comment.sh — an explicit override is
# never silently downgraded to the host default identity.
if [[ -n "${GITEA_LOGIN:-}" ]]; then
GITEA_API_TOKEN=$(get_gitea_token_for_login "$GITEA_LOGIN" "$HOST") || {
echo "Error: could not resolve a host-matched Gitea token for GITEA_LOGIN '$GITEA_LOGIN' on host '$HOST'; refusing to fall back to the host default identity (reviewer grant)" >&2
exit 1
}
else
GITEA_API_TOKEN=$(get_gitea_token "$HOST") || {
echo "Error: no Gitea credential resolved for the acting identity on host '$HOST' (reviewer grant). Set MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY=<agent-id>, or set GITEA_LOGIN=<name> to use a named tea credential." >&2
exit 1
}
fi
CONFIGURED_URL=$(get_gitea_url_for_host "$HOST") || {
echo "Error: configured Gitea URL not found for host '$HOST'" >&2
exit 1
}
GITEA_API_ROOT="${CONFIGURED_URL%/}/api/v1"
if [[ -n "$REPO_OVERRIDE" ]]; then
REPO_SLUG="$REPO_OVERRIDE"
else
REPO_SLUG=$(get_gitea_repo_slug_for_url "$CONFIGURED_URL") || {
echo "Error: could not resolve <owner>/<repo> from origin; pass -r <owner>/<repo>" >&2
exit 1
}
fi
ORG="${REPO_SLUG%%/*}"
REPO_NAME="${REPO_SLUG#*/}"
RESPONSE_FILE=$(mktemp "${TMPDIR:-/tmp}/mosaic-grant-reviewer-resp.XXXXXX")
AUTH_CONFIG=$(gitea_write_auth_config "$GITEA_API_TOKEN") || {
rm -f "$RESPONSE_FILE"
echo "Error: could not stage Gitea credential for reviewer grant" >&2
exit 1
}
trap 'rm -f "$RESPONSE_FILE" "$AUTH_CONFIG"' EXIT
# gitea_api <step> <method> <path> [json-payload]
# Runs one API call with the staged credential (token never in argv). Sets
# GITEA_API_STATUS and leaves the body in $RESPONSE_FILE. Transport failure
# and HTTP 403 are terminal here: 403 on ANY step means the acting identity
# cannot manage org teams, and the run must stop rather than continue into a
# partial grant.
gitea_api() {
local step="$1" method="$2" path="$3" payload="${4:-}"
local -a payload_args=()
if [[ -n "$payload" ]]; then
payload_args=(-H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d "$payload")
fi
if ! GITEA_API_STATUS=$(curl -sS -o "$RESPONSE_FILE" -w '%{http_code}' \
-X "$method" \
--config "$AUTH_CONFIG" \
"${payload_args[@]}" \
"$GITEA_API_ROOT$path"); then
echo "Error: Gitea transport failed during $step" >&2
return 1
fi
if [[ "$GITEA_API_STATUS" == "403" ]]; then
echo "Error: HTTP 403 during $step: org admin required on '$ORG' — managing org teams needs owner/admin on the organization. No grant was completed." >&2
return 1
fi
return 0
}
# json_field <file> <key> — print a top-level scalar field or fail.
json_field() {
python3 - "$1" "$2" <<'PY'
import json
import sys
try:
with open(sys.argv[1], encoding="utf-8") as response:
data = json.load(response)
value = data.get(sys.argv[2]) if isinstance(data, dict) else None
if value is None or isinstance(value, (dict, list, bool)):
raise ValueError(f"missing or non-scalar field {sys.argv[2]!r}")
except (OSError, json.JSONDecodeError, ValueError) as error:
print(f"Error: unusable Gitea response: {error}", file=sys.stderr)
raise SystemExit(1)
print(value)
PY
}
# 1. The owner must be an organization: teams are an org facility, and a
# user-owned repo would fail later with a misleading team error.
gitea_api "organization check" GET "/orgs/$ORG"
if [[ "$GITEA_API_STATUS" == "404" ]]; then
echo "Error: owner '$ORG' is not an organization on '$HOST'; grant-reviewer requires an org-owned repository" >&2
exit 1
fi
if [[ "$GITEA_API_STATUS" != "200" ]]; then
echo "Error: organization check for '$ORG' failed with HTTP $GITEA_API_STATUS" >&2
exit 1
fi
# 2. Idempotent team resolution: exact-name lookup first, create only on miss.
# The search endpoint substring-matches, so the exact-name filter is done
# on the response, not trusted to the query.
gitea_api "team lookup" GET "/orgs/$ORG/teams/search?q=$TEAM"
if [[ "$GITEA_API_STATUS" != "200" ]]; then
echo "Error: team lookup for '$TEAM' on '$ORG' failed with HTTP $GITEA_API_STATUS" >&2
exit 1
fi
TEAM_ID=$(TEAM_NAME="$TEAM" python3 - "$RESPONSE_FILE" <<'PY'
import json
import os
import sys
wanted = os.environ["TEAM_NAME"]
try:
with open(sys.argv[1], encoding="utf-8") as response:
result = json.load(response)
teams = result.get("data") if isinstance(result, dict) else None
if not isinstance(teams, list):
raise ValueError("team search response carried no data list")
except (OSError, json.JSONDecodeError, ValueError) as error:
print(f"Error: unusable team search response: {error}", file=sys.stderr)
raise SystemExit(1)
for team in teams:
if isinstance(team, dict) and team.get("name") == wanted:
team_id = team.get("id")
if not isinstance(team_id, int) or team_id <= 0:
print("Error: matched team carried no positive id", file=sys.stderr)
raise SystemExit(1)
print(team_id)
raise SystemExit(0)
print("")
PY
)
if [[ -z "$TEAM_ID" ]]; then
CREATE_PAYLOAD=$(TEAM_NAME="$TEAM" python3 -c '
import json
import os
print(json.dumps({
"name": os.environ["TEAM_NAME"],
"description": "review seats: code read + issues/pulls write",
"permission": "read",
"includes_all_repositories": False,
"can_create_org_repo": False,
"units_map": {
"repo.code": "read",
"repo.issues": "write",
"repo.pulls": "write",
},
}))
')
gitea_api "team create" POST "/orgs/$ORG/teams" "$CREATE_PAYLOAD"
if [[ "$GITEA_API_STATUS" != "201" ]]; then
echo "Error: team create for '$TEAM' on '$ORG' failed with HTTP $GITEA_API_STATUS" >&2
exit 1
fi
TEAM_ID=$(json_field "$RESPONSE_FILE" id) || {
echo "Error: team create returned no usable team id" >&2
exit 1
}
echo "Created team '$TEAM' (id $TEAM_ID) on org '$ORG'"
else
echo "Found existing team '$TEAM' (id $TEAM_ID) on org '$ORG'"
fi
# 3. Membership and repo attachment — both PUTs, both idempotent in Gitea.
gitea_api "member add" PUT "/teams/$TEAM_ID/members/$REVIEWER"
if [[ "$GITEA_API_STATUS" != "204" ]]; then
echo "Error: adding '$REVIEWER' to team '$TEAM' failed with HTTP $GITEA_API_STATUS" >&2
exit 1
fi
gitea_api "repo add" PUT "/teams/$TEAM_ID/repos/$ORG/$REPO_NAME"
if [[ "$GITEA_API_STATUS" != "204" ]]; then
echo "Error: adding repo '$REPO_SLUG' to team '$TEAM' failed with HTTP $GITEA_API_STATUS" >&2
exit 1
fi
# 4. Fail-closed read-back: a 204 from a PUT is an exit code, not evidence the
# grant persisted. GET the single resources back and require both.
gitea_api "member read-back" GET "/teams/$TEAM_ID/members/$REVIEWER"
if [[ "$GITEA_API_STATUS" != "200" ]]; then
echo "Error: reviewer grant NOT verified — GET /teams/$TEAM_ID/members/$REVIEWER returned HTTP $GITEA_API_STATUS after a successful PUT. Treat the grant as not made." >&2
exit 1
fi
READBACK_LOGIN=$(json_field "$RESPONSE_FILE" login) || exit 1
if [[ "${READBACK_LOGIN,,}" != "${REVIEWER,,}" ]]; then
echo "Error: reviewer grant NOT verified — member read-back returned login '$READBACK_LOGIN', expected '$REVIEWER'" >&2
exit 1
fi
gitea_api "repo read-back" GET "/teams/$TEAM_ID/repos/$ORG/$REPO_NAME"
if [[ "$GITEA_API_STATUS" != "200" ]]; then
echo "Error: reviewer grant NOT verified — GET /teams/$TEAM_ID/repos/$ORG/$REPO_NAME returned HTTP $GITEA_API_STATUS after a successful PUT. Treat the grant as not made." >&2
exit 1
fi
READBACK_FULL_NAME=$(json_field "$RESPONSE_FILE" full_name) || exit 1
if [[ "${READBACK_FULL_NAME,,}" != "${REPO_SLUG,,}" ]]; then
echo "Error: reviewer grant NOT verified — repo read-back returned '$READBACK_FULL_NAME', expected '$REPO_SLUG'" >&2
exit 1
fi
echo "Granted: '$REVIEWER' is a member of team '$TEAM' (id $TEAM_ID) with access to '$REPO_SLUG' (code read, issues/pulls write) — verified by read-back"
echo "Note: under branch protection with required approvals this reviewer's approvals are official=false unless the branch's approvals whitelist includes the team (operator decision; reviews submitted before whitelisting must be re-submitted)."

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