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fred c703cc50eb git-credential-mosaic: escape the escalation record, and stop naming a record that was never written
ci/woodpecker/pr/ci Pipeline was successful
Both defects found in review by rev-code-01 on #1311.

F3 — the JSONL record interpolated every field with a bare %s. An identity comes
from git config or the environment and a cwd is whatever directory git ran in, so
either can contain a quote or a backslash. One such refusal turned the day's spool
into unparseable JSONL, and the operator would only discover it while reading the
record that explains an outage. Fields are now JSON-escaped.

F2 — the diagnostic printed "record: <spool>/<date>.jsonl" unconditionally, but
the record is only written inside the branch where mkdir -p succeeded. When the
spool cannot be created the helper named a file that does not exist, on exactly
the hosts where the escalation was lost. It now reports the real path or says
NOT WRITTEN.

Also: prettier on README.md, which was the format-step failure on pipeline 2508.
It reflowed only the two tables this branch added.

Tests: cases 14 and 15 cover both. Verified discriminating — against the previous
helper with these same tests, case 14 fails with the unparseable record printed
and case 15 fails on both assertions; against this one both pass.

The first draft of case 14 used `ls "$spool"/*.jsonl | head -1`, which under
`set -o pipefail` exits 2 on a missed glob and killed the suite with zero output
— the same silent-nonzero failure rev-code-01 hit from a partial tools/ extraction
and the reason this file exists. Replaced with a glob loop and a comment.
2026-08-18 17:04:55 -05:00
fred 3d2b712355 git credentials: fail closed, and read a seat's token from its own slot
ci/woodpecker/pr/ci Pipeline failed
Two changes to one rule: a credential is resolved from exactly one place,
and an identity that cannot be resolved is refused rather than substituted.

FAIL CLOSED. Both readers ended in an unconditional fall-through to the
shared Gitea account whenever an identity did not resolve. Every seat in a
fleet therefore pushed, opened PRs and filed reviews under one account, and
a record made that way cannot be traced to the agent that made it
afterwards. The fallback now applies only where there is no attribution to
lose: a host with no fleet. Where seats exist, an unresolvable request emits
nothing, exits nonzero, explains itself on stderr, and — in the git helper —
appends a record naming the identity, host, reason and cwd, and no token
value, to ${MOSAIC_CREDENTIAL_SPOOL:-~/.local/state/mosaic-credential-escalations}.

A host runs a fleet when <brain>/fleet/agents exists, which is the signal
packages/mosaic/src/fleet/brain-home.ts already uses to decide a brain is
active, resolved the same way (MOSAIC_BRAIN_HOME, else ~/.mosaic). This is
what keeps the change a no-op for an operator who has not provisioned
per-slot tokens: no fleet directory, shared account, unchanged. It is also
why there is no environment variable to restore the old behavior — one would
reintroduce the substitution being removed.

STORE SELECTION. Both readers hardcoded ~/.config/mosaic/secrets/gitea-tokens,
so a seat's own secrets/ slot was invisible to the framework: a seat could
hold a valid credential and still be served the shared account. The store is
now chosen by what the identity is. An identity with a directory under
<brain>/fleet/agents/ is a seat and is read only from
<brain>/fleet/agents/<id>/secrets/; any other identity is a service identity
and is read from the framework store. There is no precedence between them
and no fallback from one to the other, so a seat with an empty slot is
refused even when a same-named token sits in the framework store. Two copies
of one credential are drift rather than redundancy, and drift surfaces as
the stale copy returning 401, which reads as a revoked token and sends
whoever debugs it somewhere else.

detect-platform.sh is in scope alongside git-credential-mosaic because they
are the two readers of these tokens. Patching only the git helper would make
"one credential, one location" true for push and fetch and false for
pr-create.sh, issue-create.sh and pr-review.sh, which is the harder failure
to notice.

TESTS. The three assertions that pinned the shared-account fall-through are
now fail-closed assertions, and a refusal is checked four independent ways:
nonzero exit, empty stdout, a stderr diagnostic naming identity and host,
and no shared token value anywhere in the output. The exit code alone would
pass against a helper that emitted the credential and then failed. Added:
seat-slot resolution, the no-cross-store-fallback case with a control
proving the framework-store file it declines to read is readable, no-identity
on a fleet host, the fleet gate firing on the default ~/.mosaic and not only
on an injected MOSAIC_BRAIN_HOME, and a cross-host leak check. Both suites
were run against the pre-change code as a control and fail there on exactly
the shared-token emission.

shellcheck is not installed on the authoring host, so the rewritten helper
is unlinted locally and CI is the first lint of it.
2026-08-18 16:19:43 -05:00
fargo 245e0c427d feat(quality-rails): typed evaluator absorbs QC-19/QC-20; verify-release wiring (RI-3-002, #1275) (#1308)
ci/woodpecker/push/publish Pipeline failed
2026-08-18 17:54:47 +00:00
18 changed files with 2314 additions and 176 deletions
+1 -1
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@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@
| RI-1-002 | done | RI-N1 negative control: checked-in tests proving a broken mandatory check blocks every publish step and that DAG edges cannot be bypassed | #1275 | pi-glm-5.3 | mosaicstack/stack | test/ri-050-publish-gate-negative | RI-1-001 | 12K | |
| RI-2-001 | done | RI-N2 (Forge): remove stub-executor false success; `--simulate` typed `simulated` results that satisfy nothing; literal-`true` gates and echo-review replaced with real gates or typed waiting-for-authority | #1275 | pi-glm-5.3 | mosaicstack/stack | fix/ri-050-forge-fail-closed | RI-0-001 | 20K | Independent review APPROVED 2026-08-17 (Gitea review 172 on PR #1278, head 99b8f6ea; reviewing seat fargo — recorded under shared host principal mos-dt-0, provenance correction posted by fred; wrapper gap filed by fred). Executed at head: forge tests 116/116, lint green, typecheck green after building macp dist (minimal-install artifact, not a defect), workspace typecheck 45/45, no external type consumers of the changed interfaces. CI red = known lane-wide fleet-test failure only, carries no information about this change (fred, log-content analysis, pipelines 2456-2458). Non-blocking finding: README L141-143 + skills/mosaic-forge/SKILL.md document bare forge run/resume, which now fails closed — fast-follow docs touch. Merge queued behind #1270. UPDATE 2026-08-18: #1270 merged; CI GREEN at head 4917df1f via serialized retry (pipeline 2477) - root cause of prior reds was CI-agent contention (web SPA timeouts under concurrent pipelines), superseding the fleet-test-failure theory. |
| RI-2-002 | done | RI-N2 (MACP): gate runner fails closed on empty commands, stub executors, and unimplemented CI-provider gates unless explicit simulate; typed capability failures | #1275 | pi-glm-5.3 | mosaicstack/stack | fix/ri-050-macp-fail-closed | RI-0-001 | 15K | PR #1293 (head 2097379e): CI green (pipeline 2465), independent review APPROVED (Gitea review 173, jarvis seat, 2026-08-17) - macp 109/109 verified at head. Merge queued behind #1276/#1277/#1278. |
| RI-3-001 | in-progress | RI-N4: complete probe inventory mapping every TS and shell quality-rail check to one canonical check with disposition (preserve/strengthen/retire, each named) | #1275 | pi-glm-5.3 | mosaicstack/stack | docs/ri-050-qr-probe-inventory | RI-0-001 | 12K | |
| RI-3-001 | done | RI-N4: complete probe inventory mapping every TS and shell quality-rail check to one canonical check with disposition (preserve/strengthen/retire, each named) | #1275 | pi-glm-5.3 | mosaicstack/stack | docs/ri-050-qr-probe-inventory | RI-0-001 | 12K | PR #1302 (head e06a47fac591): CI green (2484), independent review APPROVED (Gitea review 187, fargo seat, 2026-08-18) — 54 rows / 21 canonical checks / dispositions 43-2-9-0 verified by row-count and code spot-checks. Merged by fargo at pinned head. |
| RI-3-002 | not-started | RI-N4: TS evaluator absorbs effective shell probes; typed results (passed/failed/blocked/error/not-applicable) with versioned digested check definitions; shell commands become thin adapters; contract/parity/negative-control tests | #1275 | pi-glm-5.3 | mosaicstack/stack | feat/ri-050-qr-evaluator | RI-3-001 | 30K | |
| RI-4-001 | in-progress | RI-N3: one PRD application service — `mission --plan` persists mission↔PRD linkage (ids/versions/selected requirements); `mosaic prdy` routes through the service or becomes a named import/export adapter; Markdown is a labeled generated view; explicit conflict-aware import | #1275 | pi-glm-5.3 | mosaicstack/stack | feat/ri-050-prd-authority | RI-0-001 | 35K | PR #1294 (head 8d258e1d): CI green (pipeline 2466), independent review APPROVED (Gitea review 174, jarvis seat, 2026-08-17) - prdy 20/20 + command specs 9/9 at head. Merge queued behind #1276/#1277/#1278. |
| RI-5-001 | done | RI-N5: typed freshness states (current/stale/partial/unknown/unavailable); no failed-fetch-renders-empty; stale derived verdicts → unknown; mutations disabled when stale; failure-matrix tests | #1275 | pi-glm-5.3 | mosaicstack/stack | feat/ri-050-web-stale-safety | RI-0-001 | 25K | |
+49 -7
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@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ fleet commits, pushes, and opens PRs under one identity — with no cryptographi
separation between an author and a reviewer.
Both `git-credential-mosaic` and `get_gitea_token()` resolve an optional **per-agent
identity** before falling back to the shared account:
identity**:
1. `MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY` environment variable, or
2. `git config --get mosaic.gitIdentity` (set per-worktree; persists on disk across
@@ -51,12 +51,54 @@ identity** before falling back to the shared account:
3. (git-credential-mosaic only) the username git itself supplies for the credential
request.
If the resolved identity has a token file at
`~/.config/mosaic/secrets/gitea-tokens/gitea-{usc,mosaicstack}-<agent-id>.token`, that
identity + token is used. **Nothing configured → nothing changes**: with no per-slot
token file present, both tools fall through to the existing shared-account path
unchanged, so this feature is a no-op on any host that hasn't provisioned per-slot
tokens.
### Which store a credential is read from
The store is chosen by what the identity **is**, not by which file happens to exist first:
| The identity | Its credential is read from |
| ------------------------------------------------------------------ | -------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| has a directory at `<brain>/fleet/agents/<id>/` — it is a **seat** | `<brain>/fleet/agents/<id>/secrets/gitea-{usc,mosaicstack}-<id>.token` |
| does not — it is a **service identity** | `~/.config/mosaic/secrets/gitea-tokens/gitea-{usc,mosaicstack}-<id>.token` |
`<brain>` is `MOSAIC_BRAIN_HOME` if set, else `~/.mosaic` — the same resolution
`packages/mosaic/src/fleet/brain-home.ts` performs.
**There is no precedence between the two stores and no fallback from one to the other.**
A seat whose slot is empty is refused even when a same-named token sits in the framework
store. One credential lives in exactly one location: a second copy is drift rather than
redundancy, and the way drift surfaces is a stale copy returning 401, which reads as a
revoked token and sends whoever debugs it to the wrong place.
### What happens when nothing resolves
| identity resolves | token in its store | host runs a fleet | result |
| ----------------- | ------------------ | ----------------- | ------------------------- |
| yes | yes | — | that identity + token |
| yes | no | — | **fail closed** |
| no | — | yes | **fail closed** |
| no | — | no | shared account, unchanged |
A host "runs a fleet" when `<brain>/fleet/agents` exists — the same signal `brain-home.ts`
uses to decide a brain is active.
Failing closed means: nothing is emitted, the exit status is nonzero, a stderr diagnostic
names the identity, its source, the store it resolved to and the path that was expected,
and `git-credential-mosaic` additionally appends a record (identity, host, reason, cwd —
never a token value) to `${MOSAIC_CREDENTIAL_SPOOL:-~/.local/state/mosaic-credential-escalations}`.
The git operation fails; nothing is attributed to anyone.
The shared-account fallback that used to cover these two cases is why a PR could be
authored, commented and merged under an account whose owner did not open it — every seat
shared one identity, so the record could not be traced back afterwards. An
under-provisioned agent is refused rather than handed the most privileged account
available.
**On a host with no fleet, nothing changes**: no `fleet/agents` directory means the shared
account still answers, so this is a no-op for an operator who has not provisioned per-slot
tokens. On a host that does run a fleet, a human doing manual git work needs an identity
of their own — `MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY=<id>` with a provisioned slot. There is deliberately no
environment variable that restores the fallback; one would reintroduce exactly the
substitution this removes.
### Enabling it for a clone
@@ -507,37 +507,69 @@ get_gitea_token() {
# 0. Per-agent identity (Gate-16 author≠reviewer). If MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY, or the
# per-worktree `git config mosaic.gitIdentity`, resolves to an agent that has a
# stored per-slot token for this host, act AS that agent so API tooling
# stored credential for this host, act AS that agent so API tooling
# (pr-create, issue-create, …) authors under the right identity — matching the
# git credential helper. Backward-compatible: nothing resolvable → shared logic below.
# git credential helper, which this block deliberately mirrors.
local _ident="${MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY:-}"
local _ident_src="MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY"
if [[ -z "$_ident" ]]; then
_ident="$(git config --get mosaic.gitIdentity 2>/dev/null || true)"
_ident_src="git config mosaic.gitIdentity"
fi
if [[ -n "$_ident" ]]; then
local _idpfx=""
case "$host" in
git.uscllc.com) _idpfx=gitea-usc ;;
git.mosaicstack.dev) _idpfx=gitea-mosaicstack ;;
esac
if [[ -n "$_idpfx" ]]; then
local _idtok="$HOME/.config/mosaic/secrets/gitea-tokens/${_idpfx}-${_ident}.token"
if [[ -r "$_idtok" ]]; then
cat "$_idtok"
return 0
fi
# FAIL LOUD: an explicit git identity was requested for a recognized Gitea host,
# but no per-slot token exists for THAT identity. Refuse to fall through to the
# shared/default credential loader below — silently borrowing another slot's token
# would post PRs/issues/reviews under the WRONG agent (e.g. rev2's review attributed
# to coder3), corrupting Gate-16 author≠reviewer separation. Hard-stop instead so the
# caller aborts loudly rather than acting as the wrong identity.
echo "Error: git identity '$_ident' requested (via $_ident_src) for host '$host', but no per-slot token at $_idtok." >&2
echo " Refusing to borrow another slot's token. Provision the per-slot token, or unset the identity to use shared credentials." >&2
return 1
# Recognized Gitea hosts are the ones carrying the per-identity token scheme.
local _idpfx=""
case "$host" in
git.uscllc.com) _idpfx=gitea-usc ;;
git.mosaicstack.dev) _idpfx=gitea-mosaicstack ;;
esac
# Brain-home resolution mirrors packages/mosaic/src/fleet/brain-home.ts and
# tools/fleet/start-agent-session.sh: MOSAIC_BRAIN_HOME wins, else ~/.mosaic.
local _brain_home="${MOSAIC_BRAIN_HOME:-$HOME/.mosaic}"
if [[ -n "$_ident" && -n "$_idpfx" ]]; then
# Credential store selection: an identity is a SEAT or a SERVICE, and which
# one it is decides where its credential lives. No precedence between the
# two stores and no fallback from one to the other — a seat with an empty
# slot fails loud rather than reading a service credential of the same name.
# One credential, one location: two copies diverge, and the stale copy fails
# in a way that reads as a revoked token rather than as drift.
local _idtok _ident_kind
if [[ -d "$_brain_home/fleet/agents/$_ident" ]]; then
_ident_kind="seat"
_idtok="$_brain_home/fleet/agents/$_ident/secrets/${_idpfx}-${_ident}.token"
else
_ident_kind="service identity"
_idtok="$HOME/.config/mosaic/secrets/gitea-tokens/${_idpfx}-${_ident}.token"
fi
if [[ -r "$_idtok" ]]; then
cat "$_idtok"
return 0
fi
# FAIL LOUD: an explicit git identity was requested for a recognized Gitea host,
# but no credential exists for THAT identity. Refuse to fall through to the
# shared/default credential loader below — silently borrowing another identity's
# token would post PRs/issues/reviews under the WRONG agent (e.g. rev2's review
# attributed to coder3), corrupting Gate-16 author≠reviewer separation. Hard-stop
# instead so the caller aborts loudly rather than acting as the wrong identity.
echo "Error: git identity '$_ident' requested (via $_ident_src) for host '$host', but no per-slot token at $_idtok." >&2
echo " Resolved as a ${_ident_kind}; there is no fallback between the seat and service stores." >&2
echo " Refusing to borrow another slot's token. Provision the credential at that path, or unset the identity to use shared credentials." >&2
return 1
fi
# FAIL LOUD: no identity resolved, on a host that HAS a fleet. Where seats exist,
# every record must name the agent that made it, so an unattributable request is
# refused rather than handed the shared account. `fleet/agents` existing is the
# same signal brain-home.ts uses to decide a brain is active. A host with no fleet
# keeps the shared path below unchanged: there the shared account is the operator's
# own and there is no attribution to lose.
if [[ -z "$_ident" && -n "$_idpfx" && -d "$_brain_home/fleet/agents" ]]; then
echo "Error: no git identity resolved for host '$host', but this host runs a fleet ($_brain_home/fleet/agents)." >&2
echo " Refusing to fall back to the shared account: records it creates cannot be attributed to the agent that made them." >&2
echo " Set MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY=<agent-id> or 'git config mosaic.gitIdentity <agent-id>'." >&2
return 1
fi
# 1. Mosaic credential loader (host → service mapping, run in subshell to avoid polluting env)
@@ -1,21 +1,48 @@
#!/bin/bash
# git-credential-mosaic — git credential helper — resolves Gitea tokens from
# the Mosaic credential store at runtime so remote URLs never embed secrets.
# git-credential-mosaic — git credential helper. Resolves a Gitea token from the
# Mosaic credential store at runtime so remote URLs never embed secrets.
#
# Install (one-time, per clone or globally):
# git config credential.helper "$HOME/.config/mosaic/tools/git/git-credential-mosaic"
# # or, fleet-wide: git config --global credential.helper "$HOME/.config/mosaic/tools/git/git-credential-mosaic"
#
# Per-agent Gate-16 identity (author != reviewer separation):
# Per-agent identity (Gate-16 author != reviewer separation):
# git config mosaic.gitIdentity <agent-id> # per-worktree, persists on disk
# # or: export MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY=<agent-id>
#
# Resolution priority: MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY env > git config mosaic.gitIdentity
# (per-worktree, survives across non-persistent shells) > git-supplied username
# (credential.username / URL). When the resolved identity has a matching
# per-agent token file, use it instead of the shared account. Backward
# compatible: nothing resolvable -> shared token (unchanged behavior).
# ── WHY THIS FAILS CLOSED ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# This helper used to end by emitting the shared account's token for any request
# it could not resolve to an identity. A seat with no identity, or with an
# identity whose token was never provisioned, therefore received the most
# privileged credential configured on the host — silently, and indistinguishably
# from correct operation. Every record it then created (commit, push, PR, review)
# was attributed to that shared account, so author != reviewer separation was
# unenforceable and the true actor was unrecoverable after the fact.
#
# Under-provisioning must fail loudly, not impersonate. A refused git operation
# is recoverable in one command; a merged pull request attributed to the wrong
# principal is not.
#
# ── CONTRACT ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# identity : MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY > git config mosaic.gitIdentity > the
# username git supplies on stdin
# store : chosen by what the identity IS, with no precedence and no
# cross-store fallback (see "Credential store selection" below)
# hit : emit username + password, exit 0
# miss : emit NOTHING, spool a durable escalation record, explain on
# stderr, exit 1 — git surfaces the failure and nothing is attributed
# unknown host : exit 0 with no output, no record (passthrough for non-Mosaic
# remotes handled by another helper)
#
# Backward compatibility is preserved for exactly one case: a host with no fleet
# and no identity requested still gets the shared account, because on such a host
# the shared account is the operator's own and there is no attribution to lose.
# A host that HAS a fleet has agents whose records must be distinguishable, so
# the shared fallback is refused there.
#
# A token is never written to stderr, to the escalation record, or to any log.
[ "$1" = "get" ] || exit 0
host=""; username_in=""
while IFS= read -r line; do
[ -z "$line" ] && break
@@ -24,46 +51,170 @@ while IFS= read -r line; do
username=*) username_in=${line#username=};;
esac
done
# Per-agent identity resolution (Gate-16 author≠reviewer separation).
# Priority: MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY env > git config mosaic.gitIdentity (per-worktree,
# survives across non-persistent shells) > git-supplied username (credential.username
# / URL). When the resolved identity has a matching per-agent token, use it instead of
# the shared account. Backward-compatible: nothing resolvable → shared token.
ident="$MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY"
[ -z "$ident" ] && ident=$(git config --get mosaic.gitIdentity 2>/dev/null)
[ -z "$ident" ] && ident="$username_in"
if [ -n "$ident" ]; then
case "$host" in
git.uscllc.com) idpfx=gitea-usc;;
git.mosaicstack.dev) idpfx=gitea-mosaicstack;;
*) idpfx="";;
esac
if [ -n "$idpfx" ]; then
idtok="$HOME/.config/mosaic/secrets/gitea-tokens/${idpfx}-${ident}.token"
if [ -r "$idtok" ]; then
echo "username=${ident}"
echo "password=$(cat "$idtok")"
exit 0
fi
fi
fi
# Recognized Gitea hosts carry the per-identity token scheme. Anything else is
# declined quietly — another helper owns it, and refusing would break it.
case "$host" in
git.uscllc.com) svc=gitea-usc;;
git.mosaicstack.dev) svc=gitea-mosaicstack;;
git.uscllc.com) idpfx=gitea-usc;;
git.mosaicstack.dev) idpfx=gitea-mosaicstack;;
*) exit 0;;
esac
# Script-relative (not $HOME-absolute) so this resolves correctly regardless
# of where the framework installer places tools/ under $HOME — mirrors
# detect-platform.sh's own cred_loader resolution in this same directory.
script_dir="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
# shellcheck source=../_lib/credentials.sh
source "$script_dir/../_lib/credentials.sh"
load_credentials "$svc" >/dev/null 2>&1 || exit 0
# GITEA_USER is not populated by load_credentials (it only exports
# GITEA_URL/GITEA_TOKEN for gitea-*), so this fallback is normally taken. Gitea's
# git-over-HTTP auth authenticates from the token itself (the password field),
# not from the username string, so any non-empty placeholder works here — this
# is deliberately NOT a real account name (framework files must stay
# operator-agnostic; see tools/quality/scripts/verify-sanitized.sh).
echo "username=${GITEA_USER:-git}"
echo "password=$GITEA_TOKEN"
ident="$MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY"; ident_src="MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY"
if [ -z "$ident" ]; then
ident=$(git config --get mosaic.gitIdentity 2>/dev/null)
ident_src="git config mosaic.gitIdentity"
fi
if [ -z "$ident" ]; then
ident="$username_in"
ident_src="the username git supplied"
fi
# ── Credential store selection ────────────────────────────────────────────────
# An identity is a SEAT or it is a SERVICE, and which one it is determines where
# its credential lives. There is no precedence rule between the two stores and no
# fallback from one to the other: a seat whose slot is empty fails closed rather
# than reading a service credential that happens to share its name.
#
# seat — <brain>/fleet/agents/<ident>/ exists
# credential at <brain>/fleet/agents/<ident>/secrets/<idpfx>-<ident>.token
# service — it does not
# credential at ~/.config/mosaic/secrets/gitea-tokens/<idpfx>-<ident>.token
#
# One credential, one location. Two copies of one credential diverge, and the
# stale copy fails in a way that reads as a revoked token rather than as drift.
#
# Brain-home resolution mirrors packages/mosaic/src/fleet/brain-home.ts and
# tools/fleet/start-agent-session.sh: MOSAIC_BRAIN_HOME wins, else ~/.mosaic.
brain_home="${MOSAIC_BRAIN_HOME:-$HOME/.mosaic}"
svc_store="$HOME/.config/mosaic/secrets/gitea-tokens"
idtok=""; ident_kind=""
if [ -n "$ident" ]; then
if [ -d "$brain_home/fleet/agents/$ident" ]; then
ident_kind="seat"
idtok="$brain_home/fleet/agents/$ident/secrets/${idpfx}-${ident}.token"
else
ident_kind="service identity"
idtok="$svc_store/${idpfx}-${ident}.token"
fi
if [ -r "$idtok" ]; then
echo "username=${ident}"
echo "password=$(cat "$idtok")"
exit 0
fi
fi
# ── Shared-account fallback: ONLY on a host with no fleet and no identity ──────
# `fleet/agents` existing is the same signal brain-home.ts uses to decide a brain
# is active. Where there are seats, records must be attributable, so an
# unresolvable request is refused instead of borrowing the shared account.
fleet_present=0
[ -d "$brain_home/fleet/agents" ] && fleet_present=1
if [ -z "$ident" ] && [ "$fleet_present" -eq 0 ]; then
script_dir="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
# shellcheck source=../_lib/credentials.sh
source "$script_dir/../_lib/credentials.sh"
load_credentials "$idpfx" >/dev/null 2>&1 || exit 0
# GITEA_USER is not populated by load_credentials (it exports GITEA_URL and
# GITEA_TOKEN only). Gitea's git-over-HTTP auth authenticates from the token in
# the password field, not from the username string, so any non-empty
# placeholder works — deliberately NOT a real account name, since framework
# files stay operator-agnostic (tools/quality/scripts/verify-sanitized.sh).
echo "username=${GITEA_USER:-git}"
echo "password=$GITEA_TOKEN"
exit 0
fi
# ── FAIL CLOSED ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
if [ -z "$ident" ]; then
reason="no-identity"
else
reason="no-token-for-identity"
fi
seat="${MOSAIC_AGENT_NAME:-unknown}"
ts=$(date -u +%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ)
# The escalation RECORD is durable and unconditional; any notification built on
# top of it is best-effort. Record and alert are deduplicated separately — a cap
# on the alert alone lets the spool grow without bound exactly while the operator
# is being told nothing, so the louder the failure the quieter it gets.
#
# A record field is arbitrary operator-supplied text: an identity comes from git
# config or the environment, and cwd is whatever directory git ran in. Either can
# contain a quote or a backslash, which would make the line unparseable JSON --
# and a spool that silently stops parsing is worse than no spool, because the
# operator only discovers it while reading the record that explains an outage.
json_escape() {
local s=$1
s=${s//\\/\\\\}
s=${s//\"/\\\"}
s=${s//$'\t'/\\t}
s=${s//$'\r'/\\r}
s=${s//$'\n'/\\n}
printf '%s' "$s"
}
spool="${MOSAIC_CREDENTIAL_SPOOL:-$HOME/.local/state/mosaic-credential-escalations}"
spool_record=""
if mkdir -p "$spool" 2>/dev/null; then
chmod 700 "$spool" 2>/dev/null
spoolfile="$spool/$(date -u +%Y%m%d).jsonl"
dedupe="$spool/.spooled-${seat}-${ident:-none}-${reason}-$(date -u +%Y%m%d%H%M)"
if [ ! -e "$dedupe" ]; then
: > "$dedupe" 2>/dev/null
printf '{"ts":"%s","reason":"%s","identity":"%s","identity_source":"%s","kind":"%s","seat":"%s","host":"%s","cwd":"%s"}\n' \
"$(json_escape "$ts")" "$(json_escape "$reason")" \
"$(json_escape "${ident:-<unset>}")" "$(json_escape "$ident_src")" \
"$(json_escape "${ident_kind:-none}")" "$(json_escape "$seat")" \
"$(json_escape "$host")" "$(json_escape "$PWD")" \
>> "$spoolfile" 2>/dev/null
chmod 600 "$spoolfile" 2>/dev/null
fi
# Name the record only if one is actually on disk. Printing the path
# unconditionally sends the operator to a file that does not exist on exactly
# the hosts where the spool could not be created.
[ -s "$spoolfile" ] && spool_record="$spoolfile"
find "$spool" -maxdepth 1 -name '.spooled-*' -mmin +120 -delete 2>/dev/null
fi
cat >&2 <<EOF
git-credential-mosaic: REFUSED (fail-closed).
host : ${host}
identity : ${ident:-<unset>}${ident:+ (from ${ident_src}; resolved as a ${ident_kind})}
reason : ${reason}
EOF
if [ -n "$ident" ]; then
cat >&2 <<EOF
expected : ${idtok}
EOF
fi
cat >&2 <<EOF
No per-identity credential resolved. This helper does NOT fall back to the shared
account: that fallback makes every record it creates attributable to one
principal, which is unrecoverable once a pull request has merged under it.
Fix (pick one):
export MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY=<agent-id> # process-scoped
git config mosaic.gitIdentity <agent-id> # per-repo/worktree, persists
Then provision that identity's credential at the path named above. An identity
with a directory under \${MOSAIC_BRAIN_HOME:-\$HOME/.mosaic}/fleet/agents/ is a
seat and is read ONLY from its own secrets/ slot; any other identity is read from
~/.config/mosaic/secrets/gitea-tokens/. There is no fallback between the two.
If this identity legitimately needs git access and has none, ask the orchestrator
to provision one.
EOF
if [ -n "$spool_record" ]; then
echo " record: ${spool_record}" >&2
else
echo " record: NOT WRITTEN — spool unavailable at ${spool}" >&2
fi
exit 1
@@ -1,16 +1,26 @@
#!/usr/bin/env bash
# Regression harness for `git-credential-mosaic` — per-agent Gitea identity
# resolution (Gate-16 author≠reviewer separation).
# resolution (Gate-16 author≠reviewer separation) and fail-closed refusal.
#
# Covers:
# 1. Identity resolution priority: MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY env > git config
# mosaic.gitIdentity (per-worktree) > git-supplied username.
# 2. Correct per-slot token file path chosen per host
# 2. Correct token file path chosen per host
# (gitea-usc-<id>.token vs gitea-mosaicstack-<id>.token).
# 3. Per-slot token present -> emits that identity + token.
# 4. Per-slot token absent -> falls back to the shared account
# (backward-compat / no-op for hosts without per-slot tokens).
# 5. Unknown/unrelated host -> exits 0 with no output (passthrough).
# 3. Credential store selection: an identity with a directory under
# <brain>/fleet/agents/ is a SEAT and is read ONLY from its own secrets/
# slot; any other identity is a SERVICE and is read from the framework
# store. No precedence between them and NO fallback from one to the other.
# 4. Fail-closed: an identity that resolves but has no credential is REFUSED —
# no output, nonzero exit, a stderr diagnostic, and a durable spool record.
# The shared account is never emitted in its place.
# 5. Fail-closed: no identity resolvable on a host that runs a fleet is also
# REFUSED, because records made there must name the agent that made them.
# 6. Backward compatibility, the one surviving fallback: no identity AND no
# fleet -> shared account, unchanged. On such a host the shared account is
# the operator's own and there is no attribution to lose.
# 7. Unknown/unrelated host -> exits 0 with no output (passthrough).
# 8. Non-"get" verb -> exits 0 with no output.
#
# Uses stubbed token files under a fake HOME + a real (throwaway) git repo.
# NEVER reads real secrets or touches the real ~/.config/mosaic/secrets.
@@ -21,6 +31,9 @@ SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
WORK_DIR="${MOSAIC_TEST_WORK_DIR:-$PWD/.mosaic-test-work/git-credential-mosaic}"
FAKE_HOME="$WORK_DIR/home"
REPO_DIR="$WORK_DIR/repo"
BRAIN_DIR="$WORK_DIR/brain"
SPOOL_DIR="$WORK_DIR/spool"
SVC_STORE="$FAKE_HOME/.config/mosaic/secrets/gitea-tokens"
# Mirror the real deployed layout (~/.config/mosaic/tools/{git,_lib}/) under the
# fake HOME: git-credential-mosaic resolves its credentials.sh sibling via a
# script-relative path (BASH_SOURCE), so the copy must live next to a stubbed
@@ -28,10 +41,10 @@ REPO_DIR="$WORK_DIR/repo"
HELPER="$FAKE_HOME/.config/mosaic/tools/git/git-credential-mosaic"
rm -rf "$WORK_DIR"
mkdir -p "$FAKE_HOME/.config/mosaic/secrets/gitea-tokens" \
mkdir -p "$SVC_STORE" \
"$FAKE_HOME/.config/mosaic/tools/git" \
"$FAKE_HOME/.config/mosaic/tools/_lib" \
"$REPO_DIR"
"$REPO_DIR" "$BRAIN_DIR"
cp "$SCRIPT_DIR/git-credential-mosaic" "$HELPER"
chmod +x "$HELPER"
@@ -68,7 +81,8 @@ run_helper() {
local host="$1" username_in="$2"; shift 2
(
cd "$REPO_DIR"
env -i HOME="$FAKE_HOME" PATH="$PATH" "$@" bash "$HELPER" get <<EOF
env -i HOME="$FAKE_HOME" PATH="$PATH" MOSAIC_CREDENTIAL_SPOOL="$SPOOL_DIR" "$@" \
bash "$HELPER" get <<EOF
host=$host
username=$username_in
@@ -76,20 +90,61 @@ EOF
)
}
# A refusal must be observable in four independent ways: nonzero exit, EMPTY
# stdout, a stderr diagnostic naming the identity and host, and — the assertion
# that actually catches a regression to the old behavior — NO shared token value
# anywhere in the output. Checking only the exit code would pass against a helper
# that emitted the shared credential and then exited 1.
assert_fail_closed() {
local desc="$1" host="$2" username_in="$3" want_in_stderr="$4"; shift 4
local stderr_file="$WORK_DIR/stderr.tmp"
: > "$stderr_file"
set +e
local stdout
stdout=$(run_helper "$host" "$username_in" "$@" 2>"$stderr_file")
local rc=$?
set -e
local stderr
stderr=$(cat "$stderr_file")
if [[ "$rc" -eq 0 ]]; then
echo "FAIL: $desc — expected nonzero exit, got 0 (stdout='$stdout')" >&2
fail=1
fi
if [[ -n "$stdout" ]]; then
echo "FAIL: $desc — expected empty stdout (nothing emitted), got '$stdout'" >&2
fail=1
fi
if [[ "$stdout$stderr" == *"shared-mosaicstack-token"* || "$stdout$stderr" == *"shared-usc-token"* ]]; then
echo "FAIL: $desc — a SHARED token value appeared in the output. The shared-account fallback must be gone:" >&2
echo "$stdout$stderr" >&2
fail=1
fi
if [[ -n "$want_in_stderr" && "$stderr" != *"$want_in_stderr"* ]]; then
echo "FAIL: $desc — stderr does not contain '$want_in_stderr':" >&2
echo "$stderr" >&2
fail=1
fi
if [[ "$stderr" != *"$host"* ]]; then
echo "FAIL: $desc — stderr does not name the host '$host':" >&2
echo "$stderr" >&2
fail=1
fi
}
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# 1. No identity resolvable anywhere, no per-slot token -> shared fallback
# (backward-compat: unchanged behavior when nothing is configured).
# 1. Backward compatibility: nothing resolvable, and NO fleet on this host ->
# shared account, unchanged. This is the only surviving fallback.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
git -C "$REPO_DIR" config --unset mosaic.gitIdentity 2>/dev/null || true
out=$(run_helper "git.mosaicstack.dev" "")
assert_eq "shared fallback: username" "username=git" "$(echo "$out" | grep '^username=')"
assert_eq "shared fallback: password" "password=shared-mosaicstack-token" "$(echo "$out" | grep '^password=')"
assert_eq "no identity + no fleet: username" "username=git" "$(echo "$out" | grep '^username=')"
assert_eq "no identity + no fleet: password" "password=shared-mosaicstack-token" "$(echo "$out" | grep '^password=')"
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# 2. git-supplied username resolves to an identity WITH a per-slot token ->
# that identity + token wins over the shared account.
# 2. git-supplied username resolves to a SERVICE identity WITH a token in the
# framework store -> that identity + token wins over the shared account.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
echo -n "agentA-mosaicstack-token" > "$FAKE_HOME/.config/mosaic/secrets/gitea-tokens/gitea-mosaicstack-agentA.token"
echo -n "agentA-mosaicstack-token" > "$SVC_STORE/gitea-mosaicstack-agentA.token"
out=$(run_helper "git.mosaicstack.dev" "agentA")
assert_eq "username-resolved identity: username" "username=agentA" "$(echo "$out" | grep '^username=')"
assert_eq "username-resolved identity: password" "password=agentA-mosaicstack-token" "$(echo "$out" | grep '^password=')"
@@ -97,7 +152,7 @@ assert_eq "username-resolved identity: password" "password=agentA-mosaicstack-to
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# 3. git config mosaic.gitIdentity (per-worktree) beats git-supplied username.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
echo -n "agentB-mosaicstack-token" > "$FAKE_HOME/.config/mosaic/secrets/gitea-tokens/gitea-mosaicstack-agentB.token"
echo -n "agentB-mosaicstack-token" > "$SVC_STORE/gitea-mosaicstack-agentB.token"
git -C "$REPO_DIR" config mosaic.gitIdentity agentB
out=$(run_helper "git.mosaicstack.dev" "agentA")
assert_eq "git-config beats username: username" "username=agentB" "$(echo "$out" | grep '^username=')"
@@ -106,54 +161,210 @@ assert_eq "git-config beats username: password" "password=agentB-mosaicstack-tok
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# 4. MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY env beats git config mosaic.gitIdentity.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
echo -n "agentC-mosaicstack-token" > "$FAKE_HOME/.config/mosaic/secrets/gitea-tokens/gitea-mosaicstack-agentC.token"
echo -n "agentC-mosaicstack-token" > "$SVC_STORE/gitea-mosaicstack-agentC.token"
out=$(run_helper "git.mosaicstack.dev" "agentA" MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY=agentC)
assert_eq "env beats git-config: username" "username=agentC" "$(echo "$out" | grep '^username=')"
assert_eq "env beats git-config: password" "password=agentC-mosaicstack-token" "$(echo "$out" | grep '^password=')"
git -C "$REPO_DIR" config --unset mosaic.gitIdentity
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# 5. Identity resolves, but no matching per-slot token file -> falls back to
# the shared account (per-agent identity is opt-in, not a hard requirement).
# 5. Correct token PATH is chosen per host: same agent id, different host
# prefix (gitea-usc- vs gitea-mosaicstack-).
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
out=$(run_helper "git.mosaicstack.dev" "no-such-agent")
assert_eq "no per-slot token: username" "username=git" "$(echo "$out" | grep '^username=')"
assert_eq "no per-slot token: password" "password=shared-mosaicstack-token" "$(echo "$out" | grep '^password=')"
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# 6. Correct per-slot token PATH is chosen per host: same agent id, different
# host prefix (gitea-usc- vs gitea-mosaicstack-).
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
echo -n "agentD-usc-token" > "$FAKE_HOME/.config/mosaic/secrets/gitea-tokens/gitea-usc-agentD.token"
echo -n "agentD-usc-token" > "$SVC_STORE/gitea-usc-agentD.token"
out=$(run_helper "git.uscllc.com" "agentD")
assert_eq "host-scoped token path (usc): username" "username=agentD" "$(echo "$out" | grep '^username=')"
assert_eq "host-scoped token path (usc): password" "password=agentD-usc-token" "$(echo "$out" | grep '^password=')"
# agentD has NO mosaicstack token -> must fall back to shared mosaicstack, not
# leak the usc token across hosts.
out=$(run_helper "git.mosaicstack.dev" "agentD")
assert_eq "host-scoped token path (cross-host must not leak): username" "username=git" "$(echo "$out" | grep '^username=')"
assert_eq "host-scoped token path (cross-host must not leak): password" "password=shared-mosaicstack-token" "$(echo "$out" | grep '^password=')"
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# 7. Unrelated/unknown host -> exit 0, no output (passthrough for non-Gitea
# remotes, e.g. github.com via a different credential helper).
# 6. FAIL CLOSED — identity resolves, no credential for it on this host. Must
# NOT borrow the shared account, and must NOT leak the same agent's token
# for a DIFFERENT host (agentD holds a usc token and no mosaicstack one).
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
assert_fail_closed "cross-host absence refuses (no shared fallback, no cross-host leak)" \
"git.mosaicstack.dev" "agentD" "gitea-mosaicstack-agentD.token"
# The agent's own usc token must not appear either.
: > "$WORK_DIR/stderr.tmp"
set +e
leak_out=$(run_helper "git.mosaicstack.dev" "agentD" 2>"$WORK_DIR/stderr.tmp")
set -e
if [[ "$leak_out$(cat "$WORK_DIR/stderr.tmp")" == *"agentD-usc-token"* ]]; then
echo "FAIL: cross-host leak — the usc token value appeared on a mosaicstack request" >&2
fail=1
fi
assert_fail_closed "unknown identity refuses (shared account never substituted)" \
"git.mosaicstack.dev" "no-such-agent" "no-token-for-identity"
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# 7. A refusal leaves a durable spool record, and that record contains no token.
# The stderr diagnostic is transient; the record is what an operator reads
# afterwards, so it must exist independently of anyone watching the terminal.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
spool_file=$(find "$SPOOL_DIR" -maxdepth 1 -name '*.jsonl' | head -n 1)
if [[ -z "$spool_file" ]]; then
echo "FAIL: fail-closed left no spool record under $SPOOL_DIR" >&2
fail=1
else
spool_body=$(cat "$spool_file")
assert_eq "spool record names the refused identity" "1" \
"$(grep -c '"identity":"no-such-agent"' "$spool_file" | head -n 1)"
if [[ "$spool_body" == *"shared-"*"-token"* || "$spool_body" == *"agentD-usc-token"* ]]; then
echo "FAIL: spool record contains a token value:" >&2
echo "$spool_body" >&2
fail=1
fi
fi
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# 8. SEAT identity: an id with a directory under <brain>/fleet/agents/ is read
# from its OWN secrets/ slot, not from the framework store.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
mkdir -p "$BRAIN_DIR/fleet/agents/seatE/secrets"
echo -n "seatE-slot-token" > "$BRAIN_DIR/fleet/agents/seatE/secrets/gitea-mosaicstack-seatE.token"
out=$(run_helper "git.mosaicstack.dev" "seatE" MOSAIC_BRAIN_HOME="$BRAIN_DIR")
assert_eq "seat reads its own slot: username" "username=seatE" "$(echo "$out" | grep '^username=')"
assert_eq "seat reads its own slot: password" "password=seatE-slot-token" "$(echo "$out" | grep '^password=')"
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# 9. NO CROSS-STORE FALLBACK — the assertion this whole store-selection design
# exists for. seatF is a seat (it has a directory) with an EMPTY slot, while
# a framework-store token of the identical name is present and readable.
# The helper must refuse rather than read it: one credential, one location,
# and a seat that reads a same-named service credential is exactly the
# silent-substitution failure the fail-closed rule removes.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
mkdir -p "$BRAIN_DIR/fleet/agents/seatF/secrets"
echo -n "seatF-SERVICE-STORE-token" > "$SVC_STORE/gitea-mosaicstack-seatF.token"
assert_fail_closed "seat with empty slot does NOT fall back to the framework store" \
"git.mosaicstack.dev" "seatF" "fleet/agents/seatF/secrets" MOSAIC_BRAIN_HOME="$BRAIN_DIR"
: > "$WORK_DIR/stderr.tmp"
set +e
xstore_out=$(run_helper "git.mosaicstack.dev" "seatF" MOSAIC_BRAIN_HOME="$BRAIN_DIR" 2>"$WORK_DIR/stderr.tmp")
set -e
if [[ "$xstore_out$(cat "$WORK_DIR/stderr.tmp")" == *"seatF-SERVICE-STORE-token"* ]]; then
echo "FAIL: cross-store fallback — a seat read the framework store's same-named token" >&2
fail=1
fi
# Control: that framework-store token IS readable, so the refusal above is the
# store rule firing and not an unreadable file. A non-seat identity pointed at
# the same file gets it.
out=$(run_helper "git.mosaicstack.dev" "seatF" MOSAIC_BRAIN_HOME="$WORK_DIR/no-such-brain")
assert_eq "control — same file IS readable for a non-seat identity" \
"password=seatF-SERVICE-STORE-token" "$(echo "$out" | grep '^password=')"
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# 10. FAIL CLOSED — no identity resolvable, but this host runs a fleet. Where
# seats exist, an unattributable request is refused instead of receiving
# the shared account. Contrast with case 1, which is the same request on a
# host with no fleet and still returns the shared account.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
git -C "$REPO_DIR" config --unset mosaic.gitIdentity 2>/dev/null || true
assert_fail_closed "no identity on a fleet host refuses" \
"git.mosaicstack.dev" "" "no-identity" MOSAIC_BRAIN_HOME="$BRAIN_DIR"
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# 11. The brain home defaults to ~/.mosaic when MOSAIC_BRAIN_HOME is unset —
# the fleet gate must fire on the default path too, not only on an
# explicitly injected one. Case 1 ran before this directory existed; the
# same call now refuses, which also proves case 1 was measuring the
# no-fleet branch rather than passing for an unrelated reason.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
mkdir -p "$FAKE_HOME/.mosaic/fleet/agents"
assert_fail_closed "fleet gate fires on the default ~/.mosaic brain home" \
"git.mosaicstack.dev" "" "no-identity"
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# 12. Unrelated/unknown host -> exit 0, no output (passthrough for non-Gitea
# remotes, e.g. github.com via a different credential helper). A fleet host
# must not refuse a host this helper does not own.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
out=$(run_helper "github.com" "agentA")
assert_eq "unknown host: no output" "" "$out"
out=$(run_helper "github.com" "" MOSAIC_BRAIN_HOME="$BRAIN_DIR")
assert_eq "unknown host on a fleet host: still passthrough, not a refusal" "" "$out"
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# 8. Non-"get" verb (store/erase) -> exit 0, no output (git-credential
# protocol: this helper only implements get).
# 13. Non-"get" verb (store/erase) -> exit 0, no output (git-credential
# protocol: this helper only implements get).
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
store_out=$(cd "$REPO_DIR" && env -i HOME="$FAKE_HOME" PATH="$PATH" bash "$HELPER" store <<EOF
host=git.mosaicstack.dev
username=agentA
username=no-such-agent
password=whatever
EOF
)
assert_eq "store verb: no output" "" "$store_out"
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# 14. The escalation record is machine-readable even when a field carries a
# quote or a backslash. A cwd is arbitrary operator text; an unescaped one
# silently turns the spool into unparseable JSONL, and the operator only
# finds out while reading the record that explains an outage.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
hostile_dir="$WORK_DIR/we\"ird\\dir"
mkdir -p "$hostile_dir"
hostile_spool="$WORK_DIR/spool-hostile"
(
cd "$hostile_dir"
env -i HOME="$FAKE_HOME" PATH="$PATH" MOSAIC_CREDENTIAL_SPOOL="$hostile_spool" \
MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY=no-such-agent \
bash "$HELPER" get <<EOF >/dev/null 2>&1
host=git.mosaicstack.dev
username=no-such-agent
EOF
) || true
# Deliberately not `ls ... | head -1`: under `set -o pipefail` a missed glob
# makes ls exit 2, the pipeline inherits it, and `set -e` kills this suite with
# zero output — the same silent-nonzero failure this file exists to catch.
record_file=""
for candidate in "$hostile_spool"/*.jsonl; do
if [[ -e "$candidate" ]]; then
record_file="$candidate"
break
fi
done
if [[ -z "$record_file" ]]; then
echo "FAIL: hostile cwd — no escalation record was written at all" >&2
fail=1
elif ! python3 -c 'import json,sys
for line in open(sys.argv[1]):
line = line.strip()
if line:
json.loads(line)' "$record_file" 2>/dev/null; then
echo "FAIL: hostile cwd — escalation record is not parseable JSONL:" >&2
cat "$record_file" >&2
fail=1
fi
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# 15. When the spool cannot be created, the diagnostic must NOT name a record
# path. Naming a file that was never written sends the operator to an
# empty path on exactly the hosts where the escalation was lost.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
unwritable_spool="/proc/mosaic-credential-spool-cannot-exist"
nospool_err=$(
cd "$REPO_DIR"
env -i HOME="$FAKE_HOME" PATH="$PATH" MOSAIC_CREDENTIAL_SPOOL="$unwritable_spool" \
MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY=no-such-agent \
bash "$HELPER" get <<EOF 2>&1 >/dev/null
host=git.mosaicstack.dev
username=no-such-agent
EOF
) || true
if [[ "$nospool_err" == *"record: $unwritable_spool/"* ]]; then
echo "FAIL: unwritable spool — diagnostic names a record file that was never written" >&2
fail=1
fi
if [[ "$nospool_err" != *"NOT WRITTEN"* ]]; then
echo "FAIL: unwritable spool — diagnostic does not say the record was not written" >&2
echo "$nospool_err" >&2
fail=1
fi
if [[ "$fail" -eq 0 ]]; then
echo "git-credential-mosaic identity resolution regression passed"
fi
@@ -23,6 +23,17 @@
# 6. Scope containment: identity requested + an UNRECOGNIZED Gitea host (no
# per-slot token scheme) -> Patch 2b does not apply; existing
# fall-through behavior is unchanged.
# 7. Credential store selection: an identity with a directory under
# <brain>/fleet/agents/ is a SEAT and is read ONLY from its own secrets/
# slot; any other identity is a SERVICE and is read from the framework
# store. No precedence between them and NO fallback from one to the
# other — a seat with an empty slot is REFUSED even when a same-named
# token sits in the framework store.
# 8. Fail loud when NO identity resolves on a host that runs a fleet: where
# seats exist, an unattributable API call is refused rather than made
# under the shared account. On a host with no fleet the same call still
# returns the shared token (case 1), which is what keeps this change a
# no-op for non-fleet operators of the framework.
#
# Uses a stubbed credentials.json + stubbed per-slot token files under a fake
# HOME. NEVER reads real secrets or touches the real ~/.config/mosaic/secrets.
@@ -210,6 +221,94 @@ if [[ "$err" == *"no per-slot token at"* ]]; then
fi
git -C "$REPO_DIR" config --unset mosaic.gitIdentity
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# 7. SEAT identity: an id with a directory under <brain>/fleet/agents/ is read
# from its OWN secrets/ slot, not from the framework store. The brain home
# is resolved exactly as packages/mosaic/src/fleet/brain-home.ts does it:
# MOSAIC_BRAIN_HOME, else ~/.mosaic.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
BRAIN_DIR="$WORK_DIR/brain"
mkdir -p "$BRAIN_DIR/fleet/agents/seatE/secrets"
echo -n "seatE-slot-token" > "$BRAIN_DIR/fleet/agents/seatE/secrets/gitea-mosaicstack-seatE.token"
out=$(call_get_gitea_token "git.mosaicstack.dev" MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY=seatE MOSAIC_BRAIN_HOME="$BRAIN_DIR")
assert_eq "seat reads its own slot" "seatE-slot-token" "$out"
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# 8. NO CROSS-STORE FALLBACK. seatF is a seat (it has a directory) with an
# EMPTY slot, while a framework-store token of the identical name is
# present and readable. It must be REFUSED rather than served that token:
# one credential, one location. A seat that silently reads a same-named
# service credential is the same substitution failure as the shared-account
# fallback, one store further down.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
mkdir -p "$BRAIN_DIR/fleet/agents/seatF/secrets"
echo -n "seatF-SERVICE-STORE-token" > "$FAKE_HOME/.config/mosaic/secrets/gitea-tokens/gitea-mosaicstack-seatF.token"
assert_failloud "seat with empty slot does NOT fall back to the framework store" \
"git.mosaicstack.dev" "seatF" \
"$BRAIN_DIR/fleet/agents/seatF/secrets/gitea-mosaicstack-seatF.token" \
MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY=seatF MOSAIC_BRAIN_HOME="$BRAIN_DIR"
# assert_failloud only screens stderr for the word "shared"; this store's token
# is not named that, so check for its value explicitly.
set +e
xstore_out=$(call_get_gitea_token "git.mosaicstack.dev" MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY=seatF MOSAIC_BRAIN_HOME="$BRAIN_DIR" 2>"$WORK_DIR/stderr-xstore.tmp")
set -e
if [[ "$xstore_out$(cat "$WORK_DIR/stderr-xstore.tmp")" == *"seatF-SERVICE-STORE-token"* ]]; then
echo "FAIL: cross-store fallback — a seat was served the framework store's same-named token" >&2
fail=1
fi
# Control: that framework-store token IS readable, so the refusal above is the
# store rule firing and not an unreadable file. The same id, resolved against a
# brain home where it is not a seat, gets it.
out=$(call_get_gitea_token "git.mosaicstack.dev" MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY=seatF MOSAIC_BRAIN_HOME="$WORK_DIR/no-such-brain")
assert_eq "control — same file IS readable for a non-seat identity" "seatF-SERVICE-STORE-token" "$out"
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# 9. FAIL LOUD — no identity resolvable, but this host runs a fleet. Contrast
# with case 1: the identical call on a host with no fleet still returns the
# shared token.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
git -C "$REPO_DIR" config --unset mosaic.gitIdentity 2>/dev/null || true
set +e
noid_out=$(call_get_gitea_token "git.mosaicstack.dev" MOSAIC_BRAIN_HOME="$BRAIN_DIR" 2>"$WORK_DIR/stderr-noid.tmp")
noid_rc=$?
set -e
noid_err=$(cat "$WORK_DIR/stderr-noid.tmp")
if [[ "$noid_rc" -eq 0 ]]; then
echo "FAIL: no identity on a fleet host — expected nonzero return, got 0 (stdout='$noid_out')" >&2
fail=1
fi
if [[ -n "$noid_out" ]]; then
echo "FAIL: no identity on a fleet host — expected empty stdout, got '$noid_out'" >&2
fail=1
fi
if [[ "$noid_out" == *"shared-mosaicstack-token"* || "$noid_err" == *"shared-mosaicstack-token"* ]]; then
echo "FAIL: no identity on a fleet host — the shared token was served anyway:" >&2
echo "$noid_out$noid_err" >&2
fail=1
fi
if [[ "$noid_err" != *"MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY"* ]]; then
echo "FAIL: no identity on a fleet host — stderr does not say how to set an identity:" >&2
echo "$noid_err" >&2
fail=1
fi
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# 10. The brain home defaults to ~/.mosaic when MOSAIC_BRAIN_HOME is unset —
# the fleet gate must fire on the default path too, not only on an
# explicitly injected one. Case 1 ran before this directory existed; the
# same call now refuses, which also proves case 1 was measuring the
# no-fleet branch rather than passing for an unrelated reason.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
mkdir -p "$FAKE_HOME/.mosaic/fleet/agents"
set +e
dflt_out=$(call_get_gitea_token "git.mosaicstack.dev" 2>"$WORK_DIR/stderr-dflt.tmp")
dflt_rc=$?
set -e
if [[ "$dflt_rc" -eq 0 || -n "$dflt_out" ]]; then
echo "FAIL: fleet gate did not fire on the default ~/.mosaic brain home (rc=$dflt_rc stdout='$dflt_out')" >&2
fail=1
fi
if [[ "$fail" -eq 0 ]]; then
echo "get_gitea_token identity resolution regression passed"
fi
+63
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
# @mosaicstack/quality-rails
Quality-rails scaffolding and — since RI-3-002 (RI-N4) — the **typed
quality-rails evaluator**: the single authoritative producer of check verdicts
for the checks it owns.
## Evaluator (RI-N4)
Every verdict is typed and fail-closed:
```
{ status: 'passed' | 'failed' | 'blocked' | 'error' | 'not-applicable',
checkId, checkVersion, subject, reason }
```
Missing implementations, missing inputs, unknown check ids, process errors,
timeouts, and malformed probe output can never become `passed` or an
unqualified skip — they surface as `blocked`/`error` with a reason (vocabulary
mirrors MACP's `GateStatus` discipline).
- Check definitions live as **data** with a version and a sha256 content
digest (`definitionDigest`); every recorded verdict names the definition
version that produced it.
- Check sets are selected **per subject kind** (`node`, `python`, `rust`,
`monorepo`, `unknown`) via the versioned, digested check-set policy — this
repository (a `monorepo` subject) does not share the node template's file
list.
- Shell probes stay **thin adapters**: the TS evaluator invokes them and owns
the verdict parsing (e.g. QC-20's planted-commit probe).
### Owned checks
| check id | canonical check | mechanism |
| --------------------------- | --------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| `qc-19-rails-files-present` | QC-19 | typed absorption of the former presence-only `check`/`doctor` loop |
| `qc-20-enforcement-verify` | QC-20 | thin shell adapter (framework `verify.sh`); verdict parsing owned here |
The canonical check ids QC-1..QC-21 and their dispositions are defined in
`docs/release-integrity/probe-inventory.md` (the RI-3-001 inventory — the
evaluator's input, not its output).
### Usage
```sh
# CLI (same typed report as the programmatic API)
node dist/cli.js quality-rails evaluate --project <path> [--probe-path <verify.sh>] [--json]
node dist/cli.js quality-rails check --project <path> [--json] # QC-19 only, fail-closed exit
```
```ts
import { evaluateSubject } from '@mosaicstack/quality-rails';
const report = await evaluateSubject({ subjectPath: '/path/to/project' });
// report.state: 'passed' | 'failed' | 'blocked' | 'error'
```
`pnpm verify:release` invokes this evaluator as its `quality-rails` stage
(canonical-only stage, QC-19 on the monorepo subject).
## Scaffolding (pre-existing)
`init` scaffolds rails files per detected kind/profile; `doctor` is advisory
and reports typed states.
@@ -0,0 +1,194 @@
import { mkdir, mkdtemp, writeFile, chmod } from 'node:fs/promises';
import { tmpdir } from 'node:os';
import { join } from 'node:path';
import { afterEach, beforeEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest';
import { createQualityRailsCli } from './cli.js';
import { QC_19_RAILS_FILES_PRESENT } from './evaluator/definitions.js';
import { evaluateSubject } from './evaluator/runner.js';
import type { EvaluationReport } from './evaluator/types.js';
// CLI ↔ programmatic contract (RI-3-002): the same subject must produce the
// same typed verdicts through every entry point the card adds — the
// `evaluate`/`check` CLI surfaces and the `evaluateSubject` API.
async function makeTempDir(): Promise<string> {
return mkdtemp(join(tmpdir(), 'qr-cli-'));
}
async function scaffoldNodeFixture(skip: string[] = []): Promise<string> {
const dir = await makeTempDir();
await writeFile(join(dir, 'package.json'), '{}\n', 'utf8');
for (const relativePath of [
'.eslintrc',
'biome.json',
'.githooks/pre-commit',
'PR-CHECKLIST.md',
]) {
if (skip.includes(relativePath)) continue;
await mkdir(join(dir, relativePath, '..'), { recursive: true });
await writeFile(join(dir, relativePath), 'fixture\n', 'utf8');
}
return dir;
}
async function makePassingProbe(dir: string): Promise<string> {
const scriptPath = join(dir, 'probe-pass.sh');
await writeFile(
scriptPath,
[
'#!/bin/bash',
'echo "✅ PASS: Type errors blocked"',
'echo "✅ PASS: Lint errors blocked"',
'echo "Verification Summary"',
'exit 0',
].join('\n') + '\n',
'utf8',
);
await chmod(scriptPath, 0o755);
return scriptPath;
}
describe('CLI entry points vs the programmatic evaluator', () => {
let logSpy: ReturnType<typeof vi.spyOn>;
let previousExitCode: string | number | undefined;
beforeEach(() => {
logSpy = vi.spyOn(console, 'log').mockImplementation(() => {});
previousExitCode = process.exitCode ?? undefined;
});
afterEach(() => {
logSpy.mockRestore();
process.exitCode = previousExitCode;
});
it('evaluate --json produces the SAME typed report as evaluateSubject (full check set + probe)', async () => {
const dir = await scaffoldNodeFixture();
const probePath = await makePassingProbe(dir);
const programmatic = await evaluateSubject({
subjectPath: dir,
inputs: { 'qc-20-enforcement-verify': { probePath } },
});
const program = createQualityRailsCli();
await program.parseAsync([
'node',
'cli.js',
'quality-rails',
'evaluate',
'--project',
dir,
'--probe-path',
probePath,
'--json',
]);
const printed = logSpy.mock.calls.map((call) => String(call[0])).join('\n');
const cliReport = JSON.parse(printed) as EvaluationReport;
expect(cliReport).toEqual(programmatic);
expect(cliReport.state).toBe('passed');
expect(process.exitCode).toBe(0);
});
it('check --json produces the SAME QC-19 verdict as evaluateSubject (absorbed loop)', async () => {
const dir = await scaffoldNodeFixture(['biome.json', '.githooks/pre-commit']);
const programmatic = await evaluateSubject({
subjectPath: dir,
checkIds: [QC_19_RAILS_FILES_PRESENT.id],
});
expect(programmatic.state).toBe('failed');
const program = createQualityRailsCli();
await program.parseAsync([
'node',
'cli.js',
'quality-rails',
'check',
'--project',
dir,
'--json',
]);
const printed = logSpy.mock.calls.map((call) => String(call[0])).join('\n');
const cliReport = JSON.parse(printed) as EvaluationReport;
expect(cliReport).toEqual(programmatic);
expect(process.exitCode).toBe(1);
});
it('check on a complete subject exits 0 with a passed verdict', async () => {
const dir = await scaffoldNodeFixture();
const program = createQualityRailsCli();
await program.parseAsync([
'node',
'cli.js',
'quality-rails',
'check',
'--project',
dir,
'--json',
]);
const printed = logSpy.mock.calls.map((call) => String(call[0])).join('\n');
const cliReport = JSON.parse(printed) as EvaluationReport;
expect(cliReport.state).toBe('passed');
expect(process.exitCode).toBe(0);
});
it('evaluate with an unknown check id exits 1 and reports error, never passed', async () => {
const dir = await scaffoldNodeFixture();
const program = createQualityRailsCli();
await program.parseAsync([
'node',
'cli.js',
'quality-rails',
'evaluate',
'--project',
dir,
'--check',
'qc-99-bogus',
'--json',
]);
const printed = logSpy.mock.calls.map((call) => String(call[0])).join('\n');
const cliReport = JSON.parse(printed) as EvaluationReport;
expect(cliReport.results).toHaveLength(1);
const first = cliReport.results[0];
expect(first?.status).toBe('error');
expect(first?.reason).toContain('unknown check id');
expect(process.exitCode).toBe(1);
});
it('evaluate on a scaffold subject without --probe-path stays fail-closed (blocked, exit 1)', async () => {
const dir = await scaffoldNodeFixture();
const program = createQualityRailsCli();
await program.parseAsync([
'node',
'cli.js',
'quality-rails',
'evaluate',
'--project',
dir,
'--json',
]);
const printed = logSpy.mock.calls.map((call) => String(call[0])).join('\n');
const cliReport = JSON.parse(printed) as EvaluationReport;
const qc20 = cliReport.results.find((r) => r.checkId === 'qc-20-enforcement-verify');
expect(qc20).toBeDefined();
expect(qc20?.status).toBe('blocked');
expect(qc20?.reason).toContain('probePath');
expect(cliReport.state).toBe('blocked');
expect(process.exitCode).toBe(1);
});
it('doctor stays advisory (no nonzero exit) but reports TYPED states, including blocked', async () => {
const dir = await scaffoldNodeFixture();
const program = createQualityRailsCli();
await program.parseAsync(['node', 'cli.js', 'quality-rails', 'doctor', '--project', dir]);
const printed = logSpy.mock.calls.map((call) => String(call[0])).join('\n');
expect(printed).toContain('blocked: qc-20-enforcement-verify');
expect(process.exitCode ?? 0).toBe(0);
});
});
+81 -54
View File
@@ -1,5 +1,3 @@
import { constants } from 'node:fs';
import { access } from 'node:fs/promises';
import { resolve } from 'node:path';
import { fileURLToPath } from 'node:url';
@@ -8,18 +6,12 @@ import { Command } from 'commander';
import { detectProjectKind } from './detect.js';
import { scaffoldQualityRails } from './scaffolder.js';
import type { ProjectKind, QualityProfile, RailsConfig } from './types.js';
import { QC_19_RAILS_FILES_PRESENT } from './evaluator/definitions.js';
import { evaluateSubject } from './evaluator/runner.js';
import type { EvaluationReport } from './evaluator/types.js';
const VALID_PROFILES: readonly QualityProfile[] = ['strict', 'standard', 'minimal'];
async function fileExists(filePath: string): Promise<boolean> {
try {
await access(filePath, constants.F_OK);
return true;
} catch {
return false;
}
}
function parseProfile(rawProfile: string): QualityProfile {
if (VALID_PROFILES.includes(rawProfile as QualityProfile)) {
return rawProfile as QualityProfile;
@@ -59,22 +51,6 @@ function defaultFormatters(kind: ProjectKind): string[] {
return [];
}
function expectedFilesForKind(kind: ProjectKind): string[] {
if (kind === 'node') {
return ['.eslintrc', 'biome.json', '.githooks/pre-commit', 'PR-CHECKLIST.md'];
}
if (kind === 'python') {
return ['pyproject.toml', '.githooks/pre-commit', 'PR-CHECKLIST.md'];
}
if (kind === 'rust') {
return ['rustfmt.toml', '.githooks/pre-commit', 'PR-CHECKLIST.md'];
}
return ['.githooks/pre-commit', 'PR-CHECKLIST.md'];
}
function printScaffoldResult(
config: RailsConfig,
filesWritten: string[],
@@ -106,6 +82,20 @@ function printScaffoldResult(
}
}
function printEvaluationReport(report: EvaluationReport): void {
console.log(
`[quality-rails] evaluation for ${report.subject.path} (kind=${report.subject.kind}, check-set v${report.checkSetVersion})`,
);
for (const result of report.results) {
const reason = result.reason === undefined ? '' : `${result.reason}`;
const digest = report.definitionDigests[result.checkId] ?? 'no digest';
console.log(
` - ${result.status}: ${result.checkId} (v${result.checkVersion} [${digest}])${reason}`,
);
}
console.log(`[quality-rails] aggregate: ${report.state}`);
}
/**
* Register quality-rails subcommands on an existing Commander program.
* This avoids cross-package Commander version mismatches by using the
@@ -148,56 +138,93 @@ function buildQualityRailsCommand(qualityRails: Command): void {
printScaffoldResult(config, result.filesWritten, result.warnings, result.commandsToRun);
});
// `check` (QC-19) is ABSORBED by the RI-N4 evaluator: the presence loop
// that lived here is now the versioned, digested, typed check definition
// `qc-19-rails-files-present`. The CLI keeps its human surface (missing
// files listed, exit 1) and gains `--json` for the typed verdicts. Exit
// code is fail-closed: any non-green aggregate (failed/blocked/error) is 1.
qualityRails
.command('check')
.requiredOption('--project <path>', 'Project path')
.action(async (options: { project: string }) => {
.option('--json', 'print the typed evaluation report as JSON')
.action(async (options: { project: string; json?: boolean }) => {
const projectPath = resolve(options.project);
const kind = await detectProjectKind(projectPath);
const expected = expectedFilesForKind(kind);
const missing: string[] = [];
const report = await evaluateSubject({
subjectPath: projectPath,
checkIds: [QC_19_RAILS_FILES_PRESENT.id],
});
for (const relativePath of expected) {
const exists = await fileExists(resolve(projectPath, relativePath));
if (!exists) {
missing.push(relativePath);
}
if (options.json) {
console.log(JSON.stringify(report));
} else {
printEvaluationReport(report);
}
if (missing.length > 0) {
console.error('[quality-rails] missing files:');
for (const relativePath of missing) {
console.error(` - ${relativePath}`);
}
process.exitCode = 1;
return;
}
console.log(`[quality-rails] all expected files present for ${kind} project`);
process.exitCode = report.state === 'passed' ? 0 : 1;
});
// `doctor` (QC-19) stays advisory (documented contract: a doctor that
// cannot fail), but now reports TYPED states — a blocked or failing rail is
// visible instead of silently printed as `ok`/`missing`.
qualityRails
.command('doctor')
.requiredOption('--project <path>', 'Project path')
.action(async (options: { project: string }) => {
const projectPath = resolve(options.project);
const kind = await detectProjectKind(projectPath);
const expected = expectedFilesForKind(kind);
const report = await evaluateSubject({ subjectPath: projectPath });
console.log(`[quality-rails] doctor for ${projectPath}`);
console.log(`detected project kind: ${kind}`);
for (const relativePath of expected) {
const exists = await fileExists(resolve(projectPath, relativePath));
console.log(` - ${exists ? 'ok' : 'missing'}: ${relativePath}`);
console.log(`detected project kind: ${report.subject.kind}`);
for (const result of report.results) {
const reason = result.reason === undefined ? '' : `${result.reason}`;
console.log(` - ${result.status}: ${result.checkId}${reason}`);
}
if (kind === 'unknown') {
if (report.subject.kind === 'unknown') {
console.log(
'recommendation: add package.json, pyproject.toml, or Cargo.toml for better defaults.',
);
}
});
// `evaluate` is the canonical RI-N4 evaluator entry point: typed verdicts
// for the subject's full per-kind check set, same results as the
// programmatic API (evaluateSubject).
qualityRails
.command('evaluate')
.description('Run the typed quality-rails evaluator against a subject project')
.requiredOption('--project <path>', 'Project path')
.option('--check <id...>', 'restrict evaluation to these check ids')
.option(
'--probe-path <path>',
'path to the QC-20 behavioral probe script (framework verify.sh)',
)
.option('--json', 'print the typed evaluation report as JSON')
.action(
async (options: {
project: string;
check?: string[];
probePath?: string;
json?: boolean;
}) => {
const projectPath = resolve(options.project);
const report = await evaluateSubject({
subjectPath: projectPath,
checkIds: options.check,
inputs: options.probePath
? { 'qc-20-enforcement-verify': { probePath: options.probePath } }
: undefined,
});
if (options.json) {
console.log(JSON.stringify(report));
} else {
printEvaluationReport(report);
}
process.exitCode = report.state === 'passed' ? 0 : 1;
},
);
}
export async function runQualityRailsCli(argv: string[] = process.argv): Promise<void> {
@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
import { spawn } from 'node:child_process';
import type { ChildProcess } from 'node:child_process';
import type { AdapterOutcome, AdapterRequest, ProcessAdapter } from './types.js';
/**
* Default thin process adapter (spawn-based). Runs a command to completion with
* a hard timeout and reports exit code + captured output — it owns NO verdict
* logic. Interpreting the outcome is always the check implementation's job.
*/
export function createSpawnProcessAdapter(): ProcessAdapter {
return {
run(request: AdapterRequest): Promise<AdapterOutcome> {
return new Promise((resolve) => {
let child: ChildProcess;
try {
child = spawn(request.file, request.args, {
cwd: request.cwd,
stdio: ['ignore', 'pipe', 'pipe'],
});
} catch (error) {
resolve({
ok: false,
kind: 'spawn-error',
message: error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error),
});
return;
}
let stdout = '';
let stderr = '';
let settled = false;
const timer = setTimeout(() => {
if (settled) return;
settled = true;
child.kill('SIGKILL');
resolve({
ok: false,
kind: 'timeout',
message: `process timed out after ${request.timeoutMs}ms: ${request.file}`,
});
}, request.timeoutMs);
const settle = (outcome: AdapterOutcome): void => {
if (settled) return;
settled = true;
clearTimeout(timer);
resolve(outcome);
};
child.stdout?.on('data', (chunk: Buffer) => {
stdout += chunk.toString('utf8');
});
child.stderr?.on('data', (chunk: Buffer) => {
stderr += chunk.toString('utf8');
});
child.on('error', (error: Error) => {
settle({ ok: false, kind: 'spawn-error', message: error.message });
});
child.on('close', (code: number | null) => {
settle({ ok: true, exitCode: code, stdout, stderr });
});
});
},
};
}
@@ -0,0 +1,258 @@
import { constants } from 'node:fs';
import { access } from 'node:fs/promises';
import { isAbsolute, resolve } from 'node:path';
import { digestOfPolicy, digestOfSpec } from './digest.js';
import type {
CheckContext,
CheckDefinition,
CheckDefinitionSpec,
CheckOutcome,
CheckSetPolicy,
CheckSetPolicySpec,
SubjectKind,
} from './types.js';
// Check definitions for the RI-N4 evaluator (card RI-3-002). Each definition is
// DATA with a version and a content digest (see digest.ts); the executable
// half is attached via defineCheck. Check-set SELECTION is per subject kind
// (probe-inventory gap 7): this monorepo does not match the node template's
// file list, so the QC-19 definition carries a distinct file set for the
// `monorepo` subject kind and the policy selects checks per kind.
export function defineCheck(
spec: CheckDefinitionSpec,
evaluate: (ctx: CheckContext) => Promise<CheckOutcome>,
): CheckDefinition {
return { ...spec, definitionDigest: digestOfSpec(spec), evaluate };
}
async function fileExists(filePath: string): Promise<boolean> {
try {
await access(filePath, constants.F_OK);
return true;
} catch {
return false;
}
}
// ─── QC-19: downstream rails presence ────────────────────────────────────────
//
// Typed absorption of the former presence-only `quality-rails check` loop in
// cli.ts. The scaffold-kind file lists below are carried over VERBATIM so the
// evaluator's typed verdicts are parity-equivalent with the presence loop on
// the same fixture; the `monorepo` list is new (per-subject check sets).
const qc19Spec: CheckDefinitionSpec = {
id: 'qc-19-rails-files-present',
version: '1.0.0',
canonicalCheck: 'QC-19',
description:
'The subject still carries its quality-rails files. Typed absorption of the former presence-only check loop; presence is necessary, not sufficient (RI-N4).',
appliesTo: ['node', 'python', 'rust', 'monorepo', 'unknown'],
params: {
expectedFilesByKind: {
node: ['.eslintrc', 'biome.json', '.githooks/pre-commit', 'PR-CHECKLIST.md'],
python: ['pyproject.toml', '.githooks/pre-commit', 'PR-CHECKLIST.md'],
rust: ['rustfmt.toml', '.githooks/pre-commit', 'PR-CHECKLIST.md'],
monorepo: [
'.husky/pre-commit',
'.husky/pre-push',
'eslint.config.mjs',
'.prettierrc',
'.lintstagedrc',
],
unknown: ['.githooks/pre-commit', 'PR-CHECKLIST.md'],
},
},
};
async function evaluateQc19(ctx: CheckContext): Promise<CheckOutcome> {
const byKind = ctx.params['expectedFilesByKind'] as Record<string, readonly string[]> | undefined;
if (byKind === undefined) {
return { status: 'error', reason: 'definition params missing expectedFilesByKind' };
}
const expected = byKind[ctx.subject.kind];
if (expected === undefined) {
// Fail-closed: an undefined file set for a declared subject kind is a
// definition gap, never a green outcome.
return {
status: 'blocked',
reason: `no expected-file set defined for subject kind '${ctx.subject.kind}'`,
};
}
const missing: string[] = [];
for (const relativePath of expected) {
if (!(await fileExists(resolve(ctx.subject.path, relativePath)))) {
missing.push(relativePath);
}
}
if (missing.length > 0) {
return {
status: 'failed',
reason: `missing rails files (${ctx.subject.kind}): ${missing.join(', ')}`,
};
}
return { status: 'passed' };
}
// ─── QC-20: downstream enforcement verification (behavioral probe) ──────────
//
// The planted-commit behavioral probe (framework tools/quality/scripts/verify.sh)
// stays a THIN SHELL ADAPTER: the TS evaluator invokes it and OWNS the verdict
// parsing (RI-N4: grep-on-output verdict logic moves into the typed evaluator).
// Probe contract (verify.sh): exit 0 ⇔ every sub-probe passed, exit 1 ⇔ at
// least one sub-probe failed; sub-probe verdicts appear as `PASS:` / `FAIL:`
// marker lines and the script always prints a `Verification Summary` section.
// Any deviation from that contract (other exit codes, unparseable output,
// missing probe, process failure, timeout) is `error`/`blocked` — never
// `passed`.
const qc20Spec: CheckDefinitionSpec = {
id: 'qc-20-enforcement-verify',
version: '1.0.0',
canonicalCheck: 'QC-20',
description:
'The behavioral planted-commit probe runs against the subject and every sub-probe blocks as intended. The shell probe is a thin adapter; verdict parsing is owned by this evaluator.',
appliesTo: ['node', 'python', 'rust', 'unknown'],
params: {
command: 'bash',
timeoutMs: 120_000,
passMarker: 'PASS:',
failMarker: 'FAIL:',
summaryMarker: 'Verification Summary',
},
};
function linesWith(text: string, marker: string): string[] {
return text
.split('\n')
.map((line) => line.trim())
.filter((line) => line.includes(marker));
}
async function evaluateQc20(ctx: CheckContext): Promise<CheckOutcome> {
const rawProbePath = ctx.inputs['probePath'];
if (typeof rawProbePath !== 'string' || rawProbePath.trim().length === 0) {
return {
status: 'blocked',
reason:
'missing input: probePath — the behavioral probe script must be provided (e.g. the framework verify.sh)',
};
}
const probePath = isAbsolute(rawProbePath)
? rawProbePath
: resolve(ctx.subject.path, rawProbePath);
if (!(await fileExists(probePath))) {
return { status: 'blocked', reason: `probe script not found: ${probePath}` };
}
const command = typeof ctx.params['command'] === 'string' ? ctx.params['command'] : 'bash';
const timeoutMs = typeof ctx.params['timeoutMs'] === 'number' ? ctx.params['timeoutMs'] : 120_000;
const passMarker =
typeof ctx.params['passMarker'] === 'string' ? ctx.params['passMarker'] : 'PASS:';
const failMarker =
typeof ctx.params['failMarker'] === 'string' ? ctx.params['failMarker'] : 'FAIL:';
const summaryMarker =
typeof ctx.params['summaryMarker'] === 'string'
? ctx.params['summaryMarker']
: 'Verification Summary';
const outcome = await ctx.adapter.run({
file: command,
args: [probePath],
cwd: ctx.subject.path,
timeoutMs,
});
if (!outcome.ok) {
// Process error or timeout: the probe never produced a trustworthy result.
return {
status: 'error',
reason: `probe process ${outcome.kind}: ${outcome.message}`,
};
}
const output = `${outcome.stdout}\n${outcome.stderr}`;
const failLines = linesWith(output, failMarker);
const passLines = linesWith(output, passMarker);
if (outcome.exitCode === 0) {
// A green exit must be corroborated by a parseable green transcript:
// at least one pass marker, no fail markers, and the summary section.
if (passLines.length > 0 && failLines.length === 0 && output.includes(summaryMarker)) {
return { status: 'passed' };
}
return {
status: 'error',
reason: `malformed probe output: exit 0 without a parseable pass transcript (${passLines.length} pass markers, ${failLines.length} fail markers, summary ${output.includes(summaryMarker) ? 'present' : 'absent'})`,
};
}
if (outcome.exitCode === 1) {
if (failLines.length === 0) {
return {
status: 'error',
reason: 'malformed probe output: exit 1 without parseable FAIL markers',
};
}
return {
status: 'failed',
reason: `enforcement probe reported ${failLines.length} failing sub-probe(s): ${failLines.join(' | ')}`,
};
}
return {
status: 'error',
reason: `probe exited with unexpected code ${String(outcome.exitCode)} — outcome not interpretable`,
};
}
// ─── Per-subject check-set policy ───────────────────────────────────────────
//
// Gap 7 of the probe inventory: check sets must be selected per subject, not
// one global list. Downstream scaffold kinds get the presence check plus the
// behavioral probe (QC-20 blocks until a probePath input is provided — an
// unverified subject can never evaluate green). The monorepo subject is this
// repository itself: its rails are the husky hooks + shared lint/format
// configs, covered by QC-19; the downstream planted-commit probe does not
// apply to it (this repo's own commit gates are QC-13/QC-14, outside this
// evaluator's owned checks).
const checkSetPolicySpec: CheckSetPolicySpec = {
version: '1.0.0',
byKind: {
node: ['qc-19-rails-files-present', 'qc-20-enforcement-verify'],
python: ['qc-19-rails-files-present', 'qc-20-enforcement-verify'],
rust: ['qc-19-rails-files-present', 'qc-20-enforcement-verify'],
unknown: ['qc-19-rails-files-present', 'qc-20-enforcement-verify'],
monorepo: ['qc-19-rails-files-present'],
},
};
export const CHECK_SET_POLICY: CheckSetPolicy = {
...checkSetPolicySpec,
policyDigest: digestOfPolicy(checkSetPolicySpec),
};
export const QC_19_RAILS_FILES_PRESENT = defineCheck(qc19Spec, evaluateQc19);
export const QC_20_ENFORCEMENT_VERIFY = defineCheck(qc20Spec, evaluateQc20);
/** Built-in check definitions, keyed by id. */
export function builtInDefinitions(): CheckDefinition[] {
return [QC_19_RAILS_FILES_PRESENT, QC_20_ENFORCEMENT_VERIFY];
}
export function checkSetForKind(
kind: SubjectKind,
policy: CheckSetPolicy = CHECK_SET_POLICY,
): readonly string[] {
const selected = policy.byKind[kind];
if (selected === undefined) {
// Fail-closed selection: an unknown kind yields an EMPTY set only to the
// caller; the runner treats an empty result list as `blocked`, never green.
return [];
}
return selected;
}
@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
import { createHash } from 'node:crypto';
import type { CheckDefinitionSpec, CheckSetPolicySpec } from './types.js';
// Deterministic JSON: object keys sorted at every level so two specs with the
// same content always produce the same bytes (and thus the same digest).
export function canonicalJson(value: unknown): string {
if (value === null || typeof value !== 'object') {
return JSON.stringify(value);
}
if (Array.isArray(value)) {
return `[${value.map((entry) => canonicalJson(entry)).join(',')}]`;
}
const record = value as Record<string, unknown>;
const keys = Object.keys(record).sort();
return `{${keys.map((key) => `${JSON.stringify(key)}:${canonicalJson(record[key])}`).join(',')}}`;
}
/** sha256 over the canonical JSON of `value`. */
export function digestContent(value: unknown): string {
return createHash('sha256').update(canonicalJson(value), 'utf8').digest('hex');
}
/**
* Content digest of a check definition: covers the declarative spec (id,
* version, canonical check, description, applicability, params) — everything a
* reviewer reasons about — while excluding the executable function object.
* Changing any covered field changes the digest, so a recorded digest always
* identifies exactly which definition content produced a verdict.
*/
export function digestOfSpec(spec: CheckDefinitionSpec): string {
return digestContent({
id: spec.id,
version: spec.version,
canonicalCheck: spec.canonicalCheck,
description: spec.description,
appliesTo: spec.appliesTo,
params: spec.params,
});
}
/** Content digest of the per-subject check-set policy. */
export function digestOfPolicy(spec: CheckSetPolicySpec): string {
return digestContent(spec);
}
@@ -0,0 +1,525 @@
import { mkdtemp, mkdir, writeFile, chmod } from 'node:fs/promises';
import { tmpdir } from 'node:os';
import { join } from 'node:path';
import { fileURLToPath } from 'node:url';
import { describe, expect, it } from 'vitest';
import { createSpawnProcessAdapter } from './adapter.js';
import {
builtInDefinitions,
CHECK_SET_POLICY,
checkSetForKind,
defineCheck,
QC_19_RAILS_FILES_PRESENT,
QC_20_ENFORCEMENT_VERIFY,
} from './definitions.js';
import { digestOfSpec } from './digest.js';
import { aggregateState, evaluateSubject } from './runner.js';
import type {
AdapterOutcome,
CheckDefinitionSpec,
CheckResult,
EvaluationReport,
ProcessAdapter,
} from './types.js';
// ─── helpers ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
function firstResult(report: EvaluationReport): CheckResult {
const result = report.results[0];
if (result === undefined) {
throw new Error('expected the report to contain at least one result');
}
return result;
}
async function makeTempDir(): Promise<string> {
return mkdtemp(join(tmpdir(), 'qr-evaluator-'));
}
async function writeProbeScript(dir: string, name: string, body: string): Promise<string> {
const scriptPath = join(dir, name);
await writeFile(scriptPath, `${body}\n`, 'utf8');
await chmod(scriptPath, 0o755);
return scriptPath;
}
/** Adapter stub that always returns the given outcome (no real process). */
function stubAdapter(outcome: AdapterOutcome): ProcessAdapter {
return {
run: async () => outcome,
};
}
// VERBATIM copy of the pre-absorption presence loop (former cli.ts
// expectedFilesForKind + fileExists loop). This is the PARITY ORACLE: the
// evaluator's typed QC-19 verdict must agree with what the absorbed check
// concluded on the same fixture.
const LEGACY_EXPECTED: Record<'node' | 'python' | 'rust' | 'unknown', string[]> = {
node: ['.eslintrc', 'biome.json', '.githooks/pre-commit', 'PR-CHECKLIST.md'],
python: ['pyproject.toml', '.githooks/pre-commit', 'PR-CHECKLIST.md'],
rust: ['rustfmt.toml', '.githooks/pre-commit', 'PR-CHECKLIST.md'],
unknown: ['.githooks/pre-commit', 'PR-CHECKLIST.md'],
};
async function legacyPresenceLoop(projectPath: string, kind: keyof typeof LEGACY_EXPECTED) {
const missing: string[] = [];
for (const relativePath of LEGACY_EXPECTED[kind]) {
const fs = await import('node:fs/promises');
try {
await fs.access(join(projectPath, relativePath));
} catch {
missing.push(relativePath);
}
}
return missing;
}
async function scaffoldFixture(kind: keyof typeof LEGACY_EXPECTED, skip: string[] = []) {
const dir = await makeTempDir();
if (kind === 'node') {
await writeFile(join(dir, 'package.json'), '{}\n', 'utf8');
}
if (kind === 'python') {
await writeFile(join(dir, 'pyproject.toml'), '[project]\n', 'utf8');
}
if (kind === 'rust') {
await writeFile(join(dir, 'Cargo.toml'), '[package]\n', 'utf8');
}
for (const relativePath of LEGACY_EXPECTED[kind]) {
if (skip.includes(relativePath)) continue;
await mkdir(join(dir, relativePath, '..'), { recursive: true });
await writeFile(join(dir, relativePath), 'fixture\n', 'utf8');
}
return dir;
}
// ─── QC-19 parity: typed verdict == absorbed presence loop ──────────────────
describe('QC-19 parity with the absorbed presence loop', () => {
const kinds: Array<keyof typeof LEGACY_EXPECTED> = ['node', 'python', 'rust', 'unknown'];
it.each(kinds)('positive fixture (%s): loop said ok ⇒ evaluator passed', async (kind) => {
const dir = await scaffoldFixture(kind);
const oracleMissing = await legacyPresenceLoop(dir, kind);
expect(oracleMissing).toEqual([]);
const report = await evaluateSubject({
subjectPath: dir,
checkIds: [QC_19_RAILS_FILES_PRESENT.id],
});
const result = report.results.find((r) => r.checkId === QC_19_RAILS_FILES_PRESENT.id);
expect(result?.status).toBe('passed');
expect(result?.reason).toBeUndefined();
expect(report.state).toBe('passed');
});
it.each(kinds)(
'negative fixture (%s): loop listed missing ⇒ evaluator failed with them',
async (kind) => {
const all = LEGACY_EXPECTED[kind];
const skip = all.slice(0, Math.max(1, all.length - 1)); // leave exactly 1 present
const dir = await scaffoldFixture(kind, skip);
const oracleMissing = await legacyPresenceLoop(dir, kind);
expect(oracleMissing.length).toBeGreaterThan(0);
const report = await evaluateSubject({
subjectPath: dir,
checkIds: [QC_19_RAILS_FILES_PRESENT.id],
});
const result = report.results.find((r) => r.checkId === QC_19_RAILS_FILES_PRESENT.id);
expect(result?.status).toBe('failed');
expect(report.state).toBe('failed');
for (const missingFile of oracleMissing) {
expect(result?.reason).toContain(missingFile);
}
// No false attribution: a present file must not be named in the reason.
const presentFile = all.find((file) => !skip.includes(file));
if (presentFile !== undefined) {
expect(result?.reason).not.toContain(` ${presentFile},`);
}
},
);
});
// ─── per-subject check sets (inventory gap 7) ────────────────────────────────
describe('per-subject check sets', () => {
it('monorepo subject selects only QC-19 with the monorepo file set', async () => {
const dir = await makeTempDir();
await writeFile(join(dir, 'pnpm-workspace.yaml'), 'packages:\n - packages/*\n', 'utf8');
for (const file of [
'.husky/pre-commit',
'.husky/pre-push',
'eslint.config.mjs',
'.prettierrc',
'.lintstagedrc',
]) {
await mkdir(join(dir, file, '..'), { recursive: true });
await writeFile(join(dir, file), 'fixture\n', 'utf8');
}
const report = await evaluateSubject({ subjectPath: dir });
expect(report.subject.kind).toBe('monorepo');
expect(report.results.map((r) => r.checkId)).toEqual(['qc-19-rails-files-present']);
expect(report.state).toBe('passed');
});
it('a monorepo missing one of its rails files fails QC-19 (not the node list)', async () => {
const dir = await makeTempDir();
await writeFile(join(dir, 'pnpm-workspace.yaml'), 'packages:\n', 'utf8');
const report = await evaluateSubject({ subjectPath: dir });
const result = report.results.find((r) => r.checkId === QC_19_RAILS_FILES_PRESENT.id);
expect(result?.status).toBe('failed');
expect(result?.reason).toContain('.husky/pre-commit');
// The node-template list must NOT be applied to a monorepo subject.
expect(result?.reason).not.toContain('biome.json');
});
it('the policy selects the behavioral probe for scaffold kinds but not monorepo', () => {
expect(checkSetForKind('node')).toContain(QC_20_ENFORCEMENT_VERIFY.id);
expect(checkSetForKind('unknown')).toContain(QC_20_ENFORCEMENT_VERIFY.id);
expect(checkSetForKind('monorepo')).not.toContain(QC_20_ENFORCEMENT_VERIFY.id);
expect(CHECK_SET_POLICY.version).toBe('1.0.0');
});
});
// ─── negative controls (the point of the card) ───────────────────────────────
describe('negative controls', () => {
it('unknown check id ⇒ error, never passed', async () => {
const dir = await scaffoldFixture('node');
const report = await evaluateSubject({
subjectPath: dir,
checkIds: ['qc-99-does-not-exist'],
});
expect(report.results).toHaveLength(1);
const result = firstResult(report);
expect(result.status).toBe('error');
expect(result.reason).toContain("unknown check id 'qc-99-does-not-exist'");
expect(result.status === 'passed').toBe(false);
expect(report.state).toBe('error');
});
it('missing subject (directory absent) ⇒ blocked for every check, never passed', async () => {
const report = await evaluateSubject({
subjectPath: join(tmpdir(), `qr-evaluator-absent-${Date.now()}`),
});
expect(report.results.length).toBeGreaterThan(0);
for (const result of report.results) {
expect(result.status).toBe('blocked');
expect(result.reason).toContain('subject directory does not exist');
}
expect(report.state).toBe('blocked');
});
it('QC-20 without probePath input ⇒ blocked, never passed', async () => {
const dir = await scaffoldFixture('node');
const report = await evaluateSubject({
subjectPath: dir,
checkIds: [QC_20_ENFORCEMENT_VERIFY.id],
});
const result = firstResult(report);
expect(result.status).toBe('blocked');
expect(result.reason).toContain('missing input: probePath');
});
it('QC-20 with a nonexistent probe script ⇒ blocked, never passed', async () => {
const dir = await scaffoldFixture('node');
const report = await evaluateSubject({
subjectPath: dir,
checkIds: [QC_20_ENFORCEMENT_VERIFY.id],
inputs: { 'qc-20-enforcement-verify': { probePath: join(dir, 'no-such-probe.sh') } },
});
expect(firstResult(report).status).toBe('blocked');
expect(firstResult(report).reason).toContain('probe script not found');
});
it('adapter process error (spawn failure) ⇒ error, never passed', async () => {
const dir = await scaffoldFixture('node');
const report = await evaluateSubject({
subjectPath: dir,
checkIds: [QC_20_ENFORCEMENT_VERIFY.id],
inputs: { 'qc-20-enforcement-verify': { probePath: join(dir, 'PR-CHECKLIST.md') } },
adapter: stubAdapter({ ok: false, kind: 'spawn-error', message: 'ENOENT bash' }),
});
expect(firstResult(report).status).toBe('error');
expect(firstResult(report).reason).toContain('probe process spawn-error');
expect(firstResult(report).status === 'passed').toBe(false);
});
it('adapter timeout ⇒ error, never passed', async () => {
const dir = await scaffoldFixture('node');
const report = await evaluateSubject({
subjectPath: dir,
checkIds: [QC_20_ENFORCEMENT_VERIFY.id],
inputs: { 'qc-20-enforcement-verify': { probePath: join(dir, 'PR-CHECKLIST.md') } },
adapter: stubAdapter({ ok: false, kind: 'timeout', message: 'timed out after 120000ms' }),
});
expect(firstResult(report).status).toBe('error');
expect(firstResult(report).reason).toContain('probe process timeout');
});
it('probe exit 1 with parseable FAIL markers ⇒ failed (interpretably red), never passed', async () => {
const dir = await scaffoldFixture('node');
const probe = await writeProbeScript(
dir,
'probe-fail.sh',
`echo "Test 1: ..."\necho "❌ FAIL: Type errors NOT blocked"\necho "Verification Summary"\nexit 1`,
);
const report = await evaluateSubject({
subjectPath: dir,
checkIds: [QC_20_ENFORCEMENT_VERIFY.id],
inputs: { 'qc-20-enforcement-verify': { probePath: probe } },
adapter: createSpawnProcessAdapter(),
});
expect(firstResult(report).status).toBe('failed');
expect(firstResult(report).reason).toContain('FAIL: Type errors NOT blocked');
expect(report.state).toBe('failed');
});
it('probe exit 1 WITHOUT parseable FAIL markers ⇒ malformed ⇒ error, never passed', async () => {
const dir = await scaffoldFixture('node');
const probe = await writeProbeScript(dir, 'probe-mute.sh', `echo "nothing to see"\nexit 1`);
const report = await evaluateSubject({
subjectPath: dir,
checkIds: [QC_20_ENFORCEMENT_VERIFY.id],
inputs: { 'qc-20-enforcement-verify': { probePath: probe } },
adapter: createSpawnProcessAdapter(),
});
expect(firstResult(report).status).toBe('error');
expect(firstResult(report).reason).toContain('malformed probe output');
});
it('probe exit 0 without a parseable pass transcript ⇒ malformed ⇒ error, never passed', async () => {
const dir = await scaffoldFixture('node');
const probe = await writeProbeScript(dir, 'probe-lie.sh', `echo "all good"\nexit 0`);
const report = await evaluateSubject({
subjectPath: dir,
checkIds: [QC_20_ENFORCEMENT_VERIFY.id],
inputs: { 'qc-20-enforcement-verify': { probePath: probe } },
adapter: createSpawnProcessAdapter(),
});
expect(firstResult(report).status).toBe('error');
expect(firstResult(report).reason).toContain('malformed probe output');
expect(firstResult(report).reason).toContain('exit 0');
});
it('probe exit 0 WITH fail markers ⇒ contradictory transcript ⇒ error, never passed', async () => {
const dir = await scaffoldFixture('node');
const probe = await writeProbeScript(
dir,
'probe-contradict.sh',
`echo "✅ PASS: one"\necho "❌ FAIL: two"\necho "Verification Summary"\nexit 0`,
);
const report = await evaluateSubject({
subjectPath: dir,
checkIds: [QC_20_ENFORCEMENT_VERIFY.id],
inputs: { 'qc-20-enforcement-verify': { probePath: probe } },
adapter: createSpawnProcessAdapter(),
});
expect(firstResult(report).status).toBe('error');
});
it('probe unexpected exit code (7) ⇒ error, never passed', async () => {
const dir = await scaffoldFixture('node');
const probe = await writeProbeScript(dir, 'probe-crash.sh', `echo "boom"\nexit 7`);
const report = await evaluateSubject({
subjectPath: dir,
checkIds: [QC_20_ENFORCEMENT_VERIFY.id],
inputs: { 'qc-20-enforcement-verify': { probePath: probe } },
adapter: createSpawnProcessAdapter(),
});
expect(firstResult(report).status).toBe('error');
expect(firstResult(report).reason).toContain('unexpected code 7');
});
it('check implementation throwing ⇒ error, never passed', async () => {
const dir = await scaffoldFixture('node');
const spec: CheckDefinitionSpec = {
id: 'test-throws',
version: '1.0.0',
canonicalCheck: 'QC-TEST',
description: 'sabotage-shaped definition that always throws',
appliesTo: ['node'],
params: {},
};
const throwing = defineCheck(spec, async () => {
throw new Error('kaboom');
});
const report = await evaluateSubject({
subjectPath: dir,
checkIds: ['test-throws'],
definitions: [throwing],
});
expect(firstResult(report).status).toBe('error');
expect(firstResult(report).reason).toContain('kaboom');
});
it('non-passed verdict without a reason ⇒ upgraded to error, never an unqualified skip', async () => {
const dir = await scaffoldFixture('node');
const spec: CheckDefinitionSpec = {
id: 'test-silent-fail',
version: '1.0.0',
canonicalCheck: 'QC-TEST',
description: 'returns failed without a reason',
appliesTo: ['node'],
params: {},
};
const silent = defineCheck(spec, async () => ({ status: 'failed' }));
const report = await evaluateSubject({
subjectPath: dir,
checkIds: ['test-silent-fail'],
definitions: [silent],
});
expect(firstResult(report).status).toBe('error');
expect(firstResult(report).reason).toContain('without a reason');
});
it('empty result list aggregates to blocked, never passed', () => {
expect(aggregateState([])).toBe('blocked');
});
});
// ─── QC-20 parity: typed verdict == shell probe's own conclusion ────────────
describe('QC-20 parity with the shell probe contract', () => {
it('green transcript (exit 0) ⇒ evaluator passed', async () => {
const dir = await scaffoldFixture('node');
const probe = await writeProbeScript(
dir,
'probe-pass.sh',
[
'echo "✅ PASS: Type errors blocked"',
'echo "✅ PASS: any types blocked"',
'echo "✅ PASS: Lint errors blocked"',
'echo "Verification Summary"',
'echo "✅ Passed: 3"',
'exit 0',
].join('\n'),
);
const report = await evaluateSubject({
subjectPath: dir,
checkIds: [QC_20_ENFORCEMENT_VERIFY.id],
inputs: { 'qc-20-enforcement-verify': { probePath: probe } },
adapter: createSpawnProcessAdapter(),
});
expect(firstResult(report).status).toBe('passed');
expect(report.state).toBe('passed');
});
it('the REAL framework verify.sh on a non-git subject concludes failed (exit 1) ⇒ evaluator failed', async () => {
// Real-probe parity: verify.sh without a git repo cannot block planted
// commits, exits 1 with FAIL markers — the evaluator must record exactly
// `failed` with those markers, matching the probe's own conclusion.
const realProbe = fileURLToPath(
new URL('../../../mosaic/framework/tools/quality/scripts/verify.sh', import.meta.url),
);
const dir = await makeTempDir(); // not a git repository, no hooks
const report = await evaluateSubject({
subjectPath: dir,
checkIds: [QC_20_ENFORCEMENT_VERIFY.id],
inputs: { 'qc-20-enforcement-verify': { probePath: realProbe } },
adapter: createSpawnProcessAdapter(),
});
const result = firstResult(report);
expect(result.status).toBe('failed');
expect(result.reason).toMatch(/FAIL:/);
expect(report.state).toBe('failed');
});
});
// ─── version / digest discipline ─────────────────────────────────────────────
describe('versioned, digested check definitions', () => {
it('every verdict records the definition version that produced it', async () => {
const dir = await scaffoldFixture('node');
const report = await evaluateSubject({ subjectPath: dir });
for (const result of report.results) {
expect(result.checkVersion).toBe('1.0.0');
}
expect(report.checkSetVersion).toBe(CHECK_SET_POLICY.version);
});
it('the report records each definitions content digest', async () => {
const dir = await scaffoldFixture('node');
const report = await evaluateSubject({ subjectPath: dir });
expect(report.definitionDigests[QC_19_RAILS_FILES_PRESENT.id]).toBe(
QC_19_RAILS_FILES_PRESENT.definitionDigest,
);
expect(report.definitionDigests[QC_20_ENFORCEMENT_VERIFY.id]).toBe(
QC_20_ENFORCEMENT_VERIFY.definitionDigest,
);
});
it('digests are stable for identical content', () => {
const spec = QC_19_RAILS_FILES_PRESENT;
expect(digestOfSpec(spec)).toBe(digestOfSpec(spec));
});
it('changing a definitions content changes its digest', () => {
const base = { ...QC_19_RAILS_FILES_PRESENT } as CheckDefinitionSpec;
const baseDigest = digestOfSpec(base);
const changedParams: CheckDefinitionSpec = {
...base,
params: {
expectedFilesByKind: {
...(base.params['expectedFilesByKind'] as Record<string, string[]>),
node: ['.eslintrc', 'biome.json', '.githooks/pre-commit', 'PR-CHECKLIST.md', 'NEW.md'],
},
},
};
expect(digestOfSpec(changedParams)).not.toBe(baseDigest);
const changedVersion: CheckDefinitionSpec = { ...base, version: '1.1.0' };
expect(digestOfSpec(changedVersion)).not.toBe(baseDigest);
});
it('a definition with changed content produces a different recorded digest and version', async () => {
const dir = await scaffoldFixture('node');
const modified = defineCheck(
{ ...QC_19_RAILS_FILES_PRESENT, version: '2.0.0' } as unknown as CheckDefinitionSpec,
async () => ({ status: 'passed' }),
);
const report = await evaluateSubject({
subjectPath: dir,
checkIds: [QC_19_RAILS_FILES_PRESENT.id],
definitions: [
modified,
...builtInDefinitions().filter((d) => d.id !== QC_19_RAILS_FILES_PRESENT.id),
],
});
const result = firstResult(report);
expect(result.checkVersion).toBe('2.0.0');
expect(report.definitionDigests[QC_19_RAILS_FILES_PRESENT.id]).toBe(modified.definitionDigest);
expect(modified.definitionDigest).not.toBe(QC_19_RAILS_FILES_PRESENT.definitionDigest);
});
});
// ─── aggregate state ordering (MACP-style discipline) ───────────────────────
describe('aggregate state precedence', () => {
const result = (status: 'passed' | 'failed' | 'blocked' | 'error') => ({
status,
checkId: 'x',
checkVersion: '1.0.0',
subject: '/tmp/x',
});
it('all passed (with not-applicable) ⇒ passed', () => {
expect(
aggregateState([
result('passed'),
{ ...result('passed'), status: 'not-applicable' as const },
]),
).toBe('passed');
});
it('error outranks blocked and failed; blocked outranks failed', () => {
expect(aggregateState([result('blocked'), result('error')])).toBe('error');
expect(aggregateState([result('failed'), result('blocked')])).toBe('blocked');
expect(aggregateState([result('passed'), result('failed')])).toBe('failed');
});
});
@@ -0,0 +1,183 @@
import { constants } from 'node:fs';
import { access, stat } from 'node:fs/promises';
import { join, resolve } from 'node:path';
import { createSpawnProcessAdapter } from './adapter.js';
import { builtInDefinitions, CHECK_SET_POLICY, checkSetForKind } from './definitions.js';
import type {
AggregateState,
CheckResult,
CheckStatus,
EvaluateOptions,
EvaluationReport,
ProcessAdapter,
Subject,
SubjectKind,
} from './types.js';
import { detectProjectKind } from '../detect.js';
async function pathExists(targetPath: string): Promise<boolean> {
try {
await access(targetPath, constants.F_OK);
return true;
} catch {
return false;
}
}
async function isDirectory(targetPath: string): Promise<boolean> {
try {
return (await stat(targetPath)).isDirectory();
} catch {
return false;
}
}
/**
* Subject-kind detection for the evaluator. Extends the scaffold detection
* (detect.ts) with the `monorepo` kind: a pnpm workspace is this repository's
* own subject shape and carries a different rails file set (probe-inventory
* gap 7 — check sets are per subject, not one global file list).
*/
export async function detectSubjectKind(subjectPath: string): Promise<SubjectKind> {
if (await pathExists(join(subjectPath, 'pnpm-workspace.yaml'))) {
return 'monorepo';
}
const kind = await detectProjectKind(subjectPath);
return kind;
}
/**
* Aggregate state, MACP-style discipline: `passed` only when at least one
* check produced a verdict AND every verdict is `passed` or an explicitly
* qualified `not-applicable`. Precedence is fail-closed: error > blocked >
* failed > passed; an empty result list aggregates to `blocked`.
*/
export function aggregateState(results: readonly CheckResult[]): AggregateState {
if (results.length === 0) {
return 'blocked';
}
const has = (status: CheckStatus): boolean => results.some((result) => result.status === status);
if (has('error')) {
return 'error';
}
if (has('blocked')) {
return 'blocked';
}
if (has('failed')) {
return 'failed';
}
return 'passed';
}
function reasonFrom(error: unknown): string {
return error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error);
}
/**
* Evaluate one subject against a set of checks, producing typed verdicts.
*
* Fail-closed invariants (RI-N4):
* - unknown check id → `error` (never passed)
* - subject directory absent → every verdict `blocked`
* - check implementation threw → `error`
* - non-passed without a reason → `error` (no unqualified skips)
* - check not applicable → `not-applicable` WITH a reason
*/
export async function evaluateSubject(options: EvaluateOptions): Promise<EvaluationReport> {
const subjectPath = resolve(options.subjectPath);
const subject: Subject = {
path: subjectPath,
kind: await detectSubjectKind(subjectPath),
};
const definitions = options.definitions ?? builtInDefinitions();
const byId = new Map(definitions.map((definition) => [definition.id, definition]));
const requested = options.checkIds ?? checkSetForKind(subject.kind);
const adapter: ProcessAdapter = options.adapter ?? createSpawnProcessAdapter();
const results: CheckResult[] = [];
const definitionDigests: Record<string, string> = {};
for (const checkId of requested) {
const definition = byId.get(checkId);
if (definition === undefined) {
const known = definitions.map((entry) => entry.id).join(', ');
results.push({
status: 'error',
checkId,
checkVersion: 'unknown',
subject: subjectPath,
reason: `unknown check id '${checkId}' — no registered definition (known: ${known})`,
});
continue;
}
definitionDigests[checkId] = definition.definitionDigest;
if (!(await isDirectory(subjectPath))) {
results.push({
status: 'blocked',
checkId,
checkVersion: definition.version,
subject: subjectPath,
reason: `subject directory does not exist: ${subjectPath}`,
});
continue;
}
if (!definition.appliesTo.includes(subject.kind)) {
results.push({
status: 'not-applicable',
checkId,
checkVersion: definition.version,
subject: subjectPath,
reason: `check '${checkId}' does not apply to subject kind '${subject.kind}'`,
});
continue;
}
try {
const inputs = options.inputs?.[checkId] ?? {};
const outcome = await definition.evaluate({
subject,
params: definition.params,
inputs,
adapter,
});
if (outcome.status !== 'passed' && (outcome.reason === undefined || outcome.reason === '')) {
results.push({
status: 'error',
checkId,
checkVersion: definition.version,
subject: subjectPath,
reason: `check returned status '${outcome.status}' without a reason — treated as error`,
});
continue;
}
results.push({
status: outcome.status,
checkId,
checkVersion: definition.version,
subject: subjectPath,
reason: outcome.reason,
});
} catch (error) {
results.push({
status: 'error',
checkId,
checkVersion: definition.version,
subject: subjectPath,
reason: `check implementation threw: ${reasonFrom(error)}`,
});
}
}
return {
subject,
results,
definitionDigests,
checkSetVersion: CHECK_SET_POLICY.version,
state: aggregateState(results),
};
}
@@ -0,0 +1,148 @@
// Evaluator core types — RI-N4 (card RI-3-002, SDLC-D-037 second half).
//
// The quality-rails evaluator is the SOLE authoritative producer of check
// verdicts for the checks it owns. Every verdict is typed and fail-closed:
// missing implementations, missing inputs, unknown check ids, process errors,
// timeouts, and malformed adapter output can never become `passed` or an
// unqualified skip — they surface as `blocked` or `error` with a reason.
// (Vocabulary mirrors MACP's GateStatus discipline from packages/macp.)
/**
* Typed verdict for a single check execution.
*
* - `passed` — the check really ran and its condition held.
* - `failed` — the check really ran and its condition did NOT hold.
* - `blocked` — the check could not run at all (missing subject, missing
* input). Never a green outcome.
* - `error` — the check attempted to run but its outcome cannot be trusted
* (unknown check id, implementation threw, process error, timeout, malformed
* adapter output). Never a green outcome.
* - `not-applicable` — the check definition explicitly declares it does not
* apply to this subject (a qualified skip, always with a reason).
*/
export type CheckStatus = 'passed' | 'failed' | 'blocked' | 'error' | 'not-applicable';
/** Aggregate outcome, MACP-style: `passed` only when every result is green. */
export type AggregateState = 'passed' | 'failed' | 'blocked' | 'error';
/** Kinds of subjects the evaluator can assess. */
export type SubjectKind = 'node' | 'python' | 'rust' | 'monorepo' | 'unknown';
/**
* A single check verdict. This is the canonical result shape: `status`,
* `checkId`, `checkVersion`, `subject`, `reason`. `reason` is REQUIRED
* (enforced by the runner) for every status other than `passed`.
*/
export interface CheckResult {
status: CheckStatus;
checkId: string;
checkVersion: string;
subject: string;
reason?: string;
}
/** The project being evaluated. */
export interface Subject {
/** Absolute path. */
path: string;
kind: SubjectKind;
}
/**
* The data half of a check definition. Definitions live as DATA with a version
* and a content digest (see `digestOfSpec`); the executable half is attached
* separately so the digest covers only reviewable, declarative content.
*/
export interface CheckDefinitionSpec {
/** Stable id, e.g. `qc-19-rails-files-present`. */
id: string;
/** Semver of this definition's data+semantics. */
version: string;
/** Canonical check id from docs/release-integrity/probe-inventory.md (QC-n). */
canonicalCheck: string;
description: string;
/** Subject kinds this check can assess (others yield `not-applicable`). */
appliesTo: readonly SubjectKind[];
/** Declarative parameters (file lists, markers, timeouts) — digest-covered. */
params: Record<string, unknown>;
}
/** A fully assembled check definition: spec + digest + implementation. */
export interface CheckDefinition extends CheckDefinitionSpec {
/** sha256 content digest of the spec (canonical JSON projection). */
definitionDigest: string;
evaluate(ctx: CheckContext): Promise<CheckOutcome>;
}
/** What a check implementation returns; the runner stamps id/version/subject. */
export interface CheckOutcome {
status: CheckStatus;
reason?: string;
}
/** Caller-provided inputs for one check invocation (e.g. the QC-20 probe path). */
export type CheckInputs = Record<string, unknown>;
/** Everything a check implementation may use. */
export interface CheckContext {
subject: Subject;
params: Record<string, unknown>;
inputs: CheckInputs;
adapter: ProcessAdapter;
}
/** Outcome of running a shell probe through the thin process adapter. */
export type AdapterOutcome =
| { ok: true; exitCode: number | null; stdout: string; stderr: string }
| { ok: false; kind: 'spawn-error' | 'timeout'; message: string };
/** Request for the process adapter. */
export interface AdapterRequest {
file: string;
args: string[];
cwd: string;
timeoutMs: number;
}
/**
* Thin process adapter: runs a command, owns NO verdict logic. Verdict parsing
* always lives in the check implementation (TS), never in the shell probe.
*/
export interface ProcessAdapter {
run(request: AdapterRequest): Promise<AdapterOutcome>;
}
/** Per-subject-kind check-set selection policy (versioned and digested). */
export interface CheckSetPolicySpec {
version: string;
byKind: Record<SubjectKind, readonly string[]>;
}
export interface CheckSetPolicy extends CheckSetPolicySpec {
/** sha256 content digest of the policy spec. */
policyDigest: string;
}
/** Full typed evaluation report for one subject. */
export interface EvaluationReport {
subject: Subject;
results: CheckResult[];
/** checkId → content digest of the definition that produced the verdicts. */
definitionDigests: Record<string, string>;
/** Version of the check-set policy used for subject selection. */
checkSetVersion: string;
state: AggregateState;
}
/** Options for `evaluateSubject`. */
export interface EvaluateOptions {
subjectPath: string;
/** Restrict to these check ids; defaults to the subject kind's check set. */
checkIds?: string[];
/** Per-check inputs, keyed by check id (e.g. `{ 'qc-20-enforcement-verify': { probePath } }`). */
inputs?: Record<string, CheckInputs>;
/** Replace the built-in definitions (tests / future batches). */
definitions?: CheckDefinition[];
/** Inject a process adapter (tests / instrumentation). */
adapter?: ProcessAdapter;
}
+32
View File
@@ -3,3 +3,35 @@ export * from './detect.js';
export * from './scaffolder.js';
export * from './templates.js';
export * from './types.js';
// RI-N4 evaluator (card RI-3-002): the public, programmatic entry points.
export {
builtInDefinitions,
CHECK_SET_POLICY,
checkSetForKind,
defineCheck,
QC_19_RAILS_FILES_PRESENT,
QC_20_ENFORCEMENT_VERIFY,
} from './evaluator/definitions.js';
export { canonicalJson, digestContent, digestOfPolicy, digestOfSpec } from './evaluator/digest.js';
export { createSpawnProcessAdapter } from './evaluator/adapter.js';
export { aggregateState, detectSubjectKind, evaluateSubject } from './evaluator/runner.js';
export type {
AdapterOutcome,
AdapterRequest,
AggregateState,
CheckContext,
CheckDefinition,
CheckDefinitionSpec,
CheckInputs,
CheckOutcome,
CheckResult,
CheckSetPolicy,
CheckSetPolicySpec,
CheckStatus,
EvaluateOptions,
EvaluationReport,
ProcessAdapter,
Subject,
SubjectKind,
} from './evaluator/types.js';
+15
View File
@@ -22,6 +22,12 @@
// format | format | pnpm format:check
// test | test | pnpm test
// build | publish.yml build | pnpm build
// quality-rails | (canonical-only) | the TS quality-rails evaluator
// | | (RI-N4, QC-19 monorepo subject). Like
// | | `build`, this stage has no ci.yml
// | | mirror; it is implemented by
// | | importing the evaluator CLI rather
// | | than duplicating its presence logic.
//
// Caller-provided prerequisites (kept at the pipeline level — see the comments
// in .woodpecker/ci.yml): `bash` + `rsync` for the guard stages, `openssl` and
@@ -90,6 +96,15 @@ export const STAGES = [
name: 'build',
commands: ['pnpm build'],
},
{
// RI-N4 (QC-19, card RI-3-002): the typed quality-rails evaluator, invoked
// as the implementation of the check it owns instead of a duplicated
// presence loop here. Canonical-only stage (no ci.yml mirror — same shape
// as `build`); runs AFTER build so the evaluator's dist/ exists. Subject
// is this repository (`.` → monorepo subject kind, per-subject check set).
name: 'quality-rails',
commands: ['node packages/quality-rails/dist/cli.js quality-rails evaluate --project .'],
},
];
export function stageByName(name) {
+49 -3
View File
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ import { createRequire } from 'node:module';
import path from 'node:path';
import test from 'node:test';
import { STAGES } from './verify-release.mjs';
import { STAGES, stageByName } from './verify-release.mjs';
// SDLC-D-034 checkout invariant: publication in .woodpecker/publish.yml is
// bound to exact-commit terminal verification. This suite parses the real
@@ -229,10 +229,21 @@ steps:
function assertStagesMirrorCi(stages, ci) {
const canonical = Object.fromEntries(stages.map((stage) => [stage.name, stage.commands]));
// The complete mandatory set, in gate order.
// The complete mandatory set, in gate order. `quality-rails` is a
// canonical-only stage (RI-N4, QC-19): like `build`, it has no ci.yml
// mirror to match — its contract is asserted separately below.
assert.deepEqual(
stages.map((stage) => stage.name),
['sanitization', 'upgrade-guard', 'typecheck', 'lint', 'format', 'test', 'build'],
[
'sanitization',
'upgrade-guard',
'typecheck',
'lint',
'format',
'test',
'build',
'quality-rails',
],
);
// Guard stages: ci.yml commands minus its `apk add` environment prep must be
@@ -301,3 +312,38 @@ test('the root package.json exposes verify:release as the canonical command', as
const packageJson = JSON.parse(await readFile(path.join(process.cwd(), 'package.json'), 'utf8'));
assert.match(packageJson.scripts['verify:release'], /scripts\/verify-release\.mjs/);
});
// RI-N4 (card RI-3-002): the `quality-rails` stage must route through the TS
// evaluator instead of duplicating its presence logic inline. The evaluator
// owns QC-19; this file keeps that delegation honest.
function assertEvaluatorStage(stage) {
assert.ok(stage, 'canonical stages must include a quality-rails stage');
assert.ok(Array.isArray(stage.commands) && stage.commands.length > 0);
for (const command of stage.commands) {
assert.match(
command,
/packages\/quality-rails\/dist\/cli\.js.*quality-rails evaluate/,
`quality-rails stage command must invoke the evaluator CLI, got: '${command}'`,
);
}
}
test('the quality-rails stage invokes the evaluator rather than duplicating its logic', () => {
assertEvaluatorStage(stageByName('quality-rails'));
});
test('a quality-rails stage that re-implements presence logic inline fails the checker', () => {
// Negative control: replacing the evaluator invocation with an inline
// `test -f` presence loop is exactly the duplication RI-N4 forbids — the
// checker must go red on it.
const duplicated = {
name: 'quality-rails',
commands: ['test -f .husky/pre-commit && test -f .husky/pre-push'],
};
assert.throws(() => assertEvaluatorStage(duplicated), /must invoke the evaluator CLI/);
});
test('a quality-rails stage that silently drops the evaluator command fails the checker', () => {
const empty = { name: 'quality-rails', commands: [] };
assert.throws(() => assertEvaluatorStage(empty), /commands/);
});