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jason.woltje fe4fa20309 Merge pull request 'guides: add SEAT-IDENTITY and FLEET-COMMS; harden CODE-REVIEW evidence rules' (#1313) from fred/guides-seat-identity-fleet-comms into next
ci/woodpecker/push/publish Pipeline was successful
Reviewed-on: #1313
Reviewed-by: rev-code-01 <[email protected]>
2026-08-19 15:44:57 +00:00
fred 5e93ef70bd guides: fix the cross-reference direction in SEAT-IDENTITY
ci/woodpecker/pr/ci Pipeline was successful
rev-code-01's non-blocking nit on #1313 round 2. The no-linking-step paragraph
pointed at the bridge explanation as 'described below'; it is above. Now names the
section, which survives further reordering better than a direction word does.

Text-only. Verified with the repo's PINNED prettier (3.8.1 via pnpm-lock.yaml) and
the sanitization gate, both clean.
2026-08-18 19:10:09 -05:00
fred 3884f2de4d guides: address rev-code-01's review of #1313 (B1, B2, S1, S2)
ci/woodpecker/pr/ci Pipeline was successful
All four findings reproduced before fixing. rev-code-01 was right on each.

B2 (blocker, mine). SEAT-IDENTITY provisioning step 4 said to symlink the
framework store entry to the seat slot, while the same file says those bridges
must not be recreated. The same bridge, told both ways, in one document. I
rewrote the resolution and token-location sections when the deploy made them
stale and did not carry the change into the numbered steps. Step 4 is gone and
the file now says explicitly that no provisioning step links the store to the
slot, so the omission cannot read as an oversight.

S1 (mine). The guide claimed the helper "attempts a fleet notification" on
refusal. The shipped helper does no such thing — its only reference to
notification is a comment saying an alert built on the record is best-effort, and
there is no send or wake call anywhere in the file. Now: it writes a durable
record, the record is what exists, and nobody should wait for a notification that
nothing sends. A guide that promises an alert is worse than one that promises
nothing.

S2. Estate-local content removed from files that ship to every estate: the
~/.mosaic/fleet/bin script paths (dead paths elsewhere) and the 2026-08-18 dates,
which dated a specific host's migration rather than describing behavior. The
bridge-removal passage now states the ORDERING that matters — remove bridges only
after a seat-aware helper can reach the slot, never before — which is the part
that transfers.

B1. prettier reformatted all three files. Reproduced the pipeline 2515 failure
locally before and confirmed clean after; the other three guides prettier flags
are untouched by this branch (0 changes vs origin/next) and are pre-existing.

Sanitization gate re-run and passing.

Verified for the record, since I could not verify my own work: rev-code-01
confirmed the no-fallback claim TRUE against helper content on origin/next, and
judged the evidence rules actionable on the grounds that each names an executable
replacement.
2026-08-18 18:51:15 -05:00
fred a3c50d91ca guides: genericize the operator name in SEAT-IDENTITY provisioning
ci/woodpecker/pr/ci Pipeline failed
Pipeline 2514 failed the sanitization gate on 'Jason mints the token into the
seat slot'. The denylist is jarvis|jason|woltje|... and a shipped framework file
must not carry operator identity. My mistake: I generalized the estate paths and
seat names when promoting this guide and did not check the operator name.

Now reads 'the estate operator', with the accompanying rule that an agent does
not ask another agent to mint one either.

Verified by running tools/quality/scripts/verify-sanitized.sh locally rather than
guessing at the pattern: gate passes.
2026-08-18 18:28:37 -05:00
fred 2fd102e6af guides: state the decree, drop the mechanism
ci/woodpecker/pr/ci Pipeline failed
The #1280 prohibition carried an explanation of how the tools misattribute and
why the failure is invisible from inside them. A reader who is not going to use
the tool cannot act on any of it. Same for rule 2's closing clause about what
reviews commonly miss. Both cut to the decree and the corrective action.

Rules 1 and 3-12 keep their trailing sentences: those are corrective actions or
the detail that makes the case recognizable, not justification.
2026-08-18 18:25:47 -05:00
fred efb3c3a10c guides: add SEAT-IDENTITY and FLEET-COMMS; harden CODE-REVIEW evidence rules
ci/woodpecker/pr/ci Pipeline failed
Three guides that existed only as one host's working copy, promoted to framework
templates so every estate gets them. A working copy under ~/.mosaic binds one
host; only a template here binds all of them.

SEAT-IDENTITY.md (new) documents how a seat's git credential is actually
resolved after #1311: identity from MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY, then
mosaic.gitIdentity, then the stdin username; host mapped to a store prefix; then
ONE of two stores chosen by whether the seat directory exists, with no
precedence and no fallback between them. A seat with a directory and an empty
slot fails closed rather than reaching the service store, and that is the point.

It also corrects how to find the helper. credential.helper commonly names an
absolute path, so `command -v git-credential-mosaic` answers a different question
than the one git asks, and the two stop agreeing the moment the PATH copy is
removed. Git also tries EVERY configured helper in order, so a fail-closed helper
in front silently hands the request to whatever is configured behind it. The
guide says to read the whole list.

FLEET-COMMS.md (new) documents agent-send.sh: the class table, the addressing
preamble, and the exit codes — including that rc=2 means the text reached the
pane as an unsubmitted draft, so retrying double-sends it. Confirm with
capture-pane instead. It also says to measure the fleet rather than trust
roster.yaml, which on a live host was simultaneously naming a socket that did not
exist, listing seats that were not running, and omitting seats that were.

CODE-REVIEW.md gains an Evidence Discipline section: a green is not a result
until you have shown it could go red, measurement and explanation are separate
sentences, verify by content on the ref that ships rather than by ancestry of a
local sha, and confidence is part of a finding. Plus four shell-measurement rules
earned on #1311, each of which produced a wrong conclusion first — `cmd | tail;
echo rc=$?` reports tail's status, a missed glob under pipefail exits 2 and kills
the run under set -e, nonzero-with-no-output is an environment question before it
is a code question, and `git -C` in a non-repo directory answers from the
enclosing repo.

The estate-specific repository exception that lived in the working copy is not
carried here. The template says an estate may document one, scoped to a named
repository and never precedent for a second.

Both new guides are added to the two routing tables that agents read.
2026-08-18 18:15:50 -05:00
jason.woltje d4d32a80b2 Merge pull request 'git credentials: fail closed, and read a seat's token from its own slot' (#1311) from fred/credential-fail-closed-seat-slots into next
ci/woodpecker/push/publish Pipeline was successful
Reviewed-on: #1311
2026-08-18 22:40:46 +00:00
fred c703cc50eb git-credential-mosaic: escape the escalation record, and stop naming a record that was never written
ci/woodpecker/pr/ci Pipeline was successful
Both defects found in review by rev-code-01 on #1311.

F3 — the JSONL record interpolated every field with a bare %s. An identity comes
from git config or the environment and a cwd is whatever directory git ran in, so
either can contain a quote or a backslash. One such refusal turned the day's spool
into unparseable JSONL, and the operator would only discover it while reading the
record that explains an outage. Fields are now JSON-escaped.

F2 — the diagnostic printed "record: <spool>/<date>.jsonl" unconditionally, but
the record is only written inside the branch where mkdir -p succeeded. When the
spool cannot be created the helper named a file that does not exist, on exactly
the hosts where the escalation was lost. It now reports the real path or says
NOT WRITTEN.

Also: prettier on README.md, which was the format-step failure on pipeline 2508.
It reflowed only the two tables this branch added.

Tests: cases 14 and 15 cover both. Verified discriminating — against the previous
helper with these same tests, case 14 fails with the unparseable record printed
and case 15 fails on both assertions; against this one both pass.

The first draft of case 14 used `ls "$spool"/*.jsonl | head -1`, which under
`set -o pipefail` exits 2 on a missed glob and killed the suite with zero output
— the same silent-nonzero failure rev-code-01 hit from a partial tools/ extraction
and the reason this file exists. Replaced with a glob loop and a comment.
2026-08-18 17:04:55 -05:00
fred 3d2b712355 git credentials: fail closed, and read a seat's token from its own slot
ci/woodpecker/pr/ci Pipeline failed
Two changes to one rule: a credential is resolved from exactly one place,
and an identity that cannot be resolved is refused rather than substituted.

FAIL CLOSED. Both readers ended in an unconditional fall-through to the
shared Gitea account whenever an identity did not resolve. Every seat in a
fleet therefore pushed, opened PRs and filed reviews under one account, and
a record made that way cannot be traced to the agent that made it
afterwards. The fallback now applies only where there is no attribution to
lose: a host with no fleet. Where seats exist, an unresolvable request emits
nothing, exits nonzero, explains itself on stderr, and — in the git helper —
appends a record naming the identity, host, reason and cwd, and no token
value, to ${MOSAIC_CREDENTIAL_SPOOL:-~/.local/state/mosaic-credential-escalations}.

A host runs a fleet when <brain>/fleet/agents exists, which is the signal
packages/mosaic/src/fleet/brain-home.ts already uses to decide a brain is
active, resolved the same way (MOSAIC_BRAIN_HOME, else ~/.mosaic). This is
what keeps the change a no-op for an operator who has not provisioned
per-slot tokens: no fleet directory, shared account, unchanged. It is also
why there is no environment variable to restore the old behavior — one would
reintroduce the substitution being removed.

STORE SELECTION. Both readers hardcoded ~/.config/mosaic/secrets/gitea-tokens,
so a seat's own secrets/ slot was invisible to the framework: a seat could
hold a valid credential and still be served the shared account. The store is
now chosen by what the identity is. An identity with a directory under
<brain>/fleet/agents/ is a seat and is read only from
<brain>/fleet/agents/<id>/secrets/; any other identity is a service identity
and is read from the framework store. There is no precedence between them
and no fallback from one to the other, so a seat with an empty slot is
refused even when a same-named token sits in the framework store. Two copies
of one credential are drift rather than redundancy, and drift surfaces as
the stale copy returning 401, which reads as a revoked token and sends
whoever debugs it somewhere else.

detect-platform.sh is in scope alongside git-credential-mosaic because they
are the two readers of these tokens. Patching only the git helper would make
"one credential, one location" true for push and fetch and false for
pr-create.sh, issue-create.sh and pr-review.sh, which is the harder failure
to notice.

TESTS. The three assertions that pinned the shared-account fall-through are
now fail-closed assertions, and a refusal is checked four independent ways:
nonzero exit, empty stdout, a stderr diagnostic naming identity and host,
and no shared token value anywhere in the output. The exit code alone would
pass against a helper that emitted the credential and then failed. Added:
seat-slot resolution, the no-cross-store-fallback case with a control
proving the framework-store file it declines to read is readable, no-identity
on a fleet host, the fleet gate firing on the default ~/.mosaic and not only
on an injected MOSAIC_BRAIN_HOME, and a cross-host leak check. Both suites
were run against the pre-change code as a control and fail there on exactly
the shared-token emission.

shellcheck is not installed on the authoring host, so the rewritten helper
is unlinted locally and CI is the first lint of it.
2026-08-18 16:19:43 -05:00
fargo 245e0c427d feat(quality-rails): typed evaluator absorbs QC-19/QC-20; verify-release wiring (RI-3-002, #1275) (#1308)
ci/woodpecker/push/publish Pipeline failed
2026-08-18 17:54:47 +00:00
23 changed files with 2609 additions and 185 deletions
+1 -1
View File
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@
| RI-1-002 | done | RI-N1 negative control: checked-in tests proving a broken mandatory check blocks every publish step and that DAG edges cannot be bypassed | #1275 | pi-glm-5.3 | mosaicstack/stack | test/ri-050-publish-gate-negative | RI-1-001 | 12K | |
| RI-2-001 | done | RI-N2 (Forge): remove stub-executor false success; `--simulate` typed `simulated` results that satisfy nothing; literal-`true` gates and echo-review replaced with real gates or typed waiting-for-authority | #1275 | pi-glm-5.3 | mosaicstack/stack | fix/ri-050-forge-fail-closed | RI-0-001 | 20K | Independent review APPROVED 2026-08-17 (Gitea review 172 on PR #1278, head 99b8f6ea; reviewing seat fargo — recorded under shared host principal mos-dt-0, provenance correction posted by fred; wrapper gap filed by fred). Executed at head: forge tests 116/116, lint green, typecheck green after building macp dist (minimal-install artifact, not a defect), workspace typecheck 45/45, no external type consumers of the changed interfaces. CI red = known lane-wide fleet-test failure only, carries no information about this change (fred, log-content analysis, pipelines 2456-2458). Non-blocking finding: README L141-143 + skills/mosaic-forge/SKILL.md document bare forge run/resume, which now fails closed — fast-follow docs touch. Merge queued behind #1270. UPDATE 2026-08-18: #1270 merged; CI GREEN at head 4917df1f via serialized retry (pipeline 2477) - root cause of prior reds was CI-agent contention (web SPA timeouts under concurrent pipelines), superseding the fleet-test-failure theory. |
| RI-2-002 | done | RI-N2 (MACP): gate runner fails closed on empty commands, stub executors, and unimplemented CI-provider gates unless explicit simulate; typed capability failures | #1275 | pi-glm-5.3 | mosaicstack/stack | fix/ri-050-macp-fail-closed | RI-0-001 | 15K | PR #1293 (head 2097379e): CI green (pipeline 2465), independent review APPROVED (Gitea review 173, jarvis seat, 2026-08-17) - macp 109/109 verified at head. Merge queued behind #1276/#1277/#1278. |
| RI-3-001 | in-progress | RI-N4: complete probe inventory mapping every TS and shell quality-rail check to one canonical check with disposition (preserve/strengthen/retire, each named) | #1275 | pi-glm-5.3 | mosaicstack/stack | docs/ri-050-qr-probe-inventory | RI-0-001 | 12K | |
| RI-3-001 | done | RI-N4: complete probe inventory mapping every TS and shell quality-rail check to one canonical check with disposition (preserve/strengthen/retire, each named) | #1275 | pi-glm-5.3 | mosaicstack/stack | docs/ri-050-qr-probe-inventory | RI-0-001 | 12K | PR #1302 (head e06a47fac591): CI green (2484), independent review APPROVED (Gitea review 187, fargo seat, 2026-08-18) — 54 rows / 21 canonical checks / dispositions 43-2-9-0 verified by row-count and code spot-checks. Merged by fargo at pinned head. |
| RI-3-002 | not-started | RI-N4: TS evaluator absorbs effective shell probes; typed results (passed/failed/blocked/error/not-applicable) with versioned digested check definitions; shell commands become thin adapters; contract/parity/negative-control tests | #1275 | pi-glm-5.3 | mosaicstack/stack | feat/ri-050-qr-evaluator | RI-3-001 | 30K | |
| RI-4-001 | in-progress | RI-N3: one PRD application service — `mission --plan` persists mission↔PRD linkage (ids/versions/selected requirements); `mosaic prdy` routes through the service or becomes a named import/export adapter; Markdown is a labeled generated view; explicit conflict-aware import | #1275 | pi-glm-5.3 | mosaicstack/stack | feat/ri-050-prd-authority | RI-0-001 | 35K | PR #1294 (head 8d258e1d): CI green (pipeline 2466), independent review APPROVED (Gitea review 174, jarvis seat, 2026-08-17) - prdy 20/20 + command specs 9/9 at head. Merge queued behind #1276/#1277/#1278. |
| RI-5-001 | done | RI-N5: typed freshness states (current/stale/partial/unknown/unavailable); no failed-fetch-renders-empty; stale derived verdicts → unknown; mutations disabled when stale; failure-matrix tests | #1275 | pi-glm-5.3 | mosaicstack/stack | feat/ri-050-web-stale-safety | RI-0-001 | 25K | |
@@ -43,6 +43,8 @@ overwritten on upgrade. (Layer model: `constitution/LAYER-MODEL.md`.)
| Secrets / vault usage | `guides/VAULT-SECRETS.md` |
| Tool/credential reference (service CLIs, wrappers) | `guides/TOOLS-REFERENCE.md` |
| Memory protocol (OpenBrain capture/recall) | `guides/MEMORY.md` |
| Seat identity, git credentials, token slots | `guides/SEAT-IDENTITY.md` |
| Reaching another agent (fleet comms) | `guides/FLEET-COMMS.md` |
## Subagent Model Selection (Cost — Hard Rule)
@@ -15,8 +15,78 @@ Merge strategy enforcement (HARD RULE):
- Merge to `main` MUST be squash-only.
- Use `~/.config/mosaic/tools/git/pr-merge.sh -n {PR_NUMBER} -m squash --expect-head {approved_full_sha}` (or PowerShell equivalent).
An estate MAY carry a documented exception for a repository whose gates are commit hooks rather
than review. Such an exception belongs in that estate's own working copy of this guide, is
scoped to the named repository, and is never precedent for a second one.
**Do not use `pr-review.sh` or `issue-comment.sh` to post a verdict** (mosaicstack#1280). Post
through a direct authenticated API call as your own seat, or hand the verdict to the requesting
seat. Handing it over is a legitimate delivery path, not a fallback.
## Evidence Discipline (applies to every finding)
The checklist below says what to look at. This section says when you are allowed to believe what
you saw. Every rule here was earned by a wrong conclusion that reached a report.
1. **A finding is a claim about behavior.** State the failing input, the path taken, and the
wrong result. "This looks fragile" is not a finding.
2. **A green check is not a result until you have shown it could go red.** Run the control. A
`0`, an empty result, or a column of identical values with no failing counterpart is a
non-result.
3. **Measurement and explanation are separate sentences.** Report the command and its output,
then, as its own sentence, what you think it means.
4. **Never widen the case you measured.** If you checked one path, the finding covers one path.
5. **Reproduce a reported failure before recording it, and say which tree you measured.** Two
correct measurements of two different trees disagree without either being wrong.
6. **Verify by content on the ref that ships**, never by ancestry of a local sha. A rebase mints
new shas; a commit being an ancestor of something local proves nothing about the remote.
Compare by digest against `origin/<branch>`.
7. **Confidence is part of the finding.** "I could not reproduce this" is a usable review
comment. A confident guess is not.
8. **Author is not reviewer** (Gate-16). Do not review your own work, or work you shaped closely
enough to be a co-author of. Say so and hand it back.
### Measuring a shell suite
Each of these produced a wrong conclusion before it was written down.
9. **`cmd | tail; echo rc=$?` reports `tail`'s exit code, not `cmd`'s.** It reads as a pass when
the command failed. Redirect to a file and check `rc` directly, or use `${PIPESTATUS[0]}`.
10. **Under `set -o pipefail`, a missed glob makes `ls` exit 2**, the pipeline inherits it, and
`set -e` kills the run. Iterate a glob with a `for` loop and an `-e` test instead of piping
`ls`.
11. **A suite that exits nonzero with ZERO output is an environment question, not a defect in
the code under review.** The usual cause is a sourced dependency that is absent, so `set -e`
kills the first case before anything prints. Extract whole tool trees — `tools/git` alone is
missing `tools/_lib/credentials.sh`. Isolate the variable and prove it by adding only that
back.
12. **`git -C <dir>` in a directory that is not itself a repo answers from the enclosing repo.**
A scratch tree under `~/.mosaic` reports `~/.mosaic`'s HEAD, not the PR's, and every
conclusion drawn from it describes the wrong tree. Confirm `git rev-parse --show-toplevel`
is the tree you think it is before trusting any git output.
### Feedback Categories
- **Blocker**: must fix before merge (security, bugs, test failures)
- **Should Fix**: important but not blocking (code quality, minor issues)
- **Suggestion**: optional improvement (style preference, nice-to-have)
- **Question**: seeking clarification
## Review Checklist
Reviewer seats split this checklist by class rather than duplicating it. A seat reviews its own
sections in full and may raise anything it notices outside them as a Suggestion, never as a
Blocker on someone else's ground.
| Reviewer class | Owns |
| ---------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| `rev-code-*` | 1 Correctness, 3 Testing, 4 Code Quality, 4a TypeScript, 5 Documentation, 6 Performance, 7 Dependencies |
| `rev-security-*` | 2 Security, 2a OWASP |
Where two seats of the same class review the same change, they review independently and compare
after. A second seat that reads the first seat's findings before measuring is a proofreader, not
a second opinion.
### 1. Correctness
- [ ] Code does what the issue/PR description says
@@ -53,7 +123,7 @@ Merge strategy enforcement (HARD RULE):
- [ ] Tests cover happy path AND error cases
- [ ] Situational tests cover all impacted change surfaces (primary gate)
- [ ] Tests validate required behavior/outcomes, not only internal implementation details
- [ ] TDD was applied when required by `~/.config/mosaic/guides/QA-TESTING.md`
- [ ] TDD was applied when required by `guides/QA-TESTING.md`
- [ ] Coverage meets 85% minimum
- [ ] Tests are readable and maintainable
- [ ] No flaky tests introduced
@@ -82,7 +152,7 @@ Merge strategy enforcement (HARD RULE):
### 5. Documentation
- [ ] Complex logic has explanatory comments
- [ ] Required docs updated per `~/.config/mosaic/guides/DOCUMENTATION.md`
- [ ] Required docs updated per `guides/DOCUMENTATION.md`
- [ ] Public APIs are documented
- [ ] Private/internal APIs are documented
- [ ] API input/output schemas are documented
@@ -126,13 +196,6 @@ git diff main...HEAD
- Distinguish between blocking issues and suggestions
- Be constructive, not critical of the person
### Feedback Categories
- **Blocker**: Must fix before merge (security, bugs, test failures)
- **Should Fix**: Important but not blocking (code quality, minor issues)
- **Suggestion**: Optional improvements (style preferences, nice-to-haves)
- **Question**: Seeking clarification
### Review Comment Format
```
@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
# Fleet Comms Guide
How one seat reaches another on a host. The mechanism is the framework's; the sessions and
sockets are per-host, so measure yours rather than trusting an example.
`mosaic <runtime>` would normally inject the addressing block from the roster. Where the composer
is unavailable, or where the roster is stale, this guide is the substitute.
## Measure the fleet; do not trust the roster
`fleet/roster.yaml` is a declaration of intent, not an observation. It routinely names a socket
that was never created, lists seats that are not running, and omits seats that are — this was
all three have been observed true at once on a live host. Find out what is actually
up before addressing anyone:
```bash
tmux list-sessions
tmux list-panes -a -F '#{session_name} #{pane_current_command} #{pane_current_path}'
```
The pane command tells you the runtime. A pane showing `bash` is an idle shell with no agent
attached — a send there lands in a shell prompt and is not read by anyone.
Use the **default socket**. Do not pass `-L mosaic-fleet` on the strength of the roster.
## Sending
```bash
~/.config/mosaic/tools/tmux/agent-send.sh -s <dst_session> -C <class> -m "<message>"
```
`-s` also accepts `session:window.pane`. `-f <file>` sends a file body; stdin works too.
### Classes
`-C` takes exactly one of these. Anything else exits 3.
| Class | Use for |
| -------------- | -------------------------------------------------------- |
| `terminal-log` | log only; never needs the agent's attention |
| `actionable` | a decision, blocker, gate, or question needing an answer |
| `human` | relayed from a human operator |
| `reaction` | an ack or acknowledgement token |
| `digest` | machine wake, coalescible |
An absent class is treated as `actionable` by consumers, which is the fail-safe direction. Prefer
naming it anyway.
### Addressing preamble
The wire format is `[<src> -> <dst> class=<class>] <body>`. Flip it when you reply — the tool
sends, it does not auto-reply.
### Exit codes
| rc | Meaning |
| --- | ---------------------------------------------- |
| 0 | delivered or queued |
| 1 | target session not found |
| 2 | text reached the pane but is **still a draft** |
| 3 | usage error (bad class, missing `-s`) |
**Never retry on rc=2.** The message is in the target pane; retrying double-sends it. Confirm
instead:
```bash
tmux capture-pane -p -t <session>:0.0 | tail -20
```
rc=2 is the normal result when the target is an idle pi seat.
## Durable comms
tmux delivery is host-local and does not survive a pane. Anything that must outlive the session
goes through the estate's durable comms protocol — a committed `comms/` tree in an estate repo,
with its own README. Use it for cross-host messages, verdicts, and anything a later session needs
to find.
## Handing work across seats
1. **A verdict handed to the requesting seat is a legitimate delivery path**, and the required one
for anything `pr-review.sh` would otherwise post (see `guides/CODE-REVIEW.md`).
2. **Address the seat, not the runtime.** A seat name is a session name; whether it runs claude,
pi or codex is not the sender's business.
3. **Say what you measured, not just what you concluded** — the receiving seat cannot see your
terminal.
@@ -0,0 +1,133 @@
# Seat Identity & Credentials Guide
Every agent that touches a Mosaic-managed git host acts as a named seat with its own credential.
This guide is how that works on a host, and what an agent must never do with it.
The mechanism below is the framework's. The specific paths, seats and stores are per-host:
measure yours before trusting any of them.
## The rule
**One seat, one identity, one token file.** A seat never borrows another seat's credential, never
falls back to a shared owner account, and never carries a second copy of its own token. A second
copy is drift, and drift surfaces as the stale copy returning 401 — which reads as a revoked
token and sends whoever debugs it somewhere else entirely.
A credential refusal is correct behavior, not a bug to route around. If git refuses with a
fail-closed diagnostic, the fix is to provision or correct _your_ identity. Escalate; do not
substitute.
## How a credential is resolved
Find the helper the way **git** does, not with `command -v`. Git runs whatever
`credential.helper` names, and on a Mosaic host that is an absolute path — so a PATH lookup
answers a different question and the two disagree the moment the PATH copy is removed. It was
removed on hosts that have completed that migration.
```bash
git config --get-all credential.helper # every helper, in the order git tries them
```
Git tries **each** configured helper in turn until one supplies a credential. A fail-closed
helper supplies nothing, so a second helper configured behind it silently becomes the one that
answers. When you care which binary serves a credential, read the whole list.
Resolve all three forms git accepts — absolute path, `!command`, and a bare name looked up on
PATH — not just the one your host happens to use.
The helper resolves the identity in this order:
1. `$MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY`
2. `git config --get mosaic.gitIdentity`
3. the username git supplied on stdin
It maps the host to a store prefix — `git.mosaicstack.dev` to `gitea-mosaicstack`,
`git.uscllc.com` to `gitea-usc`. Any other host is declined quietly with rc=0, which is not an
error and raises no escalation.
Then it chooses **one** of two stores, and reads exactly one file:
```
brain_home = ${MOSAIC_BRAIN_HOME:-$HOME/.mosaic}
seat — when $brain_home/fleet/agents/<identity>/ EXISTS
$brain_home/fleet/agents/<identity>/secrets/<prefix>-<identity>.token
service — otherwise
~/.config/mosaic/secrets/gitea-tokens/<prefix>-<identity>.token
```
**There is no precedence between the two and no fallback from one to the other.** The existence
of the seat directory decides it. A seat that has a directory and an empty slot fails closed; it
does not reach the service store. That is the intended behavior — the alternative is an agent
silently acting as somebody else.
If the file is unreadable the helper **fails closed**: it refuses and writes a durable record to
the escalation spool. It does not fall back to a shared account. The record is what exists — any
alerting built on top of it is a separate, best-effort concern and is not performed by the helper,
so do not wait for a notification that nothing sends. That fallback is what made
`usc/uconnect#3084` unattributable, and it was removed deliberately.
Verify the helper you actually have:
```bash
h=$(git config --get credential.helper)
grep -c 'FAIL CLOSED' "$h" # expect >= 1
grep -c 'fleet/agents' "$h" # expect >= 1; 0 means it predates mosaicstack#1311
```
## Where a seat's token lives
The seat slot is the **only** copy:
```
~/.mosaic/fleet/agents/<seat>/secrets/<prefix>-<seat>.token real file, mode 600
```
The framework store at `~/.config/mosaic/secrets/gitea-tokens/` holds tokens for **service
identities only** — identities with no seat directory. A seat's token does not belong there.
Before mosaicstack#1311 the deployed helper knew only the service store, and seats were bridged
with a symlink from the store into the slot. **Those bridges must be removed once a seat-aware helper is deployed, and must not be
recreated.** Remove them only after the helper can reach the slot without them; the reverse order
takes every seat offline. A symlink
is not how a system finds a credential; the helper resolving the right store is.
`.principal` and `.scopes` beside the token are grant records, not secrets. They are tracked. The
`.token` never is.
### Provisioning a new seat
1. Create `~/.mosaic/fleet/agents/<seat>/secrets/` mode 700.
2. Write `.principal` (the Gitea login) and `.scopes` (the granted scopes), mode 600.
3. The estate operator mints the token into the seat slot, mode 600. Agents do not mint their
own, and do not ask another agent to mint one for them.
4. Verify with an authenticated `GET /user` and confirm the returned login is the seat, **not the
minting account**. Record the date in `ENTITY.md`. Never record the value.
There is no step that links the framework store to the slot. A seat-aware helper reads the slot
directly; a store entry pointing at a slot is the bridge described in **Where a seat's token lives** above,
and it is not part of provisioning.
Until step 3, the seat is unminted and its git writes fail closed. That is the designed state and
is safe to launch in — the seat is told at launch so it does not discover it mid-task.
## Acting as yourself
Name the identity on every invocation:
```bash
MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY=<seat> git push
git -c user.name=<seat> -c user.email=<seat>@mosaicstack.dev commit -m "..."
```
**Never persist `git config mosaic.gitIdentity` inside a `~/src/stack` worktree.** Every worktree
of that clone shares one `.git/config`, so a persisted identity there silently rewrites the
identity of every other seat working in that clone. The per-invocation form has no exception.
## Handling
1. **Never print a token value.** Compare by SHA-256 digest, or write `<REDACTED>`.
2. **Never stage a `.token`, `secrets.json`, or `ENTITY.md`.** Stage explicit paths and **never
`git add -A`** — `secrets/*.principal` and `secrets/*.scopes` are covered by no ignore rule.
3. **Never place a token in an environment variable** in an interactive session. A `declare -x`
dump has leaked the whole environment to a terminal before.
4. **No real credential or operator data on a sandbox VM, ever.**
@@ -15,3 +15,5 @@
| Infrastructure/DevOps | `~/.config/mosaic/guides/INFRASTRUCTURE.md` |
| QA/Testing | `~/.config/mosaic/guides/QA-TESTING.md` |
| Secrets management (Vault) | `~/.config/mosaic/guides/VAULT-SECRETS.md` |
| Seat identity / git credentials | `~/.config/mosaic/guides/SEAT-IDENTITY.md` |
| Reaching another agent (fleet comms) | `~/.config/mosaic/guides/FLEET-COMMS.md` |
+49 -7
View File
@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ fleet commits, pushes, and opens PRs under one identity — with no cryptographi
separation between an author and a reviewer.
Both `git-credential-mosaic` and `get_gitea_token()` resolve an optional **per-agent
identity** before falling back to the shared account:
identity**:
1. `MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY` environment variable, or
2. `git config --get mosaic.gitIdentity` (set per-worktree; persists on disk across
@@ -51,12 +51,54 @@ identity** before falling back to the shared account:
3. (git-credential-mosaic only) the username git itself supplies for the credential
request.
If the resolved identity has a token file at
`~/.config/mosaic/secrets/gitea-tokens/gitea-{usc,mosaicstack}-<agent-id>.token`, that
identity + token is used. **Nothing configured → nothing changes**: with no per-slot
token file present, both tools fall through to the existing shared-account path
unchanged, so this feature is a no-op on any host that hasn't provisioned per-slot
tokens.
### Which store a credential is read from
The store is chosen by what the identity **is**, not by which file happens to exist first:
| The identity | Its credential is read from |
| ------------------------------------------------------------------ | -------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| has a directory at `<brain>/fleet/agents/<id>/` — it is a **seat** | `<brain>/fleet/agents/<id>/secrets/gitea-{usc,mosaicstack}-<id>.token` |
| does not — it is a **service identity** | `~/.config/mosaic/secrets/gitea-tokens/gitea-{usc,mosaicstack}-<id>.token` |
`<brain>` is `MOSAIC_BRAIN_HOME` if set, else `~/.mosaic` — the same resolution
`packages/mosaic/src/fleet/brain-home.ts` performs.
**There is no precedence between the two stores and no fallback from one to the other.**
A seat whose slot is empty is refused even when a same-named token sits in the framework
store. One credential lives in exactly one location: a second copy is drift rather than
redundancy, and the way drift surfaces is a stale copy returning 401, which reads as a
revoked token and sends whoever debugs it to the wrong place.
### What happens when nothing resolves
| identity resolves | token in its store | host runs a fleet | result |
| ----------------- | ------------------ | ----------------- | ------------------------- |
| yes | yes | — | that identity + token |
| yes | no | — | **fail closed** |
| no | — | yes | **fail closed** |
| no | — | no | shared account, unchanged |
A host "runs a fleet" when `<brain>/fleet/agents` exists — the same signal `brain-home.ts`
uses to decide a brain is active.
Failing closed means: nothing is emitted, the exit status is nonzero, a stderr diagnostic
names the identity, its source, the store it resolved to and the path that was expected,
and `git-credential-mosaic` additionally appends a record (identity, host, reason, cwd —
never a token value) to `${MOSAIC_CREDENTIAL_SPOOL:-~/.local/state/mosaic-credential-escalations}`.
The git operation fails; nothing is attributed to anyone.
The shared-account fallback that used to cover these two cases is why a PR could be
authored, commented and merged under an account whose owner did not open it — every seat
shared one identity, so the record could not be traced back afterwards. An
under-provisioned agent is refused rather than handed the most privileged account
available.
**On a host with no fleet, nothing changes**: no `fleet/agents` directory means the shared
account still answers, so this is a no-op for an operator who has not provisioned per-slot
tokens. On a host that does run a fleet, a human doing manual git work needs an identity
of their own — `MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY=<id>` with a provisioned slot. There is deliberately no
environment variable that restores the fallback; one would reintroduce exactly the
substitution this removes.
### Enabling it for a clone
@@ -507,37 +507,69 @@ get_gitea_token() {
# 0. Per-agent identity (Gate-16 author≠reviewer). If MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY, or the
# per-worktree `git config mosaic.gitIdentity`, resolves to an agent that has a
# stored per-slot token for this host, act AS that agent so API tooling
# stored credential for this host, act AS that agent so API tooling
# (pr-create, issue-create, …) authors under the right identity — matching the
# git credential helper. Backward-compatible: nothing resolvable → shared logic below.
# git credential helper, which this block deliberately mirrors.
local _ident="${MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY:-}"
local _ident_src="MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY"
if [[ -z "$_ident" ]]; then
_ident="$(git config --get mosaic.gitIdentity 2>/dev/null || true)"
_ident_src="git config mosaic.gitIdentity"
fi
if [[ -n "$_ident" ]]; then
# Recognized Gitea hosts are the ones carrying the per-identity token scheme.
local _idpfx=""
case "$host" in
git.uscllc.com) _idpfx=gitea-usc ;;
git.mosaicstack.dev) _idpfx=gitea-mosaicstack ;;
esac
if [[ -n "$_idpfx" ]]; then
local _idtok="$HOME/.config/mosaic/secrets/gitea-tokens/${_idpfx}-${_ident}.token"
# Brain-home resolution mirrors packages/mosaic/src/fleet/brain-home.ts and
# tools/fleet/start-agent-session.sh: MOSAIC_BRAIN_HOME wins, else ~/.mosaic.
local _brain_home="${MOSAIC_BRAIN_HOME:-$HOME/.mosaic}"
if [[ -n "$_ident" && -n "$_idpfx" ]]; then
# Credential store selection: an identity is a SEAT or a SERVICE, and which
# one it is decides where its credential lives. No precedence between the
# two stores and no fallback from one to the other — a seat with an empty
# slot fails loud rather than reading a service credential of the same name.
# One credential, one location: two copies diverge, and the stale copy fails
# in a way that reads as a revoked token rather than as drift.
local _idtok _ident_kind
if [[ -d "$_brain_home/fleet/agents/$_ident" ]]; then
_ident_kind="seat"
_idtok="$_brain_home/fleet/agents/$_ident/secrets/${_idpfx}-${_ident}.token"
else
_ident_kind="service identity"
_idtok="$HOME/.config/mosaic/secrets/gitea-tokens/${_idpfx}-${_ident}.token"
fi
if [[ -r "$_idtok" ]]; then
cat "$_idtok"
return 0
fi
# FAIL LOUD: an explicit git identity was requested for a recognized Gitea host,
# but no per-slot token exists for THAT identity. Refuse to fall through to the
# shared/default credential loader below — silently borrowing another slot's token
# would post PRs/issues/reviews under the WRONG agent (e.g. rev2's review attributed
# to coder3), corrupting Gate-16 author≠reviewer separation. Hard-stop instead so the
# caller aborts loudly rather than acting as the wrong identity.
# but no credential exists for THAT identity. Refuse to fall through to the
# shared/default credential loader below — silently borrowing another identity's
# token would post PRs/issues/reviews under the WRONG agent (e.g. rev2's review
# attributed to coder3), corrupting Gate-16 author≠reviewer separation. Hard-stop
# instead so the caller aborts loudly rather than acting as the wrong identity.
echo "Error: git identity '$_ident' requested (via $_ident_src) for host '$host', but no per-slot token at $_idtok." >&2
echo " Refusing to borrow another slot's token. Provision the per-slot token, or unset the identity to use shared credentials." >&2
echo " Resolved as a ${_ident_kind}; there is no fallback between the seat and service stores." >&2
echo " Refusing to borrow another slot's token. Provision the credential at that path, or unset the identity to use shared credentials." >&2
return 1
fi
# FAIL LOUD: no identity resolved, on a host that HAS a fleet. Where seats exist,
# every record must name the agent that made it, so an unattributable request is
# refused rather than handed the shared account. `fleet/agents` existing is the
# same signal brain-home.ts uses to decide a brain is active. A host with no fleet
# keeps the shared path below unchanged: there the shared account is the operator's
# own and there is no attribution to lose.
if [[ -z "$_ident" && -n "$_idpfx" && -d "$_brain_home/fleet/agents" ]]; then
echo "Error: no git identity resolved for host '$host', but this host runs a fleet ($_brain_home/fleet/agents)." >&2
echo " Refusing to fall back to the shared account: records it creates cannot be attributed to the agent that made them." >&2
echo " Set MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY=<agent-id> or 'git config mosaic.gitIdentity <agent-id>'." >&2
return 1
fi
# 1. Mosaic credential loader (host → service mapping, run in subshell to avoid polluting env)
@@ -1,21 +1,48 @@
#!/bin/bash
# git-credential-mosaic — git credential helper — resolves Gitea tokens from
# the Mosaic credential store at runtime so remote URLs never embed secrets.
# git-credential-mosaic — git credential helper. Resolves a Gitea token from the
# Mosaic credential store at runtime so remote URLs never embed secrets.
#
# Install (one-time, per clone or globally):
# git config credential.helper "$HOME/.config/mosaic/tools/git/git-credential-mosaic"
# # or, fleet-wide: git config --global credential.helper "$HOME/.config/mosaic/tools/git/git-credential-mosaic"
#
# Per-agent Gate-16 identity (author != reviewer separation):
# Per-agent identity (Gate-16 author != reviewer separation):
# git config mosaic.gitIdentity <agent-id> # per-worktree, persists on disk
# # or: export MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY=<agent-id>
#
# Resolution priority: MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY env > git config mosaic.gitIdentity
# (per-worktree, survives across non-persistent shells) > git-supplied username
# (credential.username / URL). When the resolved identity has a matching
# per-agent token file, use it instead of the shared account. Backward
# compatible: nothing resolvable -> shared token (unchanged behavior).
# ── WHY THIS FAILS CLOSED ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# This helper used to end by emitting the shared account's token for any request
# it could not resolve to an identity. A seat with no identity, or with an
# identity whose token was never provisioned, therefore received the most
# privileged credential configured on the host — silently, and indistinguishably
# from correct operation. Every record it then created (commit, push, PR, review)
# was attributed to that shared account, so author != reviewer separation was
# unenforceable and the true actor was unrecoverable after the fact.
#
# Under-provisioning must fail loudly, not impersonate. A refused git operation
# is recoverable in one command; a merged pull request attributed to the wrong
# principal is not.
#
# ── CONTRACT ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# identity : MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY > git config mosaic.gitIdentity > the
# username git supplies on stdin
# store : chosen by what the identity IS, with no precedence and no
# cross-store fallback (see "Credential store selection" below)
# hit : emit username + password, exit 0
# miss : emit NOTHING, spool a durable escalation record, explain on
# stderr, exit 1 — git surfaces the failure and nothing is attributed
# unknown host : exit 0 with no output, no record (passthrough for non-Mosaic
# remotes handled by another helper)
#
# Backward compatibility is preserved for exactly one case: a host with no fleet
# and no identity requested still gets the shared account, because on such a host
# the shared account is the operator's own and there is no attribution to lose.
# A host that HAS a fleet has agents whose records must be distinguishable, so
# the shared fallback is refused there.
#
# A token is never written to stderr, to the escalation record, or to any log.
[ "$1" = "get" ] || exit 0
host=""; username_in=""
while IFS= read -r line; do
[ -z "$line" ] && break
@@ -24,46 +51,170 @@ while IFS= read -r line; do
username=*) username_in=${line#username=};;
esac
done
# Per-agent identity resolution (Gate-16 author≠reviewer separation).
# Priority: MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY env > git config mosaic.gitIdentity (per-worktree,
# survives across non-persistent shells) > git-supplied username (credential.username
# / URL). When the resolved identity has a matching per-agent token, use it instead of
# the shared account. Backward-compatible: nothing resolvable → shared token.
ident="$MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY"
[ -z "$ident" ] && ident=$(git config --get mosaic.gitIdentity 2>/dev/null)
[ -z "$ident" ] && ident="$username_in"
if [ -n "$ident" ]; then
# Recognized Gitea hosts carry the per-identity token scheme. Anything else is
# declined quietly — another helper owns it, and refusing would break it.
case "$host" in
git.uscllc.com) idpfx=gitea-usc;;
git.mosaicstack.dev) idpfx=gitea-mosaicstack;;
*) idpfx="";;
*) exit 0;;
esac
if [ -n "$idpfx" ]; then
idtok="$HOME/.config/mosaic/secrets/gitea-tokens/${idpfx}-${ident}.token"
ident="$MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY"; ident_src="MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY"
if [ -z "$ident" ]; then
ident=$(git config --get mosaic.gitIdentity 2>/dev/null)
ident_src="git config mosaic.gitIdentity"
fi
if [ -z "$ident" ]; then
ident="$username_in"
ident_src="the username git supplied"
fi
# ── Credential store selection ────────────────────────────────────────────────
# An identity is a SEAT or it is a SERVICE, and which one it is determines where
# its credential lives. There is no precedence rule between the two stores and no
# fallback from one to the other: a seat whose slot is empty fails closed rather
# than reading a service credential that happens to share its name.
#
# seat — <brain>/fleet/agents/<ident>/ exists
# credential at <brain>/fleet/agents/<ident>/secrets/<idpfx>-<ident>.token
# service — it does not
# credential at ~/.config/mosaic/secrets/gitea-tokens/<idpfx>-<ident>.token
#
# One credential, one location. Two copies of one credential diverge, and the
# stale copy fails in a way that reads as a revoked token rather than as drift.
#
# Brain-home resolution mirrors packages/mosaic/src/fleet/brain-home.ts and
# tools/fleet/start-agent-session.sh: MOSAIC_BRAIN_HOME wins, else ~/.mosaic.
brain_home="${MOSAIC_BRAIN_HOME:-$HOME/.mosaic}"
svc_store="$HOME/.config/mosaic/secrets/gitea-tokens"
idtok=""; ident_kind=""
if [ -n "$ident" ]; then
if [ -d "$brain_home/fleet/agents/$ident" ]; then
ident_kind="seat"
idtok="$brain_home/fleet/agents/$ident/secrets/${idpfx}-${ident}.token"
else
ident_kind="service identity"
idtok="$svc_store/${idpfx}-${ident}.token"
fi
if [ -r "$idtok" ]; then
echo "username=${ident}"
echo "password=$(cat "$idtok")"
exit 0
fi
fi
fi
case "$host" in
git.uscllc.com) svc=gitea-usc;;
git.mosaicstack.dev) svc=gitea-mosaicstack;;
*) exit 0;;
esac
# Script-relative (not $HOME-absolute) so this resolves correctly regardless
# of where the framework installer places tools/ under $HOME — mirrors
# detect-platform.sh's own cred_loader resolution in this same directory.
# ── Shared-account fallback: ONLY on a host with no fleet and no identity ──────
# `fleet/agents` existing is the same signal brain-home.ts uses to decide a brain
# is active. Where there are seats, records must be attributable, so an
# unresolvable request is refused instead of borrowing the shared account.
fleet_present=0
[ -d "$brain_home/fleet/agents" ] && fleet_present=1
if [ -z "$ident" ] && [ "$fleet_present" -eq 0 ]; then
script_dir="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
# shellcheck source=../_lib/credentials.sh
source "$script_dir/../_lib/credentials.sh"
load_credentials "$svc" >/dev/null 2>&1 || exit 0
# GITEA_USER is not populated by load_credentials (it only exports
# GITEA_URL/GITEA_TOKEN for gitea-*), so this fallback is normally taken. Gitea's
# git-over-HTTP auth authenticates from the token itself (the password field),
# not from the username string, so any non-empty placeholder works here — this
# is deliberately NOT a real account name (framework files must stay
# operator-agnostic; see tools/quality/scripts/verify-sanitized.sh).
load_credentials "$idpfx" >/dev/null 2>&1 || exit 0
# GITEA_USER is not populated by load_credentials (it exports GITEA_URL and
# GITEA_TOKEN only). Gitea's git-over-HTTP auth authenticates from the token in
# the password field, not from the username string, so any non-empty
# placeholder works — deliberately NOT a real account name, since framework
# files stay operator-agnostic (tools/quality/scripts/verify-sanitized.sh).
echo "username=${GITEA_USER:-git}"
echo "password=$GITEA_TOKEN"
exit 0
fi
# ── FAIL CLOSED ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
if [ -z "$ident" ]; then
reason="no-identity"
else
reason="no-token-for-identity"
fi
seat="${MOSAIC_AGENT_NAME:-unknown}"
ts=$(date -u +%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ)
# The escalation RECORD is durable and unconditional; any notification built on
# top of it is best-effort. Record and alert are deduplicated separately — a cap
# on the alert alone lets the spool grow without bound exactly while the operator
# is being told nothing, so the louder the failure the quieter it gets.
#
# A record field is arbitrary operator-supplied text: an identity comes from git
# config or the environment, and cwd is whatever directory git ran in. Either can
# contain a quote or a backslash, which would make the line unparseable JSON --
# and a spool that silently stops parsing is worse than no spool, because the
# operator only discovers it while reading the record that explains an outage.
json_escape() {
local s=$1
s=${s//\\/\\\\}
s=${s//\"/\\\"}
s=${s//$'\t'/\\t}
s=${s//$'\r'/\\r}
s=${s//$'\n'/\\n}
printf '%s' "$s"
}
spool="${MOSAIC_CREDENTIAL_SPOOL:-$HOME/.local/state/mosaic-credential-escalations}"
spool_record=""
if mkdir -p "$spool" 2>/dev/null; then
chmod 700 "$spool" 2>/dev/null
spoolfile="$spool/$(date -u +%Y%m%d).jsonl"
dedupe="$spool/.spooled-${seat}-${ident:-none}-${reason}-$(date -u +%Y%m%d%H%M)"
if [ ! -e "$dedupe" ]; then
: > "$dedupe" 2>/dev/null
printf '{"ts":"%s","reason":"%s","identity":"%s","identity_source":"%s","kind":"%s","seat":"%s","host":"%s","cwd":"%s"}\n' \
"$(json_escape "$ts")" "$(json_escape "$reason")" \
"$(json_escape "${ident:-<unset>}")" "$(json_escape "$ident_src")" \
"$(json_escape "${ident_kind:-none}")" "$(json_escape "$seat")" \
"$(json_escape "$host")" "$(json_escape "$PWD")" \
>> "$spoolfile" 2>/dev/null
chmod 600 "$spoolfile" 2>/dev/null
fi
# Name the record only if one is actually on disk. Printing the path
# unconditionally sends the operator to a file that does not exist on exactly
# the hosts where the spool could not be created.
[ -s "$spoolfile" ] && spool_record="$spoolfile"
find "$spool" -maxdepth 1 -name '.spooled-*' -mmin +120 -delete 2>/dev/null
fi
cat >&2 <<EOF
git-credential-mosaic: REFUSED (fail-closed).
host : ${host}
identity : ${ident:-<unset>}${ident:+ (from ${ident_src}; resolved as a ${ident_kind})}
reason : ${reason}
EOF
if [ -n "$ident" ]; then
cat >&2 <<EOF
expected : ${idtok}
EOF
fi
cat >&2 <<EOF
No per-identity credential resolved. This helper does NOT fall back to the shared
account: that fallback makes every record it creates attributable to one
principal, which is unrecoverable once a pull request has merged under it.
Fix (pick one):
export MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY=<agent-id> # process-scoped
git config mosaic.gitIdentity <agent-id> # per-repo/worktree, persists
Then provision that identity's credential at the path named above. An identity
with a directory under \${MOSAIC_BRAIN_HOME:-\$HOME/.mosaic}/fleet/agents/ is a
seat and is read ONLY from its own secrets/ slot; any other identity is read from
~/.config/mosaic/secrets/gitea-tokens/. There is no fallback between the two.
If this identity legitimately needs git access and has none, ask the orchestrator
to provision one.
EOF
if [ -n "$spool_record" ]; then
echo " record: ${spool_record}" >&2
else
echo " record: NOT WRITTEN — spool unavailable at ${spool}" >&2
fi
exit 1
@@ -1,16 +1,26 @@
#!/usr/bin/env bash
# Regression harness for `git-credential-mosaic` — per-agent Gitea identity
# resolution (Gate-16 author≠reviewer separation).
# resolution (Gate-16 author≠reviewer separation) and fail-closed refusal.
#
# Covers:
# 1. Identity resolution priority: MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY env > git config
# mosaic.gitIdentity (per-worktree) > git-supplied username.
# 2. Correct per-slot token file path chosen per host
# 2. Correct token file path chosen per host
# (gitea-usc-<id>.token vs gitea-mosaicstack-<id>.token).
# 3. Per-slot token present -> emits that identity + token.
# 4. Per-slot token absent -> falls back to the shared account
# (backward-compat / no-op for hosts without per-slot tokens).
# 5. Unknown/unrelated host -> exits 0 with no output (passthrough).
# 3. Credential store selection: an identity with a directory under
# <brain>/fleet/agents/ is a SEAT and is read ONLY from its own secrets/
# slot; any other identity is a SERVICE and is read from the framework
# store. No precedence between them and NO fallback from one to the other.
# 4. Fail-closed: an identity that resolves but has no credential is REFUSED —
# no output, nonzero exit, a stderr diagnostic, and a durable spool record.
# The shared account is never emitted in its place.
# 5. Fail-closed: no identity resolvable on a host that runs a fleet is also
# REFUSED, because records made there must name the agent that made them.
# 6. Backward compatibility, the one surviving fallback: no identity AND no
# fleet -> shared account, unchanged. On such a host the shared account is
# the operator's own and there is no attribution to lose.
# 7. Unknown/unrelated host -> exits 0 with no output (passthrough).
# 8. Non-"get" verb -> exits 0 with no output.
#
# Uses stubbed token files under a fake HOME + a real (throwaway) git repo.
# NEVER reads real secrets or touches the real ~/.config/mosaic/secrets.
@@ -21,6 +31,9 @@ SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
WORK_DIR="${MOSAIC_TEST_WORK_DIR:-$PWD/.mosaic-test-work/git-credential-mosaic}"
FAKE_HOME="$WORK_DIR/home"
REPO_DIR="$WORK_DIR/repo"
BRAIN_DIR="$WORK_DIR/brain"
SPOOL_DIR="$WORK_DIR/spool"
SVC_STORE="$FAKE_HOME/.config/mosaic/secrets/gitea-tokens"
# Mirror the real deployed layout (~/.config/mosaic/tools/{git,_lib}/) under the
# fake HOME: git-credential-mosaic resolves its credentials.sh sibling via a
# script-relative path (BASH_SOURCE), so the copy must live next to a stubbed
@@ -28,10 +41,10 @@ REPO_DIR="$WORK_DIR/repo"
HELPER="$FAKE_HOME/.config/mosaic/tools/git/git-credential-mosaic"
rm -rf "$WORK_DIR"
mkdir -p "$FAKE_HOME/.config/mosaic/secrets/gitea-tokens" \
mkdir -p "$SVC_STORE" \
"$FAKE_HOME/.config/mosaic/tools/git" \
"$FAKE_HOME/.config/mosaic/tools/_lib" \
"$REPO_DIR"
"$REPO_DIR" "$BRAIN_DIR"
cp "$SCRIPT_DIR/git-credential-mosaic" "$HELPER"
chmod +x "$HELPER"
@@ -68,7 +81,8 @@ run_helper() {
local host="$1" username_in="$2"; shift 2
(
cd "$REPO_DIR"
env -i HOME="$FAKE_HOME" PATH="$PATH" "$@" bash "$HELPER" get <<EOF
env -i HOME="$FAKE_HOME" PATH="$PATH" MOSAIC_CREDENTIAL_SPOOL="$SPOOL_DIR" "$@" \
bash "$HELPER" get <<EOF
host=$host
username=$username_in
@@ -76,20 +90,61 @@ EOF
)
}
# A refusal must be observable in four independent ways: nonzero exit, EMPTY
# stdout, a stderr diagnostic naming the identity and host, and — the assertion
# that actually catches a regression to the old behavior — NO shared token value
# anywhere in the output. Checking only the exit code would pass against a helper
# that emitted the shared credential and then exited 1.
assert_fail_closed() {
local desc="$1" host="$2" username_in="$3" want_in_stderr="$4"; shift 4
local stderr_file="$WORK_DIR/stderr.tmp"
: > "$stderr_file"
set +e
local stdout
stdout=$(run_helper "$host" "$username_in" "$@" 2>"$stderr_file")
local rc=$?
set -e
local stderr
stderr=$(cat "$stderr_file")
if [[ "$rc" -eq 0 ]]; then
echo "FAIL: $desc — expected nonzero exit, got 0 (stdout='$stdout')" >&2
fail=1
fi
if [[ -n "$stdout" ]]; then
echo "FAIL: $desc — expected empty stdout (nothing emitted), got '$stdout'" >&2
fail=1
fi
if [[ "$stdout$stderr" == *"shared-mosaicstack-token"* || "$stdout$stderr" == *"shared-usc-token"* ]]; then
echo "FAIL: $desc — a SHARED token value appeared in the output. The shared-account fallback must be gone:" >&2
echo "$stdout$stderr" >&2
fail=1
fi
if [[ -n "$want_in_stderr" && "$stderr" != *"$want_in_stderr"* ]]; then
echo "FAIL: $desc — stderr does not contain '$want_in_stderr':" >&2
echo "$stderr" >&2
fail=1
fi
if [[ "$stderr" != *"$host"* ]]; then
echo "FAIL: $desc — stderr does not name the host '$host':" >&2
echo "$stderr" >&2
fail=1
fi
}
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# 1. No identity resolvable anywhere, no per-slot token -> shared fallback
# (backward-compat: unchanged behavior when nothing is configured).
# 1. Backward compatibility: nothing resolvable, and NO fleet on this host ->
# shared account, unchanged. This is the only surviving fallback.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
git -C "$REPO_DIR" config --unset mosaic.gitIdentity 2>/dev/null || true
out=$(run_helper "git.mosaicstack.dev" "")
assert_eq "shared fallback: username" "username=git" "$(echo "$out" | grep '^username=')"
assert_eq "shared fallback: password" "password=shared-mosaicstack-token" "$(echo "$out" | grep '^password=')"
assert_eq "no identity + no fleet: username" "username=git" "$(echo "$out" | grep '^username=')"
assert_eq "no identity + no fleet: password" "password=shared-mosaicstack-token" "$(echo "$out" | grep '^password=')"
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# 2. git-supplied username resolves to an identity WITH a per-slot token ->
# that identity + token wins over the shared account.
# 2. git-supplied username resolves to a SERVICE identity WITH a token in the
# framework store -> that identity + token wins over the shared account.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
echo -n "agentA-mosaicstack-token" > "$FAKE_HOME/.config/mosaic/secrets/gitea-tokens/gitea-mosaicstack-agentA.token"
echo -n "agentA-mosaicstack-token" > "$SVC_STORE/gitea-mosaicstack-agentA.token"
out=$(run_helper "git.mosaicstack.dev" "agentA")
assert_eq "username-resolved identity: username" "username=agentA" "$(echo "$out" | grep '^username=')"
assert_eq "username-resolved identity: password" "password=agentA-mosaicstack-token" "$(echo "$out" | grep '^password=')"
@@ -97,7 +152,7 @@ assert_eq "username-resolved identity: password" "password=agentA-mosaicstack-to
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# 3. git config mosaic.gitIdentity (per-worktree) beats git-supplied username.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
echo -n "agentB-mosaicstack-token" > "$FAKE_HOME/.config/mosaic/secrets/gitea-tokens/gitea-mosaicstack-agentB.token"
echo -n "agentB-mosaicstack-token" > "$SVC_STORE/gitea-mosaicstack-agentB.token"
git -C "$REPO_DIR" config mosaic.gitIdentity agentB
out=$(run_helper "git.mosaicstack.dev" "agentA")
assert_eq "git-config beats username: username" "username=agentB" "$(echo "$out" | grep '^username=')"
@@ -106,54 +161,210 @@ assert_eq "git-config beats username: password" "password=agentB-mosaicstack-tok
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# 4. MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY env beats git config mosaic.gitIdentity.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
echo -n "agentC-mosaicstack-token" > "$FAKE_HOME/.config/mosaic/secrets/gitea-tokens/gitea-mosaicstack-agentC.token"
echo -n "agentC-mosaicstack-token" > "$SVC_STORE/gitea-mosaicstack-agentC.token"
out=$(run_helper "git.mosaicstack.dev" "agentA" MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY=agentC)
assert_eq "env beats git-config: username" "username=agentC" "$(echo "$out" | grep '^username=')"
assert_eq "env beats git-config: password" "password=agentC-mosaicstack-token" "$(echo "$out" | grep '^password=')"
git -C "$REPO_DIR" config --unset mosaic.gitIdentity
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# 5. Identity resolves, but no matching per-slot token file -> falls back to
# the shared account (per-agent identity is opt-in, not a hard requirement).
# 5. Correct token PATH is chosen per host: same agent id, different host
# prefix (gitea-usc- vs gitea-mosaicstack-).
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
out=$(run_helper "git.mosaicstack.dev" "no-such-agent")
assert_eq "no per-slot token: username" "username=git" "$(echo "$out" | grep '^username=')"
assert_eq "no per-slot token: password" "password=shared-mosaicstack-token" "$(echo "$out" | grep '^password=')"
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# 6. Correct per-slot token PATH is chosen per host: same agent id, different
# host prefix (gitea-usc- vs gitea-mosaicstack-).
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
echo -n "agentD-usc-token" > "$FAKE_HOME/.config/mosaic/secrets/gitea-tokens/gitea-usc-agentD.token"
echo -n "agentD-usc-token" > "$SVC_STORE/gitea-usc-agentD.token"
out=$(run_helper "git.uscllc.com" "agentD")
assert_eq "host-scoped token path (usc): username" "username=agentD" "$(echo "$out" | grep '^username=')"
assert_eq "host-scoped token path (usc): password" "password=agentD-usc-token" "$(echo "$out" | grep '^password=')"
# agentD has NO mosaicstack token -> must fall back to shared mosaicstack, not
# leak the usc token across hosts.
out=$(run_helper "git.mosaicstack.dev" "agentD")
assert_eq "host-scoped token path (cross-host must not leak): username" "username=git" "$(echo "$out" | grep '^username=')"
assert_eq "host-scoped token path (cross-host must not leak): password" "password=shared-mosaicstack-token" "$(echo "$out" | grep '^password=')"
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# 7. Unrelated/unknown host -> exit 0, no output (passthrough for non-Gitea
# remotes, e.g. github.com via a different credential helper).
# 6. FAIL CLOSED — identity resolves, no credential for it on this host. Must
# NOT borrow the shared account, and must NOT leak the same agent's token
# for a DIFFERENT host (agentD holds a usc token and no mosaicstack one).
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
assert_fail_closed "cross-host absence refuses (no shared fallback, no cross-host leak)" \
"git.mosaicstack.dev" "agentD" "gitea-mosaicstack-agentD.token"
# The agent's own usc token must not appear either.
: > "$WORK_DIR/stderr.tmp"
set +e
leak_out=$(run_helper "git.mosaicstack.dev" "agentD" 2>"$WORK_DIR/stderr.tmp")
set -e
if [[ "$leak_out$(cat "$WORK_DIR/stderr.tmp")" == *"agentD-usc-token"* ]]; then
echo "FAIL: cross-host leak — the usc token value appeared on a mosaicstack request" >&2
fail=1
fi
assert_fail_closed "unknown identity refuses (shared account never substituted)" \
"git.mosaicstack.dev" "no-such-agent" "no-token-for-identity"
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# 7. A refusal leaves a durable spool record, and that record contains no token.
# The stderr diagnostic is transient; the record is what an operator reads
# afterwards, so it must exist independently of anyone watching the terminal.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
spool_file=$(find "$SPOOL_DIR" -maxdepth 1 -name '*.jsonl' | head -n 1)
if [[ -z "$spool_file" ]]; then
echo "FAIL: fail-closed left no spool record under $SPOOL_DIR" >&2
fail=1
else
spool_body=$(cat "$spool_file")
assert_eq "spool record names the refused identity" "1" \
"$(grep -c '"identity":"no-such-agent"' "$spool_file" | head -n 1)"
if [[ "$spool_body" == *"shared-"*"-token"* || "$spool_body" == *"agentD-usc-token"* ]]; then
echo "FAIL: spool record contains a token value:" >&2
echo "$spool_body" >&2
fail=1
fi
fi
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# 8. SEAT identity: an id with a directory under <brain>/fleet/agents/ is read
# from its OWN secrets/ slot, not from the framework store.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
mkdir -p "$BRAIN_DIR/fleet/agents/seatE/secrets"
echo -n "seatE-slot-token" > "$BRAIN_DIR/fleet/agents/seatE/secrets/gitea-mosaicstack-seatE.token"
out=$(run_helper "git.mosaicstack.dev" "seatE" MOSAIC_BRAIN_HOME="$BRAIN_DIR")
assert_eq "seat reads its own slot: username" "username=seatE" "$(echo "$out" | grep '^username=')"
assert_eq "seat reads its own slot: password" "password=seatE-slot-token" "$(echo "$out" | grep '^password=')"
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# 9. NO CROSS-STORE FALLBACK — the assertion this whole store-selection design
# exists for. seatF is a seat (it has a directory) with an EMPTY slot, while
# a framework-store token of the identical name is present and readable.
# The helper must refuse rather than read it: one credential, one location,
# and a seat that reads a same-named service credential is exactly the
# silent-substitution failure the fail-closed rule removes.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
mkdir -p "$BRAIN_DIR/fleet/agents/seatF/secrets"
echo -n "seatF-SERVICE-STORE-token" > "$SVC_STORE/gitea-mosaicstack-seatF.token"
assert_fail_closed "seat with empty slot does NOT fall back to the framework store" \
"git.mosaicstack.dev" "seatF" "fleet/agents/seatF/secrets" MOSAIC_BRAIN_HOME="$BRAIN_DIR"
: > "$WORK_DIR/stderr.tmp"
set +e
xstore_out=$(run_helper "git.mosaicstack.dev" "seatF" MOSAIC_BRAIN_HOME="$BRAIN_DIR" 2>"$WORK_DIR/stderr.tmp")
set -e
if [[ "$xstore_out$(cat "$WORK_DIR/stderr.tmp")" == *"seatF-SERVICE-STORE-token"* ]]; then
echo "FAIL: cross-store fallback — a seat read the framework store's same-named token" >&2
fail=1
fi
# Control: that framework-store token IS readable, so the refusal above is the
# store rule firing and not an unreadable file. A non-seat identity pointed at
# the same file gets it.
out=$(run_helper "git.mosaicstack.dev" "seatF" MOSAIC_BRAIN_HOME="$WORK_DIR/no-such-brain")
assert_eq "control — same file IS readable for a non-seat identity" \
"password=seatF-SERVICE-STORE-token" "$(echo "$out" | grep '^password=')"
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# 10. FAIL CLOSED — no identity resolvable, but this host runs a fleet. Where
# seats exist, an unattributable request is refused instead of receiving
# the shared account. Contrast with case 1, which is the same request on a
# host with no fleet and still returns the shared account.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
git -C "$REPO_DIR" config --unset mosaic.gitIdentity 2>/dev/null || true
assert_fail_closed "no identity on a fleet host refuses" \
"git.mosaicstack.dev" "" "no-identity" MOSAIC_BRAIN_HOME="$BRAIN_DIR"
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# 11. The brain home defaults to ~/.mosaic when MOSAIC_BRAIN_HOME is unset —
# the fleet gate must fire on the default path too, not only on an
# explicitly injected one. Case 1 ran before this directory existed; the
# same call now refuses, which also proves case 1 was measuring the
# no-fleet branch rather than passing for an unrelated reason.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
mkdir -p "$FAKE_HOME/.mosaic/fleet/agents"
assert_fail_closed "fleet gate fires on the default ~/.mosaic brain home" \
"git.mosaicstack.dev" "" "no-identity"
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# 12. Unrelated/unknown host -> exit 0, no output (passthrough for non-Gitea
# remotes, e.g. github.com via a different credential helper). A fleet host
# must not refuse a host this helper does not own.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
out=$(run_helper "github.com" "agentA")
assert_eq "unknown host: no output" "" "$out"
out=$(run_helper "github.com" "" MOSAIC_BRAIN_HOME="$BRAIN_DIR")
assert_eq "unknown host on a fleet host: still passthrough, not a refusal" "" "$out"
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# 8. Non-"get" verb (store/erase) -> exit 0, no output (git-credential
# 13. Non-"get" verb (store/erase) -> exit 0, no output (git-credential
# protocol: this helper only implements get).
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
store_out=$(cd "$REPO_DIR" && env -i HOME="$FAKE_HOME" PATH="$PATH" bash "$HELPER" store <<EOF
host=git.mosaicstack.dev
username=agentA
username=no-such-agent
password=whatever
EOF
)
assert_eq "store verb: no output" "" "$store_out"
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# 14. The escalation record is machine-readable even when a field carries a
# quote or a backslash. A cwd is arbitrary operator text; an unescaped one
# silently turns the spool into unparseable JSONL, and the operator only
# finds out while reading the record that explains an outage.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
hostile_dir="$WORK_DIR/we\"ird\\dir"
mkdir -p "$hostile_dir"
hostile_spool="$WORK_DIR/spool-hostile"
(
cd "$hostile_dir"
env -i HOME="$FAKE_HOME" PATH="$PATH" MOSAIC_CREDENTIAL_SPOOL="$hostile_spool" \
MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY=no-such-agent \
bash "$HELPER" get <<EOF >/dev/null 2>&1
host=git.mosaicstack.dev
username=no-such-agent
EOF
) || true
# Deliberately not `ls ... | head -1`: under `set -o pipefail` a missed glob
# makes ls exit 2, the pipeline inherits it, and `set -e` kills this suite with
# zero output — the same silent-nonzero failure this file exists to catch.
record_file=""
for candidate in "$hostile_spool"/*.jsonl; do
if [[ -e "$candidate" ]]; then
record_file="$candidate"
break
fi
done
if [[ -z "$record_file" ]]; then
echo "FAIL: hostile cwd — no escalation record was written at all" >&2
fail=1
elif ! python3 -c 'import json,sys
for line in open(sys.argv[1]):
line = line.strip()
if line:
json.loads(line)' "$record_file" 2>/dev/null; then
echo "FAIL: hostile cwd — escalation record is not parseable JSONL:" >&2
cat "$record_file" >&2
fail=1
fi
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# 15. When the spool cannot be created, the diagnostic must NOT name a record
# path. Naming a file that was never written sends the operator to an
# empty path on exactly the hosts where the escalation was lost.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
unwritable_spool="/proc/mosaic-credential-spool-cannot-exist"
nospool_err=$(
cd "$REPO_DIR"
env -i HOME="$FAKE_HOME" PATH="$PATH" MOSAIC_CREDENTIAL_SPOOL="$unwritable_spool" \
MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY=no-such-agent \
bash "$HELPER" get <<EOF 2>&1 >/dev/null
host=git.mosaicstack.dev
username=no-such-agent
EOF
) || true
if [[ "$nospool_err" == *"record: $unwritable_spool/"* ]]; then
echo "FAIL: unwritable spool — diagnostic names a record file that was never written" >&2
fail=1
fi
if [[ "$nospool_err" != *"NOT WRITTEN"* ]]; then
echo "FAIL: unwritable spool — diagnostic does not say the record was not written" >&2
echo "$nospool_err" >&2
fail=1
fi
if [[ "$fail" -eq 0 ]]; then
echo "git-credential-mosaic identity resolution regression passed"
fi
@@ -23,6 +23,17 @@
# 6. Scope containment: identity requested + an UNRECOGNIZED Gitea host (no
# per-slot token scheme) -> Patch 2b does not apply; existing
# fall-through behavior is unchanged.
# 7. Credential store selection: an identity with a directory under
# <brain>/fleet/agents/ is a SEAT and is read ONLY from its own secrets/
# slot; any other identity is a SERVICE and is read from the framework
# store. No precedence between them and NO fallback from one to the
# other — a seat with an empty slot is REFUSED even when a same-named
# token sits in the framework store.
# 8. Fail loud when NO identity resolves on a host that runs a fleet: where
# seats exist, an unattributable API call is refused rather than made
# under the shared account. On a host with no fleet the same call still
# returns the shared token (case 1), which is what keeps this change a
# no-op for non-fleet operators of the framework.
#
# Uses a stubbed credentials.json + stubbed per-slot token files under a fake
# HOME. NEVER reads real secrets or touches the real ~/.config/mosaic/secrets.
@@ -210,6 +221,94 @@ if [[ "$err" == *"no per-slot token at"* ]]; then
fi
git -C "$REPO_DIR" config --unset mosaic.gitIdentity
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# 7. SEAT identity: an id with a directory under <brain>/fleet/agents/ is read
# from its OWN secrets/ slot, not from the framework store. The brain home
# is resolved exactly as packages/mosaic/src/fleet/brain-home.ts does it:
# MOSAIC_BRAIN_HOME, else ~/.mosaic.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
BRAIN_DIR="$WORK_DIR/brain"
mkdir -p "$BRAIN_DIR/fleet/agents/seatE/secrets"
echo -n "seatE-slot-token" > "$BRAIN_DIR/fleet/agents/seatE/secrets/gitea-mosaicstack-seatE.token"
out=$(call_get_gitea_token "git.mosaicstack.dev" MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY=seatE MOSAIC_BRAIN_HOME="$BRAIN_DIR")
assert_eq "seat reads its own slot" "seatE-slot-token" "$out"
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# 8. NO CROSS-STORE FALLBACK. seatF is a seat (it has a directory) with an
# EMPTY slot, while a framework-store token of the identical name is
# present and readable. It must be REFUSED rather than served that token:
# one credential, one location. A seat that silently reads a same-named
# service credential is the same substitution failure as the shared-account
# fallback, one store further down.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
mkdir -p "$BRAIN_DIR/fleet/agents/seatF/secrets"
echo -n "seatF-SERVICE-STORE-token" > "$FAKE_HOME/.config/mosaic/secrets/gitea-tokens/gitea-mosaicstack-seatF.token"
assert_failloud "seat with empty slot does NOT fall back to the framework store" \
"git.mosaicstack.dev" "seatF" \
"$BRAIN_DIR/fleet/agents/seatF/secrets/gitea-mosaicstack-seatF.token" \
MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY=seatF MOSAIC_BRAIN_HOME="$BRAIN_DIR"
# assert_failloud only screens stderr for the word "shared"; this store's token
# is not named that, so check for its value explicitly.
set +e
xstore_out=$(call_get_gitea_token "git.mosaicstack.dev" MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY=seatF MOSAIC_BRAIN_HOME="$BRAIN_DIR" 2>"$WORK_DIR/stderr-xstore.tmp")
set -e
if [[ "$xstore_out$(cat "$WORK_DIR/stderr-xstore.tmp")" == *"seatF-SERVICE-STORE-token"* ]]; then
echo "FAIL: cross-store fallback — a seat was served the framework store's same-named token" >&2
fail=1
fi
# Control: that framework-store token IS readable, so the refusal above is the
# store rule firing and not an unreadable file. The same id, resolved against a
# brain home where it is not a seat, gets it.
out=$(call_get_gitea_token "git.mosaicstack.dev" MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY=seatF MOSAIC_BRAIN_HOME="$WORK_DIR/no-such-brain")
assert_eq "control — same file IS readable for a non-seat identity" "seatF-SERVICE-STORE-token" "$out"
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# 9. FAIL LOUD — no identity resolvable, but this host runs a fleet. Contrast
# with case 1: the identical call on a host with no fleet still returns the
# shared token.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
git -C "$REPO_DIR" config --unset mosaic.gitIdentity 2>/dev/null || true
set +e
noid_out=$(call_get_gitea_token "git.mosaicstack.dev" MOSAIC_BRAIN_HOME="$BRAIN_DIR" 2>"$WORK_DIR/stderr-noid.tmp")
noid_rc=$?
set -e
noid_err=$(cat "$WORK_DIR/stderr-noid.tmp")
if [[ "$noid_rc" -eq 0 ]]; then
echo "FAIL: no identity on a fleet host — expected nonzero return, got 0 (stdout='$noid_out')" >&2
fail=1
fi
if [[ -n "$noid_out" ]]; then
echo "FAIL: no identity on a fleet host — expected empty stdout, got '$noid_out'" >&2
fail=1
fi
if [[ "$noid_out" == *"shared-mosaicstack-token"* || "$noid_err" == *"shared-mosaicstack-token"* ]]; then
echo "FAIL: no identity on a fleet host — the shared token was served anyway:" >&2
echo "$noid_out$noid_err" >&2
fail=1
fi
if [[ "$noid_err" != *"MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY"* ]]; then
echo "FAIL: no identity on a fleet host — stderr does not say how to set an identity:" >&2
echo "$noid_err" >&2
fail=1
fi
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# 10. The brain home defaults to ~/.mosaic when MOSAIC_BRAIN_HOME is unset —
# the fleet gate must fire on the default path too, not only on an
# explicitly injected one. Case 1 ran before this directory existed; the
# same call now refuses, which also proves case 1 was measuring the
# no-fleet branch rather than passing for an unrelated reason.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
mkdir -p "$FAKE_HOME/.mosaic/fleet/agents"
set +e
dflt_out=$(call_get_gitea_token "git.mosaicstack.dev" 2>"$WORK_DIR/stderr-dflt.tmp")
dflt_rc=$?
set -e
if [[ "$dflt_rc" -eq 0 || -n "$dflt_out" ]]; then
echo "FAIL: fleet gate did not fire on the default ~/.mosaic brain home (rc=$dflt_rc stdout='$dflt_out')" >&2
fail=1
fi
if [[ "$fail" -eq 0 ]]; then
echo "get_gitea_token identity resolution regression passed"
fi
+63
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
# @mosaicstack/quality-rails
Quality-rails scaffolding and — since RI-3-002 (RI-N4) — the **typed
quality-rails evaluator**: the single authoritative producer of check verdicts
for the checks it owns.
## Evaluator (RI-N4)
Every verdict is typed and fail-closed:
```
{ status: 'passed' | 'failed' | 'blocked' | 'error' | 'not-applicable',
checkId, checkVersion, subject, reason }
```
Missing implementations, missing inputs, unknown check ids, process errors,
timeouts, and malformed probe output can never become `passed` or an
unqualified skip — they surface as `blocked`/`error` with a reason (vocabulary
mirrors MACP's `GateStatus` discipline).
- Check definitions live as **data** with a version and a sha256 content
digest (`definitionDigest`); every recorded verdict names the definition
version that produced it.
- Check sets are selected **per subject kind** (`node`, `python`, `rust`,
`monorepo`, `unknown`) via the versioned, digested check-set policy — this
repository (a `monorepo` subject) does not share the node template's file
list.
- Shell probes stay **thin adapters**: the TS evaluator invokes them and owns
the verdict parsing (e.g. QC-20's planted-commit probe).
### Owned checks
| check id | canonical check | mechanism |
| --------------------------- | --------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| `qc-19-rails-files-present` | QC-19 | typed absorption of the former presence-only `check`/`doctor` loop |
| `qc-20-enforcement-verify` | QC-20 | thin shell adapter (framework `verify.sh`); verdict parsing owned here |
The canonical check ids QC-1..QC-21 and their dispositions are defined in
`docs/release-integrity/probe-inventory.md` (the RI-3-001 inventory — the
evaluator's input, not its output).
### Usage
```sh
# CLI (same typed report as the programmatic API)
node dist/cli.js quality-rails evaluate --project <path> [--probe-path <verify.sh>] [--json]
node dist/cli.js quality-rails check --project <path> [--json] # QC-19 only, fail-closed exit
```
```ts
import { evaluateSubject } from '@mosaicstack/quality-rails';
const report = await evaluateSubject({ subjectPath: '/path/to/project' });
// report.state: 'passed' | 'failed' | 'blocked' | 'error'
```
`pnpm verify:release` invokes this evaluator as its `quality-rails` stage
(canonical-only stage, QC-19 on the monorepo subject).
## Scaffolding (pre-existing)
`init` scaffolds rails files per detected kind/profile; `doctor` is advisory
and reports typed states.
@@ -0,0 +1,194 @@
import { mkdir, mkdtemp, writeFile, chmod } from 'node:fs/promises';
import { tmpdir } from 'node:os';
import { join } from 'node:path';
import { afterEach, beforeEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest';
import { createQualityRailsCli } from './cli.js';
import { QC_19_RAILS_FILES_PRESENT } from './evaluator/definitions.js';
import { evaluateSubject } from './evaluator/runner.js';
import type { EvaluationReport } from './evaluator/types.js';
// CLI ↔ programmatic contract (RI-3-002): the same subject must produce the
// same typed verdicts through every entry point the card adds — the
// `evaluate`/`check` CLI surfaces and the `evaluateSubject` API.
async function makeTempDir(): Promise<string> {
return mkdtemp(join(tmpdir(), 'qr-cli-'));
}
async function scaffoldNodeFixture(skip: string[] = []): Promise<string> {
const dir = await makeTempDir();
await writeFile(join(dir, 'package.json'), '{}\n', 'utf8');
for (const relativePath of [
'.eslintrc',
'biome.json',
'.githooks/pre-commit',
'PR-CHECKLIST.md',
]) {
if (skip.includes(relativePath)) continue;
await mkdir(join(dir, relativePath, '..'), { recursive: true });
await writeFile(join(dir, relativePath), 'fixture\n', 'utf8');
}
return dir;
}
async function makePassingProbe(dir: string): Promise<string> {
const scriptPath = join(dir, 'probe-pass.sh');
await writeFile(
scriptPath,
[
'#!/bin/bash',
'echo "✅ PASS: Type errors blocked"',
'echo "✅ PASS: Lint errors blocked"',
'echo "Verification Summary"',
'exit 0',
].join('\n') + '\n',
'utf8',
);
await chmod(scriptPath, 0o755);
return scriptPath;
}
describe('CLI entry points vs the programmatic evaluator', () => {
let logSpy: ReturnType<typeof vi.spyOn>;
let previousExitCode: string | number | undefined;
beforeEach(() => {
logSpy = vi.spyOn(console, 'log').mockImplementation(() => {});
previousExitCode = process.exitCode ?? undefined;
});
afterEach(() => {
logSpy.mockRestore();
process.exitCode = previousExitCode;
});
it('evaluate --json produces the SAME typed report as evaluateSubject (full check set + probe)', async () => {
const dir = await scaffoldNodeFixture();
const probePath = await makePassingProbe(dir);
const programmatic = await evaluateSubject({
subjectPath: dir,
inputs: { 'qc-20-enforcement-verify': { probePath } },
});
const program = createQualityRailsCli();
await program.parseAsync([
'node',
'cli.js',
'quality-rails',
'evaluate',
'--project',
dir,
'--probe-path',
probePath,
'--json',
]);
const printed = logSpy.mock.calls.map((call) => String(call[0])).join('\n');
const cliReport = JSON.parse(printed) as EvaluationReport;
expect(cliReport).toEqual(programmatic);
expect(cliReport.state).toBe('passed');
expect(process.exitCode).toBe(0);
});
it('check --json produces the SAME QC-19 verdict as evaluateSubject (absorbed loop)', async () => {
const dir = await scaffoldNodeFixture(['biome.json', '.githooks/pre-commit']);
const programmatic = await evaluateSubject({
subjectPath: dir,
checkIds: [QC_19_RAILS_FILES_PRESENT.id],
});
expect(programmatic.state).toBe('failed');
const program = createQualityRailsCli();
await program.parseAsync([
'node',
'cli.js',
'quality-rails',
'check',
'--project',
dir,
'--json',
]);
const printed = logSpy.mock.calls.map((call) => String(call[0])).join('\n');
const cliReport = JSON.parse(printed) as EvaluationReport;
expect(cliReport).toEqual(programmatic);
expect(process.exitCode).toBe(1);
});
it('check on a complete subject exits 0 with a passed verdict', async () => {
const dir = await scaffoldNodeFixture();
const program = createQualityRailsCli();
await program.parseAsync([
'node',
'cli.js',
'quality-rails',
'check',
'--project',
dir,
'--json',
]);
const printed = logSpy.mock.calls.map((call) => String(call[0])).join('\n');
const cliReport = JSON.parse(printed) as EvaluationReport;
expect(cliReport.state).toBe('passed');
expect(process.exitCode).toBe(0);
});
it('evaluate with an unknown check id exits 1 and reports error, never passed', async () => {
const dir = await scaffoldNodeFixture();
const program = createQualityRailsCli();
await program.parseAsync([
'node',
'cli.js',
'quality-rails',
'evaluate',
'--project',
dir,
'--check',
'qc-99-bogus',
'--json',
]);
const printed = logSpy.mock.calls.map((call) => String(call[0])).join('\n');
const cliReport = JSON.parse(printed) as EvaluationReport;
expect(cliReport.results).toHaveLength(1);
const first = cliReport.results[0];
expect(first?.status).toBe('error');
expect(first?.reason).toContain('unknown check id');
expect(process.exitCode).toBe(1);
});
it('evaluate on a scaffold subject without --probe-path stays fail-closed (blocked, exit 1)', async () => {
const dir = await scaffoldNodeFixture();
const program = createQualityRailsCli();
await program.parseAsync([
'node',
'cli.js',
'quality-rails',
'evaluate',
'--project',
dir,
'--json',
]);
const printed = logSpy.mock.calls.map((call) => String(call[0])).join('\n');
const cliReport = JSON.parse(printed) as EvaluationReport;
const qc20 = cliReport.results.find((r) => r.checkId === 'qc-20-enforcement-verify');
expect(qc20).toBeDefined();
expect(qc20?.status).toBe('blocked');
expect(qc20?.reason).toContain('probePath');
expect(cliReport.state).toBe('blocked');
expect(process.exitCode).toBe(1);
});
it('doctor stays advisory (no nonzero exit) but reports TYPED states, including blocked', async () => {
const dir = await scaffoldNodeFixture();
const program = createQualityRailsCli();
await program.parseAsync(['node', 'cli.js', 'quality-rails', 'doctor', '--project', dir]);
const printed = logSpy.mock.calls.map((call) => String(call[0])).join('\n');
expect(printed).toContain('blocked: qc-20-enforcement-verify');
expect(process.exitCode ?? 0).toBe(0);
});
});
+84 -57
View File
@@ -1,5 +1,3 @@
import { constants } from 'node:fs';
import { access } from 'node:fs/promises';
import { resolve } from 'node:path';
import { fileURLToPath } from 'node:url';
@@ -8,18 +6,12 @@ import { Command } from 'commander';
import { detectProjectKind } from './detect.js';
import { scaffoldQualityRails } from './scaffolder.js';
import type { ProjectKind, QualityProfile, RailsConfig } from './types.js';
import { QC_19_RAILS_FILES_PRESENT } from './evaluator/definitions.js';
import { evaluateSubject } from './evaluator/runner.js';
import type { EvaluationReport } from './evaluator/types.js';
const VALID_PROFILES: readonly QualityProfile[] = ['strict', 'standard', 'minimal'];
async function fileExists(filePath: string): Promise<boolean> {
try {
await access(filePath, constants.F_OK);
return true;
} catch {
return false;
}
}
function parseProfile(rawProfile: string): QualityProfile {
if (VALID_PROFILES.includes(rawProfile as QualityProfile)) {
return rawProfile as QualityProfile;
@@ -59,22 +51,6 @@ function defaultFormatters(kind: ProjectKind): string[] {
return [];
}
function expectedFilesForKind(kind: ProjectKind): string[] {
if (kind === 'node') {
return ['.eslintrc', 'biome.json', '.githooks/pre-commit', 'PR-CHECKLIST.md'];
}
if (kind === 'python') {
return ['pyproject.toml', '.githooks/pre-commit', 'PR-CHECKLIST.md'];
}
if (kind === 'rust') {
return ['rustfmt.toml', '.githooks/pre-commit', 'PR-CHECKLIST.md'];
}
return ['.githooks/pre-commit', 'PR-CHECKLIST.md'];
}
function printScaffoldResult(
config: RailsConfig,
filesWritten: string[],
@@ -106,6 +82,20 @@ function printScaffoldResult(
}
}
function printEvaluationReport(report: EvaluationReport): void {
console.log(
`[quality-rails] evaluation for ${report.subject.path} (kind=${report.subject.kind}, check-set v${report.checkSetVersion})`,
);
for (const result of report.results) {
const reason = result.reason === undefined ? '' : `${result.reason}`;
const digest = report.definitionDigests[result.checkId] ?? 'no digest';
console.log(
` - ${result.status}: ${result.checkId} (v${result.checkVersion} [${digest}])${reason}`,
);
}
console.log(`[quality-rails] aggregate: ${report.state}`);
}
/**
* Register quality-rails subcommands on an existing Commander program.
* This avoids cross-package Commander version mismatches by using the
@@ -148,56 +138,93 @@ function buildQualityRailsCommand(qualityRails: Command): void {
printScaffoldResult(config, result.filesWritten, result.warnings, result.commandsToRun);
});
// `check` (QC-19) is ABSORBED by the RI-N4 evaluator: the presence loop
// that lived here is now the versioned, digested, typed check definition
// `qc-19-rails-files-present`. The CLI keeps its human surface (missing
// files listed, exit 1) and gains `--json` for the typed verdicts. Exit
// code is fail-closed: any non-green aggregate (failed/blocked/error) is 1.
qualityRails
.command('check')
.requiredOption('--project <path>', 'Project path')
.action(async (options: { project: string }) => {
.option('--json', 'print the typed evaluation report as JSON')
.action(async (options: { project: string; json?: boolean }) => {
const projectPath = resolve(options.project);
const kind = await detectProjectKind(projectPath);
const expected = expectedFilesForKind(kind);
const missing: string[] = [];
for (const relativePath of expected) {
const exists = await fileExists(resolve(projectPath, relativePath));
if (!exists) {
missing.push(relativePath);
}
}
if (missing.length > 0) {
console.error('[quality-rails] missing files:');
for (const relativePath of missing) {
console.error(` - ${relativePath}`);
}
process.exitCode = 1;
return;
}
console.log(`[quality-rails] all expected files present for ${kind} project`);
const report = await evaluateSubject({
subjectPath: projectPath,
checkIds: [QC_19_RAILS_FILES_PRESENT.id],
});
if (options.json) {
console.log(JSON.stringify(report));
} else {
printEvaluationReport(report);
}
process.exitCode = report.state === 'passed' ? 0 : 1;
});
// `doctor` (QC-19) stays advisory (documented contract: a doctor that
// cannot fail), but now reports TYPED states — a blocked or failing rail is
// visible instead of silently printed as `ok`/`missing`.
qualityRails
.command('doctor')
.requiredOption('--project <path>', 'Project path')
.action(async (options: { project: string }) => {
const projectPath = resolve(options.project);
const kind = await detectProjectKind(projectPath);
const expected = expectedFilesForKind(kind);
const report = await evaluateSubject({ subjectPath: projectPath });
console.log(`[quality-rails] doctor for ${projectPath}`);
console.log(`detected project kind: ${kind}`);
for (const relativePath of expected) {
const exists = await fileExists(resolve(projectPath, relativePath));
console.log(` - ${exists ? 'ok' : 'missing'}: ${relativePath}`);
console.log(`detected project kind: ${report.subject.kind}`);
for (const result of report.results) {
const reason = result.reason === undefined ? '' : `${result.reason}`;
console.log(` - ${result.status}: ${result.checkId}${reason}`);
}
if (kind === 'unknown') {
if (report.subject.kind === 'unknown') {
console.log(
'recommendation: add package.json, pyproject.toml, or Cargo.toml for better defaults.',
);
}
});
// `evaluate` is the canonical RI-N4 evaluator entry point: typed verdicts
// for the subject's full per-kind check set, same results as the
// programmatic API (evaluateSubject).
qualityRails
.command('evaluate')
.description('Run the typed quality-rails evaluator against a subject project')
.requiredOption('--project <path>', 'Project path')
.option('--check <id...>', 'restrict evaluation to these check ids')
.option(
'--probe-path <path>',
'path to the QC-20 behavioral probe script (framework verify.sh)',
)
.option('--json', 'print the typed evaluation report as JSON')
.action(
async (options: {
project: string;
check?: string[];
probePath?: string;
json?: boolean;
}) => {
const projectPath = resolve(options.project);
const report = await evaluateSubject({
subjectPath: projectPath,
checkIds: options.check,
inputs: options.probePath
? { 'qc-20-enforcement-verify': { probePath: options.probePath } }
: undefined,
});
if (options.json) {
console.log(JSON.stringify(report));
} else {
printEvaluationReport(report);
}
process.exitCode = report.state === 'passed' ? 0 : 1;
},
);
}
export async function runQualityRailsCli(argv: string[] = process.argv): Promise<void> {
@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
import { spawn } from 'node:child_process';
import type { ChildProcess } from 'node:child_process';
import type { AdapterOutcome, AdapterRequest, ProcessAdapter } from './types.js';
/**
* Default thin process adapter (spawn-based). Runs a command to completion with
* a hard timeout and reports exit code + captured output — it owns NO verdict
* logic. Interpreting the outcome is always the check implementation's job.
*/
export function createSpawnProcessAdapter(): ProcessAdapter {
return {
run(request: AdapterRequest): Promise<AdapterOutcome> {
return new Promise((resolve) => {
let child: ChildProcess;
try {
child = spawn(request.file, request.args, {
cwd: request.cwd,
stdio: ['ignore', 'pipe', 'pipe'],
});
} catch (error) {
resolve({
ok: false,
kind: 'spawn-error',
message: error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error),
});
return;
}
let stdout = '';
let stderr = '';
let settled = false;
const timer = setTimeout(() => {
if (settled) return;
settled = true;
child.kill('SIGKILL');
resolve({
ok: false,
kind: 'timeout',
message: `process timed out after ${request.timeoutMs}ms: ${request.file}`,
});
}, request.timeoutMs);
const settle = (outcome: AdapterOutcome): void => {
if (settled) return;
settled = true;
clearTimeout(timer);
resolve(outcome);
};
child.stdout?.on('data', (chunk: Buffer) => {
stdout += chunk.toString('utf8');
});
child.stderr?.on('data', (chunk: Buffer) => {
stderr += chunk.toString('utf8');
});
child.on('error', (error: Error) => {
settle({ ok: false, kind: 'spawn-error', message: error.message });
});
child.on('close', (code: number | null) => {
settle({ ok: true, exitCode: code, stdout, stderr });
});
});
},
};
}
@@ -0,0 +1,258 @@
import { constants } from 'node:fs';
import { access } from 'node:fs/promises';
import { isAbsolute, resolve } from 'node:path';
import { digestOfPolicy, digestOfSpec } from './digest.js';
import type {
CheckContext,
CheckDefinition,
CheckDefinitionSpec,
CheckOutcome,
CheckSetPolicy,
CheckSetPolicySpec,
SubjectKind,
} from './types.js';
// Check definitions for the RI-N4 evaluator (card RI-3-002). Each definition is
// DATA with a version and a content digest (see digest.ts); the executable
// half is attached via defineCheck. Check-set SELECTION is per subject kind
// (probe-inventory gap 7): this monorepo does not match the node template's
// file list, so the QC-19 definition carries a distinct file set for the
// `monorepo` subject kind and the policy selects checks per kind.
export function defineCheck(
spec: CheckDefinitionSpec,
evaluate: (ctx: CheckContext) => Promise<CheckOutcome>,
): CheckDefinition {
return { ...spec, definitionDigest: digestOfSpec(spec), evaluate };
}
async function fileExists(filePath: string): Promise<boolean> {
try {
await access(filePath, constants.F_OK);
return true;
} catch {
return false;
}
}
// ─── QC-19: downstream rails presence ────────────────────────────────────────
//
// Typed absorption of the former presence-only `quality-rails check` loop in
// cli.ts. The scaffold-kind file lists below are carried over VERBATIM so the
// evaluator's typed verdicts are parity-equivalent with the presence loop on
// the same fixture; the `monorepo` list is new (per-subject check sets).
const qc19Spec: CheckDefinitionSpec = {
id: 'qc-19-rails-files-present',
version: '1.0.0',
canonicalCheck: 'QC-19',
description:
'The subject still carries its quality-rails files. Typed absorption of the former presence-only check loop; presence is necessary, not sufficient (RI-N4).',
appliesTo: ['node', 'python', 'rust', 'monorepo', 'unknown'],
params: {
expectedFilesByKind: {
node: ['.eslintrc', 'biome.json', '.githooks/pre-commit', 'PR-CHECKLIST.md'],
python: ['pyproject.toml', '.githooks/pre-commit', 'PR-CHECKLIST.md'],
rust: ['rustfmt.toml', '.githooks/pre-commit', 'PR-CHECKLIST.md'],
monorepo: [
'.husky/pre-commit',
'.husky/pre-push',
'eslint.config.mjs',
'.prettierrc',
'.lintstagedrc',
],
unknown: ['.githooks/pre-commit', 'PR-CHECKLIST.md'],
},
},
};
async function evaluateQc19(ctx: CheckContext): Promise<CheckOutcome> {
const byKind = ctx.params['expectedFilesByKind'] as Record<string, readonly string[]> | undefined;
if (byKind === undefined) {
return { status: 'error', reason: 'definition params missing expectedFilesByKind' };
}
const expected = byKind[ctx.subject.kind];
if (expected === undefined) {
// Fail-closed: an undefined file set for a declared subject kind is a
// definition gap, never a green outcome.
return {
status: 'blocked',
reason: `no expected-file set defined for subject kind '${ctx.subject.kind}'`,
};
}
const missing: string[] = [];
for (const relativePath of expected) {
if (!(await fileExists(resolve(ctx.subject.path, relativePath)))) {
missing.push(relativePath);
}
}
if (missing.length > 0) {
return {
status: 'failed',
reason: `missing rails files (${ctx.subject.kind}): ${missing.join(', ')}`,
};
}
return { status: 'passed' };
}
// ─── QC-20: downstream enforcement verification (behavioral probe) ──────────
//
// The planted-commit behavioral probe (framework tools/quality/scripts/verify.sh)
// stays a THIN SHELL ADAPTER: the TS evaluator invokes it and OWNS the verdict
// parsing (RI-N4: grep-on-output verdict logic moves into the typed evaluator).
// Probe contract (verify.sh): exit 0 ⇔ every sub-probe passed, exit 1 ⇔ at
// least one sub-probe failed; sub-probe verdicts appear as `PASS:` / `FAIL:`
// marker lines and the script always prints a `Verification Summary` section.
// Any deviation from that contract (other exit codes, unparseable output,
// missing probe, process failure, timeout) is `error`/`blocked` — never
// `passed`.
const qc20Spec: CheckDefinitionSpec = {
id: 'qc-20-enforcement-verify',
version: '1.0.0',
canonicalCheck: 'QC-20',
description:
'The behavioral planted-commit probe runs against the subject and every sub-probe blocks as intended. The shell probe is a thin adapter; verdict parsing is owned by this evaluator.',
appliesTo: ['node', 'python', 'rust', 'unknown'],
params: {
command: 'bash',
timeoutMs: 120_000,
passMarker: 'PASS:',
failMarker: 'FAIL:',
summaryMarker: 'Verification Summary',
},
};
function linesWith(text: string, marker: string): string[] {
return text
.split('\n')
.map((line) => line.trim())
.filter((line) => line.includes(marker));
}
async function evaluateQc20(ctx: CheckContext): Promise<CheckOutcome> {
const rawProbePath = ctx.inputs['probePath'];
if (typeof rawProbePath !== 'string' || rawProbePath.trim().length === 0) {
return {
status: 'blocked',
reason:
'missing input: probePath — the behavioral probe script must be provided (e.g. the framework verify.sh)',
};
}
const probePath = isAbsolute(rawProbePath)
? rawProbePath
: resolve(ctx.subject.path, rawProbePath);
if (!(await fileExists(probePath))) {
return { status: 'blocked', reason: `probe script not found: ${probePath}` };
}
const command = typeof ctx.params['command'] === 'string' ? ctx.params['command'] : 'bash';
const timeoutMs = typeof ctx.params['timeoutMs'] === 'number' ? ctx.params['timeoutMs'] : 120_000;
const passMarker =
typeof ctx.params['passMarker'] === 'string' ? ctx.params['passMarker'] : 'PASS:';
const failMarker =
typeof ctx.params['failMarker'] === 'string' ? ctx.params['failMarker'] : 'FAIL:';
const summaryMarker =
typeof ctx.params['summaryMarker'] === 'string'
? ctx.params['summaryMarker']
: 'Verification Summary';
const outcome = await ctx.adapter.run({
file: command,
args: [probePath],
cwd: ctx.subject.path,
timeoutMs,
});
if (!outcome.ok) {
// Process error or timeout: the probe never produced a trustworthy result.
return {
status: 'error',
reason: `probe process ${outcome.kind}: ${outcome.message}`,
};
}
const output = `${outcome.stdout}\n${outcome.stderr}`;
const failLines = linesWith(output, failMarker);
const passLines = linesWith(output, passMarker);
if (outcome.exitCode === 0) {
// A green exit must be corroborated by a parseable green transcript:
// at least one pass marker, no fail markers, and the summary section.
if (passLines.length > 0 && failLines.length === 0 && output.includes(summaryMarker)) {
return { status: 'passed' };
}
return {
status: 'error',
reason: `malformed probe output: exit 0 without a parseable pass transcript (${passLines.length} pass markers, ${failLines.length} fail markers, summary ${output.includes(summaryMarker) ? 'present' : 'absent'})`,
};
}
if (outcome.exitCode === 1) {
if (failLines.length === 0) {
return {
status: 'error',
reason: 'malformed probe output: exit 1 without parseable FAIL markers',
};
}
return {
status: 'failed',
reason: `enforcement probe reported ${failLines.length} failing sub-probe(s): ${failLines.join(' | ')}`,
};
}
return {
status: 'error',
reason: `probe exited with unexpected code ${String(outcome.exitCode)} — outcome not interpretable`,
};
}
// ─── Per-subject check-set policy ───────────────────────────────────────────
//
// Gap 7 of the probe inventory: check sets must be selected per subject, not
// one global list. Downstream scaffold kinds get the presence check plus the
// behavioral probe (QC-20 blocks until a probePath input is provided — an
// unverified subject can never evaluate green). The monorepo subject is this
// repository itself: its rails are the husky hooks + shared lint/format
// configs, covered by QC-19; the downstream planted-commit probe does not
// apply to it (this repo's own commit gates are QC-13/QC-14, outside this
// evaluator's owned checks).
const checkSetPolicySpec: CheckSetPolicySpec = {
version: '1.0.0',
byKind: {
node: ['qc-19-rails-files-present', 'qc-20-enforcement-verify'],
python: ['qc-19-rails-files-present', 'qc-20-enforcement-verify'],
rust: ['qc-19-rails-files-present', 'qc-20-enforcement-verify'],
unknown: ['qc-19-rails-files-present', 'qc-20-enforcement-verify'],
monorepo: ['qc-19-rails-files-present'],
},
};
export const CHECK_SET_POLICY: CheckSetPolicy = {
...checkSetPolicySpec,
policyDigest: digestOfPolicy(checkSetPolicySpec),
};
export const QC_19_RAILS_FILES_PRESENT = defineCheck(qc19Spec, evaluateQc19);
export const QC_20_ENFORCEMENT_VERIFY = defineCheck(qc20Spec, evaluateQc20);
/** Built-in check definitions, keyed by id. */
export function builtInDefinitions(): CheckDefinition[] {
return [QC_19_RAILS_FILES_PRESENT, QC_20_ENFORCEMENT_VERIFY];
}
export function checkSetForKind(
kind: SubjectKind,
policy: CheckSetPolicy = CHECK_SET_POLICY,
): readonly string[] {
const selected = policy.byKind[kind];
if (selected === undefined) {
// Fail-closed selection: an unknown kind yields an EMPTY set only to the
// caller; the runner treats an empty result list as `blocked`, never green.
return [];
}
return selected;
}
@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
import { createHash } from 'node:crypto';
import type { CheckDefinitionSpec, CheckSetPolicySpec } from './types.js';
// Deterministic JSON: object keys sorted at every level so two specs with the
// same content always produce the same bytes (and thus the same digest).
export function canonicalJson(value: unknown): string {
if (value === null || typeof value !== 'object') {
return JSON.stringify(value);
}
if (Array.isArray(value)) {
return `[${value.map((entry) => canonicalJson(entry)).join(',')}]`;
}
const record = value as Record<string, unknown>;
const keys = Object.keys(record).sort();
return `{${keys.map((key) => `${JSON.stringify(key)}:${canonicalJson(record[key])}`).join(',')}}`;
}
/** sha256 over the canonical JSON of `value`. */
export function digestContent(value: unknown): string {
return createHash('sha256').update(canonicalJson(value), 'utf8').digest('hex');
}
/**
* Content digest of a check definition: covers the declarative spec (id,
* version, canonical check, description, applicability, params) — everything a
* reviewer reasons about — while excluding the executable function object.
* Changing any covered field changes the digest, so a recorded digest always
* identifies exactly which definition content produced a verdict.
*/
export function digestOfSpec(spec: CheckDefinitionSpec): string {
return digestContent({
id: spec.id,
version: spec.version,
canonicalCheck: spec.canonicalCheck,
description: spec.description,
appliesTo: spec.appliesTo,
params: spec.params,
});
}
/** Content digest of the per-subject check-set policy. */
export function digestOfPolicy(spec: CheckSetPolicySpec): string {
return digestContent(spec);
}
@@ -0,0 +1,525 @@
import { mkdtemp, mkdir, writeFile, chmod } from 'node:fs/promises';
import { tmpdir } from 'node:os';
import { join } from 'node:path';
import { fileURLToPath } from 'node:url';
import { describe, expect, it } from 'vitest';
import { createSpawnProcessAdapter } from './adapter.js';
import {
builtInDefinitions,
CHECK_SET_POLICY,
checkSetForKind,
defineCheck,
QC_19_RAILS_FILES_PRESENT,
QC_20_ENFORCEMENT_VERIFY,
} from './definitions.js';
import { digestOfSpec } from './digest.js';
import { aggregateState, evaluateSubject } from './runner.js';
import type {
AdapterOutcome,
CheckDefinitionSpec,
CheckResult,
EvaluationReport,
ProcessAdapter,
} from './types.js';
// ─── helpers ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
function firstResult(report: EvaluationReport): CheckResult {
const result = report.results[0];
if (result === undefined) {
throw new Error('expected the report to contain at least one result');
}
return result;
}
async function makeTempDir(): Promise<string> {
return mkdtemp(join(tmpdir(), 'qr-evaluator-'));
}
async function writeProbeScript(dir: string, name: string, body: string): Promise<string> {
const scriptPath = join(dir, name);
await writeFile(scriptPath, `${body}\n`, 'utf8');
await chmod(scriptPath, 0o755);
return scriptPath;
}
/** Adapter stub that always returns the given outcome (no real process). */
function stubAdapter(outcome: AdapterOutcome): ProcessAdapter {
return {
run: async () => outcome,
};
}
// VERBATIM copy of the pre-absorption presence loop (former cli.ts
// expectedFilesForKind + fileExists loop). This is the PARITY ORACLE: the
// evaluator's typed QC-19 verdict must agree with what the absorbed check
// concluded on the same fixture.
const LEGACY_EXPECTED: Record<'node' | 'python' | 'rust' | 'unknown', string[]> = {
node: ['.eslintrc', 'biome.json', '.githooks/pre-commit', 'PR-CHECKLIST.md'],
python: ['pyproject.toml', '.githooks/pre-commit', 'PR-CHECKLIST.md'],
rust: ['rustfmt.toml', '.githooks/pre-commit', 'PR-CHECKLIST.md'],
unknown: ['.githooks/pre-commit', 'PR-CHECKLIST.md'],
};
async function legacyPresenceLoop(projectPath: string, kind: keyof typeof LEGACY_EXPECTED) {
const missing: string[] = [];
for (const relativePath of LEGACY_EXPECTED[kind]) {
const fs = await import('node:fs/promises');
try {
await fs.access(join(projectPath, relativePath));
} catch {
missing.push(relativePath);
}
}
return missing;
}
async function scaffoldFixture(kind: keyof typeof LEGACY_EXPECTED, skip: string[] = []) {
const dir = await makeTempDir();
if (kind === 'node') {
await writeFile(join(dir, 'package.json'), '{}\n', 'utf8');
}
if (kind === 'python') {
await writeFile(join(dir, 'pyproject.toml'), '[project]\n', 'utf8');
}
if (kind === 'rust') {
await writeFile(join(dir, 'Cargo.toml'), '[package]\n', 'utf8');
}
for (const relativePath of LEGACY_EXPECTED[kind]) {
if (skip.includes(relativePath)) continue;
await mkdir(join(dir, relativePath, '..'), { recursive: true });
await writeFile(join(dir, relativePath), 'fixture\n', 'utf8');
}
return dir;
}
// ─── QC-19 parity: typed verdict == absorbed presence loop ──────────────────
describe('QC-19 parity with the absorbed presence loop', () => {
const kinds: Array<keyof typeof LEGACY_EXPECTED> = ['node', 'python', 'rust', 'unknown'];
it.each(kinds)('positive fixture (%s): loop said ok ⇒ evaluator passed', async (kind) => {
const dir = await scaffoldFixture(kind);
const oracleMissing = await legacyPresenceLoop(dir, kind);
expect(oracleMissing).toEqual([]);
const report = await evaluateSubject({
subjectPath: dir,
checkIds: [QC_19_RAILS_FILES_PRESENT.id],
});
const result = report.results.find((r) => r.checkId === QC_19_RAILS_FILES_PRESENT.id);
expect(result?.status).toBe('passed');
expect(result?.reason).toBeUndefined();
expect(report.state).toBe('passed');
});
it.each(kinds)(
'negative fixture (%s): loop listed missing ⇒ evaluator failed with them',
async (kind) => {
const all = LEGACY_EXPECTED[kind];
const skip = all.slice(0, Math.max(1, all.length - 1)); // leave exactly 1 present
const dir = await scaffoldFixture(kind, skip);
const oracleMissing = await legacyPresenceLoop(dir, kind);
expect(oracleMissing.length).toBeGreaterThan(0);
const report = await evaluateSubject({
subjectPath: dir,
checkIds: [QC_19_RAILS_FILES_PRESENT.id],
});
const result = report.results.find((r) => r.checkId === QC_19_RAILS_FILES_PRESENT.id);
expect(result?.status).toBe('failed');
expect(report.state).toBe('failed');
for (const missingFile of oracleMissing) {
expect(result?.reason).toContain(missingFile);
}
// No false attribution: a present file must not be named in the reason.
const presentFile = all.find((file) => !skip.includes(file));
if (presentFile !== undefined) {
expect(result?.reason).not.toContain(` ${presentFile},`);
}
},
);
});
// ─── per-subject check sets (inventory gap 7) ────────────────────────────────
describe('per-subject check sets', () => {
it('monorepo subject selects only QC-19 with the monorepo file set', async () => {
const dir = await makeTempDir();
await writeFile(join(dir, 'pnpm-workspace.yaml'), 'packages:\n - packages/*\n', 'utf8');
for (const file of [
'.husky/pre-commit',
'.husky/pre-push',
'eslint.config.mjs',
'.prettierrc',
'.lintstagedrc',
]) {
await mkdir(join(dir, file, '..'), { recursive: true });
await writeFile(join(dir, file), 'fixture\n', 'utf8');
}
const report = await evaluateSubject({ subjectPath: dir });
expect(report.subject.kind).toBe('monorepo');
expect(report.results.map((r) => r.checkId)).toEqual(['qc-19-rails-files-present']);
expect(report.state).toBe('passed');
});
it('a monorepo missing one of its rails files fails QC-19 (not the node list)', async () => {
const dir = await makeTempDir();
await writeFile(join(dir, 'pnpm-workspace.yaml'), 'packages:\n', 'utf8');
const report = await evaluateSubject({ subjectPath: dir });
const result = report.results.find((r) => r.checkId === QC_19_RAILS_FILES_PRESENT.id);
expect(result?.status).toBe('failed');
expect(result?.reason).toContain('.husky/pre-commit');
// The node-template list must NOT be applied to a monorepo subject.
expect(result?.reason).not.toContain('biome.json');
});
it('the policy selects the behavioral probe for scaffold kinds but not monorepo', () => {
expect(checkSetForKind('node')).toContain(QC_20_ENFORCEMENT_VERIFY.id);
expect(checkSetForKind('unknown')).toContain(QC_20_ENFORCEMENT_VERIFY.id);
expect(checkSetForKind('monorepo')).not.toContain(QC_20_ENFORCEMENT_VERIFY.id);
expect(CHECK_SET_POLICY.version).toBe('1.0.0');
});
});
// ─── negative controls (the point of the card) ───────────────────────────────
describe('negative controls', () => {
it('unknown check id ⇒ error, never passed', async () => {
const dir = await scaffoldFixture('node');
const report = await evaluateSubject({
subjectPath: dir,
checkIds: ['qc-99-does-not-exist'],
});
expect(report.results).toHaveLength(1);
const result = firstResult(report);
expect(result.status).toBe('error');
expect(result.reason).toContain("unknown check id 'qc-99-does-not-exist'");
expect(result.status === 'passed').toBe(false);
expect(report.state).toBe('error');
});
it('missing subject (directory absent) ⇒ blocked for every check, never passed', async () => {
const report = await evaluateSubject({
subjectPath: join(tmpdir(), `qr-evaluator-absent-${Date.now()}`),
});
expect(report.results.length).toBeGreaterThan(0);
for (const result of report.results) {
expect(result.status).toBe('blocked');
expect(result.reason).toContain('subject directory does not exist');
}
expect(report.state).toBe('blocked');
});
it('QC-20 without probePath input ⇒ blocked, never passed', async () => {
const dir = await scaffoldFixture('node');
const report = await evaluateSubject({
subjectPath: dir,
checkIds: [QC_20_ENFORCEMENT_VERIFY.id],
});
const result = firstResult(report);
expect(result.status).toBe('blocked');
expect(result.reason).toContain('missing input: probePath');
});
it('QC-20 with a nonexistent probe script ⇒ blocked, never passed', async () => {
const dir = await scaffoldFixture('node');
const report = await evaluateSubject({
subjectPath: dir,
checkIds: [QC_20_ENFORCEMENT_VERIFY.id],
inputs: { 'qc-20-enforcement-verify': { probePath: join(dir, 'no-such-probe.sh') } },
});
expect(firstResult(report).status).toBe('blocked');
expect(firstResult(report).reason).toContain('probe script not found');
});
it('adapter process error (spawn failure) ⇒ error, never passed', async () => {
const dir = await scaffoldFixture('node');
const report = await evaluateSubject({
subjectPath: dir,
checkIds: [QC_20_ENFORCEMENT_VERIFY.id],
inputs: { 'qc-20-enforcement-verify': { probePath: join(dir, 'PR-CHECKLIST.md') } },
adapter: stubAdapter({ ok: false, kind: 'spawn-error', message: 'ENOENT bash' }),
});
expect(firstResult(report).status).toBe('error');
expect(firstResult(report).reason).toContain('probe process spawn-error');
expect(firstResult(report).status === 'passed').toBe(false);
});
it('adapter timeout ⇒ error, never passed', async () => {
const dir = await scaffoldFixture('node');
const report = await evaluateSubject({
subjectPath: dir,
checkIds: [QC_20_ENFORCEMENT_VERIFY.id],
inputs: { 'qc-20-enforcement-verify': { probePath: join(dir, 'PR-CHECKLIST.md') } },
adapter: stubAdapter({ ok: false, kind: 'timeout', message: 'timed out after 120000ms' }),
});
expect(firstResult(report).status).toBe('error');
expect(firstResult(report).reason).toContain('probe process timeout');
});
it('probe exit 1 with parseable FAIL markers ⇒ failed (interpretably red), never passed', async () => {
const dir = await scaffoldFixture('node');
const probe = await writeProbeScript(
dir,
'probe-fail.sh',
`echo "Test 1: ..."\necho "❌ FAIL: Type errors NOT blocked"\necho "Verification Summary"\nexit 1`,
);
const report = await evaluateSubject({
subjectPath: dir,
checkIds: [QC_20_ENFORCEMENT_VERIFY.id],
inputs: { 'qc-20-enforcement-verify': { probePath: probe } },
adapter: createSpawnProcessAdapter(),
});
expect(firstResult(report).status).toBe('failed');
expect(firstResult(report).reason).toContain('FAIL: Type errors NOT blocked');
expect(report.state).toBe('failed');
});
it('probe exit 1 WITHOUT parseable FAIL markers ⇒ malformed ⇒ error, never passed', async () => {
const dir = await scaffoldFixture('node');
const probe = await writeProbeScript(dir, 'probe-mute.sh', `echo "nothing to see"\nexit 1`);
const report = await evaluateSubject({
subjectPath: dir,
checkIds: [QC_20_ENFORCEMENT_VERIFY.id],
inputs: { 'qc-20-enforcement-verify': { probePath: probe } },
adapter: createSpawnProcessAdapter(),
});
expect(firstResult(report).status).toBe('error');
expect(firstResult(report).reason).toContain('malformed probe output');
});
it('probe exit 0 without a parseable pass transcript ⇒ malformed ⇒ error, never passed', async () => {
const dir = await scaffoldFixture('node');
const probe = await writeProbeScript(dir, 'probe-lie.sh', `echo "all good"\nexit 0`);
const report = await evaluateSubject({
subjectPath: dir,
checkIds: [QC_20_ENFORCEMENT_VERIFY.id],
inputs: { 'qc-20-enforcement-verify': { probePath: probe } },
adapter: createSpawnProcessAdapter(),
});
expect(firstResult(report).status).toBe('error');
expect(firstResult(report).reason).toContain('malformed probe output');
expect(firstResult(report).reason).toContain('exit 0');
});
it('probe exit 0 WITH fail markers ⇒ contradictory transcript ⇒ error, never passed', async () => {
const dir = await scaffoldFixture('node');
const probe = await writeProbeScript(
dir,
'probe-contradict.sh',
`echo "✅ PASS: one"\necho "❌ FAIL: two"\necho "Verification Summary"\nexit 0`,
);
const report = await evaluateSubject({
subjectPath: dir,
checkIds: [QC_20_ENFORCEMENT_VERIFY.id],
inputs: { 'qc-20-enforcement-verify': { probePath: probe } },
adapter: createSpawnProcessAdapter(),
});
expect(firstResult(report).status).toBe('error');
});
it('probe unexpected exit code (7) ⇒ error, never passed', async () => {
const dir = await scaffoldFixture('node');
const probe = await writeProbeScript(dir, 'probe-crash.sh', `echo "boom"\nexit 7`);
const report = await evaluateSubject({
subjectPath: dir,
checkIds: [QC_20_ENFORCEMENT_VERIFY.id],
inputs: { 'qc-20-enforcement-verify': { probePath: probe } },
adapter: createSpawnProcessAdapter(),
});
expect(firstResult(report).status).toBe('error');
expect(firstResult(report).reason).toContain('unexpected code 7');
});
it('check implementation throwing ⇒ error, never passed', async () => {
const dir = await scaffoldFixture('node');
const spec: CheckDefinitionSpec = {
id: 'test-throws',
version: '1.0.0',
canonicalCheck: 'QC-TEST',
description: 'sabotage-shaped definition that always throws',
appliesTo: ['node'],
params: {},
};
const throwing = defineCheck(spec, async () => {
throw new Error('kaboom');
});
const report = await evaluateSubject({
subjectPath: dir,
checkIds: ['test-throws'],
definitions: [throwing],
});
expect(firstResult(report).status).toBe('error');
expect(firstResult(report).reason).toContain('kaboom');
});
it('non-passed verdict without a reason ⇒ upgraded to error, never an unqualified skip', async () => {
const dir = await scaffoldFixture('node');
const spec: CheckDefinitionSpec = {
id: 'test-silent-fail',
version: '1.0.0',
canonicalCheck: 'QC-TEST',
description: 'returns failed without a reason',
appliesTo: ['node'],
params: {},
};
const silent = defineCheck(spec, async () => ({ status: 'failed' }));
const report = await evaluateSubject({
subjectPath: dir,
checkIds: ['test-silent-fail'],
definitions: [silent],
});
expect(firstResult(report).status).toBe('error');
expect(firstResult(report).reason).toContain('without a reason');
});
it('empty result list aggregates to blocked, never passed', () => {
expect(aggregateState([])).toBe('blocked');
});
});
// ─── QC-20 parity: typed verdict == shell probe's own conclusion ────────────
describe('QC-20 parity with the shell probe contract', () => {
it('green transcript (exit 0) ⇒ evaluator passed', async () => {
const dir = await scaffoldFixture('node');
const probe = await writeProbeScript(
dir,
'probe-pass.sh',
[
'echo "✅ PASS: Type errors blocked"',
'echo "✅ PASS: any types blocked"',
'echo "✅ PASS: Lint errors blocked"',
'echo "Verification Summary"',
'echo "✅ Passed: 3"',
'exit 0',
].join('\n'),
);
const report = await evaluateSubject({
subjectPath: dir,
checkIds: [QC_20_ENFORCEMENT_VERIFY.id],
inputs: { 'qc-20-enforcement-verify': { probePath: probe } },
adapter: createSpawnProcessAdapter(),
});
expect(firstResult(report).status).toBe('passed');
expect(report.state).toBe('passed');
});
it('the REAL framework verify.sh on a non-git subject concludes failed (exit 1) ⇒ evaluator failed', async () => {
// Real-probe parity: verify.sh without a git repo cannot block planted
// commits, exits 1 with FAIL markers — the evaluator must record exactly
// `failed` with those markers, matching the probe's own conclusion.
const realProbe = fileURLToPath(
new URL('../../../mosaic/framework/tools/quality/scripts/verify.sh', import.meta.url),
);
const dir = await makeTempDir(); // not a git repository, no hooks
const report = await evaluateSubject({
subjectPath: dir,
checkIds: [QC_20_ENFORCEMENT_VERIFY.id],
inputs: { 'qc-20-enforcement-verify': { probePath: realProbe } },
adapter: createSpawnProcessAdapter(),
});
const result = firstResult(report);
expect(result.status).toBe('failed');
expect(result.reason).toMatch(/FAIL:/);
expect(report.state).toBe('failed');
});
});
// ─── version / digest discipline ─────────────────────────────────────────────
describe('versioned, digested check definitions', () => {
it('every verdict records the definition version that produced it', async () => {
const dir = await scaffoldFixture('node');
const report = await evaluateSubject({ subjectPath: dir });
for (const result of report.results) {
expect(result.checkVersion).toBe('1.0.0');
}
expect(report.checkSetVersion).toBe(CHECK_SET_POLICY.version);
});
it('the report records each definitions content digest', async () => {
const dir = await scaffoldFixture('node');
const report = await evaluateSubject({ subjectPath: dir });
expect(report.definitionDigests[QC_19_RAILS_FILES_PRESENT.id]).toBe(
QC_19_RAILS_FILES_PRESENT.definitionDigest,
);
expect(report.definitionDigests[QC_20_ENFORCEMENT_VERIFY.id]).toBe(
QC_20_ENFORCEMENT_VERIFY.definitionDigest,
);
});
it('digests are stable for identical content', () => {
const spec = QC_19_RAILS_FILES_PRESENT;
expect(digestOfSpec(spec)).toBe(digestOfSpec(spec));
});
it('changing a definitions content changes its digest', () => {
const base = { ...QC_19_RAILS_FILES_PRESENT } as CheckDefinitionSpec;
const baseDigest = digestOfSpec(base);
const changedParams: CheckDefinitionSpec = {
...base,
params: {
expectedFilesByKind: {
...(base.params['expectedFilesByKind'] as Record<string, string[]>),
node: ['.eslintrc', 'biome.json', '.githooks/pre-commit', 'PR-CHECKLIST.md', 'NEW.md'],
},
},
};
expect(digestOfSpec(changedParams)).not.toBe(baseDigest);
const changedVersion: CheckDefinitionSpec = { ...base, version: '1.1.0' };
expect(digestOfSpec(changedVersion)).not.toBe(baseDigest);
});
it('a definition with changed content produces a different recorded digest and version', async () => {
const dir = await scaffoldFixture('node');
const modified = defineCheck(
{ ...QC_19_RAILS_FILES_PRESENT, version: '2.0.0' } as unknown as CheckDefinitionSpec,
async () => ({ status: 'passed' }),
);
const report = await evaluateSubject({
subjectPath: dir,
checkIds: [QC_19_RAILS_FILES_PRESENT.id],
definitions: [
modified,
...builtInDefinitions().filter((d) => d.id !== QC_19_RAILS_FILES_PRESENT.id),
],
});
const result = firstResult(report);
expect(result.checkVersion).toBe('2.0.0');
expect(report.definitionDigests[QC_19_RAILS_FILES_PRESENT.id]).toBe(modified.definitionDigest);
expect(modified.definitionDigest).not.toBe(QC_19_RAILS_FILES_PRESENT.definitionDigest);
});
});
// ─── aggregate state ordering (MACP-style discipline) ───────────────────────
describe('aggregate state precedence', () => {
const result = (status: 'passed' | 'failed' | 'blocked' | 'error') => ({
status,
checkId: 'x',
checkVersion: '1.0.0',
subject: '/tmp/x',
});
it('all passed (with not-applicable) ⇒ passed', () => {
expect(
aggregateState([
result('passed'),
{ ...result('passed'), status: 'not-applicable' as const },
]),
).toBe('passed');
});
it('error outranks blocked and failed; blocked outranks failed', () => {
expect(aggregateState([result('blocked'), result('error')])).toBe('error');
expect(aggregateState([result('failed'), result('blocked')])).toBe('blocked');
expect(aggregateState([result('passed'), result('failed')])).toBe('failed');
});
});
@@ -0,0 +1,183 @@
import { constants } from 'node:fs';
import { access, stat } from 'node:fs/promises';
import { join, resolve } from 'node:path';
import { createSpawnProcessAdapter } from './adapter.js';
import { builtInDefinitions, CHECK_SET_POLICY, checkSetForKind } from './definitions.js';
import type {
AggregateState,
CheckResult,
CheckStatus,
EvaluateOptions,
EvaluationReport,
ProcessAdapter,
Subject,
SubjectKind,
} from './types.js';
import { detectProjectKind } from '../detect.js';
async function pathExists(targetPath: string): Promise<boolean> {
try {
await access(targetPath, constants.F_OK);
return true;
} catch {
return false;
}
}
async function isDirectory(targetPath: string): Promise<boolean> {
try {
return (await stat(targetPath)).isDirectory();
} catch {
return false;
}
}
/**
* Subject-kind detection for the evaluator. Extends the scaffold detection
* (detect.ts) with the `monorepo` kind: a pnpm workspace is this repository's
* own subject shape and carries a different rails file set (probe-inventory
* gap 7 — check sets are per subject, not one global file list).
*/
export async function detectSubjectKind(subjectPath: string): Promise<SubjectKind> {
if (await pathExists(join(subjectPath, 'pnpm-workspace.yaml'))) {
return 'monorepo';
}
const kind = await detectProjectKind(subjectPath);
return kind;
}
/**
* Aggregate state, MACP-style discipline: `passed` only when at least one
* check produced a verdict AND every verdict is `passed` or an explicitly
* qualified `not-applicable`. Precedence is fail-closed: error > blocked >
* failed > passed; an empty result list aggregates to `blocked`.
*/
export function aggregateState(results: readonly CheckResult[]): AggregateState {
if (results.length === 0) {
return 'blocked';
}
const has = (status: CheckStatus): boolean => results.some((result) => result.status === status);
if (has('error')) {
return 'error';
}
if (has('blocked')) {
return 'blocked';
}
if (has('failed')) {
return 'failed';
}
return 'passed';
}
function reasonFrom(error: unknown): string {
return error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error);
}
/**
* Evaluate one subject against a set of checks, producing typed verdicts.
*
* Fail-closed invariants (RI-N4):
* - unknown check id → `error` (never passed)
* - subject directory absent → every verdict `blocked`
* - check implementation threw → `error`
* - non-passed without a reason → `error` (no unqualified skips)
* - check not applicable → `not-applicable` WITH a reason
*/
export async function evaluateSubject(options: EvaluateOptions): Promise<EvaluationReport> {
const subjectPath = resolve(options.subjectPath);
const subject: Subject = {
path: subjectPath,
kind: await detectSubjectKind(subjectPath),
};
const definitions = options.definitions ?? builtInDefinitions();
const byId = new Map(definitions.map((definition) => [definition.id, definition]));
const requested = options.checkIds ?? checkSetForKind(subject.kind);
const adapter: ProcessAdapter = options.adapter ?? createSpawnProcessAdapter();
const results: CheckResult[] = [];
const definitionDigests: Record<string, string> = {};
for (const checkId of requested) {
const definition = byId.get(checkId);
if (definition === undefined) {
const known = definitions.map((entry) => entry.id).join(', ');
results.push({
status: 'error',
checkId,
checkVersion: 'unknown',
subject: subjectPath,
reason: `unknown check id '${checkId}' — no registered definition (known: ${known})`,
});
continue;
}
definitionDigests[checkId] = definition.definitionDigest;
if (!(await isDirectory(subjectPath))) {
results.push({
status: 'blocked',
checkId,
checkVersion: definition.version,
subject: subjectPath,
reason: `subject directory does not exist: ${subjectPath}`,
});
continue;
}
if (!definition.appliesTo.includes(subject.kind)) {
results.push({
status: 'not-applicable',
checkId,
checkVersion: definition.version,
subject: subjectPath,
reason: `check '${checkId}' does not apply to subject kind '${subject.kind}'`,
});
continue;
}
try {
const inputs = options.inputs?.[checkId] ?? {};
const outcome = await definition.evaluate({
subject,
params: definition.params,
inputs,
adapter,
});
if (outcome.status !== 'passed' && (outcome.reason === undefined || outcome.reason === '')) {
results.push({
status: 'error',
checkId,
checkVersion: definition.version,
subject: subjectPath,
reason: `check returned status '${outcome.status}' without a reason — treated as error`,
});
continue;
}
results.push({
status: outcome.status,
checkId,
checkVersion: definition.version,
subject: subjectPath,
reason: outcome.reason,
});
} catch (error) {
results.push({
status: 'error',
checkId,
checkVersion: definition.version,
subject: subjectPath,
reason: `check implementation threw: ${reasonFrom(error)}`,
});
}
}
return {
subject,
results,
definitionDigests,
checkSetVersion: CHECK_SET_POLICY.version,
state: aggregateState(results),
};
}
@@ -0,0 +1,148 @@
// Evaluator core types — RI-N4 (card RI-3-002, SDLC-D-037 second half).
//
// The quality-rails evaluator is the SOLE authoritative producer of check
// verdicts for the checks it owns. Every verdict is typed and fail-closed:
// missing implementations, missing inputs, unknown check ids, process errors,
// timeouts, and malformed adapter output can never become `passed` or an
// unqualified skip — they surface as `blocked` or `error` with a reason.
// (Vocabulary mirrors MACP's GateStatus discipline from packages/macp.)
/**
* Typed verdict for a single check execution.
*
* - `passed` — the check really ran and its condition held.
* - `failed` — the check really ran and its condition did NOT hold.
* - `blocked` — the check could not run at all (missing subject, missing
* input). Never a green outcome.
* - `error` — the check attempted to run but its outcome cannot be trusted
* (unknown check id, implementation threw, process error, timeout, malformed
* adapter output). Never a green outcome.
* - `not-applicable` — the check definition explicitly declares it does not
* apply to this subject (a qualified skip, always with a reason).
*/
export type CheckStatus = 'passed' | 'failed' | 'blocked' | 'error' | 'not-applicable';
/** Aggregate outcome, MACP-style: `passed` only when every result is green. */
export type AggregateState = 'passed' | 'failed' | 'blocked' | 'error';
/** Kinds of subjects the evaluator can assess. */
export type SubjectKind = 'node' | 'python' | 'rust' | 'monorepo' | 'unknown';
/**
* A single check verdict. This is the canonical result shape: `status`,
* `checkId`, `checkVersion`, `subject`, `reason`. `reason` is REQUIRED
* (enforced by the runner) for every status other than `passed`.
*/
export interface CheckResult {
status: CheckStatus;
checkId: string;
checkVersion: string;
subject: string;
reason?: string;
}
/** The project being evaluated. */
export interface Subject {
/** Absolute path. */
path: string;
kind: SubjectKind;
}
/**
* The data half of a check definition. Definitions live as DATA with a version
* and a content digest (see `digestOfSpec`); the executable half is attached
* separately so the digest covers only reviewable, declarative content.
*/
export interface CheckDefinitionSpec {
/** Stable id, e.g. `qc-19-rails-files-present`. */
id: string;
/** Semver of this definition's data+semantics. */
version: string;
/** Canonical check id from docs/release-integrity/probe-inventory.md (QC-n). */
canonicalCheck: string;
description: string;
/** Subject kinds this check can assess (others yield `not-applicable`). */
appliesTo: readonly SubjectKind[];
/** Declarative parameters (file lists, markers, timeouts) — digest-covered. */
params: Record<string, unknown>;
}
/** A fully assembled check definition: spec + digest + implementation. */
export interface CheckDefinition extends CheckDefinitionSpec {
/** sha256 content digest of the spec (canonical JSON projection). */
definitionDigest: string;
evaluate(ctx: CheckContext): Promise<CheckOutcome>;
}
/** What a check implementation returns; the runner stamps id/version/subject. */
export interface CheckOutcome {
status: CheckStatus;
reason?: string;
}
/** Caller-provided inputs for one check invocation (e.g. the QC-20 probe path). */
export type CheckInputs = Record<string, unknown>;
/** Everything a check implementation may use. */
export interface CheckContext {
subject: Subject;
params: Record<string, unknown>;
inputs: CheckInputs;
adapter: ProcessAdapter;
}
/** Outcome of running a shell probe through the thin process adapter. */
export type AdapterOutcome =
| { ok: true; exitCode: number | null; stdout: string; stderr: string }
| { ok: false; kind: 'spawn-error' | 'timeout'; message: string };
/** Request for the process adapter. */
export interface AdapterRequest {
file: string;
args: string[];
cwd: string;
timeoutMs: number;
}
/**
* Thin process adapter: runs a command, owns NO verdict logic. Verdict parsing
* always lives in the check implementation (TS), never in the shell probe.
*/
export interface ProcessAdapter {
run(request: AdapterRequest): Promise<AdapterOutcome>;
}
/** Per-subject-kind check-set selection policy (versioned and digested). */
export interface CheckSetPolicySpec {
version: string;
byKind: Record<SubjectKind, readonly string[]>;
}
export interface CheckSetPolicy extends CheckSetPolicySpec {
/** sha256 content digest of the policy spec. */
policyDigest: string;
}
/** Full typed evaluation report for one subject. */
export interface EvaluationReport {
subject: Subject;
results: CheckResult[];
/** checkId → content digest of the definition that produced the verdicts. */
definitionDigests: Record<string, string>;
/** Version of the check-set policy used for subject selection. */
checkSetVersion: string;
state: AggregateState;
}
/** Options for `evaluateSubject`. */
export interface EvaluateOptions {
subjectPath: string;
/** Restrict to these check ids; defaults to the subject kind's check set. */
checkIds?: string[];
/** Per-check inputs, keyed by check id (e.g. `{ 'qc-20-enforcement-verify': { probePath } }`). */
inputs?: Record<string, CheckInputs>;
/** Replace the built-in definitions (tests / future batches). */
definitions?: CheckDefinition[];
/** Inject a process adapter (tests / instrumentation). */
adapter?: ProcessAdapter;
}
+32
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@@ -3,3 +3,35 @@ export * from './detect.js';
export * from './scaffolder.js';
export * from './templates.js';
export * from './types.js';
// RI-N4 evaluator (card RI-3-002): the public, programmatic entry points.
export {
builtInDefinitions,
CHECK_SET_POLICY,
checkSetForKind,
defineCheck,
QC_19_RAILS_FILES_PRESENT,
QC_20_ENFORCEMENT_VERIFY,
} from './evaluator/definitions.js';
export { canonicalJson, digestContent, digestOfPolicy, digestOfSpec } from './evaluator/digest.js';
export { createSpawnProcessAdapter } from './evaluator/adapter.js';
export { aggregateState, detectSubjectKind, evaluateSubject } from './evaluator/runner.js';
export type {
AdapterOutcome,
AdapterRequest,
AggregateState,
CheckContext,
CheckDefinition,
CheckDefinitionSpec,
CheckInputs,
CheckOutcome,
CheckResult,
CheckSetPolicy,
CheckSetPolicySpec,
CheckStatus,
EvaluateOptions,
EvaluationReport,
ProcessAdapter,
Subject,
SubjectKind,
} from './evaluator/types.js';
+15
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@@ -22,6 +22,12 @@
// format | format | pnpm format:check
// test | test | pnpm test
// build | publish.yml build | pnpm build
// quality-rails | (canonical-only) | the TS quality-rails evaluator
// | | (RI-N4, QC-19 monorepo subject). Like
// | | `build`, this stage has no ci.yml
// | | mirror; it is implemented by
// | | importing the evaluator CLI rather
// | | than duplicating its presence logic.
//
// Caller-provided prerequisites (kept at the pipeline level — see the comments
// in .woodpecker/ci.yml): `bash` + `rsync` for the guard stages, `openssl` and
@@ -90,6 +96,15 @@ export const STAGES = [
name: 'build',
commands: ['pnpm build'],
},
{
// RI-N4 (QC-19, card RI-3-002): the typed quality-rails evaluator, invoked
// as the implementation of the check it owns instead of a duplicated
// presence loop here. Canonical-only stage (no ci.yml mirror — same shape
// as `build`); runs AFTER build so the evaluator's dist/ exists. Subject
// is this repository (`.` → monorepo subject kind, per-subject check set).
name: 'quality-rails',
commands: ['node packages/quality-rails/dist/cli.js quality-rails evaluate --project .'],
},
];
export function stageByName(name) {
+49 -3
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@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ import { createRequire } from 'node:module';
import path from 'node:path';
import test from 'node:test';
import { STAGES } from './verify-release.mjs';
import { STAGES, stageByName } from './verify-release.mjs';
// SDLC-D-034 checkout invariant: publication in .woodpecker/publish.yml is
// bound to exact-commit terminal verification. This suite parses the real
@@ -229,10 +229,21 @@ steps:
function assertStagesMirrorCi(stages, ci) {
const canonical = Object.fromEntries(stages.map((stage) => [stage.name, stage.commands]));
// The complete mandatory set, in gate order.
// The complete mandatory set, in gate order. `quality-rails` is a
// canonical-only stage (RI-N4, QC-19): like `build`, it has no ci.yml
// mirror to match — its contract is asserted separately below.
assert.deepEqual(
stages.map((stage) => stage.name),
['sanitization', 'upgrade-guard', 'typecheck', 'lint', 'format', 'test', 'build'],
[
'sanitization',
'upgrade-guard',
'typecheck',
'lint',
'format',
'test',
'build',
'quality-rails',
],
);
// Guard stages: ci.yml commands minus its `apk add` environment prep must be
@@ -301,3 +312,38 @@ test('the root package.json exposes verify:release as the canonical command', as
const packageJson = JSON.parse(await readFile(path.join(process.cwd(), 'package.json'), 'utf8'));
assert.match(packageJson.scripts['verify:release'], /scripts\/verify-release\.mjs/);
});
// RI-N4 (card RI-3-002): the `quality-rails` stage must route through the TS
// evaluator instead of duplicating its presence logic inline. The evaluator
// owns QC-19; this file keeps that delegation honest.
function assertEvaluatorStage(stage) {
assert.ok(stage, 'canonical stages must include a quality-rails stage');
assert.ok(Array.isArray(stage.commands) && stage.commands.length > 0);
for (const command of stage.commands) {
assert.match(
command,
/packages\/quality-rails\/dist\/cli\.js.*quality-rails evaluate/,
`quality-rails stage command must invoke the evaluator CLI, got: '${command}'`,
);
}
}
test('the quality-rails stage invokes the evaluator rather than duplicating its logic', () => {
assertEvaluatorStage(stageByName('quality-rails'));
});
test('a quality-rails stage that re-implements presence logic inline fails the checker', () => {
// Negative control: replacing the evaluator invocation with an inline
// `test -f` presence loop is exactly the duplication RI-N4 forbids — the
// checker must go red on it.
const duplicated = {
name: 'quality-rails',
commands: ['test -f .husky/pre-commit && test -f .husky/pre-push'],
};
assert.throws(() => assertEvaluatorStage(duplicated), /must invoke the evaluator CLI/);
});
test('a quality-rails stage that silently drops the evaluator command fails the checker', () => {
const empty = { name: 'quality-rails', commands: [] };
assert.throws(() => assertEvaluatorStage(empty), /commands/);
});