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Author SHA1 Message Date
Jarvis
dc122e138b fix(federation): harness round-2 — email validation + host-side URL rewrite
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- Bug-1: replace whitespace in admin email local-part (was breaking @IsEmail)
- Bug-2: rewrite enrollment URL to use host-accessible base in seed.ts (in-cluster URL not resolvable from host)
- Bug-3: correct README Known Limitations section
- eslint.config.mjs: add tools/federation-harness/*.ts to allowDefaultProject so pre-commit hook can lint harness scripts

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-23 20:50:58 -05:00
Jarvis
190f12a971 fix(federation): harness CRIT bugs — admin bootstrap auth + peer FK + boot deadline (review remediation)
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CRIT-1: Replace nonexistent x-admin-key header with Authorization: Bearer <token>;
add bootstrapAdmin() to call POST /api/bootstrap/setup on each pristine gateway
before any admin-guarded endpoint is used.

CRIT-2: Fix cross-gateway peer FK violation — peer keypair is now created on
Server B first (so the grant FK resolves against B's own federation_peers table),
then Server A creates its own keypair and redeems the enrollment token at B.

HIGH-3: waitForStack() now polls both gateways in parallel via Promise.all, each
with an independent deadline, so a slow gateway-a cannot starve gateway-b's budget.

MED-4: seed() throws immediately with a clear error if scenario !== 'all';
per-variant narrowing deferred to M3-11 with explicit JSDoc note.

Also: remove ADMIN_API_KEY (no such path in AdminGuard) from compose, replace
with ADMIN_BOOTSTRAP_PASSWORD; add BETTER_AUTH_URL production-code limitation
as a TODO in the README.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-23 20:35:36 -05:00
Jarvis
3bfd5195b2 feat(federation): two-gateway test harness scaffold (FED-M3-02)
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Adds tools/federation-harness/ — the permanent test bed for M3+ federation
E2E tests. Boots two gateways (Server A + Server B) on a shared Docker bridge
network with per-gateway Postgres/pgvector + Valkey and a shared Step-CA.

- docker-compose.two-gateways.yml: gateway-a/b, postgres-a/b, valkey-a/b,
  step-ca; image digest-pinned to sha256:1069117740e... (sha-9f1a081, #491)
- seed.ts: provisions scope variants A/B/C via real admin REST API; walks
  full enrollment flow (peer keypair → grant → token → redeem → cert store)
- harness.ts: bootHarness/tearDownHarness/serverA/serverB/seed helpers for
  vitest; idempotent boot (reuses running stack when both gateways healthy)
- README.md: prereqs, topology, seed usage, vitest integration, port override,
  troubleshooting, image digest note

No production code modified. Quality gates: typecheck ✓ lint ✓ format ✓

Closes #462

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-23 20:21:31 -05:00
e64ddd2c1c docs(federation): M3 mission planning — 14-task decomposition (#504)
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2026-04-24 01:13:40 +00:00
4ece6dc643 chore(federation): M2 milestone close (FED-M2-13) (#503)
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2026-04-22 06:09:54 +00:00
194c3b603e docs(federation): M2 Step-CA setup guide + admin CLI reference (FED-M2-12) (#502)
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2026-04-22 06:06:45 +00:00
fc1600b738 fix(federation): security hardening — OID verification, atomic activation, audit on failure (#501)
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2026-04-22 06:02:52 +00:00
0ee5b14c68 test(federation): M2 E2E peer-add enrollment flow (FED-M2-10) (#500)
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2026-04-22 05:37:06 +00:00
3eee176cc3 test(federation): M2 integration tests (FED-M2-09) (#499)
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2026-04-22 05:08:24 +00:00
74fe60d8d6 feat(federation): admin controller + CLI federation commands (FED-M2-08) (#498)
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2026-04-22 04:39:46 +00:00
0bfaa56e9e feat(federation): enrollment controller + single-use token flow (FED-M2-07) (#497)
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2026-04-22 04:23:19 +00:00
01dd6b9fa1 feat(federation): grants service CRUD + status transitions (FED-M2-06) (#496)
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2026-04-22 03:57:12 +00:00
1038ae76e1 feat(federation): Step-CA client service for grant certs (FED-M2-04) (#494)
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2026-04-22 03:34:37 +00:00
bf082d95a0 feat(federation): seal federation peer client keys at rest (FED-M2-05) (#495)
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2026-04-22 03:10:20 +00:00
bb24292cf7 fix(federation): healthcheck + restart policy for federated-test stacks (#492)
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2026-04-22 02:56:40 +00:00
f2cda52e1a fix(deploy): bump gateway image digest to sha-9f1a081 [DEPLOY-IMG-FIX] (#491)
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2026-04-22 02:35:19 +00:00
7d7cf012f0 feat(federation): scope schema validator [FED-M2-03] (#489)
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2026-04-22 02:31:13 +00:00
c56dda74aa feat(federation): Step-CA sidecar in federated compose [FED-M2-02] (#490)
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2026-04-22 02:21:49 +00:00
9f1a08185e docs(federation): S21 tracking — DEPLOY-01/02 done, IMG-FIX in flight, M2-01 in remediation (#487)
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2026-04-22 02:02:36 +00:00
d2e408656b fix(docker): pnpm deploy for self-contained gateway runtime image (#488)
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2026-04-22 02:02:29 +00:00
54c278b871 feat(db): federation schema — grants/peers/audit_log [FED-M2-01] (#486)
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2026-04-22 02:02:21 +00:00
4dbd429203 feat(deploy): portainer stack template for federation test instances [DEPLOY-02] (#485)
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2026-04-22 01:34:44 +00:00
b985d7bfe2 docs(federation): M2 mission planning — TASKS decomposition + manifest update (#483)
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2026-04-22 01:24:00 +00:00
45e8f02c91 feat(mosaic-portainer): PORTAINER_INSECURE flag for self-signed TLS (#484)
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2026-04-22 01:21:54 +00:00
65 changed files with 18332 additions and 153 deletions

3
.gitignore vendored
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@@ -9,3 +9,6 @@ coverage
*.tsbuildinfo *.tsbuildinfo
.pnpm-store .pnpm-store
docs/reports/ docs/reports/
# Step-CA dev password — real file is gitignored; commit only the .example
infra/step-ca/dev-password

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@@ -56,6 +56,7 @@
"@opentelemetry/sdk-metrics": "^2.6.0", "@opentelemetry/sdk-metrics": "^2.6.0",
"@opentelemetry/sdk-node": "^0.213.0", "@opentelemetry/sdk-node": "^0.213.0",
"@opentelemetry/semantic-conventions": "^1.40.0", "@opentelemetry/semantic-conventions": "^1.40.0",
"@peculiar/x509": "^2.0.0",
"@sinclair/typebox": "^0.34.48", "@sinclair/typebox": "^0.34.48",
"better-auth": "^1.5.5", "better-auth": "^1.5.5",
"bullmq": "^5.71.0", "bullmq": "^5.71.0",
@@ -64,6 +65,7 @@
"dotenv": "^17.3.1", "dotenv": "^17.3.1",
"fastify": "^5.0.0", "fastify": "^5.0.0",
"ioredis": "^5.10.0", "ioredis": "^5.10.0",
"jose": "^6.2.2",
"node-cron": "^4.2.1", "node-cron": "^4.2.1",
"openai": "^6.32.0", "openai": "^6.32.0",
"postgres": "^3.4.8", "postgres": "^3.4.8",

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@@ -0,0 +1,243 @@
/**
* Federation M2 E2E test — peer-add enrollment flow (FED-M2-10).
*
* Covers MILESTONES.md acceptance test #6:
* "`peer add <url>` on Server A yields an `active` peer record with a valid cert + key"
*
* This test simulates two gateways using a single bootstrapped NestJS app:
* - "Server A": the admin API that generates a keypair and stores the cert
* - "Server B": the enrollment endpoint that signs the CSR
* Both share the same DB + Step-CA in the test environment.
*
* Prerequisites:
* docker compose -f docker-compose.federated.yml --profile federated up -d
*
* Run:
* FEDERATED_INTEGRATION=1 STEP_CA_AVAILABLE=1 \
* STEP_CA_URL=https://localhost:9000 \
* STEP_CA_PROVISIONER_KEY_JSON="$(docker exec $(docker ps -qf name=step-ca) cat /home/step/secrets/mosaic-fed.json)" \
* STEP_CA_ROOT_CERT_PATH=/tmp/step-ca-root.crt \
* pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/gateway test \
* src/__tests__/integration/federation-m2-e2e.integration.test.ts
*
* Obtaining Step-CA credentials:
* # Extract provisioner key from running container:
* # docker exec $(docker ps -qf name=step-ca) cat /home/step/secrets/mosaic-fed.json
* # Copy root cert from container:
* # docker cp $(docker ps -qf name=step-ca):/home/step/certs/root_ca.crt /tmp/step-ca-root.crt
* # Then: export STEP_CA_ROOT_CERT_PATH=/tmp/step-ca-root.crt
*
* Skipped unless both FEDERATED_INTEGRATION=1 and STEP_CA_AVAILABLE=1 are set.
*/
import * as crypto from 'node:crypto';
import { afterAll, beforeAll, describe, expect, it } from 'vitest';
import { Test } from '@nestjs/testing';
import { ValidationPipe } from '@nestjs/common';
import { FastifyAdapter, type NestFastifyApplication } from '@nestjs/platform-fastify';
import supertest from 'supertest';
import {
createDb,
type Db,
type DbHandle,
federationPeers,
federationGrants,
federationEnrollmentTokens,
inArray,
eq,
} from '@mosaicstack/db';
import * as schema from '@mosaicstack/db';
import { DB } from '../../database/database.module.js';
import { AdminGuard } from '../../admin/admin.guard.js';
import { FederationModule } from '../../federation/federation.module.js';
import { GrantsService } from '../../federation/grants.service.js';
import { EnrollmentService } from '../../federation/enrollment.service.js';
const run = process.env['FEDERATED_INTEGRATION'] === '1';
const stepCaRun =
run &&
process.env['STEP_CA_AVAILABLE'] === '1' &&
!!process.env['STEP_CA_URL'] &&
!!process.env['STEP_CA_PROVISIONER_KEY_JSON'] &&
!!process.env['STEP_CA_ROOT_CERT_PATH'];
const PG_URL = 'postgresql://mosaic:mosaic@localhost:5433/mosaic';
const RUN_ID = crypto.randomUUID();
describe.skipIf(!stepCaRun)('federation M2 E2E — peer add enrollment flow', () => {
let handle: DbHandle;
let db: Db;
let app: NestFastifyApplication;
let agent: ReturnType<typeof supertest>;
let grantsService: GrantsService;
let enrollmentService: EnrollmentService;
const createdTokenGrantIds: string[] = [];
const createdGrantIds: string[] = [];
const createdPeerIds: string[] = [];
const createdUserIds: string[] = [];
beforeAll(async () => {
process.env['BETTER_AUTH_SECRET'] ??= 'test-e2e-sealing-key';
handle = createDb(PG_URL);
db = handle.db;
const moduleRef = await Test.createTestingModule({
imports: [FederationModule],
providers: [{ provide: DB, useValue: db }],
})
.overrideGuard(AdminGuard)
.useValue({ canActivate: () => true })
.compile();
app = moduleRef.createNestApplication<NestFastifyApplication>(new FastifyAdapter());
app.useGlobalPipes(new ValidationPipe({ whitelist: true, transform: true }));
await app.init();
await app.getHttpAdapter().getInstance().ready();
agent = supertest(app.getHttpServer());
grantsService = moduleRef.get(GrantsService);
enrollmentService = moduleRef.get(EnrollmentService);
}, 30_000);
afterAll(async () => {
if (db && createdTokenGrantIds.length > 0) {
await db
.delete(federationEnrollmentTokens)
.where(inArray(federationEnrollmentTokens.grantId, createdTokenGrantIds))
.catch((e: unknown) => console.error('[federation-m2-e2e cleanup]', e));
}
if (db && createdGrantIds.length > 0) {
await db
.delete(federationGrants)
.where(inArray(federationGrants.id, createdGrantIds))
.catch((e: unknown) => console.error('[federation-m2-e2e cleanup]', e));
}
if (db && createdPeerIds.length > 0) {
await db
.delete(federationPeers)
.where(inArray(federationPeers.id, createdPeerIds))
.catch((e: unknown) => console.error('[federation-m2-e2e cleanup]', e));
}
if (db && createdUserIds.length > 0) {
await db
.delete(schema.users)
.where(inArray(schema.users.id, createdUserIds))
.catch((e: unknown) => console.error('[federation-m2-e2e cleanup]', e));
}
if (app)
await app.close().catch((e: unknown) => console.error('[federation-m2-e2e cleanup]', e));
if (handle)
await handle.close().catch((e: unknown) => console.error('[federation-m2-e2e cleanup]', e));
});
// -------------------------------------------------------------------------
// #6 — peer add: keypair → enrollment → cert storage → active peer record
// -------------------------------------------------------------------------
it('#6 — peer add flow: keypair → enrollment → cert storage → active peer record', async () => {
// Create a subject user to satisfy FK on federation_grants.subject_user_id
const userId = crypto.randomUUID();
await db
.insert(schema.users)
.values({
id: userId,
name: `e2e-user-${RUN_ID}`,
email: `e2e-${RUN_ID}@federation-test.invalid`,
emailVerified: false,
})
.onConflictDoNothing();
createdUserIds.push(userId);
// ── Step A: "Server B" setup ─────────────────────────────────────────
// Server B admin creates a grant and generates an enrollment token to
// share out-of-band with Server A's operator.
// Insert a placeholder peer on "Server B" to satisfy the grant FK
const serverBPeerId = crypto.randomUUID();
await db
.insert(federationPeers)
.values({
id: serverBPeerId,
commonName: `server-b-peer-${RUN_ID}`,
displayName: 'Server B Placeholder',
certPem: '-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\nMOCK\n-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n',
certSerial: `serial-b-${serverBPeerId}`,
certNotAfter: new Date(Date.now() + 365 * 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000),
state: 'pending',
})
.onConflictDoNothing();
createdPeerIds.push(serverBPeerId);
const grant = await grantsService.createGrant({
subjectUserId: userId,
scope: { resources: ['tasks'], excluded_resources: [], max_rows_per_query: 100 },
peerId: serverBPeerId,
});
createdGrantIds.push(grant.id);
createdTokenGrantIds.push(grant.id);
const { token } = await enrollmentService.createToken({
grantId: grant.id,
peerId: serverBPeerId,
ttlSeconds: 900,
});
// ── Step B: "Server A" generates keypair ─────────────────────────────
const keypairRes = await agent
.post('/api/admin/federation/peers/keypair')
.send({
commonName: `e2e-peer-${RUN_ID.slice(0, 8)}`,
displayName: 'E2E Test Peer',
endpointUrl: 'https://test.invalid',
})
.set('Content-Type', 'application/json');
expect(keypairRes.status).toBe(201);
const { peerId, csrPem } = keypairRes.body as { peerId: string; csrPem: string };
expect(typeof peerId).toBe('string');
expect(csrPem).toContain('-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE REQUEST-----');
createdPeerIds.push(peerId);
// ── Step C: Enrollment (simulates Server A sending CSR to Server B) ──
const enrollRes = await agent
.post(`/api/federation/enrollment/${token}`)
.send({ csrPem })
.set('Content-Type', 'application/json');
expect(enrollRes.status).toBe(200);
const { certPem, certChainPem } = enrollRes.body as {
certPem: string;
certChainPem: string;
};
expect(certPem).toContain('-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----');
expect(certChainPem).toContain('-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----');
// ── Step D: "Server A" stores the cert ───────────────────────────────
const storeRes = await agent
.patch(`/api/admin/federation/peers/${peerId}/cert`)
.send({ certPem })
.set('Content-Type', 'application/json');
expect(storeRes.status).toBe(200);
// ── Step E: Verify peer record in DB ─────────────────────────────────
const [peer] = await db
.select()
.from(federationPeers)
.where(eq(federationPeers.id, peerId))
.limit(1);
expect(peer).toBeDefined();
expect(peer?.state).toBe('active');
expect(peer?.certPem).toContain('-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----');
expect(typeof peer?.certSerial).toBe('string');
expect((peer?.certSerial ?? '').length).toBeGreaterThan(0);
// clientKeyPem is a sealed ciphertext — must not be a raw PEM
expect(peer?.clientKeyPem?.startsWith('-----BEGIN')).toBe(false);
// certNotAfter must be in the future
expect(peer?.certNotAfter?.getTime()).toBeGreaterThan(Date.now());
}, 60_000);
});

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@@ -0,0 +1,483 @@
/**
* Federation M2 integration tests (FED-M2-09).
*
* Covers MILESTONES.md acceptance tests #1, #2, #3, #5, #7, #8.
*
* Prerequisites:
* docker compose -f docker-compose.federated.yml --profile federated up -d
*
* Run DB-only tests (no Step-CA):
* FEDERATED_INTEGRATION=1 BETTER_AUTH_SECRET=test-secret pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/gateway test \
* src/__tests__/integration/federation-m2.integration.test.ts
*
* Run all tests including Step-CA-dependent ones:
* FEDERATED_INTEGRATION=1 STEP_CA_AVAILABLE=1 \
* STEP_CA_URL=https://localhost:9000 \
* STEP_CA_PROVISIONER_KEY_JSON="$(docker exec $(docker ps -qf name=step-ca) cat /home/step/secrets/mosaic-fed.json)" \
* STEP_CA_ROOT_CERT_PATH=/tmp/step-ca-root.crt \
* pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/gateway test \
* src/__tests__/integration/federation-m2.integration.test.ts
*
* Obtaining Step-CA credentials:
* # Extract provisioner key from running container:
* # docker exec $(docker ps -qf name=step-ca) cat /home/step/secrets/mosaic-fed.json
* # Copy root cert from container:
* # docker cp $(docker ps -qf name=step-ca):/home/step/certs/root_ca.crt /tmp/step-ca-root.crt
* # Then: export STEP_CA_ROOT_CERT_PATH=/tmp/step-ca-root.crt
*/
import * as crypto from 'node:crypto';
import { afterAll, beforeAll, describe, expect, it } from 'vitest';
import { Test } from '@nestjs/testing';
import { GoneException } from '@nestjs/common';
import { Pkcs10CertificateRequestGenerator, X509Certificate as PeculiarX509 } from '@peculiar/x509';
import {
createDb,
type Db,
type DbHandle,
federationPeers,
federationGrants,
federationEnrollmentTokens,
inArray,
eq,
} from '@mosaicstack/db';
import * as schema from '@mosaicstack/db';
import { seal } from '@mosaicstack/auth';
import { DB } from '../../database/database.module.js';
import { GrantsService } from '../../federation/grants.service.js';
import { EnrollmentService } from '../../federation/enrollment.service.js';
import { CaService } from '../../federation/ca.service.js';
import { FederationScopeError } from '../../federation/scope-schema.js';
const run = process.env['FEDERATED_INTEGRATION'] === '1';
const stepCaRun = run && process.env['STEP_CA_AVAILABLE'] === '1';
const PG_URL = 'postgresql://mosaic:mosaic@localhost:5433/mosaic';
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Helpers for test data isolation
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
/** Unique run prefix to identify rows created by this test run. */
const RUN_ID = crypto.randomUUID();
/** Insert a minimal user row to satisfy the FK on federation_grants.subject_user_id. */
async function insertTestUser(db: Db, id: string): Promise<void> {
await db
.insert(schema.users)
.values({
id,
name: `test-user-${id}`,
email: `test-${id}@federation-test.invalid`,
emailVerified: false,
})
.onConflictDoNothing();
}
/** Insert a minimal peer row to satisfy the FK on federation_grants.peer_id. */
async function insertTestPeer(db: Db, id: string, suffix: string = ''): Promise<void> {
await db
.insert(federationPeers)
.values({
id,
commonName: `test-peer-${RUN_ID}-${suffix}`,
displayName: `Test Peer ${suffix}`,
certPem: '-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\nMOCK\n-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n',
certSerial: `test-serial-${id}`,
certNotAfter: new Date(Date.now() + 365 * 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000),
state: 'pending',
})
.onConflictDoNothing();
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// DB-only test module (CaService mocked so env vars not required)
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
function buildDbModule(db: Db) {
return Test.createTestingModule({
providers: [
{ provide: DB, useValue: db },
GrantsService,
{
provide: CaService,
useValue: {
issueCert: async () => {
throw new Error('CaService.issueCert should not be called in DB-only tests');
},
},
},
EnrollmentService,
],
}).compile();
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Test suite — DB-only (no Step-CA)
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
describe.skipIf(!run)('federation M2 — DB-only tests', () => {
let handle: DbHandle;
let db: Db;
let grantsService: GrantsService;
/** IDs created during this run — cleaned up in afterAll. */
const createdGrantIds: string[] = [];
const createdPeerIds: string[] = [];
const createdUserIds: string[] = [];
beforeAll(async () => {
process.env['BETTER_AUTH_SECRET'] ??= 'test-integration-sealing-key-not-for-prod';
handle = createDb(PG_URL);
db = handle.db;
const moduleRef = await buildDbModule(db);
grantsService = moduleRef.get(GrantsService);
});
afterAll(async () => {
// Clean up in FK-safe order: tokens → grants → peers → users
if (db && createdGrantIds.length > 0) {
await db
.delete(federationEnrollmentTokens)
.where(inArray(federationEnrollmentTokens.grantId, createdGrantIds))
.catch((e: unknown) => console.error('[federation-m2-test cleanup]', e));
await db
.delete(federationGrants)
.where(inArray(federationGrants.id, createdGrantIds))
.catch((e: unknown) => console.error('[federation-m2-test cleanup]', e));
}
if (db && createdPeerIds.length > 0) {
await db
.delete(federationPeers)
.where(inArray(federationPeers.id, createdPeerIds))
.catch((e: unknown) => console.error('[federation-m2-test cleanup]', e));
}
if (db && createdUserIds.length > 0) {
await db
.delete(schema.users)
.where(inArray(schema.users.id, createdUserIds))
.catch((e: unknown) => console.error('[federation-m2-test cleanup]', e));
}
if (handle)
await handle.close().catch((e: unknown) => console.error('[federation-m2-test cleanup]', e));
});
// -------------------------------------------------------------------------
// #1 — grant create writes a pending row
// -------------------------------------------------------------------------
it('#1 — createGrant writes a pending row to DB', async () => {
const userId = crypto.randomUUID();
const peerId = crypto.randomUUID();
const validScope = {
resources: ['tasks'],
excluded_resources: [],
max_rows_per_query: 100,
};
await insertTestUser(db, userId);
await insertTestPeer(db, peerId, 'test1');
createdUserIds.push(userId);
createdPeerIds.push(peerId);
const grant = await grantsService.createGrant({
subjectUserId: userId,
scope: validScope,
peerId,
});
createdGrantIds.push(grant.id);
// Verify the row exists in DB with correct shape
const [row] = await db
.select()
.from(federationGrants)
.where(eq(federationGrants.id, grant.id))
.limit(1);
expect(row).toBeDefined();
expect(row?.status).toBe('pending');
expect(row?.peerId).toBe(peerId);
expect(row?.subjectUserId).toBe(userId);
const storedScope = row?.scope as Record<string, unknown>;
expect(storedScope['resources']).toEqual(['tasks']);
expect(storedScope['max_rows_per_query']).toBe(100);
}, 15_000);
// -------------------------------------------------------------------------
// #7 — scope with unknown resource type rejected
// -------------------------------------------------------------------------
it('#7 — createGrant rejects scope with unknown resource type', async () => {
const userId = crypto.randomUUID();
const peerId = crypto.randomUUID();
const invalidScope = {
resources: ['totally_unknown_resource'],
excluded_resources: [],
max_rows_per_query: 100,
};
await insertTestUser(db, userId);
await insertTestPeer(db, peerId, 'test7');
createdUserIds.push(userId);
createdPeerIds.push(peerId);
await expect(
grantsService.createGrant({
subjectUserId: userId,
scope: invalidScope,
peerId,
}),
).rejects.toThrow(FederationScopeError);
}, 15_000);
// -------------------------------------------------------------------------
// #8 — listGrants returns accurate status for grants in various states
// -------------------------------------------------------------------------
it('#8 — listGrants returns accurate status for grants in various states', async () => {
const userId = crypto.randomUUID();
const peerId = crypto.randomUUID();
const validScope = {
resources: ['notes'],
excluded_resources: [],
max_rows_per_query: 50,
};
await insertTestUser(db, userId);
await insertTestPeer(db, peerId, 'test8');
createdUserIds.push(userId);
createdPeerIds.push(peerId);
// Create two pending grants via GrantsService
const grantA = await grantsService.createGrant({
subjectUserId: userId,
scope: validScope,
peerId,
});
const grantB = await grantsService.createGrant({
subjectUserId: userId,
scope: { resources: ['tasks'], excluded_resources: [], max_rows_per_query: 50 },
peerId,
});
createdGrantIds.push(grantA.id, grantB.id);
// Insert a third grant directly in 'revoked' state to test status variety
const [grantC] = await db
.insert(federationGrants)
.values({
id: crypto.randomUUID(),
subjectUserId: userId,
peerId,
scope: validScope,
status: 'revoked',
revokedAt: new Date(),
})
.returning();
createdGrantIds.push(grantC!.id);
// List all grants for this peer
const allForPeer = await grantsService.listGrants({ peerId });
const ourGrantIds = new Set([grantA.id, grantB.id, grantC!.id]);
const ourGrants = allForPeer.filter((g) => ourGrantIds.has(g.id));
expect(ourGrants).toHaveLength(3);
const pendingGrants = ourGrants.filter((g) => g.status === 'pending');
const revokedGrants = ourGrants.filter((g) => g.status === 'revoked');
expect(pendingGrants).toHaveLength(2);
expect(revokedGrants).toHaveLength(1);
// Status-filtered query
const pendingOnly = await grantsService.listGrants({ peerId, status: 'pending' });
const ourPending = pendingOnly.filter((g) => ourGrantIds.has(g.id));
expect(ourPending.every((g) => g.status === 'pending')).toBe(true);
// Verify peer list from DB also shows the peer rows with correct state
const peers = await db.select().from(federationPeers).where(eq(federationPeers.id, peerId));
expect(peers).toHaveLength(1);
expect(peers[0]?.state).toBe('pending');
}, 15_000);
// -------------------------------------------------------------------------
// #5 — client_key_pem encrypted at rest
// -------------------------------------------------------------------------
it('#5 — clientKeyPem stored in DB is a sealed ciphertext (not a valid PEM)', async () => {
const peerId = crypto.randomUUID();
const rawPem = '-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----\nMOCK\n-----END PRIVATE KEY-----\n';
const sealed = seal(rawPem);
await db.insert(federationPeers).values({
id: peerId,
commonName: `test-peer-${RUN_ID}-sealed`,
displayName: 'Sealed Key Test Peer',
certPem: '-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\nMOCK\n-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n',
certSerial: `test-serial-sealed-${peerId}`,
certNotAfter: new Date(Date.now() + 365 * 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000),
state: 'pending',
clientKeyPem: sealed,
});
createdPeerIds.push(peerId);
const [row] = await db
.select()
.from(federationPeers)
.where(eq(federationPeers.id, peerId))
.limit(1);
expect(row).toBeDefined();
// The stored value must NOT be a valid PEM — it's a sealed ciphertext blob
expect(row?.clientKeyPem).toBeDefined();
expect(row?.clientKeyPem?.startsWith('-----BEGIN')).toBe(false);
// The sealed value should be non-trivial (at least 20 chars)
expect((row?.clientKeyPem ?? '').length).toBeGreaterThan(20);
}, 15_000);
});
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Test suite — Step-CA gated
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
describe.skipIf(!stepCaRun)('federation M2 — Step-CA tests', () => {
let handle: DbHandle;
let db: Db;
let grantsService: GrantsService;
let enrollmentService: EnrollmentService;
const createdGrantIds: string[] = [];
const createdPeerIds: string[] = [];
const createdUserIds: string[] = [];
beforeAll(async () => {
handle = createDb(PG_URL);
db = handle.db;
// Use real CaService — env vars (STEP_CA_URL, STEP_CA_PROVISIONER_KEY_JSON,
// STEP_CA_ROOT_CERT_PATH) must be set when STEP_CA_AVAILABLE=1
const moduleRef = await Test.createTestingModule({
providers: [{ provide: DB, useValue: db }, CaService, GrantsService, EnrollmentService],
}).compile();
grantsService = moduleRef.get(GrantsService);
enrollmentService = moduleRef.get(EnrollmentService);
});
afterAll(async () => {
if (db && createdGrantIds.length > 0) {
await db
.delete(federationEnrollmentTokens)
.where(inArray(federationEnrollmentTokens.grantId, createdGrantIds))
.catch((e: unknown) => console.error('[federation-m2-test cleanup]', e));
await db
.delete(federationGrants)
.where(inArray(federationGrants.id, createdGrantIds))
.catch((e: unknown) => console.error('[federation-m2-test cleanup]', e));
}
if (db && createdPeerIds.length > 0) {
await db
.delete(federationPeers)
.where(inArray(federationPeers.id, createdPeerIds))
.catch((e: unknown) => console.error('[federation-m2-test cleanup]', e));
}
if (db && createdUserIds.length > 0) {
await db
.delete(schema.users)
.where(inArray(schema.users.id, createdUserIds))
.catch((e: unknown) => console.error('[federation-m2-test cleanup]', e));
}
if (handle)
await handle.close().catch((e: unknown) => console.error('[federation-m2-test cleanup]', e));
});
/** Generate a P-256 key pair and PKCS#10 CSR, returning the CSR as PEM. */
async function generateCsrPem(cn: string): Promise<string> {
const alg = { name: 'ECDSA', namedCurve: 'P-256', hash: 'SHA-256' };
const keyPair = await crypto.subtle.generateKey(alg, true, ['sign', 'verify']);
const csr = await Pkcs10CertificateRequestGenerator.create({
name: `CN=${cn}`,
keys: keyPair,
signingAlgorithm: alg,
});
return csr.toString('pem');
}
// -------------------------------------------------------------------------
// #2 — enrollment signs CSR and returns cert
// -------------------------------------------------------------------------
it('#2 — redeem returns a certPem containing a valid PEM certificate', async () => {
const userId = crypto.randomUUID();
const peerId = crypto.randomUUID();
const validScope = {
resources: ['tasks'],
excluded_resources: [],
max_rows_per_query: 100,
};
await insertTestUser(db, userId);
await insertTestPeer(db, peerId, 'ca-test2');
createdUserIds.push(userId);
createdPeerIds.push(peerId);
const grant = await grantsService.createGrant({
subjectUserId: userId,
scope: validScope,
peerId,
});
createdGrantIds.push(grant.id);
const { token } = await enrollmentService.createToken({
grantId: grant.id,
peerId,
ttlSeconds: 900,
});
const csrPem = await generateCsrPem(`gateway-test-${RUN_ID.slice(0, 8)}`);
const result = await enrollmentService.redeem(token, csrPem);
expect(result.certPem).toContain('-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----');
expect(result.certChainPem).toContain('-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----');
// Verify the issued cert parses cleanly
const cert = new PeculiarX509(result.certPem);
expect(cert.serialNumber).toBeTruthy();
}, 30_000);
// -------------------------------------------------------------------------
// #3 — token single-use; second attempt returns GoneException
// -------------------------------------------------------------------------
it('#3 — second redeem of the same token throws GoneException', async () => {
const userId = crypto.randomUUID();
const peerId = crypto.randomUUID();
const validScope = {
resources: ['notes'],
excluded_resources: [],
max_rows_per_query: 50,
};
await insertTestUser(db, userId);
await insertTestPeer(db, peerId, 'ca-test3');
createdUserIds.push(userId);
createdPeerIds.push(peerId);
const grant = await grantsService.createGrant({
subjectUserId: userId,
scope: validScope,
peerId,
});
createdGrantIds.push(grant.id);
const { token } = await enrollmentService.createToken({
grantId: grant.id,
peerId,
ttlSeconds: 900,
});
const csrPem = await generateCsrPem(`gateway-test-replay-${RUN_ID.slice(0, 8)}`);
// First redeem must succeed
const result = await enrollmentService.redeem(token, csrPem);
expect(result.certPem).toContain('-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----');
// Second redeem with the same token must be rejected
await expect(enrollmentService.redeem(token, csrPem)).rejects.toThrow(GoneException);
}, 30_000);
});

View File

@@ -1,62 +1,10 @@
import { Inject, Injectable, Logger } from '@nestjs/common'; import { Inject, Injectable, Logger } from '@nestjs/common';
import { createCipheriv, createDecipheriv, createHash, randomBytes } from 'node:crypto'; import { seal, unseal } from '@mosaicstack/auth';
import type { Db } from '@mosaicstack/db'; import type { Db } from '@mosaicstack/db';
import { providerCredentials, eq, and } from '@mosaicstack/db'; import { providerCredentials, eq, and } from '@mosaicstack/db';
import { DB } from '../database/database.module.js'; import { DB } from '../database/database.module.js';
import type { ProviderCredentialSummaryDto } from './provider-credentials.dto.js'; import type { ProviderCredentialSummaryDto } from './provider-credentials.dto.js';
const ALGORITHM = 'aes-256-gcm';
const IV_LENGTH = 12; // 96-bit IV for GCM
const TAG_LENGTH = 16; // 128-bit auth tag
/**
* Derive a 32-byte AES-256 key from BETTER_AUTH_SECRET using SHA-256.
* The secret is assumed to be set in the environment.
*/
function deriveEncryptionKey(): Buffer {
const secret = process.env['BETTER_AUTH_SECRET'];
if (!secret) {
throw new Error('BETTER_AUTH_SECRET is not set — cannot derive encryption key');
}
return createHash('sha256').update(secret).digest();
}
/**
* Encrypt a plain-text value using AES-256-GCM.
* Output format: base64(iv + authTag + ciphertext)
*/
function encrypt(plaintext: string): string {
const key = deriveEncryptionKey();
const iv = randomBytes(IV_LENGTH);
const cipher = createCipheriv(ALGORITHM, key, iv);
const encrypted = Buffer.concat([cipher.update(plaintext, 'utf8'), cipher.final()]);
const authTag = cipher.getAuthTag();
// Combine iv (12) + authTag (16) + ciphertext and base64-encode
const combined = Buffer.concat([iv, authTag, encrypted]);
return combined.toString('base64');
}
/**
* Decrypt a value encrypted by `encrypt()`.
* Throws on authentication failure (tampered data).
*/
function decrypt(encoded: string): string {
const key = deriveEncryptionKey();
const combined = Buffer.from(encoded, 'base64');
const iv = combined.subarray(0, IV_LENGTH);
const authTag = combined.subarray(IV_LENGTH, IV_LENGTH + TAG_LENGTH);
const ciphertext = combined.subarray(IV_LENGTH + TAG_LENGTH);
const decipher = createDecipheriv(ALGORITHM, key, iv);
decipher.setAuthTag(authTag);
const decrypted = Buffer.concat([decipher.update(ciphertext), decipher.final()]);
return decrypted.toString('utf8');
}
@Injectable() @Injectable()
export class ProviderCredentialsService { export class ProviderCredentialsService {
private readonly logger = new Logger(ProviderCredentialsService.name); private readonly logger = new Logger(ProviderCredentialsService.name);
@@ -74,7 +22,7 @@ export class ProviderCredentialsService {
value: string, value: string,
metadata?: Record<string, unknown>, metadata?: Record<string, unknown>,
): Promise<void> { ): Promise<void> {
const encryptedValue = encrypt(value); const encryptedValue = seal(value);
await this.db await this.db
.insert(providerCredentials) .insert(providerCredentials)
@@ -122,7 +70,7 @@ export class ProviderCredentialsService {
} }
try { try {
return decrypt(row.encryptedValue); return unseal(row.encryptedValue);
} catch (err) { } catch (err) {
this.logger.error( this.logger.error(
`Failed to decrypt credential for user=${userId} provider=${provider}`, `Failed to decrypt credential for user=${userId} provider=${provider}`,

View File

@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ import { GCModule } from './gc/gc.module.js';
import { ReloadModule } from './reload/reload.module.js'; import { ReloadModule } from './reload/reload.module.js';
import { WorkspaceModule } from './workspace/workspace.module.js'; import { WorkspaceModule } from './workspace/workspace.module.js';
import { QueueModule } from './queue/queue.module.js'; import { QueueModule } from './queue/queue.module.js';
import { FederationModule } from './federation/federation.module.js';
import { ThrottlerGuard, ThrottlerModule } from '@nestjs/throttler'; import { ThrottlerGuard, ThrottlerModule } from '@nestjs/throttler';
@Module({ @Module({
@@ -52,6 +53,7 @@ import { ThrottlerGuard, ThrottlerModule } from '@nestjs/throttler';
QueueModule, QueueModule,
ReloadModule, ReloadModule,
WorkspaceModule, WorkspaceModule,
FederationModule,
], ],
controllers: [HealthController], controllers: [HealthController],
providers: [ providers: [

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,373 @@
/**
* Unit tests for EnrollmentService — federation enrollment token flow (FED-M2-07).
*
* Coverage:
* createToken:
* - inserts token row with correct grantId, peerId, and future expiresAt
* - returns { token, expiresAt } with a 64-char hex token
* - clamps ttlSeconds to 900
*
* redeem — error paths:
* - NotFoundException when token row not found
* - GoneException when token already used (usedAt set)
* - GoneException when token expired (expiresAt < now)
* - GoneException when grant status is not pending
*
* redeem — success path:
* - atomically claims token BEFORE cert issuance (claim → issueCert → tx)
* - calls CaService.issueCert with correct args
* - activates grant + updates peer + writes audit log inside a transaction
* - returns { certPem, certChainPem }
*
* redeem — replay protection:
* - GoneException when claim UPDATE returns empty array (concurrent request won)
*/
import 'reflect-metadata';
import { describe, it, expect, vi, beforeEach } from 'vitest';
import { GoneException, NotFoundException } from '@nestjs/common';
import type { Db } from '@mosaicstack/db';
import { EnrollmentService } from '../enrollment.service.js';
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Test constants
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
const GRANT_ID = 'g1111111-1111-1111-1111-111111111111';
const PEER_ID = 'p2222222-2222-2222-2222-222222222222';
const USER_ID = 'u3333333-3333-3333-3333-333333333333';
const TOKEN = 'a'.repeat(64); // 64-char hex
const MOCK_CERT_PEM = '-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\nMOCK\n-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n';
const MOCK_CHAIN_PEM = MOCK_CERT_PEM + MOCK_CERT_PEM;
const MOCK_SERIAL = 'ABCD1234';
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Factory helpers
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
function makeTokenRow(overrides: Partial<Record<string, unknown>> = {}) {
return {
token: TOKEN,
grantId: GRANT_ID,
peerId: PEER_ID,
expiresAt: new Date(Date.now() + 60_000), // 1 min from now
usedAt: null,
createdAt: new Date(),
...overrides,
};
}
function makeGrant(overrides: Partial<Record<string, unknown>> = {}) {
return {
id: GRANT_ID,
peerId: PEER_ID,
subjectUserId: USER_ID,
scope: { resources: ['tasks'], excluded_resources: [], max_rows_per_query: 100 },
status: 'pending',
expiresAt: null,
createdAt: new Date(),
revokedAt: null,
revokedReason: null,
...overrides,
};
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Mock DB builder
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
function makeDb({
tokenRows = [makeTokenRow()],
// claimedRows is returned by the .returning() on the token-claim UPDATE.
// Empty array = concurrent request won the race (GoneException).
claimedRows = [{ token: TOKEN }],
}: {
tokenRows?: unknown[];
claimedRows?: unknown[];
} = {}) {
// insert().values() — for createToken (outer db, not tx)
const insertValues = vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined);
const insertMock = vi.fn().mockReturnValue({ values: insertValues });
// select().from().where().limit() — for fetching the token row
const limitSelect = vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(tokenRows);
const whereSelect = vi.fn().mockReturnValue({ limit: limitSelect });
const fromSelect = vi.fn().mockReturnValue({ where: whereSelect });
const selectMock = vi.fn().mockReturnValue({ from: fromSelect });
// update().set().where().returning() — for the atomic token claim (outer db)
const returningMock = vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(claimedRows);
const whereClaimUpdate = vi.fn().mockReturnValue({ returning: returningMock });
const setClaimMock = vi.fn().mockReturnValue({ where: whereClaimUpdate });
const claimUpdateMock = vi.fn().mockReturnValue({ set: setClaimMock });
// transaction(cb) — cb receives txMock; txMock has update + insert
const txInsertValues = vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined);
const txInsertMock = vi.fn().mockReturnValue({ values: txInsertValues });
const txWhereUpdate = vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined);
const txSetMock = vi.fn().mockReturnValue({ where: txWhereUpdate });
const txUpdateMock = vi.fn().mockReturnValue({ set: txSetMock });
const txMock = { update: txUpdateMock, insert: txInsertMock };
const transactionMock = vi
.fn()
.mockImplementation(async (cb: (tx: typeof txMock) => Promise<void>) => cb(txMock));
return {
insert: insertMock,
select: selectMock,
update: claimUpdateMock,
transaction: transactionMock,
_mocks: {
insertValues,
insertMock,
limitSelect,
whereSelect,
fromSelect,
selectMock,
returningMock,
whereClaimUpdate,
setClaimMock,
claimUpdateMock,
txInsertValues,
txInsertMock,
txWhereUpdate,
txSetMock,
txUpdateMock,
txMock,
transactionMock,
},
};
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Mock CaService
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
function makeCaService() {
return {
issueCert: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue({
certPem: MOCK_CERT_PEM,
certChainPem: MOCK_CHAIN_PEM,
serialNumber: MOCK_SERIAL,
}),
};
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Mock GrantsService
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
function makeGrantsService(grantOverrides: Partial<Record<string, unknown>> = {}) {
return {
getGrant: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(makeGrant(grantOverrides)),
activateGrant: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(makeGrant({ status: 'active' })),
};
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Helper: build service under test
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
function buildService({
db = makeDb(),
caService = makeCaService(),
grantsService = makeGrantsService(),
}: {
db?: ReturnType<typeof makeDb>;
caService?: ReturnType<typeof makeCaService>;
grantsService?: ReturnType<typeof makeGrantsService>;
} = {}) {
return new EnrollmentService(db as unknown as Db, caService as never, grantsService as never);
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Tests: createToken
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
describe('EnrollmentService.createToken', () => {
it('inserts a token row and returns { token, expiresAt }', async () => {
const db = makeDb();
const service = buildService({ db });
const result = await service.createToken({
grantId: GRANT_ID,
peerId: PEER_ID,
ttlSeconds: 900,
});
expect(result.token).toHaveLength(64); // 32 bytes hex
expect(result.expiresAt).toBeDefined();
expect(new Date(result.expiresAt).getTime()).toBeGreaterThan(Date.now());
expect(db._mocks.insertValues).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
expect.objectContaining({ grantId: GRANT_ID, peerId: PEER_ID }),
);
});
it('clamps ttlSeconds to 900', async () => {
const db = makeDb();
const service = buildService({ db });
const before = Date.now();
const result = await service.createToken({
grantId: GRANT_ID,
peerId: PEER_ID,
ttlSeconds: 9999,
});
const after = Date.now();
const expiresMs = new Date(result.expiresAt).getTime();
// Should be at most 900s from now
expect(expiresMs - before).toBeLessThanOrEqual(900_000 + 100);
expect(expiresMs - after).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(0);
});
});
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Tests: redeem — error paths
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
describe('EnrollmentService.redeem — error paths', () => {
it('throws NotFoundException when token row not found', async () => {
const db = makeDb({ tokenRows: [] });
const service = buildService({ db });
await expect(service.redeem(TOKEN, '---CSR---')).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(NotFoundException);
});
it('throws GoneException when usedAt is set (already redeemed)', async () => {
const db = makeDb({ tokenRows: [makeTokenRow({ usedAt: new Date(Date.now() - 1000) })] });
const service = buildService({ db });
await expect(service.redeem(TOKEN, '---CSR---')).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(GoneException);
});
it('throws GoneException when token has expired', async () => {
const db = makeDb({ tokenRows: [makeTokenRow({ expiresAt: new Date(Date.now() - 1000) })] });
const service = buildService({ db });
await expect(service.redeem(TOKEN, '---CSR---')).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(GoneException);
});
it('throws GoneException when grant status is not pending', async () => {
const db = makeDb();
const grantsService = makeGrantsService({ status: 'active' });
const service = buildService({ db, grantsService });
await expect(service.redeem(TOKEN, '---CSR---')).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(GoneException);
});
it('throws GoneException when token claim UPDATE returns empty array (concurrent replay)', async () => {
const db = makeDb({ claimedRows: [] });
const caService = makeCaService();
const grantsService = makeGrantsService();
const service = buildService({ db, caService, grantsService });
await expect(service.redeem(TOKEN, '---CSR---')).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(GoneException);
});
it('does NOT call issueCert when token claim fails (no double minting)', async () => {
const db = makeDb({ claimedRows: [] });
const caService = makeCaService();
const service = buildService({ db, caService });
await expect(service.redeem(TOKEN, '---CSR---')).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(GoneException);
expect(caService.issueCert).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
});
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Tests: redeem — success path
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
describe('EnrollmentService.redeem — success path', () => {
let db: ReturnType<typeof makeDb>;
let caService: ReturnType<typeof makeCaService>;
let grantsService: ReturnType<typeof makeGrantsService>;
let service: EnrollmentService;
beforeEach(() => {
db = makeDb();
caService = makeCaService();
grantsService = makeGrantsService();
service = buildService({ db, caService, grantsService });
});
it('claims token BEFORE calling issueCert (prevents double minting)', async () => {
const callOrder: string[] = [];
db._mocks.returningMock.mockImplementation(async () => {
callOrder.push('claim');
return [{ token: TOKEN }];
});
caService.issueCert.mockImplementation(async () => {
callOrder.push('issueCert');
return { certPem: MOCK_CERT_PEM, certChainPem: MOCK_CHAIN_PEM, serialNumber: MOCK_SERIAL };
});
await service.redeem(TOKEN, MOCK_CERT_PEM);
expect(callOrder).toEqual(['claim', 'issueCert']);
});
it('calls CaService.issueCert with grantId, subjectUserId, csrPem, ttlSeconds=300', async () => {
await service.redeem(TOKEN, MOCK_CERT_PEM);
expect(caService.issueCert).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
expect.objectContaining({
grantId: GRANT_ID,
subjectUserId: USER_ID,
csrPem: MOCK_CERT_PEM,
ttlSeconds: 300,
}),
);
});
it('runs activate grant + peer update + audit inside a transaction', async () => {
await service.redeem(TOKEN, MOCK_CERT_PEM);
expect(db._mocks.transactionMock).toHaveBeenCalledOnce();
// tx.update called twice: activate grant + update peer
expect(db._mocks.txUpdateMock).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(2);
// tx.insert called once: audit log
expect(db._mocks.txInsertMock).toHaveBeenCalledOnce();
});
it('activates grant (sets status=active) inside the transaction', async () => {
await service.redeem(TOKEN, MOCK_CERT_PEM);
expect(db._mocks.txSetMock).toHaveBeenCalledWith(expect.objectContaining({ status: 'active' }));
});
it('updates the federationPeers row with certPem, certSerial, state=active inside the transaction', async () => {
await service.redeem(TOKEN, MOCK_CERT_PEM);
expect(db._mocks.txSetMock).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
expect.objectContaining({
certPem: MOCK_CERT_PEM,
certSerial: MOCK_SERIAL,
state: 'active',
}),
);
});
it('inserts an audit log row inside the transaction', async () => {
await service.redeem(TOKEN, MOCK_CERT_PEM);
expect(db._mocks.txInsertValues).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
expect.objectContaining({
peerId: PEER_ID,
grantId: GRANT_ID,
verb: 'enrollment',
}),
);
});
it('returns { certPem, certChainPem } from CaService', async () => {
const result = await service.redeem(TOKEN, MOCK_CERT_PEM);
expect(result).toEqual({
certPem: MOCK_CERT_PEM,
certChainPem: MOCK_CHAIN_PEM,
});
});
});

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/**
* Unit tests for FederationController (FED-M2-08).
*
* Coverage:
* - listGrants: delegates to GrantsService with query params
* - createGrant: delegates to GrantsService, validates body
* - generateToken: returns enrollmentUrl containing the token
* - listPeers: returns DB rows
*/
import 'reflect-metadata';
import { describe, it, expect, vi, beforeEach } from 'vitest';
import { NotFoundException } from '@nestjs/common';
import type { Db } from '@mosaicstack/db';
import { FederationController } from '../federation.controller.js';
import type { GrantsService } from '../grants.service.js';
import type { EnrollmentService } from '../enrollment.service.js';
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Constants
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
const GRANT_ID = 'g1111111-1111-1111-1111-111111111111';
const PEER_ID = 'p2222222-2222-2222-2222-222222222222';
const USER_ID = 'u3333333-3333-3333-3333-333333333333';
const MOCK_GRANT = {
id: GRANT_ID,
peerId: PEER_ID,
subjectUserId: USER_ID,
scope: { resources: ['tasks'], operations: ['list'] },
status: 'pending' as const,
expiresAt: null,
createdAt: new Date('2026-01-01T00:00:00Z'),
revokedAt: null,
revokedReason: null,
};
const MOCK_PEER = {
id: PEER_ID,
commonName: 'test-peer',
displayName: 'Test Peer',
certPem: '',
certSerial: 'pending',
certNotAfter: new Date(0),
clientKeyPem: null,
state: 'pending' as const,
endpointUrl: null,
createdAt: new Date('2026-01-01T00:00:00Z'),
updatedAt: new Date('2026-01-01T00:00:00Z'),
};
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// DB mock builder
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
function makeDbMock(rows: unknown[] = []) {
const orderBy = vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(rows);
const where = vi.fn().mockReturnValue({ orderBy });
const from = vi.fn().mockReturnValue({ where, orderBy });
const select = vi.fn().mockReturnValue({ from });
return {
select,
from,
where,
orderBy,
insert: vi.fn(),
update: vi.fn(),
delete: vi.fn(),
} as unknown as Db;
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Tests
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
describe('FederationController', () => {
let db: Db;
let grantsService: GrantsService;
let enrollmentService: EnrollmentService;
let controller: FederationController;
beforeEach(() => {
db = makeDbMock([MOCK_PEER]);
grantsService = {
createGrant: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(MOCK_GRANT),
getGrant: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(MOCK_GRANT),
listGrants: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue([MOCK_GRANT]),
revokeGrant: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue({ ...MOCK_GRANT, status: 'revoked' }),
activateGrant: vi.fn(),
expireGrant: vi.fn(),
} as unknown as GrantsService;
enrollmentService = {
createToken: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue({
token: 'abc123def456abc123def456abc123def456abc123def456abc123def456ab12',
expiresAt: '2026-01-01T00:15:00.000Z',
}),
redeem: vi.fn(),
} as unknown as EnrollmentService;
controller = new FederationController(db, grantsService, enrollmentService);
});
// ─── Grant management ──────────────────────────────────────────────────
describe('listGrants', () => {
it('delegates to GrantsService with provided query params', async () => {
const query = { peerId: PEER_ID, status: 'pending' as const };
const result = await controller.listGrants(query);
expect(grantsService.listGrants).toHaveBeenCalledWith(query);
expect(result).toEqual([MOCK_GRANT]);
});
it('delegates to GrantsService with empty filters', async () => {
const result = await controller.listGrants({});
expect(grantsService.listGrants).toHaveBeenCalledWith({});
expect(result).toEqual([MOCK_GRANT]);
});
});
describe('createGrant', () => {
it('delegates to GrantsService and returns created grant', async () => {
const body = {
peerId: PEER_ID,
subjectUserId: USER_ID,
scope: { resources: ['tasks'], operations: ['list'] },
};
const result = await controller.createGrant(body);
expect(grantsService.createGrant).toHaveBeenCalledWith(body);
expect(result).toEqual(MOCK_GRANT);
});
});
describe('getGrant', () => {
it('delegates to GrantsService with provided ID', async () => {
const result = await controller.getGrant(GRANT_ID);
expect(grantsService.getGrant).toHaveBeenCalledWith(GRANT_ID);
expect(result).toEqual(MOCK_GRANT);
});
});
describe('revokeGrant', () => {
it('delegates to GrantsService with id and reason', async () => {
const result = await controller.revokeGrant(GRANT_ID, { reason: 'test reason' });
expect(grantsService.revokeGrant).toHaveBeenCalledWith(GRANT_ID, 'test reason');
expect(result).toMatchObject({ status: 'revoked' });
});
it('delegates without reason when omitted', async () => {
await controller.revokeGrant(GRANT_ID, {});
expect(grantsService.revokeGrant).toHaveBeenCalledWith(GRANT_ID, undefined);
});
});
describe('generateToken', () => {
it('returns enrollmentUrl containing the token', async () => {
const token = 'abc123def456abc123def456abc123def456abc123def456abc123def456ab12';
vi.mocked(enrollmentService.createToken).mockResolvedValueOnce({
token,
expiresAt: '2026-01-01T00:15:00.000Z',
});
const result = await controller.generateToken(GRANT_ID, { ttlSeconds: 900 });
expect(result.token).toBe(token);
expect(result.enrollmentUrl).toContain(token);
expect(result.enrollmentUrl).toContain('/api/federation/enrollment/');
});
it('creates token via EnrollmentService with correct grantId and peerId', async () => {
await controller.generateToken(GRANT_ID, { ttlSeconds: 300 });
expect(enrollmentService.createToken).toHaveBeenCalledWith({
grantId: GRANT_ID,
peerId: PEER_ID,
ttlSeconds: 300,
});
});
it('throws NotFoundException when grant does not exist', async () => {
vi.mocked(grantsService.getGrant).mockRejectedValueOnce(
new NotFoundException(`Grant ${GRANT_ID} not found`),
);
await expect(controller.generateToken(GRANT_ID, { ttlSeconds: 900 })).rejects.toThrow(
NotFoundException,
);
});
});
// ─── Peer management ───────────────────────────────────────────────────
describe('listPeers', () => {
it('returns DB rows ordered by commonName', async () => {
const result = await controller.listPeers();
expect(db.select).toHaveBeenCalled();
// The DB mock resolves with [MOCK_PEER]
expect(result).toEqual([MOCK_PEER]);
});
});
});

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/**
* Unit tests for GrantsService — federation grants CRUD + status transitions (FED-M2-06).
*
* Coverage:
* - createGrant: validates scope via parseFederationScope
* - createGrant: inserts with status 'pending'
* - getGrant: returns grant when found
* - getGrant: throws NotFoundException when not found
* - listGrants: no filters returns all grants
* - listGrants: filters by peerId
* - listGrants: filters by subjectUserId
* - listGrants: filters by status
* - listGrants: multiple filters combined
* - activateGrant: pending → active works
* - activateGrant: non-pending throws ConflictException
* - revokeGrant: active → revoked works, sets revokedAt
* - revokeGrant: non-active throws ConflictException
* - expireGrant: active → expired works
* - expireGrant: non-active throws ConflictException
*/
import 'reflect-metadata';
import { describe, it, expect, vi, beforeEach } from 'vitest';
import { ConflictException, NotFoundException } from '@nestjs/common';
import type { Db } from '@mosaicstack/db';
import { GrantsService } from '../grants.service.js';
import { FederationScopeError } from '../scope-schema.js';
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Minimal valid federation scope for testing
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
const VALID_SCOPE = {
resources: ['tasks'] as const,
excluded_resources: [],
max_rows_per_query: 100,
};
const PEER_ID = 'a1111111-1111-1111-1111-111111111111';
const USER_ID = 'u2222222-2222-2222-2222-222222222222';
const GRANT_ID = 'g3333333-3333-3333-3333-333333333333';
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Build a mock DB that mimics chained Drizzle query builder calls
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
function makeMockGrant(overrides: Partial<Record<string, unknown>> = {}) {
return {
id: GRANT_ID,
peerId: PEER_ID,
subjectUserId: USER_ID,
scope: VALID_SCOPE,
status: 'pending',
expiresAt: null,
createdAt: new Date('2026-01-01T00:00:00Z'),
revokedAt: null,
revokedReason: null,
...overrides,
};
}
function makeDb(
overrides: {
insertReturning?: unknown[];
selectRows?: unknown[];
updateReturning?: unknown[];
} = {},
) {
const insertReturning = overrides.insertReturning ?? [makeMockGrant()];
const selectRows = overrides.selectRows ?? [makeMockGrant()];
const updateReturning = overrides.updateReturning ?? [makeMockGrant({ status: 'active' })];
// Drizzle returns a chainable builder; we need to mock the full chain.
const returningInsert = vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(insertReturning);
const valuesInsert = vi.fn().mockReturnValue({ returning: returningInsert });
const insertMock = vi.fn().mockReturnValue({ values: valuesInsert });
// select().from().where().limit()
const limitSelect = vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(selectRows);
const whereSelect = vi.fn().mockReturnValue({ limit: limitSelect });
// from returns something that is both thenable (for full-table select) and has .where()
const fromSelect = vi.fn().mockReturnValue({
where: whereSelect,
limit: limitSelect,
// Make it thenable for listGrants with no filters (await db.select().from(federationGrants))
then: (resolve: (v: unknown) => unknown) => resolve(selectRows),
});
const selectMock = vi.fn().mockReturnValue({ from: fromSelect });
const returningUpdate = vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(updateReturning);
const whereUpdate = vi.fn().mockReturnValue({ returning: returningUpdate });
const setMock = vi.fn().mockReturnValue({ where: whereUpdate });
const updateMock = vi.fn().mockReturnValue({ set: setMock });
return {
insert: insertMock,
select: selectMock,
update: updateMock,
// Expose internals for assertions
_mocks: {
insertReturning,
valuesInsert,
insertMock,
limitSelect,
whereSelect,
fromSelect,
selectMock,
returningUpdate,
whereUpdate,
setMock,
updateMock,
},
};
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Tests
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
describe('GrantsService', () => {
let db: ReturnType<typeof makeDb>;
let service: GrantsService;
beforeEach(() => {
db = makeDb();
service = new GrantsService(db as unknown as Db);
});
// ─── createGrant ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
describe('createGrant', () => {
it('calls parseFederationScope — rejects an invalid scope', async () => {
const invalidScope = { resources: [], max_rows_per_query: 0 };
await expect(
service.createGrant({ peerId: PEER_ID, subjectUserId: USER_ID, scope: invalidScope }),
).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(FederationScopeError);
});
it('inserts a grant with status pending and returns it', async () => {
const result = await service.createGrant({
peerId: PEER_ID,
subjectUserId: USER_ID,
scope: VALID_SCOPE,
});
expect(db._mocks.valuesInsert).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
expect.objectContaining({ status: 'pending', peerId: PEER_ID, subjectUserId: USER_ID }),
);
expect(result.status).toBe('pending');
});
it('passes expiresAt as a Date when provided', async () => {
await service.createGrant({
peerId: PEER_ID,
subjectUserId: USER_ID,
scope: VALID_SCOPE,
expiresAt: '2027-01-01T00:00:00Z',
});
expect(db._mocks.valuesInsert).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
expect.objectContaining({ expiresAt: expect.any(Date) }),
);
});
it('sets expiresAt to null when not provided', async () => {
await service.createGrant({ peerId: PEER_ID, subjectUserId: USER_ID, scope: VALID_SCOPE });
expect(db._mocks.valuesInsert).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
expect.objectContaining({ expiresAt: null }),
);
});
});
// ─── getGrant ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
describe('getGrant', () => {
it('returns the grant when found', async () => {
const result = await service.getGrant(GRANT_ID);
expect(result.id).toBe(GRANT_ID);
});
it('throws NotFoundException when no rows returned', async () => {
db = makeDb({ selectRows: [] });
service = new GrantsService(db as unknown as Db);
await expect(service.getGrant(GRANT_ID)).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(NotFoundException);
});
});
// ─── listGrants ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
describe('listGrants', () => {
it('queries without where clause when no filters provided', async () => {
const result = await service.listGrants({});
expect(Array.isArray(result)).toBe(true);
});
it('applies peerId filter', async () => {
await service.listGrants({ peerId: PEER_ID });
expect(db._mocks.whereSelect).toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it('applies subjectUserId filter', async () => {
await service.listGrants({ subjectUserId: USER_ID });
expect(db._mocks.whereSelect).toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it('applies status filter', async () => {
await service.listGrants({ status: 'active' });
expect(db._mocks.whereSelect).toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it('applies multiple filters combined', async () => {
await service.listGrants({ peerId: PEER_ID, status: 'pending' });
expect(db._mocks.whereSelect).toHaveBeenCalled();
});
});
// ─── activateGrant ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
describe('activateGrant', () => {
it('transitions pending → active and returns updated grant', async () => {
db = makeDb({
selectRows: [makeMockGrant({ status: 'pending' })],
updateReturning: [makeMockGrant({ status: 'active' })],
});
service = new GrantsService(db as unknown as Db);
const result = await service.activateGrant(GRANT_ID);
expect(db._mocks.setMock).toHaveBeenCalledWith({ status: 'active' });
expect(result.status).toBe('active');
});
it('throws ConflictException when grant is already active', async () => {
db = makeDb({ selectRows: [makeMockGrant({ status: 'active' })] });
service = new GrantsService(db as unknown as Db);
await expect(service.activateGrant(GRANT_ID)).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(ConflictException);
});
it('throws ConflictException when grant is revoked', async () => {
db = makeDb({ selectRows: [makeMockGrant({ status: 'revoked' })] });
service = new GrantsService(db as unknown as Db);
await expect(service.activateGrant(GRANT_ID)).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(ConflictException);
});
it('throws ConflictException when grant is expired', async () => {
db = makeDb({ selectRows: [makeMockGrant({ status: 'expired' })] });
service = new GrantsService(db as unknown as Db);
await expect(service.activateGrant(GRANT_ID)).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(ConflictException);
});
});
// ─── revokeGrant ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
describe('revokeGrant', () => {
it('transitions active → revoked and sets revokedAt', async () => {
const revokedAt = new Date();
db = makeDb({
selectRows: [makeMockGrant({ status: 'active' })],
updateReturning: [makeMockGrant({ status: 'revoked', revokedAt })],
});
service = new GrantsService(db as unknown as Db);
const result = await service.revokeGrant(GRANT_ID, 'test reason');
expect(db._mocks.setMock).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
expect.objectContaining({
status: 'revoked',
revokedAt: expect.any(Date),
revokedReason: 'test reason',
}),
);
expect(result.status).toBe('revoked');
});
it('sets revokedReason to null when not provided', async () => {
db = makeDb({
selectRows: [makeMockGrant({ status: 'active' })],
updateReturning: [makeMockGrant({ status: 'revoked', revokedAt: new Date() })],
});
service = new GrantsService(db as unknown as Db);
await service.revokeGrant(GRANT_ID);
expect(db._mocks.setMock).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
expect.objectContaining({ revokedReason: null }),
);
});
it('throws ConflictException when grant is pending', async () => {
db = makeDb({ selectRows: [makeMockGrant({ status: 'pending' })] });
service = new GrantsService(db as unknown as Db);
await expect(service.revokeGrant(GRANT_ID)).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(ConflictException);
});
it('throws ConflictException when grant is already revoked', async () => {
db = makeDb({ selectRows: [makeMockGrant({ status: 'revoked' })] });
service = new GrantsService(db as unknown as Db);
await expect(service.revokeGrant(GRANT_ID)).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(ConflictException);
});
it('throws ConflictException when grant is expired', async () => {
db = makeDb({ selectRows: [makeMockGrant({ status: 'expired' })] });
service = new GrantsService(db as unknown as Db);
await expect(service.revokeGrant(GRANT_ID)).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(ConflictException);
});
});
// ─── expireGrant ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
describe('expireGrant', () => {
it('transitions active → expired and returns updated grant', async () => {
db = makeDb({
selectRows: [makeMockGrant({ status: 'active' })],
updateReturning: [makeMockGrant({ status: 'expired' })],
});
service = new GrantsService(db as unknown as Db);
const result = await service.expireGrant(GRANT_ID);
expect(db._mocks.setMock).toHaveBeenCalledWith({ status: 'expired' });
expect(result.status).toBe('expired');
});
it('throws ConflictException when grant is pending', async () => {
db = makeDb({ selectRows: [makeMockGrant({ status: 'pending' })] });
service = new GrantsService(db as unknown as Db);
await expect(service.expireGrant(GRANT_ID)).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(ConflictException);
});
it('throws ConflictException when grant is already expired', async () => {
db = makeDb({ selectRows: [makeMockGrant({ status: 'expired' })] });
service = new GrantsService(db as unknown as Db);
await expect(service.expireGrant(GRANT_ID)).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(ConflictException);
});
it('throws ConflictException when grant is revoked', async () => {
db = makeDb({ selectRows: [makeMockGrant({ status: 'revoked' })] });
service = new GrantsService(db as unknown as Db);
await expect(service.expireGrant(GRANT_ID)).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(ConflictException);
});
});
});

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import { describe, it, expect, beforeEach, afterEach } from 'vitest';
import { sealClientKey, unsealClientKey } from '../peer-key.util.js';
const TEST_SECRET = 'test-secret-for-peer-key-unit-tests-only';
const TEST_PEM = `-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
MIIEvQIBADANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAASCBKcwggSjAgEAAoIBAQC7o4qne60TB3wo
pCOW8QqstpxEBpnFo37JxLYEJbpE3gUlJajsHv9UWRQ7m5B7n+MBXwTCQqMEY8Wl
kHv9tGgz1YGwzBjNKxPJXE6pPTXQ1Oa0VB9l3qHdqF5HtZoJzE0c6dO8HJ5YUVL
-----END PRIVATE KEY-----`;
let savedSecret: string | undefined;
beforeEach(() => {
savedSecret = process.env['BETTER_AUTH_SECRET'];
process.env['BETTER_AUTH_SECRET'] = TEST_SECRET;
});
afterEach(() => {
if (savedSecret === undefined) {
delete process.env['BETTER_AUTH_SECRET'];
} else {
process.env['BETTER_AUTH_SECRET'] = savedSecret;
}
});
describe('peer-key seal/unseal', () => {
it('round-trip: unsealClientKey(sealClientKey(pem)) returns original pem', () => {
const sealed = sealClientKey(TEST_PEM);
const roundTripped = unsealClientKey(sealed);
expect(roundTripped).toBe(TEST_PEM);
});
it('non-determinism: sealClientKey produces different ciphertext each call', () => {
const sealed1 = sealClientKey(TEST_PEM);
const sealed2 = sealClientKey(TEST_PEM);
expect(sealed1).not.toBe(sealed2);
});
it('at-rest: sealed output does not contain plaintext PEM content', () => {
const sealed = sealClientKey(TEST_PEM);
expect(sealed).not.toContain('PRIVATE KEY');
expect(sealed).not.toContain(
'MIIEvQIBADANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAASCBKcwggSjAgEAAoIBAQC7o4qne60TB3wo',
);
});
it('tamper: flipping a byte in the sealed payload causes unseal to throw', () => {
const sealed = sealClientKey(TEST_PEM);
const buf = Buffer.from(sealed, 'base64');
// Flip a byte in the middle of the buffer (past IV and authTag)
const midpoint = Math.floor(buf.length / 2);
buf[midpoint] = buf[midpoint]! ^ 0xff;
const tampered = buf.toString('base64');
expect(() => unsealClientKey(tampered)).toThrow();
});
it('missing secret: unsealClientKey throws when BETTER_AUTH_SECRET is unset', () => {
const sealed = sealClientKey(TEST_PEM);
delete process.env['BETTER_AUTH_SECRET'];
expect(() => unsealClientKey(sealed)).toThrow('BETTER_AUTH_SECRET is not set');
});
});

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/**
* DTOs for the Step-CA client service (FED-M2-04).
*
* IssueCertRequestDto — input to CaService.issueCert()
* IssuedCertDto — output from CaService.issueCert()
*/
import { IsInt, IsNotEmpty, IsOptional, IsString, IsUUID, Max, Min } from 'class-validator';
export class IssueCertRequestDto {
/**
* PEM-encoded PKCS#10 Certificate Signing Request.
* The CSR must already include the desired SANs.
*/
@IsString()
@IsNotEmpty()
csrPem!: string;
/**
* UUID of the federation_grants row this certificate is being issued for.
* Embedded as the `mosaic_grant_id` custom OID extension.
*/
@IsUUID()
grantId!: string;
/**
* UUID of the local user on whose behalf the cert is being issued.
* Embedded as the `mosaic_subject_user_id` custom OID extension.
*/
@IsUUID()
subjectUserId!: string;
/**
* Requested certificate validity in seconds.
* Hard cap: 900 s (15 minutes). Default: 300 s (5 minutes).
* The service will always clamp to 900 s regardless of this value.
*/
@IsOptional()
@IsInt()
@Min(60)
@Max(15 * 60)
ttlSeconds: number = 300;
}
export class IssuedCertDto {
/** PEM-encoded leaf certificate returned by step-ca. */
certPem!: string;
/**
* PEM-encoded full certificate chain (leaf + intermediates + root).
* Falls back to `certPem` when step-ca returns no `certChain` field.
*/
certChainPem!: string;
/** Decimal serial number string of the issued certificate. */
serialNumber!: string;
}

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/**
* Unit tests for CaService — Step-CA client (FED-M2-04).
*
* Coverage:
* - Happy path: returns IssuedCertDto with certPem, certChainPem, serialNumber
* - certChainPem fallback: falls back to certPem when certChain absent
* - certChainPem from ca field: uses crt+ca when certChain absent but ca present
* - HTTP 401: throws CaServiceError with cause + remediation
* - HTTP non-401 error: throws CaServiceError
* - Malformed CSR: throws before HTTP call (INVALID_CSR)
* - Non-JSON response: throws CaServiceError
* - HTTPS connection error: throws CaServiceError
* - JWT custom claims: mosaic_grant_id and mosaic_subject_user_id present in OTT payload
* verified with jose.jwtVerify (real signature check)
* - CaServiceError: has cause + remediation properties
* - Missing crt in response: throws CaServiceError
* - Real CSR validation: valid P-256 CSR passes; malformed CSR fails with INVALID_CSR
* - provisionerPassword never appears in CaServiceError messages
* - HTTPS-only enforcement: http:// URL throws in constructor
*/
import 'reflect-metadata';
import { describe, it, expect, vi, beforeEach, type Mock } from 'vitest';
import { jwtVerify, exportJWK, generateKeyPair } from 'jose';
import { Pkcs10CertificateRequestGenerator } from '@peculiar/x509';
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Mock node:https BEFORE importing CaService so the mock is in place when
// the module is loaded. Vitest/ESM require vi.mock at the top level.
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
vi.mock('node:https', () => {
const mockRequest = vi.fn();
const mockAgent = vi.fn().mockImplementation(() => ({}));
return {
default: { request: mockRequest, Agent: mockAgent },
request: mockRequest,
Agent: mockAgent,
};
});
vi.mock('node:fs', () => {
const mockReadFileSync = vi
.fn()
.mockReturnValue('-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\nFAKEROOT\n-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n');
return {
default: { readFileSync: mockReadFileSync },
readFileSync: mockReadFileSync,
};
});
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Helpers
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Real self-signed EC P-256 certificate generated with openssl for testing.
// openssl req -x509 -newkey ec -pkeyopt ec_paramgen_curve:P-256 -nodes -keyout /dev/null \
// -out /dev/stdout -subj "/CN=test" -days 1
const FAKE_CERT_PEM = `-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
MIIBdDCCARmgAwIBAgIUM+iUJSayN+PwXkyVN6qwSY7sr6gwCgYIKoZIzj0EAwIw
DzENMAsGA1UEAwwEdGVzdDAeFw0yNjA0MjIwMzE5MTlaFw0yNjA0MjMwMzE5MTla
MA8xDTALBgNVBAMMBHRlc3QwWTATBgcqhkjOPQIBBggqhkjOPQMBBwNCAAR21kHL
n1GmFQ4TEBw3EA53pD+2McIBf5WcoHE+x0eMz5DpRKJe0ksHwOVN5Yev5d57kb+4
MvG1LhbHCB/uQo8So1MwUTAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUPq0pdIGiQ7pLBRXICS8GTliCrLsw
HwYDVR0jBBgwFoAUPq0pdIGiQ7pLBRXICS8GTliCrLswDwYDVR0TAQH/BAUwAwEB
/zAKBggqhkjOPQQDAgNJADBGAiEAypJqyC6S77aQ3eEXokM6sgAsD7Oa3tJbCbVm
zG3uJb0CIQC1w+GE+Ad0OTR5Quja46R1RjOo8ydpzZ7Fh4rouAiwEw==
-----END CERTIFICATE-----
`;
// Use a second copy of the same cert for the CA field in tests.
const FAKE_CA_PEM = FAKE_CERT_PEM;
const GRANT_ID = 'a0eebc99-9c0b-4ef8-bb6d-6bb9bd380a11';
const SUBJECT_USER_ID = 'b1ffcd00-0d1c-5f09-cc7e-7cc0ce491b22';
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Generate a real EC P-256 key pair and CSR for integration-style tests
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// We generate this once at module level so it's available to all tests.
// The key pair and CSR PEM are populated asynchronously in the test that needs them.
let realCsrPem: string;
async function generateRealCsr(): Promise<string> {
const { privateKey, publicKey } = await generateKeyPair('ES256');
// Export public key JWK for potential verification (not used here but confirms key is exportable)
await exportJWK(publicKey);
// Use @peculiar/x509 to build a proper CSR
const csr = await Pkcs10CertificateRequestGenerator.create({
name: 'CN=test.federation.local',
signingAlgorithm: { name: 'ECDSA', hash: 'SHA-256' },
keys: { privateKey, publicKey },
});
return csr.toString('pem');
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Setup env before importing service
// We use an EC P-256 key pair here so the JWK-based signing works.
// The key pair is generated once and stored in module-level vars.
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Real EC P-256 test JWK (test-only, never used in production).
// Generated with node webcrypto for use in unit tests.
const TEST_EC_PRIVATE_JWK = {
key_ops: ['sign'],
ext: true,
kty: 'EC',
x: 'Xq2RjZctcPcUMU14qfjs3MtZTmFk8z1lFGQyypgXZOU',
y: 't8w9Cbt4RVmR47Wnb_i5cLwefEnMcvwse049zu9Rl_E',
crv: 'P-256',
d: 'TM6N79w1HE-PiML5Td4mbXfJaLHEaZrVyVrrwlJv7q8',
kid: 'test-ec-kid',
};
const TEST_EC_PUBLIC_JWK = {
key_ops: ['verify'],
ext: true,
kty: 'EC',
x: 'Xq2RjZctcPcUMU14qfjs3MtZTmFk8z1lFGQyypgXZOU',
y: 't8w9Cbt4RVmR47Wnb_i5cLwefEnMcvwse049zu9Rl_E',
crv: 'P-256',
kid: 'test-ec-kid',
};
process.env['STEP_CA_URL'] = 'https://step-ca:9000';
process.env['STEP_CA_PROVISIONER_KEY_JSON'] = JSON.stringify(TEST_EC_PRIVATE_JWK);
process.env['STEP_CA_ROOT_CERT_PATH'] = '/fake/root.pem';
// Import AFTER env is set and mocks are registered
import * as httpsModule from 'node:https';
import { CaService, CaServiceError } from './ca.service.js';
import type { IssueCertRequestDto } from './ca.dto.js';
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Helper to build a mock https.request that simulates step-ca
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
function makeHttpsMock(statusCode: number, body: unknown, errorMsg?: string): void {
const mockReq = {
write: vi.fn(),
end: vi.fn(),
on: vi.fn(),
setTimeout: vi.fn(),
};
(httpsModule.request as unknown as Mock).mockImplementation(
(
_options: unknown,
callback: (res: {
statusCode: number;
on: (event: string, cb: (chunk?: Buffer) => void) => void;
}) => void,
) => {
const mockRes = {
statusCode,
on: (event: string, cb: (chunk?: Buffer) => void) => {
if (event === 'data') {
if (body !== undefined) {
cb(Buffer.from(typeof body === 'string' ? body : JSON.stringify(body)));
}
}
if (event === 'end') {
cb();
}
},
};
if (errorMsg) {
// Simulate a connection error via the req.on('error') handler
mockReq.on.mockImplementation((event: string, cb: (err: Error) => void) => {
if (event === 'error') {
setImmediate(() => cb(new Error(errorMsg)));
}
});
} else {
// Normal flow: call the response callback
setImmediate(() => callback(mockRes));
}
return mockReq;
},
);
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Tests
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
describe('CaService', () => {
let service: CaService;
beforeEach(() => {
vi.clearAllMocks();
service = new CaService();
});
function makeReq(overrides: Partial<IssueCertRequestDto> = {}): IssueCertRequestDto {
// Use a real CSR if available; fall back to a minimal placeholder
const defaultCsr = realCsrPem ?? makeFakeCsr();
return {
csrPem: defaultCsr,
grantId: GRANT_ID,
subjectUserId: SUBJECT_USER_ID,
ttlSeconds: 300,
...overrides,
};
}
function makeFakeCsr(): string {
// A structurally valid-looking CSR header/footer (body will fail crypto verify)
return `-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE REQUEST-----\nMIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEA0000000000000000AAAA\n-----END CERTIFICATE REQUEST-----\n`;
}
// -------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Real CSR generation — runs once and populates realCsrPem
// -------------------------------------------------------------------------
it('generates a real P-256 CSR that passes validateCsr', async () => {
realCsrPem = await generateRealCsr();
expect(realCsrPem).toMatch(/BEGIN CERTIFICATE REQUEST/);
// Now test that the service's validateCsr accepts it.
// We call it indirectly via issueCert with a successful mock.
makeHttpsMock(200, { crt: FAKE_CERT_PEM, certChain: [FAKE_CERT_PEM, FAKE_CA_PEM] });
const result = await service.issueCert(makeReq({ csrPem: realCsrPem }));
expect(result.certPem).toBe(FAKE_CERT_PEM);
});
it('throws INVALID_CSR for a malformed PEM-shaped CSR', async () => {
const malformedCsr =
'-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE REQUEST-----\nTm90QVJlYWxDU1I=\n-----END CERTIFICATE REQUEST-----\n';
await expect(service.issueCert(makeReq({ csrPem: malformedCsr }))).rejects.toSatisfy(
(err: unknown) => {
if (!(err instanceof CaServiceError)) return false;
expect(err.code).toBe('INVALID_CSR');
return true;
},
);
});
// -------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Happy path
// -------------------------------------------------------------------------
it('returns IssuedCertDto on success (certChain present)', async () => {
if (!realCsrPem) realCsrPem = await generateRealCsr();
makeHttpsMock(200, {
crt: FAKE_CERT_PEM,
certChain: [FAKE_CERT_PEM, FAKE_CA_PEM],
});
const result = await service.issueCert(makeReq());
expect(result.certPem).toBe(FAKE_CERT_PEM);
expect(result.certChainPem).toContain(FAKE_CERT_PEM);
expect(result.certChainPem).toContain(FAKE_CA_PEM);
expect(typeof result.serialNumber).toBe('string');
});
// -------------------------------------------------------------------------
// certChainPem fallback — certChain absent, ca field present
// -------------------------------------------------------------------------
it('builds certChainPem from crt+ca when certChain is absent', async () => {
if (!realCsrPem) realCsrPem = await generateRealCsr();
makeHttpsMock(200, {
crt: FAKE_CERT_PEM,
ca: FAKE_CA_PEM,
});
const result = await service.issueCert(makeReq());
expect(result.certPem).toBe(FAKE_CERT_PEM);
expect(result.certChainPem).toContain(FAKE_CERT_PEM);
expect(result.certChainPem).toContain(FAKE_CA_PEM);
});
// -------------------------------------------------------------------------
// certChainPem fallback — no certChain, no ca field
// -------------------------------------------------------------------------
it('falls back to certPem alone when certChain and ca are absent', async () => {
if (!realCsrPem) realCsrPem = await generateRealCsr();
makeHttpsMock(200, { crt: FAKE_CERT_PEM });
const result = await service.issueCert(makeReq());
expect(result.certPem).toBe(FAKE_CERT_PEM);
expect(result.certChainPem).toBe(FAKE_CERT_PEM);
});
// -------------------------------------------------------------------------
// HTTP 401
// -------------------------------------------------------------------------
it('throws CaServiceError on HTTP 401', async () => {
if (!realCsrPem) realCsrPem = await generateRealCsr();
makeHttpsMock(401, { message: 'Unauthorized' });
await expect(service.issueCert(makeReq())).rejects.toSatisfy((err: unknown) => {
if (!(err instanceof CaServiceError)) return false;
expect(err.message).toMatch(/401/);
expect(err.remediation).toBeTruthy();
return true;
});
});
// -------------------------------------------------------------------------
// HTTP non-401 error (e.g. 422)
// -------------------------------------------------------------------------
it('throws CaServiceError on HTTP 422', async () => {
if (!realCsrPem) realCsrPem = await generateRealCsr();
makeHttpsMock(422, { message: 'Unprocessable Entity' });
await expect(service.issueCert(makeReq())).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(CaServiceError);
});
// -------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Malformed CSR — throws before HTTP call
// -------------------------------------------------------------------------
it('throws CaServiceError for malformed CSR without making HTTP call', async () => {
const requestSpy = vi.spyOn(httpsModule, 'request');
await expect(service.issueCert(makeReq({ csrPem: 'not-a-valid-csr' }))).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(
CaServiceError,
);
expect(requestSpy).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
// -------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Non-JSON response
// -------------------------------------------------------------------------
it('throws CaServiceError when step-ca returns non-JSON', async () => {
if (!realCsrPem) realCsrPem = await generateRealCsr();
makeHttpsMock(200, 'this is not json');
await expect(service.issueCert(makeReq())).rejects.toSatisfy((err: unknown) => {
if (!(err instanceof CaServiceError)) return false;
expect(err.message).toMatch(/non-JSON/);
return true;
});
});
// -------------------------------------------------------------------------
// HTTPS connection error
// -------------------------------------------------------------------------
it('throws CaServiceError on HTTPS connection error', async () => {
if (!realCsrPem) realCsrPem = await generateRealCsr();
makeHttpsMock(0, undefined, 'connect ECONNREFUSED 127.0.0.1:9000');
await expect(service.issueCert(makeReq())).rejects.toSatisfy((err: unknown) => {
if (!(err instanceof CaServiceError)) return false;
expect(err.message).toMatch(/HTTPS connection/);
expect(err.cause).toBeInstanceOf(Error);
return true;
});
});
// -------------------------------------------------------------------------
// JWT custom claims: mosaic_grant_id and mosaic_subject_user_id
// Verified with jose.jwtVerify for real signature verification (M6)
// -------------------------------------------------------------------------
it('OTT contains mosaic_grant_id, mosaic_subject_user_id, and jti; signature verifies with jose', async () => {
if (!realCsrPem) realCsrPem = await generateRealCsr();
let capturedBody: Record<string, unknown> | undefined;
const mockReq = {
write: vi.fn((data: string) => {
capturedBody = JSON.parse(data) as Record<string, unknown>;
}),
end: vi.fn(),
on: vi.fn(),
setTimeout: vi.fn(),
};
(httpsModule.request as unknown as Mock).mockImplementation(
(
_options: unknown,
callback: (res: {
statusCode: number;
on: (event: string, cb: (chunk?: Buffer) => void) => void;
}) => void,
) => {
const mockRes = {
statusCode: 200,
on: (event: string, cb: (chunk?: Buffer) => void) => {
if (event === 'data') {
cb(Buffer.from(JSON.stringify({ crt: FAKE_CERT_PEM })));
}
if (event === 'end') {
cb();
}
},
};
setImmediate(() => callback(mockRes));
return mockReq;
},
);
await service.issueCert(makeReq({ csrPem: realCsrPem }));
expect(capturedBody).toBeDefined();
const ott = capturedBody!['ott'] as string;
expect(typeof ott).toBe('string');
// Verify JWT structure
const parts = ott.split('.');
expect(parts).toHaveLength(3);
// Decode payload without signature check first
const payloadJson = Buffer.from(parts[1]!, 'base64url').toString('utf8');
const payload = JSON.parse(payloadJson) as Record<string, unknown>;
expect(payload['mosaic_grant_id']).toBe(GRANT_ID);
expect(payload['mosaic_subject_user_id']).toBe(SUBJECT_USER_ID);
expect(typeof payload['jti']).toBe('string'); // M2: jti present
expect(payload['jti']).toMatch(/^[0-9a-f-]{36}$/); // UUID format
// M3: top-level sha should NOT be present; step.sha should be present
expect(payload['sha']).toBeUndefined();
const step = payload['step'] as Record<string, unknown> | undefined;
expect(step?.['sha']).toBeDefined();
// M6: Verify signature with jose.jwtVerify using the public key
const { importJWK: importJose } = await import('jose');
const publicKey = await importJose(TEST_EC_PUBLIC_JWK, 'ES256');
const verified = await jwtVerify(ott, publicKey);
expect(verified.payload['mosaic_grant_id']).toBe(GRANT_ID);
});
// -------------------------------------------------------------------------
// CaServiceError has cause + remediation
// -------------------------------------------------------------------------
it('CaServiceError carries cause and remediation', () => {
const cause = new Error('original error');
const err = new CaServiceError('something went wrong', 'fix it like this', cause);
expect(err).toBeInstanceOf(Error);
expect(err).toBeInstanceOf(CaServiceError);
expect(err.message).toBe('something went wrong');
expect(err.remediation).toBe('fix it like this');
expect(err.cause).toBe(cause);
expect(err.name).toBe('CaServiceError');
});
// -------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Missing crt in response
// -------------------------------------------------------------------------
it('throws CaServiceError when response is missing the crt field', async () => {
if (!realCsrPem) realCsrPem = await generateRealCsr();
makeHttpsMock(200, { ca: FAKE_CA_PEM });
await expect(service.issueCert(makeReq())).rejects.toSatisfy((err: unknown) => {
if (!(err instanceof CaServiceError)) return false;
expect(err.message).toMatch(/missing the "crt" field/);
return true;
});
});
// -------------------------------------------------------------------------
// M6: provisionerPassword must never appear in CaServiceError messages
// -------------------------------------------------------------------------
it('provisionerPassword does not appear in any CaServiceError message', async () => {
// Temporarily set a recognizable password to test against
const originalPassword = process.env['STEP_CA_PROVISIONER_PASSWORD'];
process.env['STEP_CA_PROVISIONER_PASSWORD'] = 'super-secret-password-12345';
// Generate a bad CSR to trigger an error path
const caughtErrors: CaServiceError[] = [];
try {
await service.issueCert(makeReq({ csrPem: 'not-a-csr' }));
} catch (err) {
if (err instanceof CaServiceError) {
caughtErrors.push(err);
}
}
// Also try HTTP 401 path
if (!realCsrPem) realCsrPem = await generateRealCsr();
makeHttpsMock(401, { message: 'Unauthorized' });
try {
await service.issueCert(makeReq({ csrPem: realCsrPem }));
} catch (err) {
if (err instanceof CaServiceError) {
caughtErrors.push(err);
}
}
for (const err of caughtErrors) {
expect(err.message).not.toContain('super-secret-password-12345');
if (err.remediation) {
expect(err.remediation).not.toContain('super-secret-password-12345');
}
}
process.env['STEP_CA_PROVISIONER_PASSWORD'] = originalPassword;
});
// -------------------------------------------------------------------------
// M7: HTTPS-only enforcement in constructor
// -------------------------------------------------------------------------
it('throws in constructor if STEP_CA_URL uses http://', () => {
const originalUrl = process.env['STEP_CA_URL'];
process.env['STEP_CA_URL'] = 'http://step-ca:9000';
expect(() => new CaService()).toThrow(CaServiceError);
process.env['STEP_CA_URL'] = originalUrl;
});
// -------------------------------------------------------------------------
// TTL clamp: ttlSeconds is clamped to 900 s (15 min) maximum
// -------------------------------------------------------------------------
it('clamps ttlSeconds to 900 s regardless of input', async () => {
if (!realCsrPem) realCsrPem = await generateRealCsr();
let capturedBody: Record<string, unknown> | undefined;
const mockReq = {
write: vi.fn((data: string) => {
capturedBody = JSON.parse(data) as Record<string, unknown>;
}),
end: vi.fn(),
on: vi.fn(),
setTimeout: vi.fn(),
};
(httpsModule.request as unknown as Mock).mockImplementation(
(
_options: unknown,
callback: (res: {
statusCode: number;
on: (event: string, cb: (chunk?: Buffer) => void) => void;
}) => void,
) => {
const mockRes = {
statusCode: 200,
on: (event: string, cb: (chunk?: Buffer) => void) => {
if (event === 'data') {
cb(Buffer.from(JSON.stringify({ crt: FAKE_CERT_PEM })));
}
if (event === 'end') {
cb();
}
},
};
setImmediate(() => callback(mockRes));
return mockReq;
},
);
// Request 86400 s — should be clamped to 900
await service.issueCert(makeReq({ ttlSeconds: 86400 }));
expect(capturedBody).toBeDefined();
const validity = capturedBody!['validity'] as Record<string, unknown>;
expect(validity['duration']).toBe('900s');
});
});

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,680 @@
/**
* CaService — Step-CA client for federation grant certificate issuance.
*
* Responsibilities:
* 1. Build a JWK-provisioner One-Time Token (OTT) signed with the provisioner
* private key (ES256/ES384/RS256 per JWK kty/crv) carrying Mosaic-specific
* claims (`mosaic_grant_id`, `mosaic_subject_user_id`, `step.sha`) per the
* step-ca JWK provisioner protocol.
* 2. POST the CSR + OTT to the step-ca `/1.0/sign` endpoint over HTTPS,
* pinning the trust to the CA root cert supplied via env.
* 3. Return an IssuedCertDto containing the leaf cert, full chain, and
* serial number.
*
* Environment variables (all required at runtime — validated in constructor):
* STEP_CA_URL https://step-ca:9000
* STEP_CA_PROVISIONER_KEY_JSON JWK provisioner private key (JSON)
* STEP_CA_ROOT_CERT_PATH Absolute path to the CA root PEM
*
* Optional (only used for JWK PBES2 decrypt at startup if key is encrypted):
* STEP_CA_PROVISIONER_PASSWORD JWK provisioner password (raw string)
*
* Custom OID registry (PRD §6, docs/federation/SETUP.md):
* 1.3.6.1.4.1.99999.1 — mosaic_grant_id
* 1.3.6.1.4.1.99999.2 — mosaic_subject_user_id
*
* Fail-loud contract:
* Every error path throws CaServiceError with a human-readable `remediation`
* field. Silent OID-stripping is NEVER allowed — if the sign response does
* not include the cert, we throw rather than return a cert that may be
* missing the custom extensions.
*/
import { Injectable, Logger } from '@nestjs/common';
import * as crypto from 'node:crypto';
import * as fs from 'node:fs';
import * as https from 'node:https';
import { SignJWT, importJWK } from 'jose';
import { Pkcs10CertificateRequest, X509Certificate } from '@peculiar/x509';
import type { IssueCertRequestDto } from './ca.dto.js';
import { IssuedCertDto } from './ca.dto.js';
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Custom error class
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
export class CaServiceError extends Error {
readonly cause: unknown;
readonly remediation: string;
readonly code?: string;
constructor(message: string, remediation: string, cause?: unknown, code?: string) {
super(message);
this.name = 'CaServiceError';
this.cause = cause;
this.remediation = remediation;
this.code = code;
}
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Internal types
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
interface StepSignResponse {
crt: string;
ca?: string;
certChain?: string[];
}
interface JwkKey {
kty: string;
kid?: string;
use?: string;
alg?: string;
k?: string; // symmetric
n?: string; // RSA
e?: string;
d?: string;
x?: string; // EC
y?: string;
crv?: string;
[key: string]: unknown;
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Helpers
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
/** UUID regex for validation */
const UUID_RE = /^[0-9a-f]{8}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{12}$/i;
/**
* Derive the JWT algorithm string from a JWK's kty/crv fields.
* EC P-256 → ES256, EC P-384 → ES384, RSA → RS256.
*/
function algFromJwk(jwk: JwkKey): string {
if (jwk.alg) return jwk.alg;
if (jwk.kty === 'EC') {
if (jwk.crv === 'P-384') return 'ES384';
return 'ES256'; // default for P-256 and Ed25519-style EC keys
}
if (jwk.kty === 'RSA') return 'RS256';
throw new CaServiceError(
`Unsupported JWK kty: ${jwk.kty}`,
'STEP_CA_PROVISIONER_KEY_JSON must be an EC (P-256/P-384) or RSA JWK private key.',
);
}
/**
* Compute SHA-256 fingerprint of the DER-encoded CSR body.
* step-ca uses this as the `step.sha` claim to bind the OTT to a specific CSR.
*/
function csrFingerprint(csrPem: string): string {
// Strip PEM headers and decode base64 body
const b64 = csrPem
.replace(/-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE REQUEST-----/, '')
.replace(/-----END CERTIFICATE REQUEST-----/, '')
.replace(/\s+/g, '');
let derBuf: Buffer;
try {
derBuf = Buffer.from(b64, 'base64');
} catch (err) {
throw new CaServiceError(
'Failed to base64-decode the CSR PEM body',
'Verify that csrPem is a valid PKCS#10 PEM-encoded certificate request.',
err,
);
}
if (derBuf.length === 0) {
throw new CaServiceError(
'CSR PEM decoded to empty buffer — malformed input',
'Provide a valid non-empty PKCS#10 PEM-encoded certificate request.',
);
}
return crypto.createHash('sha256').update(derBuf).digest('hex');
}
/**
* Send a JSON POST to the step-ca sign endpoint.
* Returns the parsed response body or throws CaServiceError.
*/
function httpsPost(url: string, body: unknown, agent: https.Agent): Promise<StepSignResponse> {
return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
const bodyStr = JSON.stringify(body);
const parsed = new URL(url);
const options: https.RequestOptions = {
hostname: parsed.hostname,
port: parsed.port ? parseInt(parsed.port, 10) : 443,
path: parsed.pathname,
method: 'POST',
headers: {
'Content-Type': 'application/json',
'Content-Length': Buffer.byteLength(bodyStr),
},
agent,
timeout: 5000,
};
const req = https.request(options, (res) => {
const chunks: Buffer[] = [];
res.on('data', (chunk: Buffer) => chunks.push(chunk));
res.on('end', () => {
const raw = Buffer.concat(chunks).toString('utf8');
if (res.statusCode === 401) {
reject(
new CaServiceError(
`step-ca returned HTTP 401 — invalid or expired OTT`,
'Check STEP_CA_PROVISIONER_KEY_JSON. Ensure the mosaic-fed provisioner is configured in the CA.',
),
);
return;
}
if (res.statusCode && res.statusCode >= 400) {
reject(
new CaServiceError(
`step-ca returned HTTP ${res.statusCode}: ${raw.slice(0, 256)}`,
`Review the step-ca logs. Status ${res.statusCode} may indicate a CSR policy violation or misconfigured provisioner.`,
),
);
return;
}
let parsed: unknown;
try {
parsed = JSON.parse(raw) as unknown;
} catch (err) {
reject(
new CaServiceError(
'step-ca returned a non-JSON response',
'Verify STEP_CA_URL points to a running step-ca instance and that TLS is properly configured.',
err,
),
);
return;
}
resolve(parsed as StepSignResponse);
});
});
req.setTimeout(5000, () => {
req.destroy(new Error('Request timed out after 5000ms'));
});
req.on('error', (err: Error) => {
reject(
new CaServiceError(
`HTTPS connection to step-ca failed: ${err.message}`,
'Ensure STEP_CA_URL is reachable and STEP_CA_ROOT_CERT_PATH points to the correct CA root certificate.',
err,
),
);
});
req.write(bodyStr);
req.end();
});
}
/**
* Extract a decimal serial number from a PEM certificate.
* Throws CaServiceError on failure — never silently returns 'unknown'.
*/
function extractSerial(certPem: string): string {
let cert: crypto.X509Certificate;
try {
cert = new crypto.X509Certificate(certPem);
} catch (err) {
throw new CaServiceError(
'Failed to parse the issued certificate PEM',
'The certificate returned by step-ca could not be parsed. Check that step-ca is returning a valid PEM certificate.',
err,
'CERT_PARSE',
);
}
return cert.serialNumber;
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Service
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@Injectable()
export class CaService {
private readonly logger = new Logger(CaService.name);
private readonly caUrl: string;
private readonly rootCertPath: string;
private readonly httpsAgent: https.Agent;
private readonly jwk: JwkKey;
private cachedPrivateKey: crypto.KeyObject | null = null;
private readonly jwtAlg: string;
private readonly kid: string;
constructor() {
const caUrl = process.env['STEP_CA_URL'];
const provisionerKeyJson = process.env['STEP_CA_PROVISIONER_KEY_JSON'];
const rootCertPath = process.env['STEP_CA_ROOT_CERT_PATH'];
if (!caUrl) {
throw new CaServiceError(
'STEP_CA_URL is not set',
'Set STEP_CA_URL to the base URL of the step-ca instance, e.g. https://step-ca:9000',
);
}
// Enforce HTTPS-only URL
let parsedUrl: URL;
try {
parsedUrl = new URL(caUrl);
} catch (err) {
throw new CaServiceError(
`STEP_CA_URL is not a valid URL: ${caUrl}`,
'Set STEP_CA_URL to a valid HTTPS URL, e.g. https://step-ca:9000',
err,
);
}
if (parsedUrl.protocol !== 'https:') {
throw new CaServiceError(
`STEP_CA_URL must use HTTPS — got: ${parsedUrl.protocol}`,
'Set STEP_CA_URL to an https:// URL. Unencrypted connections to the CA are not permitted.',
);
}
if (!provisionerKeyJson) {
throw new CaServiceError(
'STEP_CA_PROVISIONER_KEY_JSON is not set',
'Set STEP_CA_PROVISIONER_KEY_JSON to the JSON-encoded JWK for the mosaic-fed provisioner.',
);
}
if (!rootCertPath) {
throw new CaServiceError(
'STEP_CA_ROOT_CERT_PATH is not set',
'Set STEP_CA_ROOT_CERT_PATH to the absolute path of the step-ca root CA certificate PEM file.',
);
}
// Parse JWK once — do NOT store the raw JSON string as a class field
let jwk: JwkKey;
try {
jwk = JSON.parse(provisionerKeyJson) as JwkKey;
} catch (err) {
throw new CaServiceError(
'STEP_CA_PROVISIONER_KEY_JSON is not valid JSON',
'Set STEP_CA_PROVISIONER_KEY_JSON to the JSON-serialised JWK object for the mosaic-fed provisioner.',
err,
);
}
// Derive algorithm from JWK metadata
const jwtAlg = algFromJwk(jwk);
const kid = jwk.kid ?? 'mosaic-fed';
// Import the JWK into a native KeyObject — fail loudly if it cannot be loaded.
// We do this synchronously here by calling the async importJWK via a blocking workaround.
// Actually importJWK is async, so we store it for use during token building.
// We keep the raw jwk object for later async import inside buildOtt.
// NOTE: We do NOT store provisionerKeyJson string as a class field.
this.jwk = jwk;
this.jwtAlg = jwtAlg;
this.kid = kid;
this.caUrl = caUrl;
this.rootCertPath = rootCertPath;
// Read the root cert and pin it for all HTTPS connections.
let rootCert: string;
try {
rootCert = fs.readFileSync(this.rootCertPath, 'utf8');
} catch (err) {
throw new CaServiceError(
`Cannot read STEP_CA_ROOT_CERT_PATH: ${rootCertPath}`,
'Ensure the file exists and is readable by the gateway process.',
err,
);
}
this.httpsAgent = new https.Agent({
ca: rootCert,
rejectUnauthorized: true,
});
this.logger.log(`CaService initialised — CA URL: ${this.caUrl}`);
}
/**
* Lazily import the private key from JWK on first use.
* The key is cached in cachedPrivateKey after first import.
*/
private async getPrivateKey(): Promise<crypto.KeyObject> {
if (this.cachedPrivateKey !== null) return this.cachedPrivateKey;
try {
const key = await importJWK(this.jwk, this.jwtAlg);
// importJWK returns KeyLike (crypto.KeyObject | Uint8Array) — in Node.js it's KeyObject
this.cachedPrivateKey = key as unknown as crypto.KeyObject;
return this.cachedPrivateKey;
} catch (err) {
throw new CaServiceError(
'Failed to import STEP_CA_PROVISIONER_KEY_JSON as a cryptographic key',
'Ensure STEP_CA_PROVISIONER_KEY_JSON contains a valid JWK private key (EC P-256/P-384 or RSA).',
err,
);
}
}
/**
* Build the JWK-provisioner OTT signed with the provisioner private key.
* Algorithm is derived from the JWK kty/crv fields.
*/
private async buildOtt(params: {
csrPem: string;
grantId: string;
subjectUserId: string;
ttlSeconds: number;
csrCn: string;
}): Promise<string> {
const { csrPem, grantId, subjectUserId, ttlSeconds, csrCn } = params;
// Validate UUID shape for grant id and subject user id
if (!UUID_RE.test(grantId)) {
throw new CaServiceError(
`grantId is not a valid UUID: ${grantId}`,
'Provide a valid UUID (RFC 4122) for grantId.',
undefined,
'INVALID_GRANT_ID',
);
}
if (!UUID_RE.test(subjectUserId)) {
throw new CaServiceError(
`subjectUserId is not a valid UUID: ${subjectUserId}`,
'Provide a valid UUID (RFC 4122) for subjectUserId.',
undefined,
'INVALID_GRANT_ID',
);
}
const sha = csrFingerprint(csrPem);
const now = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000);
const privateKey = await this.getPrivateKey();
const ott = await new SignJWT({
iss: this.kid,
sub: csrCn, // M1: set sub to identity from CSR CN
aud: [`${this.caUrl}/1.0/sign`],
iat: now,
nbf: now - 30, // 30 s clock-skew tolerance
exp: now + Math.min(ttlSeconds, 3600), // OTT validity ≤ 1 h
jti: crypto.randomUUID(), // M2: unique token ID
// step.sha is the canonical field name used in the template — M3: keep only step.sha
step: { sha },
// Mosaic custom claims consumed by federation.tpl
mosaic_grant_id: grantId,
mosaic_subject_user_id: subjectUserId,
})
.setProtectedHeader({ alg: this.jwtAlg, typ: 'JWT', kid: this.kid })
.sign(privateKey);
return ott;
}
/**
* Validate a PEM-encoded CSR using @peculiar/x509.
* Verifies the self-signature, key type/size, and signature algorithm.
* Optionally verifies that the CSR's SANs match the expected set.
*
* Throws CaServiceError with code 'INVALID_CSR' on failure.
*/
private async validateCsr(pem: string, expectedSans?: string[]): Promise<string> {
let csr: Pkcs10CertificateRequest;
try {
csr = new Pkcs10CertificateRequest(pem);
} catch (err) {
throw new CaServiceError(
'Failed to parse CSR PEM as a valid PKCS#10 certificate request',
'Provide a valid PEM-encoded PKCS#10 CSR.',
err,
'INVALID_CSR',
);
}
// Verify self-signature
let valid: boolean;
try {
valid = await csr.verify();
} catch (err) {
throw new CaServiceError(
'CSR signature verification threw an error',
'The CSR self-signature could not be verified. Ensure the CSR is properly formed.',
err,
'INVALID_CSR',
);
}
if (!valid) {
throw new CaServiceError(
'CSR self-signature is invalid',
'The CSR must be self-signed with the corresponding private key.',
undefined,
'INVALID_CSR',
);
}
// Validate signature algorithm — reject MD5 and SHA-1
// signatureAlgorithm is HashedAlgorithm which extends Algorithm.
// Cast through unknown to access .name and .hash.name without DOM lib globals.
const sigAlgAny = csr.signatureAlgorithm as unknown as {
name?: string;
hash?: { name?: string };
};
const sigAlgName = (sigAlgAny.name ?? '').toLowerCase();
const hashName = (sigAlgAny.hash?.name ?? '').toLowerCase();
if (
sigAlgName.includes('md5') ||
sigAlgName.includes('sha1') ||
hashName === 'sha-1' ||
hashName === 'sha1'
) {
throw new CaServiceError(
`CSR uses a forbidden signature algorithm: ${sigAlgAny.name ?? 'unknown'}`,
'Use SHA-256 or stronger. MD5 and SHA-1 are not permitted.',
undefined,
'INVALID_CSR',
);
}
// Validate public key algorithm and strength via the algorithm descriptor on the key.
// csr.publicKey.algorithm is type Algorithm (WebCrypto) — use name-based checks.
// We cast to an extended interface to access curve/modulus info without DOM globals.
const pubKeyAlgo = csr.publicKey.algorithm as {
name: string;
namedCurve?: string;
modulusLength?: number;
};
const keyAlgoName = pubKeyAlgo.name;
if (keyAlgoName === 'RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5' || keyAlgoName === 'RSA-PSS') {
const modulusLength = pubKeyAlgo.modulusLength ?? 0;
if (modulusLength < 2048) {
throw new CaServiceError(
`CSR RSA key is too short: ${modulusLength} bits (minimum 2048)`,
'Use an RSA key of at least 2048 bits.',
undefined,
'INVALID_CSR',
);
}
} else if (keyAlgoName === 'ECDSA') {
const namedCurve = pubKeyAlgo.namedCurve ?? '';
const allowedCurves = new Set(['P-256', 'P-384']);
if (!allowedCurves.has(namedCurve)) {
throw new CaServiceError(
`CSR EC key uses disallowed curve: ${namedCurve}`,
'Use EC P-256 or P-384. Other curves are not permitted.',
undefined,
'INVALID_CSR',
);
}
} else if (keyAlgoName === 'Ed25519') {
// Ed25519 is explicitly allowed
} else {
throw new CaServiceError(
`CSR uses unsupported key algorithm: ${keyAlgoName}`,
'Use EC (P-256/P-384), Ed25519, or RSA (≥2048 bit) keys.',
undefined,
'INVALID_CSR',
);
}
// Extract SANs if expectedSans provided
if (expectedSans && expectedSans.length > 0) {
// Get SANs from CSR extensions
const sanExtension = csr.extensions?.find(
(ext) => ext.type === '2.5.29.17', // Subject Alternative Name OID
);
const csrSans: string[] = [];
if (sanExtension) {
// Parse the raw SAN extension — store as stringified for comparison
// @peculiar/x509 exposes SANs through the parsed extension
const sanExt = sanExtension as { names?: Array<{ type: string; value: string }> };
if (sanExt.names) {
for (const name of sanExt.names) {
csrSans.push(name.value);
}
}
}
const csrSanSet = new Set(csrSans);
const expectedSanSet = new Set(expectedSans);
const missing = expectedSans.filter((s) => !csrSanSet.has(s));
const extra = csrSans.filter((s) => !expectedSanSet.has(s));
if (missing.length > 0 || extra.length > 0) {
throw new CaServiceError(
`CSR SANs do not match expected set. Missing: [${missing.join(', ')}], Extra: [${extra.join(', ')}]`,
'The CSR must include exactly the SANs specified in the issuance request.',
undefined,
'INVALID_CSR',
);
}
}
// Return the CN from the CSR subject for use as JWT sub
const cn = csr.subjectName.getField('CN')?.[0] ?? '';
return cn;
}
/**
* Submit a CSR to step-ca and return the issued certificate.
*
* Throws `CaServiceError` on any failure (network, auth, malformed input).
* Never silently swallows errors — fail-loud is a hard contract per M2-02 review.
*/
async issueCert(req: IssueCertRequestDto): Promise<IssuedCertDto> {
// Clamp TTL to 15-minute maximum (H2)
const ttl = Math.min(req.ttlSeconds ?? 300, 900);
this.logger.debug(
`issueCert — grantId=${req.grantId} subjectUserId=${req.subjectUserId} ttl=${ttl}s`,
);
// Validate CSR — real cryptographic validation (H3)
const csrCn = await this.validateCsr(req.csrPem);
const ott = await this.buildOtt({
csrPem: req.csrPem,
grantId: req.grantId,
subjectUserId: req.subjectUserId,
ttlSeconds: ttl,
csrCn,
});
const signUrl = `${this.caUrl}/1.0/sign`;
const requestBody = {
csr: req.csrPem,
ott,
validity: {
duration: `${ttl}s`,
},
};
this.logger.debug(`Posting CSR to ${signUrl}`);
const response = await httpsPost(signUrl, requestBody, this.httpsAgent);
if (!response.crt) {
throw new CaServiceError(
'step-ca sign response missing the "crt" field',
'This is unexpected — the step-ca instance may be misconfigured or running an incompatible version.',
);
}
// Build certChainPem: prefer certChain array, fall back to ca field, fall back to crt alone.
let certChainPem: string;
if (response.certChain && response.certChain.length > 0) {
certChainPem = response.certChain.join('\n');
} else if (response.ca) {
certChainPem = response.crt + '\n' + response.ca;
} else {
certChainPem = response.crt;
}
const serialNumber = extractSerial(response.crt);
// CRIT-1: Verify the issued certificate contains both Mosaic OID extensions
// with the correct values. Step-CA's federation.tpl encodes each as an ASN.1
// UTF8String TLV: tag 0x0C + 1-byte length + UUID bytes. We skip 2 bytes
// (tag + length) to extract the raw UUID string.
const issuedCert = new X509Certificate(response.crt);
const decoder = new TextDecoder();
const grantIdExt = issuedCert.getExtension('1.3.6.1.4.1.99999.1');
if (!grantIdExt) {
throw new CaServiceError(
'Issued certificate is missing required Mosaic OID: mosaic_grant_id',
'The Step-CA federation.tpl template did not embed OID 1.3.6.1.4.1.99999.1. Check the provisioner template configuration.',
undefined,
'OID_MISSING',
);
}
const grantIdInCert = decoder.decode(grantIdExt.value.slice(2));
if (grantIdInCert !== req.grantId) {
throw new CaServiceError(
`Issued certificate mosaic_grant_id mismatch: expected ${req.grantId}, got ${grantIdInCert}`,
'The Step-CA issued a certificate with a different grant ID than requested. This may indicate a provisioner misconfiguration or a MITM.',
undefined,
'OID_MISMATCH',
);
}
const subjectUserIdExt = issuedCert.getExtension('1.3.6.1.4.1.99999.2');
if (!subjectUserIdExt) {
throw new CaServiceError(
'Issued certificate is missing required Mosaic OID: mosaic_subject_user_id',
'The Step-CA federation.tpl template did not embed OID 1.3.6.1.4.1.99999.2. Check the provisioner template configuration.',
undefined,
'OID_MISSING',
);
}
const subjectUserIdInCert = decoder.decode(subjectUserIdExt.value.slice(2));
if (subjectUserIdInCert !== req.subjectUserId) {
throw new CaServiceError(
`Issued certificate mosaic_subject_user_id mismatch: expected ${req.subjectUserId}, got ${subjectUserIdInCert}`,
'The Step-CA issued a certificate with a different subject user ID than requested. This may indicate a provisioner misconfiguration or a MITM.',
undefined,
'OID_MISMATCH',
);
}
this.logger.log(`Certificate issued — serial=${serialNumber} grantId=${req.grantId}`);
const result = new IssuedCertDto();
result.certPem = response.crt;
result.certChainPem = certChainPem;
result.serialNumber = serialNumber;
return result;
}
}

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@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
/**
* EnrollmentController — federation enrollment HTTP layer (FED-M2-07).
*
* Routes:
* POST /api/federation/enrollment/tokens — admin creates a single-use token
* POST /api/federation/enrollment/:token — unauthenticated; token IS the auth
*/
import {
Body,
Controller,
HttpCode,
HttpStatus,
Inject,
Param,
Post,
UseGuards,
} from '@nestjs/common';
import { AdminGuard } from '../admin/admin.guard.js';
import { EnrollmentService } from './enrollment.service.js';
import { CreateEnrollmentTokenDto, RedeemEnrollmentTokenDto } from './enrollment.dto.js';
@Controller('api/federation/enrollment')
export class EnrollmentController {
constructor(@Inject(EnrollmentService) private readonly enrollmentService: EnrollmentService) {}
/**
* Admin-only: generate a single-use enrollment token for a pending grant.
* The token should be distributed out-of-band to the remote peer operator.
*
* POST /api/federation/enrollment/tokens
*/
@Post('tokens')
@UseGuards(AdminGuard)
@HttpCode(HttpStatus.CREATED)
async createToken(@Body() dto: CreateEnrollmentTokenDto) {
return this.enrollmentService.createToken(dto);
}
/**
* Unauthenticated: remote peer redeems a token by submitting its CSR.
* The token itself is the credential — no session or bearer token required.
*
* POST /api/federation/enrollment/:token
*
* Returns the signed leaf cert and full chain PEM on success.
* Returns 410 Gone if the token was already used or has expired.
*/
@Post(':token')
@HttpCode(HttpStatus.OK)
async redeem(@Param('token') token: string, @Body() dto: RedeemEnrollmentTokenDto) {
return this.enrollmentService.redeem(token, dto.csrPem);
}
}

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@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
/**
* DTOs for the federation enrollment flow (FED-M2-07).
*
* CreateEnrollmentTokenDto — admin generates a single-use enrollment token
* RedeemEnrollmentTokenDto — remote peer submits CSR to redeem the token
*/
import { IsInt, IsNotEmpty, IsOptional, IsString, IsUUID, Max, Min } from 'class-validator';
export class CreateEnrollmentTokenDto {
/** UUID of the federation grant this token will activate on redemption. */
@IsUUID()
grantId!: string;
/** UUID of the peer record that will receive the issued cert on redemption. */
@IsUUID()
peerId!: string;
/**
* Token lifetime in seconds. Default 900 (15 min). Min 60. Max 900.
* After this time the token is rejected even if unused.
*/
@IsOptional()
@IsInt()
@Min(60)
@Max(900)
ttlSeconds: number = 900;
}
export class RedeemEnrollmentTokenDto {
/** PEM-encoded PKCS#10 Certificate Signing Request from the remote peer. */
@IsString()
@IsNotEmpty()
csrPem!: string;
}

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/**
* EnrollmentService — single-use enrollment token lifecycle (FED-M2-07).
*
* Responsibilities:
* 1. Generate time-limited single-use enrollment tokens (admin action).
* 2. Redeem a token: validate → atomically claim token → issue cert via
* CaService → transactionally activate grant + update peer + write audit.
*
* Replay protection: the token is claimed (UPDATE WHERE used_at IS NULL) BEFORE
* cert issuance. This prevents double cert minting on concurrent requests.
* If cert issuance fails after claim, the token is consumed and the grant
* stays pending — admin must create a new grant.
*/
import {
BadRequestException,
ConflictException,
GoneException,
Inject,
Injectable,
Logger,
NotFoundException,
} from '@nestjs/common';
import * as crypto from 'node:crypto';
// X509Certificate is available as a named export in Node.js ≥ 15.6
const { X509Certificate } = crypto;
import {
type Db,
and,
eq,
isNull,
sql,
federationEnrollmentTokens,
federationGrants,
federationPeers,
federationAuditLog,
} from '@mosaicstack/db';
import { DB } from '../database/database.module.js';
import { CaService } from './ca.service.js';
import { GrantsService } from './grants.service.js';
import { FederationScopeError } from './scope-schema.js';
import type { CreateEnrollmentTokenDto } from './enrollment.dto.js';
export interface EnrollmentTokenResult {
token: string;
expiresAt: string;
}
export interface RedeemResult {
certPem: string;
certChainPem: string;
}
@Injectable()
export class EnrollmentService {
private readonly logger = new Logger(EnrollmentService.name);
constructor(
@Inject(DB) private readonly db: Db,
private readonly caService: CaService,
private readonly grantsService: GrantsService,
) {}
/**
* Generate a single-use enrollment token for an admin to distribute
* out-of-band to the remote peer operator.
*/
async createToken(dto: CreateEnrollmentTokenDto): Promise<EnrollmentTokenResult> {
const ttl = Math.min(dto.ttlSeconds, 900);
// MED-3: Verify the grantId ↔ peerId binding — prevents attacker from
// cross-wiring grants to attacker-controlled peers.
const [grant] = await this.db
.select({ peerId: federationGrants.peerId })
.from(federationGrants)
.where(eq(federationGrants.id, dto.grantId))
.limit(1);
if (!grant) {
throw new NotFoundException(`Grant ${dto.grantId} not found`);
}
if (grant.peerId !== dto.peerId) {
throw new BadRequestException(`peerId does not match the grant's registered peer`);
}
const token = crypto.randomBytes(32).toString('hex');
const expiresAt = new Date(Date.now() + ttl * 1000);
await this.db.insert(federationEnrollmentTokens).values({
token,
grantId: dto.grantId,
peerId: dto.peerId,
expiresAt,
});
this.logger.log(
`Enrollment token created — grantId=${dto.grantId} peerId=${dto.peerId} expiresAt=${expiresAt.toISOString()}`,
);
return { token, expiresAt: expiresAt.toISOString() };
}
/**
* Redeem an enrollment token.
*
* Full flow:
* 1. Fetch token row — NotFoundException if not found
* 2. usedAt set → GoneException (already used)
* 3. expiresAt < now → GoneException (expired)
* 4. Load grant — verify status is 'pending'
* 5. Atomically claim token (UPDATE WHERE used_at IS NULL RETURNING token)
* — if no rows returned, concurrent request won → GoneException
* 6. Issue cert via CaService (network call, outside transaction)
* — if this fails, token is consumed; grant stays pending; admin must recreate
* 7. Transaction: activate grant + update peer record + write audit log
* 8. Return { certPem, certChainPem }
*/
async redeem(token: string, csrPem: string): Promise<RedeemResult> {
// HIGH-5: Track outcome so we can write a failure audit row on any error.
let outcome: 'allowed' | 'denied' = 'denied';
// row may be undefined if the token is not found — used defensively in catch.
let row: typeof federationEnrollmentTokens.$inferSelect | undefined;
try {
// 1. Fetch token row
const [fetchedRow] = await this.db
.select()
.from(federationEnrollmentTokens)
.where(eq(federationEnrollmentTokens.token, token))
.limit(1);
if (!fetchedRow) {
throw new NotFoundException('Enrollment token not found');
}
row = fetchedRow;
// 2. Already used?
if (row.usedAt !== null) {
throw new GoneException('Enrollment token has already been used');
}
// 3. Expired?
if (row.expiresAt < new Date()) {
throw new GoneException('Enrollment token has expired');
}
// 4. Load grant and verify it is still pending
let grant;
try {
grant = await this.grantsService.getGrant(row.grantId);
} catch (err) {
if (err instanceof FederationScopeError) {
throw new BadRequestException(err.message);
}
throw err;
}
if (grant.status !== 'pending') {
throw new GoneException(
`Grant ${row.grantId} is no longer pending (status: ${grant.status})`,
);
}
// 5. Atomically claim the token BEFORE cert issuance to prevent double-minting.
// WHERE used_at IS NULL ensures only one concurrent request wins.
// Using .returning() works on both node-postgres and PGlite without rowCount inspection.
const claimed = await this.db
.update(federationEnrollmentTokens)
.set({ usedAt: sql`NOW()` })
.where(
and(
eq(federationEnrollmentTokens.token, token),
isNull(federationEnrollmentTokens.usedAt),
),
)
.returning({ token: federationEnrollmentTokens.token });
if (claimed.length === 0) {
throw new GoneException('Enrollment token has already been used (concurrent request)');
}
// 6. Issue certificate via CaService (network call — outside any transaction).
// If this throws, the token is already consumed. The grant stays pending.
// Admin must revoke the grant and create a new one.
let issued;
try {
issued = await this.caService.issueCert({
csrPem,
grantId: row.grantId,
subjectUserId: grant.subjectUserId,
ttlSeconds: 300,
});
} catch (err) {
// HIGH-4: Log only the first 8 hex chars of the token for correlation — never log the full token.
this.logger.error(
`issueCert failed after token ${token.slice(0, 8)}... was claimed — grant ${row.grantId} is stranded pending`,
err instanceof Error ? err.stack : String(err),
);
if (err instanceof FederationScopeError) {
throw new BadRequestException((err as Error).message);
}
throw err;
}
// 7. Atomically activate grant, update peer record, and write audit log.
const certNotAfter = this.extractCertNotAfter(issued.certPem);
await this.db.transaction(async (tx) => {
// CRIT-2: Guard activation with WHERE status='pending' to prevent double-activation.
const [activated] = await tx
.update(federationGrants)
.set({ status: 'active' })
.where(and(eq(federationGrants.id, row!.grantId), eq(federationGrants.status, 'pending')))
.returning({ id: federationGrants.id });
if (!activated) {
throw new ConflictException(
`Grant ${row!.grantId} is no longer pending — cannot activate`,
);
}
// CRIT-2: Guard peer update with WHERE state='pending'.
await tx
.update(federationPeers)
.set({
certPem: issued.certPem,
certSerial: issued.serialNumber,
certNotAfter,
state: 'active',
})
.where(and(eq(federationPeers.id, row!.peerId), eq(federationPeers.state, 'pending')));
await tx.insert(federationAuditLog).values({
requestId: crypto.randomUUID(),
peerId: row!.peerId,
grantId: row!.grantId,
verb: 'enrollment',
resource: 'federation_grant',
statusCode: 200,
outcome: 'allowed',
});
});
this.logger.log(
`Enrollment complete — peerId=${row.peerId} grantId=${row.grantId} serial=${issued.serialNumber}`,
);
outcome = 'allowed';
// 8. Return cert material
return {
certPem: issued.certPem,
certChainPem: issued.certChainPem,
};
} catch (err) {
// HIGH-5: Best-effort audit write on failure — do not let this throw.
if (outcome === 'denied') {
await this.db
.insert(federationAuditLog)
.values({
requestId: crypto.randomUUID(),
peerId: row?.peerId ?? null,
grantId: row?.grantId ?? null,
verb: 'enrollment',
resource: 'federation_grant',
statusCode:
err instanceof GoneException ? 410 : err instanceof NotFoundException ? 404 : 500,
outcome: 'denied',
})
.catch(() => {});
}
throw err;
}
}
/**
* Extract the notAfter date from a PEM certificate.
* HIGH-2: No silent fallback — a cert that cannot be parsed should fail loud.
*/
private extractCertNotAfter(certPem: string): Date {
const cert = new X509Certificate(certPem);
return new Date(cert.validTo);
}
}

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/**
* DTOs for the federation admin controller (FED-M2-08).
*/
import { IsInt, IsNotEmpty, IsOptional, IsString, IsUrl, Max, Min } from 'class-validator';
export class CreatePeerKeypairDto {
@IsString()
@IsNotEmpty()
commonName!: string;
@IsString()
@IsNotEmpty()
displayName!: string;
@IsOptional()
@IsUrl()
endpointUrl?: string;
}
export class StorePeerCertDto {
@IsString()
@IsNotEmpty()
certPem!: string;
}
export class GenerateEnrollmentTokenDto {
@IsOptional()
@IsInt()
@Min(60)
@Max(900)
ttlSeconds: number = 900;
}
export class RevokeGrantBodyDto {
@IsOptional()
@IsString()
reason?: string;
}

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/**
* FederationController — admin REST API for federation management (FED-M2-08).
*
* Routes (all under /api/admin/federation, all require AdminGuard):
*
* Grant management:
* POST /api/admin/federation/grants
* GET /api/admin/federation/grants
* GET /api/admin/federation/grants/:id
* PATCH /api/admin/federation/grants/:id/revoke
* POST /api/admin/federation/grants/:id/tokens
*
* Peer management:
* GET /api/admin/federation/peers
* POST /api/admin/federation/peers/keypair
* PATCH /api/admin/federation/peers/:id/cert
*
* NOTE: The enrollment REDEMPTION endpoint (POST /api/federation/enrollment/:token)
* is handled by EnrollmentController — not duplicated here.
*/
import {
Body,
Controller,
Get,
HttpCode,
HttpStatus,
Inject,
NotFoundException,
Param,
Patch,
Post,
Query,
UseGuards,
} from '@nestjs/common';
import { webcrypto } from 'node:crypto';
import { X509Certificate } from 'node:crypto';
import { Pkcs10CertificateRequestGenerator } from '@peculiar/x509';
import { type Db, eq, federationPeers } from '@mosaicstack/db';
import { DB } from '../database/database.module.js';
import { AdminGuard } from '../admin/admin.guard.js';
import { GrantsService } from './grants.service.js';
import { EnrollmentService } from './enrollment.service.js';
import { sealClientKey } from './peer-key.util.js';
import { CreateGrantDto, ListGrantsDto } from './grants.dto.js';
import {
CreatePeerKeypairDto,
GenerateEnrollmentTokenDto,
RevokeGrantBodyDto,
StorePeerCertDto,
} from './federation-admin.dto.js';
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Helpers
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
/**
* Convert an ArrayBuffer to a Base64 string (for PEM encoding).
*/
function arrayBufferToBase64(buf: ArrayBuffer): string {
const bytes = new Uint8Array(buf);
let binary = '';
for (const b of bytes) {
binary += String.fromCharCode(b);
}
return Buffer.from(binary, 'binary').toString('base64');
}
/**
* Wrap a Base64 string in PEM armour.
*/
function toPem(label: string, b64: string): string {
const lines = b64.match(/.{1,64}/g) ?? [];
return `-----BEGIN ${label}-----\n${lines.join('\n')}\n-----END ${label}-----\n`;
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Controller
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@Controller('api/admin/federation')
@UseGuards(AdminGuard)
export class FederationController {
constructor(
@Inject(DB) private readonly db: Db,
@Inject(GrantsService) private readonly grantsService: GrantsService,
@Inject(EnrollmentService) private readonly enrollmentService: EnrollmentService,
) {}
// ─── Grant management ────────────────────────────────────────────────────
/**
* POST /api/admin/federation/grants
* Create a new grant in pending state.
*/
@Post('grants')
@HttpCode(HttpStatus.CREATED)
async createGrant(@Body() body: CreateGrantDto) {
return this.grantsService.createGrant(body);
}
/**
* GET /api/admin/federation/grants
* List grants with optional filters.
*/
@Get('grants')
async listGrants(@Query() query: ListGrantsDto) {
return this.grantsService.listGrants(query);
}
/**
* GET /api/admin/federation/grants/:id
* Get a single grant by ID.
*/
@Get('grants/:id')
async getGrant(@Param('id') id: string) {
return this.grantsService.getGrant(id);
}
/**
* PATCH /api/admin/federation/grants/:id/revoke
* Revoke an active grant.
*/
@Patch('grants/:id/revoke')
async revokeGrant(@Param('id') id: string, @Body() body: RevokeGrantBodyDto) {
return this.grantsService.revokeGrant(id, body.reason);
}
/**
* POST /api/admin/federation/grants/:id/tokens
* Generate a single-use enrollment token for a pending grant.
* Returns the token plus an enrollmentUrl the operator shares out-of-band.
*/
@Post('grants/:id/tokens')
@HttpCode(HttpStatus.CREATED)
async generateToken(@Param('id') id: string, @Body() body: GenerateEnrollmentTokenDto) {
const grant = await this.grantsService.getGrant(id);
const result = await this.enrollmentService.createToken({
grantId: id,
peerId: grant.peerId,
ttlSeconds: body.ttlSeconds ?? 900,
});
const baseUrl = process.env['BETTER_AUTH_URL'] ?? 'http://localhost:14242';
const enrollmentUrl = `${baseUrl}/api/federation/enrollment/${result.token}`;
return {
token: result.token,
expiresAt: result.expiresAt,
enrollmentUrl,
};
}
// ─── Peer management ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────
/**
* GET /api/admin/federation/peers
* List all federation peer rows.
*/
@Get('peers')
async listPeers() {
return this.db.select().from(federationPeers).orderBy(federationPeers.commonName);
}
/**
* POST /api/admin/federation/peers/keypair
* Generate a new peer entry with EC P-256 key pair and a PKCS#10 CSR.
*
* Flow:
* 1. Generate EC P-256 key pair via webcrypto
* 2. Generate a self-signed CSR via @peculiar/x509
* 3. Export private key as PEM
* 4. sealClientKey(privatePem) → sealed blob
* 5. Insert pending peer row
* 6. Return { peerId, csrPem }
*/
@Post('peers/keypair')
@HttpCode(HttpStatus.CREATED)
async createPeerKeypair(@Body() body: CreatePeerKeypairDto) {
// 1. Generate EC P-256 key pair via Web Crypto
const keyPair = await webcrypto.subtle.generateKey(
{ name: 'ECDSA', namedCurve: 'P-256' },
true, // extractable
['sign', 'verify'],
);
// 2. Generate PKCS#10 CSR
const csr = await Pkcs10CertificateRequestGenerator.create({
name: `CN=${body.commonName}`,
keys: keyPair,
signingAlgorithm: { name: 'ECDSA', hash: 'SHA-256' },
});
const csrPem = csr.toString('pem');
// 3. Export private key as PKCS#8 PEM
const pkcs8Der = await webcrypto.subtle.exportKey('pkcs8', keyPair.privateKey);
const privatePem = toPem('PRIVATE KEY', arrayBufferToBase64(pkcs8Der));
// 4. Seal the private key
const sealed = sealClientKey(privatePem);
// 5. Insert pending peer row
const [peer] = await this.db
.insert(federationPeers)
.values({
commonName: body.commonName,
displayName: body.displayName,
certPem: '',
certSerial: 'pending',
certNotAfter: new Date(0),
clientKeyPem: sealed,
state: 'pending',
endpointUrl: body.endpointUrl,
})
.returning();
return {
peerId: peer!.id,
csrPem,
};
}
/**
* PATCH /api/admin/federation/peers/:id/cert
* Store a signed certificate after enrollment completes.
*
* Flow:
* 1. Parse the cert to extract serial and notAfter
* 2. Update the peer row with cert data + state='active'
* 3. Return the updated peer row
*/
@Patch('peers/:id/cert')
async storePeerCert(@Param('id') id: string, @Body() body: StorePeerCertDto) {
// Ensure peer exists
const [existing] = await this.db
.select({ id: federationPeers.id })
.from(federationPeers)
.where(eq(federationPeers.id, id))
.limit(1);
if (!existing) {
throw new NotFoundException(`Peer ${id} not found`);
}
// 1. Parse cert
const x509 = new X509Certificate(body.certPem);
const certSerial = x509.serialNumber;
const certNotAfter = new Date(x509.validTo);
// 2. Update peer
const [updated] = await this.db
.update(federationPeers)
.set({
certPem: body.certPem,
certSerial,
certNotAfter,
state: 'active',
})
.where(eq(federationPeers.id, id))
.returning();
return updated;
}
}

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import { Module } from '@nestjs/common';
import { AdminGuard } from '../admin/admin.guard.js';
import { CaService } from './ca.service.js';
import { EnrollmentController } from './enrollment.controller.js';
import { EnrollmentService } from './enrollment.service.js';
import { FederationController } from './federation.controller.js';
import { GrantsService } from './grants.service.js';
@Module({
controllers: [EnrollmentController, FederationController],
providers: [AdminGuard, CaService, EnrollmentService, GrantsService],
exports: [CaService, EnrollmentService, GrantsService],
})
export class FederationModule {}

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import { IsDateString, IsIn, IsObject, IsOptional, IsString, IsUUID } from 'class-validator';
export class CreateGrantDto {
@IsUUID()
peerId!: string;
@IsUUID()
subjectUserId!: string;
@IsObject()
scope!: Record<string, unknown>;
@IsOptional()
@IsDateString()
expiresAt?: string;
}
export class ListGrantsDto {
@IsOptional()
@IsUUID()
peerId?: string;
@IsOptional()
@IsUUID()
subjectUserId?: string;
@IsOptional()
@IsIn(['pending', 'active', 'revoked', 'expired'])
status?: 'pending' | 'active' | 'revoked' | 'expired';
}
export class RevokeGrantDto {
@IsOptional()
@IsString()
reason?: string;
}

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/**
* Federation grants service — CRUD + status transitions (FED-M2-06).
*
* Business logic only. CSR/cert work is handled by M2-07.
*
* Status lifecycle:
* pending → active (activateGrant, called by M2-07 enrollment controller after cert signed)
* active → revoked (revokeGrant)
* active → expired (expireGrant, called by M6 scheduler)
*/
import { ConflictException, Inject, Injectable, NotFoundException } from '@nestjs/common';
import { type Db, and, eq, federationGrants } from '@mosaicstack/db';
import { DB } from '../database/database.module.js';
import { parseFederationScope } from './scope-schema.js';
import type { CreateGrantDto, ListGrantsDto } from './grants.dto.js';
export type Grant = typeof federationGrants.$inferSelect;
@Injectable()
export class GrantsService {
constructor(@Inject(DB) private readonly db: Db) {}
/**
* Create a new grant in `pending` state.
* Validates the scope against the federation scope JSON schema before inserting.
*/
async createGrant(dto: CreateGrantDto): Promise<Grant> {
// Throws FederationScopeError (a plain Error subclass) on invalid scope.
parseFederationScope(dto.scope);
const [grant] = await this.db
.insert(federationGrants)
.values({
peerId: dto.peerId,
subjectUserId: dto.subjectUserId,
scope: dto.scope,
status: 'pending',
expiresAt: dto.expiresAt != null ? new Date(dto.expiresAt) : null,
})
.returning();
return grant!;
}
/**
* Fetch a single grant by ID. Throws NotFoundException if not found.
*/
async getGrant(id: string): Promise<Grant> {
const [grant] = await this.db
.select()
.from(federationGrants)
.where(eq(federationGrants.id, id))
.limit(1);
if (!grant) {
throw new NotFoundException(`Grant ${id} not found`);
}
return grant;
}
/**
* List grants with optional filters for peerId, subjectUserId, and status.
*/
async listGrants(filters: ListGrantsDto): Promise<Grant[]> {
const conditions = [];
if (filters.peerId != null) {
conditions.push(eq(federationGrants.peerId, filters.peerId));
}
if (filters.subjectUserId != null) {
conditions.push(eq(federationGrants.subjectUserId, filters.subjectUserId));
}
if (filters.status != null) {
conditions.push(eq(federationGrants.status, filters.status));
}
if (conditions.length === 0) {
return this.db.select().from(federationGrants);
}
return this.db
.select()
.from(federationGrants)
.where(and(...conditions));
}
/**
* Transition a grant from `pending` → `active`.
* Called by M2-07 enrollment controller after cert is signed.
* Throws ConflictException if the grant is not in `pending` state.
*/
async activateGrant(id: string): Promise<Grant> {
const grant = await this.getGrant(id);
if (grant.status !== 'pending') {
throw new ConflictException(
`Grant ${id} cannot be activated: expected status 'pending', got '${grant.status}'`,
);
}
const [updated] = await this.db
.update(federationGrants)
.set({ status: 'active' })
.where(eq(federationGrants.id, id))
.returning();
return updated!;
}
/**
* Transition a grant from `active` → `revoked`.
* Sets revokedAt and optionally revokedReason.
* Throws ConflictException if the grant is not in `active` state.
*/
async revokeGrant(id: string, reason?: string): Promise<Grant> {
const grant = await this.getGrant(id);
if (grant.status !== 'active') {
throw new ConflictException(
`Grant ${id} cannot be revoked: expected status 'active', got '${grant.status}'`,
);
}
const [updated] = await this.db
.update(federationGrants)
.set({
status: 'revoked',
revokedAt: new Date(),
revokedReason: reason ?? null,
})
.where(eq(federationGrants.id, id))
.returning();
return updated!;
}
/**
* Transition a grant from `active` → `expired`.
* Intended for use by the M6 scheduler.
* Throws ConflictException if the grant is not in `active` state.
*/
async expireGrant(id: string): Promise<Grant> {
const grant = await this.getGrant(id);
if (grant.status !== 'active') {
throw new ConflictException(
`Grant ${id} cannot be expired: expected status 'active', got '${grant.status}'`,
);
}
const [updated] = await this.db
.update(federationGrants)
.set({ status: 'expired' })
.where(eq(federationGrants.id, id))
.returning();
return updated!;
}
}

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import { seal, unseal } from '@mosaicstack/auth';
export function sealClientKey(privateKeyPem: string): string {
return seal(privateKeyPem);
}
export function unsealClientKey(sealedKey: string): string {
return unseal(sealedKey);
}

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/**
* Unit tests for FederationScopeSchema and parseFederationScope.
*
* Coverage:
* - Valid: minimal scope
* - Valid: full PRD §8.1 example
* - Valid: resources + excluded_resources (no overlap)
* - Invalid: empty resources
* - Invalid: unknown resource value
* - Invalid: resources / excluded_resources intersection
* - Invalid: filter key not in resources
* - Invalid: max_rows_per_query = 0
* - Invalid: max_rows_per_query = 10001
* - Invalid: not an object / null
* - Defaults: include_personal defaults to true; excluded_resources defaults to []
* - Sentinel: console.warn fires for sensitive resources
*/
import { describe, it, expect, vi, afterEach } from 'vitest';
import {
parseFederationScope,
FederationScopeError,
FederationScopeSchema,
} from './scope-schema.js';
afterEach(() => {
vi.restoreAllMocks();
});
describe('parseFederationScope — valid inputs', () => {
it('accepts a minimal scope (resources + max_rows_per_query only)', () => {
const scope = parseFederationScope({
resources: ['tasks'],
max_rows_per_query: 100,
});
expect(scope.resources).toEqual(['tasks']);
expect(scope.max_rows_per_query).toBe(100);
expect(scope.excluded_resources).toEqual([]);
expect(scope.filters).toBeUndefined();
});
it('accepts the full PRD §8.1 example', () => {
const scope = parseFederationScope({
resources: ['tasks', 'notes', 'memory'],
filters: {
tasks: { include_teams: ['team_uuid_1', 'team_uuid_2'], include_personal: true },
notes: { include_personal: true, include_teams: [] },
memory: { include_personal: true },
},
excluded_resources: ['credentials', 'api_keys'],
max_rows_per_query: 500,
});
expect(scope.resources).toEqual(['tasks', 'notes', 'memory']);
expect(scope.excluded_resources).toEqual(['credentials', 'api_keys']);
expect(scope.filters?.tasks?.include_teams).toEqual(['team_uuid_1', 'team_uuid_2']);
expect(scope.max_rows_per_query).toBe(500);
});
it('accepts a scope with excluded_resources and no filter overlap', () => {
const scope = parseFederationScope({
resources: ['tasks', 'notes'],
excluded_resources: ['memory'],
max_rows_per_query: 250,
});
expect(scope.resources).toEqual(['tasks', 'notes']);
expect(scope.excluded_resources).toEqual(['memory']);
});
});
describe('parseFederationScope — defaults', () => {
it('defaults excluded_resources to []', () => {
const scope = parseFederationScope({ resources: ['tasks'], max_rows_per_query: 1 });
expect(scope.excluded_resources).toEqual([]);
});
it('defaults include_personal to true when filter is provided without it', () => {
const scope = parseFederationScope({
resources: ['tasks'],
filters: { tasks: { include_teams: ['t1'] } },
max_rows_per_query: 10,
});
expect(scope.filters?.tasks?.include_personal).toBe(true);
});
});
describe('parseFederationScope — invalid inputs', () => {
it('throws FederationScopeError for empty resources array', () => {
expect(() => parseFederationScope({ resources: [], max_rows_per_query: 100 })).toThrow(
FederationScopeError,
);
});
it('throws for unknown resource value in resources', () => {
expect(() =>
parseFederationScope({ resources: ['unknown_resource'], max_rows_per_query: 100 }),
).toThrow(FederationScopeError);
});
it('throws when resources and excluded_resources intersect', () => {
expect(() =>
parseFederationScope({
resources: ['tasks', 'memory'],
excluded_resources: ['memory'],
max_rows_per_query: 100,
}),
).toThrow(FederationScopeError);
});
it('throws when filters references a resource not in resources', () => {
expect(() =>
parseFederationScope({
resources: ['tasks'],
filters: { notes: { include_personal: true } },
max_rows_per_query: 100,
}),
).toThrow(FederationScopeError);
});
it('throws for max_rows_per_query = 0', () => {
expect(() => parseFederationScope({ resources: ['tasks'], max_rows_per_query: 0 })).toThrow(
FederationScopeError,
);
});
it('throws for max_rows_per_query = 10001', () => {
expect(() => parseFederationScope({ resources: ['tasks'], max_rows_per_query: 10001 })).toThrow(
FederationScopeError,
);
});
it('throws for null input', () => {
expect(() => parseFederationScope(null)).toThrow(FederationScopeError);
});
it('throws for non-object input (string)', () => {
expect(() => parseFederationScope('not-an-object')).toThrow(FederationScopeError);
});
});
describe('parseFederationScope — sentinel warning', () => {
it('emits console.warn when resources includes "credentials"', () => {
const warnSpy = vi.spyOn(console, 'warn').mockImplementation(() => {});
parseFederationScope({
resources: ['tasks', 'credentials'],
max_rows_per_query: 100,
});
expect(warnSpy).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
expect.stringContaining(
'[FederationScope] WARNING: scope grants sensitive resource "credentials"',
),
);
});
it('emits console.warn when resources includes "api_keys"', () => {
const warnSpy = vi.spyOn(console, 'warn').mockImplementation(() => {});
parseFederationScope({
resources: ['tasks', 'api_keys'],
max_rows_per_query: 100,
});
expect(warnSpy).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
expect.stringContaining(
'[FederationScope] WARNING: scope grants sensitive resource "api_keys"',
),
);
});
it('does NOT emit console.warn for non-sensitive resources', () => {
const warnSpy = vi.spyOn(console, 'warn').mockImplementation(() => {});
parseFederationScope({ resources: ['tasks', 'notes', 'memory'], max_rows_per_query: 100 });
expect(warnSpy).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
});
describe('FederationScopeSchema — boundary values', () => {
it('accepts max_rows_per_query = 1 (lower bound)', () => {
const result = FederationScopeSchema.safeParse({ resources: ['tasks'], max_rows_per_query: 1 });
expect(result.success).toBe(true);
});
it('accepts max_rows_per_query = 10000 (upper bound)', () => {
const result = FederationScopeSchema.safeParse({
resources: ['tasks'],
max_rows_per_query: 10000,
});
expect(result.success).toBe(true);
});
});

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/**
* Federation grant scope schema and validator.
*
* Source of truth: docs/federation/PRD.md §8.1
*
* This module is intentionally pure — no DB, no NestJS, no CA wiring.
* It is reusable from grant CRUD (M2-06) and scope enforcement (M3+).
*/
import { z } from 'zod';
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Allowlist of federation resources (canonical — M3+ will extend this list)
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
export const FEDERATION_RESOURCE_VALUES = [
'tasks',
'notes',
'memory',
'credentials',
'api_keys',
] as const;
export type FederationResource = (typeof FEDERATION_RESOURCE_VALUES)[number];
/**
* Sensitive resources require explicit admin approval (PRD §8.4).
* The parser warns when these appear in `resources`; M2-06 grant CRUD
* will add a hard gate on top of this warning.
*/
const SENSITIVE_RESOURCES: ReadonlySet<FederationResource> = new Set(['credentials', 'api_keys']);
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Sub-schemas
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
const ResourceArraySchema = z
.array(z.enum(FEDERATION_RESOURCE_VALUES))
.nonempty({ message: 'resources must contain at least one value' })
.refine((arr) => new Set(arr).size === arr.length, {
message: 'resources must not contain duplicate values',
});
const ResourceFilterSchema = z.object({
include_teams: z.array(z.string()).optional(),
include_personal: z.boolean().default(true),
});
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Top-level schema
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
export const FederationScopeSchema = z
.object({
resources: ResourceArraySchema,
excluded_resources: z
.array(z.enum(FEDERATION_RESOURCE_VALUES))
.default([])
.refine((arr) => new Set(arr).size === arr.length, {
message: 'excluded_resources must not contain duplicate values',
}),
filters: z.record(z.string(), ResourceFilterSchema).optional(),
max_rows_per_query: z
.number()
.int({ message: 'max_rows_per_query must be an integer' })
.min(1, { message: 'max_rows_per_query must be at least 1' })
.max(10000, { message: 'max_rows_per_query must be at most 10000' }),
})
.superRefine((data, ctx) => {
const resourceSet = new Set(data.resources);
// Intersection guard: a resource cannot be both granted and excluded
for (const r of data.excluded_resources) {
if (resourceSet.has(r)) {
ctx.addIssue({
code: z.ZodIssueCode.custom,
message: `Resource "${r}" appears in both resources and excluded_resources`,
path: ['excluded_resources'],
});
}
}
// Filter keys must be a subset of resources
if (data.filters) {
for (const key of Object.keys(data.filters)) {
if (!resourceSet.has(key as FederationResource)) {
ctx.addIssue({
code: z.ZodIssueCode.custom,
message: `filters key "${key}" references a resource not present in resources`,
path: ['filters', key],
});
}
}
}
});
export type FederationScope = z.infer<typeof FederationScopeSchema>;
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Error class
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
export class FederationScopeError extends Error {
constructor(message: string) {
super(message);
this.name = 'FederationScopeError';
}
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Typed parser
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
/**
* Parse and validate an unknown value as a FederationScope.
*
* Throws `FederationScopeError` with aggregated Zod issues on failure.
*
* Emits `console.warn` when sensitive resources (`credentials`, `api_keys`)
* are present in `resources` — per PRD §8.4, these require explicit admin
* approval. M2-06 grant CRUD will add a hard gate on top of this warning.
*/
export function parseFederationScope(input: unknown): FederationScope {
const result = FederationScopeSchema.safeParse(input);
if (!result.success) {
const issues = result.error.issues
.map((e) => ` - [${e.path.join('.') || 'root'}] ${e.message}`)
.join('\n');
throw new FederationScopeError(`Invalid federation scope:\n${issues}`);
}
const scope = result.data;
// Sentinel warning for sensitive resources (PRD §8.4)
for (const resource of scope.resources) {
if (SENSITIVE_RESOURCES.has(resource)) {
console.warn(
`[FederationScope] WARNING: scope grants sensitive resource "${resource}". Per PRD §8.4 this requires explicit admin approval and is logged.`,
);
}
}
return scope;
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
# deploy/portainer/
Portainer stack templates for Mosaic Stack deployments.
## Files
| File | Purpose |
| -------------------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| `federated-test.stack.yml` | Docker Swarm stack for federation end-to-end test instances (`mos-test-1.woltje.com`, `mos-test-2.woltje.com`) |
---
## federated-test.stack.yml
A self-contained Swarm stack that boots a federated-tier Mosaic gateway with co-located Postgres 17 (pgvector) and Valkey 8. This is a **test template** — production deployments will use a separate template with stricter resource limits and Docker secrets.
### Deploy via Portainer UI
1. Log into Portainer.
2. Navigate to **Stacks → Add stack**.
3. Set a stack name matching `STACK_NAME` below (e.g. `mos-test-1`).
4. Choose **Web editor** and paste the contents of `federated-test.stack.yml`.
5. Scroll to **Environment variables** and add each variable listed below.
6. Click **Deploy the stack**.
### Required environment variables
| Variable | Example | Notes |
| -------------------- | --------------------------------------- | -------------------------------------------------------- |
| `STACK_NAME` | `mos-test-1` | Unique per stack — used in Traefik router/service names. |
| `HOST_FQDN` | `mos-test-1.woltje.com` | Fully-qualified hostname served by this stack. |
| `POSTGRES_PASSWORD` | _(generate randomly)_ | Database password. Do **not** reuse between stacks. |
| `BETTER_AUTH_SECRET` | _(generate: `openssl rand -base64 32`)_ | BetterAuth session signing key. |
| `BETTER_AUTH_URL` | `https://mos-test-1.woltje.com` | Public base URL of the gateway. |
Optional variables (uncomment in the YAML or set in Portainer):
| Variable | Notes |
| ----------------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------- |
| `ANTHROPIC_API_KEY` | Enable Claude models. |
| `OPENAI_API_KEY` | Enable OpenAI models. |
| `OTEL_EXPORTER_OTLP_ENDPOINT` | Forward traces to a collector (e.g. `http://jaeger:4318`). |
### Required external resources
Before deploying, ensure the following exist on the Swarm:
1. **`traefik-public` overlay network** — shared network Traefik uses to route traffic to stacks.
```bash
docker network create --driver overlay --attachable traefik-public
```
2. **`letsencrypt` cert resolver** — configured in the Traefik Swarm stack. The stack template references `tls.certresolver=letsencrypt`; the name must match your Traefik config.
3. **DNS A record** — `${HOST_FQDN}` must resolve to the Swarm ingress IP (or a Cloudflare-proxied address pointing there).
### Deployed instances
| Stack name | HOST_FQDN | Purpose |
| ------------ | ----------------------- | ---------------------------------- |
| `mos-test-1` | `mos-test-1.woltje.com` | DEPLOY-03 — first federation peer |
| `mos-test-2` | `mos-test-2.woltje.com` | DEPLOY-04 — second federation peer |
### Image
The gateway image is pinned by digest to `fed-v0.1.0-m1` (verified in DEPLOY-01). Update the digest in the YAML when promoting a new build — never use `:latest` or a mutable tag in Swarm.
### Notes
- This template boots a **vanilla M1-baseline gateway** in federated tier. Federation grants (Step-CA, mTLS) are M2+ scope and not included here.
- Each stack gets its own Postgres volume (`postgres-data`) and Valkey volume (`valkey-data`) scoped to the stack name by Swarm.
- `depends_on` is honoured by Compose but ignored by Swarm — healthchecks on Postgres and Valkey ensure the gateway retries until they are ready.

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,160 @@
# deploy/portainer/federated-test.stack.yml
#
# Portainer / Docker Swarm stack template — federated-tier test instance
#
# PURPOSE
# Deploys a single federated-tier Mosaic gateway with co-located Postgres
# (pgvector) and Valkey for end-to-end federation testing. Intended for
# mos-test-1.woltje.com and mos-test-2.woltje.com (DEPLOY-03/04).
#
# REQUIRED ENV VARS (set per-stack in Portainer → Stacks → Environment variables)
# STACK_NAME Unique name for Traefik router/service labels.
# Examples: mos-test-1, mos-test-2
# HOST_FQDN Fully-qualified domain name served by this stack.
# Examples: mos-test-1.woltje.com, mos-test-2.woltje.com
# POSTGRES_PASSWORD Database password — set per stack; do NOT commit a default.
# BETTER_AUTH_SECRET Random 32-char string for BetterAuth session signing.
# Generate: openssl rand -base64 32
# BETTER_AUTH_URL Public gateway base URL, e.g. https://mos-test-1.woltje.com
#
# OPTIONAL ENV VARS (uncomment and set in Portainer to enable features)
# ANTHROPIC_API_KEY sk-ant-...
# OPENAI_API_KEY sk-...
# OTEL_EXPORTER_OTLP_ENDPOINT http://<collector>:4318
# OTEL_SERVICE_NAME (default: mosaic-gateway)
#
# REQUIRED EXTERNAL RESOURCES
# traefik-public Docker overlay network — must exist before deploying.
# Create: docker network create --driver overlay --attachable traefik-public
# letsencrypt Traefik cert resolver configured on the Swarm manager.
# DNS A record ${HOST_FQDN} → Swarm ingress IP (or Cloudflare proxy).
#
# IMAGE
# Pinned to sha-9f1a081 (main HEAD post-#488 Dockerfile fix). The previous
# pin (fed-v0.1.0-m1, sha256:9b72e2...) had a broken pnpm copy and could
# not resolve @mosaicstack/storage at runtime. The new digest was smoke-
# tested locally — gateway boots, imports resolve, tier-detector runs.
# Update digest here when promoting a new build.
#
# HEALTHCHECK NOTE (2026-04-21)
# Switched from busybox wget to node http.get on 127.0.0.1 (not localhost) to
# avoid IPv6 resolution issues on Alpine. Retries increased to 5 and
# start_period to 60s to cover the NestJS/GC cold-start window (~40-50s).
# restart_policy set to `any` so SIGTERM/clean-exit also triggers restart.
#
# NOTE: This is a TEST template — production deployments use a separate
# parameterised template with stricter resource limits and secrets.
version: '3.9'
services:
gateway:
image: git.mosaicstack.dev/mosaicstack/stack/gateway@sha256:1069117740e00ccfeba357cae38c43f3729fe5ae702740ce474f6512414d7c02
# Tag for human reference: sha-9f1a081 (post-#488 Dockerfile fix; smoke-tested locally)
environment:
# ── Tier ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
MOSAIC_TIER: federated
# ── Database ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
DATABASE_URL: postgres://gateway:${POSTGRES_PASSWORD}@postgres:5432/mosaic
# ── Queue ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
VALKEY_URL: redis://valkey:6379
# ── Gateway ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
GATEWAY_PORT: '3000'
GATEWAY_CORS_ORIGIN: https://${HOST_FQDN}
# ── Auth ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
BETTER_AUTH_SECRET: ${BETTER_AUTH_SECRET}
BETTER_AUTH_URL: https://${HOST_FQDN}
# ── Observability ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
OTEL_SERVICE_NAME: ${STACK_NAME:-mosaic-gateway}
# OTEL_EXPORTER_OTLP_ENDPOINT: http://<collector>:4318
# ── AI Providers (uncomment to enable) ─────────────────────────────────
# ANTHROPIC_API_KEY: ${ANTHROPIC_API_KEY}
# OPENAI_API_KEY: ${OPENAI_API_KEY}
networks:
- federated-test
- traefik-public
deploy:
replicas: 1
restart_policy:
condition: any
delay: 5s
max_attempts: 3
labels:
- 'traefik.enable=true'
- 'traefik.docker.network=traefik-public'
- 'traefik.http.routers.${STACK_NAME}.rule=Host(`${HOST_FQDN}`)'
- 'traefik.http.routers.${STACK_NAME}.entrypoints=websecure'
- 'traefik.http.routers.${STACK_NAME}.tls=true'
- 'traefik.http.routers.${STACK_NAME}.tls.certresolver=letsencrypt'
- 'traefik.http.services.${STACK_NAME}.loadbalancer.server.port=3000'
healthcheck:
test:
- 'CMD'
- 'node'
- '-e'
- "require('http').get('http://127.0.0.1:3000/health',r=>process.exit(r.statusCode===200?0:1)).on('error',()=>process.exit(1))"
interval: 30s
timeout: 5s
retries: 5
start_period: 60s
depends_on:
- postgres
- valkey
postgres:
image: pgvector/pgvector:pg17
environment:
POSTGRES_USER: gateway
POSTGRES_PASSWORD: ${POSTGRES_PASSWORD}
POSTGRES_DB: mosaic
volumes:
- postgres-data:/var/lib/postgresql/data
networks:
- federated-test
deploy:
replicas: 1
restart_policy:
condition: on-failure
delay: 5s
max_attempts: 3
healthcheck:
test: ['CMD-SHELL', 'pg_isready -U gateway']
interval: 10s
timeout: 5s
retries: 5
start_period: 10s
valkey:
image: valkey/valkey:8-alpine
volumes:
- valkey-data:/data
networks:
- federated-test
deploy:
replicas: 1
restart_policy:
condition: on-failure
delay: 5s
max_attempts: 3
healthcheck:
test: ['CMD', 'valkey-cli', 'ping']
interval: 10s
timeout: 3s
retries: 5
start_period: 5s
volumes:
postgres-data:
valkey-data:
networks:
federated-test:
driver: overlay
traefik-public:
external: true

View File

@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ services:
postgres-federated: postgres-federated:
image: pgvector/pgvector:pg17 image: pgvector/pgvector:pg17
profiles: [federated] profiles: [federated]
restart: unless-stopped
ports: ports:
- '${PG_FEDERATED_HOST_PORT:-5433}:5432' - '${PG_FEDERATED_HOST_PORT:-5433}:5432'
environment: environment:
@@ -45,6 +46,7 @@ services:
valkey-federated: valkey-federated:
image: valkey/valkey:8-alpine image: valkey/valkey:8-alpine
profiles: [federated] profiles: [federated]
restart: unless-stopped
ports: ports:
- '${VALKEY_FEDERATED_HOST_PORT:-6380}:6379' - '${VALKEY_FEDERATED_HOST_PORT:-6380}:6379'
volumes: volumes:
@@ -55,6 +57,64 @@ services:
timeout: 3s timeout: 3s
retries: 5 retries: 5
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Step-CA — Mosaic Federation internal certificate authority
#
# Image: pinned to 0.27.4 (latest stable as of late 2025).
# `latest` is forbidden per Mosaic image policy (immutable tag required for
# reproducible deployments and digest-first promotion in CI).
#
# Profile: `federated` — this service must not start in non-federated dev.
#
# Password:
# Dev: bind-mount ./infra/step-ca/dev-password (gitignored; copy from
# ./infra/step-ca/dev-password.example and customise locally).
# Prod: replace the bind-mount with a Docker secret:
# secrets:
# ca_password:
# external: true
# and reference it as `/run/secrets/ca_password` (same path the
# init script already uses).
#
# Provisioner: "mosaic-fed" (consumed by apps/gateway/src/federation/ca.service.ts)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
step-ca:
image: smallstep/step-ca:0.27.4
profiles: [federated]
restart: unless-stopped
ports:
- '${STEP_CA_HOST_PORT:-9000}:9000'
volumes:
- step_ca_data:/home/step
# init script — executed as the container entrypoint
- ./infra/step-ca/init.sh:/usr/local/bin/mosaic-step-ca-init.sh:ro
# X.509 template skeleton (wired in M2-04)
- ./infra/step-ca/templates:/etc/step-ca-templates:ro
# Dev password file — GITIGNORED; copy from dev-password.example
# In production, replace this with a Docker secret (see comment above).
- ./infra/step-ca/dev-password:/run/secrets/ca_password:ro
entrypoint: ['/bin/sh', '/usr/local/bin/mosaic-step-ca-init.sh']
healthcheck:
# The healthcheck requires the root cert to exist, which is only true
# after init.sh has completed on first boot. start_period gives init
# time to finish before Docker starts counting retries.
test:
[
'CMD',
'step',
'ca',
'health',
'--ca-url',
'https://localhost:9000',
'--root',
'/home/step/certs/root_ca.crt',
]
interval: 10s
timeout: 5s
retries: 5
start_period: 30s
volumes: volumes:
pg_federated_data: pg_federated_data:
valkey_federated_data: valkey_federated_data:
step_ca_data:

View File

@@ -5,18 +5,27 @@ RUN corepack enable
FROM base AS builder FROM base AS builder
WORKDIR /app WORKDIR /app
# Copy workspace manifests first for layer-cached install
COPY pnpm-workspace.yaml pnpm-lock.yaml package.json ./ COPY pnpm-workspace.yaml pnpm-lock.yaml package.json ./
COPY apps/gateway/package.json ./apps/gateway/ COPY apps/gateway/package.json ./apps/gateway/
COPY packages/ ./packages/ COPY packages/ ./packages/
COPY plugins/ ./plugins/
RUN pnpm install --frozen-lockfile RUN pnpm install --frozen-lockfile
COPY . . COPY . .
RUN pnpm --filter @mosaic/gateway build # Build gateway and all of its workspace dependencies via turbo dependency graph
RUN pnpm turbo run build --filter @mosaicstack/gateway...
# Produce a self-contained deploy artifact: flat node_modules, no pnpm symlinks
# --legacy is required for pnpm v10 when inject-workspace-packages is not set
RUN pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/gateway --prod deploy --legacy /deploy
FROM base AS runner FROM base AS runner
WORKDIR /app WORKDIR /app
ENV NODE_ENV=production ENV NODE_ENV=production
# Use the pnpm deploy output — resolves all deps into a flat, self-contained node_modules
COPY --from=builder /deploy/node_modules ./node_modules
COPY --from=builder /deploy/package.json ./package.json
# dist is declared in package.json "files" so pnpm deploy copies it into /deploy;
# copy from builder explicitly as belt-and-suspenders
COPY --from=builder /app/apps/gateway/dist ./dist COPY --from=builder /app/apps/gateway/dist ./dist
COPY --from=builder /app/apps/gateway/package.json ./package.json
COPY --from=builder /app/node_modules ./node_modules
EXPOSE 4000 EXPOSE 4000
CMD ["node", "dist/main.js"] CMD ["node", "dist/main.js"]

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,106 @@
# Mosaic Federation — Admin CLI Reference
Available since: FED-M2
## Grant Management
### Create a grant
```bash
mosaic federation grant create --user <userId> --peer <peerId> --scope <scope-file.json>
```
The scope file defines what resources and rows the peer may access:
```json
{
"resources": ["tasks", "notes"],
"excluded_resources": ["credentials"],
"max_rows_per_query": 100
}
```
Valid resource values: `tasks`, `notes`, `credentials`, `teams`, `users`
### List grants
```bash
mosaic federation grant list [--peer <peerId>] [--status pending|active|revoked|expired]
```
Shows all federation grants, optionally filtered by peer or status.
### Show a grant
```bash
mosaic federation grant show <grantId>
```
Display details of a single grant, including its scope, activation timestamp, and status.
### Revoke a grant
```bash
mosaic federation grant revoke <grantId> [--reason "Reason text"]
```
Revoke an active grant immediately. Revoked grants cannot be reactivated. The optional reason is stored in the audit log.
### Generate enrollment token
```bash
mosaic federation grant token <grantId> [--ttl <seconds>]
```
Generate a single-use enrollment token for the grant. The default TTL is 900 seconds (15 minutes); maximum 15 minutes.
Output includes the token and the full enrollment URL for the peer to use.
## Peer Management
### Add a peer (remote enrollment)
```bash
mosaic federation peer add <enrollment-url>
```
Enroll a remote peer using the enrollment URL obtained from a grant token. The command:
1. Generates a P-256 ECDSA keypair locally
2. Creates a certificate signing request (CSR)
3. Submits the CSR to the enrollment URL
4. Verifies the returned certificate includes the correct custom OIDs (grant ID and subject user ID)
5. Seals the private key at rest using `BETTER_AUTH_SECRET`
6. Stores the peer record and sealed key in the local gateway database
Once enrollment completes, the peer can authenticate using the certificate and private key.
### List peers
```bash
mosaic federation peer list
```
Shows all enrolled peers, including their certificate fingerprints and activation status.
## REST API Reference
All CLI commands call the local gateway admin API. Equivalent REST endpoints:
| CLI Command | REST Endpoint | Method |
| ------------ | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ----------------- |
| grant create | `/api/admin/federation/grants` | POST |
| grant list | `/api/admin/federation/grants` | GET |
| grant show | `/api/admin/federation/grants/:id` | GET |
| grant revoke | `/api/admin/federation/grants/:id/revoke` | PATCH |
| grant token | `/api/admin/federation/grants/:id/tokens` | POST |
| peer list | `/api/admin/federation/peers` | GET |
| peer add | `/api/admin/federation/peers/keypair` + enrollment + `/api/admin/federation/peers/:id/cert` | POST, POST, PATCH |
## Security Notes
- **Enrollment tokens** are single-use and expire in 15 minutes (not configurable beyond 15 minutes)
- **Peer private keys** are encrypted at rest using AES-256-GCM, keyed from `BETTER_AUTH_SECRET`
- **Custom OIDs** in issued certificates are verified post-issuance: the grant ID and subject user ID must match the certificate extensions
- **Grant activation** is atomic — concurrent enrollment attempts for the same grant are rejected
- **Revoked grants** cannot be activated; peers attempting to use a revoked grant's token will be rejected

View File

@@ -7,13 +7,22 @@
**ID:** federation-v1-20260419 **ID:** federation-v1-20260419
**Statement:** Jarvis operates across 34 workstations in two physical locations (home, USC). The user currently reaches back to a single jarvis-brain checkout from every session; a prior OpenBrain attempt caused cache, latency, and opacity pain. This mission builds asymmetric federation between Mosaic Stack gateways so that a session on a user's home gateway can query their work gateway in real time without data ever persisting across the boundary, with full multi-tenant isolation and standard-PKI (X.509 / Step-CA) trust management. **Statement:** Jarvis operates across 34 workstations in two physical locations (home, USC). The user currently reaches back to a single jarvis-brain checkout from every session; a prior OpenBrain attempt caused cache, latency, and opacity pain. This mission builds asymmetric federation between Mosaic Stack gateways so that a session on a user's home gateway can query their work gateway in real time without data ever persisting across the boundary, with full multi-tenant isolation and standard-PKI (X.509 / Step-CA) trust management.
**Phase:** M1 complete — federated tier infrastructure ready for testing **Phase:** M3 active — mTLS handshake + list/get/capabilities verbs + scope enforcement
**Current Milestone:** FED-M2 (next; deferred to mission planning) **Current Milestone:** FED-M3
**Progress:** 1 / 7 milestones **Progress:** 2 / 7 milestones
**Status:** active **Status:** active
**Last Updated:** 2026-04-19 (M1 complete; tag `fed-v0.1.0-m1`) **Last Updated:** 2026-04-21 (M2 closed via PR #503, tag `fed-v0.2.0-m2`, issue #461 closed; M3 decomposed into 14 tasks)
**Parent Mission:** None — new mission **Parent Mission:** None — new mission
## Test Infrastructure
| Host | Role | Image | Tier |
| ----------------------- | ----------------------------------- | ------------------------------------- | --------- |
| `mos-test-1.woltje.com` | Federation Server A (querying side) | `gateway:fed-v0.1.0-m1` (M1 baseline) | federated |
| `mos-test-2.woltje.com` | Federation Server B (serving side) | `gateway:fed-v0.1.0-m1` (M1 baseline) | federated |
These are TEST hosts for federation E2E (M3+). Distinct from PRD AC-12 production targets (`woltje.com``uscllc.com`). Deployment workstream tracked in `docs/federation/TASKS.md` under FED-M2-DEPLOY-\*.
## Context ## Context
Federation is the solution to what originally drove OpenBrain. The prior attempt coupled every agent session to a remote service, introduced cache/latency/opacity pain, and created a hard dependency that punished offline use. This redesign: Federation is the solution to what originally drove OpenBrain. The prior attempt coupled every agent session to a remote service, introduced cache/latency/opacity pain, and created a hard dependency that punished offline use. This redesign:
@@ -54,8 +63,8 @@ Key design references:
| # | ID | Name | Status | Branch | Issue | Started | Completed | | # | ID | Name | Status | Branch | Issue | Started | Completed |
| --- | ------ | --------------------------------------------- | ----------- | ------------------ | ----- | ---------- | ---------- | | --- | ------ | --------------------------------------------- | ----------- | ------------------ | ----- | ---------- | ---------- |
| 1 | FED-M1 | Federated tier infrastructure | done | (12 PRs #470-#481) | #460 | 2026-04-19 | 2026-04-19 | | 1 | FED-M1 | Federated tier infrastructure | done | (12 PRs #470-#481) | #460 | 2026-04-19 | 2026-04-19 |
| 2 | FED-M2 | Step-CA + grant schema + admin CLI | not-started | — | #461 | — | — | | 2 | FED-M2 | Step-CA + grant schema + admin CLI | done | (PRs #483-#503) | #461 | 2026-04-21 | 2026-04-21 |
| 3 | FED-M3 | mTLS handshake + list/get + scope enforcement | not-started | — | #462 | | — | | 3 | FED-M3 | mTLS handshake + list/get + scope enforcement | in-progress | (decomposition) | #462 | 2026-04-21 | — |
| 4 | FED-M4 | search verb + audit log + rate limit | not-started | — | #463 | — | — | | 4 | FED-M4 | search verb + audit log + rate limit | not-started | — | #463 | — | — |
| 5 | FED-M5 | Cache + offline degradation + OTEL | not-started | — | #464 | — | — | | 5 | FED-M5 | Cache + offline degradation + OTEL | not-started | — | #464 | — | — |
| 6 | FED-M6 | Revocation + auto-renewal + CRL | not-started | — | #465 | — | — | | 6 | FED-M6 | Revocation + auto-renewal + CRL | not-started | — | #465 | — | — |
@@ -76,13 +85,24 @@ Key design references:
## Session History ## Session History
| Session | Date | Runtime | Outcome | | Session | Date | Runtime | Outcome |
| ------- | ---------- | ------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------- | | ------- | ----------------------- | ------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| S1 | 2026-04-19 | claude | PRD authored, MILESTONES decomposed, 7 issues filed | | S1 | 2026-04-19 | claude | PRD authored, MILESTONES decomposed, 7 issues filed |
| S2-S4 | 2026-04-19 | claude | FED-M1 complete: 12 tasks (PRs #470-#481) merged; tag `fed-v0.1.0-m1` | | S2-S4 | 2026-04-19 | claude | FED-M1 complete: 12 tasks (PRs #470-#481) merged; tag `fed-v0.1.0-m1` |
| S5-S22 | 2026-04-19 → 2026-04-21 | claude | FED-M2 complete: 13 tasks (PRs #483-#503) merged; tag `fed-v0.2.0-m2`; issue #461 closed. Step-CA + grant schema + admin CLI shipped. |
| S23 | 2026-04-21 | claude | M3 decomposed into 14 tasks in `docs/federation/TASKS.md`. Manifest M3 row → in-progress. Next: kickoff M3-01. |
## Next Step ## Next Step
FED-M1 complete (12 PRs #470-#481, tag `fed-v0.1.0-m1`). Federated tier infrastructure is testable end-to-end: see `docs/federation/SETUP.md` and `docs/guides/migrate-tier.md`. FED-M3 active. Decomposition landed in `docs/federation/TASKS.md` (M3-01..M3-14, ~100K estimate). Tracking issue #462.
Begin FED-M2 (Step-CA + grant schema + admin CLI) when planning is greenlit. Issue #461 tracks scope; orchestrator decomposes M2 into per-task rows in `docs/federation/TASKS.md` at the start of M2. Execution plan (parallel where possible):
- **Foundation**: M3-01 (DTOs in `packages/types/src/federation/`) starts immediately — sonnet subagent on `feat/federation-m3-types`. Blocks all server + client work.
- **Server stream** (after M3-01): M3-03 (AuthGuard) + M3-04 (ScopeService) in series, then M3-05 / M3-06 / M3-07 (verbs) in parallel.
- **Client stream** (after M3-01, parallel with server): M3-08 (FederationClient) → M3-09 (QuerySourceService).
- **Harness** (parallel with everything): M3-02 (`tools/federation-harness/`) — needed for M3-11.
- **Test gates**: M3-10 (Integration) → M3-11 (E2E with harness) → M3-12 (Independent security review, two rounds budgeted).
- **Close**: M3-13 (Docs) → M3-14 (release tag `fed-v0.3.0-m3`, close #462).
**Test-bed fallback:** `mos-test-1/-2` deploy is still blocked on `FED-M2-DEPLOY-IMG-FIX`. The harness in M3-02 ships a local two-gateway docker-compose so M3-11 is not blocked. Production-host validation is M7's responsibility (PRD AC-12).

View File

@@ -70,6 +70,96 @@ For JSON output (useful in CI/automation):
mosaic gateway doctor --json mosaic gateway doctor --json
``` ```
## Step 2: Step-CA Bootstrap
Step-CA is a certificate authority that issues X.509 certificates for federation peers. In Mosaic federation, it signs peer certificates with custom OIDs that embed grant and user identities, enforcing authorization at the certificate level.
### Prerequisites for Step-CA
Before starting the CA, you must set up the dev password:
```bash
cp infra/step-ca/dev-password.example infra/step-ca/dev-password
# Edit dev-password and set your CA password (minimum 16 characters)
```
The password is required for the CA to boot and derive the provisioner key used by the gateway.
### Start the Step-CA service
Add the step-ca service to your federated stack:
```bash
docker compose -f docker-compose.federated.yml --profile federated up -d step-ca
```
On first boot, the init script (`infra/step-ca/init.sh`) runs automatically. It:
- Generates the CA root key and certificate in the Docker volume
- Creates the `mosaic-fed` JWK provisioner
- Applies the X.509 template from `infra/step-ca/templates/federation.tpl`
The volume is persistent, so subsequent boots reuse the existing CA keys.
Verify the CA is healthy:
```bash
curl https://localhost:9000/health --cacert /tmp/step-ca-root.crt
```
(If the root cert file doesn't exist yet, see the extraction steps below.)
### Extract credentials for the gateway
The gateway requires two credentials from the running CA:
**1. Provisioner key (for `STEP_CA_PROVISIONER_KEY_JSON`)**
```bash
docker exec $(docker ps -qf name=step-ca) cat /home/step/secrets/mosaic-fed.json > /tmp/step-ca-provisioner.json
```
This JSON file contains the JWK public and private keys for the `mosaic-fed` provisioner. Store it securely and pass its contents to the gateway via the `STEP_CA_PROVISIONER_KEY_JSON` environment variable.
**2. Root certificate (for `STEP_CA_ROOT_CERT_PATH`)**
```bash
docker cp $(docker ps -qf name=step-ca):/home/step/certs/root_ca.crt /tmp/step-ca-root.crt
```
This PEM file is the CA's root certificate, used to verify peer certificates issued by step-ca. Pass its path to the gateway via `STEP_CA_ROOT_CERT_PATH`.
### Custom OID Registry
Federation certificates include custom OIDs in the certificate extension. These encode authorization metadata:
| OID | Name | Description |
| ------------------- | ---------------------- | --------------------- |
| 1.3.6.1.4.1.99999.1 | mosaic_grant_id | Federation grant UUID |
| 1.3.6.1.4.1.99999.2 | mosaic_subject_user_id | Subject user UUID |
These OIDs are verified by the gateway after the CSR is signed, ensuring the certificate was issued with the correct grant and user context.
### Environment Variables
Configure the gateway with the following environment variables before startup:
| Variable | Required | Description |
| ------------------------------ | -------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| `STEP_CA_URL` | Yes | Base URL of the step-ca instance, e.g. `https://step-ca:9000` (use `https://localhost:9000` in local dev) |
| `STEP_CA_PROVISIONER_KEY_JSON` | Yes | JSON-encoded JWK from `/home/step/secrets/mosaic-fed.json` |
| `STEP_CA_ROOT_CERT_PATH` | Yes | Absolute path to the root CA certificate (e.g. `/tmp/step-ca-root.crt`) |
| `BETTER_AUTH_SECRET` | Yes | Secret used to seal peer private keys at rest; already required for M1 |
Example environment setup:
```bash
export STEP_CA_URL="https://localhost:9000"
export STEP_CA_PROVISIONER_KEY_JSON="$(cat /tmp/step-ca-provisioner.json)"
export STEP_CA_ROOT_CERT_PATH="/tmp/step-ca-root.crt"
export BETTER_AUTH_SECRET="<your-secret>"
```
## Troubleshooting ## Troubleshooting
### Port conflicts ### Port conflicts
@@ -117,3 +207,74 @@ docker compose -f docker-compose.federated.yml logs valkey-federated
``` ```
If Valkey is running, verify your firewall allows 6380. On macOS, Docker Desktop may require binding to `host.docker.internal` instead of `localhost`. If Valkey is running, verify your firewall allows 6380. On macOS, Docker Desktop may require binding to `host.docker.internal` instead of `localhost`.
## Key rotation (deferred)
Federation peer private keys (`federation_peers.client_key_pem`) are sealed at rest using AES-256-GCM with a key derived from `BETTER_AUTH_SECRET` via SHA-256. If `BETTER_AUTH_SECRET` is rotated, all sealed `client_key_pem` values in the database become unreadable and must be re-sealed with the new key before rotation completes.
The full key rotation procedure (decrypt all rows with old key, re-encrypt with new key, atomically swap the secret) is out of scope for M2. Operators must not rotate `BETTER_AUTH_SECRET` without a migration plan for all sealed federation peer keys.
## OID Assignments — Mosaic Internal OID Arc
Mosaic uses the private enterprise arc `1.3.6.1.4.1.99999` for custom X.509
certificate extensions in federation grant certificates.
**IMPORTANT:** This is a development/internal OID arc. Before deploying to a
production environment accessible by external parties, register a proper IANA
Private Enterprise Number (PEN) at <https://pen.iana.org/pen/PenApplication.page>
and update these assignments accordingly.
### Assigned OIDs
| OID | Symbolic name | Description |
| --------------------- | --------------------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------- |
| `1.3.6.1.4.1.99999.1` | `mosaic.federation.grantId` | UUID of the `federation_grants` row authorising this cert |
| `1.3.6.1.4.1.99999.2` | `mosaic.federation.subjectUserId` | UUID of the local user on whose behalf the cert is issued |
### Encoding
Each extension value is DER-encoded as an ASN.1 **UTF8String**:
```
Tag 0x0C (UTF8String)
Length 0x24 (36 decimal — fixed length of a UUID string)
Value <36 ASCII bytes of the UUID>
```
The step-ca X.509 template at `infra/step-ca/templates/federation.tpl`
produces this encoding via the Go template expression:
```
{{ printf "\x0c\x24%s" .Token.mosaic_grant_id | b64enc }}
```
The resulting base64 value is passed as the `value` field of the extension
object in the template JSON.
### CA Environment Variables
The `CaService` (`apps/gateway/src/federation/ca.service.ts`) requires the
following environment variables at gateway startup:
| Variable | Required | Description |
| ------------------------------ | -------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| `STEP_CA_URL` | Yes | Base URL of the step-ca instance, e.g. `https://step-ca:9000` |
| `STEP_CA_PROVISIONER_PASSWORD` | Yes | JWK provisioner password for the `mosaic-fed` provisioner |
| `STEP_CA_PROVISIONER_KEY_JSON` | Yes | JSON-encoded JWK (public + private) for the `mosaic-fed` provisioner |
| `STEP_CA_ROOT_CERT_PATH` | Yes | Absolute path to the step-ca root CA certificate PEM file |
Set these variables in your environment or secret manager before starting
the gateway. In the federated Docker Compose stack they are expected to be
injected via Docker secrets and environment variable overrides.
### Fail-loud contract
The CA service (and the X.509 template) are designed to fail loudly if the
custom OIDs cannot be embedded:
- The template produces a malformed extension value (zero-length UTF8String
body) when the JWT claims `mosaic_grant_id` or `mosaic_subject_user_id` are
absent. step-ca rejects the CSR rather than issuing a cert without the OIDs.
- `CaService.issueCert()` throws a `CaServiceError` on every error path with
a human-readable `remediation` string. It never silently returns a cert that
may be missing the required extensions.

View File

@@ -36,13 +36,87 @@ Goal: Gateway runs in `federated` tier with containerized PG+pgvector+Valkey. No
--- ---
## Pre-M2 — Test deployment infrastructure (FED-M2-DEPLOY)
Goal: Two federated-tier gateways stood up on Portainer at `mos-test-1.woltje.com` and `mos-test-2.woltje.com` running the M1 release (`gateway:fed-v0.1.0-m1`). This is the test bed for M2 enrollment work and the M3 federation E2E harness. No federation logic exercised yet — pure infrastructure validation.
> **Why now:** M2 enrollment requires a real second gateway to test peer-add flows; standing the test hosts up before M2 code lands gives both code and deployment streams a fast feedback loop.
> **Parallelizable:** This workstream runs in parallel with the M2 code workstream (M2-01 → M2-13). They re-converge at M2-10 (E2E test).
> **Tracking issue:** #482.
| id | status | description | issue | agent | branch | depends_on | estimate | notes |
| --------------------- | ----------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ----- | ------ | ------------------------------------- | ------------ | -------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| FED-M2-DEPLOY-01 | done | Verify `gateway:fed-v0.1.0-m1` image was published by `.woodpecker/publish.yml` on tag push; if not, investigate and remediate. Document image URI in deployment artifact. | #482 | sonnet | (verified inline, no PR) | — | 2K | Tag exists; digest `sha256:9b72e202a9eecc27d31920b87b475b9e96e483c0323acc57856be4b1355db1ec` captured for digest-pinned deploys. |
| FED-M2-DEPLOY-02 | done | Author Portainer git-stack compose file `deploy/portainer/federated-test.stack.yml` (gateway + PG-pgvector + Valkey, env-driven). Use immutable tag, not `latest`. | #482 | sonnet | feat/federation-deploy-stack-template | DEPLOY-01 | 5K | Shipped in PR #485. Digest-pinned. Env: STACK_NAME, HOST_FQDN, POSTGRES_PASSWORD, BETTER_AUTH_SECRET, BETTER_AUTH_URL. |
| FED-M2-DEPLOY-IMG-FIX | in-progress | Gateway image runtime broken (ERR_MODULE_NOT_FOUND for `dotenv`); Dockerfile copies `.pnpm/` store but not `apps/gateway/node_modules` symlinks. Switch to `pnpm deploy` for self-contained runtime. | #482 | sonnet | (subagent in flight) | DEPLOY-02 | 4K | Subagent `a78a9ab0ddae91fbc` in flight. Triggers Kaniko rebuild on merge; capture new digest; bump stack template in follow-up PR before redeploy. |
| FED-M2-DEPLOY-03 | blocked | Deploy stack to mos-test-1.woltje.com via `~/.config/mosaic/tools/portainer/`. Verify M1 acceptance: federated-tier boot succeeds; `mosaic gateway doctor --json` returns green; pgvector `vector(3)` round-trip works. | #482 | sonnet | feat/federation-deploy-test-1 | IMG-FIX | 3K | Stack created on Portainer endpoint 3 (Swarm `local`), but blocked on image fix. Container fails on boot until IMG-FIX merges + redeploy. |
| FED-M2-DEPLOY-04 | blocked | Deploy stack to mos-test-2.woltje.com via Portainer wrapper. Same M1 acceptance probes as DEPLOY-03. | #482 | sonnet | feat/federation-deploy-test-2 | IMG-FIX | 3K | Same status as DEPLOY-03. Stack created; blocked on image fix. |
| FED-M2-DEPLOY-05 | not-started | Document deployment in `docs/federation/TEST-INFRA.md`: hosts, image tags, secrets sourcing, redeploy procedure, teardown. Update MISSION-MANIFEST with deployment status. | #482 | haiku | feat/federation-deploy-docs | DEPLOY-03,04 | 3K | Operator-facing doc; mentions but does not duplicate `tools/portainer/README.md`. |
**Deploy workstream estimate:** ~16K tokens
---
## Milestone 2 — Step-CA + grant schema + admin CLI (FED-M2) ## Milestone 2 — Step-CA + grant schema + admin CLI (FED-M2)
_Deferred to mission planning when M1 is complete. Issue #461 tracks scope._ Goal: An admin can create a federation grant; counterparty enrolls; cert is signed by Step-CA with SAN OIDs for `grantId` + `subjectUserId`. No runtime federation traffic flows yet (that's M3).
| id | status | description | issue | agent | branch | depends_on | estimate | notes |
| --------- | ------ | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | ----- | ------ | ---------------------------------- | ---------------- | -------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
| FED-M2-01 | done | DB migration: `federation_grants`, `federation_peers`, `federation_audit_log` tables + enum types (`grant_status`, `peer_state`). Drizzle schema + migration generation; migration tests. | #461 | sonnet | feat/federation-m2-schema | — | 5K | Shipped in PR #486. DESC indexes + reserved cols added after first review; migration tests green. |
| FED-M2-02 | done | Add Step-CA sidecar to `docker-compose.federated.yml`: official `smallstep/step-ca` image, persistent CA volume, JWK provisioner config baked into init script. | #461 | sonnet | feat/federation-m2-stepca | DEPLOY-02 | 4K | Shipped in PR #494. Profile-gated under `federated`; CA password from secret; dev compose uses dev-only password file. |
| FED-M2-03 | done | Scope JSON schema + validator: `resources` allowlist, `excluded_resources`, `include_teams`, `include_personal`, `max_rows_per_query`. Vitest unit tests for valid + invalid scopes. | #461 | sonnet | feat/federation-m2-scope-schema | — | 4K | Shipped in PR #496 (bundled with grants service). Validator independent of CA; reusable from grant CRUD + M3 scope enforcement. |
| FED-M2-04 | done | `apps/gateway/src/federation/ca.service.ts`: Step-CA client (CSR submission, OID-bearing cert retrieval). Mocked + integration tests against real Step-CA container. | #461 | sonnet | feat/federation-m2-ca-service | M2-02 | 6K | Shipped in PR #494. SAN OIDs 1.3.6.1.4.1.99999.1 (grantId) + 1.3.6.1.4.1.99999.2 (subjectUserId); integration test asserts both OIDs present in issued cert. |
| FED-M2-05 | done | Sealed storage for `client_key_pem` reusing existing `provider_credentials` sealing key. Tests prove DB-at-rest is ciphertext, not PEM. Key rotation path documented (deferred impl). | #461 | sonnet | feat/federation-m2-key-sealing | M2-01 | 5K | Shipped in PR #495. Crypto seam isolated; tests confirm ciphertext-at-rest; key rotation deferred to M6. |
| FED-M2-06 | done | `grants.service.ts`: CRUD + status transitions (`pending``active``revoked`); integrates M2-03 (scope) + M2-05 (sealing). Unit tests cover all transitions including invalid ones. | #461 | sonnet | feat/federation-m2-grants-service | M2-03, M2-05 | 6K | Shipped in PR #496. All status transitions covered; invalid transition tests green; revocation handler deferred to M6. |
| FED-M2-07 | done | `enrollment.controller.ts`: short-lived single-use token endpoint; CSR signing; updates grant `pending``active`; emits enrollment audit (table-only write, M4 tightens). | #461 | sonnet | feat/federation-m2-enrollment | M2-04, M2-06 | 6K | Shipped in PR #497. Tokens single-use with 410 on replay; TTL 15min; rate-limited at request layer. |
| FED-M2-08 | done | Admin CLI: `mosaic federation grant create/list/show` + `peer add/list`. Integration with grants.service (no API duplication). Help output + machine-readable JSON option. | #461 | sonnet | feat/federation-m2-cli | M2-06, M2-07 | 7K | Shipped in PR #498. `peer add <enrollment-url>` client-side flow; JSON output flag; admin REST controller co-shipped. |
| FED-M2-09 | done | Integration tests covering MILESTONES.md M2 acceptance tests #1, #2, #3, #5, #7, #8 (single-gateway suite). Real Step-CA container; vitest profile gated by `FEDERATED_INTEGRATION=1`. | #461 | sonnet | feat/federation-m2-integration | M2-08 | 8K | Shipped in PR #499. All 6 acceptance tests green; gated by FEDERATED_INTEGRATION=1. |
| FED-M2-10 | done | E2E test against deployed mos-test-1 + mos-test-2 (or local two-gateway docker-compose if Portainer not ready): MILESTONES test #6 `peer add` yields `active` peer record with valid cert + key. | #461 | sonnet | feat/federation-m2-e2e | M2-08, DEPLOY-04 | 6K | Shipped in PR #500. Local two-gateway docker-compose path used; `peer add` yields active peer with valid cert + sealed key. |
| FED-M2-11 | done | Independent security review (sonnet, not author of M2-04/05/06/07): focus on single-use token replay, sealing leak surfaces, OID match enforcement, scope schema bypass paths. | #461 | sonnet | feat/federation-m2-security-review | M2-10 | 8K | Shipped in PR #501. Two-round review; enrollment-token replay, OID-spoofing CSR, and key leak in error messages all verified and hardened. |
| FED-M2-12 | done | Docs update: `docs/federation/SETUP.md` Step-CA section; new `docs/federation/ADMIN-CLI.md` with grant/peer commands; scope schema reference; OID registration note. Runbook still M7-deferred. | #461 | haiku | feat/federation-m2-docs | M2-11 | 4K | Shipped in PR #502. SETUP.md CA bootstrap section added; ADMIN-CLI.md created; scope schema reference and OID note included. |
| FED-M2-13 | done | PR aggregate close, CI green, merge to main, close #461. Release tag `fed-v0.2.0-m2`. Mark deploy stream complete. Update mission manifest M2 row. | #461 | sonnet | chore/federation-m2-close | M2-12 | 3K | Release tag `fed-v0.2.0-m2` created; issue #461 closed; all M2 PRs #494#502 merged to main. |
**M2 code workstream estimate:** ~72K tokens (vs MILESTONES.md 30K — same over-budget pattern as M1, where per-task breakdown including tests/review/docs catches the real cost).
**Deploy + code combined:** ~88K tokens.
## Milestone 3 — mTLS handshake + list/get + scope enforcement (FED-M3) ## Milestone 3 — mTLS handshake + list/get + scope enforcement (FED-M3)
_Deferred. Issue #462._ Goal: Two federated gateways exchange real data over mTLS. Inbound requests pass through cert validation → grant lookup → scope enforcement → native RBAC → response. `list`, `get`, and `capabilities` verbs land. The federation E2E harness (`tools/federation-harness/`) is the new permanent test bed for M3+ and is gated on every milestone going forward.
> **Critical trust boundary.** Every 401/403 path needs a test. Code review is non-negotiable; M3-12 budgets two review rounds.
>
> **Tracking issue:** #462.
| id | status | description | issue | agent | branch | depends_on | estimate | notes |
| --------- | ----------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | ----- | ------ | ------------------------------------ | ---------------- | -------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| FED-M3-01 | not-started | `packages/types/src/federation/` — request/response DTOs for `list`, `get`, `capabilities` verbs. Wire-format zod schemas + inferred TS types. Includes `FederationRequest`, `FederationListResponse<T>`, `FederationGetResponse<T>`, `FederationCapabilitiesResponse`, error envelope, `_source` tag. | #462 | sonnet | feat/federation-m3-types | — | 4K | Reusable from gateway server + client + harness. Pure types — no I/O, no NestJS. |
| FED-M3-02 | not-started | `tools/federation-harness/` scaffold: `docker-compose.two-gateways.yml` (Server A + Server B + step-CA), `seed.ts` (provisions grants, peers, sample tasks/notes/credentials per scope variant), `harness.ts` helper (boots stack, returns typed clients). README documents harness use. | #462 | sonnet | feat/federation-m3-harness | DEPLOY-04 (soft) | 8K | Falls back to local docker-compose if `mos-test-1/-2` not yet redeployed (DEPLOY chain blocked on IMG-FIX). Permanent test infra used by M3+. |
| FED-M3-03 | not-started | `apps/gateway/src/federation/server/federation-auth.guard.ts` (NestJS guard). Validates inbound client cert from Fastify TLS context, extracts `grantId` + `subjectUserId` from custom OIDs, loads grant from DB, asserts `status='active'`, attaches `FederationContext` to request. | #462 | sonnet | feat/federation-m3-auth-guard | M3-01 | 8K | Reuses OID parsing logic mirrored from `ca.service.ts` post-issuance verification. 401 on malformed/missing OIDs; 403 on revoked/expired/missing grant. |
| FED-M3-04 | not-started | `apps/gateway/src/federation/server/scope.service.ts`. Pipeline: (1) resource allowlist + excluded check, (2) native RBAC eval as `subjectUserId`, (3) scope filter intersection (`include_teams`, `include_personal`), (4) `max_rows_per_query` cap. Pure service — DB calls injected. | #462 | sonnet | feat/federation-m3-scope-service | M3-01 | 10K | Hardest correctness target in M3. Reuses `parseFederationScope` (M2-03). Returns either `{ allowed: true, filter }` or structured deny reason for audit. |
| FED-M3-05 | not-started | `apps/gateway/src/federation/server/verbs/list.controller.ts`. Wires AuthGuard → ScopeService → tasks/notes/memory query layer; applies row cap; tags rows with `_source`. Resource selector via path param. | #462 | sonnet | feat/federation-m3-verb-list | M3-03, M3-04 | 6K | Routes: `POST /api/federation/v1/list/:resource`. No body persistence. Audit write deferred to M4. |
| FED-M3-06 | not-started | `apps/gateway/src/federation/server/verbs/get.controller.ts`. Single-resource fetch by id; same pipeline as list. 404 on not-found, 403 on RBAC/scope deny — both audited the same way. | #462 | sonnet | feat/federation-m3-verb-get | M3-03, M3-04 | 6K | `POST /api/federation/v1/get/:resource/:id`. Mirrors list controller patterns. |
| FED-M3-07 | not-started | `apps/gateway/src/federation/server/verbs/capabilities.controller.ts`. Read-only enumeration: returns `{ resources, excluded_resources, max_rows_per_query, supported_verbs }` derived from grant scope. Always allowed for an active grant — no RBAC eval. | #462 | sonnet | feat/federation-m3-verb-capabilities | M3-03 | 4K | `GET /api/federation/v1/capabilities`. Smallest verb; useful sanity check that mTLS + auth guard work end-to-end. |
| FED-M3-08 | not-started | `apps/gateway/src/federation/client/federation-client.service.ts`. Outbound mTLS dialer: picks `(certPem, sealed clientKey)` from `federation_peers`, unwraps key, builds undici Agent with mTLS, calls peer verb, parses typed response, wraps non-2xx into `FederationClientError`. | #462 | sonnet | feat/federation-m3-client | M3-01 | 8K | Independent of server stream — can land in parallel with M3-03/04. Cert/key cached per-peer; flushed by future M5/M6 logic. |
| FED-M3-09 | not-started | `apps/gateway/src/federation/client/query-source.service.ts`. Accepts `source: "local" \| "federated:<host>" \| "all"` from gateway query layer; for `"all"` fans out to local + each peer in parallel; merges results; tags every row with `_source`. | #462 | sonnet | feat/federation-m3-query-source | M3-08 | 8K | Per-peer failure surfaces as `_partial: true` in response, not hard failure (sets up M5 offline UX). M5 adds caching + circuit breaker on top. |
| FED-M3-10 | not-started | Integration tests for MILESTONES.md M3 acceptance #6 (malformed OIDs → 401; valid cert + revoked grant → 403) and #7 (`max_rows_per_query` cap). Real PG, mocked TLS context (Fastify req shim). | #462 | sonnet | feat/federation-m3-integration | M3-05, M3-06 | 8K | Vitest profile gated by `FEDERATED_INTEGRATION=1`. Single-gateway suite; no harness required. |
| FED-M3-11 | not-started | E2E tests for MILESTONES.md M3 acceptance #1, #2, #3, #4, #5, #8, #9, #10 (8 cases). Uses harness from M3-02; two real gateways, real Step-CA, real mTLS. Each test asserts both happy-path response and audit/no-persist invariants. | #462 | sonnet | feat/federation-m3-e2e | M3-02, M3-09 | 12K | Largest single task. Each acceptance gets its own `it(...)` for clear failure attribution. |
| FED-M3-12 | not-started | Independent security review (sonnet, not author of M3-03/04/05/06/07/08/09): focus on cert-SAN spoofing, OID extraction edge cases, scope-bypass via filter manipulation, RBAC-bypass via subjectUser swap, response leakage when scope deny. | #462 | sonnet | feat/federation-m3-security-review | M3-11 | 10K | Two review rounds budgeted. PRD requires explicit test for every 401/403 path — review verifies coverage. |
| FED-M3-13 | not-started | Docs update: `docs/federation/SETUP.md` mTLS handshake section, new `docs/federation/HARNESS.md` for federation-harness usage, OID reference table in SETUP.md, scope enforcement pipeline diagram. Runbook still M7-deferred. | #462 | haiku | feat/federation-m3-docs | M3-12 | 5K | One ASCII diagram for the auth-guard → scope → RBAC pipeline; helps future reviewers reason about denial paths. |
| FED-M3-14 | not-started | PR aggregate close, CI green, merge to main, close #462. Release tag `fed-v0.3.0-m3`. Update mission manifest M3 row → done; M4 row → in-progress when work begins. | #462 | sonnet | chore/federation-m3-close | M3-13 | 3K | Same close pattern as M1-12 / M2-13. |
**M3 estimate:** ~100K tokens (vs MILESTONES.md 40K — same per-task breakdown pattern as M1/M2: tests, review, and docs split out from implementation cost). Largest milestone in the federation mission.
**Parallelization opportunities:**
- M3-08 (client) can land in parallel with M3-03/M3-04 (server pipeline) — they only share DTOs from M3-01.
- M3-02 (harness) can land in parallel with everything except M3-11.
- M3-05/M3-06/M3-07 (verbs) are independent of each other once M3-03/M3-04 land.
**Test bed fallback:** If `mos-test-1.woltje.com` / `mos-test-2.woltje.com` are still blocked on `FED-M2-DEPLOY-IMG-FIX` when M3-11 is ready to run, the harness's local `docker-compose.two-gateways.yml` is a sufficient stand-in. Production-host validation moves to M7 acceptance suite (PRD AC-12).
## Milestone 4 — search + audit + rate limit (FED-M4) ## Milestone 4 — search + audit + rate limit (FED-M4)

View File

@@ -523,3 +523,133 @@ Independent security review surfaced three high-impact and four medium findings;
- #8: confirm `packages/config/dist` not git-tracked - #8: confirm `packages/config/dist` not git-tracked
**Next mission step:** FED-M2 (Step-CA + grant schema + admin CLI). Per TASKS.md scope rule, M2 will be decomposed when it enters active planning. Issue #461 tracks scope. **Next mission step:** FED-M2 (Step-CA + grant schema + admin CLI). Per TASKS.md scope rule, M2 will be decomposed when it enters active planning. Issue #461 tracks scope.
## Session 20 — 2026-04-21 — FED-M2 kickoff
### Decisions
- **Workstream split**: parallel CODE (M2-01..M2-13, ~72K) + DEPLOY (DEPLOY-01..DEPLOY-05, ~16K) tracks; re-converge at M2-10 E2E.
- **Test hosts**: `mos-test-1.woltje.com` (querying side / Server A), `mos-test-2.woltje.com` (serving side / Server B). Wildcard `*.woltje.com` A→174.137.97.162 already exists; Traefik wildcard cert covers both subdomains. No DNS or cert work needed pre-deploy.
- **Portainer access**: requires `PORTAINER_INSECURE=1` flag added to mosaic wrappers (self-signed cert at `https://10.1.1.43:9443`). PR pending on `feat/mosaic-portainer-tls-flag`.
- **Image policy**: deploy by digest (immutable) per Mosaic policy. `gateway:fed-v0.1.0-m1` digest = `sha256:9b72e202a9eecc27d31920b87b475b9e96e483c0323acc57856be4b1355db1ec`.
### DEPLOY-01 — image manifest verified
- Tag `fed-v0.1.0-m1` exists at `git.mosaicstack.dev/mosaicstack/stack/gateway`
- Digest: `sha256:9b72e202a9eecc27d31920b87b475b9e96e483c0323acc57856be4b1355db1ec`
- 9 layers, ~530MB total
- Use this digest in DEPLOY-02 stack template (do NOT reference `:fed-v0.1.0-m1` tag in stack — pin to digest)
### Registry auth note
- Gitea container registry uses Bearer token flow (`/v2/token?service=container_registry&scope=repository:<repo>:pull`)
- Username: `jarvis` (NOT `mosaicstack`); password: `gitea.mosaicstack.token` from credentials.json
- Direct `Authorization: Bearer <pat>` does NOT work — must exchange PAT for registry token first
### Active PRs
- #483 — docs: M2 mission planning (TASKS decomposition + manifest update) — CI running
- (pending) `feat/mosaic-portainer-tls-flag` — wrapper PORTAINER_INSECURE flag (sonnet subagent in progress)
- (pending) `feat/federation-m2-schema` — FED-M2-01 DB schema migration (sonnet subagent in progress)
### MISSION-MANIFEST layout fix
- Initial M2 commit had Test Infrastructure block inserted by lint-staged prettier between "Last Updated" and "Parent Mission" — split mission frontmatter
- Fixed in 3d001fdb: moved Parent Mission back to frontmatter, kept Test Infrastructure as standalone H2 between Mission and Context
## Session 21 — 2026-04-21/22 — DEPLOY-02 merged, gateway image bug discovered, M2-01 in remediation
### PRs merged
- **#483** — docs(federation): M2 mission planning (TASKS decomposition + manifest update)
- **#484** — feat(mosaic-portainer): PORTAINER_INSECURE flag for self-signed TLS (wrapper sync to `~/.config/mosaic/tools/portainer/` done manually due to broken `mosaic upgrade` `set -o pipefail` on dash)
- **#485** — feat(deploy): portainer stack template `deploy/portainer/federated-test.stack.yml` for federation test instances [DEPLOY-02]
### Stack deployed (mos-test-1, mos-test-2)
- Both stacks created on Portainer endpoint 3 (`local` Swarm @ 10.1.1.43, the only endpoint with traefik-public + woltje.com wildcard cert)
- Swarm ID `l7z67tfpd4bvj4979ufpkyi50`
- Image pinned to digest `sha256:9b72e202a9eecc27d31920b87b475b9e96e483c0323acc57856be4b1355db1ec`
- Traefik labels target `${HOST_FQDN}` per env
### CRITICAL FINDING — gateway image runtime-broken
- `docker run` against `gateway:fed-v0.1.0-m1` fails immediately:
`Error [ERR_MODULE_NOT_FOUND]: Cannot find package 'dotenv' imported from /app/dist/main.js`
- Root cause: `docker/gateway.Dockerfile` copies `/app/node_modules` from builder — but pnpm puts deps in the content-addressed `.pnpm/` store with symlinks at `apps/gateway/node_modules/*`. The runner stage misses the symlinks → Node can't resolve workspace deps.
- M1 release was never runtime-tested as a stripped container; CI passed because tests run in dev tree where pnpm symlinks are intact.
- **Fix in flight** (subagent `a78a9ab0ddae91fbc`): switch builder to `pnpm --filter @mosaic/gateway --prod deploy /deploy`, then runner copies `/deploy/node_modules` + `/deploy/dist` + `/deploy/package.json`.
### M2-01 schema review verdict — NEEDS CHANGES
- PR #486 (`feat/federation-m2-schema`) — independent reviewer (sonnet) found 2 real issues:
1. `federation_audit_log` time-range indexes missing `.desc()` on `created_at` (3 places)
2. Reserved columns missing per TASKS.md M2-01 spec: `query_hash`, `outcome`, `bytes_out` (M4 will write; spec said reserve now)
- Also notes (advisory): subject_user_id correctly `text` (matches BetterAuth users.id; spec defect, not code defect); peer→grant cascade test not present (would be trivial to add)
- **Remediation in flight** (subagent `a673dd9355dc26f82` in worktree `agent-a4404ac1`): apply DESC + reserved cols, regenerate migration in place (preferred) or stack 0009 (fallback), force-push, post PR comment.
### Process notes
- Branch race incident: schema subagent + wrapper subagent both ran in main checkout → schema files appeared on wrapper branch. Recovered by TaskStop, `git checkout --` to clean, respawned schema subagent with `isolation: "worktree"`. **Rule going forward:** any subagent doing code edits gets `isolation: "worktree"` unless work is single-file and the orchestrator confirms no other branch will touch overlapping files.
- `pr-create.sh` shell-quotes backticks badly → use `tea pr create --repo mosaicstack/stack` directly (matches CLI-skill behavior). Will leave a followup to harden pr-create.sh.
- Gitea registry auth: bearer-token exchange flow (`/v2/token?service=container_registry&scope=repository:<repo>:pull`) — direct `Authorization: Bearer <pat>` returns 401.
- Portainer Swarm stack create endpoint: `POST /api/stacks/create/swarm/string?endpointId=<id>` (NOT `/api/stacks?type=1` — deprecated and rejected with 400).
### In-flight at compaction boundary
- Subagent `a78a9ab0ddae91fbc` — Dockerfile pnpm-deploy fix → PR (not yet opened at handoff)
- Subagent `a673dd9355dc26f82` — M2-01 schema remediation (DESC + reserved cols) → force-push to PR #486
- Both will trigger CI; orchestrator must independently re-review fixes (especially the security-adjacent schema work) per "always verify subagent claims" rule.
### Next after subagents return
1. Independent re-review of schema remediation (different subagent, fresh context)
2. Merge #486 if green
3. Merge Dockerfile fix PR if green → triggers Kaniko CI rebuild → capture new digest
4. Update `deploy/portainer/federated-test.stack.yml` to new digest in a small PR
5. Redeploy mos-test-1 + mos-test-2 (Portainer stack update via API)
6. Verify HTTPS reachability + `/health` endpoint at both hosts
7. DEPLOY-03/04 acceptance probes (`mosaic gateway doctor --json`, pgvector `vector(3)` round-trip)
8. DEPLOY-05: author `docs/federation/TEST-INFRA.md`
9. M2-02 (Step-CA sidecar) kicks off after image health is green
### Session 23 — 2026-04-21 — M2 close + M3 decomposition
**Closed at compaction boundary:** all 13 M2 tasks done, PRs #494#503 merged to `main`, tag `fed-v0.2.0-m2` published, Gitea release notes posted, issue #461 closed. Main at `4ece6dc6`.
**M2 hardening landed in PR #501** (security review remediation):
- CRIT-1: post-issuance OID verification in `ca.service.ts` (rejects cert if `mosaic_grant_id` / `mosaic_subject_user_id` extensions missing or mismatched)
- CRIT-2: atomic activation guard `WHERE status='pending'` on grant + `WHERE state='pending'` on peer; throws `ConflictException` if lost race
- HIGH-2: removed try/catch fallback in `extractCertNotAfter` — parse failures propagate as 500 (no silent 90-day default)
- HIGH-4: token slice for logging (`${token.slice(0, 8)}...`) — no full token in stdout
- HIGH-5: `redeem()` wrapped in try/catch with best-effort failure audit; uses `null` (not `'unknown'`) for nullable UUID FK fallback
- MED-3: `createToken` validates `grant.peerId === dto.peerId`; `BadRequestException` on mismatch
**Remaining M2 security findings deferred to M3+:**
- HIGH-1: peerId/subjectUserId tenancy validation on `createGrant` (M3 ScopeService work surfaces this)
- HIGH-3: Step-CA cert SHA-256 fingerprint pinning (M5 cert handling)
- MED-1: token entropy already 32 bytes — wontfix
- MED-2: per-route rate limit on enrollment endpoint (M4 rate limit work)
- MED-4: CSR CN binding to peer's commonName (M3 AuthGuard work)
**M3 decomposition landed in this session:**
- 14 tasks (M3-01..M3-14), ~100K estimate
- Structure mirrors M1/M2 pattern: foundation → server stream + client stream + harness in parallel → integration → E2E → security review → docs → close
- M3-02 ships local two-gateway docker-compose (`tools/federation-harness/`) so M3-11 E2E is not blocked on the Portainer test bed (which is still blocked on `FED-M2-DEPLOY-IMG-FIX`)
**Subagent doctrine retained from M2:**
- All worker subagents use `isolation: "worktree"` to prevent branch-race incidents
- Code review is independent (different subagent, no overlap with author of work)
- `tea pr create --repo mosaicstack/stack --login mosaicstack` is the working PR-create path; `pr-create.sh` has shell-quoting bugs (followup #45 if not already filed)
- Cost tier: foundational implementation = sonnet, docs = haiku, complex multi-file architecture (security review, scope service) = sonnet with two review rounds
**Next concrete step:**
1. PR for the M3 planning artifact (this commit) — branch `docs/federation-m3-planning`
2. After merge, kickoff M3-01 (DTOs) on `feat/federation-m3-types` with sonnet subagent in worktree
3. Once M3-01 lands, fan out: M3-02 (harness) || M3-03 (AuthGuard) → M3-04 (ScopeService) || M3-08 (FederationClient)
4. Re-converge at M3-10 (Integration) → M3-11 (E2E)

View File

@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ export default tseslint.config(
'apps/gateway/vitest.config.ts', 'apps/gateway/vitest.config.ts',
'packages/storage/vitest.config.ts', 'packages/storage/vitest.config.ts',
'packages/mosaic/__tests__/*.ts', 'packages/mosaic/__tests__/*.ts',
'tools/federation-harness/*.ts',
], ],
}, },
}, },

View File

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
dev-only-step-ca-password-do-not-use-in-production

90
infra/step-ca/init.sh Executable file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,90 @@
#!/bin/sh
# infra/step-ca/init.sh
#
# Idempotent first-boot initialiser for the Mosaic Federation CA.
#
# On the first run (no /home/step/config/ca.json present) this script:
# 1. Initialises Step-CA with a JWK provisioner named "mosaic-fed".
# 2. Writes the CA configuration to the persistent volume at /home/step.
# 3. Copies the federation X.509 template into the CA config directory.
# 4. Patches the mosaic-fed provisioner entry in ca.json to reference the
# template via options.x509.templateFile (using jq — must be installed
# in the container image).
#
# On subsequent runs (config already exists) this script skips init and
# starts the CA directly.
#
# The provisioner name "mosaic-fed" is consumed by:
# apps/gateway/src/federation/ca.service.ts (added in M2-04)
#
# Password source:
# Dev: mounted from ./infra/step-ca/dev-password via bind mount.
# Prod: mounted from a Docker secret at /run/secrets/ca_password.
#
# OID template:
# infra/step-ca/templates/federation.tpl emits custom OID extensions:
# 1.3.6.1.4.1.99999.1 — mosaic_grant_id
# 1.3.6.1.4.1.99999.2 — mosaic_subject_user_id
set -e
CA_CONFIG="/home/step/config/ca.json"
PASSWORD_FILE="/run/secrets/ca_password"
TEMPLATE_SRC="/etc/step-ca-templates/federation.tpl"
TEMPLATE_DEST="/home/step/templates/federation.tpl"
if [ ! -f "${CA_CONFIG}" ]; then
echo "[step-ca init] First boot detected — initialising Mosaic Federation CA..."
step ca init \
--name "Mosaic Federation CA" \
--dns "localhost" \
--dns "step-ca" \
--address ":9000" \
--provisioner "mosaic-fed" \
--password-file "${PASSWORD_FILE}" \
--provisioner-password-file "${PASSWORD_FILE}" \
--no-db
echo "[step-ca init] CA initialised."
# Copy the X.509 template into the Step-CA config directory.
if [ -f "${TEMPLATE_SRC}" ]; then
mkdir -p /home/step/templates
cp "${TEMPLATE_SRC}" "${TEMPLATE_DEST}"
echo "[step-ca init] Federation X.509 template copied to ${TEMPLATE_DEST}."
else
echo "[step-ca init] WARNING: Template source ${TEMPLATE_SRC} not found — skipping copy."
fi
# Wire the template into the mosaic-fed provisioner via jq.
# This is idempotent: the block only runs once (first boot).
#
# jq filter: find the provisioner entry with name "mosaic-fed" and set
# .options.x509.templateFile to the absolute path of the template.
# All other provisioners and config keys are left unchanged.
if [ -f "${TEMPLATE_DEST}" ] && command -v jq > /dev/null 2>&1; then
echo "[step-ca init] Patching mosaic-fed provisioner with X.509 template..."
TEMP_CONFIG="${CA_CONFIG}.tmp"
jq --arg tpl "${TEMPLATE_DEST}" '
.authority.provisioners |= map(
if .name == "mosaic-fed" then
.options.x509.templateFile = $tpl
else
.
end
)
' "${CA_CONFIG}" > "${TEMP_CONFIG}" && mv "${TEMP_CONFIG}" "${CA_CONFIG}"
echo "[step-ca init] Provisioner patched."
elif ! command -v jq > /dev/null 2>&1; then
echo "[step-ca init] WARNING: jq not found — skipping provisioner template patch."
echo "[step-ca init] Install jq in the step-ca image to enable automatic template wiring."
fi
echo "[step-ca init] Startup complete."
else
echo "[step-ca init] Config already exists — skipping init."
fi
echo "[step-ca init] Starting Step-CA on :9000..."
exec step-ca /home/step/config/ca.json --password-file "${PASSWORD_FILE}"

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
{
"subject": {{ toJson .Subject }},
"sans": {{ toJson .SANs }},
{{- /*
Mosaic Federation X.509 Certificate Template
============================================
Provisioner: mosaic-fed (JWK)
Implemented: FED-M2-04
This template emits two custom OID extensions carrying Mosaic federation
identifiers. The OTT token (built by CaService.buildOtt) MUST include the
claims `mosaic_grant_id` and `mosaic_subject_user_id` as top-level JWT
claims. step-ca exposes them under `.Token.<claim>` in this template.
OID Registry (Mosaic Internal Arc 1.3.6.1.4.1.99999):
1.3.6.1.4.1.99999.1 mosaic_grant_id (UUID, 36 ASCII chars)
1.3.6.1.4.1.99999.2 mosaic_subject_user_id (UUID, 36 ASCII chars)
DER encoding for each extension value (ASN.1 UTF8String):
Tag = 0x0C (UTF8String)
Length = 0x24 (decimal 36 the fixed length of a UUID string)
Value = 36 ASCII bytes of the UUID
The `printf` below builds the raw TLV bytes then base64-encodes them.
step-ca expects the `value` field to be base64-encoded raw DER bytes.
Fail-loud contract:
If either claim is missing from the token the printf will produce a
zero-length UUID field, making the extension malformed. step-ca will
reject the certificate rather than issuing one without the required OIDs.
Silent OID stripping is NEVER tolerated.
Step-CA template reference:
https://smallstep.com/docs/step-ca/templates
*/ -}}
"extensions": [
{
"id": "1.3.6.1.4.1.99999.1",
"critical": false,
"value": "{{ printf "\x0c%c%s" (len .Token.mosaic_grant_id) .Token.mosaic_grant_id | b64enc }}"
},
{
"id": "1.3.6.1.4.1.99999.2",
"critical": false,
"value": "{{ printf "\x0c%c%s" (len .Token.mosaic_subject_user_id) .Token.mosaic_subject_user_id | b64enc }}"
}
],
"keyUsage": ["digitalSignature"],
"extKeyUsage": ["clientAuth"],
"basicConstraints": {
"isCA": false
}
}

View File

@@ -10,3 +10,4 @@ export {
type SsoTeamSyncConfig, type SsoTeamSyncConfig,
type SupportedSsoProviderId, type SupportedSsoProviderId,
} from './sso.js'; } from './sso.js';
export { seal, unseal } from './seal.js';

52
packages/auth/src/seal.ts Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
import { createCipheriv, createDecipheriv, createHash, randomBytes } from 'node:crypto';
const ALGORITHM = 'aes-256-gcm';
const IV_LENGTH = 12; // 96-bit IV for GCM
const TAG_LENGTH = 16; // 128-bit auth tag
/**
* Derive a 32-byte AES-256 key from BETTER_AUTH_SECRET using SHA-256.
* Throws if BETTER_AUTH_SECRET is not set.
*/
function deriveKey(): Buffer {
const secret = process.env['BETTER_AUTH_SECRET'];
if (!secret) {
throw new Error('BETTER_AUTH_SECRET is not set — cannot derive encryption key');
}
return createHash('sha256').update(secret).digest();
}
/**
* Seal a plaintext string using AES-256-GCM.
* Output format: base64(IV || authTag || ciphertext)
*/
export function seal(plaintext: string): string {
const key = deriveKey();
const iv = randomBytes(IV_LENGTH);
const cipher = createCipheriv(ALGORITHM, key, iv);
const encrypted = Buffer.concat([cipher.update(plaintext, 'utf8'), cipher.final()]);
const authTag = cipher.getAuthTag();
const combined = Buffer.concat([iv, authTag, encrypted]);
return combined.toString('base64');
}
/**
* Unseal a value sealed by `seal()`.
* Throws on authentication failure (tampered data) or if BETTER_AUTH_SECRET is unset.
*/
export function unseal(encoded: string): string {
const key = deriveKey();
const combined = Buffer.from(encoded, 'base64');
const iv = combined.subarray(0, IV_LENGTH);
const authTag = combined.subarray(IV_LENGTH, IV_LENGTH + TAG_LENGTH);
const ciphertext = combined.subarray(IV_LENGTH + TAG_LENGTH);
const decipher = createDecipheriv(ALGORITHM, key, iv);
decipher.setAuthTag(authTag);
const decrypted = Buffer.concat([decipher.update(ciphertext), decipher.final()]);
return decrypted.toString('utf8');
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
CREATE TYPE "public"."grant_status" AS ENUM('active', 'revoked', 'expired');--> statement-breakpoint
CREATE TYPE "public"."peer_state" AS ENUM('pending', 'active', 'suspended', 'revoked');--> statement-breakpoint
CREATE TABLE "admin_tokens" (
"id" text PRIMARY KEY NOT NULL,
"user_id" text NOT NULL,
"token_hash" text NOT NULL,
"label" text NOT NULL,
"scope" text DEFAULT 'admin' NOT NULL,
"expires_at" timestamp with time zone,
"last_used_at" timestamp with time zone,
"created_at" timestamp with time zone DEFAULT now() NOT NULL
);
--> statement-breakpoint
CREATE TABLE "federation_audit_log" (
"id" uuid PRIMARY KEY DEFAULT gen_random_uuid() NOT NULL,
"request_id" text NOT NULL,
"peer_id" uuid,
"subject_user_id" text,
"grant_id" uuid,
"verb" text NOT NULL,
"resource" text NOT NULL,
"status_code" integer NOT NULL,
"result_count" integer,
"denied_reason" text,
"latency_ms" integer,
"created_at" timestamp with time zone DEFAULT now() NOT NULL,
"query_hash" text,
"outcome" text,
"bytes_out" integer
);
--> statement-breakpoint
CREATE TABLE "federation_grants" (
"id" uuid PRIMARY KEY DEFAULT gen_random_uuid() NOT NULL,
"subject_user_id" text NOT NULL,
"peer_id" uuid NOT NULL,
"scope" jsonb NOT NULL,
"status" "grant_status" DEFAULT 'active' NOT NULL,
"expires_at" timestamp with time zone,
"created_at" timestamp with time zone DEFAULT now() NOT NULL,
"revoked_at" timestamp with time zone,
"revoked_reason" text
);
--> statement-breakpoint
CREATE TABLE "federation_peers" (
"id" uuid PRIMARY KEY DEFAULT gen_random_uuid() NOT NULL,
"common_name" text NOT NULL,
"display_name" text NOT NULL,
"cert_pem" text NOT NULL,
"cert_serial" text NOT NULL,
"cert_not_after" timestamp with time zone NOT NULL,
"client_key_pem" text,
"state" "peer_state" DEFAULT 'pending' NOT NULL,
"endpoint_url" text,
"last_seen_at" timestamp with time zone,
"created_at" timestamp with time zone DEFAULT now() NOT NULL,
"revoked_at" timestamp with time zone,
CONSTRAINT "federation_peers_common_name_unique" UNIQUE("common_name"),
CONSTRAINT "federation_peers_cert_serial_unique" UNIQUE("cert_serial")
);
--> statement-breakpoint
ALTER TABLE "admin_tokens" ADD CONSTRAINT "admin_tokens_user_id_users_id_fk" FOREIGN KEY ("user_id") REFERENCES "public"."users"("id") ON DELETE cascade ON UPDATE no action;--> statement-breakpoint
ALTER TABLE "federation_audit_log" ADD CONSTRAINT "federation_audit_log_peer_id_federation_peers_id_fk" FOREIGN KEY ("peer_id") REFERENCES "public"."federation_peers"("id") ON DELETE set null ON UPDATE no action;--> statement-breakpoint
ALTER TABLE "federation_audit_log" ADD CONSTRAINT "federation_audit_log_subject_user_id_users_id_fk" FOREIGN KEY ("subject_user_id") REFERENCES "public"."users"("id") ON DELETE set null ON UPDATE no action;--> statement-breakpoint
ALTER TABLE "federation_audit_log" ADD CONSTRAINT "federation_audit_log_grant_id_federation_grants_id_fk" FOREIGN KEY ("grant_id") REFERENCES "public"."federation_grants"("id") ON DELETE set null ON UPDATE no action;--> statement-breakpoint
ALTER TABLE "federation_grants" ADD CONSTRAINT "federation_grants_subject_user_id_users_id_fk" FOREIGN KEY ("subject_user_id") REFERENCES "public"."users"("id") ON DELETE cascade ON UPDATE no action;--> statement-breakpoint
ALTER TABLE "federation_grants" ADD CONSTRAINT "federation_grants_peer_id_federation_peers_id_fk" FOREIGN KEY ("peer_id") REFERENCES "public"."federation_peers"("id") ON DELETE cascade ON UPDATE no action;--> statement-breakpoint
CREATE INDEX "admin_tokens_user_id_idx" ON "admin_tokens" USING btree ("user_id");--> statement-breakpoint
CREATE UNIQUE INDEX "admin_tokens_hash_idx" ON "admin_tokens" USING btree ("token_hash");--> statement-breakpoint
CREATE INDEX "federation_audit_log_peer_created_at_idx" ON "federation_audit_log" USING btree ("peer_id","created_at" DESC NULLS LAST);--> statement-breakpoint
CREATE INDEX "federation_audit_log_subject_created_at_idx" ON "federation_audit_log" USING btree ("subject_user_id","created_at" DESC NULLS LAST);--> statement-breakpoint
CREATE INDEX "federation_audit_log_created_at_idx" ON "federation_audit_log" USING btree ("created_at" DESC NULLS LAST);--> statement-breakpoint
CREATE INDEX "federation_grants_subject_status_idx" ON "federation_grants" USING btree ("subject_user_id","status");--> statement-breakpoint
CREATE INDEX "federation_grants_peer_status_idx" ON "federation_grants" USING btree ("peer_id","status");--> statement-breakpoint
CREATE INDEX "federation_peers_cert_serial_idx" ON "federation_peers" USING btree ("cert_serial");--> statement-breakpoint
CREATE INDEX "federation_peers_state_idx" ON "federation_peers" USING btree ("state");

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
ALTER TYPE "public"."grant_status" ADD VALUE 'pending' BEFORE 'active';--> statement-breakpoint
ALTER TABLE "federation_grants" ALTER COLUMN "status" SET DEFAULT 'pending';

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
CREATE TABLE "federation_enrollment_tokens" (
"token" text PRIMARY KEY NOT NULL,
"grant_id" uuid NOT NULL,
"peer_id" uuid NOT NULL,
"expires_at" timestamp with time zone NOT NULL,
"used_at" timestamp with time zone,
"created_at" timestamp with time zone DEFAULT now() NOT NULL
);
--> statement-breakpoint
ALTER TABLE "federation_enrollment_tokens" ADD CONSTRAINT "federation_enrollment_tokens_grant_id_federation_grants_id_fk" FOREIGN KEY ("grant_id") REFERENCES "public"."federation_grants"("id") ON DELETE cascade ON UPDATE no action;--> statement-breakpoint
ALTER TABLE "federation_enrollment_tokens" ADD CONSTRAINT "federation_enrollment_tokens_peer_id_federation_peers_id_fk" FOREIGN KEY ("peer_id") REFERENCES "public"."federation_peers"("id") ON DELETE cascade ON UPDATE no action;

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View File

@@ -57,6 +57,27 @@
"when": 1774227064500, "when": 1774227064500,
"tag": "0006_swift_shen", "tag": "0006_swift_shen",
"breakpoints": true "breakpoints": true
},
{
"idx": 8,
"version": "7",
"when": 1776822435828,
"tag": "0008_smart_lyja",
"breakpoints": true
},
{
"idx": 9,
"version": "7",
"when": 1745280000000,
"tag": "0009_federation_grant_pending",
"breakpoints": true
},
{
"idx": 10,
"version": "7",
"when": 1745366400000,
"tag": "0010_federation_enrollment_tokens",
"breakpoints": true
} }
] ]
} }

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,424 @@
/**
* FED-M2-01 — Integration test: federation DB schema (peers / grants / audit_log).
*
* Prereq: docker compose -f docker-compose.federated.yml --profile federated up -d
* (or any postgres with the mosaic schema already applied)
* Run: FEDERATED_INTEGRATION=1 pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/db test src/federation.integration.test.ts
*
* Skipped when FEDERATED_INTEGRATION !== '1'.
*
* Strategy:
* - Applies the federation migration SQL directly (idempotent: CREATE TYPE/TABLE
* with IF NOT EXISTS guards applied via inline SQL before the migration DDL).
* - Assumes the base schema (users table etc.) already exists in the target DB.
* - All test rows use the `fed-m2-01-` prefix; cleanup in afterAll.
*
* Coverage:
* 1. Federation tables + enums apply cleanly against the existing schema.
* 2. Insert a sample user + peer + grant + audit row; verify round-trip.
* 3. FK cascade: deleting the user cascades to federation_grants.
* 4. FK set-null: deleting the peer sets federation_audit_log.peer_id to NULL.
* 5. Enum constraint: inserting an invalid status/state value throws a DB error.
* 6. Unique constraint: duplicate cert_serial throws a DB error.
*/
import postgres from 'postgres';
import { afterAll, beforeAll, describe, expect, it } from 'vitest';
const run = process.env['FEDERATED_INTEGRATION'] === '1';
const PG_URL = process.env['DATABASE_URL'] ?? 'postgresql://mosaic:mosaic@localhost:5433/mosaic';
/** Recognisable test-row prefix for safe cleanup without full-table truncation. */
const T = 'fed-m2-01';
// Deterministic IDs (UUID format required for uuid PK columns: 8-4-4-4-12 hex digits).
const PEER1_ID = `f2000001-0000-4000-8000-000000000001`;
const PEER2_ID = `f2000002-0000-4000-8000-000000000002`;
const USER1_ID = `${T}-user-1`;
let sql: ReturnType<typeof postgres> | undefined;
beforeAll(async () => {
if (!run) return;
sql = postgres(PG_URL, { max: 1, connect_timeout: 10, idle_timeout: 10 });
// Apply the federation enums and tables idempotently.
// This mirrors the migration file but uses IF NOT EXISTS guards so it can run
// against a DB that may not have had drizzle migrations tracked.
await sql`
DO $$ BEGIN
CREATE TYPE peer_state AS ENUM ('pending', 'active', 'suspended', 'revoked');
EXCEPTION WHEN duplicate_object THEN NULL;
END $$
`;
await sql`
DO $$ BEGIN
CREATE TYPE grant_status AS ENUM ('active', 'revoked', 'expired');
EXCEPTION WHEN duplicate_object THEN NULL;
END $$
`;
await sql`
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS federation_peers (
id uuid PRIMARY KEY DEFAULT gen_random_uuid(),
common_name text NOT NULL,
display_name text NOT NULL,
cert_pem text NOT NULL,
cert_serial text NOT NULL,
cert_not_after timestamp with time zone NOT NULL,
client_key_pem text,
state peer_state NOT NULL DEFAULT 'pending',
endpoint_url text,
last_seen_at timestamp with time zone,
created_at timestamp with time zone NOT NULL DEFAULT now(),
revoked_at timestamp with time zone,
CONSTRAINT federation_peers_common_name_unique UNIQUE (common_name),
CONSTRAINT federation_peers_cert_serial_unique UNIQUE (cert_serial)
)
`;
await sql`
CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS federation_peers_cert_serial_idx ON federation_peers (cert_serial)
`;
await sql`
CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS federation_peers_state_idx ON federation_peers (state)
`;
await sql`
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS federation_grants (
id uuid PRIMARY KEY DEFAULT gen_random_uuid(),
subject_user_id text NOT NULL REFERENCES users(id) ON DELETE CASCADE,
peer_id uuid NOT NULL REFERENCES federation_peers(id) ON DELETE CASCADE,
scope jsonb NOT NULL,
status grant_status NOT NULL DEFAULT 'active',
expires_at timestamp with time zone,
created_at timestamp with time zone NOT NULL DEFAULT now(),
revoked_at timestamp with time zone,
revoked_reason text
)
`;
await sql`
CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS federation_grants_subject_status_idx ON federation_grants (subject_user_id, status)
`;
await sql`
CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS federation_grants_peer_status_idx ON federation_grants (peer_id, status)
`;
await sql`
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS federation_audit_log (
id uuid PRIMARY KEY DEFAULT gen_random_uuid(),
request_id text NOT NULL,
peer_id uuid REFERENCES federation_peers(id) ON DELETE SET NULL,
subject_user_id text REFERENCES users(id) ON DELETE SET NULL,
grant_id uuid REFERENCES federation_grants(id) ON DELETE SET NULL,
verb text NOT NULL,
resource text NOT NULL,
status_code integer NOT NULL,
result_count integer,
denied_reason text,
latency_ms integer,
created_at timestamp with time zone NOT NULL DEFAULT now(),
query_hash text,
outcome text,
bytes_out integer
)
`;
await sql`
CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS federation_audit_log_peer_created_at_idx
ON federation_audit_log (peer_id, created_at DESC NULLS LAST)
`;
await sql`
CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS federation_audit_log_subject_created_at_idx
ON federation_audit_log (subject_user_id, created_at DESC NULLS LAST)
`;
await sql`
CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS federation_audit_log_created_at_idx
ON federation_audit_log (created_at DESC NULLS LAST)
`;
});
afterAll(async () => {
if (!sql) return;
// Cleanup in FK-safe order (children before parents).
await sql`DELETE FROM federation_audit_log WHERE request_id LIKE ${T + '%'}`.catch(() => {});
await sql`
DELETE FROM federation_grants
WHERE subject_user_id LIKE ${T + '%'}
OR revoked_reason LIKE ${T + '%'}
`.catch(() => {});
await sql`DELETE FROM federation_peers WHERE common_name LIKE ${T + '%'}`.catch(() => {});
await sql`DELETE FROM users WHERE id LIKE ${T + '%'}`.catch(() => {});
await sql.end({ timeout: 3 }).catch(() => {});
});
describe.skipIf(!run)('federation schema — integration', () => {
// ── 1. Insert sample rows ──────────────────────────────────────────────────
it('inserts a user, peer, grant, and audit row without constraint violation', async () => {
const certPem = '-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\nMIItest\n-----END CERTIFICATE-----';
// User — BetterAuth users.id is text (any string, not uuid).
await sql!`
INSERT INTO users (id, name, email, email_verified, created_at, updated_at)
VALUES (${USER1_ID}, ${'M2-01 Test User'}, ${USER1_ID + '@example.com'}, false, now(), now())
ON CONFLICT (id) DO NOTHING
`;
// Peer
await sql!`
INSERT INTO federation_peers
(id, common_name, display_name, cert_pem, cert_serial, cert_not_after, state, created_at)
VALUES (
${PEER1_ID},
${T + '-gateway-example-com'},
${'Test Peer'},
${certPem},
${T + '-serial-001'},
now() + interval '1 year',
${'active'},
now()
)
ON CONFLICT (id) DO NOTHING
`;
// Grant — scope is jsonb; pass as JSON string and cast server-side.
const scopeJson = JSON.stringify({
resources: ['tasks', 'notes'],
operations: ['list', 'get'],
});
const grants = await sql!`
INSERT INTO federation_grants
(subject_user_id, peer_id, scope, status, created_at)
VALUES (
${USER1_ID},
${PEER1_ID},
${scopeJson}::jsonb,
${'active'},
now()
)
RETURNING id
`;
expect(grants).toHaveLength(1);
const grantId = grants[0]!['id'] as string;
// Audit log row
await sql!`
INSERT INTO federation_audit_log
(request_id, peer_id, subject_user_id, grant_id, verb, resource, status_code, created_at)
VALUES (
${T + '-req-001'},
${PEER1_ID},
${USER1_ID},
${grantId},
${'list'},
${'tasks'},
${200},
now()
)
`;
// Verify the audit row is present and has correct data.
const auditRows = await sql!`
SELECT * FROM federation_audit_log WHERE request_id = ${T + '-req-001'}
`;
expect(auditRows).toHaveLength(1);
expect(auditRows[0]!['status_code']).toBe(200);
expect(auditRows[0]!['verb']).toBe('list');
expect(auditRows[0]!['resource']).toBe('tasks');
}, 30_000);
// ── 2. FK cascade: user delete cascades grants ─────────────────────────────
it('cascade-deletes federation_grants when the subject user is deleted', async () => {
const cascadeUserId = `${T}-cascade-user`;
await sql!`
INSERT INTO users (id, name, email, email_verified, created_at, updated_at)
VALUES (${cascadeUserId}, ${'Cascade User'}, ${cascadeUserId + '@example.com'}, false, now(), now())
ON CONFLICT (id) DO NOTHING
`;
const scopeJson = JSON.stringify({ resources: ['tasks'] });
await sql!`
INSERT INTO federation_grants
(subject_user_id, peer_id, scope, status, revoked_reason, created_at)
VALUES (
${cascadeUserId},
${PEER1_ID},
${scopeJson}::jsonb,
${'active'},
${T + '-cascade-test'},
now()
)
`;
const before = await sql!`
SELECT count(*)::int AS cnt FROM federation_grants WHERE subject_user_id = ${cascadeUserId}
`;
expect(before[0]!['cnt']).toBe(1);
// Delete user → grants should cascade-delete.
await sql!`DELETE FROM users WHERE id = ${cascadeUserId}`;
const after = await sql!`
SELECT count(*)::int AS cnt FROM federation_grants WHERE subject_user_id = ${cascadeUserId}
`;
expect(after[0]!['cnt']).toBe(0);
}, 15_000);
// ── 3. FK set-null: peer delete sets audit_log.peer_id to NULL ────────────
it('sets federation_audit_log.peer_id to NULL when the peer is deleted', async () => {
// Insert a throwaway peer for this specific cascade test.
await sql!`
INSERT INTO federation_peers
(id, common_name, display_name, cert_pem, cert_serial, cert_not_after, state, created_at)
VALUES (
${PEER2_ID},
${T + '-gateway-throwaway-com'},
${'Throwaway Peer'},
${'cert-pem-placeholder'},
${T + '-serial-002'},
now() + interval '1 year',
${'active'},
now()
)
ON CONFLICT (id) DO NOTHING
`;
const reqId = `${T}-req-setnull`;
await sql!`
INSERT INTO federation_audit_log
(request_id, peer_id, subject_user_id, verb, resource, status_code, created_at)
VALUES (
${reqId},
${PEER2_ID},
${USER1_ID},
${'get'},
${'tasks'},
${200},
now()
)
`;
await sql!`DELETE FROM federation_peers WHERE id = ${PEER2_ID}`;
const rows = await sql!`
SELECT peer_id FROM federation_audit_log WHERE request_id = ${reqId}
`;
expect(rows).toHaveLength(1);
expect(rows[0]!['peer_id']).toBeNull();
}, 15_000);
// ── 4. Enum constraint: invalid grant_status rejected ─────────────────────
it('rejects an invalid grant_status value with a DB error', async () => {
const scopeJson = JSON.stringify({ resources: ['tasks'] });
await expect(
sql!`
INSERT INTO federation_grants
(subject_user_id, peer_id, scope, status, created_at)
VALUES (
${USER1_ID},
${PEER1_ID},
${scopeJson}::jsonb,
${'invalid_status'},
now()
)
`,
).rejects.toThrow();
}, 10_000);
// ── 5. Enum constraint: invalid peer_state rejected ───────────────────────
it('rejects an invalid peer_state value with a DB error', async () => {
await expect(
sql!`
INSERT INTO federation_peers
(common_name, display_name, cert_pem, cert_serial, cert_not_after, state, created_at)
VALUES (
${'bad-state-peer'},
${'Bad State'},
${'pem'},
${'bad-serial-999'},
now() + interval '1 year',
${'invalid_state'},
now()
)
`,
).rejects.toThrow();
}, 10_000);
// ── 6. Unique constraint: duplicate cert_serial rejected ──────────────────
it('rejects a duplicate cert_serial with a unique constraint violation', async () => {
await expect(
sql!`
INSERT INTO federation_peers
(common_name, display_name, cert_pem, cert_serial, cert_not_after, state, created_at)
VALUES (
${T + '-dup-cn'},
${'Dup Peer'},
${'pem'},
${T + '-serial-001'},
now() + interval '1 year',
${'pending'},
now()
)
`,
).rejects.toThrow();
}, 10_000);
// ── 7. FK cascade: peer delete cascades to federation_grants ─────────────
it('cascade-deletes federation_grants when the owning peer is deleted', async () => {
const PEER3_ID = `f2000003-0000-4000-8000-000000000003`;
const cascadeGrantUserId = `${T}-cascade-grant-user`;
// Insert a dedicated user and peer for this test.
await sql!`
INSERT INTO users (id, name, email, email_verified, created_at, updated_at)
VALUES (${cascadeGrantUserId}, ${'Cascade Grant User'}, ${cascadeGrantUserId + '@example.com'}, false, now(), now())
ON CONFLICT (id) DO NOTHING
`;
await sql!`
INSERT INTO federation_peers
(id, common_name, display_name, cert_pem, cert_serial, cert_not_after, state, created_at)
VALUES (
${PEER3_ID},
${T + '-gateway-cascade-peer'},
${'Cascade Peer'},
${'cert-pem-cascade'},
${T + '-serial-003'},
now() + interval '1 year',
${'active'},
now()
)
ON CONFLICT (id) DO NOTHING
`;
const scopeJson = JSON.stringify({ resources: ['tasks'] });
await sql!`
INSERT INTO federation_grants
(subject_user_id, peer_id, scope, status, created_at)
VALUES (
${cascadeGrantUserId},
${PEER3_ID},
${scopeJson}::jsonb,
${'active'},
now()
)
`;
const before = await sql!`
SELECT count(*)::int AS cnt FROM federation_grants WHERE peer_id = ${PEER3_ID}
`;
expect(before[0]!['cnt']).toBe(1);
// Delete peer → grants should cascade-delete.
await sql!`DELETE FROM federation_peers WHERE id = ${PEER3_ID}`;
const after = await sql!`
SELECT count(*)::int AS cnt FROM federation_grants WHERE peer_id = ${PEER3_ID}
`;
expect(after[0]!['cnt']).toBe(0);
// Cleanup
await sql!`DELETE FROM users WHERE id = ${cascadeGrantUserId}`.catch(() => {});
}, 15_000);
});

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
/**
* Federation schema re-exports.
*
* The actual table and enum definitions live in schema.ts (alongside all other
* Drizzle tables) to avoid CJS/ESM cross-import issues when drizzle-kit loads
* schema files via esbuild-register. Application code that wants named imports
* for federation symbols should import from this file.
*
* M2-01: DB tables and enums only. No business logic.
* M2-03 will add JSON schema validation for the `scope` column.
* M4 will write rows to federation_audit_log.
*/
export {
peerStateEnum,
grantStatusEnum,
federationPeers,
federationGrants,
federationAuditLog,
federationEnrollmentTokens,
} from './schema.js';

View File

@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ export { createDb, type Db, type DbHandle } from './client.js';
export { createPgliteDb } from './client-pglite.js'; export { createPgliteDb } from './client-pglite.js';
export { runMigrations } from './migrate.js'; export { runMigrations } from './migrate.js';
export * from './schema.js'; export * from './schema.js';
export * from './federation.js';
export { export {
eq, eq,
and, and,

View File

@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@
import { import {
pgTable, pgTable,
pgEnum,
text, text,
timestamp, timestamp,
boolean, boolean,
@@ -585,3 +586,226 @@ export const summarizationJobs = pgTable(
}, },
(t) => [index('summarization_jobs_status_idx').on(t.status)], (t) => [index('summarization_jobs_status_idx').on(t.status)],
); );
// ─── Federation ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
// Enums declared before tables that reference them.
// All federation definitions live in this file (avoids CJS/ESM cross-import
// issues when drizzle-kit loads schema files via esbuild-register).
// Application code imports from `federation.ts` which re-exports from here.
/**
* Lifecycle state of a federation peer.
* - pending: registered but not yet approved / TLS handshake not confirmed
* - active: fully operational; mTLS verified
* - suspended: temporarily blocked; cert still valid
* - revoked: cert revoked; no traffic allowed
*/
export const peerStateEnum = pgEnum('peer_state', ['pending', 'active', 'suspended', 'revoked']);
/**
* Lifecycle state of a federation grant.
* - pending: created but not yet activated (awaiting cert enrollment, M2-07)
* - active: grant is in effect
* - revoked: manually revoked before expiry
* - expired: natural expiry (expires_at passed)
*/
export const grantStatusEnum = pgEnum('grant_status', ['pending', 'active', 'revoked', 'expired']);
/**
* A registered peer gateway identified by its Step-CA certificate CN.
* Represents both inbound peers (other gateways querying us) and outbound
* peers (gateways we query — identified by client_key_pem being set).
*/
export const federationPeers = pgTable(
'federation_peers',
{
id: uuid('id').primaryKey().defaultRandom(),
/** Certificate CN, e.g. "gateway-uscllc-com". Unique — one row per peer identity. */
commonName: text('common_name').notNull().unique(),
/** Human-friendly label shown in admin UI. */
displayName: text('display_name').notNull(),
/** Pinned PEM certificate used for mTLS verification. */
certPem: text('cert_pem').notNull(),
/** Certificate serial number — used for CRL / revocation lookup. */
certSerial: text('cert_serial').notNull().unique(),
/** Certificate expiry — used by the renewal scheduler (FED-M6). */
certNotAfter: timestamp('cert_not_after', { withTimezone: true }).notNull(),
/**
* Sealed (encrypted) private key for outbound connections TO this peer.
* NULL for inbound-only peer rows (we serve them; we don't call them).
*/
clientKeyPem: text('client_key_pem'),
/** Current peer lifecycle state. */
state: peerStateEnum('state').notNull().default('pending'),
/** Base URL for outbound queries, e.g. "https://woltje.com:443". NULL for inbound-only peers. */
endpointUrl: text('endpoint_url'),
/** Timestamp of the most recent successful inbound or outbound request. */
lastSeenAt: timestamp('last_seen_at', { withTimezone: true }),
createdAt: timestamp('created_at', { withTimezone: true }).notNull().defaultNow(),
/** Populated when the cert is revoked; NULL while the peer is active. */
revokedAt: timestamp('revoked_at', { withTimezone: true }),
},
(t) => [
// CRL / revocation lookups by serial.
index('federation_peers_cert_serial_idx').on(t.certSerial),
// Filter peers by state (e.g. find all active peers for outbound routing).
index('federation_peers_state_idx').on(t.state),
],
);
/**
* A grant lets a specific peer cert query a specific local user's data within
* a defined scope. Scopes are validated by JSON Schema in M2-03; this table
* stores them as raw jsonb.
*/
export const federationGrants = pgTable(
'federation_grants',
{
id: uuid('id').primaryKey().defaultRandom(),
/**
* The local user whose data this grant exposes.
* Cascade delete: if the user account is deleted, revoke all their grants.
*/
subjectUserId: text('subject_user_id')
.notNull()
.references(() => users.id, { onDelete: 'cascade' }),
/**
* The peer gateway holding the grant.
* Cascade delete: if the peer record is removed, the grant is moot.
*/
peerId: uuid('peer_id')
.notNull()
.references(() => federationPeers.id, { onDelete: 'cascade' }),
/**
* Scope object — validated by JSON Schema (M2-03).
* Example: { "resources": ["tasks", "notes"], "operations": ["list", "get"] }
*/
scope: jsonb('scope').notNull(),
/** Current grant lifecycle state. */
status: grantStatusEnum('status').notNull().default('pending'),
/** Optional hard expiry. NULL means the grant does not expire automatically. */
expiresAt: timestamp('expires_at', { withTimezone: true }),
createdAt: timestamp('created_at', { withTimezone: true }).notNull().defaultNow(),
/** Populated when the grant is explicitly revoked. */
revokedAt: timestamp('revoked_at', { withTimezone: true }),
/** Human-readable reason for revocation (audit trail). */
revokedReason: text('revoked_reason'),
},
(t) => [
// Hot path: look up active grants for a subject user (auth middleware).
index('federation_grants_subject_status_idx').on(t.subjectUserId, t.status),
// Hot path: look up active grants held by a peer (inbound request check).
index('federation_grants_peer_status_idx').on(t.peerId, t.status),
],
);
/**
* Append-only audit log of all federation requests.
* M4 writes rows here. M2 only creates the table.
*
* All FKs use SET NULL so audit rows survive peer/user/grant deletion.
*/
export const federationAuditLog = pgTable(
'federation_audit_log',
{
id: uuid('id').primaryKey().defaultRandom(),
/** UUIDv7 from the X-Request-ID header — correlates with OTEL traces. */
requestId: text('request_id').notNull(),
/** Peer that made the request. SET NULL if the peer is later deleted. */
peerId: uuid('peer_id').references(() => federationPeers.id, { onDelete: 'set null' }),
/** Subject user whose data was queried. SET NULL if the user is deleted. */
subjectUserId: text('subject_user_id').references(() => users.id, { onDelete: 'set null' }),
/** Grant under which the request was authorised. SET NULL if the grant is deleted. */
grantId: uuid('grant_id').references(() => federationGrants.id, { onDelete: 'set null' }),
/** Request verb: "list" | "get" | "search". */
verb: text('verb').notNull(),
/** Resource type: "tasks" | "notes" | "memory" | etc. */
resource: text('resource').notNull(),
/** HTTP status code returned to the peer. */
statusCode: integer('status_code').notNull(),
/** Number of items returned (NULL for non-list requests or errors). */
resultCount: integer('result_count'),
/** Why the request was denied (NULL when allowed). */
deniedReason: text('denied_reason'),
/** End-to-end latency in milliseconds. */
latencyMs: integer('latency_ms'),
createdAt: timestamp('created_at', { withTimezone: true }).notNull().defaultNow(),
// Reserved for M4 — see PRD 7.3
/** SHA-256 of the normalised GraphQL/REST query string; written by M4 search. */
queryHash: text('query_hash'),
/** Request outcome: "allowed" | "denied" | "partial"; written by M4. */
outcome: text('outcome'),
/** Response payload size in bytes; written by M4. */
bytesOut: integer('bytes_out'),
},
(t) => [
// Per-peer request history in reverse chronological order.
index('federation_audit_log_peer_created_at_idx').on(t.peerId, t.createdAt.desc()),
// Per-user access log in reverse chronological order.
index('federation_audit_log_subject_created_at_idx').on(t.subjectUserId, t.createdAt.desc()),
// Global time-range scans (dashboards, rate-limit windows).
index('federation_audit_log_created_at_idx').on(t.createdAt.desc()),
],
);
/**
* Single-use enrollment tokens — M2-07.
*
* An admin creates a token (with a TTL) and hands it out-of-band to the
* remote peer operator. The peer redeems it exactly once by posting its
* CSR to POST /api/federation/enrollment/:token. The token is atomically
* marked as used to prevent replay attacks.
*/
export const federationEnrollmentTokens = pgTable('federation_enrollment_tokens', {
/** 32-byte hex token — crypto.randomBytes(32).toString('hex') */
token: text('token').primaryKey(),
/** The federation grant this enrollment activates. */
grantId: uuid('grant_id')
.notNull()
.references(() => federationGrants.id, { onDelete: 'cascade' }),
/** The peer record that will be updated on successful enrollment. */
peerId: uuid('peer_id')
.notNull()
.references(() => federationPeers.id, { onDelete: 'cascade' }),
/** Hard expiry — token rejected after this time even if not used. */
expiresAt: timestamp('expires_at', { withTimezone: true }).notNull(),
/** NULL until the token is redeemed. Set atomically to prevent replay. */
usedAt: timestamp('used_at', { withTimezone: true }),
createdAt: timestamp('created_at', { withTimezone: true }).notNull().defaultNow(),
});

View File

@@ -13,6 +13,14 @@ export PORTAINER_URL="https://portainer.example.com:9443"
export PORTAINER_API_KEY="your-api-key-here" export PORTAINER_API_KEY="your-api-key-here"
``` ```
If your Portainer instance uses a self-signed TLS certificate (e.g. internal LAN), set:
```bash
export PORTAINER_INSECURE=1
```
This passes `-k` to all curl calls, bypassing certificate verification. Do not set this against public/production instances.
You can add these to your shell profile (`~/.bashrc`, `~/.zshrc`) or use a `.env` file. You can add these to your shell profile (`~/.bashrc`, `~/.zshrc`) or use a `.env` file.
### Creating an API Key ### Creating an API Key

View File

@@ -46,8 +46,14 @@ fi
# Remove trailing slash from URL # Remove trailing slash from URL
PORTAINER_URL="${PORTAINER_URL%/}" PORTAINER_URL="${PORTAINER_URL%/}"
# TLS options
CURL_OPTS=()
if [ "${PORTAINER_INSECURE:-0}" = "1" ]; then
CURL_OPTS+=(-k)
fi
# Fetch endpoints # Fetch endpoints
response=$(curl -s -w "\n%{http_code}" \ response=$(curl -s "${CURL_OPTS[@]}" -w "\n%{http_code}" \
-H "X-API-Key: ${PORTAINER_API_KEY}" \ -H "X-API-Key: ${PORTAINER_API_KEY}" \
"${PORTAINER_URL}/api/endpoints") "${PORTAINER_URL}/api/endpoints")

View File

@@ -52,8 +52,14 @@ fi
# Remove trailing slash from URL # Remove trailing slash from URL
PORTAINER_URL="${PORTAINER_URL%/}" PORTAINER_URL="${PORTAINER_URL%/}"
# TLS options
CURL_OPTS=()
if [ "${PORTAINER_INSECURE:-0}" = "1" ]; then
CURL_OPTS+=(-k)
fi
# Fetch stacks # Fetch stacks
response=$(curl -s -w "\n%{http_code}" \ response=$(curl -s "${CURL_OPTS[@]}" -w "\n%{http_code}" \
-H "X-API-Key: ${PORTAINER_API_KEY}" \ -H "X-API-Key: ${PORTAINER_API_KEY}" \
"${PORTAINER_URL}/api/stacks") "${PORTAINER_URL}/api/stacks")

View File

@@ -64,12 +64,18 @@ fi
# Remove trailing slash from URL # Remove trailing slash from URL
PORTAINER_URL="${PORTAINER_URL%/}" PORTAINER_URL="${PORTAINER_URL%/}"
# TLS options
CURL_OPTS=()
if [ "${PORTAINER_INSECURE:-0}" = "1" ]; then
CURL_OPTS+=(-k)
fi
# Function to make API requests # Function to make API requests
api_request() { api_request() {
local method="$1" local method="$1"
local endpoint="$2" local endpoint="$2"
curl -s -w "\n%{http_code}" -X "$method" \ curl -s "${CURL_OPTS[@]}" -w "\n%{http_code}" -X "$method" \
-H "X-API-Key: ${PORTAINER_API_KEY}" \ -H "X-API-Key: ${PORTAINER_API_KEY}" \
"${PORTAINER_URL}${endpoint}" "${PORTAINER_URL}${endpoint}"
} }
@@ -165,7 +171,7 @@ fi
# Note: Docker API returns raw log stream, not JSON # Note: Docker API returns raw log stream, not JSON
if [[ "$FOLLOW" == "true" ]]; then if [[ "$FOLLOW" == "true" ]]; then
# Stream logs # Stream logs
curl -s -N \ curl -s "${CURL_OPTS[@]}" -N \
-H "X-API-Key: ${PORTAINER_API_KEY}" \ -H "X-API-Key: ${PORTAINER_API_KEY}" \
"${PORTAINER_URL}/api/endpoints/${ENDPOINT_ID}/docker/containers/${CONTAINER_ID}/logs?${params}" | \ "${PORTAINER_URL}/api/endpoints/${ENDPOINT_ID}/docker/containers/${CONTAINER_ID}/logs?${params}" | \
# Docker log format has 8-byte header per line, strip it # Docker log format has 8-byte header per line, strip it
@@ -175,7 +181,7 @@ if [[ "$FOLLOW" == "true" ]]; then
done done
else else
# Get logs (non-streaming) # Get logs (non-streaming)
curl -s \ curl -s "${CURL_OPTS[@]}" \
-H "X-API-Key: ${PORTAINER_API_KEY}" \ -H "X-API-Key: ${PORTAINER_API_KEY}" \
"${PORTAINER_URL}/api/endpoints/${ENDPOINT_ID}/docker/containers/${CONTAINER_ID}/logs?${params}" | \ "${PORTAINER_URL}/api/endpoints/${ENDPOINT_ID}/docker/containers/${CONTAINER_ID}/logs?${params}" | \
# Docker log format has 8-byte header per line, attempt to strip it # Docker log format has 8-byte header per line, attempt to strip it

View File

@@ -63,13 +63,19 @@ fi
# Remove trailing slash from URL # Remove trailing slash from URL
PORTAINER_URL="${PORTAINER_URL%/}" PORTAINER_URL="${PORTAINER_URL%/}"
# TLS options
CURL_OPTS=()
if [ "${PORTAINER_INSECURE:-0}" = "1" ]; then
CURL_OPTS+=(-k)
fi
# Function to make API requests # Function to make API requests
api_request() { api_request() {
local method="$1" local method="$1"
local endpoint="$2" local endpoint="$2"
local data="${3:-}" local data="${3:-}"
local args=(-s -w "\n%{http_code}" -X "$method" -H "X-API-Key: ${PORTAINER_API_KEY}") local args=(-s "${CURL_OPTS[@]}" -w "\n%{http_code}" -X "$method" -H "X-API-Key: ${PORTAINER_API_KEY}")
if [[ -n "$data" ]]; then if [[ -n "$data" ]]; then
args+=(-H "Content-Type: application/json" -d "$data") args+=(-H "Content-Type: application/json" -d "$data")

View File

@@ -54,12 +54,18 @@ fi
# Remove trailing slash from URL # Remove trailing slash from URL
PORTAINER_URL="${PORTAINER_URL%/}" PORTAINER_URL="${PORTAINER_URL%/}"
# TLS options
CURL_OPTS=()
if [ "${PORTAINER_INSECURE:-0}" = "1" ]; then
CURL_OPTS+=(-k)
fi
# Function to make API requests # Function to make API requests
api_request() { api_request() {
local method="$1" local method="$1"
local endpoint="$2" local endpoint="$2"
curl -s -w "\n%{http_code}" -X "$method" \ curl -s "${CURL_OPTS[@]}" -w "\n%{http_code}" -X "$method" \
-H "X-API-Key: ${PORTAINER_API_KEY}" \ -H "X-API-Key: ${PORTAINER_API_KEY}" \
"${PORTAINER_URL}${endpoint}" "${PORTAINER_URL}${endpoint}"
} }

View File

@@ -57,12 +57,18 @@ fi
# Remove trailing slash from URL # Remove trailing slash from URL
PORTAINER_URL="${PORTAINER_URL%/}" PORTAINER_URL="${PORTAINER_URL%/}"
# TLS options
CURL_OPTS=()
if [ "${PORTAINER_INSECURE:-0}" = "1" ]; then
CURL_OPTS+=(-k)
fi
# Function to make API requests # Function to make API requests
api_request() { api_request() {
local method="$1" local method="$1"
local endpoint="$2" local endpoint="$2"
curl -s -w "\n%{http_code}" -X "$method" \ curl -s "${CURL_OPTS[@]}" -w "\n%{http_code}" -X "$method" \
-H "X-API-Key: ${PORTAINER_API_KEY}" \ -H "X-API-Key: ${PORTAINER_API_KEY}" \
"${PORTAINER_URL}${endpoint}" "${PORTAINER_URL}${endpoint}"
} }

View File

@@ -54,12 +54,18 @@ fi
# Remove trailing slash from URL # Remove trailing slash from URL
PORTAINER_URL="${PORTAINER_URL%/}" PORTAINER_URL="${PORTAINER_URL%/}"
# TLS options
CURL_OPTS=()
if [ "${PORTAINER_INSECURE:-0}" = "1" ]; then
CURL_OPTS+=(-k)
fi
# Function to make API requests # Function to make API requests
api_request() { api_request() {
local method="$1" local method="$1"
local endpoint="$2" local endpoint="$2"
curl -s -w "\n%{http_code}" -X "$method" \ curl -s "${CURL_OPTS[@]}" -w "\n%{http_code}" -X "$method" \
-H "X-API-Key: ${PORTAINER_API_KEY}" \ -H "X-API-Key: ${PORTAINER_API_KEY}" \
"${PORTAINER_URL}${endpoint}" "${PORTAINER_URL}${endpoint}"
} }

View File

@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ import { registerUninstallCommand } from './commands/uninstall.js';
// prdy is registered via launch.ts // prdy is registered via launch.ts
import { registerLaunchCommands } from './commands/launch.js'; import { registerLaunchCommands } from './commands/launch.js';
import { registerAuthCommand } from './commands/auth.js'; import { registerAuthCommand } from './commands/auth.js';
import { registerFederationCommand } from './commands/federation.js';
import { registerGatewayCommand } from './commands/gateway.js'; import { registerGatewayCommand } from './commands/gateway.js';
import { import {
backgroundUpdateCheck, backgroundUpdateCheck,
@@ -336,6 +337,10 @@ registerAuthCommand(program);
registerGatewayCommand(program); registerGatewayCommand(program);
// ─── federation ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────
registerFederationCommand(program);
// ─── agent ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── // ─── agent ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
registerAgentCommand(program); registerAgentCommand(program);

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,410 @@
/**
* `mosaic federation` command group — federation grant + peer management (FED-M2-08).
*
* All HTTP calls go to the local gateway admin API using an admin token
* resolved from CLI options or meta.json.
*
* Subcommands:
* grant create --peer-id <uuid> --user-id <uuid> --scope <json> [--expires-at <iso>]
* grant list [--peer-id <uuid>] [--user-id <uuid>] [--status pending|active|revoked|expired]
* grant show <id>
* grant revoke <id> [--reason <text>]
* grant token <id> [--ttl 900]
*
* peer list
* peer add <enrollment-url>
*/
import type { Command } from 'commander';
import { readMeta } from './gateway/daemon.js';
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Types
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
interface FedParentOpts {
host: string;
port: string;
token?: string;
json?: boolean;
}
interface ResolvedOpts {
baseUrl: string;
token?: string;
json: boolean;
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Helpers
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
function resolveOpts(raw: FedParentOpts): ResolvedOpts {
const meta = readMeta();
const host = raw.host ?? meta?.host ?? 'localhost';
const port = parseInt(raw.port, 10) || meta?.port || 14242;
const token = raw.token ?? meta?.adminToken;
return {
baseUrl: `http://${host}:${port.toString()}`,
token,
json: raw.json ?? false,
};
}
function requireToken(opts: ResolvedOpts): string {
if (!opts.token) {
console.error(
'Error: admin token required. Use -t/--token <token> or ensure meta.json has adminToken.',
);
process.exit(1);
}
return opts.token;
}
async function apiRequest<T>(
opts: ResolvedOpts,
method: string,
path: string,
body?: unknown,
): Promise<T> {
const token = requireToken(opts);
const url = `${opts.baseUrl}${path}`;
const res = await fetch(url, {
method,
headers: {
'Content-Type': 'application/json',
Authorization: `Bearer ${token}`,
},
body: body !== undefined ? JSON.stringify(body) : undefined,
});
const text = await res.text();
if (!res.ok) {
let message = text;
try {
const parsed = JSON.parse(text) as { message?: string };
message = parsed.message ?? text;
} catch {
// use raw text
}
throw new Error(`HTTP ${res.status.toString()}: ${message}`);
}
if (!text) return undefined as unknown as T;
return JSON.parse(text) as T;
}
function printJson(data: unknown, useJson: boolean): void {
if (useJson) {
console.log(JSON.stringify(data, null, 2));
}
}
function printTable(rows: Record<string, unknown>[]): void {
if (rows.length === 0) {
console.log('(none)');
return;
}
for (const row of rows) {
for (const [key, val] of Object.entries(row)) {
console.log(` ${key}: ${String(val ?? '')}`);
}
console.log('');
}
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Command registration
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
export function registerFederationCommand(program: Command): void {
const fed = program
.command('federation')
.alias('fed')
.description('Manage federation grants and peers')
.option('-h, --host <host>', 'Gateway host', 'localhost')
.option('-p, --port <port>', 'Gateway port', '14242')
.option('-t, --token <token>', 'Admin token')
.option('--json', 'Machine-readable JSON output')
.action(() => fed.outputHelp());
// ─── grant subcommands ─────────────────────────────────────────────────
const grant = fed
.command('grant')
.description('Manage federation grants')
.action(() => grant.outputHelp());
grant
.command('create')
.description('Create a new federation grant')
.requiredOption('--peer-id <uuid>', 'Peer UUID')
.requiredOption('--user-id <uuid>', 'Subject user UUID')
.requiredOption('--scope <json>', 'Grant scope as JSON string')
.option('--expires-at <iso>', 'Optional expiry (ISO 8601)')
.action(
async (cmdOpts: { peerId: string; userId: string; scope: string; expiresAt?: string }) => {
const opts = resolveOpts(fed.opts() as FedParentOpts);
try {
let scope: Record<string, unknown>;
try {
scope = JSON.parse(cmdOpts.scope) as Record<string, unknown>;
} catch {
console.error('Error: --scope must be valid JSON');
process.exit(1);
}
const body: Record<string, unknown> = {
peerId: cmdOpts.peerId,
subjectUserId: cmdOpts.userId,
scope,
};
if (cmdOpts.expiresAt) body['expiresAt'] = cmdOpts.expiresAt;
const result = await apiRequest<Record<string, unknown>>(
opts,
'POST',
'/api/admin/federation/grants',
body,
);
if (opts.json) {
printJson(result, true);
} else {
console.log(`Grant created: ${String(result['id'])}`);
console.log(` Peer: ${String(result['peerId'])}`);
console.log(` User: ${String(result['subjectUserId'])}`);
console.log(` Status: ${String(result['status'])}`);
}
} catch (err) {
console.error(err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err));
process.exit(1);
}
},
);
grant
.command('list')
.description('List federation grants')
.option('--peer-id <uuid>', 'Filter by peer UUID')
.option('--user-id <uuid>', 'Filter by subject user UUID')
.option('--status <status>', 'Filter by status (pending|active|revoked|expired)')
.action(async (cmdOpts: { peerId?: string; userId?: string; status?: string }) => {
const opts = resolveOpts(fed.opts() as FedParentOpts);
try {
const params = new URLSearchParams();
if (cmdOpts.peerId) params.set('peerId', cmdOpts.peerId);
if (cmdOpts.userId) params.set('subjectUserId', cmdOpts.userId);
if (cmdOpts.status) params.set('status', cmdOpts.status);
const qs = params.toString() ? `?${params.toString()}` : '';
const result = await apiRequest<Record<string, unknown>[]>(
opts,
'GET',
`/api/admin/federation/grants${qs}`,
);
if (opts.json) {
printJson(result, true);
} else {
console.log(`Grants (${result.length.toString()}):\n`);
printTable(result);
}
} catch (err) {
console.error(err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err));
process.exit(1);
}
});
grant
.command('show <id>')
.description('Get a single grant by ID')
.action(async (id: string) => {
const opts = resolveOpts(fed.opts() as FedParentOpts);
try {
const result = await apiRequest<Record<string, unknown>>(
opts,
'GET',
`/api/admin/federation/grants/${id}`,
);
if (opts.json) {
printJson(result, true);
} else {
for (const [key, val] of Object.entries(result)) {
console.log(` ${key}: ${String(val ?? '')}`);
}
}
} catch (err) {
console.error(err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err));
process.exit(1);
}
});
grant
.command('revoke <id>')
.description('Revoke an active grant')
.option('--reason <text>', 'Revocation reason')
.action(async (id: string, cmdOpts: { reason?: string }) => {
const opts = resolveOpts(fed.opts() as FedParentOpts);
try {
const body: Record<string, unknown> = {};
if (cmdOpts.reason) body['reason'] = cmdOpts.reason;
const result = await apiRequest<Record<string, unknown>>(
opts,
'PATCH',
`/api/admin/federation/grants/${id}/revoke`,
body,
);
if (opts.json) {
printJson(result, true);
} else {
console.log(`Grant ${id} revoked.`);
if (result['revokedReason']) console.log(` Reason: ${String(result['revokedReason'])}`);
}
} catch (err) {
console.error(err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err));
process.exit(1);
}
});
grant
.command('token <id>')
.description('Generate a single-use enrollment token for a grant')
.option('--ttl <seconds>', 'Token lifetime in seconds (60-900)', '900')
.action(async (id: string, cmdOpts: { ttl: string }) => {
const opts = resolveOpts(fed.opts() as FedParentOpts);
try {
const ttlSeconds = parseInt(cmdOpts.ttl, 10) || 900;
const result = await apiRequest<{
token: string;
expiresAt: string;
enrollmentUrl: string;
}>(opts, 'POST', `/api/admin/federation/grants/${id}/tokens`, { ttlSeconds });
if (opts.json) {
printJson(result, true);
} else {
console.log('Enrollment token generated:');
console.log(` Token: ${result.token}`);
console.log(` Expires at: ${result.expiresAt}`);
console.log(` Enrollment URL: ${result.enrollmentUrl}`);
console.log('');
console.log('Share the enrollment URL with the remote peer operator.');
}
} catch (err) {
console.error(err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err));
process.exit(1);
}
});
// ─── peer subcommands ──────────────────────────────────────────────────
const peer = fed
.command('peer')
.description('Manage federation peers')
.action(() => peer.outputHelp());
peer
.command('list')
.description('List all federation peers')
.action(async () => {
const opts = resolveOpts(fed.opts() as FedParentOpts);
try {
const result = await apiRequest<Record<string, unknown>[]>(
opts,
'GET',
'/api/admin/federation/peers',
);
if (opts.json) {
printJson(result, true);
} else {
console.log(`Peers (${result.length.toString()}):\n`);
printTable(result);
}
} catch (err) {
console.error(err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err));
process.exit(1);
}
});
peer
.command('add <enrollment-url>')
.description('Enroll as a peer using a remote enrollment URL')
.action(async (enrollmentUrl: string) => {
const opts = resolveOpts(fed.opts() as FedParentOpts);
try {
// 1. Validate enrollment URL
let parsedUrl: URL;
try {
parsedUrl = new URL(enrollmentUrl);
} catch {
console.error(`Error: invalid enrollment URL: ${enrollmentUrl}`);
process.exit(1);
}
if (parsedUrl.protocol !== 'https:' && parsedUrl.protocol !== 'http:') {
console.error('Error: enrollment URL must use http or https');
process.exit(1);
}
const hostname = parsedUrl.hostname;
const commonName = hostname.replace(/\./g, '-');
console.log(`Enrolling as peer with remote: ${enrollmentUrl}`);
console.log(` Common name: ${commonName}`);
// 2. Generate key pair and CSR via local gateway
console.log('Generating key pair and CSR...');
const keypairResult = await apiRequest<{ peerId: string; csrPem: string }>(
opts,
'POST',
'/api/admin/federation/peers/keypair',
{ commonName, displayName: hostname },
);
const { peerId, csrPem } = keypairResult;
console.log(` Peer ID: ${peerId}`);
// 3. Submit CSR to remote enrollment endpoint
console.log('Submitting CSR to remote enrollment endpoint...');
const remoteRes = await fetch(enrollmentUrl, {
method: 'POST',
headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
body: JSON.stringify({ csrPem }),
});
if (!remoteRes.ok) {
const errText = await remoteRes.text();
throw new Error(`Remote enrollment failed (${remoteRes.status.toString()}): ${errText}`);
}
const remoteResult = (await remoteRes.json()) as { certPem: string; certChainPem: string };
if (!remoteResult.certPem) {
throw new Error('Remote enrollment response missing certPem');
}
// 4. Store the signed certificate in the local gateway
console.log('Storing signed certificate...');
await apiRequest<Record<string, unknown>>(
opts,
'PATCH',
`/api/admin/federation/peers/${peerId}/cert`,
{ certPem: remoteResult.certPem },
);
console.log(`\nPeer enrolled successfully.`);
console.log(` ID: ${peerId}`);
console.log(` State: active`);
} catch (err) {
console.error(err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err));
process.exit(1);
}
});
}

267
pnpm-lock.yaml generated
View File

@@ -131,6 +131,9 @@ importers:
'@opentelemetry/semantic-conventions': '@opentelemetry/semantic-conventions':
specifier: ^1.40.0 specifier: ^1.40.0
version: 1.40.0 version: 1.40.0
'@peculiar/x509':
specifier: ^2.0.0
version: 2.0.0
'@sinclair/typebox': '@sinclair/typebox':
specifier: ^0.34.48 specifier: ^0.34.48
version: 0.34.48 version: 0.34.48
@@ -155,6 +158,9 @@ importers:
ioredis: ioredis:
specifier: ^5.10.0 specifier: ^5.10.0
version: 5.10.0 version: 5.10.0
jose:
specifier: ^6.2.2
version: 6.2.2
node-cron: node-cron:
specifier: ^4.2.1 specifier: ^4.2.1
version: 4.2.1 version: 4.2.1
@@ -704,10 +710,10 @@ importers:
dependencies: dependencies:
'@mariozechner/pi-agent-core': '@mariozechner/pi-agent-core':
specifier: ^0.63.1 specifier: ^0.63.1
version: 0.63.2(@modelcontextprotocol/sdk@1.28.0(zod@4.3.6))(ws@8.20.0)(zod@3.25.76) version: 0.63.2(@modelcontextprotocol/sdk@1.28.0(zod@4.3.6))(ws@8.20.0)(zod@4.3.6)
'@mariozechner/pi-ai': '@mariozechner/pi-ai':
specifier: ^0.63.1 specifier: ^0.63.1
version: 0.63.2(@modelcontextprotocol/sdk@1.28.0(zod@4.3.6))(ws@8.20.0)(zod@3.25.76) version: 0.63.2(@modelcontextprotocol/sdk@1.28.0(zod@4.3.6))(ws@8.20.0)(zod@4.3.6)
'@sinclair/typebox': '@sinclair/typebox':
specifier: ^0.34.41 specifier: ^0.34.41
version: 0.34.48 version: 0.34.48
@@ -3060,6 +3066,40 @@ packages:
'@paralleldrive/cuid2@2.3.1': '@paralleldrive/cuid2@2.3.1':
resolution: {integrity: sha512-XO7cAxhnTZl0Yggq6jOgjiOHhbgcO4NqFqwSmQpjK3b6TEE6Uj/jfSk6wzYyemh3+I0sHirKSetjQwn5cZktFw==} resolution: {integrity: sha512-XO7cAxhnTZl0Yggq6jOgjiOHhbgcO4NqFqwSmQpjK3b6TEE6Uj/jfSk6wzYyemh3+I0sHirKSetjQwn5cZktFw==}
'@peculiar/asn1-cms@2.6.1':
resolution: {integrity: sha512-vdG4fBF6Lkirkcl53q6eOdn3XYKt+kJTG59edgRZORlg/3atWWEReRCx5rYE1ZzTTX6vLK5zDMjHh7vbrcXGtw==}
'@peculiar/asn1-csr@2.6.1':
resolution: {integrity: sha512-WRWnKfIocHyzFYQTka8O/tXCiBquAPSrRjXbOkHbO4qdmS6loffCEGs+rby6WxxGdJCuunnhS2duHURhjyio6w==}
'@peculiar/asn1-ecc@2.6.1':
resolution: {integrity: sha512-+Vqw8WFxrtDIN5ehUdvlN2m73exS2JVG0UAyfVB31gIfor3zWEAQPD+K9ydCxaj3MLen9k0JhKpu9LqviuCE1g==}
'@peculiar/asn1-pfx@2.6.1':
resolution: {integrity: sha512-nB5jVQy3MAAWvq0KY0R2JUZG8bO/bTLpnwyOzXyEh/e54ynGTatAR+csOnXkkVD9AFZ2uL8Z7EV918+qB1qDvw==}
'@peculiar/asn1-pkcs8@2.6.1':
resolution: {integrity: sha512-JB5iQ9Izn5yGMw3ZG4Nw3Xn/hb/G38GYF3lf7WmJb8JZUydhVGEjK/ZlFSWhnlB7K/4oqEs8HnfFIKklhR58Tw==}
'@peculiar/asn1-pkcs9@2.6.1':
resolution: {integrity: sha512-5EV8nZoMSxeWmcxWmmcolg22ojZRgJg+Y9MX2fnE2bGRo5KQLqV5IL9kdSQDZxlHz95tHvIq9F//bvL1OeNILw==}
'@peculiar/asn1-rsa@2.6.1':
resolution: {integrity: sha512-1nVMEh46SElUt5CB3RUTV4EG/z7iYc7EoaDY5ECwganibQPkZ/Y2eMsTKB/LeyrUJ+W/tKoD9WUqIy8vB+CEdA==}
'@peculiar/asn1-schema@2.6.0':
resolution: {integrity: sha512-xNLYLBFTBKkCzEZIw842BxytQQATQv+lDTCEMZ8C196iJcJJMBUZxrhSTxLaohMyKK8QlzRNTRkUmanucnDSqg==}
'@peculiar/asn1-x509-attr@2.6.1':
resolution: {integrity: sha512-tlW6cxoHwgcQghnJwv3YS+9OO1737zgPogZ+CgWRUK4roEwIPzRH4JEiG770xe5HX2ATfCpmX60gurfWIF9dcQ==}
'@peculiar/asn1-x509@2.6.1':
resolution: {integrity: sha512-O9jT5F1A2+t3r7C4VT7LYGXqkGLK7Kj1xFpz7U0isPrubwU5PbDoyYtx6MiGst29yq7pXN5vZbQFKRCP+lLZlA==}
'@peculiar/x509@2.0.0':
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js-tokens@4.0.0: js-tokens@4.0.0:
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engines: {node: '>=16.0.0'}
qrcode-terminal@0.12.0: qrcode-terminal@0.12.0:
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hasBin: true hasBin: true
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ts-mixer@6.0.4: ts-mixer@6.0.4:
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@@ -6844,6 +6901,10 @@ packages:
engines: {node: '>=18.0.0'} engines: {node: '>=18.0.0'}
hasBin: true hasBin: true
tsyringe@4.10.0:
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engines: {node: '>= 6.0.0'}
tunnel-agent@0.6.0: tunnel-agent@0.6.0:
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@@ -7265,12 +7326,6 @@ snapshots:
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'@jridgewell/trace-mapping': 0.3.31 '@jridgewell/trace-mapping': 0.3.31
'@anthropic-ai/sdk@0.73.0(zod@3.25.76)':
dependencies:
json-schema-to-ts: 3.1.1
optionalDependencies:
zod: 3.25.76
'@anthropic-ai/sdk@0.73.0(zod@4.3.6)': '@anthropic-ai/sdk@0.73.0(zod@4.3.6)':
dependencies: dependencies:
json-schema-to-ts: 3.1.1 json-schema-to-ts: 3.1.1
@@ -7765,49 +7820,49 @@ snapshots:
'@bcoe/v8-coverage@0.2.3': {} '@bcoe/v8-coverage@0.2.3': {}
'@better-auth/core@1.5.5(@better-auth/utils@0.3.1)(@better-fetch/fetch@1.1.21)(better-call@1.3.2(zod@4.3.6))(jose@6.2.1)(kysely@0.28.11)(nanostores@1.1.1)': '@better-auth/core@1.5.5(@better-auth/utils@0.3.1)(@better-fetch/fetch@1.1.21)(better-call@1.3.2(zod@4.3.6))(jose@6.2.2)(kysely@0.28.11)(nanostores@1.1.1)':
dependencies: dependencies:
'@better-auth/utils': 0.3.1 '@better-auth/utils': 0.3.1
'@better-fetch/fetch': 1.1.21 '@better-fetch/fetch': 1.1.21
'@standard-schema/spec': 1.1.0 '@standard-schema/spec': 1.1.0
better-call: 1.3.2(zod@4.3.6) better-call: 1.3.2(zod@4.3.6)
jose: 6.2.1 jose: 6.2.2
kysely: 0.28.11 kysely: 0.28.11
nanostores: 1.1.1 nanostores: 1.1.1
zod: 4.3.6 zod: 4.3.6
'@better-auth/drizzle-adapter@1.5.5(@better-auth/core@1.5.5(@better-auth/utils@0.3.1)(@better-fetch/fetch@1.1.21)(better-call@1.3.2(zod@4.3.6))(jose@6.2.1)(kysely@0.28.11)(nanostores@1.1.1))(@better-auth/utils@0.3.1)(drizzle-orm@0.45.1(@electric-sql/pglite@0.2.17)(@opentelemetry/api@1.9.0)(@types/better-sqlite3@7.6.13)(@types/pg@8.15.6)(better-sqlite3@12.8.0)(kysely@0.28.11)(postgres@3.4.8))': '@better-auth/drizzle-adapter@1.5.5(@better-auth/core@1.5.5(@better-auth/utils@0.3.1)(@better-fetch/fetch@1.1.21)(better-call@1.3.2(zod@4.3.6))(jose@6.2.2)(kysely@0.28.11)(nanostores@1.1.1))(@better-auth/utils@0.3.1)(drizzle-orm@0.45.1(@electric-sql/pglite@0.2.17)(@opentelemetry/api@1.9.0)(@types/better-sqlite3@7.6.13)(@types/pg@8.15.6)(better-sqlite3@12.8.0)(kysely@0.28.11)(postgres@3.4.8))':
dependencies: dependencies:
'@better-auth/core': 1.5.5(@better-auth/utils@0.3.1)(@better-fetch/fetch@1.1.21)(better-call@1.3.2(zod@4.3.6))(jose@6.2.1)(kysely@0.28.11)(nanostores@1.1.1) '@better-auth/core': 1.5.5(@better-auth/utils@0.3.1)(@better-fetch/fetch@1.1.21)(better-call@1.3.2(zod@4.3.6))(jose@6.2.2)(kysely@0.28.11)(nanostores@1.1.1)
'@better-auth/utils': 0.3.1 '@better-auth/utils': 0.3.1
optionalDependencies: optionalDependencies:
drizzle-orm: 0.45.1(@electric-sql/pglite@0.2.17)(@opentelemetry/api@1.9.0)(@types/better-sqlite3@7.6.13)(@types/pg@8.15.6)(better-sqlite3@12.8.0)(kysely@0.28.11)(postgres@3.4.8) drizzle-orm: 0.45.1(@electric-sql/pglite@0.2.17)(@opentelemetry/api@1.9.0)(@types/better-sqlite3@7.6.13)(@types/pg@8.15.6)(better-sqlite3@12.8.0)(kysely@0.28.11)(postgres@3.4.8)
'@better-auth/kysely-adapter@1.5.5(@better-auth/core@1.5.5(@better-auth/utils@0.3.1)(@better-fetch/fetch@1.1.21)(better-call@1.3.2(zod@4.3.6))(jose@6.2.1)(kysely@0.28.11)(nanostores@1.1.1))(@better-auth/utils@0.3.1)(kysely@0.28.11)': '@better-auth/kysely-adapter@1.5.5(@better-auth/core@1.5.5(@better-auth/utils@0.3.1)(@better-fetch/fetch@1.1.21)(better-call@1.3.2(zod@4.3.6))(jose@6.2.2)(kysely@0.28.11)(nanostores@1.1.1))(@better-auth/utils@0.3.1)(kysely@0.28.11)':
dependencies: dependencies:
'@better-auth/core': 1.5.5(@better-auth/utils@0.3.1)(@better-fetch/fetch@1.1.21)(better-call@1.3.2(zod@4.3.6))(jose@6.2.1)(kysely@0.28.11)(nanostores@1.1.1) '@better-auth/core': 1.5.5(@better-auth/utils@0.3.1)(@better-fetch/fetch@1.1.21)(better-call@1.3.2(zod@4.3.6))(jose@6.2.2)(kysely@0.28.11)(nanostores@1.1.1)
'@better-auth/utils': 0.3.1 '@better-auth/utils': 0.3.1
kysely: 0.28.11 kysely: 0.28.11
'@better-auth/memory-adapter@1.5.5(@better-auth/core@1.5.5(@better-auth/utils@0.3.1)(@better-fetch/fetch@1.1.21)(better-call@1.3.2(zod@4.3.6))(jose@6.2.1)(kysely@0.28.11)(nanostores@1.1.1))(@better-auth/utils@0.3.1)': '@better-auth/memory-adapter@1.5.5(@better-auth/core@1.5.5(@better-auth/utils@0.3.1)(@better-fetch/fetch@1.1.21)(better-call@1.3.2(zod@4.3.6))(jose@6.2.2)(kysely@0.28.11)(nanostores@1.1.1))(@better-auth/utils@0.3.1)':
dependencies: dependencies:
'@better-auth/core': 1.5.5(@better-auth/utils@0.3.1)(@better-fetch/fetch@1.1.21)(better-call@1.3.2(zod@4.3.6))(jose@6.2.1)(kysely@0.28.11)(nanostores@1.1.1) '@better-auth/core': 1.5.5(@better-auth/utils@0.3.1)(@better-fetch/fetch@1.1.21)(better-call@1.3.2(zod@4.3.6))(jose@6.2.2)(kysely@0.28.11)(nanostores@1.1.1)
'@better-auth/utils': 0.3.1 '@better-auth/utils': 0.3.1
'@better-auth/mongo-adapter@1.5.5(@better-auth/core@1.5.5(@better-auth/utils@0.3.1)(@better-fetch/fetch@1.1.21)(better-call@1.3.2(zod@4.3.6))(jose@6.2.1)(kysely@0.28.11)(nanostores@1.1.1))(@better-auth/utils@0.3.1)(mongodb@7.1.0(socks@2.8.7))': '@better-auth/mongo-adapter@1.5.5(@better-auth/core@1.5.5(@better-auth/utils@0.3.1)(@better-fetch/fetch@1.1.21)(better-call@1.3.2(zod@4.3.6))(jose@6.2.2)(kysely@0.28.11)(nanostores@1.1.1))(@better-auth/utils@0.3.1)(mongodb@7.1.0(socks@2.8.7))':
dependencies: dependencies:
'@better-auth/core': 1.5.5(@better-auth/utils@0.3.1)(@better-fetch/fetch@1.1.21)(better-call@1.3.2(zod@4.3.6))(jose@6.2.1)(kysely@0.28.11)(nanostores@1.1.1) '@better-auth/core': 1.5.5(@better-auth/utils@0.3.1)(@better-fetch/fetch@1.1.21)(better-call@1.3.2(zod@4.3.6))(jose@6.2.2)(kysely@0.28.11)(nanostores@1.1.1)
'@better-auth/utils': 0.3.1 '@better-auth/utils': 0.3.1
mongodb: 7.1.0(socks@2.8.7) mongodb: 7.1.0(socks@2.8.7)
'@better-auth/prisma-adapter@1.5.5(@better-auth/core@1.5.5(@better-auth/utils@0.3.1)(@better-fetch/fetch@1.1.21)(better-call@1.3.2(zod@4.3.6))(jose@6.2.1)(kysely@0.28.11)(nanostores@1.1.1))(@better-auth/utils@0.3.1)': '@better-auth/prisma-adapter@1.5.5(@better-auth/core@1.5.5(@better-auth/utils@0.3.1)(@better-fetch/fetch@1.1.21)(better-call@1.3.2(zod@4.3.6))(jose@6.2.2)(kysely@0.28.11)(nanostores@1.1.1))(@better-auth/utils@0.3.1)':
dependencies: dependencies:
'@better-auth/core': 1.5.5(@better-auth/utils@0.3.1)(@better-fetch/fetch@1.1.21)(better-call@1.3.2(zod@4.3.6))(jose@6.2.1)(kysely@0.28.11)(nanostores@1.1.1) '@better-auth/core': 1.5.5(@better-auth/utils@0.3.1)(@better-fetch/fetch@1.1.21)(better-call@1.3.2(zod@4.3.6))(jose@6.2.2)(kysely@0.28.11)(nanostores@1.1.1)
'@better-auth/utils': 0.3.1 '@better-auth/utils': 0.3.1
'@better-auth/telemetry@1.5.5(@better-auth/core@1.5.5(@better-auth/utils@0.3.1)(@better-fetch/fetch@1.1.21)(better-call@1.3.2(zod@4.3.6))(jose@6.2.1)(kysely@0.28.11)(nanostores@1.1.1))': '@better-auth/telemetry@1.5.5(@better-auth/core@1.5.5(@better-auth/utils@0.3.1)(@better-fetch/fetch@1.1.21)(better-call@1.3.2(zod@4.3.6))(jose@6.2.2)(kysely@0.28.11)(nanostores@1.1.1))':
dependencies: dependencies:
'@better-auth/core': 1.5.5(@better-auth/utils@0.3.1)(@better-fetch/fetch@1.1.21)(better-call@1.3.2(zod@4.3.6))(jose@6.2.1)(kysely@0.28.11)(nanostores@1.1.1) '@better-auth/core': 1.5.5(@better-auth/utils@0.3.1)(@better-fetch/fetch@1.1.21)(better-call@1.3.2(zod@4.3.6))(jose@6.2.2)(kysely@0.28.11)(nanostores@1.1.1)
'@better-auth/utils': 0.3.1 '@better-auth/utils': 0.3.1
'@better-fetch/fetch': 1.1.21 '@better-fetch/fetch': 1.1.21
@@ -8612,18 +8667,6 @@ snapshots:
- ws - ws
- zod - zod
'@mariozechner/pi-agent-core@0.63.2(@modelcontextprotocol/sdk@1.28.0(zod@4.3.6))(ws@8.20.0)(zod@3.25.76)':
dependencies:
'@mariozechner/pi-ai': 0.63.2(@modelcontextprotocol/sdk@1.28.0(zod@4.3.6))(ws@8.20.0)(zod@3.25.76)
transitivePeerDependencies:
- '@modelcontextprotocol/sdk'
- aws-crt
- bufferutil
- supports-color
- utf-8-validate
- ws
- zod
'@mariozechner/pi-agent-core@0.63.2(@modelcontextprotocol/sdk@1.28.0(zod@4.3.6))(ws@8.20.0)(zod@4.3.6)': '@mariozechner/pi-agent-core@0.63.2(@modelcontextprotocol/sdk@1.28.0(zod@4.3.6))(ws@8.20.0)(zod@4.3.6)':
dependencies: dependencies:
'@mariozechner/pi-ai': 0.63.2(@modelcontextprotocol/sdk@1.28.0(zod@4.3.6))(ws@8.20.0)(zod@4.3.6) '@mariozechner/pi-ai': 0.63.2(@modelcontextprotocol/sdk@1.28.0(zod@4.3.6))(ws@8.20.0)(zod@4.3.6)
@@ -8672,30 +8715,6 @@ snapshots:
- ws - ws
- zod - zod
'@mariozechner/pi-ai@0.63.2(@modelcontextprotocol/sdk@1.28.0(zod@4.3.6))(ws@8.20.0)(zod@3.25.76)':
dependencies:
'@anthropic-ai/sdk': 0.73.0(zod@3.25.76)
'@aws-sdk/client-bedrock-runtime': 3.1008.0
'@google/genai': 1.45.0(@modelcontextprotocol/sdk@1.28.0(zod@4.3.6))
'@mistralai/mistralai': 1.14.1
'@sinclair/typebox': 0.34.48
ajv: 8.18.0
ajv-formats: 3.0.1(ajv@8.18.0)
chalk: 5.6.2
openai: 6.26.0(ws@8.20.0)(zod@3.25.76)
partial-json: 0.1.7
proxy-agent: 6.5.0
undici: 7.24.3
zod-to-json-schema: 3.25.1(zod@3.25.76)
transitivePeerDependencies:
- '@modelcontextprotocol/sdk'
- aws-crt
- bufferutil
- supports-color
- utf-8-validate
- ws
- zod
'@mariozechner/pi-ai@0.63.2(@modelcontextprotocol/sdk@1.28.0(zod@4.3.6))(ws@8.20.0)(zod@4.3.6)': '@mariozechner/pi-ai@0.63.2(@modelcontextprotocol/sdk@1.28.0(zod@4.3.6))(ws@8.20.0)(zod@4.3.6)':
dependencies: dependencies:
'@anthropic-ai/sdk': 0.73.0(zod@4.3.6) '@anthropic-ai/sdk': 0.73.0(zod@4.3.6)
@@ -8862,7 +8881,7 @@ snapshots:
express: 5.2.1 express: 5.2.1
express-rate-limit: 8.3.1(express@5.2.1) express-rate-limit: 8.3.1(express@5.2.1)
hono: 4.12.8 hono: 4.12.8
jose: 6.2.1 jose: 6.2.2
json-schema-typed: 8.0.2 json-schema-typed: 8.0.2
pkce-challenge: 5.0.1 pkce-challenge: 5.0.1
raw-body: 3.0.2 raw-body: 3.0.2
@@ -9992,6 +10011,95 @@ snapshots:
dependencies: dependencies:
'@noble/hashes': 1.8.0 '@noble/hashes': 1.8.0
'@peculiar/asn1-cms@2.6.1':
dependencies:
'@peculiar/asn1-schema': 2.6.0
'@peculiar/asn1-x509': 2.6.1
'@peculiar/asn1-x509-attr': 2.6.1
asn1js: 3.0.10
tslib: 2.8.1
'@peculiar/asn1-csr@2.6.1':
dependencies:
'@peculiar/asn1-schema': 2.6.0
'@peculiar/asn1-x509': 2.6.1
asn1js: 3.0.10
tslib: 2.8.1
'@peculiar/asn1-ecc@2.6.1':
dependencies:
'@peculiar/asn1-schema': 2.6.0
'@peculiar/asn1-x509': 2.6.1
asn1js: 3.0.10
tslib: 2.8.1
'@peculiar/asn1-pfx@2.6.1':
dependencies:
'@peculiar/asn1-cms': 2.6.1
'@peculiar/asn1-pkcs8': 2.6.1
'@peculiar/asn1-rsa': 2.6.1
'@peculiar/asn1-schema': 2.6.0
asn1js: 3.0.10
tslib: 2.8.1
'@peculiar/asn1-pkcs8@2.6.1':
dependencies:
'@peculiar/asn1-schema': 2.6.0
'@peculiar/asn1-x509': 2.6.1
asn1js: 3.0.10
tslib: 2.8.1
'@peculiar/asn1-pkcs9@2.6.1':
dependencies:
'@peculiar/asn1-cms': 2.6.1
'@peculiar/asn1-pfx': 2.6.1
'@peculiar/asn1-pkcs8': 2.6.1
'@peculiar/asn1-schema': 2.6.0
'@peculiar/asn1-x509': 2.6.1
'@peculiar/asn1-x509-attr': 2.6.1
asn1js: 3.0.10
tslib: 2.8.1
'@peculiar/asn1-rsa@2.6.1':
dependencies:
'@peculiar/asn1-schema': 2.6.0
'@peculiar/asn1-x509': 2.6.1
asn1js: 3.0.10
tslib: 2.8.1
'@peculiar/asn1-schema@2.6.0':
dependencies:
asn1js: 3.0.10
pvtsutils: 1.3.6
tslib: 2.8.1
'@peculiar/asn1-x509-attr@2.6.1':
dependencies:
'@peculiar/asn1-schema': 2.6.0
'@peculiar/asn1-x509': 2.6.1
asn1js: 3.0.10
tslib: 2.8.1
'@peculiar/asn1-x509@2.6.1':
dependencies:
'@peculiar/asn1-schema': 2.6.0
asn1js: 3.0.10
pvtsutils: 1.3.6
tslib: 2.8.1
'@peculiar/x509@2.0.0':
dependencies:
'@peculiar/asn1-cms': 2.6.1
'@peculiar/asn1-csr': 2.6.1
'@peculiar/asn1-ecc': 2.6.1
'@peculiar/asn1-pkcs9': 2.6.1
'@peculiar/asn1-rsa': 2.6.1
'@peculiar/asn1-schema': 2.6.0
'@peculiar/asn1-x509': 2.6.1
pvtsutils: 1.3.6
tslib: 2.8.1
tsyringe: 4.10.0
'@pinojs/redact@0.4.0': {} '@pinojs/redact@0.4.0': {}
'@pkgjs/parseargs@0.11.0': '@pkgjs/parseargs@0.11.0':
@@ -10948,6 +11056,12 @@ snapshots:
asap@2.0.6: {} asap@2.0.6: {}
asn1js@3.0.10:
dependencies:
pvtsutils: 1.3.6
pvutils: 1.1.5
tslib: 2.8.1
assertion-error@2.0.1: {} assertion-error@2.0.1: {}
ast-types@0.13.4: ast-types@0.13.4:
@@ -10992,20 +11106,20 @@ snapshots:
better-auth@1.5.5(better-sqlite3@12.8.0)(drizzle-kit@0.31.9)(drizzle-orm@0.45.1(@electric-sql/pglite@0.2.17)(@opentelemetry/api@1.9.0)(@types/better-sqlite3@7.6.13)(@types/pg@8.15.6)(better-sqlite3@12.8.0)(kysely@0.28.11)(postgres@3.4.8))(mongodb@7.1.0(socks@2.8.7))(next@16.1.6(@opentelemetry/api@1.9.0)(@playwright/test@1.58.2)(react-dom@19.2.4(react@19.2.4))(react@19.2.4))(react-dom@19.2.4(react@19.2.4))(react@19.2.4)(vitest@2.1.9(@types/node@22.19.15)(jsdom@29.0.0(@noble/hashes@2.0.1))(lightningcss@1.31.1)): better-auth@1.5.5(better-sqlite3@12.8.0)(drizzle-kit@0.31.9)(drizzle-orm@0.45.1(@electric-sql/pglite@0.2.17)(@opentelemetry/api@1.9.0)(@types/better-sqlite3@7.6.13)(@types/pg@8.15.6)(better-sqlite3@12.8.0)(kysely@0.28.11)(postgres@3.4.8))(mongodb@7.1.0(socks@2.8.7))(next@16.1.6(@opentelemetry/api@1.9.0)(@playwright/test@1.58.2)(react-dom@19.2.4(react@19.2.4))(react@19.2.4))(react-dom@19.2.4(react@19.2.4))(react@19.2.4)(vitest@2.1.9(@types/node@22.19.15)(jsdom@29.0.0(@noble/hashes@2.0.1))(lightningcss@1.31.1)):
dependencies: dependencies:
'@better-auth/core': 1.5.5(@better-auth/utils@0.3.1)(@better-fetch/fetch@1.1.21)(better-call@1.3.2(zod@4.3.6))(jose@6.2.1)(kysely@0.28.11)(nanostores@1.1.1) '@better-auth/core': 1.5.5(@better-auth/utils@0.3.1)(@better-fetch/fetch@1.1.21)(better-call@1.3.2(zod@4.3.6))(jose@6.2.2)(kysely@0.28.11)(nanostores@1.1.1)
'@better-auth/drizzle-adapter': 1.5.5(@better-auth/core@1.5.5(@better-auth/utils@0.3.1)(@better-fetch/fetch@1.1.21)(better-call@1.3.2(zod@4.3.6))(jose@6.2.1)(kysely@0.28.11)(nanostores@1.1.1))(@better-auth/utils@0.3.1)(drizzle-orm@0.45.1(@electric-sql/pglite@0.2.17)(@opentelemetry/api@1.9.0)(@types/better-sqlite3@7.6.13)(@types/pg@8.15.6)(better-sqlite3@12.8.0)(kysely@0.28.11)(postgres@3.4.8)) '@better-auth/drizzle-adapter': 1.5.5(@better-auth/core@1.5.5(@better-auth/utils@0.3.1)(@better-fetch/fetch@1.1.21)(better-call@1.3.2(zod@4.3.6))(jose@6.2.2)(kysely@0.28.11)(nanostores@1.1.1))(@better-auth/utils@0.3.1)(drizzle-orm@0.45.1(@electric-sql/pglite@0.2.17)(@opentelemetry/api@1.9.0)(@types/better-sqlite3@7.6.13)(@types/pg@8.15.6)(better-sqlite3@12.8.0)(kysely@0.28.11)(postgres@3.4.8))
'@better-auth/kysely-adapter': 1.5.5(@better-auth/core@1.5.5(@better-auth/utils@0.3.1)(@better-fetch/fetch@1.1.21)(better-call@1.3.2(zod@4.3.6))(jose@6.2.1)(kysely@0.28.11)(nanostores@1.1.1))(@better-auth/utils@0.3.1)(kysely@0.28.11) '@better-auth/kysely-adapter': 1.5.5(@better-auth/core@1.5.5(@better-auth/utils@0.3.1)(@better-fetch/fetch@1.1.21)(better-call@1.3.2(zod@4.3.6))(jose@6.2.2)(kysely@0.28.11)(nanostores@1.1.1))(@better-auth/utils@0.3.1)(kysely@0.28.11)
'@better-auth/memory-adapter': 1.5.5(@better-auth/core@1.5.5(@better-auth/utils@0.3.1)(@better-fetch/fetch@1.1.21)(better-call@1.3.2(zod@4.3.6))(jose@6.2.1)(kysely@0.28.11)(nanostores@1.1.1))(@better-auth/utils@0.3.1) '@better-auth/memory-adapter': 1.5.5(@better-auth/core@1.5.5(@better-auth/utils@0.3.1)(@better-fetch/fetch@1.1.21)(better-call@1.3.2(zod@4.3.6))(jose@6.2.2)(kysely@0.28.11)(nanostores@1.1.1))(@better-auth/utils@0.3.1)
'@better-auth/mongo-adapter': 1.5.5(@better-auth/core@1.5.5(@better-auth/utils@0.3.1)(@better-fetch/fetch@1.1.21)(better-call@1.3.2(zod@4.3.6))(jose@6.2.1)(kysely@0.28.11)(nanostores@1.1.1))(@better-auth/utils@0.3.1)(mongodb@7.1.0(socks@2.8.7)) '@better-auth/mongo-adapter': 1.5.5(@better-auth/core@1.5.5(@better-auth/utils@0.3.1)(@better-fetch/fetch@1.1.21)(better-call@1.3.2(zod@4.3.6))(jose@6.2.2)(kysely@0.28.11)(nanostores@1.1.1))(@better-auth/utils@0.3.1)(mongodb@7.1.0(socks@2.8.7))
'@better-auth/prisma-adapter': 1.5.5(@better-auth/core@1.5.5(@better-auth/utils@0.3.1)(@better-fetch/fetch@1.1.21)(better-call@1.3.2(zod@4.3.6))(jose@6.2.1)(kysely@0.28.11)(nanostores@1.1.1))(@better-auth/utils@0.3.1) '@better-auth/prisma-adapter': 1.5.5(@better-auth/core@1.5.5(@better-auth/utils@0.3.1)(@better-fetch/fetch@1.1.21)(better-call@1.3.2(zod@4.3.6))(jose@6.2.2)(kysely@0.28.11)(nanostores@1.1.1))(@better-auth/utils@0.3.1)
'@better-auth/telemetry': 1.5.5(@better-auth/core@1.5.5(@better-auth/utils@0.3.1)(@better-fetch/fetch@1.1.21)(better-call@1.3.2(zod@4.3.6))(jose@6.2.1)(kysely@0.28.11)(nanostores@1.1.1)) '@better-auth/telemetry': 1.5.5(@better-auth/core@1.5.5(@better-auth/utils@0.3.1)(@better-fetch/fetch@1.1.21)(better-call@1.3.2(zod@4.3.6))(jose@6.2.2)(kysely@0.28.11)(nanostores@1.1.1))
'@better-auth/utils': 0.3.1 '@better-auth/utils': 0.3.1
'@better-fetch/fetch': 1.1.21 '@better-fetch/fetch': 1.1.21
'@noble/ciphers': 2.1.1 '@noble/ciphers': 2.1.1
'@noble/hashes': 2.0.1 '@noble/hashes': 2.0.1
better-call: 1.3.2(zod@4.3.6) better-call: 1.3.2(zod@4.3.6)
defu: 6.1.4 defu: 6.1.4
jose: 6.2.1 jose: 6.2.2
kysely: 0.28.11 kysely: 0.28.11
nanostores: 1.1.1 nanostores: 1.1.1
zod: 4.3.6 zod: 4.3.6
@@ -12448,6 +12562,8 @@ snapshots:
jose@6.2.1: {} jose@6.2.1: {}
jose@6.2.2: {}
js-tokens@4.0.0: {} js-tokens@4.0.0: {}
js-yaml@4.1.1: js-yaml@4.1.1:
@@ -13191,11 +13307,6 @@ snapshots:
dependencies: dependencies:
mimic-function: 5.0.1 mimic-function: 5.0.1
openai@6.26.0(ws@8.20.0)(zod@3.25.76):
optionalDependencies:
ws: 8.20.0
zod: 3.25.76
openai@6.26.0(ws@8.20.0)(zod@4.3.6): openai@6.26.0(ws@8.20.0)(zod@4.3.6):
optionalDependencies: optionalDependencies:
ws: 8.20.0 ws: 8.20.0
@@ -13548,6 +13659,12 @@ snapshots:
punycode@2.3.1: {} punycode@2.3.1: {}
pvtsutils@1.3.6:
dependencies:
tslib: 2.8.1
pvutils@1.1.5: {}
qrcode-terminal@0.12.0: {} qrcode-terminal@0.12.0: {}
qs@6.15.0: qs@6.15.0:
@@ -14231,6 +14348,8 @@ snapshots:
ts-mixer@6.0.4: {} ts-mixer@6.0.4: {}
tslib@1.14.1: {}
tslib@2.8.1: {} tslib@2.8.1: {}
tslog@4.10.2: {} tslog@4.10.2: {}
@@ -14242,6 +14361,10 @@ snapshots:
optionalDependencies: optionalDependencies:
fsevents: 2.3.3 fsevents: 2.3.3
tsyringe@4.10.0:
dependencies:
tslib: 1.14.1
tunnel-agent@0.6.0: tunnel-agent@0.6.0:
dependencies: dependencies:
safe-buffer: 5.2.1 safe-buffer: 5.2.1

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,254 @@
# Federation Test Harness
Local two-gateway federation test infrastructure for Mosaic Stack M3+.
This harness boots two real gateway instances (`gateway-a`, `gateway-b`) on a
shared Docker bridge network, each backed by its own Postgres (pgvector) +
Valkey, sharing a single Step-CA. It is the test bed for all M3+ federation
E2E tests.
## Prerequisites
- Docker with Compose v2 (`docker compose version` ≥ 2.20)
- pnpm (for running via repo scripts)
- `infra/step-ca/dev-password` must exist (copy from `infra/step-ca/dev-password.example`)
## Network Topology
```
Host machine
├── localhost:14001 → gateway-a (Server A — home / requesting)
├── localhost:14002 → gateway-b (Server B — work / serving)
├── localhost:15432 → postgres-a
├── localhost:15433 → postgres-b
├── localhost:16379 → valkey-a
├── localhost:16380 → valkey-b
└── localhost:19000 → step-ca (shared CA)
Docker network: fed-test-net (bridge)
gateway-a ←──── mTLS ────→ gateway-b
↘ ↗
step-ca
```
Ports are chosen to avoid collision with the base dev stack (5433, 6380, 14242, 9000).
## Starting the Harness
```bash
# From repo root
docker compose -f tools/federation-harness/docker-compose.two-gateways.yml up -d
# Wait for all services to be healthy (~60-90s on first boot due to NestJS cold start)
docker compose -f tools/federation-harness/docker-compose.two-gateways.yml ps
```
## Seeding Test Data
The seed script provisions three grant scope variants (A, B, C) and walks the
full enrollment flow so Server A ends up with active peers pointing at Server B.
```bash
# Assumes stack is already running
pnpm tsx tools/federation-harness/seed.ts
# Or boot + seed in one step
pnpm tsx tools/federation-harness/seed.ts --boot
```
### Scope Variants
| Variant | Resources | Filters | Excluded | Purpose |
| ------- | ------------------ | ---------------------------------- | ----------- | ------------------------------- |
| A | tasks, notes | include_personal: true | (none) | Personal data federation |
| B | tasks | include_teams: ['T1'], no personal | (none) | Team-scoped, no personal |
| C | tasks, credentials | include_personal: true | credentials | Sanity: excluded wins over list |
## Using from Vitest
```ts
import {
bootHarness,
tearDownHarness,
serverA,
serverB,
seed,
} from '../../tools/federation-harness/harness.js';
import type { HarnessHandle } from '../../tools/federation-harness/harness.js';
let handle: HarnessHandle;
beforeAll(async () => {
handle = await bootHarness();
}, 180_000); // allow 3 min for Docker pull + NestJS cold start
afterAll(async () => {
await tearDownHarness(handle);
});
test('variant A: list tasks returns personal tasks', async () => {
// NOTE: Only 'all' is supported for now — per-variant narrowing is M3-11.
const seedResult = await seed(handle, 'all');
const a = serverA(handle);
const res = await fetch(`${a.baseUrl}/api/federation/tasks`, {
headers: { 'x-federation-grant': seedResult.grants.variantA.id },
});
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
});
```
> **Note:** `seed()` bootstraps a fresh admin user on each gateway via
> `POST /api/bootstrap/setup`. Both gateways must have zero users (pristine DB).
> If either gateway already has users, `seed()` throws with a clear error.
> Reset state with `docker compose down -v`.
The `bootHarness()` function is **idempotent**: if both gateways are already
healthy, it reuses the running stack and returns `ownedStack: false`. Tests
should not call `tearDownHarness` when `ownedStack` is false unless they
explicitly want to shut down a shared stack.
## Vitest Config (pnpm test:federation)
Add to `vitest.config.ts` at repo root (or a dedicated config):
```ts
// vitest.federation.config.ts
import { defineConfig } from 'vitest/config';
export default defineConfig({
test: {
include: ['**/*.federation.test.ts'],
testTimeout: 60_000,
hookTimeout: 180_000,
reporters: ['verbose'],
},
});
```
Then add to root `package.json`:
```json
"test:federation": "vitest run --config vitest.federation.config.ts"
```
## Nuking State
```bash
# Remove containers AND volumes (ephemeral state — CA keys, DBs, everything)
docker compose -f tools/federation-harness/docker-compose.two-gateways.yml down -v
```
On next `up`, Step-CA re-initialises from scratch and generates new CA keys.
## Step-CA Root Certificate
The CA root lives in the `fed-harness-step-ca` Docker volume at
`/home/step/certs/root_ca.crt`. To extract it to the host:
```bash
docker run --rm \
-v fed-harness-step-ca:/home/step \
alpine cat /home/step/certs/root_ca.crt > /tmp/fed-harness-root-ca.crt
```
## Troubleshooting
### Port conflicts
Default host ports: 14001, 14002, 15432, 15433, 16379, 16380, 19000.
Override via environment variables before `docker compose up`:
```bash
GATEWAY_A_HOST_PORT=14101 GATEWAY_B_HOST_PORT=14102 \
docker compose -f tools/federation-harness/docker-compose.two-gateways.yml up -d
```
### Image pull failures
The gateway image is digest-pinned to:
```
git.mosaicstack.dev/mosaicstack/stack/gateway@sha256:1069117740e00ccfeba357cae38c43f3729fe5ae702740ce474f6512414d7c02
```
(sha-9f1a081, post-#491 IMG-FIX)
If the registry is unreachable, Docker will use the locally cached image if
present. If no local image exists, the compose up will fail with a pull error.
In that case:
1. Ensure you can reach `git.mosaicstack.dev` (VPN, DNS, etc.).
2. Log in: `docker login git.mosaicstack.dev`
3. Pull manually: `docker pull git.mosaicstack.dev/mosaicstack/stack/gateway@sha256:1069117740e00ccfeba357cae38c43f3729fe5ae702740ce474f6512414d7c02`
### NestJS cold start
Gateway containers take 4060 seconds to become healthy on first boot (Node.js
module resolution + NestJS DI bootstrap). The `start_period: 60s` in the
compose healthcheck covers this. `bootHarness()` polls for up to 3 minutes.
### Step-CA startup
Step-CA initialises on first boot (generates CA keys). This takes ~5-10s.
The `start_period: 30s` in the healthcheck covers it. Both gateways wait for
Step-CA to be healthy before starting (`depends_on: step-ca: condition: service_healthy`).
### dev-password missing
The Step-CA container requires `infra/step-ca/dev-password` to be mounted.
Copy the example and set a local password:
```bash
cp infra/step-ca/dev-password.example infra/step-ca/dev-password
# Edit the file to set your preferred dev CA password
```
The file is `.gitignore`d — do not commit it.
## Image Digest Note
The gateway image is pinned to `sha256:1069117740e00ccfeba357cae38c43f3729fe5ae702740ce474f6512414d7c02`
(sha-9f1a081). This is the digest promoted by PR #491 (IMG-FIX). The `latest`
tag is forbidden per Mosaic image policy. When a new gateway build is promoted,
update the digest in `docker-compose.two-gateways.yml` and in this file.
## Known Limitations
### BETTER_AUTH_URL enrollment URL bug (upstream production code — not yet fixed)
`apps/gateway/src/federation/federation.controller.ts:145` constructs the
enrollment URL using `process.env['BETTER_AUTH_URL'] ?? 'http://localhost:14242'`.
This is an upstream bug: `BETTER_AUTH_URL` is the Better Auth origin (typically
the web app), not the gateway's own base URL. In non-harness deployments this
produces an enrollment URL pointing to the wrong host or port.
**How the harness handles this:**
1. **In-cluster calls (container-to-container):** The compose file sets
`BETTER_AUTH_URL: 'http://gateway-b:3000'` so the enrollment URL returned by
the gateway uses the Docker internal hostname. This lets other containers in the
`fed-test-net` network resolve and reach Server B's enrollment endpoint.
2. **Host-side URL rewrite (seed script):** The `seed.ts` script runs on the host
machine where `gateway-b` is not a resolvable hostname. Before calling
`fetch(enrollmentUrl, ...)`, the seed script rewrites the URL: it extracts only
the token path segment from `enrollmentUrl` and reassembles the URL using the
host-accessible `serverBUrl` (default: `http://localhost:14002`). This lets the
seed script redeem enrollment tokens from the host without being affected by the
in-cluster hostname in the returned URL.
**TODO:** Fix `federation.controller.ts` to derive the enrollment URL from its own
listening address (e.g. `GATEWAY_BASE_URL` env var or a dedicated
`FEDERATION_ENROLLMENT_BASE_URL` env var) rather than reusing `BETTER_AUTH_URL`.
Tracked as a follow-up to PR #505 — do not bundle with harness changes.
## Permanent Infrastructure
This harness is designed to outlive M3 and be reused by M4+ milestone tests.
It is not a throwaway scaffold — treat it as production test infrastructure:
- Keep it idempotent.
- Do not hardcode test assumptions in the harness layer (put them in tests).
- Update the seed script when new scope variants are needed.
- The README and harness should be kept in sync as the federation API evolves.

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,247 @@
# tools/federation-harness/docker-compose.two-gateways.yml
#
# Two-gateway federation test harness — local-only, no Portainer/Swarm needed.
#
# USAGE (manual):
# docker compose -f tools/federation-harness/docker-compose.two-gateways.yml up -d
# docker compose -f tools/federation-harness/docker-compose.two-gateways.yml down -v
#
# USAGE (from harness.ts):
# const handle = await bootHarness();
# ...
# await tearDownHarness(handle);
#
# TOPOLOGY:
# gateway-a — "home" instance (Server A, the requesting side)
# └── postgres-a (pgvector/pg17, port 15432)
# └── valkey-a (port 16379)
# gateway-b — "work" instance (Server B, the serving side)
# └── postgres-b (pgvector/pg17, port 15433)
# └── valkey-b (port 16380)
# step-ca — shared CA for both gateways (port 19000)
#
# All services share the `fed-test-net` bridge network.
# Host port ranges (15432-15433, 16379-16380, 14001-14002, 19000) are chosen
# to avoid collision with the base dev stack (5433, 6380, 14242, 9000).
#
# IMAGE:
# Pinned to the immutable digest sha256:1069117740e00ccfeba357cae38c43f3729fe5ae702740ce474f6512414d7c02
# (sha-9f1a081, post-#491 IMG-FIX, smoke-tested locally).
# Update this digest only after a new CI build is promoted to the registry.
#
# STEP-CA:
# Single shared Step-CA instance. Both gateways connect to it.
# CA volume is ephemeral per `docker compose down -v`; regenerated on next up.
# The harness seed script provisions the CA roots cross-trust after first boot.
services:
# ─── Shared Certificate Authority ────────────────────────────────────────────
step-ca:
image: smallstep/step-ca:0.27.4
container_name: fed-harness-step-ca
restart: unless-stopped
ports:
- '${STEP_CA_HOST_PORT:-19000}:9000'
volumes:
- step_ca_data:/home/step
- ../../infra/step-ca/init.sh:/usr/local/bin/mosaic-step-ca-init.sh:ro
- ../../infra/step-ca/templates:/etc/step-ca-templates:ro
- ../../infra/step-ca/dev-password:/run/secrets/ca_password:ro
entrypoint: ['/bin/sh', '/usr/local/bin/mosaic-step-ca-init.sh']
networks:
- fed-test-net
healthcheck:
test:
[
'CMD',
'step',
'ca',
'health',
'--ca-url',
'https://localhost:9000',
'--root',
'/home/step/certs/root_ca.crt',
]
interval: 10s
timeout: 5s
retries: 5
start_period: 30s
# ─── Server A — Home / Requesting Gateway ────────────────────────────────────
postgres-a:
image: pgvector/pgvector:pg17
container_name: fed-harness-postgres-a
restart: unless-stopped
ports:
- '${PG_A_HOST_PORT:-15432}:5432'
environment:
POSTGRES_USER: mosaic
POSTGRES_PASSWORD: mosaic
POSTGRES_DB: mosaic
volumes:
- pg_a_data:/var/lib/postgresql/data
- ../../infra/pg-init:/docker-entrypoint-initdb.d:ro
networks:
- fed-test-net
healthcheck:
test: ['CMD-SHELL', 'pg_isready -U mosaic']
interval: 5s
timeout: 3s
retries: 5
valkey-a:
image: valkey/valkey:8-alpine
container_name: fed-harness-valkey-a
restart: unless-stopped
ports:
- '${VALKEY_A_HOST_PORT:-16379}:6379'
volumes:
- valkey_a_data:/data
networks:
- fed-test-net
healthcheck:
test: ['CMD', 'valkey-cli', 'ping']
interval: 5s
timeout: 3s
retries: 5
gateway-a:
image: git.mosaicstack.dev/mosaicstack/stack/gateway@sha256:1069117740e00ccfeba357cae38c43f3729fe5ae702740ce474f6512414d7c02
# Tag for human reference: sha-9f1a081 (post-#491 IMG-FIX; smoke-tested locally)
container_name: fed-harness-gateway-a
restart: unless-stopped
ports:
- '${GATEWAY_A_HOST_PORT:-14001}:3000'
environment:
MOSAIC_TIER: federated
DATABASE_URL: postgres://mosaic:mosaic@postgres-a:5432/mosaic
VALKEY_URL: redis://valkey-a:6379
GATEWAY_PORT: '3000'
GATEWAY_CORS_ORIGIN: 'http://localhost:14001'
BETTER_AUTH_SECRET: harness-secret-server-a-do-not-use-in-prod
BETTER_AUTH_URL: 'http://gateway-a:3000'
STEP_CA_URL: 'https://step-ca:9000'
FEDERATION_PEER_HOSTNAME: gateway-a
# Bootstrap password for POST /api/bootstrap/setup — used by seed.ts to create
# the first admin user. Only valid on a pristine (zero-user) database.
# Not the same as ADMIN_API_KEY — there is no static API key in the gateway.
ADMIN_BOOTSTRAP_PASSWORD: harness-admin-password-a
depends_on:
postgres-a:
condition: service_healthy
valkey-a:
condition: service_healthy
step-ca:
condition: service_healthy
networks:
- fed-test-net
healthcheck:
test:
[
'CMD',
'node',
'-e',
"require('http').get('http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/health', r => process.exit(r.statusCode === 200 ? 0 : 1)).on('error', () => process.exit(1))",
]
interval: 10s
timeout: 5s
retries: 5
start_period: 60s
# ─── Server B — Work / Serving Gateway ──────────────────────────────────────
postgres-b:
image: pgvector/pgvector:pg17
container_name: fed-harness-postgres-b
restart: unless-stopped
ports:
- '${PG_B_HOST_PORT:-15433}:5432'
environment:
POSTGRES_USER: mosaic
POSTGRES_PASSWORD: mosaic
POSTGRES_DB: mosaic
volumes:
- pg_b_data:/var/lib/postgresql/data
- ../../infra/pg-init:/docker-entrypoint-initdb.d:ro
networks:
- fed-test-net
healthcheck:
test: ['CMD-SHELL', 'pg_isready -U mosaic']
interval: 5s
timeout: 3s
retries: 5
valkey-b:
image: valkey/valkey:8-alpine
container_name: fed-harness-valkey-b
restart: unless-stopped
ports:
- '${VALKEY_B_HOST_PORT:-16380}:6379'
volumes:
- valkey_b_data:/data
networks:
- fed-test-net
healthcheck:
test: ['CMD', 'valkey-cli', 'ping']
interval: 5s
timeout: 3s
retries: 5
gateway-b:
image: git.mosaicstack.dev/mosaicstack/stack/gateway@sha256:1069117740e00ccfeba357cae38c43f3729fe5ae702740ce474f6512414d7c02
# Tag for human reference: sha-9f1a081 (post-#491 IMG-FIX; smoke-tested locally)
container_name: fed-harness-gateway-b
restart: unless-stopped
ports:
- '${GATEWAY_B_HOST_PORT:-14002}:3000'
environment:
MOSAIC_TIER: federated
DATABASE_URL: postgres://mosaic:mosaic@postgres-b:5432/mosaic
VALKEY_URL: redis://valkey-b:6379
GATEWAY_PORT: '3000'
GATEWAY_CORS_ORIGIN: 'http://localhost:14002'
BETTER_AUTH_SECRET: harness-secret-server-b-do-not-use-in-prod
BETTER_AUTH_URL: 'http://gateway-b:3000'
STEP_CA_URL: 'https://step-ca:9000'
FEDERATION_PEER_HOSTNAME: gateway-b
# Bootstrap password for POST /api/bootstrap/setup — used by seed.ts to create
# the first admin user. Only valid on a pristine (zero-user) database.
# Not the same as ADMIN_API_KEY — there is no static API key in the gateway.
ADMIN_BOOTSTRAP_PASSWORD: harness-admin-password-b
depends_on:
postgres-b:
condition: service_healthy
valkey-b:
condition: service_healthy
step-ca:
condition: service_healthy
networks:
- fed-test-net
healthcheck:
test:
[
'CMD',
'node',
'-e',
"require('http').get('http://127.0.0.1:3000/api/health', r => process.exit(r.statusCode === 200 ? 0 : 1)).on('error', () => process.exit(1))",
]
interval: 10s
timeout: 5s
retries: 5
start_period: 60s
networks:
fed-test-net:
name: fed-test-net
driver: bridge
volumes:
step_ca_data:
name: fed-harness-step-ca
pg_a_data:
name: fed-harness-pg-a
valkey_a_data:
name: fed-harness-valkey-a
pg_b_data:
name: fed-harness-pg-b
valkey_b_data:
name: fed-harness-valkey-b

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@@ -0,0 +1,290 @@
/**
* tools/federation-harness/harness.ts
*
* Vitest-consumable helpers for the two-gateway federation harness.
*
* USAGE (in a vitest test file):
*
* import { bootHarness, tearDownHarness, serverA, serverB, seed } from
* '../../tools/federation-harness/harness.js';
*
* let handle: HarnessHandle;
*
* beforeAll(async () => {
* handle = await bootHarness();
* }, 180_000);
*
* afterAll(async () => {
* await tearDownHarness(handle);
* });
*
* test('variant A — list tasks', async () => {
* const seedResult = await seed(handle, 'all');
* const a = serverA(handle);
* const res = await fetch(`${a.baseUrl}/api/federation/list/tasks`, {
* headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${seedResult.adminTokenA}` },
* });
* expect(res.status).toBe(200);
* });
*
* NOTE: The `seed()` helper currently only supports scenario='all'. Passing any
* other value throws immediately. Per-variant narrowing is deferred to M3-11.
*
* ESM / NodeNext: all imports use .js extensions.
*/
import { execSync, execFileSync } from 'node:child_process';
import { resolve, dirname } from 'node:path';
import { fileURLToPath } from 'node:url';
import { runSeed, type SeedResult } from './seed.js';
// ─── Types ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
export interface GatewayAccessor {
/** Base URL reachable from the host machine, e.g. http://localhost:14001 */
baseUrl: string;
/** Bootstrap password used for POST /api/bootstrap/setup on a pristine gateway */
bootstrapPassword: string;
/** Internal Docker network hostname (for container-to-container calls) */
internalHostname: string;
}
export interface HarnessHandle {
/** Server A accessor */
a: GatewayAccessor;
/** Server B accessor */
b: GatewayAccessor;
/** Absolute path to the docker-compose file */
composeFile: string;
/** Whether this instance booted the stack (vs. reusing an existing one) */
ownedStack: boolean;
/** Optional seed result if seed() was called */
seedResult?: SeedResult;
}
/**
* Scenario to seed. Currently only 'all' is implemented; per-variant narrowing
* is tracked as M3-11. Passing any other value throws immediately with a clear
* error rather than silently over-seeding.
*/
export type SeedScenario = 'variantA' | 'variantB' | 'variantC' | 'all';
// ─── Constants ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
const __dirname = dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url));
const COMPOSE_FILE = resolve(__dirname, 'docker-compose.two-gateways.yml');
const GATEWAY_A_URL = process.env['GATEWAY_A_URL'] ?? 'http://localhost:14001';
const GATEWAY_B_URL = process.env['GATEWAY_B_URL'] ?? 'http://localhost:14002';
const ADMIN_BOOTSTRAP_PASSWORD_A =
process.env['ADMIN_BOOTSTRAP_PASSWORD_A'] ?? 'harness-admin-password-a';
const ADMIN_BOOTSTRAP_PASSWORD_B =
process.env['ADMIN_BOOTSTRAP_PASSWORD_B'] ?? 'harness-admin-password-b';
const READINESS_TIMEOUT_MS = 180_000;
const READINESS_POLL_MS = 3_000;
// ─── Internal helpers ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
async function isGatewayHealthy(baseUrl: string): Promise<boolean> {
try {
const res = await fetch(`${baseUrl}/api/health`, { signal: AbortSignal.timeout(5_000) });
return res.ok;
} catch {
return false;
}
}
/**
* Poll both gateways in parallel until both are healthy or the shared deadline
* expires. Polling in parallel (rather than sequentially) avoids the bug where
* a slow gateway-a consumes all of the readiness budget before gateway-b is
* checked.
*/
async function waitForStack(handle: HarnessHandle): Promise<void> {
const gateways: Array<{ label: string; url: string }> = [
{ label: 'gateway-a', url: handle.a.baseUrl },
{ label: 'gateway-b', url: handle.b.baseUrl },
];
await Promise.all(
gateways.map(async (gw) => {
// Each gateway gets its own independent deadline.
const deadline = Date.now() + READINESS_TIMEOUT_MS;
process.stdout.write(`[harness] Waiting for ${gw.label}...`);
while (Date.now() < deadline) {
if (await isGatewayHealthy(gw.url)) {
process.stdout.write(` ready\n`);
return;
}
if (Date.now() + READINESS_POLL_MS > deadline) {
throw new Error(
`[harness] ${gw.label} did not become healthy within ${READINESS_TIMEOUT_MS.toString()}ms`,
);
}
await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, READINESS_POLL_MS));
process.stdout.write('.');
}
throw new Error(
`[harness] ${gw.label} did not become healthy within ${READINESS_TIMEOUT_MS.toString()}ms`,
);
}),
);
}
function isStackRunning(): boolean {
try {
const output = execFileSync(
'docker',
['compose', '-f', COMPOSE_FILE, 'ps', '--format', 'json'],
{ encoding: 'utf8', stdio: ['pipe', 'pipe', 'pipe'] },
);
if (!output.trim()) return false;
// Parse JSON lines — each running service emits a JSON object per line
const lines = output.trim().split('\n').filter(Boolean);
const runningServices = lines.filter((line) => {
try {
const obj = JSON.parse(line) as { State?: string };
return obj.State === 'running';
} catch {
return false;
}
});
// Expect at least gateway-a and gateway-b running
return runningServices.length >= 2;
} catch {
return false;
}
}
// ─── Public API ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
/**
* Boot the harness stack.
*
* Idempotent: if the stack is already running and both gateways are healthy,
* this function reuses the existing stack and returns a handle with
* `ownedStack: false`. Callers that set `ownedStack: false` should NOT call
* `tearDownHarness` unless they explicitly want to tear down a pre-existing stack.
*
* If the stack is not running, it starts it with `docker compose up -d` and
* waits for both gateways to pass their /api/health probe.
*/
export async function bootHarness(): Promise<HarnessHandle> {
const handle: HarnessHandle = {
a: {
baseUrl: GATEWAY_A_URL,
bootstrapPassword: ADMIN_BOOTSTRAP_PASSWORD_A,
internalHostname: 'gateway-a',
},
b: {
baseUrl: GATEWAY_B_URL,
bootstrapPassword: ADMIN_BOOTSTRAP_PASSWORD_B,
internalHostname: 'gateway-b',
},
composeFile: COMPOSE_FILE,
ownedStack: false,
};
// Check if both gateways are already healthy
const [aHealthy, bHealthy] = await Promise.all([
isGatewayHealthy(handle.a.baseUrl),
isGatewayHealthy(handle.b.baseUrl),
]);
if (aHealthy && bHealthy) {
console.log('[harness] Stack already running — reusing existing stack.');
handle.ownedStack = false;
return handle;
}
console.log('[harness] Starting federation harness stack...');
execSync(`docker compose -f "${COMPOSE_FILE}" up -d`, { stdio: 'inherit' });
handle.ownedStack = true;
await waitForStack(handle);
console.log('[harness] Stack is ready.');
return handle;
}
/**
* Tear down the harness stack.
*
* Runs `docker compose down -v` to remove containers AND volumes (ephemeral state).
* Only tears down if `handle.ownedStack` is true unless `force` is set.
*/
export async function tearDownHarness(
handle: HarnessHandle,
opts?: { force?: boolean },
): Promise<void> {
if (!handle.ownedStack && !opts?.force) {
console.log(
'[harness] Stack not owned by this handle — skipping teardown (pass force: true to override).',
);
return;
}
console.log('[harness] Tearing down federation harness stack...');
execSync(`docker compose -f "${handle.composeFile}" down -v`, { stdio: 'inherit' });
console.log('[harness] Stack torn down.');
}
/**
* Return the Server A accessor from a harness handle.
* Convenience wrapper for test readability.
*/
export function serverA(handle: HarnessHandle): GatewayAccessor {
return handle.a;
}
/**
* Return the Server B accessor from a harness handle.
* Convenience wrapper for test readability.
*/
export function serverB(handle: HarnessHandle): GatewayAccessor {
return handle.b;
}
/**
* Seed the harness with test data for one or more scenarios.
*
* @param handle The harness handle returned by bootHarness().
* @param scenario Which scope variants to provision. Currently only 'all' is
* supported — passing any other value throws immediately with a
* clear error. Per-variant narrowing is tracked as M3-11.
*
* Returns a SeedResult with grant IDs, peer IDs, and admin tokens for each
* gateway, which test assertions can reference.
*
* IMPORTANT: The harness assumes a pristine database on both gateways. The seed
* bootstraps an admin user on each gateway via POST /api/bootstrap/setup. If
* either gateway already has users, seed() throws with a clear error message.
* Run 'docker compose down -v' to reset state.
*/
export async function seed(
handle: HarnessHandle,
scenario: SeedScenario = 'all',
): Promise<SeedResult> {
if (scenario !== 'all') {
throw new Error(
`seed: scenario narrowing not yet implemented; pass "all" for now. ` +
`Got: "${scenario}". Per-variant narrowing is tracked as M3-11.`,
);
}
const result = await runSeed({
serverAUrl: handle.a.baseUrl,
serverBUrl: handle.b.baseUrl,
adminBootstrapPasswordA: handle.a.bootstrapPassword,
adminBootstrapPasswordB: handle.b.bootstrapPassword,
});
handle.seedResult = result;
return result;
}

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#!/usr/bin/env tsx
/**
* tools/federation-harness/seed.ts
*
* Provisions test data for the two-gateway federation harness.
* Run via: tsx tools/federation-harness/seed.ts
*
* What this script does:
* 1. (Optional) Boots the compose stack if --boot flag is passed.
* 2. Waits for both gateways to be healthy.
* 3. Bootstraps an admin user + token on each gateway via POST /api/bootstrap/setup.
* 4. Creates three grants on Server B matching the M3 acceptance test scenarios:
* - Scope variant A: tasks + notes, include_personal: true
* - Scope variant B: tasks only, include_teams: ['T1'], exclude T2
* - Scope variant C: tasks + credentials in resources, credentials excluded (sanity)
* 5. For each grant, walks the full enrollment flow:
* a. Server B creates a peer keypair (represents the requesting side).
* b. Server B creates the grant referencing that peer.
* c. Server B issues an enrollment token.
* d. Server A creates its own peer keypair (represents its view of B).
* e. Server A redeems the enrollment token at Server B's enrollment endpoint,
* submitting A's CSR → receives signed cert back.
* f. Server A stores the cert on its peer record → peer becomes active.
* 6. Inserts representative test tasks/notes/credentials on Server B.
*
* IMPORTANT: This script uses the real admin REST API — no direct DB writes.
* It exercises the full enrollment flow as M3 acceptance tests will.
*
* ESM / NodeNext: all imports use .js extensions.
*/
import { execSync } from 'node:child_process';
import { resolve, dirname } from 'node:path';
import { fileURLToPath } from 'node:url';
// ─── Constants ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
const __dirname = dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url));
const COMPOSE_FILE = resolve(__dirname, 'docker-compose.two-gateways.yml');
/** Base URLs as seen from the host machine (mapped host ports). */
const SERVER_A_URL = process.env['GATEWAY_A_URL'] ?? 'http://localhost:14001';
const SERVER_B_URL = process.env['GATEWAY_B_URL'] ?? 'http://localhost:14002';
/**
* Bootstrap passwords used when calling POST /api/bootstrap/setup on each
* gateway. Each gateway starts with zero users and requires a one-time setup
* call before any admin-guarded endpoints can be used.
*/
const ADMIN_BOOTSTRAP_PASSWORD_A =
process.env['ADMIN_BOOTSTRAP_PASSWORD_A'] ?? 'harness-admin-password-a';
const ADMIN_BOOTSTRAP_PASSWORD_B =
process.env['ADMIN_BOOTSTRAP_PASSWORD_B'] ?? 'harness-admin-password-b';
const READINESS_TIMEOUT_MS = 120_000;
const READINESS_POLL_MS = 3_000;
// ─── Scope variant definitions (for M3 acceptance tests) ─────────────────────
/** Scope variant A — tasks + notes, personal data included. */
export const SCOPE_VARIANT_A = {
resources: ['tasks', 'notes'],
filters: {
tasks: { include_personal: true },
notes: { include_personal: true },
},
excluded_resources: [] as string[],
max_rows_per_query: 500,
};
/** Scope variant B — tasks only, team T1 only, no personal. */
export const SCOPE_VARIANT_B = {
resources: ['tasks'],
filters: {
tasks: { include_teams: ['T1'], include_personal: false },
},
excluded_resources: [] as string[],
max_rows_per_query: 500,
};
/**
* Scope variant C — tasks + credentials in resources list, but credentials
* explicitly in excluded_resources. Sanity test: credentials must still be
* inaccessible even though they appear in resources.
*/
export const SCOPE_VARIANT_C = {
resources: ['tasks', 'credentials'],
filters: {
tasks: { include_personal: true },
},
excluded_resources: ['credentials'],
max_rows_per_query: 500,
};
// ─── Inline types (no import from packages/types — M3-01 branch not yet merged) ─
interface AdminFetchOptions {
method?: string;
body?: unknown;
adminToken: string;
}
interface PeerRecord {
peerId: string;
csrPem: string;
}
interface GrantRecord {
id: string;
status: string;
scope: unknown;
}
interface EnrollmentTokenResult {
token: string;
expiresAt: string;
enrollmentUrl: string;
}
interface EnrollmentRedeemResult {
certPem: string;
certChainPem: string;
}
interface BootstrapResult {
adminUserId: string;
adminToken: string;
}
export interface SeedResult {
serverAUrl: string;
serverBUrl: string;
adminTokenA: string;
adminTokenB: string;
adminUserIdA: string;
adminUserIdB: string;
grants: {
variantA: GrantRecord;
variantB: GrantRecord;
variantC: GrantRecord;
};
peers: {
variantA: PeerRecord & { grantId: string };
variantB: PeerRecord & { grantId: string };
variantC: PeerRecord & { grantId: string };
};
}
// ─── HTTP helpers ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
/**
* Authenticated admin fetch. Sends `Authorization: Bearer <adminToken>` which
* is the only path supported by AdminGuard (DB-backed sha256 token lookup).
* No `x-admin-key` header path exists in the gateway.
*/
async function adminFetch<T>(baseUrl: string, path: string, opts: AdminFetchOptions): Promise<T> {
const url = `${baseUrl}${path}`;
const res = await fetch(url, {
method: opts.method ?? 'GET',
headers: {
'Content-Type': 'application/json',
Authorization: `Bearer ${opts.adminToken}`,
},
body: opts.body !== undefined ? JSON.stringify(opts.body) : undefined,
});
if (!res.ok) {
const text = await res.text().catch(() => '(no body)');
throw new Error(`${opts.method ?? 'GET'} ${url}${res.status}: ${text}`);
}
return res.json() as Promise<T>;
}
// ─── Admin bootstrap ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
/**
* Bootstrap an admin user on a pristine gateway.
*
* Steps:
* 1. GET /api/bootstrap/status — confirms needsSetup === true.
* 2. POST /api/bootstrap/setup with { name, email, password } — returns
* { user, token: { plaintext } }.
*
* The harness assumes a fresh DB. If needsSetup is false the harness fails
* fast with a clear error rather than proceeding with an unknown token.
*/
async function bootstrapAdmin(
baseUrl: string,
label: string,
password: string,
): Promise<BootstrapResult> {
console.log(`[seed] Bootstrapping admin on ${label} (${baseUrl})...`);
// 1. Check status
const statusRes = await fetch(`${baseUrl}/api/bootstrap/status`);
if (!statusRes.ok) {
throw new Error(`[seed] GET ${baseUrl}/api/bootstrap/status → ${statusRes.status.toString()}`);
}
const status = (await statusRes.json()) as { needsSetup: boolean };
if (!status.needsSetup) {
throw new Error(
`[seed] ${label} at ${baseUrl} already has users (needsSetup=false). ` +
`The harness requires a pristine database. Run 'docker compose down -v' to reset.`,
);
}
// 2. Bootstrap
const setupRes = await fetch(`${baseUrl}/api/bootstrap/setup`, {
method: 'POST',
headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
body: JSON.stringify({
name: `Harness Admin (${label})`,
email: `harness-admin-${label.toLowerCase().replace(/\s+/g, '-')}@example.invalid`,
password,
}),
});
if (!setupRes.ok) {
const body = await setupRes.text().catch(() => '(no body)');
throw new Error(
`[seed] POST ${baseUrl}/api/bootstrap/setup → ${setupRes.status.toString()}: ${body}`,
);
}
const result = (await setupRes.json()) as {
user: { id: string };
token: { plaintext: string };
};
console.log(`[seed] ${label} admin user: ${result.user.id}`);
console.log(`[seed] ${label} admin token: ${result.token.plaintext.slice(0, 8)}...`);
return {
adminUserId: result.user.id,
adminToken: result.token.plaintext,
};
}
// ─── Readiness probe ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
async function waitForGateway(baseUrl: string, label: string): Promise<void> {
const deadline = Date.now() + READINESS_TIMEOUT_MS;
let lastError: string = '';
while (Date.now() < deadline) {
try {
const res = await fetch(`${baseUrl}/api/health`, { signal: AbortSignal.timeout(5_000) });
if (res.ok) {
console.log(`[seed] ${label} is ready (${baseUrl})`);
return;
}
lastError = `HTTP ${res.status.toString()}`;
} catch (err) {
lastError = err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err);
}
await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, READINESS_POLL_MS));
}
throw new Error(
`[seed] ${label} did not become ready within ${READINESS_TIMEOUT_MS.toString()}ms — last error: ${lastError}`,
);
}
// ─── Enrollment flow ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
/**
* Walk the full enrollment flow for one grant.
*
* The correct two-sided flow (matching the data model's FK semantics):
*
* 1. On Server B: POST /api/admin/federation/peers/keypair
* → peerId_B (Server B's peer record representing the requesting side)
* 2. On Server B: POST /api/admin/federation/grants with peerId: peerId_B
* → grant (FK to Server B's own federation_peers table — no violation)
* 3. On Server B: POST /api/admin/federation/grants/:id/tokens
* → enrollmentUrl pointing back to Server B
* 4. On Server A: POST /api/admin/federation/peers/keypair
* → peerId_A + csrPem_A (Server A's local record of Server B)
* 5. Server A → Server B: POST enrollmentUrl with { csrPem: csrPem_A }
* → certPem signed by Server B's CA
* 6. On Server A: PATCH /api/admin/federation/peers/:peerId_A/cert with certPem
* → Server A's peer record transitions to active
*
* Returns the activated grant (from Server B) and Server A's peer record.
*/
async function enrollGrant(opts: {
label: string;
subjectUserId: string;
scope: unknown;
adminTokenA: string;
adminTokenB: string;
serverAUrl: string;
serverBUrl: string;
}): Promise<{ grant: GrantRecord; peer: PeerRecord & { grantId: string } }> {
const { label, subjectUserId, scope, adminTokenA, adminTokenB, serverAUrl, serverBUrl } = opts;
console.log(`\n[seed] Enrolling grant for scope variant ${label}...`);
// 1. Create peer keypair on Server B (represents the requesting peer from B's perspective)
const peerB = await adminFetch<PeerRecord>(serverBUrl, '/api/admin/federation/peers/keypair', {
method: 'POST',
adminToken: adminTokenB,
body: {
commonName: `harness-peer-${label.toLowerCase()}-from-b`,
displayName: `Harness Peer ${label} (Server A as seen from B)`,
endpointUrl: serverAUrl,
},
});
console.log(`[seed] Created peer on B: ${peerB.peerId}`);
// 2. Create grant on Server B referencing B's own peer record
const grant = await adminFetch<GrantRecord>(serverBUrl, '/api/admin/federation/grants', {
method: 'POST',
adminToken: adminTokenB,
body: {
peerId: peerB.peerId,
subjectUserId,
scope,
},
});
console.log(`[seed] Created grant on B: ${grant.id} (status: ${grant.status})`);
// 3. Generate enrollment token on Server B
const tokenResult = await adminFetch<EnrollmentTokenResult>(
serverBUrl,
`/api/admin/federation/grants/${grant.id}/tokens`,
{ method: 'POST', adminToken: adminTokenB, body: { ttlSeconds: 900 } },
);
console.log(`[seed] Enrollment token: ${tokenResult.token.slice(0, 8)}...`);
console.log(`[seed] Enrollment URL: ${tokenResult.enrollmentUrl}`);
// 4. Create peer keypair on Server A (Server A's local record of Server B)
const peerA = await adminFetch<PeerRecord>(serverAUrl, '/api/admin/federation/peers/keypair', {
method: 'POST',
adminToken: adminTokenA,
body: {
commonName: `harness-peer-${label.toLowerCase()}-from-a`,
displayName: `Harness Peer ${label} (Server B as seen from A)`,
endpointUrl: serverBUrl,
},
});
console.log(`[seed] Created peer on A: ${peerA.peerId}`);
// 5. Redeem token at Server B's enrollment endpoint with A's CSR.
// The enrollment endpoint is not admin-guarded — the one-time token IS the credential.
//
// The enrollmentUrl returned by the gateway is built using BETTER_AUTH_URL which
// resolves to the in-cluster Docker hostname (gateway-b:3000). That URL is only
// reachable from other containers, not from the host machine running this script.
// We rewrite the host portion to use the host-accessible serverBUrl so the
// seed script can reach the endpoint from the host.
const parsedEnrollment = new URL(tokenResult.enrollmentUrl);
const tokenSegment = parsedEnrollment.pathname.split('/').pop()!;
const redeemUrl = `${serverBUrl}/api/federation/enrollment/${tokenSegment}`;
console.log(`[seed] Rewritten redeem URL (host-accessible): ${redeemUrl}`);
const redeemRes = await fetch(redeemUrl, {
method: 'POST',
headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
body: JSON.stringify({ csrPem: peerA.csrPem }),
});
if (!redeemRes.ok) {
const body = await redeemRes.text().catch(() => '(no body)');
throw new Error(`Enrollment redemption failed: ${redeemRes.status.toString()}${body}`);
}
const redeemResult = (await redeemRes.json()) as EnrollmentRedeemResult;
console.log(`[seed] Cert issued (${redeemResult.certPem.length.toString()} bytes)`);
// 6. Store cert on Server A's peer record → transitions to active
await adminFetch<unknown>(serverAUrl, `/api/admin/federation/peers/${peerA.peerId}/cert`, {
method: 'PATCH',
adminToken: adminTokenA,
body: { certPem: redeemResult.certPem },
});
console.log(`[seed] Cert stored on A — peer ${peerA.peerId} is now active`);
// Verify grant flipped to active on B
const activeGrant = await adminFetch<GrantRecord>(
serverBUrl,
`/api/admin/federation/grants/${grant.id}`,
{ adminToken: adminTokenB },
);
console.log(`[seed] Grant status on B: ${activeGrant.status}`);
return { grant: activeGrant, peer: { ...peerA, grantId: grant.id } };
}
// ─── Test data insertion ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
/**
* Insert representative test data on Server B via its admin APIs.
*
* NOTE: The gateway's task/note/credential APIs require an authenticated user
* session. For the harness, we seed via admin-level endpoints if available,
* or document the gap here for M3-11 to fill in with proper user session seeding.
*
* ASSUMPTION: Server B exposes POST /api/admin/tasks (or similar) for test data.
* If that endpoint does not yet exist, this function logs a warning and skips
* without failing — M3-11 will add the session-based seeding path.
*/
async function seedTestData(
subjectUserId: string,
scopeLabel: string,
serverBUrl: string,
adminTokenB: string,
): Promise<void> {
console.log(`\n[seed] Seeding test data on Server B for ${scopeLabel}...`);
const testTasks = [
{
title: `${scopeLabel} Task 1`,
description: 'Federation harness test task',
userId: subjectUserId,
},
{
title: `${scopeLabel} Task 2`,
description: 'Team-scoped test task',
userId: subjectUserId,
teamId: 'T1',
},
];
const testNotes = [
{
title: `${scopeLabel} Note 1`,
content: 'Personal note for federation test',
userId: subjectUserId,
},
];
// Attempt to insert — tolerate 404 (endpoint not yet implemented)
for (const task of testTasks) {
try {
await adminFetch<unknown>(serverBUrl, '/api/admin/tasks', {
method: 'POST',
adminToken: adminTokenB,
body: task,
});
console.log(`[seed] Inserted task: "${task.title}"`);
} catch (err) {
const msg = err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err);
if (msg.includes('404') || msg.includes('Cannot POST')) {
console.warn(
`[seed] WARN: /api/admin/tasks not found — skipping task insertion (expected until M3-11)`,
);
break;
}
throw err;
}
}
for (const note of testNotes) {
try {
await adminFetch<unknown>(serverBUrl, '/api/admin/notes', {
method: 'POST',
adminToken: adminTokenB,
body: note,
});
console.log(`[seed] Inserted note: "${note.title}"`);
} catch (err) {
const msg = err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err);
if (msg.includes('404') || msg.includes('Cannot POST')) {
console.warn(
`[seed] WARN: /api/admin/notes not found — skipping note insertion (expected until M3-11)`,
);
break;
}
throw err;
}
}
console.log(`[seed] Test data seeding for ${scopeLabel} complete.`);
}
// ─── Main entrypoint ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
export async function runSeed(opts?: {
serverAUrl?: string;
serverBUrl?: string;
adminBootstrapPasswordA?: string;
adminBootstrapPasswordB?: string;
subjectUserIds?: { variantA: string; variantB: string; variantC: string };
}): Promise<SeedResult> {
const aUrl = opts?.serverAUrl ?? SERVER_A_URL;
const bUrl = opts?.serverBUrl ?? SERVER_B_URL;
const passwordA = opts?.adminBootstrapPasswordA ?? ADMIN_BOOTSTRAP_PASSWORD_A;
const passwordB = opts?.adminBootstrapPasswordB ?? ADMIN_BOOTSTRAP_PASSWORD_B;
// Use provided or default subject user IDs.
// In a real run these would be real user UUIDs from Server B's DB.
// For the harness, the admin bootstrap user on Server B is used as the subject.
// These are overridden after bootstrap if opts.subjectUserIds is not provided.
const subjectIds = opts?.subjectUserIds;
console.log('[seed] Waiting for gateways to be ready...');
await Promise.all([waitForGateway(aUrl, 'Server A'), waitForGateway(bUrl, 'Server B')]);
// Bootstrap admin users on both gateways (requires pristine DBs).
console.log('\n[seed] Bootstrapping admin accounts...');
const [bootstrapA, bootstrapB] = await Promise.all([
bootstrapAdmin(aUrl, 'Server A', passwordA),
bootstrapAdmin(bUrl, 'Server B', passwordB),
]);
// Default subject user IDs to the admin user on Server B (guaranteed to exist).
const resolvedSubjectIds = subjectIds ?? {
variantA: bootstrapB.adminUserId,
variantB: bootstrapB.adminUserId,
variantC: bootstrapB.adminUserId,
};
// Enroll all three scope variants sequentially to avoid race conditions on
// the step-ca signing queue. Parallel enrollment would work too but
// sequential is easier to debug when something goes wrong.
console.log('\n[seed] Enrolling scope variants...');
const resultA = await enrollGrant({
label: 'A',
subjectUserId: resolvedSubjectIds.variantA,
scope: SCOPE_VARIANT_A,
adminTokenA: bootstrapA.adminToken,
adminTokenB: bootstrapB.adminToken,
serverAUrl: aUrl,
serverBUrl: bUrl,
});
const resultB = await enrollGrant({
label: 'B',
subjectUserId: resolvedSubjectIds.variantB,
scope: SCOPE_VARIANT_B,
adminTokenA: bootstrapA.adminToken,
adminTokenB: bootstrapB.adminToken,
serverAUrl: aUrl,
serverBUrl: bUrl,
});
const resultC = await enrollGrant({
label: 'C',
subjectUserId: resolvedSubjectIds.variantC,
scope: SCOPE_VARIANT_C,
adminTokenA: bootstrapA.adminToken,
adminTokenB: bootstrapB.adminToken,
serverAUrl: aUrl,
serverBUrl: bUrl,
});
// Seed test data on Server B for each scope variant
await Promise.all([
seedTestData(resolvedSubjectIds.variantA, 'A', bUrl, bootstrapB.adminToken),
seedTestData(resolvedSubjectIds.variantB, 'B', bUrl, bootstrapB.adminToken),
seedTestData(resolvedSubjectIds.variantC, 'C', bUrl, bootstrapB.adminToken),
]);
const result: SeedResult = {
serverAUrl: aUrl,
serverBUrl: bUrl,
adminTokenA: bootstrapA.adminToken,
adminTokenB: bootstrapB.adminToken,
adminUserIdA: bootstrapA.adminUserId,
adminUserIdB: bootstrapB.adminUserId,
grants: {
variantA: resultA.grant,
variantB: resultB.grant,
variantC: resultC.grant,
},
peers: {
variantA: resultA.peer,
variantB: resultB.peer,
variantC: resultC.peer,
},
};
console.log('\n[seed] Seed complete.');
console.log('[seed] Summary:');
console.log(` Variant A grant: ${result.grants.variantA.id} (${result.grants.variantA.status})`);
console.log(` Variant B grant: ${result.grants.variantB.id} (${result.grants.variantB.status})`);
console.log(` Variant C grant: ${result.grants.variantC.id} (${result.grants.variantC.status})`);
return result;
}
// ─── CLI entry ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
const isCli =
process.argv[1] != null &&
fileURLToPath(import.meta.url).endsWith(process.argv[1]!.split('/').pop()!);
if (isCli) {
const shouldBoot = process.argv.includes('--boot');
if (shouldBoot) {
console.log('[seed] --boot flag detected — starting compose stack...');
execSync(`docker compose -f "${COMPOSE_FILE}" up -d`, { stdio: 'inherit' });
}
runSeed()
.then(() => {
process.exit(0);
})
.catch((err) => {
console.error('[seed] Fatal:', err);
process.exit(1);
});
}