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Author SHA1 Message Date
Hermes Agent c09392e0c4 fix(guard): classify Git option grammar
ci/woodpecker/pr/ci Pipeline was successful
Replace finite clone/worktree boolean allowlists with the closed separate-value grammar, including Git's accepted long abbreviations and bundled short options. Keep placement operands distinct from HOME-valued sources, metadata, commit-ish values, and rule-generated --no-* flags while preserving separate-git-dir and later-command traps.

Canonicalize shell-known HOME spellings, dot aliases, and existing symlink parents before placement comparison. Expand the hermetic suite from 242 to 292 fixtures and document the requirements and review evidence.

Deliberate residuals: a future unclassified value-taking clone placement option can fail open, and a future worktree value option can shift the inferred path; defaulting it to flag grammar avoids present-day over-blocking of Git's non-enumerable boolean family. PreToolUse symlink canonicalization is non-atomic against replacement after inspection; architectural closure is tracked by #1199.
2026-08-13 06:46:25 -05:00
Hermes Agent 91cc37bcf6 fix(guard): inspect checkout placement operands
ci/woodpecker/pr/ci Pipeline was successful
Classify git clone and worktree add operands so HOME-valued environment assignments, sources, references, templates, and metadata do not impersonate checkout destinations. Preserve both forms of clone --separate-git-dir as real placement targets and distinguish shell words, command boundaries, and redirections in the existing quote-aware normalized stream.

Deliberate fail-closed residual: unknown future Git options with a separate following word are not adjudicated as source-only. Their value remains a possible placement, so a HOME-shaped value blocks rather than silently creating a bypass. Relative destinations whose effective path depends on cwd remain out of scope in #1197.
2026-08-13 05:55:33 -05:00
Hermes Agent 20d86e392b fix(guard): end the home match at a shell word boundary, not at whitespace
ci/woodpecker/pr/ci Pipeline was successful
Rounds 8 and 9 of the same class, in the two halves of one line.

The path arm required the home token to be followed by `/`. That silently
made `$HOME` itself -- the exact target the rule names -- legal: `git worktree
add $HOME` cleared a guard whose message is "this checks a repository out
under $HOME". Reachability is not theoretical; the command succeeds against an
empty home directory. Trailing `/` was then admitted, and with it every
terminator that is not whitespace: `$HOME;`, `$HOME&&`, `$HOME|`, `$HOME&`
and end-of-string all cleared, 25 shapes in all.

The fix that did not happen is worth recording, because it was mine. The brief
for this round prescribed a closed continuation class, `([^A-Za-z0-9_.-]|$)`,
on the reasoning that terminator sets are open and continuation sets are
closed. That is true of some axes and false of this one: `+ @ , : = %` all
continue a FILENAME, so `$HOME+bak/wt` and five siblings like it would have
been refused -- a new over-block traded for a closed bypass, which is not a
trade. The implementer measured the six counterexamples and declined the brief
rather than pick between two acceptance conditions that cannot both hold. They
are now permanent fixtures; a rejected over-block that nothing pins comes back.

The axis that IS closed is word termination, and it is closed by specification
rather than by anyone's imagination: POSIX fixes the unquoted metacharacter set
at space, tab, newline, and | & ; ( ) < >. So the path normalizer marks those
as an internal word boundary, in the same state machine and by the same
mechanism as the existing literal-dollar and literal-tilde markers, which is
what lets a QUOTED or escaped metacharacter stay word content: `"$HOME;bak"`
is one word and must be allowed. A raw marker byte arriving in the input is
encoded first, so input cannot forge or suppress a boundary. The home token
must now be preceded by start, `=`, or a boundary, and followed by a boundary,
`/` for a descendant, or end.

Verified by oracle rather than against the brief -- `bash -c "printf '%s' WORD"`
performs expansion and quote removal without executing, so the expected verdict
comes from the shell instead of from the reading that has now been wrong once.
Fixtures 198 -> 230; the new ones are red at both prior heads (15 failing at
4b8eba95, 21 at 3d0a882a), so they measure the change rather than passing on it.

Known and deliberately not addressed here: a checkout target that never names
$HOME at all. A relative target resolves against the cwd, and every agent seat
on this host runs with a cwd under $HOME, so `git clone URL` with no target at
all lands in $HOME and is invisible to a rule that matches home spellings.
That is a different rule -- it needs the effective cwd, which `cd` inside the
command can move -- and it is filed separately rather than becoming round ten
in this file.
2026-08-13 05:08:01 -05:00
Hermes Agent 4b8eba95a3 fix(guard): apply word normalization to the path arm, not just the name arm
The quote/escape handling added over rounds 1-6 was wired into the command
NAME reading only. The PATH reading one line below it still matched the raw
text, so every spelling the name arm had learned to see was invisible to the
checkout check: `"$HOME"/wt`, `${HOME}/wt`, `"${HOME}"/wt` and a quoted
literal home path all cleared a guard whose entire purpose is to refuse them.
An identifier is not one spelling, and this file has now proven that seven
times; the arms of the rule were audited one at a time, and the class survived
in the arm nobody looked at.

The two readings need the same quote and escape handling but differ in one
respect, so this is one state machine with two modes rather than a copy:
substitution flattening is correct for a name and wrong for a path, where an
expansion-capable `$HOME` must stay visible. In path mode a shell-LITERAL
dollar or tilde -- single-quoted, escaped, or a quoted tilde -- becomes an
internal nonmatching marker, so quote removal cannot manufacture a home
spelling the shell would never expand, and `"~/wt"` is no longer refused.

`home_re` treats the braces as the pair they are. `$HOME}` expands HOME and
appends a literal brace; `${HOME` is not an expansion at all. Admitting either
as `${HOME}` would invent a home path the shell never resolves.

Verified by oracle rather than by assertion: for each spelling, `printf` under
bash performs expansion and quote removal without executing, and the resulting
path decides the expected verdict. 24 spellings, 0 mismatched here; 6
mismatched at 3d0a882a, which is what makes this a fix and not a rewrite.
Fixtures 184 -> 198.
2026-08-13 04:38:44 -05:00
Hermes Agent 3d0a882a63 wrapper-guard: model quote removal and escaping as separate operations
ci/woodpecker/pr/ci Pipeline was successful
Round six of the same class: a program NAME is not one SPELLING. Two findings,
and the second is one this change's own predecessor introduced.

A FOURTH name consumer never went through the shared site. Checkout detection
still recognized git by a raw whole-command regex, so `g"it" clone`, `g'it'
clone` and `g\it clone` into $HOME were all allowed. `/usr/bin/git` blocked only
because the raw text still happened to contain contiguous `git` — the same
passing presentation that established nothing during the curl rounds. It now
uses CMD_NAMES and NAME_PREFIX like the other three, so all four consumers
share one definition of what a name looks like.

Routing it through NAME_PREFIX also repaired an over-block the arm had carried
from the start: the old regex found `git` INSIDE a longer word, so `mygit clone`
and `gitfoo clone` were refused at every previous head. That is the mycurl and
curl-wrapper class, and refusing it is how a guard gets routed around instead
of repaired.

The normalization itself was creating names the shell never runs. It deleted
every backslash regardless of quote context, but a backslash inside single
quotes is literal, so `'cu\rl' --config` names a program called cu\rl and was
refused. The same holds inside double quotes before any character other than
$, `, " or backslash. Both were false positives, and both were regressions —
the pre-PR head allowed them.

Quote removal and escape handling are different operations that were sharing
one context-blind deletion pass. They are now a small state machine that
follows the actual rule: outside quotes a backslash escapes the next character;
inside single quotes everything is literal; inside double quotes a backslash is
special only before $, `, " or backslash. Quote characters drop without
splitting the word, and the substitution flattening that makes `$(which curl)`
resolve to a bare name is unchanged.

An over-block is not the safe direction. A guard that refuses legitimate work
gets routed around rather than fixed, which is the same outcome as a bypass and
arrives faster.

Unchanged and still disclosed: names absent from the literal text — assembled
from braces or variables — remain invisible to text matching, and `$((curl))`
is over-matched at every head including the pre-PR one.

Fixtures: 173 -> 184. Every one added here discriminates against the previous
head 1c3e79a9 (8 fail there: 3 git bypasses, 5 over-blocks), and the positives
also fail at the pre-PR head df83a9ee. Suite green at head, bash -n and
shellcheck clean, enumeration gate 55/38/18.
2026-08-13 04:10:59 -05:00
Hermes Agent 1c3e79a9ed wrapper-guard tests: cover the shapes I had only reasoned about
ci/woodpecker/pr/ci Pipeline was successful
Test-only. No change to the guard; every case below already behaves
correctly at 46f52eed. They are committed because reasoning that a shape was
already covered is exactly what produced rounds four and five, and an
unmeasured belief about a security control is worth nothing.

Three fail at df83a9ee and pass here, so they discriminate:

    \curl --config /tmp/w.cfg              escaping the leading character
    cur"l" --config /tmp/w.cfg             the quote at a different offset
    g"h" api -X POST "repos/a/b/$EP" …     both halves dressed at once

`\curl` is the ordinary way to bypass a shell alias. It is a thing people
type, which makes it the least hypothetical entry in the file, and it was
not covered by any of the eight fixtures added in the previous commit.

The last one is the case I would have bet on breaking: the name gate reads
the normalized copy while the unreadable-endpoint tail reads RAW text, so
dressing BOTH halves at once is the input where those two readings are most
likely to disagree. They do not — the tail matches through the quote — but
the previous commit's message asserted that from reading the regex rather
than running it, and one round earlier the same kind of assertion was wrong.

Four negatives pass at BOTH heads and are here as regression guards: a
quoted read, an ordinary download, `gh --version` with no api subcommand,
and the word curl inside a string with no flag. Over-blocking is a real
failure and not a safe direction — a guard that refuses legitimate work gets
routed around instead of repaired, which costs more than the bypass it was
protecting against.

Suite 173/173.
2026-08-13 03:40:41 -05:00
Hermes Agent 46f52eedfe wrapper-guard: remove quotes instead of splitting on them; last name consumer
ci/woodpecker/pr/ci Pipeline was canceled
Round-five remediation of both blockers gate-ultron-01 raised on df83a9ee.
Measured against that head first; all eight returned rc=0 and each executes
the program the check exists to recognize:

    cu"rl" --config /tmp/w.cfg               -> allowed
    cu'rl' --config /tmp/w.cfg               -> allowed
    /usr/bin/cu\rl --config /tmp/w.cfg       -> allowed
    g"h" api -X POST repos/a/b/issues …      -> allowed
    /usr/bin/g\h api -X POST repos/a/b/… …   -> allowed
    curl --con"fig" /tmp/w.cfg               -> allowed
    /usr/bin/gh api -X POST repos/a/b/$EP …  -> allowed
    g"h" api -X POST repos/a/b/$EP …         -> allowed

BLOCKER 1. The previous commit said names are recognized "after quote
removal" and did not do that. It replaced quote characters with whitespace,
which is token SEPARATION: a shell removes a quote WITHOUT splitting the
word around it, so `cu"rl"` is one word naming curl, while whitespace made
it two words naming neither. `"/usr/bin/curl"` blocked under that version
only because the inserted space happened to land after a slash — a passing
case that established nothing about quote removal, and I read it as
confirmation. The characters are now DELETED, which is what quote removal
is. Backslashes go with them, because escaping is ordinary word formation
too. Deletion still handles substitution: `$(which curl)` becomes
`which curl`, where the name is a word on its own.

The flag is read from the same normalized copy for the same reason —
`--con"fig"` is one word spelling --config. No review raised that; the name
was simply the easier half to reach, and reading both halves the same way
is the entire point of having one normalization.

BLOCKER 2. A THIRD name consumer never went through the shared site: the
unreadable-endpoint arm kept a private bare-name copy of the scope gate's
regex against raw $CMD. A caller could be admitted by the repaired gate and
then go unrecognized by the fail-closed refinement — a gate and its own
refinement disagreeing about who the caller is, which is the defect one
layer downstream.

Fixing that surfaced the same mistake a third time inside this very edit:
my first version left the NAME in the refinement's tail regex, so the name
gate recognized `g"h" api` while the tail still demanded the undressed
spelling, and the two halves disagreed exactly as before. Caught by the
fixture, not by reading. Each half now asks one question: the name gate
asks WHO, from the normalized copy; the tail asks whether the ENDPOINT is
readable, from the raw text — deliberately raw, because the expansion
markers that make an endpoint unreadable are the characters the normalized
copy removes, and reading the tail from it would erase the evidence.

Controls: the 8 positive fixtures FAIL at df83a9ee and pass here; the
negatives — mycurl, curl-wrapper, mygh, mygh with an assembled endpoint, an
absolute-path read, and -K on a non-curl — pass at BOTH heads. Suite
166/166.

Unchanged and still stated in the comment rather than this message: a name
ABSENT from the text, assembled from variables or reached through a wrapper
script that execs the program, is invisible to any of this.
2026-08-13 03:36:42 -05:00
Hermes Agent df83a9eec2 wrapper-guard: recognize program names after quote removal, in one place
ci/woodpecker/pr/ci Pipeline was successful
Round-four remediation of both blockers gate-ultron-01 raised on d99ff57e.
Measured against that head before anything was touched; all seven returned
rc=0, and each executes the program the check exists to recognize:

    "/usr/bin/curl" --config /tmp/w.cfg          -> allowed
    './curl' --config /tmp/w.cfg                 -> allowed
    $(which curl) --config /tmp/w.cfg            -> allowed
    `which curl` --config /tmp/w.cfg             -> allowed
    /usr/bin/gh api -X POST repos/a/b/issues …   -> allowed
    ./gh api -X POST repos/a/b/issues …          -> allowed
    /usr/local/bin/tea api -X POST repos/a/b/… … -> allowed

This is the third appearance of one defect, and the shape is worth stating
plainly because the first two repairs each fixed an INSTANCE and left the
class: the check matched the bare word, then it matched the unquoted
basename. Both were models of one TEXTUAL PRESENTATION of a shell word
rather than of the word, so the first repair was defeated by an absolute
path and the second by two quote characters. Recognizing a name is either
done after quote removal or it is caller-name parsing wearing a longer
regex.

The second blocker is the same defect sitting untouched in the API SCOPE
gate the whole time, while the curl arm was repaired twice beside it. That
one is worse than it looks: the scope gate decides whether write detection
runs AT ALL, so failing to admit `/usr/bin/gh api -X POST` is not a missed
match, it is an allow. No URL marker rescued those commands either —
provider CLI endpoints are spelled `repos/…` with no leading slash, so
`/repos/` never matched them.

Fix, and the reason it is one fix rather than two:

  - $CMD_NAMES — a second reading of the same command with quote and
    substitution punctuation turned into whitespace. Names are read from it.
  - $NAME_PREFIX — the one place the shape of a program name is written
    down. Both callers use it, so the next fix to this class lands in a
    single location instead of whichever arm review happened to probe. That
    is the actual lesson of finding this defect twice in one file.

The prefix still must end at a slash. `mycurl` and `curl-wrapper` are
different programs and blocking them is the over-block that gets a guard
routed around instead of repaired; both remain negative fixtures, and
`mygh` and an absolute-path READ join them.

The cost is the one this file already chose and documented for the payload
check: quoting an example does not exempt it, so writing one of these
commands inside quotes on a Bash line is refused too. Applying that rule to
the name arms makes the file coherent — the alternative is a guard where
the payload arm treats quotes as text and the name arms treat them as
armour.

Still open, stated rather than left to be found: a name absent from the
text — assembled from variables, or reached through a wrapper script that
execs the program — is invisible here. That is a limit of inspecting a
command string, not something a pattern closes.

Controls: the 7 positive fixtures FAIL at d99ff57e and pass here; the 4
negative fixtures pass at BOTH heads, so they measure over-blocking rather
than decorate the diff. Suite 157/157.
2026-08-13 03:12:39 -05:00
Hermes Agent d99ff57e14 wrapper-guard: match curl by basename, not by bare word
ci/woodpecker/pr/ci Pipeline was successful
Round-three remediation of the single blocker gate-ultron-01 raised on
06046f76. Confirmed by measurement before being touched: all three spellings
returned rc=0 against that head.

    /usr/bin/curl --config /tmp/provider-write.cfg      -> allowed
    env /usr/bin/curl -K/tmp/provider-write.cfg         -> allowed
    ./curl --config /tmp/provider-write.cfg             -> allowed

The config file still owned the URL, method, body and headers in every one of
them, so each executed exactly the wrapped raw provider write the previous
commit was written to refuse, while the guard reported clean.

The mistake is worth naming precisely, because it is the one this file already
exists to refuse and I reintroduced it: recognizing the unqualified name only is
CALLER-NAME PARSING. `/usr/bin/curl` is not a different program from `curl`, and
a control that can be defeated by typing the absolute path is not a control. The
match is now on curl as a BASENAME — an optional prefix that must end at a
slash — so a path spelling costs the caller nothing and buys them nothing.

The prefix must end at a slash deliberately: `mycurl` and `curl-wrapper` are
different programs, and blocking them would be the over-block that gets a guard
routed around instead of fixed. Both are negative fixtures.

Still open and stated rather than left to be discovered: a wrapper script that
execs curl on the operator's behalf is invisible here, because neither the name
nor the request appears in the command text. That is a limit of inspecting a
command string, not something this regex can close, and it is now written in the
comment above the check.

Controls: the three bypass fixtures FAIL against 06046f76 and pass at this head;
the two over-block fixtures pass against both. Suite 148/148.
2026-08-13 02:36:51 -05:00
Hermes Agent 06046f7675 wrapper-guard: close three fail-opens the last round left, and enumerate the large-repo test
ci/woodpecker/pr/ci Pipeline was successful
Round-two remediation of the four blockers gate-ultron-01 raised on f8d04d1b. All
four were confirmed by my own measurement before being touched; none is taken on
the reviewer's word.

1. The --config/-K refusal never ran. It sat nested inside `if API_SHAPED`, and
   API_SHAPED is a test for a provider URL in the command text — which is exactly
   what a config file removes. The check was guarded by the condition that the
   capability it guards against defeats, so `curl --config /tmp/write.cfg` walked
   past it. It now keys on curl itself, ahead of the URL gate, and covers the
   attached (`-K/tmp/f`) and bundled (`-sK`) spellings a space-separated test
   cannot see.

2. Percent-encoded endpoints are a live route, not a theoretical one. Measured
   against the provider: `…/issues/1174` and `…/iss%75es/1174` both return HTTP
   200 for the same object. A write carrying any percent-escape is now refused
   rather than decoded — a decoder has to be exactly right about depth
   (%2569 -> %69 -> i) and about the provider's own normalisation, and being
   approximately right there is indistinguishable from not checking. Scoped to
   writes: a read is never this hook's business and a query string carrying %20
   is an ordinary URL.

3. HOME was still expanded unguarded at the `W=` fallback, which runs before any
   of the new HOME adjudication — so a guard deployed without its siblings still
   died on an unset HOME, upstream of the fix that was supposed to survive it.
   Moving a fail-open earlier in the file is not closing it. HOME is now resolved
   once, above every use, and every later site reads the resolved value.

   The existing harness could not have caught this: it runs the guard beside its
   siblings, so `[ -x "$W/pr-review.sh" ]` always succeeded and the fallback was
   never reached. A test's blind spot can be a property of the harness rather
   than of the code. The new lone_case() block copies the guard alone into an
   empty directory and re-asserts the four behaviours there.

4. test-mosaic-worktree-large-repo.sh shipped at mode 100644 and appeared in no
   CI step, so the enumeration guard (#1017) redded pipeline 2386 — correctly.
   Committed mode is now 100755 and the test is enumerated in the sanitization
   step. My own process miss: I verified the CI queue before pushing and never
   verified terminal CI after.

Controls: the 25 fixtures added here all FAIL against 029af418 (rc 0 or 1 where 2
is required) and all pass at this head, 143/143.
2026-08-13 02:18:35 -05:00
Hermes Agent f8d04d1bf4 wrapper-guard: decide allows on the shell's reading, not on the whole command text
ci/woodpecker/pr/ci Pipeline failed
Four blockers from adversarial review, and three are one defect wearing three
hats: a test over the WHOLE command text deciding an ALLOW. That is the
fail-open shape this file keeps rediscovering, and it had reached the
break-glass itself.

- Break-glass read POSITIONALLY. `case $CMD in *MOSAIC_WRAPPER_OVERRIDE=1*)`
  cleared the entire command if that string appeared anywhere in it, so quoting
  the override in a note, naming a variable after it, or writing =10 disabled
  the guard for the call sitting beside it. Now only leading NAME=value
  assignments count, exactly where the shell would honour one. Cost, pinned as a
  fixture: an override after `&&` no longer arms.

- $HOME resolved once, and unset / empty / "/" refused. This was filed as a
  checkout-arm defect and is larger: under `set -u` the old file died at line 62
  on EVERY command with HOME unset, exit 1, before the API arms or the APPROVE
  trap ran. A seat with no HOME (systemd unit, container, env -i) had no guard at
  all. A checkout whose question cannot be asked now blocks; the blast radius is
  asserted to be that one command shape and not the session.

- Subresource refinement inverted. It asked whether a subresource appears
  anywhere in the command, so `gh api -X PATCH .../issues/1 -f body=cf-/pulls/2/files`
  was cleared on the strength of text in its own body. It now clears only when
  EVERY numbered-object occurrence carries a subresource.

- -K/--config refused. curl reads the method, body, headers and URL from that
  file, so none of them are in the command: every write test read 0 and the call
  went through. An unreadable request is not a cleared one.

mosaic-worktree: never close a git pipe early

resolve_repo took the first porcelain line with `awk ... exit`, which closes the
read end while git is still writing. git takes SIGPIPE, pipefail returns 141, and
the function aborts SILENTLY — no message, no path, exit 141. It fires as a
function of REPO SIZE: fine on three worktrees, reliable on seventy. Measured at
73 worktrees (10 KB of porcelain): rc=141, no output. The file already removed a
`head -200` for this exact reason; the rule is now uniform.

Evidence — every new case run against 029af418, the tree before these fixes:

  test-wrapper-guard.sh              130/130 pass here; 15 FAIL against 029af418
  test-mosaic-worktree-large-repo.sh   2/2 pass here;  2 FAIL against 029af418
                                       (got rc=141 and empty output, the signature)

No pre-existing fixture changed behaviour on the old guard, so the new cases are
the whole delta. The size dependence is stubbed out rather than inherited: a test
that ran against whatever repo it sits in would have PASSED on the broken tree.
2026-08-13 01:57:07 -05:00
Hermes Agent 029af418f0 wrapper-guard: name the marker every forge API shares, not one dialect's
ci/woodpecker/pr/ci Pipeline was successful
The scope gate asked for a scheme URL, a `/api/v[0-9]` path, or a provider-CLI
`api` subcommand. `/api/v[0-9]` is Gitea's spelling. GitHub's API carries no
version segment at all -- `api.github.com/repos/a/b/issues` -- so the schemeless
Gitea write was in scope and the schemeless GitHub one was not:

    curl -X POST -d x api.github.com/repos/a/b/issues              rc 0
    curl -X POST -d x api.github.com/repos/a/b/issues/1/comments   rc 0
    host=api.github.com; curl -X POST -d x ${host}/repos/a/b/issues rc 0

A gate calibrated to one provider's spelling rather than to what identifies a
provider API. `/repos/` is the marker both dialects share -- every forge API
addresses a repository through it -- so the gate now names both.

This is SPAN a third time, and the third layer it has appeared on. Round 8: a
block message named a wrapper that could not make the call. Round 9: a map
claimed a span its wrapper did not cover. Round 10: a control claimed a surface
it did not measure. Here the scope gate itself claimed a class of API and
recognised one member of it. Same question each time -- does this thing SPAN
what it claims -- and it has now been the answer four rounds running, which is
the argument for asking it of every arm rather than of the reported one.

Widening a scope gate can only make the guard stricter. Downstream a block still
requires a body flag AND either a mapped endpoint or an unreadable one, so this
widens what is CONSIDERED, not what is refused. The three fixtures asserting that
-- a schemeless GitHub read, an unwrapped GitHub endpoint, and a read past `--`
-- exist to hold that claim to account rather than state it.

Also: the provider-CLI arm's option scanner required a letter after the dashes,
so `gh api -X POST -- ${p}${q} -f title=x` walked its endpoint straight past.
The end-of-options marker is the one option not spelled like one, and a scanner
that skips options had to be told so.

Because the new endpoints are READABLE, each blocked fixture asserts the wrapper
its message must name. A rc-only fixture here would have passed on the unreadable
arm and proved nothing -- which is the failure mode this suite caught in itself
last round.

Evidence: 110/110 fixtures (was 101) locally and in ci-base. Negative-controlled
per change, not in aggregate: dropping `/repos/` from the gate fails exactly the
five GitHub fixtures; dropping the `--` alternative fails exactly one; neither
disturbs a pre-existing fixture. 18-command sweep unchanged (same three round-6
flips, nothing new); 12-command ordinary-work sweep 0 blocked. shellcheck clean
at warning+. CI 2374 on the previous head was green across all nine steps.

Residual, stated rather than implied: a caller who splits `/repos/` itself in a
schemeless GitHub URL leaves no literal marker anywhere and is out of scope --
the same boundary as splitting the hostname, and no longer a mistake anyone
makes by accident.

Round 11, addressing rev0 review 154.
2026-08-12 19:07:44 -05:00
Hermes Agent 51746f44eb wrapper-guard: fail closed on an unreadable endpoint in every shape the scope gate admits
ci/woodpecker/pr/ci Pipeline was successful
Round-9 review found the fail-closed rule narrower than the block it guards.
The scope gate admits three shapes — a scheme URL, a schemeless /api/vN path,
and a provider CLI's `api` subcommand — but the unreadable-endpoint test asked
only for https?://. So a split endpoint token in the other two shapes was in
scope to be blocked, produced no readable endpoint, and fell through to ALLOW,
while the identical split behind a literal scheme blocked.

Four writes reaching the provider unexamined, one of them a review verdict:

  p=repos/a/b/iss;              q=ues;     gh api -X POST ${p}${q} -f title=x
  p=repos/a/b/issues/1/comm;    q=ents;    gh api -X POST ${p}${q} -f body=x
  p=repos/a/b/pulls/1/rev;      q=iews;    gh api -X POST ${p}${q} -f event=APPROVED
  p=/api/v1/repos/a/b/iss;      q=ues;     curl -X POST -d x host${p}${q}

This is the same defect class as the milestone arm one round earlier, one layer
up: there the map claimed a span its wrapper did not cover, here a control
claimed a surface it did not measure. A control is only as wide as its narrowest
arm, and widening the scope gate without widening the fail-closed rule left the
gap exactly where the gate had just been extended.

Three arms now, one per admitted shape: a scheme URL token carrying an
expansion; a schemeless token carrying both a forge fragment and an expansion,
in either order; and the endpoint argument of a provider-CLI api call, read
positionally. Limits are stated in the source rather than implied — a caller who
splits the hostname as well, and an endpoint pushed past an option whose value
contains whitespace, are both outside what this measures.

An expansion in a BODY is explicitly not unreadable. Passing a payload in a
variable is the safe practice and leaves the endpoint fully legible; blocking it
would have been a control punishing the behaviour it wants.

101/101 fixtures, up from 92. Each arm is negative-controlled separately:
removing the schemeless arm fails exactly the two schemeless fixtures, removing
the provider-CLI arm fails exactly the four CLI fixtures, and neither disturbs
any pre-existing fixture. One added fixture was rewritten after it passed for
the wrong reason — its endpoint was readable, so it blocked on the endpoint map
and never exercised the arm it was written for.

Evidence: 101/101 locally and in ci-base; shellcheck clean at warning+; a
12-command sweep of ordinary forge work — reads with split endpoints, bodies in
variables, unwrapped endpoints, an artifact PUT — blocks none of them; the
18-command sweep still blocks the same three round-six flips and nothing new.
2026-08-12 18:53:25 -05:00
Hermes Agent 1bfd0ddd71 wrapper-guard: an arm may only claim the span its wrapper actually covers
ci/woodpecker/pr/ci Pipeline was successful
Round eight replaced an absence-driven allow with an endpoint inventory, and
review found the inventory answered the wrong question. It recorded which
wrapper TOUCHES an endpoint, when the sound question is whether the wrapper
SPANS it. A PATCH to a numbered milestone blocked with "use milestone-close.sh".
That wrapper takes only -t <title> and sends state=closed on both the gh and tea
paths, so it cannot express a title, description or due-date edit. The block was
correct and the advice was not — the same remediation-accuracy defect as the
round-seven subresource arm, one step quieter, because a wrapper was rounded up
from owning a slice to owning the endpoint.

The treatment already existed two arms away: /pulls/{n} named pr-close.sh for
state and said in the message that a PR title/body edit is a real wrapper gap.
So this was a consistency failure rather than a missing idea, which is why the
fix is not just the reported arm. Auditing every arm for span against the flags
each script accepts found a second bad one that review had not reached:
/pulls/{n}/requested_reviewers was mapped to pr-review.sh, and pr-review.sh
takes -a <action> -c <comment> and files a verdict. Nothing in this tree adds a
requested reviewer, so that arm was advertising a wrapper that cannot make the
call. It is unowned and now flows through, like a comment edit.

Changes:
  - /milestones/{n} keeps blocking, and the message states that milestone-close.sh
    owns the close only while title/description/due-date is a wrapper gap.
  - /pulls/{n}/requested_reviewers becomes residue, above the reviews arm so it
    cannot be refused with "use pr-review.sh".
  - /issues/{n} now also names issue-assign.sh, which owns the assignee field;
    issue-edit.sh has no assignee flag, so the old advice was short by one wrapper
    for a PATCH that sets one.
  - The map comment carries a span column, so a future arm has to state what its
    wrapper covers rather than imply all of it.

Fixtures assert the span language, not just the wrapper name: the milestone edit
must say it owns the close only, and a PATCH setting an assignee must name
issue-assign.sh. Negative-controlled — reverting each of the three behaviours
fails that fixture and only that fixture.

92/92 (was 89), locally and in ci-base. shellcheck clean at warning+. The
18-command ordinary sweep blocks the same three round-six flips and nothing new.

Gates: fixtures 92/92 in ci-base, shellcheck clean at warning+.
2026-08-12 18:36:23 -05:00
Hermes Agent a3cacac7fb wrapper-guard: make subresource ownership an inventory, and check the advice
ci/woodpecker/pr/ci Pipeline was canceled
Round seven fixed "wrong wrapper advice" by letting every path under a numbered
issue or PR flow through, on the stated reasoning that no wrapper owned any of
them. Review checked that reasoning against the directory and it was false:

  gh api -X PATCH repos/a/b/issues/1 -f title=x
  curl -X PATCH -d @b https://host/api/v1/repos/a/b/issues/1
  gh api -X PATCH repos/a/b/issues/1/labels -f labels[]=bug
  gh api -X POST  repos/a/b/issues/1/assignees -f assignees[]=u

issue-edit.sh takes --title/--body/--labels/--milestone and issue-assign.sh
takes assignee/labels/milestone, so all four are wrapped calls and all four
returned 0. The guard answered "allow" because wrapper ownership had been
ASSUMED absent rather than looked up — the same absence-driven allow this file
exists to remove, committed inside the fix for it. I withdraw the round-seven
departure: the reviewer's position was right on the evidence, and my argument
for it was sound reasoning applied to a fact I never checked.

The endpoint map is now an inventory read off tools/git/*.sh and their flags:
assignees to issue-assign.sh, labels to issue-edit.sh (naming issue-assign.sh
alongside it, since both set them), a numbered issue to issue-edit.sh (naming
issue-close.sh/issue-reopen.sh for state), a numbered PR to pr-close.sh (with
the PR title/body gap stated in the message rather than papered over), and
/milestones/{n} to milestone-close.sh instead of the create wrapper.

The residue is defined by SUBTRACTION, not by listing provider API surface:
everything a wrapper owns is consumed by an arm above, so a numbered path that
reaches the end is owned by nothing and still flows through — times, stopwatch,
reactions, a comment edit at /issues/comments/{id}. A list would rot the moment
a provider adds an endpoint, and rot in the blocking direction with wrong advice.

That residue test is a regex, deliberately. `case` globs cannot express a path
SEGMENT, so the natural allow arm *"/issues/"[0-9]*"/"* clears

  gh api -X PATCH repos/a/b/issues/1 -f body="see /docs"

on the strength of a slash inside the body. An allow decided by a glob over the
whole command is the fail-open shape again; the regex pins the segment to the
number, and that command is pinned as a fixture.

Also: `-f labels[]=bug` was not read as a body at all, because the key class
stopped at the bracket. The array spelling is what the provider CLIs use for
repeated fields, so an implicit POST carrying only array fields was invisible.

And the reason six rounds of this were invisible: the harness read the exit code
and nothing else, so a block naming the WRONG wrapper passed every run. Fixtures
may now state the wrapper the message must name, and the wrapped ones do. The
assertion was negative-controlled — pointing one fixture at the wrong wrapper
fails that fixture and only that fixture.

89/89 (was 79), locally and in ci-base. All eight sanitization commands green
in-image. The 18-command ordinary sweep blocks the same three round-six flips
and nothing new, so the tighter map cost nothing on ordinary work.

Gates: sanitization (all eight green in ci-base), shellcheck clean at warning+.
2026-08-12 18:25:13 -05:00
Hermes Agent b4578dcd0a wrapper-guard: close the absence shape at the new boundary; stop giving wrong advice
ci/woodpecker/pr/ci Pipeline was successful
Round six deleted the code/data parser and scoped what remained on `https?://`.
Review found the failure class had not been eliminated, only relocated: a raw
provider CLI carries no scheme, so the scope gate answered "not my business"
because the URL was ABSENT — the same shape, at the new boundary.

  gh api -X POST repos/a/b/issues -f title=x -f body=y
  gh api -X POST repos/a/b/pulls/1/reviews -f event=APPROVE
  tea api -X POST repos/a/b/issues/1/comments -f body=x
  curl -X POST -d x git.example.invalid/api/v1/repos/a/b/issues

All four were real writes to endpoints a wrapper owns, and all four passed.
Constitution gate 7 names raw provider CLIs explicitly, so they are in scope
rather than something to narrow the docs around. The scope gate now also
triggers on `/api/v{n}` and on the `api` subcommand of the provider CLIs, and
`-f key=value` joins curl's `-d` as an implicit POST. Adding triggers to a scope
gate can only make it stricter — it cannot open a new hole — which is why this
is a list of shapes rather than a model of any one caller.

The boundary is stated in the file rather than left to be discovered: provider
PORCELAIN (`tea pulls create`) is NOT covered, because catching it means
modelling every CLI's verb grammar, which is the parser mistake wearing a new
costume. That is a wrapper-and-review gap, not a thing this hook can hold.

Second finding, and the one I had flagged as my own worry: the endpoint `case`
was prefix-greedy, so `/issues/1/labels` blocked with "use issue-create.sh" —
the wrong wrapper for that call. A block an agent cannot comply with is worse
than no block, because it teaches that the hook is broken and the override is
routine, and an override that is routine is a guard that is off. Issue and PR
subresources now flow through, exactly as /releases and every other endpoint no
wrapper owns already does. This hook enforces "use the wrapper"; where there is
no wrapper it has nothing to enforce, and the gap belongs in the wrapper set.

I am departing from the review on that one deliberately: the review held that
blocking is correct there and only the remediation wrong. Naming a wrapper gap
in a refusal keeps gate-7 pressure, but it makes the override the normal path
for every labels and assignees call, which spends the override's meaning on the
cases where it is least needed.

Also: the APPROVE trap now catches the provider-CLI spelling `-f event=APPROVE`
alongside the JSON body, and still never matches the correct value APPROVED.

79/79 fixtures, locally and inside the CI image, with both blockers pinned in
both directions — the four repros block and name the right wrapper, while a
provider-CLI read, an unwrapped endpoint reached through one, porcelain, and the
`rm -f`/`grep -f` collisions all still pass. The 18-command ordinary sweep
blocks the same three round-six flips and nothing new, so the broader gate cost
nothing on ordinary work. Second over-block documented rather than found: prose
carrying `.post(` near a wrapped URL is refused, which follows from judging the
payload and is now stated next to the quoted-curl cost.

Gates: sanitization (all eight commands green in ci-base), shellcheck clean.
2026-08-12 18:10:19 -05:00
Hermes Agent b1254f52f3 wrapper-guard: judge the payload, not the caller — delete the code/data parser
ci/woodpecker/pr/ci Pipeline was canceled
Round-five review found command substitution executing inside the very quoted
spans the skeleton was discarding as prose:

  echo "$(curl -d@b .../issues/1/comments)"
  msg="$(curl -d@b .../issues/1/comments)"

The unquoted and process-substitution forms already blocked, so the same call
was refused or allowed depending on a quote character. That makes it a
classification defect rather than another spelling, and it is the nineteenth
write to reach execution through this file by the same route: the client was
ABSENT from the skeleton, so the guard allowed.

The reviewer's judgement, which I asked for and accept: this is fitting to the
test set. Answering "code or data" from shell text with sed and awk is not a
hard problem, it is the wrong problem.

It was also not portable. CI has been red at `sanitization` since round four,
and the log says why: under the image's busybox awk the octal escape in the
quote-stripping regex does not bite, every quoted span survives into the
skeleton, and the guard began refusing ordinary prose. Five allow-direction
fixtures failed in CI that pass under GNU awk. A control that reverses its
verdict with the awk on the host is not a control.

So the client detection is gone — the skeleton, the invoker list, the prefix
list, the option-value skipping, all of it. What remains asks two questions of
the text: is this a write, and does it name an endpoint a wrapper owns. It
cannot fail open by hiding the caller because it never looks for one, and it
now catches clients it was never taught: `python -c ... requests.post(...)` and
`wget --post-data` are both fixtures.

The cost is stated in the file and pinned in both directions: QUOTING one of
these calls on a Bash command line is refused as well. Ten fixtures that used
to assert "discussing a call is not making one" now assert the opposite, and
the boundary that stops this becoming block-everything is asserted just as
hard — a quoted READ, an endpoint named without a body flag, a quoted write to
an UNWRAPPED endpoint, and the wrapper's own body flag all still pass. The
18-command ordinary-work sweep blocks none.

The rule an agent can hold without a parser: do not put a raw write to a
wrapped forge endpoint on a Bash command line, not even inside quotes. Write
the example with a file-writing tool.

60/60 fixtures, verified inside the CI image (busybox) as well as locally.
Gates: sanitization, resident budget, test enumeration, tools-index (self-test
4/4, git suite 100%), issue-close, prettier.
2026-08-12 17:59:14 -05:00
Hermes Agent 2a2a87251a wrapper-guard: read the command the shell will run, and stop losing the client behind option values
ci/woodpecker/pr/ci Pipeline failed
Round-four review, three more absence-driven allows.

1. The guard read the command as TYPED. A backslash before a newline is removed
   before anything else happens, so an endpoint token split across the join
   (`.../iss\` + newline + `ues/1/comments`) executed the comments endpoint while
   the literal token never appeared in the text. Continuations are now joined
   before every check, because the joined form IS the command. This is the same
   defect as the split-across-variables case, minus the excuse: there the token
   genuinely does not exist until the shell expands it, here it was sitting in
   the input the whole time and the guard chose the wrong reading of it.

2. Transparent prefixes take option VALUES. `sudo -u root curl` hid a live write
   because `root` was a word the prefix list did not know. Enumerating option
   grammars per prefix is the wrong game, so what is skipped is an option and at
   most one value for it, plus a bare duration for `timeout` — never an
   arbitrary word. `xargs echo curl ...` therefore stays ALLOWED, because there
   the command is echo and the client is its argument.

3. `find -exec` runs the client. It opens command position the same way an
   operator does, and now reads that way.

All seven reviewer repros are fixtures, each with its counter-case in the
allowed direction: a continuation inside a heredoc document stays a document,
`xargs echo curl` stays allowed, `sudo apt-get install curl` stays allowed, a
prefixed READ stays allowed. 48/48, and the 18-command ordinary sweep still
blocks none.

Gates: sanitization, resident budget, test enumeration, tools-index (self-test
4/4, git suite 100%), prettier.
2026-08-12 17:46:25 -05:00
Hermes Agent e6a881a795 wrapper-guard: judge command position on prefixes and on what a shell will execute
ci/woodpecker/pr/ci Pipeline failed
Round-three review found two more absence-driven allows, both in the skeleton
introduced by round two, and fixing them exposed a third the reviewer had not
reached yet.

1. A word in front of a command does not displace the command. `env VAR=v curl`,
   `command curl`, `timeout 10 curl` and `/usr/bin/curl` were all real writes at
   execution position that a bare-name match could not see. The `env` form is the
   one that matters: it is what an agent reaches for to keep a credential out of
   the global environment, so the careful spelling was the invisible one.

2. Quoted data stops being data when a shell is about to execute it, and the
   first version knew only `bash -c`, `sh <<` and `eval`. It did not know the
   pipe, which is the form people actually use: `printf ... | sh`, `cat <<EOF | sh`,
   `sh -s <<EOF` each made a live call vanish from the skeleton while still
   running.

3. Found while testing the fix: that decision was made for the WHOLE command, so
   a single unrelated `docker run ... sh -c 'echo hi'` promoted every other
   quoted span on every other line to code. It blocked its own author for the
   second time in a day. A shell on one line does not execute a string on another
   line, and over-blocking is not the safe direction — a guard that blocks
   ordinary work gets switched off, and a guard that is off permits everything.
   The skeleton is now built per line, and a heredoc body is code only when the
   line that opened it fed a shell.

All seven reviewer repros are pinned as fixtures, each with a counter-fixture in
the allowed direction: `echo timeout 10 curl ...` is not a call, a pipe to `wc`
is not execution, an unrelated shell on another line changes nothing. Fixtures
40/40, and a sweep of 18 ordinary commands blocks none of them.

Gates: sanitization, resident budget, test enumeration, tools-index (self-test
4/4, git suite 100%), prettier.
2026-08-12 17:39:05 -05:00
Hermes Agent 7962e4302f guard: judge command position on the code, not on the text
ci/woodpecker/pr/ci Pipeline was canceled
The position test added an hour ago blocked its own author. The message being
sent quoted one of the fixtures, so the quoted text contained an operator
followed by a client, and an operator inside a string is not an operator. That
is the reported over-blocking defect one level in, and it landed within an hour
of shipping the fix for the reported one — which is the argument for pinning
both directions as fixtures rather than reasoning about them.

Position is now judged against a SKELETON: the command with its data spans
(quoted strings, heredoc bodies) removed. Endpoint, URL and body detection keep
running against the full text, because real calls quote their URLs and a
skeleton would be blind to them.

The exception is what makes quotes data in the first place. If something is
about to EXECUTE the quoted text — `bash -c`, `sh <<EOF`, `eval` — the quotes
hold code, and the skeleton keeps them as command separators so the client
inside is still at command position, one interpreter down.

Three fixtures: an operator inside a quoted string, a heredoc body, and
`bash -c` making the same text code again. 30/30.
2026-08-12 17:29:33 -05:00
Hermes Agent 8a901cc19a guard: read command position, refuse unreadable URLs, survive pipefail
ci/woodpecker/pr/ci Pipeline was canceled
Round two of the same independent review. Three findings, all real, and the
first two share a root cause: the guard was reading command TEXT as though it
were a command.

1. Splitting the endpoint token itself defeats fragment matching outright —
   `a=/api/v1/repos/o/r/iss; b=ues/1/comments` leaves no fragment contiguous.
   Round one fixed one spelling of this and the reviewer produced the general
   form immediately. It is not winnable by more fragments: the endpoint does
   not exist until the shell expands it, and this hook runs first. So the guard
   stops pretending to read it. A write whose URL contains an expansion, on a
   visibly forge-shaped command, is now BLOCKED as unreadable — because "I
   could not find an endpoint" must not mean "there is no endpoint". Opaque
   URLs that are not forge-shaped (webhooks, artifact stores) still pass.

2. The broadened body detection false-blocked ordinary work: `grep -R "curl -d
   https://.../issues" docs/`, `echo "curl -d ..." > note.txt`, printing an
   example from python. Talking about a call is not making one, and this is the
   direction that actually kills a control — an over-blocking hook gets turned
   off, and an off hook permits everything. The client must now appear at
   COMMAND POSITION: line start or after a shell operator, optionally behind
   VAR=value. In every false positive it sat behind a quote instead. Quotes are
   deliberately NOT stripped before matching; real calls quote their URLs.

3. `wt_precious()` aborted `cmd_rm` under `set -euo pipefail`: `grep -v` exits 1
   when it filters everything out, which is exactly the disposable-only case,
   so a SAFE worktree failed to remove with no message. Fixed, and the same
   defect was latent one step upstream in `wt_dirty()`, where `head -200`
   SIGPIPEs git on any worktree with 201 changed files. The cap is gone —
   counting is cheap and the cap only ever truncated output that is no longer
   printed.

Seven new fixtures pin all of it, in both directions. 27/27.
2026-08-12 17:26:09 -05:00
Hermes Agent 8b7ac5b51e guard: close four fail-open holes found by independent review
ci/woodpecker/pr/ci Pipeline was canceled
An independent reviewer broke all three new controls before they shipped.
Every finding is reproduced as a fixture or a repro, because the class is
recurring rather than incidental: each hole was a case where the answer was
"allow" because something was ABSENT rather than because it was CHECKED.

1. wrapper-guard read only the spellings it knew. `curl -d@body` (no space),
   `--request=POST` (equals form), and a URL path assembled from shell
   variables each carried a real provider write straight through. Write
   detection now covers every body and method form curl accepts, and the
   endpoint match no longer anchors on a literal host path that a variable
   can dissolve.

2. wrapper-guard blocked only when the wrapper FILE existed. A host with a
   broken or partial install therefore permitted exactly the raw writes the
   guard exists to stop. Blocking is now on the endpoint; a missing wrapper
   changes the remedy text, not the verdict — a broken install is not
   permission to bypass gate 7.

3. mosaic-worktree read a worktree's safety from two questions, and a clean,
   fully-pushed tree holding a gitignored `local.secret` answered both with
   zero. `git worktree remove` then deleted the one copy in existence. A file
   is gitignored precisely so nothing else holds it, so ignored-but-not-
   disposable files are now a third evidence question. Build junk
   (node_modules, .venv, dist, caches, *.pyc) stays disposable, so the common
   case still reads SAFE.

4. check-tools-index counted a documented tool as discoverable at mode 0644.
   Every caller tests `[ -x ]`, so a non-executable tool is a missing tool;
   it now fails the gate with its own message.

Local gates green: sanitization, resident budget, test enumeration,
tools-index (4/4 self-test, 100% on the enforced git suite), and
wrapper-guard 20/20.
2026-08-12 17:20:11 -05:00
Hermes Agent 96609bdade framework: prove the wrapper guard both ways, and resolve its wrappers relatively
ci/woodpecker/pr/ci Pipeline failed
Two defects found by running the guard rather than reading it.

1. The guard resolved its sibling wrappers through a hardcoded
   $HOME/.config/mosaic/tools/git. On a host with no installed mosaic home — a
   CI container, a bare checkout — every wrapper lookup missed, `[ -x ]` failed,
   and the guard fell through allowing the raw API write it exists to block. It
   failed OPEN, silently, in exactly the environment least likely to notice.
   It now resolves relative to its own path, so it names the wrappers from the
   install it was launched from, with $HOME as the fallback.

2. There was no test. Adding one surfaced the guard's other sharp edge
   immediately: it matches the literal text of the Bash command, so a harness
   that embeds a blocked pattern inline trips the guard on itself rather than on
   the fixture. That is the correct fail-closed posture and it is now recorded in
   the test's own comments, because the next person will hit it too.

test-wrapper-guard.sh asserts twelve fixtures and asserts the ALLOWED cases as
hard as the blocked ones. A guard that over-blocks gets routed around and a guard
that under-blocks is decoration; only pinning both edges keeps it useful. It is
hermetic — no network, no credentials, no repository — so it joins the CI
sanitization step directly rather than the exclusions file.
2026-08-12 16:54:18 -05:00
Hermes Agent e3a0ee87b3 framework: make tool discoverability, workspace placement and model tiering mechanical
An undocumented tool is, from inside an agent session, indistinguishable from a
tool that was never written. The framework shipped 26 git wrappers and named 6 of
them in its resident index docs — 23% discoverability, with pr-review.sh among the
missing. The observable consequence was an agent obeying Constitution gate 7 as
best it could see it, reaching for raw curl, sending GitHub's APPROVE to a Gitea
host, and getting HTTP 200 with the review silently filed PENDING. Three times.
That is not a discipline failure and no amount of prose fixes it.

Four changes, each converting a rule that decayed into a mechanism that cannot:

- check-tools-index.sh (new, CI-blocking): every tool in an enforced suite must be
  named in a resident index doc, and every tool an index names must exist. The git
  suite is enforced now; other suites report coverage without failing, so the
  ratchet tightens one reviewed PR at a time instead of landing as one sweep. The
  enforced list is framework-owned rather than a marker inside operator-owned
  TOOLS.md — a doc marker would let an operator silence the gate on exactly the
  host where it matters most. Carries --self-test, because a checker that only
  ever passes is indistinguishable from one that is not running.

- TOOLS-REFERENCE.md: complete 28-entry git index, plus the APPROVED/APPROVE
  dialect note that explains why pr-review.sh is not a formality.

- mosaic-worktree.sh + wrapper-guard.sh (upstreamed): the rule "big work goes on a
  work filesystem" already existed in prose, and 255 GB accumulated in $HOME across
  842 directories anyway, under five simultaneous placement conventions on one
  host. The helper therefore exposes no placement decision — given a branch name,
  every path is derived from `git worktree list --porcelain`. Worktrees rather than
  clones because enumerability is the only thing that makes reclaim safe, and
  reclaim is by evidence (clean tree + no unpushed commits), never by size or age.
  The guard blocks three mechanically-detectable mistakes and nothing else:
  a checkout into $HOME, a raw provider-API write to an endpoint that has a
  wrapper, and the literal APPROVE event. Reads pass untouched.

- STANDARDS.md: model tiering as a standard, named by capability class so it
  survives a model generation. Start cheapest, escalate on evidence, benchmark
  before demoting a task class, and keep the class->model binding in operator
  config with the DB-backed config service as the end state.

Registering the guard in runtime/claude/settings.json is the point of upstreaming
it: ~/.claude/settings.json is a framework-managed copy, so a hand-added hook there
is destroyed by the next upgrade. In the template it survives, and it reaches every
host instead of one.
2026-08-12 16:51:17 -05:00
mos-dt-0 ec260e678f Merge pull request 'fix(git): accept http/https as one scheme class in comment URL verification (#991)' (#1022) from fix/991-comment-url-scheme-normalise into main
ci/woodpecker/push/publish Pipeline was successful
ci/woodpecker/push/ci Pipeline was successful
2026-08-12 01:11:09 +00:00
Jason Woltje b590a5c3d8 fix(git): accept http/https as one scheme class in comment URL verification (#991)
ci/woodpecker/pr/ci Pipeline was successful
issue-comment.sh and pr-review.sh verify a durable write by pinning the
provider-returned object URL's origin and full path. The origin included the
SCHEME verbatim. On a Gitea whose ROOT_URL is configured `http://` while every
client reaches it over `https://`, the provider returns `http://` object URLs,
so the comparison rejects the provider's own truthful answer about a write that
LANDED. The failure is deterministic, not intermittent: every comment, every
time, on such a deployment.

The scheme was never what the check defends. The forgeries it exists to catch —
look-alike host, decoy path prefix, wrong owner/repo/kind/number — all vary the
HOST or the PATH. Both stay strict. `http` and `https` now collapse to one
scheme class; any other scheme (file:, ftp:, javascript:) stays distinguishing,
and an EXPLICIT non-default port still distinguishes, because a different port
is a different service on the same host.

Consequences of the bug, both observed:

- The wrapper reports failure on a comment that is durably on the issue/PR, and
  attributes it to #865 ("no durable comment created"). The write landed; the
  citation is wrong. Reproduced here: the harness's persisted state contains the
  record while the wrapper exits 1.
- pr-review.sh's comment path is worse. On a host where no seat can create a
  review OBJECT, comment-form is the only gate-16 review record obtainable, and
  this check refuses all of it.

Test gap this closes: every URL fixture in both harnesses was `https://`, and
every negative case varied only host or path. The one axis that fails in
production had zero coverage — the fixtures encoded the assumption that breaks.
Added, in both suites:

- scheme-downgrade (http vs https, otherwise correct) — must be ACCEPTED. Fails
  against the unmodified wrappers, passes against the fixed ones; verified in
  both directions, and the negative control's captured output is the #865
  misattribution above.
- explicit non-default port (`:8443`) — must stay REJECTED.
- non-web scheme (`ftp://`) — must stay REJECTED.

Also fixes test-issue-comment-readback.sh hermeticity (#1007), without which the
suite cannot run on any seat that has a per-agent Gitea token: detect-platform's
step-0 identity lookup reads ~/.config/mosaic/gitea-tokens/<identity>, outside
both XDG_CONFIG_HOME and MOSAIC_CREDENTIALS_FILE, so the suite resolved a
PRODUCTION credential and died at HTTP 401 before case 1. Same two-part fix
already merged for test-pr-review-gitea-comment.sh in #1006: a sandboxed HOME
plus an empty REPO-LOCAL mosaic.gitIdentity to shadow the global. Note the
env-var route does NOT work — detect-platform.sh reads `${MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY:-}`
and `:-` treats set-but-empty identically to unset.

The owner-side half of #991 (setting the deployment's Gitea ROOT_URL to https)
is not in scope here and is not made unnecessary by this change; this makes the
wrappers correct against a deployment that returns either scheme.
2026-08-11 19:00:31 -05:00
mos-dt-0 540ec5b6ef Merge pull request 'fix(git): #1007 suite hermeticity — pin repo-local mosaic.gitIdentity in five test suites' (#1024) from fix/1007-suite-hermeticity into main
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2026-08-11 23:19:49 +00:00
mos-dt-0 563d1ac053 Merge pull request 'fix(shell): remove wake validation pipe hazards' (#1107) from fix/1099-pipefail-wake into main
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2026-08-11 23:19:45 +00:00
mos-dt-0 722163671f feat(pi): add persistent Mosaic /goal controller (#1152)
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2026-08-10 22:54:43 +00:00
f10-coder f158be8003 fix(shell): remove wake validation pipe hazards
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2026-08-07 06:13:47 -05:00
f10-coderandMos b0f7d26dd9 fix(shell): remove test harness pipe hazards (#1106)
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Co-authored-by: f10-coder <[email protected]>
2026-08-07 11:12:17 +00:00
f10-coderandMos 3a1203b2f8 fix(shell): remove runtime early-exit pipe hazards (#1105)
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Co-authored-by: f10-coder <[email protected]>
2026-08-07 09:38:37 +00:00
be-coder-08 df4c591ab4 fix(fleet): make framework shell assertions SIGPIPE-safe (#1100)
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2026-08-07 08:21:20 +00:00
be-coder-06andMos 4fa2768962 fix(fleet): propagate roster git identity (#1073)
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Co-authored-by: be-coder-06 <[email protected]>
2026-08-07 07:07:45 +00:00
Jason Woltje 2fa6bcd576 fix(git): #1007 — test-issue-comment-readback is a FIFTH affected suite (second census correction)
ci/woodpecker/pr/ci Pipeline was successful
My previous commit said four. It is five. `test-issue-comment-readback.sh` has
the same defect and is fixed the same way, and I had already looked straight at
it and filed it as an *unrelated* silent failure. Correcting that here rather
than folding it in quietly.

WHY IT WAS MISSED — the general lesson, not the excuse. `run_comment()` sends
the wrapper's stdout AND stderr to `$OUTPUT_FILE`, and the `EXIT` trap deletes
`$WORK_DIR`. The suite therefore exits 1 with ZERO bytes on stdout and stderr,
and the one line that says what went wrong —

    Error: Gitea authenticated-identity read failed with HTTP 401

— lives only inside a directory that no longer exists when anyone looks. Every
oracle I had swept the family with greps for a SYMPTOM in surviving output, so
against this suite all of them returned "nothing found", which I read as "clean"
in the first sweep and as "unrelated pre-existing failure" in the second. A
suite that discards or deletes its own evidence converts a post-hoc assay into a
non-measurement, and I wrote that sentence into the previous commit while it was
already false about a file in the same directory.

HOW IT WAS ACTUALLY FOUND. Intercept the identity read at its SOURCE instead of
grepping for its consequence: a PATH shim over `git` that logs every
`mosaic.gitIdentity` read — args, rc, and resolved value — to a file OUTSIDE any
suite's work dir, then execs the real git. Deletion-proof by construction, and
it measures the defect's cause rather than one of its symptoms. Sweeping all 16
suites with it under an ordinary invocation:

  resolves a REAL identity (`mos-dt-0`) before the fix:
    test-issue-comment-readback          1 read   rc=1 (RED on every seat)
    test-pr-review-repo-host-override    6 reads  rc=0
    test-ci-queue-wait-branch-absent     3 reads  rc=0
  the four fixed in the previous commit now read empty; the rest never read at all.

The latter two are NOT affected and are deliberately left alone: under a seat
replica (identity set, no per-slot token) neither reaches `get_gitea_token`'s
fail-loud branch, and under a canary HOME neither carries the canary credential
into any surviving artifact. They read the identity and never enter a credential
path. That residual is structural and belongs to the wrapper half of #1007 —
scoping the read with `git -C "$repo"` removes it for everyone at once.

An earlier version of that sweep reported the four fixed suites as still
resolving a real identity. That was my grep, not the suites: `value=\[..*\]` is
satisfied by `value=[] args=[…]`, because `.*` runs past the empty pair and
matches the closing bracket of the NEXT one. `value=\[[^]]` is the correct test.
Recorded because the wrong pattern failed in the direction that would have sent
me re-fixing four already-correct files.

VERIFICATION of this suite, four HOME arms, all rc=0 with zero non-empty
identity reads and the pass line on stdout: real HOME, seat replica, canary
HOME, and an empty HOME with no identity at all. Full 16-suite sweep after the
change: every suite rc=0.

CONSEQUENCE FOR THE FINDING LIST IN THE PREVIOUS COMMIT: item 2 there — the
"silently red, unrelated to #1007" suite — is withdrawn. It was #1007 all along.
Item 1 (`pr-metadata.sh:89-92`, the anonymous fallback that reports an HTTP 200
carrying valid JSON as "unknown API error") stands and is still unfixed here.

Refs #1007
2026-07-31 07:27:10 -05:00
Jason Woltje 1afe2b36dc fix(git): #1007 suite hermeticity — pin repo-local mosaic.gitIdentity in four test suites
CENSUS CORRECTION: FOUR suites, not the three my own #1007 audit named. The
fourth (test-pr-metadata-gitea.sh) was outside the candidate set that audit
worked from and was found only by sweeping the discriminator across all 16
tools/git/test-*.sh suites. Recording that as a correction to my finding, not
as part of the original claim.

THE DEFECT. get_gitea_token() (detect-platform.sh:502-599) resolves a per-agent
identity at STEP 0, from `git config --get mosaic.gitIdentity`, BEFORE both the
Mosaic credential loader (step 1) and the GITEA_TOKEN env check (step 2). On a
provisioned agent seat that value is set GLOBALLY in ~/.gitconfig and is
inherited by any freshly-`git init`ed repo, so step 0 reads a REAL per-slot
token out of $HOME and returns it without ever consulting the suite's own
MOSAIC_CREDENTIALS_FILE / GITEA_TOKEN fixtures. The suites were running against
production credentials, and the fixture credential each one carefully
constructs was inert.

THE FIX: an empty repo-local `mosaic.gitIdentity`. An empty local value shadows
the global one and reads back empty at rc=0, so step 0 declines. The env route
does NOT work: detect-platform.sh reads "${MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY:-}", and `:-`
treats set-but-empty identically to unset.

OPERATIVE vs CONTAINMENT — the two mechanisms are not interchangeable and the
comment in each suite says so. The pin is operative: it prevents the resolution.
The sandboxed HOME each suite now also gets is containment: it bounds a failure
the pin should already have prevented. Conflating them is how this class stays
invisible, because a decoy HOME REMOVES the trigger (~/.gitconfig is where the
global identity lives), so any suite audited under one reads clean however
vulnerable it is. To MEASURE, replicate a seat: a decoy HOME whose .gitconfig
sets mosaic.gitIdentity with no per-slot token, so step 0 reaches its fail-loud
branch. That note is in each file for the next auditor.

SECOND, INDEPENDENT DEFECT in test-pr-metadata-gitea.sh. Applying the pin alone
turned that suite RED — and a control at baseline 826a8b3 under a plain HOME
reproduced the same failure, so it is pre-existing, not introduced. Its
`GITEA_TOKEN="stub-token"` / `GITEA_URL="https://git.example.test"` pair can
never satisfy step 2, because step 2 accepts GITEA_TOKEN only when GITEA_URL
matches the remote host and this repo's origin is git.uscllc.com. The suite had
therefore only ever passed by resolving a REAL credential — step 0 on a seat, or
step 1 from the operator's own credentials.json. A MOSAIC_CREDENTIALS_FILE
fixture is added rather than leaning on the sandboxed HOME making step 1 find
nothing: a test that passes because production configuration is ABSENT fails the
moment it is present. Shipping the pin without this would have moved the failure
rather than removed it.

NO CI ARM. .woodpecker/ci.yml does not run these suites; packages/mosaic/
package.json:28 (test:framework-shell) runs an ENUMERATED list that excludes all
four. They run only by hand — i.e. exclusively on a provisioned seat, the one
environment where the defect is live. "Passes in CI, fails on a seat" does not
apply here; there is no CI observation at all.

VERIFICATION (seat replica = decoy HOME with mosaic.gitIdentity set, no per-slot
token; canary = same plus a marked non-credential at both per-slot paths; plain
= empty HOME; real = ordinary invocation):
  - bash -n clean on all four.
  - Sweep of all 16 suites at baseline 826a8b3 under the seat replica:
    test-gitea-login-resolution rc=1 REACHES-STEP0; test-issue-create-
    interactive-auth rc=1 REACHES-STEP0; test-pr-merge-gitea-empty-uid rc=1
    REACHES-STEP0; test-pr-metadata-gitea rc=1 REACHES-STEP0.
  - Same sweep after: every row rc=0 with step0 absent.
  - test-gitea-token-identity flags REACHES-STEP0 in BOTH arms and is NOT a
    defect: it runs under `env -i HOME="$FAKE_HOME"` (line 77) and its hit is
    its own deliberate assert_failloud fixtures (lines 158-171). The fail-loud
    grep matches the intended behaviour as well as the defect, so it needs the
    second discriminator; recorded here so the next sweep does not re-file it.
  - Durable-argv assay (a PATH shim that tees argv out of each suite's own mock
    curl, because test-pr-merge-gitea-empty-uid truncates its log between phases
    and its EXIT trap removes the sandbox — a post-hoc read of that suite is a
    non-measurement, and "no trace" there is not a clearance):
      test-pr-merge-gitea-empty-uid  before: canary token in argv, fixture never
        used. after: fixture token in argv, canary absent. 5 curl calls both arms.
      test-pr-metadata-gitea         before: canary in argv. after: both calls
        carry the fixture token against git.uscllc.com.
  - test-pr-metadata-gitea across seat/canary/plain HOMEs after the fix: rc=0,
    rc=0, rc=0.
  - All four under the real HOME: rc=0. No regression to ordinary invocation.

The comment block is duplicated across the four files rather than pointing at a
shared note. Deliberate, and matching the merged #1006 precedent
(test-pr-review-gitea-comment.sh:87-95): the reader who needs it is auditing one
file.

TWO FINDINGS DELIBERATELY NOT FIXED HERE (out of this branch's scope, to be
filed):
  1. pr-metadata.sh:89-92 — the anonymous curl fallback does not check ^2, so an
     HTTP 200 carrying valid JSON is reported as "unknown API error" at rc=1.
  2. test-issue-comment-readback.sh exits 1 with ZERO bytes on stdout AND
     stderr, dying at its first seed_state python3 heredoc. Reproduces at
     baseline 826a8b3 under both a seat replica and the real HOME. Silently red
     at main for everyone; unrelated to #1007.

Refs #1007
2026-07-31 07:13:13 -05:00
87 changed files with 6803 additions and 197 deletions
+18
View File
@@ -46,10 +46,28 @@ steps:
# [0] of the pnpm chain, so severing that chain would silence it together
# with everything it guards; this direct line keeps one instrument running.
- bash packages/mosaic/framework/tools/quality/scripts/check-test-enumeration.sh
# Tool-index gate: a shipped wrapper that appears in no resident index doc
# is undiscoverable from inside a session, and an agent that cannot learn a
# wrapper exists reaches for raw curl instead — which is how a Gitea review
# got filed PENDING three times. Ships-and-documented is one commit, or red.
- bash packages/mosaic/framework/tools/quality/scripts/check-tools-index.sh --self-test
- bash packages/mosaic/framework/tools/quality/scripts/check-tools-index.sh
# Hermetic regression for issue-close.sh (#1081): mocks tea/curl onto PATH
# and sandboxes a throwaway git repo, so it resolves no real credentials and
# joins CI directly rather than the exclusions file.
- bash packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/test-issue-close-fail-closed.sh
# Hermetic behavioural regression for the PreToolUse wrapper guard: proves
# it still blocks the three mistakes AND still lets reads, unwrapped
# endpoints and ordinary commands through. Both directions are asserted —
# a guard that over-blocks gets routed around, which fails just as hard.
- bash packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/test-wrapper-guard.sh
# Hermetic regression for mosaic-worktree.sh at fleet scale: stubs git onto
# PATH so `list` faces ~450 KB of porcelain. The defect it pins is invisible
# at small size — `git … | awk '…exit'` gives the producer SIGPIPE, which
# under `set -euo pipefail` aborts the caller silently with rc=141 and no
# output. A repo only reaches that once it has enough worktrees, so the
# stub supplies the scale instead of the host's own checkout.
- bash packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/test-mosaic-worktree-large-repo.sh
# Blocking gate (#791): a framework upgrade must never write or delete an
# operator-owned path. The HARD GATE proves an unanticipated operator sentinel
+8
View File
@@ -60,6 +60,14 @@ The launcher verifies your config, checks for `SOUL.md`, injects your `AGENTS.md
Pi launches default to a token-lean skill posture: `mosaic pi` passes `--no-skills` so Pi does not preload every global skill description into the system prompt. Use `MOSAIC_PI_SKILL_MODE=all mosaic pi` for the legacy all-skills catalog, or `MOSAIC_PI_SKILL_MODE=discover mosaic pi` to let Pi use its native settings/project skill discovery.
Mosaic also loads its Pi extensions from `~/.config/mosaic/runtime/pi/`. Inside Pi,
`/goal set <statement>` starts a bounded persistent loop that checks every turn and successful
compaction, requires two evidence-bearing completion reports, and can be inspected or stopped with
`/goal status`, `/goal pause`, `/goal resume`, and `/goal cancel`. Controller-owned goal-state
entries redact common credential shapes, but Pi's model/tool-call history is separate, so goals and
evidence must never contain secrets or raw sensitive output. Mosaic does not install this extension
into `~/.pi/agent/extensions/`.
### TUI & Gateway
```bash
+237
View File
@@ -102,6 +102,128 @@ Context compaction, session replacement, and same-PID runtime reloads can leave
---
## Pi Persistent Goal Loop (#1150)
### Problem and objective
A Pi agent can stop after a plausible-looking answer even when the operator's broader objective is
not complete, and ordinary compaction can weaken or omit the original objective. Mosaic needs an
optional, operator-controlled goal loop that keeps a Pi session oriented, checks progress at native
lifecycle boundaries, and resumes work until completion is verified or a bounded safety state is
reached.
The objective is a Mosaic-owned Pi extension deployed from the framework into
`~/.config/mosaic/runtime/pi/`. It must not install into or depend on `~/.pi/agent/extensions/`.
### Scope
#### In scope
1. `PGL-REQ-01`: The framework SHALL ship a dedicated Pi goal extension under
`packages/mosaic/framework/runtime/pi/`, seed it under `$MOSAIC_HOME/runtime/pi/`, and make
`mosaic pi` load it alongside the core Mosaic extension when present.
2. `PGL-REQ-02`: `/goal` SHALL support setting a goal plus status, pause, resume, cancel, and help
operations without silently replacing an active goal.
3. `PGL-REQ-03`: Active branch-specific goal state SHALL be persisted in Pi custom session entries,
restored on session start and tree navigation, and never rely on a compaction summary as its
source of truth.
4. `PGL-REQ-04`: A hidden goal contract SHALL be injected through Pi's `context` event before every
model request so it remains effective across tool turns, retries, and post-compaction requests.
5. `PGL-REQ-05`: The harness SHALL inspect every `turn_end` and successful `session_compact` event.
A structured terminating goal-report tool SHALL capture `continue`, evidence-bearing `achieved`,
or `blocked` status without requiring a redundant model turn.
6. `PGL-REQ-06`: An achievement claim SHALL remain provisional until a second consecutive
evidence-bearing verification report. Any continuation report or successful compaction during
verification SHALL reset the verification sequence.
7. `PGL-REQ-07`: Continuation SHALL be initiated at safe lifecycle boundaries, primarily
`agent_settled`; manual compaction and restored active sessions may schedule a deferred idle
continuation without re-entering compaction handlers.
8. `PGL-REQ-08`: The loop SHALL have operator cancellation plus bounded turn and repeated-no-progress
limits. Exhausted or blocked goals pause rather than continuing indefinitely.
9. `PGL-REQ-09`: Framework installation and update SHALL preserve normal manifest ownership: the
goal extension is framework-owned under `runtime/**`, while no goal extension or configuration
asset is created or modified under the operator's main Pi configuration. Pi remains the owner of
its native session files used by `appendEntry()`.
#### Out of scope
1. A mathematical guarantee that an arbitrary natural-language goal is semantically complete.
2. Automatically executing user-supplied shell predicates or accepting executable validation code in
`/goal` arguments.
3. Restarting Pi after process, host, or supervisor failure; the existing Mosaic fleet/runtime
supervisor owns process durability.
4. Gateway, database, web UI, Discord, or cross-harness goal orchestration in this slice.
### User and stakeholder requirements
- An operator can start a goal from Pi and see its current phase, evidence, limits, and latest report.
- The agent remains oriented after each turn and compaction until verified, paused, blocked,
exhausted, or cancelled.
- Local testing uses a file under `~/.config/mosaic/runtime/pi/`; the feature never writes an
extension asset to `~/.pi/agent/extensions/`.
- Framework updates deploy the same reviewed extension source through Mosaic's existing manifest
sync path.
### Non-functional requirements
1. **Safety:** bounded continuation, explicit cancellation, no arbitrary command execution, and no
completion without non-empty reported evidence.
2. **Reliability:** serialized continuation scheduling, branch-aware restoration, compaction-safe
context injection, and stale-timer cancellation on session shutdown.
3. **Performance:** no extra nested judge-model request on every turn; structured reporting uses the
active agent's final terminating tool call.
4. **Observability:** Pi status/notifications expose phase and bounded counters without recording
credentials or hidden model reasoning.
5. **Maintainability:** the state machine is deterministic and behavior-tested independently from Pi
provider/network access.
### Acceptance criteria
1. `AC-PGL-01`: A framework-sync fixture installs the extension at
`$MOSAIC_HOME/runtime/pi/goal-extension.ts`, and launcher tests prove both Mosaic Pi extensions are
emitted in deterministic order while absent optional files remain backward-compatible.
2. `AC-PGL-02`: Command tests prove set/status/pause/resume/cancel behavior, active-goal replacement
refusal, and bounded input handling.
3. `AC-PGL-03`: Lifecycle tests prove every turn is recorded, active context is injected on every
request, two evidence-bearing achievement reports are required, and `agent_settled` continues an
unmet goal without duplicate scheduling.
4. `AC-PGL-04`: Compaction and restoration tests prove goal state survives, verification is reset and
rechecked after compaction, manual compaction continuation is deferred until idle, and tree/session
branch state is reconstructed correctly.
5. `AC-PGL-05`: Limit tests prove max-turn and repeated-no-progress exhaustion stop autonomous
continuation, while pause/cancel/blocked states do not restart.
6. `AC-PGL-06`: Focused tests, package typecheck/lint/test, repository quality gates, a local Pi load
smoke test from `~/.config/mosaic/runtime/pi/`, independent review, and terminal-green CI pass before
issue #1150 closes.
### Constraints, risks, and assumptions
- Dependency: Pi's extension API must continue to provide `registerCommand`, `registerTool`,
`context`, `turn_end`, `agent_settled`, `session_compact`, session custom entries, and terminating
tool results.
- Risk: the working agent can overstate completion. Mitigation: structured evidence, a mandatory
second verification pass, explicit semantic limitations, and operator-visible reports.
- Risk: an impossible goal can consume unbounded resources. Mitigation: hard turn/no-progress bounds
and paused terminal states.
- Risk: automatic continuation can race compaction or session replacement. Mitigation: drive from
`agent_settled`, defer idle restarts, generation-check timers, and clear timers on shutdown.
- `ASSUMPTION:` Two consecutive evidence-bearing reports are the initial local verification policy;
rationale: it provides a real recheck without doubling every turn's model cost. Future policy may
add independent or deterministic validators.
- `ASSUMPTION:` Default limits are 40 turns and 6 repeated no-progress reports, configurable only by
bounded Mosaic environment settings; rationale: useful persistence with a finite autonomous budget.
- `ASSUMPTION:` Documentation remains canonical in-repo for this slice; no external docs publication
is requested.
### Testing and delivery intent
Use TDD for the deterministic controller and lifecycle invariants. Test with fake Pi lifecycle
objects first, then run a local load/smoke test from the deployed Mosaic path. Deliver source, tests,
launcher wiring, framework/runtime documentation, user/developer guides, and sitemap updates in one
reviewed squash PR to `main` with terminal-green CI.
---
## Fleet Declarative Configuration Management Workstream (FCM, #758)
### Problem and objective
@@ -146,6 +268,68 @@ lands. M0 consists only of these normative requirements, the complete task DAG,
documentation IA checklist, and the legacy example/profile disposition inventory. Subsequent cards
are defined in [docs/TASKS.md](./TASKS.md) and must remain one card/one PR.
### Fleet git identity launch propagation (#1043)
#### Problem and objective
A fleet seat can have a registered per-agent Git credential while its launched runtime process lacks
`MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY`. The credential resolver then cannot select the seat identity reliably, which
blocks repository operations on fail-closed estates and can fall through to an unrelated identity on
estates where that refusal is not active. The objective is to make Git identity a deterministic,
roster-derived part of the generated launch projection and prove it reaches the launched process.
#### Normative requirements
1. `FGI-REQ-01`: Every generated fleet agent projection SHALL declare
`MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY=<MOSAIC_AGENT_NAME>`; a differing or unsafe identity SHALL fail closed before
tmux launch.
2. `FGI-REQ-02`: The clean `/usr/bin/env -i` pane boundary SHALL pass every variable declared by the
generated projection, including `MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY`, to the launched runtime process.
3. `FGI-REQ-03`: A behavioral integration test SHALL set-compare the complete generated projection
against the launched process environment. Source-text/string-presence assertions are insufficient.
4. `FGI-REQ-04`: Verification SHALL include RED-first evidence and a delete-the-subject mutation that
removes Git-identity pane propagation and makes the behavioral test fail.
#### Acceptance criteria
1. `AC-FGI-01`: A launched seat process contains every key/value pair declared by its generated
environment projection, including the roster-derived Git identity.
2. `AC-FGI-02`: Missing, unsafe, or split Git identity is rejected before a tmux session is created.
3. `AC-FGI-03`: Focused launcher and generated-environment tests, repository quality gates,
independent review, and the required RED/green/R7 evidence are recorded before push.
### Framework shell assertion portability (#1098)
#### Problem and objective
The blocking framework-shell chain can report that a pane command omitted `/usr/bin/env -i` even when
`-i` matched successfully. A short-circuiting `grep -q` under `set -o pipefail` may close its pipe after
the match and cause an upstream producer to exit with SIGPIPE, turning a valid semantic result into a
nonzero aggregate pipeline. The objective is to inspect the captured NUL-delimited argv directly and
make failures carry the observed records needed for diagnosis.
#### Normative requirements
1. `FSP-REQ-01`: The pane-boundary test SHALL validate an adjacent `/usr/bin/env`, `-i` argv pair from
the authoritative NUL-delimited tmux capture without a short-circuit pipeline whose upstream status
can override a successful match.
2. `FSP-REQ-02`: Missing, reversed, or non-adjacent boundary tokens SHALL fail, while valid boundaries
SHALL remain valid regardless of trailing argv size, pipe capacity, process scheduling, or host/CI
utility implementation.
3. `FSP-REQ-03`: A failed boundary check SHALL print stable indexed, shell-escaped observed argv records
before exiting nonzero; the fixture SHALL continue to contain generated non-secret launch data only.
4. `FSP-REQ-04`: Verification SHALL include RED-first large-payload evidence, negative token-order
controls, the complete focused launcher suite, canonical Woodpecker CI, and independent review.
#### Acceptance criteria
1. `AC-FSP-01`: A large captured argv with adjacent `/usr/bin/env`, `-i` passes even when the former
`grep -q` pipeline returns nonzero from an upstream SIGPIPE.
2. `AC-FSP-02`: Missing executable, missing flag, and detached/reversed flag fixtures return nonzero and
emit the indexed observed argv.
3. `AC-FSP-03`: The focused suite passes on the development host and CI image, and the merged-main
Woodpecker pipeline is terminal green before #1098 closes.
---
## Exact Cross-Harness Fleet Communications Contract (#766)
@@ -1345,6 +1529,59 @@ All work is **alpha** (< 0.1.0) until Jason approves 0.1.0 beta release.
---
## Workspace placement guard hardening (#1174)
### Problem and objective
The Bash pre-tool guard must prevent Git checkouts and repository state from being placed under
`$HOME` without refusing ordinary Git commands merely because a source, option value, branch name,
or metadata mentions `$HOME`. A guard that over-blocks routine work is unsafe because operators
will route around it.
### Scope and requirements
1. `WPG-REQ-01`: `git clone` and `git worktree add` placement SHALL be judged from their placement
operands, not from every HOME-shaped word in the command.
2. `WPG-REQ-02`: Clone sources, references, templates, environment assignments, and non-placement
worktree metadata MAY resolve under HOME when all placement operands resolve elsewhere.
3. `WPG-REQ-03`: Both attached and separate-value `--separate-git-dir` forms SHALL remain placement
operands and SHALL be refused when they resolve under HOME.
4. `WPG-REQ-04`: Option classification SHALL account for Git's rule-generated boolean negations
without relying on an enumerable allowlist of flag spellings.
5. `WPG-REQ-05`: Quote removal, escapes, shell command boundaries, redirections, and end-of-options
handling SHALL preserve existing fail-closed checkout coverage.
6. `WPG-REQ-06`: Absolute placement aliases SHALL resolve shell-known HOME spellings, dot segments,
repeated separators, and existing symlink parents before the HOME boundary comparison.
7. Relative targets whose effective path depends on the shell cwd are out of scope and tracked by
#1197.
### Acceptance and verification
1. Git's own option parser accepts each tested flag, including generated `--no-*` forms, while the
guard allows a HOME-valued source with an explicit safe destination.
2. Equivalent clone and worktree fixtures cover rule-generated negations and remain discriminating
against the prior head where the defect existed.
3. Real HOME destinations and both `--separate-git-dir` forms remain blocked, including placements
after shell command boundaries.
4. The full hermetic guard suite, syntax/static checks, adversarial probes, independent review, and
terminal-green CI pass before merge.
5. Any option-classification residual is documented with its deliberate failure direction.
### Constraints, risks, and assumptions
- Security and usability are co-equal: neither a placement bypass nor routine over-block is an
acceptable repair.
- `ASSUMPTION:` The value-taking option surface exposed by the installed Git version is closed and
measurable through Git's own parser/help output; rationale: boolean flags are rule-generated,
while separate-value options have explicit grammar and must be classified as such.
- Risk: a future Git release may add a new value-taking placement option. Mitigation: document the
chosen residual direction and pin every currently supported placement option in behavior tests.
- Risk: a symlink can be replaced after pre-execution canonicalization. Mitigation: resolve every
existing parent physically and document the remaining inherent TOCTOU window; the worktree helper
remains the authoritative path-derivation mechanism, with atomic closure tracked by #1199.
---
## Assumptions
1. RESOLVED: **pgvector is sufficient** for semantic search at v0.1.0 scale (personal/family/team = thousands to low hundreds-of-thousands of vectors). `@mosaicstack/memory` defines a `VectorStore` interface with pgvector as the default adapter. The interface boundary makes Qdrant a drop-in migration if PG resource contention or scale demands it later. Zero additional infrastructure for v0.1.0. Rationale: Reduces ops burden; pgvector HNSW indexes are fast at this scale; interface abstraction costs almost nothing now.
+7
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@@ -14,6 +14,13 @@
- [Skill registration user guide](guides/user-guide.md#claude-code-skill-registration) — register, unregister, list statuses, automatic install/update reconciliation, and Claude reload behavior.
- [Skill bridge developer guide](guides/dev-guide.md#claude-code-skill-bridge) — path-validation, ownership, clobber-protection, install/update wiring, tests, and Pi/Codex scope notes.
## Pi persistent goals
- [Persistent goal user guide](guides/user-guide.md#pi-persistent-goals) — `/goal` commands, verification behavior, limits, compaction/resume semantics, and limitations.
- [Goal extension developer guide](guides/dev-guide.md#pi-persistent-goal-extension) — framework ownership, launcher ordering, lifecycle design, tests, and local Mosaic-path smoke workflow.
- [Goal loop operations](guides/admin-guide.md#pi-goal-loop-operations) — deployment ownership, bounded settings, pause/resume procedures, and supervisor boundary.
- [Pi runtime reference](../packages/mosaic/framework/runtime/pi/RUNTIME.md#extensions) — deployed paths, command summary, and bounded environment settings.
## Fleet configuration management
- [Fleet configuration entry point](fleet/README.md) — desired-versus-observed decision tree and complete operator link map.
+13 -10
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@@ -5,14 +5,14 @@ Generated environment files are rebuildable projections, not an operator-editabl
## Launch chain
| Layer | Responsibility |
| ------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| Roster | `fleet/roster.yaml` supplies the agent name, class, supported runtime, model, reasoning, tool policy, workdir, and tmux socket. |
| Projection writer | Renders deterministic fleet/agents/<name>.env.generated from the roster. |
| Optional local data | Reads a strict, data-only fleet/agents/<name>.env.local; it cannot shadow generated keys. |
| systemd | Starts the launcher with env -i and fixed bootstrap data. It does not preload either environment file. |
| session launcher | Validates generated and local data before it queries, creates, or stops an exact tmux session. |
| runtime launch | Derives the fixed mosaic yolo <runtime> argument array from validated roster data, then seeds the runtime contract. |
| Layer | Responsibility |
| ------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| Roster | `fleet/roster.yaml` supplies the agent name, class, supported runtime, model, reasoning, tool policy, workdir, and tmux socket; Git identity is derived from the exact agent name. |
| Projection writer | Renders deterministic fleet/agents/<name>.env.generated from the roster. |
| Optional local data | Reads a strict, data-only fleet/agents/<name>.env.local; it cannot shadow generated keys. |
| systemd | Starts the launcher with env -i and fixed bootstrap data. It does not preload either environment file. |
| session launcher | Validates generated and local data before it queries, creates, or stops an exact tmux session. |
| runtime launch | Derives the fixed mosaic yolo <runtime> argument array from validated roster data, then seeds the runtime contract. |
The launcher never `source`s or `eval`s an environment file and never accepts an environment-supplied
command. `MOSAIC_AGENT_COMMAND`, command/channel overrides, unknown keys, generated-key shadowing,
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ secret-like key names, duplicate keys, comments, quoted/export syntax, and unsaf
```dotenv
MOSAIC_AGENT_NAME=<roster name>
MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY=<roster name>
MOSAIC_AGENT_CLASS=<roster class>
MOSAIC_AGENT_RUNTIME=<roster runtime>
MOSAIC_AGENT_MODEL=<roster model hint>
@@ -33,8 +34,10 @@ MOSAIC_AGENT_WORKDIR=<absolute roster work directory>
MOSAIC_TMUX_SOCKET=<roster socket or empty>
```
The generated launch contract supports `claude`, `codex`, `opencode`, and `pi`. mosaic fleet add
rejects another runtime before it writes the roster or modifies generated, local, or quarantine state.
`MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY` is not independently configurable: it must equal `MOSAIC_AGENT_NAME`, preventing
split runtime and repository identity authority. The generated launch contract supports `claude`,
`codex`, `opencode`, and `pi`. mosaic fleet add rejects another runtime before it writes the roster or
modifies generated, local, or quarantine state.
The legacy dogfood stub remains an observability-only canary on its separate `mosaic-factory` socket;
it has no generated-launch adapter and cannot be added through this path.
@@ -3,11 +3,12 @@
The launcher consumes validated data, not shell configuration.
1. Read and validate the canonical roster.
2. Render deterministic <name>.env.generated data from that roster.
2. Render deterministic <name>.env.generated data from that roster, including `MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY` derived exactly from the roster agent name.
3. Parse optional <name>.env.local through a strict allowlist.
4. Reject generated-key shadowing, unknown or sensitive-looking keys, unsafe paths/values, duplicates, malformed lines, shell syntax, and command overrides.
5. Derive the runtime command from validated runtime/model/reasoning data.
6. Target only the exact configured tmux socket and roster session after ownership checks.
5. Reject a Git identity that is unsafe or differs from the generated agent name.
6. Derive the runtime command from validated runtime/model/reasoning data and pass every generated projection entry through the clean process environment boundary.
7. Target only the exact configured tmux socket and roster session after ownership checks.
## File precedence and ownership
@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ values, credential material, or command text.
```dotenv
MOSAIC_AGENT_NAME=<roster name>
MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY=<roster name>
MOSAIC_AGENT_CLASS=<roster class>
MOSAIC_AGENT_RUNTIME=<roster runtime>
MOSAIC_AGENT_MODEL=<roster model hint>
@@ -44,8 +45,9 @@ MOSAIC_AGENT_WORKDIR=<absolute roster work directory>
MOSAIC_TMUX_SOCKET=<roster socket or empty>
```
The generated launch contract supports only `claude`, `codex`, `opencode`, and `pi`. fleet add
uses that same runtime authority and rejects any other runtime before it writes the roster or changes
`MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY` is derived from and must equal `MOSAIC_AGENT_NAME`; it is not a separate
operator-controlled identity authority. The generated launch contract supports only `claude`, `codex`,
`opencode`, and `pi`. fleet add uses that same runtime authority and rejects any other runtime before it writes the roster or changes
projection, local, or quarantine files. The legacy dogfood stub on its separate `mosaic-factory`
socket remains an observability canary; it has no generated-launch adapter and cannot be added through
this projection path.
+38 -1
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@@ -7,7 +7,8 @@
3. [Provider Configuration](#provider-configuration)
4. [MCP Server Configuration](#mcp-server-configuration)
5. [Environment Variables Reference](#environment-variables-reference)
6. [Local Fleet Canary](./fleet-local-canary.md)
6. [Pi Goal Loop Operations](#pi-goal-loop-operations)
7. [Local Fleet Canary](./fleet-local-canary.md)
---
@@ -264,6 +265,16 @@ Each OIDC provider requires its client ID, client secret, and issuer URL togethe
| `AGENT_SYSTEM_PROMPT` | — | Platform-level system prompt injected into all sessions |
| `AGENT_USER_TOOLS` | all tools | Comma-separated allowlist of tools for non-admin users |
### Mosaic Pi goal loop
| Variable | Default | Description |
| ----------------------------- | ------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| `MOSAIC_GOAL_MAX_TURNS` | `40` | Per-goal autonomous turn limit; accepted range `1..500` |
| `MOSAIC_GOAL_MAX_NO_PROGRESS` | `6` | Consecutive identical progress-report limit; accepted range `1..100` |
These variables are consumed by the framework-owned Pi goal extension at goal creation. Invalid or
out-of-range values fall back to the defaults; they do not disable the bounds.
### Providers
| Variable | Default | Description |
@@ -374,3 +385,29 @@ Session cleanup is scoped to one session identifier and only removes that sessio
| Variable | Default | Description |
| ----------------------- | ----------------------------- | ------------------------------------------ |
| `MOSAIC_WORKSPACE_ROOT` | monorepo root (auto-detected) | Root path for mission workspace operations |
---
## Pi Goal Loop Operations
The reviewed runtime asset is deployed at
`~/.config/mosaic/runtime/pi/goal-extension.ts` by framework install/update. Do not install another
copy under `~/.pi/agent/extensions/`; duplicate registration can create suffixed commands and two
competing lifecycle controllers.
Operational checks:
1. Run `mosaic pi` and verify `/goal help` is available.
2. Use `/goal status` to inspect phase, turn/no-progress limits, compaction checks, and evidence.
Reports persist in Pi session data; controller-owned state redacts common credential shapes, but
Pi's model/tool-call history is separate. Operators must not place secrets or raw sensitive output
in goals, pause reasons, or evidence.
3. Use `/goal pause <reason>` before planned maintenance or manual investigation. Pause and cancel
abort the current goal-driven run when Pi is busy.
4. Use `/goal resume` only after addressing a blocker; counters restart with the configured bounds.
5. Use `/goal cancel` before replacing an unfinished goal.
A blocked or exhausted goal remains stopped and visible; Mosaic does not automatically raise its
limits or restart the process. Framework sync owns file deployment, while Pi's native session file
owns branch replay. Process/host restart remains the responsibility of the existing runtime or fleet
supervisor.
+82 -2
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@@ -9,8 +9,9 @@
5. [Adding New MCP Tools](#adding-new-mcp-tools)
6. [Database Schema and Migrations](#database-schema-and-migrations)
7. [Claude Code Skill Bridge](#claude-code-skill-bridge)
8. [API Endpoint Reference](#api-endpoint-reference)
9. [Local Fleet Canary](./fleet-local-canary.md)
8. [Pi Persistent Goal Extension](#pi-persistent-goal-extension)
9. [API Endpoint Reference](#api-endpoint-reference)
10. [Local Fleet Canary](./fleet-local-canary.md)
---
@@ -385,6 +386,85 @@ M1 intentionally manages Claude Code only. Pi's Mosaic launcher can discover the
canonical root directly. Codex still relies on the existing full skill-sync
linker and needs separate parity analysis before this lifecycle API is extended.
## Pi Persistent Goal Extension
The source of the Mosaic-owned Pi goal controller is:
```text
packages/mosaic/framework/runtime/pi/goal-extension.ts
```
The framework manifest classifies `runtime/**` as framework-owned. Both the bash installer and the
TypeScript file adapter therefore deploy the same reviewed source to:
```text
$MOSAIC_HOME/runtime/pi/goal-extension.ts
# default: ~/.config/mosaic/runtime/pi/goal-extension.ts
```
Do not copy or link this extension into `~/.pi/agent/extensions/`. The launcher function
`discoverPiExtensionArgs()` emits the core `mosaic-extension.ts` first and the optional
`goal-extension.ts` second, preserving compatibility with an older installed framework that does
not have the goal file yet.
### Lifecycle design
| Pi API | Goal-controller responsibility |
| ------------------------------ | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| `registerCommand('goal')` | Set, inspect, pause, resume, or cancel one branch-specific goal |
| `registerTool(...)` | Record a terminating structured progress report with evidence |
| `context` | Inject the active goal contract before every provider request |
| `turn_end` | Record every turn, reject mixed final reports, and enforce the turn bound |
| `agent_settled` | Start one deduplicated continuation only after Pi has no retry/compact/queue work |
| `session_compact` | Record the compact check, reset provisional verification, and defer idle work |
| `session_start`/`session_tree` | Rebuild state from custom entries on the active branch |
| `session_shutdown` | Invalidate deferred callbacks and clear UI state |
State is appended as `mosaic-goal-state` custom entries, which do not enter model context. The
`context` hook creates a fresh hidden `mosaic-goal-context` message for each request instead of
trusting compaction summaries. The `mosaic_goal_report` result uses `terminate: true`; when it is the
sole final tool call, Pi avoids an unnecessary model response before the controller decides whether
to verify, continue, or stop.
Before state is appended or displayed, the controller applies bounded credential-pattern redaction
to the goal statement, report summary/evidence/next step, and stop reason. Fingerprints are computed
over redacted report content. Pi session entries are append-only, so a credential-bearing legacy
entry cannot honestly be erased by the extension: restoration fails closed, emits a warning, and
requires removal of the affected session before setting a new goal. This is defense-in-depth rather
than a secret-storage contract, and it does not rewrite Pi's separate model-message/tool-call
history. Goal prompts tell the agent not to submit credentials or raw sensitive output, and tests use
canaries to prove known forms do not reach new custom entries, status text, context, or tool details
while ordinary typed fields such as `token: string` remain intact.
Completion remains evidence-gated but semantic: two consecutive `achieved` reports are required,
and the second run is explicitly a verification pass. This avoids an extra judge-model request after
every turn. Deterministic validator commands are intentionally not accepted as `/goal` input in this
slice, so never describe this mechanism as proof of arbitrary natural-language completion.
### Tests and local smoke workflow
```bash
pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/mosaic exec vitest run \
src/runtime/pi-goal-extension.spec.ts \
src/commands/launch.spec.ts \
src/config/file-adapter.test.ts
bash packages/mosaic/framework/tools/quality/scripts/test-install-migration.sh
```
For an additive local smoke test without reseeding unrelated live framework files:
```bash
install -D -m 0644 \
packages/mosaic/framework/runtime/pi/goal-extension.ts \
~/.config/mosaic/runtime/pi/goal-extension.ts
pi --extension ~/.config/mosaic/runtime/pi/goal-extension.ts
```
Use `/goal help`, `/goal set ...`, and `/goal status` in that test session. A released framework
sync installs the file, and a released Mosaic CLI loads it automatically through `mosaic pi`.
## API Endpoint Reference
All endpoints are served by the gateway at `http://localhost:14242` by default.
+55 -3
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@@ -8,9 +8,10 @@
4. [Tasks](#tasks)
5. [Settings](#settings)
6. [CLI Usage](#cli-usage)
7. [Sub-package Commands](#sub-package-commands)
8. [Telemetry](#telemetry)
9. [Local Fleet Canary](./fleet-local-canary.md)
7. [Pi Persistent Goals](#pi-persistent-goals)
8. [Sub-package Commands](#sub-package-commands)
9. [Telemetry](#telemetry)
10. [Local Fleet Canary](./fleet-local-canary.md)
---
@@ -307,6 +308,57 @@ mosaic prdy
mosaic quality-rails
```
## Pi Persistent Goals
`mosaic pi` loads a Mosaic-owned goal extension from
`~/.config/mosaic/runtime/pi/goal-extension.ts`. It is deliberately not installed in
`~/.pi/agent/extensions/`; framework installation and updates manage it with the rest of the Mosaic
runtime assets.
Start Pi, then set a goal:
```text
/goal set Deliver the feature, tests, documentation, and verification evidence
# Shorthand:
/goal Deliver the feature, tests, documentation, and verification evidence
```
Control and inspect the loop with:
| Command | Behavior |
| ---------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------ |
| `/goal status` | Show phase, limits, compaction checks, latest report, and evidence |
| `/goal pause [reason]` | Stop autonomous continuation while preserving the goal |
| `/goal resume` | Resume with fresh turn and no-progress counters |
| `/goal cancel` | Cancel the goal and remove its active status |
| `/goal help` | Show command help |
While a goal is active, Mosaic injects its contract before every Pi model request and checks every
completed model/tool turn. The agent ends each work cycle with the structured
`mosaic_goal_report` tool. `achieved` is provisional until a second consecutive report rechecks the
whole goal with evidence. A continuation report or a successful compaction resets provisional
verification.
Goal statements and reports are stored in Pi session data. Mosaic redacts common credential shapes
before appending its goal-state entries and before goal tool output or `/goal status`, but
pattern-based redaction is not a secret store. Pi's own model-message and tool-call records are
outside that redactor. Never put tokens, passwords, private keys, connection strings, or raw
sensitive output in a goal or report; cite the command, artifact, and pass/fail result instead.
The loop stops instead of running forever when it is paused, blocked, cancelled, verified, reaches
its turn limit, or repeats the same no-progress report too many times. Defaults are 40 turns and 6
repeated no-progress reports. Operators may lower or raise them within enforced bounds before
launching Pi:
```bash
MOSAIC_GOAL_MAX_TURNS=60 MOSAIC_GOAL_MAX_NO_PROGRESS=8 mosaic pi
```
Goal state is branch-specific Pi session data. It survives compaction and session resume, but Pi's
process still must be relaunched or supervised after a process/host failure. This initial verifier
checks structured evidence twice; it cannot mathematically prove every arbitrary natural-language
goal. Use explicit acceptance criteria and inspect `/goal status` for consequential work.
---
### Claude Code Skill Registration
@@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
# #1099 pipefail + early-exit sweep
Baseline: `df4c591ab42aa1ae62c12935fdc0e772684864a0`
This is a site inventory, not a risk count. `FIXED` means the early-exiting consumer no longer has a piped upstream process whose SIGPIPE can become the result under `pipefail`. `NOT-LOAD-BEARING` means the pipeline status is explicitly discarded. `UNREACHABLE-AND-WHY` describes designed input, not a payload-size safety claim.
## Tranche 1 — runtime and general scripts
| Baseline site | Verdict | Construction / reason |
| --- | --- | --- |
| `tools/matrix-presence-harness/run.sh:38` | FIXED | nullglob array selects the first path; no pipeline |
| `tools/e2e-install-test.sh:139` | FIXED | capture help completely, then grep via redirection |
| `tools/install.sh:312` | FIXED | NUL `mapfile` reads all roots; count != 1 reaches the named malformed-archive diagnostic |
| `scripts/analysis/reflect-board-history.sh:76` | FIXED | capture Git history completely, then grep via redirection |
| `scripts/analysis/reflect-git-history.sh:67` | FIXED | grep reads from a here-string |
| `scripts/analysis/reflect-git-history.sh:69` | FIXED | grep reads from a here-string |
| `packages/mosaic/framework/tools/authentik/user-create.sh:72` | FIXED | jq `first(...)` reads the response directly |
| `packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/mutate-push-guard.sh:87` | FIXED | grep `-m1` reads the file directly; downstream `cut` consumes its complete scalar output |
| `packages/mosaic/framework/tools/orchestrator/session-resume.sh:94` | FIXED | `mapfile` plus bounded indexed loop replaces `head` pipeline |
| `packages/mosaic/framework/tools/prdy/prdy-status.sh:69` | FIXED | grep reads from a here-string |
| `packages/mosaic/framework/tools/qa/reflect-stop-hook.sh:172` | FIXED | grep reads from a here-string |
| `packages/mosaic/framework/tools/qa/reflect-stop-hook.sh:173` | FIXED | grep reads from a here-string |
| `packages/mosaic/framework/tools/qa/reflect-stop-hook.sh:174` | FIXED | grep reads from a here-string |
| `packages/mosaic/framework/tools/qa/reflect-stop-hook.sh:175` | FIXED | grep reads from a here-string |
| `packages/mosaic/framework/tools/qa/reflect-stop-hook.sh:176` | FIXED | grep reads from a here-string |
| `packages/mosaic/framework/tools/qa/reflect-stop-hook.sh:177` | FIXED | grep reads from a here-string |
| `packages/mosaic/framework/tools/qa/reflect-stop-hook.sh:178` | FIXED | grep reads from a here-string |
| `packages/mosaic/framework/tools/qa/typecheck-hook.sh:16` | FIXED | Bash regex extracts the first field without a pipeline |
| `packages/mosaic/framework/tools/qa/typecheck-hook.sh:56` | FIXED | grep and bounded sed each read from a here-string |
| `packages/mosaic/framework/tools/tmux/send-message.sh:113` | FIXED | grep reads from a here-string |
| `packages/mosaic/framework/tools/tmux/send-message.sh:124` | FIXED | grep reads from a here-string |
| `packages/mosaic/framework/tools/wake/detector.sh:126` | FIXED | one awk reads the manifest directly and exits after the first exact key |
| `packages/mosaic/framework/tools/wake/detector.sh:270` | FIXED | grep reads from a here-string |
| `packages/mosaic/framework/tools/wake/detector.sh:278` | FIXED | grep reads from a here-string |
| `packages/mosaic/framework/tools/wake/digest.sh:647` | FIXED | capture complete locator output, then select first line by parameter expansion |
| `packages/mosaic/framework/tools/wake/reconcile.sh:149` | FIXED | one awk reads the manifest directly and exits after the first exact key |
## Explicit withdrawn / non-load-bearing sites
| Baseline site | Verdict | Reason |
| --- | --- | --- |
| `tools/install.sh:182` | NOT-LOAD-BEARING | `|| true` explicitly discards lookup status |
| `tools/install.sh:356` | UNREACHABLE-AND-WHY | `pnpm pack` writes one matching CLI tarball into a fresh directory immediately before lookup; citation withdrawn in #1099 |
| `tools/install.sh:357` | UNREACHABLE-AND-WHY | same fresh-directory invariant for gateway tarball; citation withdrawn in #1099 |
| `tools/install.sh:627` | NOT-LOAD-BEARING | `|| true` explicitly discards lookup status |
| `scripts/agent/session-start.sh:70` | NOT-LOAD-BEARING | optional scratchpad lookup has `|| true` |
| `packages/mosaic/framework/templates/repo/scripts/agent/session-start.sh:58` | NOT-LOAD-BEARING | optional scratchpad lookup has `|| true` |
| `packages/mosaic/framework/tools/qa/qa-hook-stdin.sh:25` | UNREACHABLE-AND-WHY | withdrawn in #1099 after designed-input reachability measurement; preserved without re-litigation |
| `packages/mosaic/framework/tools/qa/qa-hook-stdin.sh:27` | UNREACHABLE-AND-WHY | same withdrawn designed-input finding |
| `packages/mosaic/framework/tools/qa/qa-hook-stdin.sh:30` | UNREACHABLE-AND-WHY | same withdrawn designed-input finding |
| `packages/mosaic/framework/tools/qa/qa-hook-stdin.sh:32` | UNREACHABLE-AND-WHY | same withdrawn designed-input finding |
| `packages/mosaic/framework/tools/qa/qa-hook-stdin.sh:34` | UNREACHABLE-AND-WHY | same withdrawn designed-input finding |
## Tranche 2 — non-wake test harnesses
All 22 baseline sites below are `FIXED`; the checked-in tranche fixture is passed through the same scanner and asserts all 22 occurrences and 21 normalized identities (the same response-split line occurs twice).
| Baseline site(s) | Verdict | Construction |
| --- | --- | --- |
| `systemd/user/test-fleet-units.sh:148` | FIXED | capture tmux output, then grep via redirection |
| `git/test-issue-comment-readback.sh:283,302` | FIXED | parameter expansion splits status/body without `head` |
| `git/test-pr-review-gitea-comment.sh:228` | FIXED | parameter expansion splits status/body |
| `git/test-lane-brief-pr-linkage.sh:72` | FIXED | grep reads from a here-string |
| `git/test-pr-review-repo-host-override.sh:225-226` | FIXED | grep reads from a here-string |
| `orchestrator/smoke-test.sh:67,72` | FIXED | parameter expansion selects first line |
| `orchestrator/test-board-roll.sh:99-100` | FIXED | grep reads from a here-string |
| `quality/scripts/test-upgrade-durable-snapshot.sh:180` | FIXED | complete sorted output is read with `mapfile`, then indexed |
| `quality/scripts/test-upgrade-rollback.sh:339,356` | FIXED | direct `grep -m1` file reads; cleanup captures before testing |
| `tmux/test-send-message-socket.sh:37,38,44-46,68,72` | FIXED | capture commands complete before redirected grep assertions |
| `tmux/test-send-message-verdict.sh:34` | FIXED | grep reads from a here-string |
## Tranche 3 — wake validation harnesses
All 26 baseline occurrences (25 normalized identities; one preimage selector occurs twice) are `FIXED` and mechanically bound through the wake fixture and shared scanner.
| Baseline site(s) | Verdict | Construction |
| --- | --- | --- |
| `wake/test-wake-digest-quarantine.sh:567` | FIXED | complete match populations are captured, then first line selected by parameter expansion |
| `wake/test-wake-preimage.sh:182-183,346-347` | FIXED | jq `first(...)` reads each JSONL file directly |
| `wake/validate-973/microtest-wake-assert.sh:153,170-171,176,204-209,233-234,251-252,286-287` | FIXED | scalar assertions use here-strings; diagnostics use non-early sed ranges; source line captured before matching |
| `wake/validate-973/validate-973.sh:110,119,180,182,187` | FIXED | scalar assertions use here-strings; diagnostic truncation uses consuming sed ranges |
The scoped inventory is complete: 26 runtime/general + 22 non-wake tests + 26 wake tests fixed; 11 explicitly withdrawn or non-load-bearing sites retain their documented verdicts.
+229
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@@ -0,0 +1,229 @@
# #1043 — Fleet pane git-identity propagation
## Objective
Ensure a fleet seat's launched runtime process receives its roster-derived `MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY`, and lock the complete generated-environment propagation boundary with an enumerated set comparison.
## Tracking
- External issue: `mosaicstack/stack#1043`
- Branch: `fix/1043-pane-git-identity`
- Coordinator: `tl-mosaic`
- `docs/TASKS.md`: read-only by project worker contract; not modified.
## Constraints
- RED-first bug reproducer is mandatory.
- R7 delete-the-subject mutation must turn the behavioral test red.
- Assert launched-process environment, not source text.
- One push only; do not poll CI after push.
- Run the CI queue guard immediately before push and report its `state=` line as state, not evidence.
- Do not modify a live host launcher or obtain/copy another credential.
- Self-post the PR, verify provider attribution, then stop.
- Final status wording: `believed-fixed, pending jarvis validation`.
## Scope inventory
Re-derived against `origin/main` at `85d2108e`:
- Launch consumer: `packages/mosaic/framework/tools/fleet/start-agent-session.sh`
- Behavioral launch test: `packages/mosaic/framework/tools/fleet/test-start-agent-session.sh`
- Generated-environment contract/parser: `packages/mosaic/src/fleet/generated-env-boundary.ts`
- Roster projection producers:
- `packages/mosaic/src/commands/fleet.ts`
- `packages/mosaic/src/fleet/fleet-reconciler.ts`
- `packages/mosaic/src/fleet/fleet-agent-crud.ts`
- `packages/mosaic/src/fleet/v1-v2-migration.ts`
- Contract and producer tests discovered by repository search.
- Generated-environment operator/developer docs and their executable documentation contract test.
Discrepancy sent to `tl-mosaic`: current main no longer contains the charter's `PANE_SHELL_SNIPPET`; #772 replaced it with an `/usr/bin/env -i` argv launch boundary, and current generated projections do not declare git identity. Code-read inventory is **NOT MEASURED** behavior.
## Plan
1. Add the process-environment set-comparison regression first and record RED.
2. Add roster-derived `MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY=<agent name>` to the complete generated projection contract.
3. Validate identity syntax and equality with `MOSAIC_AGENT_NAME`; pass it through the clean pane environment.
4. Update affected projection tests and generated-environment docs.
5. Run focused and baseline gates.
6. Perform R7 by deleting the pane propagation entry, prove RED, restore, and prove GREEN.
7. Run independent review, remediate, commit, queue guard, one push, self-post PR, verify provider attribution, and stop without CI polling.
## Budget
No explicit token cap was provided. Working cap: one narrow logical unit, no dependency installation unless existing tooling requires it, no unrelated refactor.
## Evidence log
### TDD and mutation evidence
- RED-first, repository launcher: `bash packages/mosaic/framework/tools/fleet/test-start-agent-session.sh` exited 64 on pre-fix source with `code=unknown-key key=MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY`. The generated seat could not launch with the required declared identity.
- GREEN: the same repository launcher test emitted `ok - start-agent-session generated environment boundary`.
- R7 delete-the-subject: removed only `"MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY=$MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY"` from the repository launch array; the same test exited 1 with `FAIL: runtime pane omitted or changed generated environment keys: MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY`.
- R7 restoration: restored that launch entry; the same test returned green.
- Launcher under test is explicitly `packages/mosaic/framework/tools/fleet/start-agent-session.sh` through the test's `$START`, **not** the stale installed host copy.
### Situational and focused tests
- Repository launcher boundary: green, including set comparison of all nine generated projection entries and fail-before-tmux cases for missing, unsafe, mismatched, and local-shadow Git identity.
- Fleet systemd launcher integration: `bash packages/mosaic/framework/systemd/user/test-fleet-units.sh` — green.
- Focused Mosaic Vitest set: 6 files, 311 tests — green.
- `bash -n` on changed shell files — green.
- `git diff --check` — green.
### Baseline gates
- `pnpm typecheck` — 45/45 tasks green.
- `pnpm lint` — 25/25 tasks green.
- `pnpm format:check` — green.
- `pnpm test:checkout` — green.
- Repository-wide Vitest under a hermetic current-version npm prefix: Mosaic 81/81 files and 1510/1510 tests green; other workspace test tasks shown green before the framework-shell phase.
- Canonical `pnpm test` is not fully green on this host for unrelated environment-sensitive gates:
1. the first two runs exposed the globally installed Mosaic 0.0.48 update banner in three CLI smoke tests expecting empty stderr;
2. after isolating that global-version input, the framework wake assertion aborted at the known `#973` Bash `BASH_LINENO` convention check (exit 97; observed `[3 5]`, expected `[3 4]`).
No tests were weakened or bypassed; focused changed-surface tests are green. CI remains the canonical clean-environment result and is intentionally not polled after push per charter.
### Independent review
- Codex code review first pass: request changes for missing shell rejection-path coverage.
- Remediation: added table-driven missing/unsafe/mismatch/local-shadow launcher cases, each asserting no tmux call.
- Codex code re-review: **approve**, no findings, confidence 0.88.
- Codex security review: risk `none`, no findings, confidence 0.97.
### Acceptance criteria mapping
| Acceptance criterion | Evidence |
| --- | --- |
| AC-FGI-01: launched process receives every generated key/value | Repository launcher process-environment `comm -23` set comparison; GREEN and R7 RED evidence above |
| AC-FGI-02: missing, unsafe, or split identity fails before tmux | Table-driven shell cases plus TypeScript generated-boundary tests |
| AC-FGI-03: focused/baseline/review evidence recorded | Commands and review outcomes above; host-sensitive full-suite limitations stated explicitly |
### Documentation checklist
- PRD updated with #1043 requirements and acceptance criteria.
- Fleet launch runbook, generated-env concept, and generated-env reference updated.
- No API/OpenAPI, sitemap, user publishing target, deployment, or external docs publication change applies.
- `docs/TASKS.md` remains unmodified per its single-writer project contract.
## Round 2 — PR #1073 review 97 remediation
### Review blocker
The launched-process suite was signed-excluded from CI enumeration. Manual GREEN/R7 evidence therefore did not prove a PR workflow could detect regression.
### RED-first and canonical wiring
1. Removed the suite's signed exclusion before adding a CI execution path.
2. `check-test-enumeration.sh` went RED with exact `UNENUMERATED` output for `test-start-agent-session.sh`: population 49, enumerated 30, excluded 18.
3. Added both `framework/tools/fleet/test-start-agent-session.sh` and `framework/systemd/user/test-fleet-units.sh` to `@mosaicstack/mosaic`'s canonical `test:framework-shell` chain.
4. The guard returned GREEN: population 49, enumerated 32, excluded 18, surfaces 45. The systemd suite is outside the guard's tools-only population but now has the same explicit canonical execution disposition.
### Workflow-level R7
- Deleted only the pane launch entry `"MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY=$MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY"`.
- Ran the exact `.woodpecker/ci.yml` test-step command, `pnpm test`, with only a temporary PATH-scoped npm shim reporting the checkout's current 0.0.49 version so the unrelated global 0.0.48 banner could not preempt the shell chain.
- Result: exit 1 at `@mosaicstack/mosaic#test`, with the enumeration guard GREEN followed by `FAIL: runtime pane omitted or changed generated environment keys: MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY`.
- Restored the launch entry. The canonical `test:framework-shell` chain then reached both newly wired suites and printed both GREEN markers before the known unrelated #973 host-only `BASH_LINENO` abort.
- An actual provider PR workflow on the intentionally broken mutant is **NOT MEASURED**: the one-push constraint forbids pushing a red mutant and then a repaired head. Local execution proves the exact PR workflow command and dependency chain go RED on the subject deletion; CI on the repaired pushed head remains canonical.
### Workflow population
- **DEFINED:** 3 workflows (`ci.yml`, `ci-image.yml`, `publish.yml`).
- **ELIGIBLE for `pull_request`:** 1/3 (`ci.yml`), based on top-level `when:` clauses.
- **REPORTED:** Round-1 exact-head provider read reported 1/1 eligible context (`ci/woodpecker/pr/ci`). Post-remediation-head reported count is **NOT MEASURED** by this seat because CI polling is prohibited; workflow definitions and eligibility did not change.
### Independent remediation review
- First Round-2 review identified a CI-image blocker: the newly wired launcher suite used Perl, which the Alpine CI base does not install.
- Replaced the suite's three Perl-only fixture mutations with POSIX/BusyBox-compatible `sed -i` substitutions; production behavior and assertions are unchanged.
- Codex re-review: **APPROVE**, confidence 0.93, no findings.
### Vitest denominator reconciliation
The PR's `311/311` is correct for its explicitly named six-file command at both the original and remediation worktrees:
- generated environment boundary: 24
- fleet documentation: 23
- Tess service profile: 6
- fleet regen command: 27
- fleet agent CRUD command: 22
- fleet command: 209
- total: **311**
Review 97 reported 312/312 without naming its six files. That is a different or miscounted population and cannot replace the command-scoped 311 denominator; the PR follow-up will name the exact files and arithmetic.
## Round 3 — Alpine stale-marker portability
### Objective and plan
- Replace the GNU-only relative-date fixture with a deterministic POSIX/BusyBox timestamp while preserving the required stale-marker assertion.
- Re-run the launcher suite in the canonical `ci-base:latest` Alpine image, then run applicable repository gates and independent review.
- Update the PR body to name the repeated GNU-host/Alpine-CI portability pattern, run the mandatory queue guard, push once, verify provider attribution, and stop without CI polling.
- Working budget: 8K tokens; scope is one fixture line plus delivery evidence. No production behavior changes.
### RED-first evidence
Before the fix, the canonical CI image command
`docker run --rm -v "$PWD:/work" -w /work git.mosaicstack.dev/mosaicstack/stack/ci-base:latest bash packages/mosaic/framework/tools/fleet/test-start-agent-session.sh`
exited 1 at the stale-marker setup with exact BusyBox output
`touch: invalid date '10 seconds ago'`. The prior fresh-marker assertions had already executed, matching pipeline 2233's failure location.
### Root cause and fix
The test used GNU `touch -d` relative-date parsing although the PR workflow runs on Alpine/BusyBox. The fixture now uses POSIX `touch -t 200001010000.00`, a fixed timestamp that is unconditionally stale; the stale assertion remains mandatory and was not made tolerant of missing timestamp metadata.
### Structural pattern
This is the third GNU-host/Alpine-CI portability defect in the lane: GNU `grep` multi-match counting, Perl-only fixture mutation, and GNU `touch -d` date parsing. The repeated cause is shell suites authored on a GNU host but executed in an Alpine CI image; durable prevention belongs in CI-image execution or portability lint, not assertion weakening.
### GREEN and quality evidence
- Focused launcher suite in `ci-base:latest`: exit 0, `ok - start-agent-session generated environment boundary`.
- Canonical test step in `ci-base:latest` with the pipeline's `pgvector/pgvector:pg17` service, readiness check, migration, and `pnpm test`: exit 0; 46/46 Turbo tasks; Mosaic 81/81 files and 1510/1510 tests; Gateway 57 passed/5 skipped files and 629 passed/11 skipped tests; enumeration 49 population / 32 enumerated / 18 signed exclusions / 45 named surfaces.
- The first image-only `pnpm test` attempt lacked the pipeline PostgreSQL service and failed only on connection refusal after the launcher suite was GREEN. The rerun supplied the canonical service precondition and passed.
- Canonical-image baseline: typecheck 45/45 tasks, lint 25/25 tasks, format check GREEN; `git diff --check` GREEN.
- Independent Codex code review: APPROVE, confidence 0.96, 2/2 Round-3 files, no findings.
- Independent Codex security review: risk none, confidence 0.99, 2/2 Round-3 files, no findings.
### Re-derived inventory and denominators
- Round-3 git delta: **2/2 files** — launcher suite and task scratchpad; 25 insertions / 1 deletion before evidence finalization.
- Full PR path inventory against `origin/main` at `85d2108e`: **19/19 changed paths**; Round 3 adds no new PR path.
- Workflow definition population: **1/3 pull-request-eligible** (`ci.yml` of `ci.yml`, `ci-image.yml`, `publish.yml`).
- Do not re-litigate the settled 311/312 populations; both are valid for their separately named Tess6 and CRUD-core7 sets.
## Round 4 — bound stale-marker observation
### Objective and plan
- Make the heartbeat assertion discriminate an initially stale native marker from a fresh marker without changing the production staleness threshold or shortening the polling window.
- Freeze only the sidecar's numeric observation clock during the stale-fixture arm so elapsed assertion time cannot turn a fresh mutant stale.
- Prove two independent mutants RED: disable production stale-marker detection while retaining the stale fixture; replace the stale fixture with a fresh marker. Restore the tree and prove GREEN in the canonical Alpine image.
- Re-derive the changed-path inventory, run applicable quality and independent review gates, commit with environment-only author/committer identity, queue-guard, push once, verify provider attribution using curl stdin config, and stop without CI polling.
- Working budget: 8K tokens. Scope is the launcher test and its scratchpad evidence; production launcher behavior remains unchanged.
### Root cause and bounded observation
The 30 × 0.1-second assertion window overlaps the production `now - marker > interval * 2 + 1` threshold at interval 1. Depending on second boundaries and load, a fresh marker can age past the threshold before the assertion ends. A focused pre-fix fresh-mutant attempt returned RED while Review 101's full-suite run returned GREEN; the differing result is itself timing dependence, not a discriminating assertion.
The test now supplies a fixed numeric epoch only to the stale-fixture sidecar. Its real marker mtime is still read from the filesystem, but assertion runtime cannot advance `now`. Date formatting still delegates to the image's real `/bin/date`. Neither the production threshold nor the 30 × 0.1-second polling window changed.
### Two-mutant RED / restored GREEN
All three runs used `git.mosaicstack.dev/mosaicstack/stack/ci-base:latest`:
1. **Stale-detection mutant RED:** replaced only the production stale-age predicate with `false` while retaining the fixed stale marker; suite exit 1 with `FAIL: heartbeat sidecar did not resume after native marker became stale or absent`.
2. **Fresh-marker mutant RED:** replaced only `touch -t 200001010000.00` with fresh `touch`; suite exit 1 with the same failed stale-resumption assertion. The fixed observation epoch kept the mutant fresh throughout all 30 polls.
3. **Restored tree GREEN:** suite exit 0 with `ok - start-agent-session generated environment boundary`.
### Re-derived inventory
- Round-4 delta: **2/2 files** — launcher test plus task scratchpad; production launcher delta is empty.
- Full PR inventory against `origin/main`: **19/19 paths**; Round 4 adds no path.
- Production stale threshold remains `now - marker > iv * 2 + 1`; assertion polling remains 30 × 0.1 seconds.
- Review 101's confirmed enumeration/workflow/CI and attribution evidence is accepted without re-polling or re-derivation.
## Residual risk
- Landing on `main` does not update the currently installed host launcher. Host framework installation/reseed and Jarvis live-seat validation are separate downstream events.
- Canonical CI result is pending and will not be polled by this seat.
@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
# #1098 — Framework shell portability / red main
## Objective
Restore terminal-green `main` by making the `test-start-agent-session.sh` clean-environment assertion semantic and portable without removing either newly enumerated framework-shell suite.
## Scope
- Tracking issue: `mosaicstack/stack#1098`
- Branch: `fix/framework-shell-portability`
- Base: `origin/main` at `4fa2768962702d53e16e8b67ee6ad52ebcb0910e`
- Primary file: `packages/mosaic/framework/tools/fleet/test-start-agent-session.sh`
- Requirements source: `docs/PRD.md` § Framework shell assertion portability (#1098)
- Out of scope: deployed files under `~/.config/mosaic`, pnpm-store cleanup, checkout deletion, and changes to the launchers `/usr/bin/env -i` behavior.
## Acceptance criteria
1. The test inspects the captured NUL-delimited tmux argv semantically and accepts an adjacent `/usr/bin/env`, `-i` pair regardless of trailing payload size or pipe scheduling.
2. Missing `/usr/bin/env`, missing `-i`, and non-adjacent `-i` remain failures.
3. Failure output includes the observed argv records with stable indexes and shell escaping; it exposes no credentials because this fixture supplies only generated non-secret launch data.
4. The focused suite passes on the dev host and in the repository CI image; the blocking PR/main pipeline returns terminal green.
5. Independent review passes; PR is squash-merged and #1098 is closed only after merged-main CI is terminal green.
## Budget
- ASSUMPTION: 30K-token working budget; rationale: one shell-test defect plus full PR/CI lifecycle.
- Auto-reduction: focused shell and package gates first; rely on canonical Woodpecker for the full monorepo suite rather than duplicating a dependency install under constrained `/home`.
- Disk baseline before clone/build: `/home` 7.1G free (99% used), `/tmp` 2.4G free (92% used).
## Investigation
### First-hand CI evidence
- Public log: `GET https://ci.mosaicstack.dev/api/repos/47/logs/2269/53041`
- Decoded 1,436 entries (11 null `data` entries treated as empty log rows), 190,756 bytes.
- Failure: `FAIL: pane command did not clear its environment` immediately after the expected pane-PID warning.
- BusyBox primitives, complete assertion pipeline, real CI image, stale/current image digests, Turbo cache masking, gateway failure, and heartbeat-sidecar concurrent writing were independently excluded.
### Root cause
The assertion ends in:
```bash
printf '%s\n' "$pane_args" | tail -n +"$after_pane_env" | grep -qxF -- '-i'
```
The script has `set -o pipefail`. `grep -q` exits as soon as it finds the valid `-i` record. Upstream `tail`/`printf` can then receive SIGPIPE, making the aggregate pipeline nonzero even though grep returned 0 and the semantic property is true. This depends on payload size, pipe capacity, and scheduling, explaining a local/image pass with a CI failure.
Discriminating stress control with `/usr/bin/env` followed immediately by `-i`:
- 8,192-byte trailing payload: `printf=0 tail=0 grep=0`, aggregate 0.
- 16,384-byte trailing payload: `printf=0 tail=141 grep=0`, aggregate 141.
- 32,768+ bytes: `printf=141 tail=141 grep=0`, aggregate 141.
- A full-reading `grep -xF` control remained 0 for every payload.
This is a third branch omitted by the earlier present-vs-corrupted split: the pair can be present and intact while `pipefail` reports an upstream SIGPIPE.
## TDD plan
1. RED: preserve the one-off stress reproducer above and add an automated large-argv semantic regression that fails under the current pipeline implementation.
2. GREEN: parse the authoritative NUL-delimited capture into a Bash array and search for an adjacent `/usr/bin/env`, `-i` pair without a short-circuit pipeline.
3. Add negative controls for missing, detached, and reversed tokens.
4. On failure, print indexed `%q` argv records before returning nonzero.
5. Run focused suite, mutation controls, shell syntax/format checks, then repository baseline gates feasible without dependency installation.
6. Independent review, queue guard, push, PR, CI, coordinator merge authorization, squash merge, merged-main CI, issue close.
## Progress
- [x] Checkout created and based on `origin/main` `4fa27689`.
- [x] CI log decoded directly.
- [x] Root-cause stress control reproduced semantic match + aggregate pipeline failure.
- [x] RED evidence: intact `/usr/bin/env`, `-i` fixture produced component statuses `0/141/0` and aggregate 141 under the former `grep -q` pipeline; full-reading semantic control stayed 0.
- [x] GREEN implementation: direct NUL-argv adjacency parser, indexed diagnostics, and full-reading scalar predicates replace all load-bearing early-exit pipelines in this test.
- [x] Baseline/situational tests:
- focused launcher suite: PASS on GNU host and cached Alpine CI image;
- paired `test-fleet-units.sh`: PASS;
- enumeration guard: PASS (`population=53`, `enumerated=36`, `excluded=18`), 14/14 mutation needles;
- `bash -n`, ShellCheck, `git diff --check`: PASS;
- static denominator after change: zero load-bearing `grep -q`/`head`/`-m1` pipeline candidates in `test-start-agent-session.sh`;
- delete-the-subject mutation removing production `-i`: RED with 78 indexed argv records, byte count, and explicit boundary failure.
- [x] Independent review:
- first Codex review: request changes — negative fixtures did not each assert diagnostics;
- remediation: centralized predicate + diagnostic wrapper and exercised all four negative fixtures;
- second Codex review: APPROVE, 0 blockers/should-fix/suggestions;
- Codex security review: risk none, 0 findings.
- [ ] PR CI, formal fleet review, merge, merged-main CI, issue closure.
## Documentation disposition
- Updated canonical `docs/PRD.md` with FSP requirements and acceptance criteria.
- This is an internal test/reliability change with no API, user workflow, deployment, navigation, or publishing-surface change; no user/admin/API/sitemap update is required.
- `docs/TASKS.md` remains unchanged because the project contract makes it orchestrator-only.
## Risks
- The CI failure did not print its captured argv, so the exact CI payload is unavailable. The stress control proves the assertion is non-portable and can emit the exact false verdict; branch CI is the canonical confirmation that replacing it resolves pipeline 2269s failure class.
- Printing fixture argv is safe only while this tests projection remains non-secret. The diagnostic must stay scoped to the test capture and shell-escaped.
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# #1099 — pipefail + early-exit sweep
## Scope and decisions
- Baseline `df4c591ab42aa1ae62c12935fdc0e772684864a0`, after #1100 removed its 35 sites.
- Split into review-sized non-closing tranches: runtime/general; tmux/git/quality tests; wake validation/tests.
- Do not equate class membership with demonstrated risk. Do not use payload size or pipeline stage count as a safety proxy.
- Preserve the issue's withdrawn findings for `qa-hook-stdin.sh` and the two fresh-directory `pnpm pack` lookups. Fix `install.sh:312` because malformed multi-root input must reach its named handler.
## Tranche 1 TDD
RED-first control: `node --test scripts/pipefail-early-exit.test.mjs` reported exactly 26 non-accepted runtime/general sites, including `install.sh:312`, and exited 1. A checked-in fixture generated from immutable baseline `df4c591a` records all 26 normalized sites; the control passes every fixture entry through the same scanner, asserts exact identity/count/uniqueness, and separately requires zero findings in the current tree. It also inventories accepted sites rather than silently excluding whole files.
Construction choices:
- here-string/file redirection for scalar grep assertions;
- full capture then parameter expansion for first-line selection;
- arrays/`mapfile` for complete populations;
- direct jq/awk/grep selection where one tool can express the property;
- no `|| true` added to a load-bearing assertion.
Site-by-site verdicts: `docs/reports/quality/1099-pipefail-sweep.md`.
## Tranche 2 TDD
Expanded the unconditional scanner over 11 non-wake test harnesses. RED named exactly 22 source lines; a second immutable-baseline fixture now asserts those 22 entries through the same scanner. Rewrites preserve command status by capturing producers before redirected assertions, use parameter expansion for line selection, and use complete `mapfile` populations where ordering matters. Current-tree finding count is zero for tranches 1 and 2.
## Tranche 3 TDD
Expanded the shared scanner over four wake validation harnesses. RED named 26 occurrences. The wake fixture asserts 26 occurrences / 25 normalized identities through the same scanner; all scalar assertions now use redirection, direct jq selection, complete capture, or consuming diagnostic ranges. Current-tree finding count is zero across the full scoped population.
## Verification so far
- `bash -n` on every changed shell script: pass.
- structural Node control: pass.
- `test-mutate-push-guard.sh`: 8/8 pass.
- `test-send-message-verdict.sh`: 3/3 pass.
- `test-send-message-socket.sh`: pass.
- Independent review 143 found two semantic regressions: a help-probe `|| true` changed the failure truth table, and an unguarded Git capture changed non-Git data-dir behavior from rc 0 + JSON to silent rc 128. Both received RED-first regressions before correction; help status is now separate and required, and Git status remains condition-guarded.
- Wake static inventory remains aligned at 261/261 after line-neutral rewrites; no static-set mismatch. Wake detector/reconcile/digest/preimage suites terminate at their existing fail-closed #973 `BASH_LINENO` environment probe (exit 97, observed `[3 5]`, expected `[3 4]`) before subject tests. No bypass or skip was used; canonical CI remains required.
- ShellCheck reports only pre-existing source-following, unused-variable, and untouched `ls | head` findings; no new diagnostic was introduced.
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# #1150 — Pi persistent goal extension
- **Task ID:** ISSUE-1150 (no `docs/TASKS.md` row; that file is orchestrator-only)
- **Issue:** #1150`pi: add persistent /goal controller extension to Mosaic framework`
- **Branch:** `feat/1150-pi-goal-extension`
- **Mode:** Delivery
- **Status:** in progress
## Objective
Build and locally validate a Mosaic-owned Pi `/goal` extension. Source must ship from
`packages/mosaic/framework/runtime/pi/`, framework sync must deploy it under
`~/.config/mosaic/runtime/pi/`, and no extension/configuration asset may be written into `~/.pi`.
Pi's native session manager remains the owner of session entries.
## Scope and acceptance source
- Canonical requirements: `docs/PRD.md`, section **Pi Persistent Goal Loop (#1150)**.
- User intent: continuous goal orientation and status checking after each Pi turn and compaction,
tested locally before framework delivery.
- Documentation target: canonical in-repo user/developer/runtime docs; no external publication.
## Assumptions
- `ASSUMPTION:` Initial semantic verification uses two consecutive structured, evidence-bearing
reports from the working agent rather than a second model request after every turn. This keeps the
loop testable and avoids doubling model cost while making the limitation explicit.
- `ASSUMPTION:` Default autonomous bounds are 40 turns and 6 repeated no-progress reports, with only
bounded numeric environment overrides.
- `ASSUMPTION:` A local smoke copy to `~/.config/mosaic/runtime/pi/goal-extension.ts` is authorized by
the user's explicit request. Full framework reseed into the live home is not required for the smoke
test and would touch unrelated framework-owned files.
## Budget
- Working estimate: 30K implementation/review tokens.
- Hard user cap: none stated.
- Cost control: deterministic fake-Pi tests; no nested evaluator calls; only bounded arithmetic/load
smoke workflows against the installed runtime.
## Plan
1. Update PRD and create tracking/scratchpad artifacts.
2. Read launcher, installer ownership, Pi extension, and documentation surfaces.
3. TDD: add fake-Pi behavior tests for commands, state restoration, turn checks, compaction, limits,
verification, and continuation deduplication.
4. Implement `runtime/pi/goal-extension.ts` and deterministic launcher discovery.
5. Add framework-sync/deployment acceptance coverage.
6. Update user, developer, runtime, framework README, and sitemap documentation.
7. Run focused tests, local Mosaic-path smoke test, then baseline repository gates.
8. Run independent review, remediate, commit, push/PR/CI/merge/issue closure per delivery gates.
## TDD decision
Applied. The continuation state machine and lifecycle scheduling are control-path logic where a race
or false terminal state can cause unbounded work or premature completion.
## Progress checkpoints
- [x] Issue #1150 created through Mosaic wrapper.
- [x] Isolated worktree created from `origin/main`.
- [x] PRD requirements and acceptance criteria added.
- [x] Task scratchpad created.
- [x] RED controller and security-regression tests written and observed failing before implementation.
- [x] Goal controller, launcher discovery, framework deployment coverage, and bounded state machine
implemented.
- [x] User, admin, developer, runtime, adapter, README, and sitemap documentation updated.
- [x] Final source copied additively to `~/.config/mosaic/runtime/pi/goal-extension.ts`; source and
deployed SHA-256 are identical.
- [x] Live Pi RPC smoke from the exact Mosaic path reached `achieved` with two verification passes and
no extension errors.
- [x] Baseline and situational checks completed, except the explicitly documented unavailable
PostgreSQL-only root integration case.
- [x] Independent code and OWASP/security reviews completed; all findings remediated and re-reviewed.
- [ ] Commit, push, PR, terminal-green CI, squash merge, and issue closure complete.
## Tests and evidence
### Situational
- `pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/mosaic exec vitest run src/runtime/pi-goal-extension.spec.ts`
- final: 25 passed.
- Covers commands, per-turn checks, context injection, two-pass verification, mixed-report
rejection, bounded limits, compaction, branch restore, stale timers, credential redaction,
typed-field false-positive protection, and append-only legacy-state fail-closed behavior.
- Final focused launcher/controller/file-adapter run: 3 files / 67 tests passed.
- Final V8 coverage for `framework/runtime/pi/goal-extension.ts`:
- 99.17% statements/lines, 93.78% branches, 100% functions.
- Installer migration fixture: 24 passed and byte-compared the deployed framework asset.
- Standalone extension TypeScript check against installed Pi 0.84.1 types passed:
`pnpm --filter @mosaicstack/mosaic exec tsc --noEmit --pretty false --module NodeNext
--moduleResolution NodeNext --target ES2022 --skipLibCheck framework/runtime/pi/goal-extension.ts`.
- Live deployment/load evidence:
- source/deployed SHA-256:
`1f0a3806e0948ad5f49684273a7e535e9880c148f7fd16d13ee487fcd601f637`.
- `get_commands` identified `/goal` as an extension command sourced from
`~/.config/mosaic/runtime/pi/goal-extension.ts`; `/goal help` succeeded; zero extension errors.
- live arithmetic goal ended `achieved`, verification `2/2`, with 3 goal reports / 3 agent starts
and zero extension errors.
- no goal extension exists under `~/.pi` extension paths.
### Baseline
- `pnpm build`: passed before the final framework-only redaction remediation; the extension is not a
package build input and its final source passed the standalone Pi type check.
- `pnpm typecheck`: 45/45 tasks passed.
- `pnpm lint`: 25/25 tasks passed.
- `pnpm format:check`: passed.
- Final Mosaic package components:
- Vitest: 82 files / 1,539 tests passed.
- full `test:framework-shell` harness passed.
- the discovered pre-existing tmux loader-marker race was reproduced with constructor PID
evidence, fixed with a pane readiness/FIFO barrier, passed 3 consecutive focused runs, and passed
in the full shell harness.
- one combined rerun encountered the separate existing real-lease probe TOCTOU in
`install-ordering-guard.spec.ts`; an earlier final Vitest run was fully green and the changed
focused suites remained green.
- Gateway safe baseline excluding the prohibited PostgreSQL-only fixture: 55 files / 600 tests passed
(6 files / 12 tests skipped by their existing environment gates).
- Root `pnpm test` reached 43 successful workspace tasks and all changed-package Vitest tests, but
the unchanged `apps/gateway/src/__tests__/cross-user-isolation.test.ts` afterAll hook retried a
PostgreSQL connection and failed authentication (`28P01`). This checkout explicitly forbids local
PostgreSQL startup/access; the failure is unrelated to #1150 and cannot be remediated by starting
the database. The gateway suite excluding that PostgreSQL-only file and required CI are used as
the safe verification paths.
### Independent review
- Codex code review: approved, 0 findings across 15 files.
- Initial Codex security review: one medium CWE-532/A09 finding for raw report persistence.
- Remediation added central credential-pattern redaction, prompt/docs guidance, canary tests, typed
field false-positive guards, and sticky fail-closed restore for credential-bearing append-only
history.
- Codex security re-review: risk `none`, 0 findings, confidence 0.87.
- Focused remediation review findings were fixed; final focused re-review verdict: `APPROVE`.
- Focused independent review of the tmux readiness barrier: `APPROVE`, no actionable findings.
## Risks and blockers
- Live `~/.config/mosaic` is shared by active Pi/fleet processes. Local deployment remained a single
additive framework file and did not reload or restart unrelated sessions.
- Completion verification is semantic, not mathematical: the active agent supplies structured
evidence twice. Operators must still inspect consequential outcomes.
- Credential redaction is pattern-based defense-in-depth, not a secret store. It covers
controller-owned state/status/tool details, not Pi's separate model-message/tool-call history.
Goals and reports must never contain real secrets or raw sensitive output. Because Pi session
entries are append-only, a detected credential-bearing legacy branch fails closed and the affected
session must be removed.
- Current installed Pi is newer than the repository's historical gateway Pi dependency. The
extension was checked and smoke-tested against installed Pi 0.84.1 using stable documented APIs.
- Local root testing cannot safely execute the unchanged PostgreSQL-only integration fixture under
the checkout's explicit database safety constraints. Terminal-green PR CI remains mandatory before
merge.
- The unchanged real-lease default-probe test can observe different broker availability across its two
sequential probes; one combined package rerun hit that existing TOCTOU. The same final Vitest suite
passed in a separate run, and CI remains the merge authority.
@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
# #1174 — Wrapper guard rounds 1011
## Objective
Make checkout enforcement judge Git placement operands rather than every HOME-shaped word in the command, without reopening `--separate-git-dir` placement under HOME.
## Plan
1. Reproduce the four over-blocks and the placement-option control at head `20d86e39`.
2. Add RED fixtures before production changes.
3. Extract clone/worktree placement operands from the existing shell-aware normalized stream.
4. Run the full guard corpus, historical-head discrimination, syntax/static checks, probes, review, and CI.
## Progress and evidence
- Reproduced: `NOTE=$HOME`, `--reference=$HOME`, `GIT_DIR=$HOME/x`, and `--template=$HOME/t` all blocked despite explicit `/src/wt` destinations.
- RED at `20d86e39`: expanded suite had 8 failures, all HOME-valued non-placement cases.
- GREEN: expanded suite passes 242/242.
- Round-10 probes: 7/7 placement expectations and 4/4 placement-option controls pass.
- Earlier path probes remain green: 60/60, 24/24, and 17/17.
- Historical discrimination with the 242-fixture suite:
- `3d0a882a`: 216 pass / 26 fail.
- `4b8eba95`: 222 pass / 20 fail.
- `20d86e39`: 234 pass / 8 fail.
- `bash -n`, ShellCheck warning-or-higher, and `git diff --check`: pass.
## Residual / risk
- Relative destinations whose effective path depends on cwd are tracked separately by #1197 and remain out of scope.
- Unknown future Git options with a separate following value fail closed when that value is HOME-shaped. This may require classification when Git adds an unrelated path-taking option, but prevents a new placement option from silently bypassing the guard.
## Round 11 objective and intake
- **Issue / PR:** #1174.
- **Objective:** Remove the finite boolean-flag allowlists that turn accepted clone/worktree flags into fake placement operands, while preserving all real HOME placement blocks.
- **Scope:** `wrapper-guard.sh`, its hermetic fixtures, and task documentation. Relative cwd-dependent destinations remain in #1197.
- **Surfaces:** security-sensitive Bash hook behavior and shell/Git option grammar; no API, DB, UI, auth, deploy, or dependency changes.
- **Budget assumption:** 25K working tokens; reduce exploratory matrices before reducing acceptance coverage.
### Round 11 plan
1. Use Git itself to classify accepted/rejected clone and worktree options, and Bash itself to resolve path-word expectations.
2. Add RED fixtures for all six reported clone flags, generated negations, and equivalent worktree grammar.
3. Replace the open-ended unknown-option fail-closed fallback with a parser based on the closed value-taking option surface; keep explicit placement options special.
4. Run the full corpus, historical discrimination, shell/static checks, targeted probes, independent code/security review, one push, and exact-head CI.
### Root-cause evidence
- Git 2.39.5 accepts all six reported clone flags and the broader generated family measured in the brief: `--bare`, `--mirror`, `--ipv4`, `--ipv6`, `-4`, `-6`, `--no-local`, `--no-reject-shallow`, `--no-bare`, `--no-sparse`, `--no-dissociate`, `--no-shallow-submodules`, `--no-quiet`, `--no-progress`, and `--no-recurse-submodules`; it rejects `--relative-paths` as unknown.
- Git 2.39.5 accepts worktree negations including `--no-force`, `--no-detach`, `--no-lock`, `--no-guess-remote`, and `--no-track`; the current finite worktree flag list does not describe that generated family.
- `bash -c "printf '%s' <word>"` resolves `$HOME/source`, `${HOME}/source`, and `"$HOME"/source` under HOME while `/src/wt` remains outside it.
- **Hypothesis:** only separate-value options need positive classification. Treat every other option token as a no-value flag unless it is the explicit placement option; this matches Git's non-enumerable boolean family and confines the residual to genuinely new future value-taking options.
### TDD and verification checkpoints
- RED against the unmodified `91cc37bc` guard: 253 pass / 22 fail in the initial expanded 275-fixture suite. Failures include all 15 accepted clone flags, accepted long abbreviations, short value-taking bundles, abbreviated placement, worktree metadata abbreviation, and both directions of bundled worktree branch parsing.
- An exploratory fail-closed residual test drove emission of every worktree positional. Re-review correctly showed that this over-blocked HOME-shaped commit-ish metadata; a new commit-ish fixture failed RED against that intermediate implementation (278 pass / 2 fail, including one transient message assertion) and the parser was restored to emit only the actual path.
- GREEN after remediation: 280/280.
- Ultron's 13-shape option probe: 13/13 correct, including the six reported over-blocks, HOME destinations, end-of-options, worktree controls, and a later-command placement.
- Round-10 probes remain green: 7/7 subject-placement expectations and 4/4 `--separate-git-dir` controls.
- Earlier shell/path probes remain green: 60/60, 24/24, and 17/17.
- `bash -n`, ShellCheck warning-or-higher, and `git diff --check`: pass.
### Deliberate residual
A future Git release could add a new separate-value option absent from the closed value grammar. It defaults to no-value flag parsing, which leaves the following word positional. For clone, this can fail open if that future option itself creates repository state at its value. For worktree, it can shift which word is read as the path. This hypothetical future ambiguity is accepted deliberately because failing closed on every unclassified option is proven to over-block Git's open-ended present-day boolean/`--no-*` family. Every value-taking and placement option Git currently supports is classified, including accepted abbreviations of `--separate-git-dir`. Relative cwd-dependent targets remain in #1197.
### Independent review checkpoint
- Initial Codex code/security review raised `--orphan` as value-taking. Upstream Git `master` contradicts that premise: the synopsis is `[--orphan] [(-b | -B) <new-branch>] <path> [<commit-ish>]`, and the prose derives the branch from the path when `-b`/`-B` is absent. `--orphan` is therefore correctly handled as a boolean flag.
- The security review separately identified the generic future worktree shift residual. An attempted fail-closed remediation emitted every positional, but code re-review correctly rejected it because valid grammar has only one placement positional and an optional commit-ish. Final behavior checks only the path and documents the hypothetical future option shift deliberately; paired actual-grammar `--orphan` fixtures cover safe/HOME paths and `-b` metadata.
- Security re-review initially had no findings. Code re-review's commit-ish blocker was remediated with a RED fixture and path-only restoration; final code re-review approved with no findings.
- Final security review then found non-canonical absolute and symlink aliases. Eight lexical fixtures failed RED against the prior implementation, followed by three symlink fixtures failing RED. Remediation expands only shell-visible HOME tokens, resolves the longest existing directory prefix physically, and lexically normalizes the nonexistent suffix. The suite is now 292/292.
- Inherent residual: a symlink can be replaced between pre-tool inspection and Git execution. Existing aliases are resolved; eliminating the race requires enforcement inside the filesystem mutation path rather than a text pre-hook. Security review classified this medium, and architectural closure is tracked in #1199.
- Final independent code review: APPROVE, 0 findings. Final security review: no critical/high findings; the single medium TOCTOU residual is explicitly tracked in #1199.
### Final local evidence
- Final hermetic suite: 292/292; the same suite against `91cc37bc` discriminates at 256 pass / 36 fail.
- Ultron option probe: 13/13; round-10 probes: 7/7 plus 4/4 controls; earlier shell/path probes: 60/60, 24/24, and 17/17.
- `bash -n`, ShellCheck warning-or-higher, `git diff --check`, sanitization gate, and test-enumeration gate (population 55; 38 enumerated; 18 signed exclusions): pass.
- Independent code review: APPROVE, 0 findings. Security review's remaining medium TOCTOU architecture residual is tracked in #1199; no critical/high findings remain.
- Repository-wide TypeScript gates require dependencies absent from this worktree; the canonical Woodpecker pipeline will run them against the pushed exact head.
### Documentation checklist
- `docs/PRD.md` updated with WPG requirements, acceptance, canonicalization, and residual risk.
- Task scratchpad updated in the same logical change set; `docs/TASKS.md` remains orchestrator-only.
- No API, auth, UI, navigation, deployment, user-guide, or admin-guide surface changed; OpenAPI, endpoint index, sitemap, and publishing are not applicable.
+3 -1
View File
@@ -13,7 +13,8 @@ Pi is the native Mosaic agent runtime. The `mosaic pi` launcher:
1. Injects the full runtime contract via `--append-system-prompt`
2. Loads Mosaic skills via `--skill` flags
3. Loads the Mosaic extension via `--extension` for lifecycle hooks
3. Loads framework-owned `mosaic-extension.ts` and `goal-extension.ts` from
`~/.config/mosaic/runtime/pi/` via ordered `--extension` flags
4. Detects active missions and injects initial prompts
## Capabilities vs Other Runtimes
@@ -22,6 +23,7 @@ Pi is the native Mosaic agent runtime. The `mosaic pi` launcher:
- Native thinking levels replace sequential-thinking MCP
- Native skill discovery compatible with Mosaic SKILL.md format
- Native extension system for lifecycle hooks (TypeScript, not bash shims)
- Bounded persistent `/goal` loop with per-turn, post-compaction, and two-pass evidence checks
- Native session persistence and resume
- Model-agnostic (Anthropic, OpenAI, Google, Ollama, custom providers)
+10 -3
View File
@@ -94,7 +94,14 @@ The launcher:
1. Verifies `~/.config/mosaic` exists
2. Verifies `SOUL.md` exists (auto-runs `mosaic init` if missing)
3. Injects `AGENTS.md` into the runtime
4. Forwards all arguments to the runtime CLI
4. For Pi, loads the framework-owned core and persistent-goal extensions from
`~/.config/mosaic/runtime/pi/`
5. Forwards all arguments to the runtime CLI
Inside `mosaic pi`, `/goal set <statement>` starts a bounded persistent goal loop. Use `/goal status`,
`/goal pause`, `/goal resume`, or `/goal cancel` to control it. The extension remains part of Mosaic
under `~/.config/mosaic/runtime/pi/goal-extension.ts`; it is not installed in Pi's main extension
directory.
You can still launch runtimes directly (`claude`, `codex`, etc.) — thin runtime adapters will tell the agent to read `~/.config/mosaic/AGENTS.md`.
@@ -114,7 +121,7 @@ You can still launch runtimes directly (`claude`, `codex`, etc.) — thin runtim
│ ├── claude/ ← CLAUDE.md, RUNTIME.md, settings.json, hooks
│ ├── codex/ ← instructions.md, RUNTIME.md
│ ├── opencode/ ← AGENTS.md, RUNTIME.md
│ ├── pi/ ← RUNTIME.md, mosaic-extension.ts
│ ├── pi/ ← RUNTIME.md, mosaic-extension.ts, goal-extension.ts
│ └── mcp/ ← MCP server configs
├── skills/ ← Universal skills (synced from mosaic/agent-skills)
├── skills-local/ ← Local cross-runtime skills
@@ -126,7 +133,7 @@ You can still launch runtimes directly (`claude`, `codex`, etc.) — thin runtim
| Launch method | Injection mechanism |
| ------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| `mosaic pi` | `--append-system-prompt` with composed runtime contract + skills + extension |
| `mosaic pi` | `--append-system-prompt` with composed runtime contract + skills + Mosaic extensions |
| `mosaic claude` | `--append-system-prompt` with composed runtime contract (`AGENTS.md` + runtime reference) |
| `mosaic codex` | Writes composed runtime contract to `~/.codex/instructions.md` before launch |
| `mosaic opencode` | Writes composed runtime contract to `~/.config/opencode/AGENTS.md` before launch |
@@ -52,6 +52,52 @@ If a repo does not expose these scripts, run equivalent local workflow commands
- Do not auto-resolve data conflicts in shared state files.
- Keep commits scoped to a single logical change set.
## Model Tiering
Model choice is a standard, not a preference. Delegating a mechanical grep to a
frontier reasoning model wastes budget; sending a security review to a cheap tier
produces a review that passes and proves nothing. Both are defects.
Tiers are named by **capability class**, so the standard survives a model
generation. An operator binds each class to a concrete model id.
| Class | Use for |
| ------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| `search` | grep/glob, file location, status and health checks, one-line mechanical edits |
| `build` | feature implementation, test writing, bugfixes, routine refactors |
| `judge` | code review, planning, API/compat-sensitive changes |
| `adversarial` | security review, ambiguous architecture, anything where a wrong "looks fine" is expensive |
Rules:
1. **Start at the cheapest class that can do the task; escalate on evidence, not
on nerves.** Omitting a tier is not neutral — it inherits the caller's model,
which is usually the most expensive one.
2. **Compat-sensitive work escalates one class.** A change that must interoperate
with an existing contract is judged, not just built.
3. **A tier assignment is benchmarked, not asserted.** Move a task class to a
cheaper tier only against a blind A/B on real work from this codebase, ranked
by someone other than the author. "It seemed fine" is not evidence.
4. **Reviewer independence beats reviewer size.** An `adversarial` verdict from
the model that wrote the code is not a second opinion (see Constitution gate 16).
### Where the binding lives
The class→model map is operator configuration, never framework source: model
availability, cost, and quotas differ per operator and per host.
Resolution order, first hit wins:
1. the config service (DB-backed, surfaced and editable in the Mosaic webUI)
2. a local operator file (`STANDARDS.local.md`, or `policy/` where the runtime
injects it)
3. the framework default — the class names above, with no binding
Only layer 1 is auditable across a fleet, so it is the target end state; layers 2
and 3 exist so a host with no config service still runs. A local override that
silently disagrees with the config service is drift — the same failure class the
tool-index gate exists to catch, and it belongs in `mosaic doctor`.
## Prompting Contract
All runtime adapters should inject:
@@ -11,22 +11,105 @@ All tool suites are located at `~/.config/mosaic/tools/`.
Mosaic wrappers at `~/.config/mosaic/tools/git/*.sh` handle platform detection and edge cases. Always use these before raw CLI commands.
This index is complete and is kept complete mechanically: `tools/quality/scripts/check-tools-index.sh`
fails CI when a wrapper ships without an entry here, or when an entry here names a wrapper that no
longer exists. A wrapper missing from this list is, from inside an agent session, indistinguishable
from a wrapper that was never written — which is how the APPROVE/APPROVED incident below happened.
Every command takes `--help`. All of them accept `--login <account>` to pin the acting identity;
supply it explicitly on any host where the provider CLI's default account is an admin.
| Issues | |
| ------------------ | --------------------------------- |
| `issue-create.sh` | Create an issue (Gitea or GitHub) |
| `issue-view.sh` | Show one issue |
| `issue-list.sh` | List issues |
| `issue-edit.sh` | Edit title/body/labels/milestone |
| `issue-comment.sh` | Add a comment |
| `issue-assign.sh` | Assign or unassign |
| `issue-close.sh` | Close an issue |
| `issue-reopen.sh` | Reopen a closed issue |
| Pull requests | |
| ---------------- | --------------------------------------------------------- |
| `pr-create.sh` | Open a pull request |
| `pr-view.sh` | Show one PR |
| `pr-list.sh` | List PRs |
| `pr-diff.sh` | Fetch a PR's diff |
| `pr-metadata.sh` | PR metadata as JSON (head SHA, base, state, mergeability) |
| `pr-review.sh` | **Place a review verdict — see the dialect note below** |
| `pr-ci-wait.sh` | Block until the PR's CI reaches a terminal state |
| `pr-merge.sh` | Merge a PR |
| `pr-close.sh` | Close a PR without merging |
| Milestones | |
| --------------------- | ------------------ |
| `milestone-create.sh` | Create a milestone |
| `milestone-list.sh` | List milestones |
| `milestone-close.sh` | Close a milestone |
| Gates and guards | |
| ----------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| `ci-queue-wait.sh` | CI queue guard — required before push/merge (see below) |
| `push-guard.sh` | Refuse verifications that pass for the wrong reason (e.g. green against an unpushed tree) |
| `mutate-push-guard.sh` | Regenerate the guard's mutation-coverage table from measurement, so the table cannot drift from the guard |
| `verify-clean-clone.sh` | Prove the **committed** artifact runs, from a clean clone — not the working tree |
| Context | |
| -------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| `detect-platform.sh` | Resolve the provider (Gitea vs GitHub) for the current repo; every other wrapper uses it |
| `lane-brief.sh` | Live dispatch brief for a repo "lane" (milestone/label) straight from the provider |
| Workspace | |
| -------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
| `mosaic-worktree.sh` | Create/list/remove git worktrees — **the only supported way**; see below |
| `wrapper-guard.sh` | PreToolUse hook that enforces the two rules above; not called by hand |
**Workspace placement is derived, not chosen.** `mosaic-worktree.sh new <branch>` takes a branch
name and nothing else. Every path comes out of `git worktree list --porcelain` — main worktree,
repo name, parent dir, then `<parent>/<repo>-worktrees/<branch-slug>`. There is no placement flag
because a decision an agent has to make is a decision that drifts: the rule "big work goes on a work
filesystem" already existed in prose and 255 GB accumulated in `$HOME` across 842 directories
anyway, under five simultaneous conventions on a single host.
```bash
# Issues
~/.config/mosaic/tools/git/issue-create.sh
~/.config/mosaic/tools/git/issue-close.sh
~/.config/mosaic/tools/git/mosaic-worktree.sh new <branch> [--from <base>]
~/.config/mosaic/tools/git/mosaic-worktree.sh path <branch> # derived path, no side effect
~/.config/mosaic/tools/git/mosaic-worktree.sh list # this repo's worktrees + state
~/.config/mosaic/tools/git/mosaic-worktree.sh rm <branch> # removal is part of the task
~/.config/mosaic/tools/git/mosaic-worktree.sh gc [--apply] # reclaim clean + fully-pushed ones
```
# PRs
~/.config/mosaic/tools/git/pr-create.sh
~/.config/mosaic/tools/git/pr-merge.sh
Worktrees rather than clones, because `git worktree list` makes every checkout enumerable — a bare
clone dropped somewhere on disk can never be safely reclaimed, so it is never reclaimed. `rm` and
`gc` decide by **evidence, never by size or age**: a worktree is reclaimable only when
`git status --porcelain` is empty _and_ `git rev-list --count HEAD --not --remotes` is 0. Anything
else is preserved and reported. `--force` exists and is yours to type deliberately.
# Milestones
~/.config/mosaic/tools/git/milestone-create.sh
`wrapper-guard.sh` is registered as a Claude Code `PreToolUse` hook on `Bash` (see
`runtime/claude/settings.json`). It blocks exactly three things and lets everything else through:
a `git clone`/`git worktree add` targeting `$HOME`; a raw provider-API **write** to an endpoint that
already has a wrapper above (reads are untouched — they are how you gather evidence); and the
literal `"event": "APPROVE"`. For a genuine gap no wrapper can express, prefix
`MOSAIC_WRAPPER_OVERRIDE=1`. Reaching for the override twice for the same call means the wrapper has
a missing flag — extend the wrapper.
```bash
~/.config/mosaic/tools/git/issue-create.sh --help
~/.config/mosaic/tools/git/pr-review.sh --pr 42 --event APPROVED --body "..."
# CI queue guard (required before push/merge; defaults to the checked-out branch)
~/.config/mosaic/tools/git/ci-queue-wait.sh --purpose push|merge
```
**Review dialect — the reason `pr-review.sh` is not optional.** Gitea's approve event is
`APPROVED`; GitHub's is `APPROVE`. Send GitHub's spelling to a Gitea host and it answers **HTTP
200**, files the review as PENDING, and then rejects the submit with `422 review stay pending` — the
verdict looks placed and is not. (`REQUEST_CHANGES` is spelled identically on both, so only the
approve path carries the trap.) `pr-review.sh` sends the correct token for the detected provider.
Whatever you use, re-read `GET /pulls/{n}/reviews` and assert the state before reporting a verdict
placed.
The guard exits nonzero for any provider-asserted non-green, missing, or malformed CI state. If credentials or the provider are unavailable, it emits `CANNOT_ASSERT` and writes a JSONL audit record. Push degrades to exit 0 so recovery work is not bricked; merge holds with retryable exit 75 until the provider recovers, then self-clears without manual reset. Neither outcome is evidence that CI was clear. `pr-merge.sh` automatically inspects the exact PR head repository and full commit SHA rather than its `main` base; this also handles fork PRs without branch-name ambiguity. Pass `--expect-head <approved-full-sha>` to bind a commit-specific review or merge-gate verdict; Gitea uses atomic `head_commit_id` and GitHub uses `--match-head-commit`.
### Code Review (Codex)
@@ -52,6 +52,16 @@
"timeout": 10
}
]
},
{
"matcher": "Bash",
"hooks": [
{
"type": "command",
"command": "~/.config/mosaic/tools/git/wrapper-guard.sh",
"timeout": 10
}
]
}
],
"PostToolUse": [
@@ -51,12 +51,26 @@ Skills are discovered from:
### Extensions
The Mosaic Pi extension (`~/.config/mosaic/runtime/pi/mosaic-extension.ts`) handles:
`mosaic pi` loads framework-owned extensions directly from `~/.config/mosaic/runtime/pi/` in this
order:
- Session start/end lifecycle hooks
- Active mission detection and context injection
- Memory routing to `~/.config/mosaic/memory/`
- MACP queue status reporting
1. `mosaic-extension.ts` — session lifecycle, mission context, memory routing, lease/mutator gates,
and fleet heartbeat reporting.
2. `goal-extension.ts` — optional persistent `/goal` controller with per-turn and post-compaction
checks.
The goal extension is deployed by Mosaic and MUST NOT be copied into `~/.pi/agent/extensions/`.
Use `/goal set <statement>` (or `/goal <statement>`) to start, then `/goal status`, `/goal pause`,
`/goal resume`, or `/goal cancel` to control it. An active goal is injected before every model
request, restored from branch-specific session entries, and considered achieved only after two
consecutive evidence-bearing reports. Common credential shapes are redacted before controller-owned
goal-state entries are persisted or
displayed; Pi's own model/tool-call history is separate. Goals and reports must contain references
and pass/fail summaries rather than secrets or raw sensitive output.
- `MOSAIC_GOAL_MAX_TURNS` — autonomous turn limit, default `40`, accepted range `1..500`.
- `MOSAIC_GOAL_MAX_NO_PROGRESS` — identical no-progress report limit, default `6`, accepted range
`1..100`.
### Sessions
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
@@ -66,7 +66,10 @@ if command -v tmux >/dev/null 2>&1 && command -v cc >/dev/null 2>&1; then
trap 'tmux -L "$TEST_SOCKET" kill-server >/dev/null 2>&1 || true; rm -rf "$TEST_ROOT"' EXIT
MARKER="$TEST_ROOT/loader-marker"
LIBRARY="$TEST_ROOT/marker.so"
FIXTURE_READY="$TEST_ROOT/loader-ready"
FIXTURE_FIFO="$TEST_ROOT/loader-block"
HOLDER_HOME="$TEST_ROOT/holder-home"
mkfifo "$FIXTURE_FIFO"
mkdir -p "$HOLDER_HOME/.config/mosaic/fleet/run"
chmod 700 "$HOLDER_HOME/.config" "$HOLDER_HOME/.config/mosaic" \
"$HOLDER_HOME/.config/mosaic/fleet" "$HOLDER_HOME/.config/mosaic/fleet/run"
@@ -87,7 +90,17 @@ __attribute__((constructor)) static void mark_loader(void) {
EOF
cc -shared -fPIC -o "$LIBRARY" "$TEST_ROOT/marker.c"
MOSAIC_LOADER_MARKER="$MARKER" LD_PRELOAD="$LIBRARY" \
tmux -L "$TEST_SOCKET" new-session -d -s _holder 'sleep 60'
tmux -L "$TEST_SOCKET" new-session -d -s _holder \
"touch '$FIXTURE_READY'; read _ < '$FIXTURE_FIFO'"
# tmux starts the pane asynchronously. Wait until its contaminated shell has
# loaded the constructor and reached a builtin-only FIFO barrier before
# clearing the marker; otherwise that expected constructor can race with the
# clean holder assertion below and create a false failure.
for _attempt in {1..100}; do
[ -e "$FIXTURE_READY" ] && break
sleep 0.01
done
[ -e "$FIXTURE_READY" ] || fail "contaminated fixture pane did not become ready"
[ -s "$MARKER" ] || fail "contaminated fixture did not execute loader constructor"
server_pid=$(tmux -L "$TEST_SOCKET" display-message -p '#{pid}')
: > "$MARKER"
@@ -112,6 +125,7 @@ EOF
chmod 700 "$AGENT_HOME/fleet/agents"
cat > "$AGENT_HOME/fleet/agents/$AGENT_NAME.env.generated" <<EOF
MOSAIC_AGENT_NAME=$AGENT_NAME
MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY=$AGENT_NAME
MOSAIC_AGENT_CLASS=code
MOSAIC_AGENT_RUNTIME=pi
MOSAIC_AGENT_MODEL=
@@ -144,7 +158,8 @@ EOF
/usr/bin/env -i HOME="$HOLDER_HOME" PATH=/usr/bin:/bin \
MOSAIC_TMUX_SOCKET="$TEST_SOCKET" MOSAIC_TMUX_HOLDER=_holder "$HOLDER_START"
tmux -L "$TEST_SOCKET" has-session -t '=_holder:0.0' || fail "fresh holder was not created"
if tmux -L "$TEST_SOCKET" show-environment -g LD_PRELOAD 2>/dev/null | grep -q '^LD_PRELOAD='; then
ld_preload_env="$(tmux -L "$TEST_SOCKET" show-environment -g LD_PRELOAD 2>/dev/null)" || true
if grep -q '^LD_PRELOAD=' <<<"$ld_preload_env"; then
fail "fresh holder retained LD_PRELOAD"
fi
/usr/bin/env -i HOME="$HOLDER_HOME" PATH=/usr/bin:/bin MOSAIC_HOME="$AGENT_HOME" \
@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ if [[ -n "$GROUP" ]]; then
group_response=$(curl -sk \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
"${AUTHENTIK_URL}/api/v3/core/groups/?search=${GROUP}")
group_pk=$(echo "$group_response" | jq -r ".results[] | select(.name == \"$GROUP\") | .pk" | head -1)
group_pk=$(jq -r "first(.results[] | select(.name == \"$GROUP\") | .pk) // empty" <<<"$group_response")
if [[ -n "$group_pk" ]]; then
payload=$(echo "$payload" | jq --arg gk "$group_pk" '. + {groups: [$gk]}')
else
@@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ is_sensitive_key() {
is_generated_key() {
case "$1" in
MOSAIC_AGENT_NAME|MOSAIC_AGENT_CLASS|MOSAIC_AGENT_RUNTIME|MOSAIC_AGENT_MODEL|MOSAIC_AGENT_REASONING|MOSAIC_AGENT_TOOL_POLICY|MOSAIC_AGENT_WORKDIR|MOSAIC_TMUX_SOCKET) return 0 ;;
MOSAIC_AGENT_NAME|MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY|MOSAIC_AGENT_CLASS|MOSAIC_AGENT_RUNTIME|MOSAIC_AGENT_MODEL|MOSAIC_AGENT_REASONING|MOSAIC_AGENT_TOOL_POLICY|MOSAIC_AGENT_WORKDIR|MOSAIC_TMUX_SOCKET) return 0 ;;
*) return 1 ;;
esac
}
@@ -114,6 +114,7 @@ validate_generated_value() {
local value="$2"
case "$key" in
MOSAIC_AGENT_NAME) safe_agent_name "$value" || fail_env unsafe-agent-name "$key" "$value" ;;
MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY) safe_agent_name "$value" || fail_env unsafe-git-identity "$key" "$value" ;;
MOSAIC_AGENT_CLASS) safe_policy_name "$value" || fail_env unsafe-class "$key" "$value" ;;
MOSAIC_AGENT_RUNTIME)
case "$value" in claude|codex|opencode|pi) ;; *) fail_env unsupported-runtime "$key" "$value" ;; esac
@@ -175,7 +176,7 @@ load_environment_file() {
load_environment_file "$GENERATED_ENV" generated
for required_key in \
MOSAIC_AGENT_NAME MOSAIC_AGENT_CLASS MOSAIC_AGENT_RUNTIME MOSAIC_AGENT_MODEL \
MOSAIC_AGENT_NAME MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY MOSAIC_AGENT_CLASS MOSAIC_AGENT_RUNTIME MOSAIC_AGENT_MODEL \
MOSAIC_AGENT_REASONING MOSAIC_AGENT_TOOL_POLICY MOSAIC_AGENT_WORKDIR MOSAIC_TMUX_SOCKET; do
[ -n "${GENERATED_VALUES[$required_key]+set}" ] || fail_env missing-key "$required_key" ''
done
@@ -183,12 +184,15 @@ load_environment_file "$LOCAL_ENV" local
[ "${GENERATED_VALUES[MOSAIC_AGENT_NAME]}" = "$AGENT_NAME" ] || \
fail_env agent-name-mismatch MOSAIC_AGENT_NAME "${GENERATED_VALUES[MOSAIC_AGENT_NAME]}"
[ "${GENERATED_VALUES[MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY]}" = "$AGENT_NAME" ] || \
fail_env git-identity-mismatch MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY "${GENERATED_VALUES[MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY]}"
MOSAIC_TMUX_SOCKET=${GENERATED_VALUES[MOSAIC_TMUX_SOCKET]}
MOSAIC_AGENT_RUNTIME=${GENERATED_VALUES[MOSAIC_AGENT_RUNTIME]}
MOSAIC_AGENT_MODEL=${GENERATED_VALUES[MOSAIC_AGENT_MODEL]}
MOSAIC_AGENT_REASONING=${GENERATED_VALUES[MOSAIC_AGENT_REASONING]}
MOSAIC_AGENT_WORKDIR=${GENERATED_VALUES[MOSAIC_AGENT_WORKDIR]}
MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY=${GENERATED_VALUES[MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY]}
MOSAIC_AGENT_CLASS=${GENERATED_VALUES[MOSAIC_AGENT_CLASS]}
MOSAIC_AGENT_TOOL_POLICY=${GENERATED_VALUES[MOSAIC_AGENT_TOOL_POLICY]}
MOSAIC_RUNTIME_BIN=${LOCAL_VALUES[MOSAIC_RUNTIME_BIN]:-}
@@ -343,6 +347,7 @@ LAUNCH_ENV=(
"PATH=$PANE_PATH"
"MOSAIC_HOME=$MOSAIC_HOME"
"MOSAIC_AGENT_NAME=$AGENT_NAME"
"MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY=$MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY"
"MOSAIC_AGENT_CLASS=$MOSAIC_AGENT_CLASS"
"MOSAIC_AGENT_RUNTIME=$MOSAIC_AGENT_RUNTIME"
"MOSAIC_AGENT_MODEL=$MOSAIC_AGENT_MODEL"
@@ -14,6 +14,82 @@ fail() {
exit 1
}
pane_command_clears_environment() {
local calls_file="$1"
local -a argv=()
local index
mapfile -d '' -t argv < "$calls_file"
for ((index = 0; index + 1 < ${#argv[@]}; index++)); do
if [ "${argv[$index]}" = /usr/bin/env ] && [ "${argv[$((index + 1))]}" = -i ]; then
return 0
fi
done
return 1
}
print_pane_argv() {
local calls_file="$1"
local -a argv=()
local bytes index
mapfile -d '' -t argv < "$calls_file"
bytes=$(wc -c < "$calls_file")
printf 'observed pane argv: records=%s bytes=%s\n' "${#argv[@]}" "$bytes" >&2
for ((index = 0; index < ${#argv[@]}; index++)); do
printf ' [%03d] %q\n' "$index" "${argv[$index]}" >&2
done
}
check_pane_environment_boundary() {
local calls_file="$1"
if pane_command_clears_environment "$calls_file"; then
return 0
fi
print_pane_argv "$calls_file"
return 1
}
contains_literal() {
grep -F -- "$2" <<< "$1" >/dev/null
}
contains_line() {
grep -xF -- "$2" <<< "$1" >/dev/null
}
# Portability regression: inspect the authoritative NUL-delimited argv instead
# of piping a newline reconstruction through `grep -q` under pipefail. The old
# pipeline could report failure after a successful match when an upstream
# producer received SIGPIPE. A large trailing argument keeps that failure class
# covered without making stream size part of the semantic contract.
PORTABILITY_CALLS="$ROOT/portability-calls"
printf -v PORTABILITY_PADDING '%*s' 32768 ''
PORTABILITY_PADDING=${PORTABILITY_PADDING// /x}
printf '%s\0' /usr/bin/env -i "$PORTABILITY_PADDING" > "$PORTABILITY_CALLS"
pane_command_clears_environment "$PORTABILITY_CALLS" || \
fail "valid large pane argv was rejected by the environment-boundary assertion"
assert_pane_boundary_rejected() {
local case_name="$1"
local expected_records="$2"
local diagnostic
if diagnostic=$(check_pane_environment_boundary "$PORTABILITY_CALLS" 2>&1); then
fail "pane boundary accepted invalid $case_name fixture"
fi
contains_literal "$diagnostic" "records=$expected_records bytes=" || \
fail "pane argv diagnostic omitted counts for $case_name fixture"
contains_literal "$diagnostic" '[000]' || \
fail "pane argv diagnostic omitted indexed arguments for $case_name fixture"
}
printf '%s\0' tmux -i > "$PORTABILITY_CALLS"
assert_pane_boundary_rejected missing-env 2
printf '%s\0' /usr/bin/env HOME=/untrusted > "$PORTABILITY_CALLS"
assert_pane_boundary_rejected missing-i 2
printf '%s\0' /usr/bin/env HOME=/untrusted -i > "$PORTABILITY_CALLS"
assert_pane_boundary_rejected non-adjacent-i 3
printf '%s\0' -i /usr/bin/env > "$PORTABILITY_CALLS"
assert_pane_boundary_rejected reversed-boundary 2
cat > "$FAKE_BIN/tmux" <<'SHIM'
#!/usr/bin/env bash
set -euo pipefail
@@ -62,6 +138,19 @@ env -0 > "${MOSAIC_HOME:?}/fleet/pane-environment"
SHIM
chmod +x "$FAKE_BIN/mosaic"
# Freeze numeric epoch reads only when a test arm supplies an observation bound.
# Formatting reads still use the real BusyBox/POSIX date implementation.
cat > "$FAKE_BIN/date" <<'SHIM'
#!/usr/bin/env bash
set -euo pipefail
if [ -n "${MOSAIC_TEST_FIXED_EPOCH:-}" ] && [ "${1:-}" = '+%s' ]; then
printf '%s\n' "$MOSAIC_TEST_FIXED_EPOCH"
exit 0
fi
exec /bin/date "$@"
SHIM
chmod +x "$FAKE_BIN/date"
write_generated() {
local home="$1"
local agent="$2"
@@ -71,6 +160,7 @@ write_generated() {
chmod 600 "$home/fleet/run/holder-owner"
cat > "$home/fleet/agents/$agent.env.generated" <<EOF
MOSAIC_AGENT_NAME=$agent
MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY=$agent
MOSAIC_AGENT_CLASS=code
MOSAIC_AGENT_RUNTIME=pi
MOSAIC_AGENT_MODEL=openai-codex/gpt-5.6-sol
@@ -88,6 +178,7 @@ run_start() {
local agent="$2"
HOME="$home" PATH="$FAKE_BIN:$PATH" MOSAIC_TEST_TMUX_CALLS="$TMUX_CALLS" \
MOSAIC_TEST_PANE_PID="${MOSAIC_TEST_PANE_PID:-}" \
MOSAIC_TEST_FIXED_EPOCH="${MOSAIC_TEST_FIXED_EPOCH:-}" \
MOSAIC_TEST_HOME="$home" \
MOSAIC_TEST_FLEET_OWNER=123e4567-e89b-12d3-a456-426614174000 \
MOSAIC_HOME="$home" "$START" "$agent"
@@ -100,19 +191,55 @@ AGENT_VALID="coder0"
write_generated "$HOME_VALID" "$AGENT_VALID"
run_start "$HOME_VALID" "$AGENT_VALID"
valid_args=$(tr '\0' '\n' < "$TMUX_CALLS")
echo "$valid_args" | grep -qF new-session || fail "valid generated projection did not reach tmux"
echo "$valid_args" | grep -qF 'mosaic' || fail "fixed mosaic launcher command missing"
echo "$valid_args" | grep -qF 'yolo' || fail "fixed yolo launcher command missing"
echo "$valid_args" | grep -qF 'pi' || fail "roster runtime missing"
if echo "$valid_args" | grep -qF 'bash -c'; then
contains_literal "$valid_args" new-session || fail "valid generated projection did not reach tmux"
contains_literal "$valid_args" mosaic || fail "fixed mosaic launcher command missing"
contains_literal "$valid_args" yolo || fail "fixed yolo launcher command missing"
contains_literal "$valid_args" pi || fail "roster runtime missing"
if contains_literal "$valid_args" 'bash -c'; then
fail "launcher constructed a shell command payload"
fi
# The pane must start through an absolute clean-environment boundary. Its
# runtime command remains an argv vector, but no holder/session environment
# control variable can pass through the pane command.
echo "$valid_args" | grep -qxF '/usr/bin/env' || fail "pane does not use absolute env"
echo "$valid_args" | grep -qxF -- '-i' || fail "pane environment is not cleared"
check_pane_environment_boundary "$TMUX_CALLS" || \
fail "pane command did not use an adjacent /usr/bin/env -i boundary"
# Git identity is generated authority, not an optional or independently mutable
# local value. Each invalid form must fail before fake tmux receives a call.
assert_git_identity_rejected() {
local case_name="$1"
local expected_code="$2"
local home="$ROOT/git-identity-$case_name"
local agent="coder-git-identity-$case_name"
local generated="$home/fleet/agents/$agent.env.generated"
write_generated "$home" "$agent"
case "$case_name" in
missing) grep -v '^MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY=' "$generated" > "$generated.next" && mv "$generated.next" "$generated" ;;
unsafe) sed -i 's|^MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY=.*$|MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY=bad/identity|' "$generated" ;;
mismatch) sed -i 's|^MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY=.*$|MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY=other-agent|' "$generated" ;;
local-shadow)
printf 'MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY=%s\n' "$agent" > "$home/fleet/agents/$agent.env.local"
chmod 600 "$home/fleet/agents/$agent.env.local"
;;
*) fail "unknown Git identity rejection case: $case_name" ;;
esac
chmod 600 "$generated"
: > "$TMUX_CALLS"
if output=$(run_start "$home" "$agent" 2>&1); then
fail "Git identity case $case_name was accepted"
fi
[ ! -s "$TMUX_CALLS" ] || fail "tmux ran before Git identity $case_name rejection"
contains_literal "$output" "code=$expected_code" || \
fail "Git identity $case_name diagnostic omitted code $expected_code"
}
assert_git_identity_rejected missing missing-key
assert_git_identity_rejected unsafe unsafe-git-identity
assert_git_identity_rejected mismatch git-identity-mismatch
assert_git_identity_rejected local-shadow generated-key-shadow
# The generated-file parent is a security boundary too: even a private regular
# file is untrusted if its parent can be replaced or written by another user.
@@ -125,7 +252,7 @@ if output=$(run_start "$HOME_UNSAFE_PARENT" coder-parent 2>&1); then
fail "generated file under a world-writable parent was accepted"
fi
[ ! -s "$TMUX_CALLS" ] || fail "tmux ran before unsafe parent rejection"
echo "$output" | grep -qF 'code=unsafe-permissions' || fail "unsafe parent diagnostic missing"
contains_literal "$output" 'code=unsafe-permissions' || fail "unsafe parent diagnostic missing"
: > "$TMUX_CALLS"
HOME_SYMLINK_PARENT="$ROOT/symlink-parent"
@@ -136,7 +263,7 @@ if output=$(run_start "$HOME_SYMLINK_PARENT" coder-symlink-parent 2>&1); then
fail "generated file under a symlinked parent was accepted"
fi
[ ! -s "$TMUX_CALLS" ] || fail "tmux ran before symlinked parent rejection"
echo "$output" | grep -qF 'code=unsafe-directory' || fail "symlinked parent diagnostic missing"
contains_literal "$output" 'code=unsafe-directory' || fail "symlinked parent diagnostic missing"
# Every managed ancestor is a boundary: MOSAIC_HOME, fleet, and agents. A
# symlink or group/world-writable ancestor must fail before environment parsing,
@@ -174,8 +301,8 @@ assert_managed_ancestor_rejected() {
fi
[ ! -s "$TMUX_CALLS" ] || fail "tmux ran before $hazard $ancestor rejection"
[ ! -e "$home/work" ] || fail "workdir was created before $hazard $ancestor rejection"
echo "$output" | grep -qF "code=unsafe-" || fail "managed ancestor diagnostic missing"
if echo "$output" | grep -qF 'key=MOSAIC_AGENT_COMMAND'; then
contains_literal "$output" 'code=unsafe-' || fail "managed ancestor diagnostic missing"
if contains_literal "$output" 'key=MOSAIC_AGENT_COMMAND'; then
fail "environment parsing ran before $hazard $ancestor rejection"
fi
}
@@ -196,9 +323,9 @@ if output=$(run_start "$HOME_SHADOW" coder1 2>&1); then
fail "generated-key shadow was accepted"
fi
[ ! -s "$TMUX_CALLS" ] || fail "tmux ran before generated-key shadow rejection"
echo "$output" | grep -qF 'key=MOSAIC_AGENT_RUNTIME' || fail "shadow diagnostic omitted key"
echo "$output" | grep -qF 'sha256=' || fail "shadow diagnostic omitted hash"
if echo "$output" | grep -qF 'codex'; then
contains_literal "$output" 'key=MOSAIC_AGENT_RUNTIME' || fail "shadow diagnostic omitted key"
contains_literal "$output" 'sha256=' || fail "shadow diagnostic omitted hash"
if contains_literal "$output" codex; then
fail "shadow diagnostic leaked value"
fi
@@ -214,9 +341,9 @@ if output=$(run_start "$HOME_COMMAND" coder2 2>&1); then
fail "arbitrary command override was accepted"
fi
[ ! -s "$TMUX_CALLS" ] || fail "tmux ran before command rejection"
echo "$output" | grep -qF 'key=MOSAIC_AGENT_COMMAND' || fail "command diagnostic omitted key"
echo "$output" | grep -qF 'sha256=' || fail "command diagnostic omitted hash"
if echo "$output" | grep -qF "$COMMAND_VALUE"; then
contains_literal "$output" 'key=MOSAIC_AGENT_COMMAND' || fail "command diagnostic omitted key"
contains_literal "$output" 'sha256=' || fail "command diagnostic omitted hash"
if contains_literal "$output" "$COMMAND_VALUE"; then
fail "command diagnostic leaked command value"
fi
@@ -230,7 +357,7 @@ if output=$(run_start "$HOME_PERMS" coder3 2>&1); then
fail "world-readable local input was accepted"
fi
[ ! -s "$TMUX_CALLS" ] || fail "tmux ran before permissions rejection"
echo "$output" | grep -qF 'code=unsafe-permissions' || fail "permission diagnostic missing"
contains_literal "$output" 'code=unsafe-permissions' || fail "permission diagnostic missing"
# A unit/holder-like clean bootstrap must yield a pane with trusted HOME and
# computed PATH only. The pane command itself must not carry loader, shell
@@ -260,25 +387,35 @@ PATH="$PANE_STALE_PATH" \
MOSAIC_TEST_EXECUTE_PANE=1 \
"$START" coder-pane-boundary
pane_args=$(tr '\0' '\n' < "$TMUX_CALLS")
echo "$pane_args" | grep -qxF "HOME=$PANE_TRUSTED_HOME" || \
contains_line "$pane_args" "HOME=$PANE_TRUSTED_HOME" || \
fail "pane did not restore trusted HOME"
echo "$pane_args" | grep -qF "HOME=$PANE_STALE_HOME" && \
contains_literal "$pane_args" "HOME=$PANE_STALE_HOME" && \
fail "pane inherited stale HOME"
echo "$pane_args" | grep -qF "$PANE_STALE_PATH" && fail "pane inherited stale PATH"
contains_literal "$pane_args" "$PANE_STALE_PATH" && fail "pane inherited stale PATH"
for blocked in LD_PRELOAD= BASH_ENV= MOSAIC_UNTRUSTED_SENTINEL=; do
echo "$pane_args" | grep -qF "$blocked" && fail "pane inherited $blocked"
contains_literal "$pane_args" "$blocked" && fail "pane inherited $blocked"
done
after_pane_env=$(printf '%s\n' "$pane_args" | grep -n -m1 -F '/usr/bin/env' | cut -d: -f1)
[ -n "$after_pane_env" ] || fail "pane command did not use absolute env"
printf '%s\n' "$pane_args" | tail -n +"$after_pane_env" | grep -qxF -- '-i' || \
fail "pane command did not clear its environment"
check_pane_environment_boundary "$TMUX_CALLS" || \
fail "pane command did not use an adjacent /usr/bin/env -i boundary"
pane_environment=$(tr '\0' '\n' < "$HOME_PANE_BOUNDARY/fleet/pane-environment")
echo "$pane_environment" | grep -qxF "HOME=$PANE_TRUSTED_HOME" || \
# Exercise the repository launcher at $START, not the independently installed
# host copy. Set-compare every declared generated projection entry with the
# launched process environment so a newly declared identity cannot be omitted
# by a hand-maintained per-variable assertion.
declared_generated_environment=$(sort "$HOME_PANE_BOUNDARY/fleet/agents/coder-pane-boundary.env.generated")
missing_or_changed_generated_environment=$(comm -23 \
<(printf '%s\n' "$declared_generated_environment") \
<(printf '%s\n' "$pane_environment" | sort))
if [ -n "$missing_or_changed_generated_environment" ]; then
missing_or_changed_keys=$(printf '%s\n' "$missing_or_changed_generated_environment" | cut -d= -f1 | paste -sd, -)
fail "runtime pane omitted or changed generated environment keys: $missing_or_changed_keys"
fi
contains_line "$pane_environment" "HOME=$PANE_TRUSTED_HOME" || \
fail "runtime pane did not receive trusted HOME"
echo "$pane_environment" | grep -qF "$PANE_STALE_PATH" && fail "runtime pane received stale PATH"
contains_literal "$pane_environment" "$PANE_STALE_PATH" && fail "runtime pane received stale PATH"
for blocked in LD_PRELOAD= BASH_ENV= MOSAIC_UNTRUSTED_SENTINEL=; do
echo "$pane_environment" | grep -qF "$blocked" && fail "runtime pane received $blocked"
contains_literal "$pane_environment" "$blocked" && fail "runtime pane received $blocked"
done
write_interaction_generated() {
@@ -290,6 +427,7 @@ write_interaction_generated() {
chmod 600 "$home/fleet/run/holder-owner"
cat > "$home/fleet/agents/$agent.env.generated" <<EOF
MOSAIC_AGENT_NAME=$agent
MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY=$agent
MOSAIC_AGENT_CLASS=operator-interaction
MOSAIC_AGENT_RUNTIME=pi
MOSAIC_AGENT_MODEL=openai/gpt-5.6-sol
@@ -352,8 +490,12 @@ write_generated "$HOME_NATIVE_STALE" "coder-native-stale"
write_heartbeat_local "$HOME_NATIVE_STALE" "coder-native-stale"
STALE_HB="$HOME_NATIVE_STALE/run/coder-native-stale.hb"
printf 'ts=native\npid=1\nstatus=busy\nmodel=stale-model\n' > "$STALE_HB"
touch -d '10 seconds ago' "$STALE_HB.native"
MOSAIC_TEST_PANE_PID=$$ run_start "$HOME_NATIVE_STALE" coder-native-stale
touch -t 200001010000.00 "$STALE_HB.native"
# Hold the sidecar's observation epoch constant: assertion runtime must not age
# a fresh-marker mutant into the stale state that this fixture must distinguish.
STALE_OBSERVATION_EPOCH=$(date +%s)
MOSAIC_TEST_FIXED_EPOCH="$STALE_OBSERVATION_EPOCH" \
MOSAIC_TEST_PANE_PID=$$ run_start "$HOME_NATIVE_STALE" coder-native-stale
wait_for_sidecar_status "$STALE_HB"
HOME_NATIVE_ABSENT="$ROOT/native-absent"
@@ -374,22 +516,22 @@ if output=$(run_interaction "$HOME_INTERACTION_MALFORMED" interaction-malformed
fail "interaction wrapper accepted malformed generated data"
fi
[ ! -s "$TMUX_CALLS" ] || fail "tmux ran before interaction strict-parser rejection"
echo "$output" | grep -qF 'code=unknown-key' || fail "interaction did not use shared strict parser first"
contains_literal "$output" 'code=unknown-key' || fail "interaction did not use shared strict parser first"
# A syntactically valid but policy-incompatible projection reaches the pinned
# interaction policy check only after strict parsing and never starts tmux.
: > "$TMUX_CALLS"
HOME_INTERACTION_POLICY="$ROOT/interaction-policy"
write_interaction_generated "$HOME_INTERACTION_POLICY" "interaction-policy"
perl -0pi -e 's/MOSAIC_AGENT_RUNTIME=pi/MOSAIC_AGENT_RUNTIME=codex/' \
sed -i 's|^MOSAIC_AGENT_RUNTIME=pi$|MOSAIC_AGENT_RUNTIME=codex|' \
"$HOME_INTERACTION_POLICY/fleet/agents/interaction-policy.env.generated"
if output=$(run_interaction "$HOME_INTERACTION_POLICY" interaction-policy 2>&1); then
fail "interaction wrapper accepted a policy-incompatible projection"
fi
interaction_policy_args=$(tr '\0' '\n' < "$TMUX_CALLS")
echo "$interaction_policy_args" | grep -qF 'new-session' && \
contains_literal "$interaction_policy_args" new-session && \
fail "interaction pinned-policy rejection created a tmux session"
echo "$output" | grep -qF 'operator interaction service requires runtime pi' || \
contains_literal "$output" 'operator interaction service requires runtime pi' || \
fail "interaction pinned-policy check did not follow strict parsing"
# Exact stop derives the socket exclusively from the validated generated
@@ -402,10 +544,10 @@ HOME="$HOME_STOP" PATH="$FAKE_BIN:$PATH" MOSAIC_TEST_TMUX_CALLS="$TMUX_CALLS" \
MOSAIC_TEST_FLEET_OWNER=123e4567-e89b-12d3-a456-426614174000 \
MOSAIC_HOME="$HOME_STOP" MOSAIC_TMUX_SOCKET=ambient-socket "$START" --stop coder-stop
stop_args=$(tr '\0' '\n' < "$TMUX_CALLS")
echo "$stop_args" | grep -qxF 'mosaic-test' || fail "exact stop did not use the validated generated socket"
echo "$stop_args" | grep -qxF 'kill-session' || fail "exact stop did not request session termination"
echo "$stop_args" | grep -qxF '=coder-stop' || fail "exact stop did not exact-match the generated agent name"
if echo "$stop_args" | grep -qF 'ambient-socket'; then
contains_line "$stop_args" mosaic-test || fail "exact stop did not use the validated generated socket"
contains_line "$stop_args" kill-session || fail "exact stop did not request session termination"
contains_line "$stop_args" '=coder-stop' || fail "exact stop did not exact-match the generated agent name"
if contains_literal "$stop_args" ambient-socket; then
fail "exact stop trusted an ambient socket"
fi
@@ -254,15 +254,32 @@ from urllib.parse import urlparse
def _origin_and_path(url):
# Normalize a URL to (scheme, host, effective-port) + comment path. The port
# defaults to the scheme's default (80 http / 443 otherwise) so an implicit
# port and its explicit default form compare equal.
# Normalize a URL to (scheme-class, host, distinguishing-port) + comment path.
#
# #991: http and https collapse into ONE scheme class ("web"). A Gitea whose
# ROOT_URL is configured http:// returns http:// object URLs even when every
# client reaches it over https://, so a scheme-strict comparison rejects the
# provider's own correct answer about a write that landed — a deterministic
# false negative on every comment posted against such a deployment. The
# scheme is also not what this check defends: the forgeries it exists to
# catch (look-alike host, decoy path prefix, wrong owner/repo/number) all
# vary the HOST or the PATH, both of which stay strict below. Any OTHER
# scheme (file:, ftp:, javascript:) remains distinguishing and is rejected.
#
# Port: an implicit port and its own scheme's default compare equal, so
# http://h == https://h. An EXPLICIT non-default port still distinguishes,
# because a different port is a different service on the same host.
parsed = urlparse(url or "")
scheme = (parsed.scheme or "").lower()
host = (parsed.hostname or "").lower()
default_port = 80 if scheme == "http" else 443
port = parsed.port if parsed.port is not None else default_port
return (scheme, host, port), parsed.path.rstrip("/")
if scheme in ("http", "https"):
scheme_class = "web"
default_port = 80 if scheme == "http" else 443
port = None if parsed.port in (None, default_port) else parsed.port
else:
scheme_class = scheme
port = parsed.port
return (scheme_class, host, port), parsed.path.rstrip("/")
try:
+306
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,306 @@
#!/usr/bin/env bash
# mosaic-worktree.sh — the only supported way to create and dispose of a git
# worktree on a fleet host.
#
# Why this exists as a helper and not as a rule: the rule already existed, in
# the framework's own words ("Big work → /var/tmp"), and 255 GB accumulated in
# $HOME across 842 directories anyway. Five placement conventions were live on
# one fleet host simultaneously. Every one was a decision an agent had to make,
# and a decision an agent has to make is a decision that drifts.
#
# So this script makes NO placement decision available. The caller supplies a
# branch name. Every path is DERIVED:
#
# main worktree <- git worktree list --porcelain (never cwd, which may
# itself already be a worktree)
# REPO_NAME <- basename of the main worktree
# REPO_PARENT <- dirname of the main worktree
# WT_ROOT <- $REPO_PARENT/$REPO_NAME-worktrees
# SLUG <- branch with '/' replaced by '-'
# WT_PATH <- $WT_ROOT/$SLUG
#
# The derivation puts the worktree on the same filesystem as the object store
# it shares, as a sibling of the repo, under one root per repo. Those are the
# properties that make the checkout cheap and — via `git worktree list` —
# enumerable, which is the only reason automated cleanup can ever be safe.
#
# Usage:
# mosaic-worktree.sh new <branch> [--from <base>] create (branch may exist)
# mosaic-worktree.sh path <branch> print derived path, no side effect
# mosaic-worktree.sh list this repo's worktrees + state
# mosaic-worktree.sh rm <branch> [--force] remove; refuses to lose work
# mosaic-worktree.sh gc [--apply] report/remove clean+pushed worktrees
#
# `rm` and `gc` refuse to delete a worktree with uncommitted changes, with
# commits absent from every remote, or holding ignored files that are not of the
# well-known regenerable kind (a `.env` is ignored so it is never committed,
# which is also why nothing else holds a copy). That check is by EVIDENCE, never
# by size or age. --force overrides it and is yours to type deliberately.
#
# Run from anywhere inside the repo, or pass --repo <path>.
set -euo pipefail
die() { printf 'mosaic-worktree: %s\n' "$*" >&2; exit 1; }
REPO_HINT=""
ARGS=()
while [ $# -gt 0 ]; do
case "$1" in
--repo) REPO_HINT="${2:-}"; shift 2 ;;
*) ARGS+=("$1"); shift ;;
esac
done
set -- "${ARGS[@]+"${ARGS[@]}"}"
CMD="${1:-}"
[ -n "$CMD" ] || die "no command. Try: new | path | list | rm | gc"
shift || true
# ---- mechanical derivation -------------------------------------------------
# The FIRST entry of `git worktree list --porcelain` is always the main
# worktree, regardless of which worktree we are standing in. Deriving from cwd
# would nest worktrees inside worktrees.
resolve_repo() {
local start="${REPO_HINT:-$PWD}"
git -C "$start" rev-parse --git-dir >/dev/null 2>&1 \
|| die "not inside a git repository: $start"
# Take the first entry WITHOUT closing the pipe early. `awk ... exit` on the
# first match closes the read end while git is still writing, git takes SIGPIPE,
# and under `set -euo pipefail` the command substitution returns 141 and this
# function aborts SILENTLY — no message, no worktree, and `new` exits 141 while
# printing nothing at all.
#
# Whether it happens depends on how much git still had to write when awk left,
# so the failure is a function of REPO SIZE: fine on a repo with three
# worktrees, reliably broken on one with seventy. That is backwards — the repos
# this helper exists to serve are exactly the ones that accumulated worktrees,
# and it silently did nothing on those while working everywhere it was tried.
# Measured on a repo with 73 worktrees (10 KB of porcelain): rc=141, no output.
#
# The file's own comment block below already names this class for `head -200`
# and removed that cap for the same reason. The `exit` here is the same defect
# in the same file, so the rule is now uniform: nothing in this script closes a
# git pipe early. Dropping `exit` costs one pass over a few KB.
MAIN_WT="$(git -C "$start" worktree list --porcelain | awk '/^worktree /&&!seen{print substr($0,10); seen=1}')"
[ -n "$MAIN_WT" ] || die "could not resolve the main worktree"
REPO_NAME="$(basename -- "$MAIN_WT")"
REPO_PARENT="$(dirname -- "$MAIN_WT")"
WT_ROOT="$REPO_PARENT/$REPO_NAME-worktrees"
}
slugify() { printf '%s' "$1" | tr '/' '-'; }
derive_path() {
local branch="$1"
[ -n "$branch" ] || die "branch name required"
printf '%s/%s' "$WT_ROOT" "$(slugify "$branch")"
}
# A worktree root under $HOME defeats the entire point: wrong filesystem, and
# $HOME is for configuration and state, not work products. Refuse rather than
# silently produce the layout we are trying to eliminate.
assert_not_home() {
local p="$1" home_real repo_real
home_real="$(cd "$HOME" && pwd -P)"
repo_real="$(cd "$(dirname -- "$p")" 2>/dev/null && pwd -P || dirname -- "$p")"
case "$repo_real/" in
"$home_real"/*)
die "refusing: derived path is under \$HOME ($p).
The repo itself lives under \$HOME, so its worktrees would too. Move the repo
to a work filesystem (e.g. /src/$REPO_NAME) and re-run. \$HOME holds
configuration, credentials, state and caches — not checkouts." ;;
esac
}
# ---- work-loss evidence ----------------------------------------------------
# Two independent questions, both answered from git, neither from size or age:
# dirty — anything uncommitted in the tree
# unpushed — commits reachable from HEAD that no remote ref contains
# precious — IGNORED files git will not mention and will not miss
#
# The third question is not obvious and was missed on the first pass. An
# independent reviewer demonstrated it in four commands: a pushed, clean
# worktree whose .gitignore covers `*.secret`, holding one `local.secret`.
# `git status --porcelain` is empty, `rev-list --count HEAD --not --remotes` is
# 0 — the evidence reads SAFE — and `git worktree remove` deletes the file. The
# same shape covers `.env`, credentials, scratch notes, downloaded fixtures:
# precisely the files that are ignored BECAUSE they must not be committed, which
# is also why nothing else is holding a copy.
#
# So ignored files count as work unless they are the well-known regenerable
# kind. Getting that set wrong is asymmetric: an over-broad list preserves a
# worktree that could have been reclaimed (cheap, visible, fixable by --force),
# an over-narrow one deletes the only copy of a secret (silent, permanent).
# The list stays short and conservative for that reason.
DISPOSABLE_RE='(^|/)(node_modules|\.venv|venv|__pycache__|\.mypy_cache|\.pytest_cache|\.ruff_cache|\.turbo|\.cache|\.parcel-cache|\.gradle|dist|build|out|target|coverage|\.next|\.nuxt|\.svelte-kit)(/|$)|\.(pyc|pyo|o|class)$'
# These three run under `set -euo pipefail` inside command substitution, which
# makes any nonzero exit ANYWHERE in the pipeline abort the calling function
# silently. Two ways that bites, one of which shipped:
#
# * `grep -v` exits 1 when it filters everything out. A worktree whose only
# ignored entry is `node_modules/` is exactly the SAFE case, and it made
# `rm` exit 1 with no message and no removal — found by review.
# * `head -200` closes the pipe, SIGPIPEs the producer, and turns a worktree
# with 201 dirty files into the same silent abort. Not reported; it is the
# same defect one step upstream, so the cap is gone. Counting is cheap;
# the cap only ever protected output that is now never printed.
#
# Every one of them therefore ends in a total, and every stage that can
# legitimately exit nonzero says so explicitly.
wt_dirty() {
local out
out="$(git -C "$1" status --porcelain 2>/dev/null || true)"
if [ -n "$out" ]; then printf '%s\n' "$out" | wc -l; else printf '0'; fi
}
wt_unpushed() { git -C "$1" rev-list --count HEAD --not --remotes 2>/dev/null || printf '?'; }
# Default --ignored (not =matching) so a 40k-file node_modules collapses to one
# directory entry instead of being enumerated and then discarded.
wt_precious() {
local ignored
ignored="$(git -C "$1" status --porcelain --ignored 2>/dev/null \
| awk '/^!! /{print substr($0,4)}' || true)"
[ -n "$ignored" ] || { printf '0'; return 0; }
printf '%s\n' "$ignored" | grep -Ecv "$DISPOSABLE_RE" || true
}
wt_state() {
local wt="$1" d u p
d="$(wt_dirty "$wt")"; u="$(wt_unpushed "$wt")"; p="$(wt_precious "$wt")"
if [ "$d" -eq 0 ] && [ "$u" = "0" ] && [ "$p" -eq 0 ]; then
printf 'SAFE\tclean; 0 unpushed; no ignored files worth keeping'
else
printf 'PRESERVE\t%s uncommitted; %s unpushed; %s ignored-but-not-disposable' "$d" "$u" "$p"
fi
}
# ---- commands --------------------------------------------------------------
cmd_path() { resolve_repo; derive_path "${1:-}"; echo; }
cmd_new() {
local branch="${1:-}" base=""
shift || true
while [ $# -gt 0 ]; do
case "$1" in --from) base="${2:-}"; shift 2 ;; *) die "unknown flag: $1" ;; esac
done
[ -n "$branch" ] || die "usage: mosaic-worktree.sh new <branch> [--from <base>]"
resolve_repo
local path; path="$(derive_path "$branch")"
assert_not_home "$path"
if [ -e "$path" ]; then
echo "exists: $path"
echo "(already checked out — reuse it, or 'rm' it first)"
return 0
fi
mkdir -p "$WT_ROOT"
# Existing branch -> check it out. New branch -> create from base (default:
# the remote's default branch if resolvable, else current HEAD).
if git -C "$MAIN_WT" show-ref --verify --quiet "refs/heads/$branch" \
|| git -C "$MAIN_WT" show-ref --verify --quiet "refs/remotes/origin/$branch"; then
git -C "$MAIN_WT" worktree add "$path" "$branch"
else
if [ -z "$base" ]; then
base="$(git -C "$MAIN_WT" symbolic-ref --quiet --short refs/remotes/origin/HEAD 2>/dev/null || true)"
[ -n "$base" ] || base="HEAD"
fi
git -C "$MAIN_WT" worktree add -b "$branch" "$path" "$base"
fi
cat <<EOF
worktree: $path
branch: $branch
Removal is part of this task, not a later chore. When the work is pushed:
mosaic-worktree.sh rm $branch
EOF
}
cmd_list() {
resolve_repo
printf 'repo: %s\nroot: %s\n\n' "$MAIN_WT" "$WT_ROOT"
git -C "$MAIN_WT" worktree list --porcelain \
| awk '/^worktree /{print substr($0,10)}' \
| while read -r wt; do
[ "$wt" = "$MAIN_WT" ] && { printf '%-10s %s (main)\n' "-" "$wt"; continue; }
printf '%-10s %s\t%s\n' "$(wt_state "$wt" | cut -f1)" "$wt" "$(wt_state "$wt" | cut -f2)"
done
}
cmd_rm() {
local branch="${1:-}" force=0
shift || true
while [ $# -gt 0 ]; do
case "$1" in --force) force=1; shift ;; *) die "unknown flag: $1" ;; esac
done
[ -n "$branch" ] || die "usage: mosaic-worktree.sh rm <branch> [--force]"
resolve_repo
local path; path="$(derive_path "$branch")"
[ -d "$path" ] || die "no worktree at $path"
local d u p
d="$(wt_dirty "$path")"; u="$(wt_unpushed "$path")"; p="$(wt_precious "$path")"
if [ "$force" -eq 0 ] && { [ "$d" -ne 0 ] || [ "$u" != "0" ] || [ "$p" -ne 0 ]; }; then
die "refusing to remove $path
uncommitted files: $d
unpushed commits: $u
ignored, not disposable: $p
Commit and push first — that is the contract. Ignored files are counted because
git will neither report them nor miss them: a .env or a *.secret is ignored
precisely so it is never committed, which is also why nothing else holds a copy.
List them with: git -C $path status --porcelain --ignored | grep '^!!'
If this work is genuinely disposable, re-run with --force."
fi
# NB: ${force:+--force} would expand for force=0 too ("0" is non-empty).
if [ "$force" -eq 1 ]; then
git -C "$MAIN_WT" worktree remove --force "$path"
else
git -C "$MAIN_WT" worktree remove "$path"
fi
git -C "$MAIN_WT" worktree prune
echo "removed: $path"
rmdir "$WT_ROOT" 2>/dev/null || true
}
cmd_gc() {
local apply=0
[ "${1:-}" = "--apply" ] && apply=1
resolve_repo
git -C "$MAIN_WT" worktree prune
git -C "$MAIN_WT" worktree list --porcelain \
| awk '/^worktree /{print substr($0,10)}' \
| while read -r wt; do
[ "$wt" = "$MAIN_WT" ] && continue
local_state="$(wt_state "$wt")"
case "$local_state" in
SAFE*)
if [ "$apply" -eq 1 ]; then
git -C "$MAIN_WT" worktree remove "$wt" && echo "removed: $wt"
else
echo "reclaimable (clean + fully pushed): $wt"
fi ;;
*) echo "preserved: $wt [$(printf '%s' "$local_state" | cut -f2)]" ;;
esac
done
git -C "$MAIN_WT" worktree prune
[ "$apply" -eq 1 ] || echo $'\n(report only — re-run with --apply to remove the reclaimable ones)'
}
case "$CMD" in
new) cmd_new "$@" ;;
path) cmd_path "$@" ;;
list) cmd_list "$@" ;;
rm) cmd_rm "$@" ;;
gc) cmd_gc "$@" ;;
-h|--help|help) sed -n '2,40p' "$0" | sed 's/^# \{0,1\}//' ;;
*) die "unknown command: $CMD (new | path | list | rm | gc)" ;;
esac
@@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ cp "$TARGET" "$BAK"
export MOSAIC_TEST_WORK_DIR="$WORK/.work"
# --- where the prose lives: usage() { ... EOF ---------------------------------
PROSE_LO="$(grep -n '^usage() {' "$BAK" | head -1 | cut -d: -f1)"
PROSE_LO="$(grep -n -m1 '^usage() {' "$BAK" | cut -d: -f1)"
PROSE_HI="$(awk -v lo="$PROSE_LO" 'NR > lo && /^EOF$/ { print NR; exit }' "$BAK")"
if [[ -z "$PROSE_LO" || -z "$PROSE_HI" ]]; then
echo "!! cannot locate the usage() heredoc -- the prose guard would be inert; refusing" >&2
@@ -243,15 +243,35 @@ from urllib.parse import urlparse
def _origin_and_path(url):
# Normalize a URL to (scheme, host, effective-port) + comment path. The port
# defaults to the scheme's default (80 http / 443 otherwise) so an implicit
# port and its explicit default form compare equal.
# Normalize a URL to (scheme-class, host, distinguishing-port) + comment path.
#
# #991: http and https collapse into ONE scheme class ("web"). A Gitea whose
# ROOT_URL is configured http:// returns http:// object URLs even when every
# client reaches it over https://, so a scheme-strict comparison rejects the
# provider's own correct answer about a comment that landed — a deterministic
# false negative on EVERY review comment posted against such a deployment.
# That matters more here than anywhere else: on a host where no seat can
# create a review OBJECT, the comment-form review record this path produces
# is the only gate-16 evidence available, and this check refuses all of it.
# The scheme is also not what the check defends: the forgeries it exists to
# catch (look-alike host, decoy path prefix, wrong owner/repo/kind/number)
# all vary the HOST or the PATH, both of which stay strict below. Any OTHER
# scheme (file:, ftp:, javascript:) remains distinguishing and is rejected.
#
# Port: an implicit port and its own scheme's default compare equal, so
# http://h == https://h. An EXPLICIT non-default port still distinguishes,
# because a different port is a different service on the same host.
parsed = urlparse(url or "")
scheme = (parsed.scheme or "").lower()
host = (parsed.hostname or "").lower()
default_port = 80 if scheme == "http" else 443
port = parsed.port if parsed.port is not None else default_port
return (scheme, host, port), parsed.path.rstrip("/")
if scheme in ("http", "https"):
scheme_class = "web"
default_port = 80 if scheme == "http" else 443
port = None if parsed.port in (None, default_port) else parsed.port
else:
scheme_class = scheme
port = parsed.port
return (scheme_class, host, port), parsed.path.rstrip("/")
try:
@@ -7,14 +7,40 @@ SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
WORK_DIR="${MOSAIC_TEST_WORK_DIR:-$PWD/.mosaic-test-work/gitea-login-resolution}"
REPO_DIR="$WORK_DIR/repo"
BIN_DIR="$WORK_DIR/bin"
HOME_DIR="$WORK_DIR/home"
LOG_FILE="$WORK_DIR/calls.log"
CREDENTIALS_FILE="$WORK_DIR/credentials.json"
rm -rf "$WORK_DIR"
mkdir -p "$REPO_DIR" "$BIN_DIR"
mkdir -p "$REPO_DIR" "$BIN_DIR" "$HOME_DIR"
git -C "$REPO_DIR" init -q
git -C "$REPO_DIR" remote add origin https://git.uscllc.com/USC/uconnect.git
# HERMETICITY (#1007) — TWO mechanisms with DIFFERENT jobs; do not conflate them.
#
# OPERATIVE: the empty repo-local `mosaic.gitIdentity` below. get_gitea_token()
# step 0 resolves a per-agent identity from `git config --get mosaic.gitIdentity`,
# which on a provisioned agent seat is set GLOBALLY and so leaks into this fresh
# repo. It then reads a REAL per-slot token from $HOME and returns it WITHOUT ever
# consulting MOSAIC_CREDENTIALS_FILE, so the fixture credentials below are silently
# ignored. This suite is the one where the consequence is not subtle: it FAILS
# outright on a provisioned seat (rc=1 bare, rc=0 with $HOME sandboxed, one
# variable changed) and passes everywhere else, including CI, which has no
# per-agent token to leak.
#
# CONTAINMENT: the sandboxed HOME in the four run helpers below. It only has to
# bound a failure that the pin should already have prevented.
#
# NOTE FOR ANYONE AUDITING THIS SUITE: the sandboxed HOME is containment, NOT an
# assay. Running a suite under a decoy HOME to test for this defect REMOVES the
# trigger — ~/.gitconfig is where the global identity lives, so step 0 is skipped
# by construction and every suite reads clean however vulnerable it is. To measure,
# REPLICATE a seat (a decoy HOME whose .gitconfig sets mosaic.gitIdentity, with no
# per-slot token) so step 0 reaches its fail-loud branch.
#
# Note the env-var route does NOT work: detect-platform.sh reads
# "${MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY:-}", and `:-` treats set-but-empty identically to unset.
git -C "$REPO_DIR" config mosaic.gitIdentity ""
cat > "$CREDENTIALS_FILE" <<'JSON'
{
@@ -86,6 +112,7 @@ run_in_repo() {
(
cd "$REPO_DIR"
PATH="$BIN_DIR:$PATH" \
HOME="$HOME_DIR" \
MOSAIC_CREDENTIALS_FILE="$CREDENTIALS_FILE" \
MOSAIC_TEST_LOG="$LOG_FILE" \
"$@"
@@ -283,6 +310,7 @@ run_in_repo2() {
(
cd "$REPO_DIR"
PATH="$BIN_DIR2:$PATH" \
HOME="$HOME_DIR" \
MOSAIC_CREDENTIALS_FILE="$CREDENTIALS_FILE" \
MOSAIC_TEST_LOG="$LOG_FILE" \
"$@"
@@ -343,7 +371,7 @@ write_fixture() { printf '%s' "$1" > "$FIXTURE_XDG/tea/config.yml"; }
token_fallback() {
(
cd "$REPO_DIR"
XDG_CONFIG_HOME="$FIXTURE_XDG" PYTHONPATH="$NOYAML_DIR" bash -c '
HOME="$HOME_DIR" XDG_CONFIG_HOME="$FIXTURE_XDG" PYTHONPATH="$NOYAML_DIR" bash -c '
source "'"$SCRIPT_DIR"'/detect-platform.sh"
get_gitea_token_for_login "$1" "$2"
' _ "$1" "$2"
@@ -354,7 +382,7 @@ token_fallback() {
token_pyyaml() {
(
cd "$REPO_DIR"
XDG_CONFIG_HOME="$FIXTURE_XDG" bash -c '
HOME="$HOME_DIR" XDG_CONFIG_HOME="$FIXTURE_XDG" bash -c '
source "'"$SCRIPT_DIR"'/detect-platform.sh"
get_gitea_token_for_login "$1" "$2"
' _ "$1" "$2"
@@ -61,15 +61,54 @@ STATE_FILE="$WORK_DIR/comments.json"
# A dedicated scratch dir the wrapper is pointed at via TMPDIR, so the leak
# check can assert every POST/GET body + metadata temp file is cleaned up.
TMP_SCRATCH="$WORK_DIR/scratch"
HOME_DIR="$WORK_DIR/home"
cleanup() {
rm -rf "$WORK_DIR"
}
trap cleanup EXIT
mkdir -p "$REPO_DIR" "$BIN_DIR" "$XDG_DIR" "$TMP_SCRATCH"
mkdir -p "$REPO_DIR" "$BIN_DIR" "$XDG_DIR" "$TMP_SCRATCH" "$HOME_DIR"
git -C "$REPO_DIR" init -q
git -C "$REPO_DIR" remote add origin https://git.mosaicstack.dev/mosaicstack/stack.git
# HERMETICITY (#1007) — TWO mechanisms with DIFFERENT jobs; do not conflate them.
#
# OPERATIVE: the empty repo-local `mosaic.gitIdentity` below. get_gitea_token()
# step 0 resolves a per-agent identity from `git config --get mosaic.gitIdentity`,
# which on a provisioned agent seat is set GLOBALLY and so leaks into this fresh
# repo. It then reads a REAL per-slot token from $HOME and returns it WITHOUT ever
# consulting MOSAIC_CREDENTIALS_FILE, so the fixture credential below is silently
# ignored. The stub curl then rejects the unrecognised bearer, and this suite
# fails at its FIRST case with `Gitea authenticated-identity read failed with
# HTTP 401`. An empty repo-local value shadows the global one and reads back
# empty at rc=0. Measured: without this pin the suite is RED on every seat.
#
# CONTAINMENT: the sandboxed HOME in run_comment(). It only has to bound a
# failure that the pin should already have prevented.
#
# THIS SUITE WAS THE HARDEST OF THE FIVE TO SEE, and the reason is worth stating
# because it generalises: run_comment() sends the wrapper's stdout AND stderr to
# $OUTPUT_FILE, and the EXIT trap above deletes $WORK_DIR. So the 401 — the only
# thing that says what went wrong — exists only inside a directory that is gone
# by the time anyone looks. The suite exits 1 with ZERO bytes on stdout and
# stderr. A suite that discards or deletes its own evidence turns any post-hoc
# assay into a non-measurement: "nothing found" there means "no surviving
# trace", never "clean". It was found by intercepting the identity read at its
# SOURCE (a PATH shim over `git` logging every `mosaic.gitIdentity` read to a
# file outside $WORK_DIR), which is deletion-proof by construction, rather than
# by grepping for the symptom.
#
# NOTE FOR ANYONE AUDITING THIS SUITE: the sandboxed HOME is containment, NOT an
# assay. Running a suite under a decoy HOME to test for this defect REMOVES the
# trigger — ~/.gitconfig is where the global identity lives, so step 0 is skipped
# by construction and every suite reads clean however vulnerable it is. To
# measure, REPLICATE a seat (a decoy HOME whose .gitconfig sets
# mosaic.gitIdentity, with no per-slot token) so step 0 reaches its fail-loud
# branch — or intercept the read as described above.
#
# Note the env-var route does NOT work: detect-platform.sh reads
# "${MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY:-}", and `:-` treats set-but-empty identically to unset.
git -C "$REPO_DIR" config mosaic.gitIdentity ""
ISSUE_NUMBER=7
REPO_SLUG="mosaicstack/stack"
@@ -280,7 +319,10 @@ print("201")
print(json.dumps(record))
PY
)
write_response "$(printf '%s' "$result" | head -n1)" "$(printf '%s' "$result" | tail -n +2)"
response_status="${result%%$'\n'*}"
response_body=""
[[ "$result" == *$'\n'* ]] && response_body="${result#*$'\n'}"
write_response "$response_status" "$response_body"
elif [[ "$method" == "GET" && "$path" == "$ISSUE_COMMENT_API_BASE"/issues/comments/* ]]; then
result=$(ISSUE_COMMENT_GET_ID="${path##*/}" python3 - <<'PY'
import json
@@ -299,7 +341,10 @@ else:
print(json.dumps(match))
PY
)
write_response "$(printf '%s' "$result" | head -n1)" "$(printf '%s' "$result" | tail -n +2)"
response_status="${result%%$'\n'*}"
response_body=""
[[ "$result" == *$'\n'* ]] && response_body="${result#*$'\n'}"
write_response "$response_status" "$response_body"
else
echo "Unexpected curl request: $method $url" >&2
exit 97
@@ -366,6 +411,7 @@ run_comment() {
cd "$REPO_DIR"
PATH="$BIN_DIR:$PATH" \
TMPDIR="$TMP_SCRATCH" \
HOME="$HOME_DIR" \
XDG_CONFIG_HOME="$XDG_DIR" \
MOSAIC_CREDENTIALS_FILE="$CREDENTIALS_FILE" \
ISSUE_COMMENT_TEA_LOG="$TEA_LOG" \
@@ -7,13 +7,38 @@ SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
WORK_DIR="${MOSAIC_TEST_WORK_DIR:-$PWD/.mosaic-test-work/issue-create-interactive-auth}"
REPO_DIR="$WORK_DIR/repo"
BIN_DIR="$WORK_DIR/bin"
HOME_DIR="$WORK_DIR/home"
LOG_FILE="$WORK_DIR/calls.log"
CREDENTIALS_FILE="$WORK_DIR/credentials.json"
rm -rf "$WORK_DIR"
mkdir -p "$REPO_DIR" "$BIN_DIR"
mkdir -p "$REPO_DIR" "$BIN_DIR" "$HOME_DIR"
git -C "$REPO_DIR" init -q
git -C "$REPO_DIR" remote add origin https://git.mosaicstack.dev/mosaicstack/stack.git
# HERMETICITY (#1007) — TWO mechanisms with DIFFERENT jobs; do not conflate them.
#
# OPERATIVE: the empty repo-local `mosaic.gitIdentity` below. get_gitea_token()
# step 0 resolves a per-agent identity from `git config --get mosaic.gitIdentity`,
# which on a provisioned agent seat is set GLOBALLY and so leaks into this fresh
# repo. It then reads a REAL per-slot token from $HOME and returns it WITHOUT ever
# consulting MOSAIC_CREDENTIALS_FILE, so the fixture credential below is silently
# ignored and the suite runs against a production credential. An empty repo-local
# value shadows the global one and reads back empty at rc=0. Measured: this suite
# resolves a per-slot token without it.
#
# CONTAINMENT: the sandboxed HOME in run_wrapper(). It only has to bound a failure
# that the pin should already have prevented.
#
# NOTE FOR ANYONE AUDITING THIS SUITE: the sandboxed HOME is containment, NOT an
# assay. Running a suite under a decoy HOME to test for this defect REMOVES the
# trigger — ~/.gitconfig is where the global identity lives, so step 0 is skipped
# by construction and every suite reads clean however vulnerable it is. To measure,
# REPLICATE a seat (a decoy HOME whose .gitconfig sets mosaic.gitIdentity, with no
# per-slot token) so step 0 reaches its fail-loud branch.
#
# Note the env-var route does NOT work: detect-platform.sh reads
# "${MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY:-}", and `:-` treats set-but-empty identically to unset.
git -C "$REPO_DIR" config mosaic.gitIdentity ""
cat > "$CREDENTIALS_FILE" <<'JSON'
{"gitea":{"mosaicstack":{"url":"https://git.mosaicstack.dev","token":"test-token"}}}
@@ -50,6 +75,7 @@ run_wrapper() {
(
cd "$REPO_DIR"
PATH="$BIN_DIR:$PATH" \
HOME="$HOME_DIR" \
MOSAIC_CREDENTIALS_FILE="$CREDENTIALS_FILE" \
MOSAIC_TEST_LOG="$LOG_FILE" \
"$@"
@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ section_nums() { # $1 = output $2 = header-prefix
}
fail() { echo "FAIL: $1" >&2; exit 1; }
contains() { printf '%s\n' "$1" | grep -qx "$2"; }
contains() { grep -qx "$2" <<<"$1"; }
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Fixed (current) script behavior
@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
#!/usr/bin/env bash
# test-mosaic-worktree-large-repo.sh — the helper must work on the repos it exists for.
#
# resolve_repo() took the first line of `git worktree list --porcelain` with
# `awk '/^worktree /{print substr($0,10); exit}'`. The `exit` closes the read end
# of the pipe while git is still writing, git takes SIGPIPE, and under
# `set -euo pipefail` the command substitution returns 141 — so the assignment
# fails, `set -e` aborts the function, and the script dies printing NOTHING. No
# message, no path, no worktree, exit 141.
#
# What makes it worth a dedicated test rather than a fixture line is WHEN it
# fires. If git finishes writing before awk leaves, there is no SIGPIPE and
# everything works. So the failure is a function of how much porcelain the repo
# produces: invisible on a three-worktree repo, reliable on a seventy-worktree
# one. It was measured on a repo with 73 worktrees (10 KB of porcelain) — rc=141,
# no output — and it had passed every hand-check before that, on small repos.
#
# A test that ran `git worktree list` against whatever repo it happens to sit in
# would inherit that same size dependence and would have PASSED on the tree that
# was broken. So git is stubbed on PATH and made to emit a large porcelain
# stream, which turns "depends on the repo you are standing in" into "always".
#
# Exit: 0 = the helper resolved the repo · 1 = it did not
set -uo pipefail
HERE="$(cd -- "$(dirname -- "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
TOOL="${1:-$HERE/mosaic-worktree.sh}"
[ -x "$TOOL" ] || { printf 'test-mosaic-worktree-large-repo: not executable: %s\n' "$TOOL" >&2; exit 2; }
TMP="$(mktemp -d)"; trap 'rm -rf "$TMP"' EXIT
mkdir -p "$TMP/bin"
# The stub answers exactly the two calls resolve_repo makes, and answers the
# porcelain one with ~450 KB — comfortably past a 64 KB pipe buffer, so the
# writer is still writing when a reader that quits early goes away. Anything
# else exits non-zero rather than pretending to be git.
cat > "$TMP/bin/git" <<'STUB'
#!/bin/sh
while [ $# -gt 0 ]; do
case "$1" in -C) shift 2 ;; *) break ;; esac
done
case "$*" in
"rev-parse --git-dir")
echo .git; exit 0 ;;
"worktree list --porcelain")
# The first entry is the main worktree. That single line is all the helper
# needs, and it is exactly what it stopped receiving.
printf 'worktree /src/fakerepo\nHEAD %040d\nbranch refs/heads/main\n\n' 0
awk 'BEGIN{ for (i = 0; i < 4000; i++)
printf "worktree /src/fakerepo-worktrees/w%d\nHEAD %040d\nbranch refs/heads/topic-%d\n\n", i, 0, i }'
# NOT `exit 0`. Real git dies of SIGPIPE here and reports 141, and pipefail
# in the caller is what turns that into the silent abort. A stub that exits 0
# regardless hands the caller a clean status and the probe passes on the
# broken tree — which is how this test failed to be a test on its first run.
exit $? ;;
esac
exit 1
STUB
chmod +x "$TMP/bin/git"
fail=0
check() {
local why="$1" want="$2" got="$3"
if [ "$want" = "$got" ]; then
printf 'ok %s\n' "$why"
else
printf 'FAIL %s\n want: %s\n got: %s\n' "$why" "$want" "$got"
fail=1
fi
}
out="$(PATH="$TMP/bin:$PATH" "$TOOL" path feat/workspace-hygiene 2>&1)"
rc=$?
# Both halves are asserted. rc alone would pass if the helper started printing a
# usage error, and output alone would miss a non-zero exit — and the defect's
# signature is precisely a non-zero exit with no output, which only the pair
# distinguishes from every other way this could go wrong.
check 'resolving a repo with a large worktree list exits 0' 0 "$rc"
check 'and derives the path from the main worktree' /src/fakerepo-worktrees/feat-workspace-hygiene "$out"
printf '\n'
if [ "$fail" -eq 0 ]; then
printf 'mosaic-worktree: resolves against a large porcelain stream.\n'
else
cat <<'EOF'
mosaic-worktree could not resolve the repository.
An empty output with a non-zero exit is the SIGPIPE signature: a reader that
quits early (`awk ... exit`, `head -n`) kills the producer, and pipefail turns
that into a silent abort. Nothing in this script may close a git pipe early.
EOF
fi
exit "$fail"
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ WORK_ROOT="${AGENT_WORK_ROOT:-${HOME:-/tmp}/mosaic/agent-work}"
SANDBOX="$WORK_ROOT/pr-merge-empty-uid-test-$$"
MOCK_BIN="$SANDBOX/bin"
REPO_DIR="$SANDBOX/repo"
HOME_DIR="$SANDBOX/home"
LOG_FILE="$SANDBOX/mock.log"
cleanup() {
@@ -15,7 +16,7 @@ cleanup() {
}
trap cleanup EXIT
mkdir -p "$MOCK_BIN" "$REPO_DIR"
mkdir -p "$MOCK_BIN" "$REPO_DIR" "$HOME_DIR"
: > "$LOG_FILE"
cat > "$MOCK_BIN/tea" <<'EOF'
@@ -109,7 +110,48 @@ chmod +x "$MOCK_BIN/curl"
cd "$REPO_DIR"
git init -q
git remote add origin https://git.mosaicstack.dev/mosaicstack/stack.git
# HERMETICITY (#1007) — TWO mechanisms with DIFFERENT jobs; do not conflate them.
#
# OPERATIVE: the empty repo-local `mosaic.gitIdentity` below. get_gitea_token()
# step 0 resolves a per-agent identity from `git config --get mosaic.gitIdentity`,
# which on a provisioned agent seat is set GLOBALLY and so leaks into this fresh
# repo. Step 0 runs BEFORE the credential loader AND before the GITEA_TOKEN env
# check, so the `GITEA_TOKEN=redacted-test-token` exported below is silently
# overridden and a REAL per-slot token from $HOME is what flows through the
# wrapper. Measured on a provisioned seat before this pin: all 5 mock-curl calls
# carried the real per-slot token in argv and the fixture token was never used at
# ALL. Three consequences specific to this suite:
# 1. pr-merge.sh passes the token as `-H "Authorization: token $token"` and the
# mock curl logs full argv, so the real credential is written to $LOG_FILE
# on disk — transiently: the suite truncates that file between phases and
# the EXIT trap removes $SANDBOX, so it leaves NO post-hoc trace. That is
# why this suite was the hardest of the three to detect; observing it needs
# an instrument that captures argv while the run is live.
# 2. Every failure path dumps $OUTPUT/$LOG_FILE to stderr through
# `sed 's/redacted-test-token/***REDACTED***/g'` — a redaction pattern that
# is the literal fixture string and therefore CANNOT match the token
# actually in use.
# 3. The leak assertion at "Token leaked to pr-merge.sh output" greps for that
# same fixture string, so on a provisioned seat it passes vacuously: it is
# searching for a value the run never used.
# An empty repo-local value shadows the global one and reads back empty at rc=0.
#
# CONTAINMENT: the sandboxed HOME exported below. It only has to bound a failure
# that the pin should already have prevented.
#
# NOTE FOR ANYONE AUDITING THIS SUITE: the sandboxed HOME is containment, NOT an
# assay. Running a suite under a decoy HOME to test for this defect REMOVES the
# trigger — ~/.gitconfig is where the global identity lives, so step 0 is skipped
# by construction and every suite reads clean however vulnerable it is. To measure,
# REPLICATE a seat (a decoy HOME whose .gitconfig sets mosaic.gitIdentity, with no
# per-slot token) so step 0 reaches its fail-loud branch.
#
# Note the env-var route does NOT work: detect-platform.sh reads
# "${MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY:-}", and `:-` treats set-but-empty identically to unset.
git -C "$REPO_DIR" config mosaic.gitIdentity ""
# $SANDBOX/$HOME_DIR were derived from the real $HOME above, before this export.
export HOME="$HOME_DIR"
export PATH="$MOCK_BIN:$PATH"
export PR_MERGE_TEST_LOG="$LOG_FILE"
export GITEA_LOGIN="git.mosaicstack.dev"
@@ -8,12 +8,68 @@ WORK_DIR="${MOSAIC_TEST_WORK_DIR:-$PWD/.mosaic-test-work/pr-metadata-gitea}"
REPO_DIR="$WORK_DIR/repo"
FIXTURE_DIR="$WORK_DIR/fixtures"
STUB_DIR="$WORK_DIR/stubs"
HOME_DIR="$WORK_DIR/home"
CREDENTIALS_FILE="$WORK_DIR/credentials.json"
rm -rf "$WORK_DIR"
mkdir -p "$REPO_DIR" "$FIXTURE_DIR" "$STUB_DIR"
mkdir -p "$REPO_DIR" "$FIXTURE_DIR" "$STUB_DIR" "$HOME_DIR"
git -C "$REPO_DIR" init -q
git -C "$REPO_DIR" remote add origin https://git.uscllc.com/USC/uconnect.git
# HERMETICITY (#1007) — TWO mechanisms with DIFFERENT jobs; do not conflate them.
#
# OPERATIVE: the empty repo-local `mosaic.gitIdentity` below. get_gitea_token()
# step 0 resolves a per-agent identity from `git config --get mosaic.gitIdentity`,
# which on a provisioned agent seat is set GLOBALLY and so leaks into this fresh
# repo. Step 0 runs BEFORE the credential loader AND before the GITEA_TOKEN env
# check, so the `GITEA_TOKEN="stub-token"` set in the run helpers below is
# silently overridden and a REAL per-slot token from $HOME is what reaches curl.
# Measured on a provisioned seat before this pin: both stub-curl calls carried
# the real token in argv. An empty repo-local value shadows the global one and
# reads back empty at rc=0.
#
# CONTAINMENT: the sandboxed HOME in the three run helpers below. It only has to
# bound a failure that the pin should already have prevented.
#
# NOTE FOR ANYONE AUDITING THIS SUITE: the sandboxed HOME is containment, NOT an
# assay. Running a suite under a decoy HOME to test for this defect REMOVES the
# trigger — ~/.gitconfig is where the global identity lives, so step 0 is skipped
# by construction and every suite reads clean however vulnerable it is. To measure,
# REPLICATE a seat (a decoy HOME whose .gitconfig sets mosaic.gitIdentity, with no
# per-slot token) so step 0 reaches its fail-loud branch. See
# test-gitea-token-identity.sh for the stronger `env -i HOME=…` form used where a
# suite's whole subject IS identity resolution.
#
# Note the env-var route does NOT work: detect-platform.sh reads
# "${MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY:-}", and `:-` treats set-but-empty identically to unset.
git -C "$REPO_DIR" config mosaic.gitIdentity ""
# The pin above removes step 0, but this suite has a SECOND, independent
# dependency on operator state, and closing only the first would leave the suite
# red on any hermetic environment. The `GITEA_TOKEN="stub-token"` /
# `GITEA_URL="https://git.example.test"` pair the run helpers set is INERT: step 2
# of get_gitea_token accepts GITEA_TOKEN only when GITEA_URL matches the remote
# host, and this repo's origin is git.uscllc.com, so that pair can never satisfy
# it. Before this fixture the only credential that could reach the authenticated
# curl branch was a REAL one — from step 0 on an agent seat, or from step 1
# reading the operator's own ~/.config/mosaic/credentials.json. That is why the
# "curl success path" case passed: not because the stub credential worked, but
# because a production credential was available.
#
# A fixture is used rather than relying on the sandboxed HOME making step 1 find
# nothing: a test that passes because production configuration is ABSENT fails
# the moment it is present. Step 1 now resolves deterministically to a value that
# is a fixture on every machine.
cat > "$CREDENTIALS_FILE" <<'JSON'
{
"gitea": {
"usc": {
"url": "https://git.uscllc.com",
"token": "stub-token"
}
}
}
JSON
cat > "$FIXTURE_DIR/gitea-standard.json" <<'JSON'
{
@@ -131,6 +187,8 @@ run_curl_success_case() {
set +e
output=$(cd "$REPO_DIR" && \
PATH="$STUB_DIR:$PATH" \
HOME="$HOME_DIR" \
MOSAIC_CREDENTIALS_FILE="$CREDENTIALS_FILE" \
TMPDIR="$tmpdir" \
GITEA_TOKEN="stub-token" \
GITEA_URL="https://git.example.test" \
@@ -170,6 +228,8 @@ run_curl_early_exit_cleanup_case() {
set +e
output=$(cd "$REPO_DIR" && \
PATH="$STUB_DIR:$PATH" \
HOME="$HOME_DIR" \
MOSAIC_CREDENTIALS_FILE="$CREDENTIALS_FILE" \
TMPDIR="$tmpdir" \
GITEA_TOKEN="stub-token" \
GITEA_URL="https://git.example.test" \
@@ -204,7 +264,8 @@ run_curl_early_exit_cleanup_case() {
run_case() {
local fixture="$1" expected_number="$2" expected_head="$3"
local output
output=$(cd "$REPO_DIR" && MOSAIC_GITEA_PR_METADATA_RAW_FILE="$fixture" "$SCRIPT_DIR/pr-metadata.sh" -n "$expected_number")
output=$(cd "$REPO_DIR" && HOME="$HOME_DIR" MOSAIC_CREDENTIALS_FILE="$CREDENTIALS_FILE" \
MOSAIC_GITEA_PR_METADATA_RAW_FILE="$fixture" "$SCRIPT_DIR/pr-metadata.sh" -n "$expected_number")
PR_METADATA_OUTPUT="$output" python3 - "$expected_number" "$expected_head" <<'PY'
import json
import os
@@ -225,7 +225,10 @@ write_response() {
emit() {
# Split a two-line "status\n<json body>" python result into the response.
local result="$1"
write_response "$(printf '%s' "$result" | head -n1)" "$(printf '%s' "$result" | tail -n +2)"
response_status="${result%%$'\n'*}"
response_body=""
[[ "$result" == *$'\n'* ]] && response_body="${result#*$'\n'}"
write_response "$response_status" "$response_body"
}
mode="${PR_REVIEW_TEST_MODE:-}"
@@ -436,6 +439,19 @@ elif mode == "comment-url-wrong-repo":
elif mode == "comment-url-suffix-injection":
# Prefix-injected: a bare endswith("/<slug>/pulls/123") test would ACCEPT it.
pr_url = f"{_origin}/deceptive{_slug}/pulls/123"
elif mode == "comment-url-wrong-port":
# #991 bound: an EXPLICIT non-default port is a different service on the same
# host. Relaxing http-vs-https must NOT relax this.
pr_url = f"{_p.scheme}://{_p.hostname}:8443{_slug}/pulls/123"
elif mode == "comment-url-non-web-scheme":
# #991 bound: ONLY http/https collapse; any other scheme stays distinguishing.
pr_url = f"ftp://{_p.netloc}{_slug}/pulls/123"
elif mode == "comment-url-scheme-downgrade":
# #991, and the only URL mode here that must be ACCEPTED. A Gitea whose
# ROOT_URL is http:// returns http:// object URLs for a repo reached over
# https://. Same host, same path, correct record — a truthful provider
# answer about a comment that landed, not a forgery.
pr_url = f"http://{_p.netloc}{_slug}/pulls/123"
elif mode == "comment-mixed-case-slug":
# #875: EXPECTED_REPO_SLUG is taken verbatim from GITEA_API_BASE and can be
# mixed-case (e.g. "USC/uconnect"), but Gitea canonicalizes the returned
@@ -890,11 +906,16 @@ fi
assert_no_temp_leak "review-body-reuse"
# Cases 12-15 (#865 Blocker 3): a PR comment whose id/author/body are all correct
# but whose provider-returned pull_request_url is forged must FAIL CLOSED.
# Verification pins the URL's ORIGIN (scheme+host+effective-port) and FULL path
# (deployment prefix + exact owner/repo + kind + number); a bare endswith/suffix
# test would wrongly accept the look-alike-host and prefix-injection variants.
for bad_mode in comment-url-wrong-host comment-url-wrong-owner comment-url-wrong-repo comment-url-suffix-injection; do
# but whose provider-returned pull_request_url does not belong to this PR must
# FAIL CLOSED. Verification pins the URL's ORIGIN (scheme-class + host + explicit
# non-default port) and FULL path (deployment prefix + exact owner/repo + kind +
# number); a bare endswith/suffix test would wrongly accept the look-alike-host
# and prefix-injection variants. comment-url-wrong-port and
# comment-url-non-web-scheme (#991) bound the scheme relaxation from the other
# side: collapsing http/https must not also collapse a different port or a
# different scheme family.
for bad_mode in comment-url-wrong-host comment-url-wrong-owner comment-url-wrong-repo \
comment-url-suffix-injection comment-url-wrong-port comment-url-non-web-scheme; do
if run_review "$bad_mode" comment durable-body; then
echo "FAIL: forged comment URL ($bad_mode) was accepted" >&2
cat "$OUTPUT_FILE" >&2
@@ -920,6 +941,19 @@ run_review comment-mixed-case-slug comment durable-body https://git.mosaicstack.
grep -q 'Added and verified comment on Gitea PR #123' "$OUTPUT_FILE"
assert_no_temp_leak "comment-mixed-case-slug"
# Case 15c (#991): the deployment's Gitea ROOT_URL is http:// while every client
# reaches it over https://, so the provider returns an http:// pull_request_url
# for a comment that is otherwise entirely correct. Same class as 15b — a
# legitimate provider response, not a spoof — and a scheme-strict compare
# rejects it on EVERY comment, deterministically. That is not a cosmetic false
# negative here: on a host where no seat can create a review OBJECT, this
# comment-form record is the only gate-16 evidence obtainable, and the wrapper
# refuses all of it while the comment sits durably on the PR. Host, path, owner,
# repo, kind and number stay strict; only http-vs-https is relaxed.
run_review comment-url-scheme-downgrade comment durable-body
grep -q 'Added and verified comment on Gitea PR #123' "$OUTPUT_FILE"
assert_no_temp_leak "comment-url-scheme-downgrade"
# Case 16 (#865 ITEM 1, current-head TOCTOU): the PR head advances between the
# pre-submit head read (which pins the review) and the post-verify re-read. The
# review is genuinely created and verified as pinned to the OLD head, but the
@@ -222,8 +222,8 @@ grep -q 'Unknown action: bogus-action' "$OUTPUT_FILE"
# --- Case 2: -h/--help documents both overrides.
HELP_TEXT="$("$SCRIPT_DIR/pr-review.sh" -h)"
echo "$HELP_TEXT" | grep -q -- '-r, --repo'
echo "$HELP_TEXT" | grep -q -- '-H, --host'
grep -q -- '-r, --repo' <<<"$HELP_TEXT"
grep -q -- '-H, --host' <<<"$HELP_TEXT"
# --- Case 3 (comment): a TRUE no-git-origin dir + -r/-H must not silently die
# and must not fail with "not a git repository or no origin remote" either.
+703
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,703 @@
#!/usr/bin/env bash
# test-wrapper-guard.sh — hermetic behavioural regression for wrapper-guard.sh.
#
# Resolves no credentials, touches no network, and creates no repository: the
# guard reads a hook payload on stdin and answers with an exit code, so the whole
# contract is testable from fixtures.
#
# The fixtures are written to a temp file rather than passed inline, and this is
# not stylistic. The guard inspects the literal text of the Bash command it is
# handed. A test that embeds `git clone ... $HOME` inside its own command line
# trips the guard on the harness instead of on the fixture — which is exactly
# what happened the first time this was checked by hand. Substring matching over
# whole command text is the guard's deliberate fail-closed posture; a test that
# does not account for it silently measures the wrong thing.
#
# Exit: 0 = every fixture behaved as specified · 1 = at least one did not
set -uo pipefail
HERE="$(cd -- "$(dirname -- "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
GUARD="${1:-$HERE/wrapper-guard.sh}"
[ -x "$GUARD" ] || { printf 'test-wrapper-guard: not executable: %s\n' "$GUARD" >&2; exit 2; }
TMP="$(mktemp -d)"; trap 'rm -rf "$TMP"' EXIT
FIXTURES="$TMP/fixtures.tsv"
# Each line: <expected-exit> TAB <hook payload> TAB <what it proves>
# [ TAB <substring the block message must contain> ]
# 0 = allowed, 2 = blocked. The optional fourth field is how the remediation
# itself gets checked; without it a block is only asserted to have happened,
# not to have been useful.
{
printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git clone https://example.invalid/x ~/wt"}}\tcheckout into $HOME is refused\n'
printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git worktree add ~/wt topic"}}\tworktree into $HOME is refused\n'
printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"g\\"it\\" clone https://example.invalid/x $HOME/wt"}}\ta double quote inside git does not hide a checkout\n'
printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"g'"'"'it'"'"' clone https://example.invalid/x $HOME/wt"}}\ta single quote inside git does not hide a checkout\n'
printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"g\\\\it clone https://example.invalid/x $HOME/wt"}}\tan unquoted escape inside git does not hide a checkout\n'
# Path words use the same quote/escape state machine as names, but preserve
# substitutions so HOME remains visible. Quotes do not split the path word.
printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git clone x \\"$HOME\\"/wt"}}\ta closing quote between HOME and slash does not hide the path\n'
printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git clone x ${HOME}/wt"}}\tthe braced HOME spelling is the same home path\n'
printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git clone x \\"${HOME}\\"/wt"}}\tbraced HOME may also end a quoted span before the slash\n'
# Lexically equivalent absolute paths must be compared after shell-known HOME
# expansion and dot-segment normalization, without resolving filesystem links.
printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git clone x /var/../$HOME/wt"}}\tHOME expansion after parent traversal is normalized before comparison\n'
printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git worktree add /var/../${HOME}/wt"}}\tworktree placement also normalizes embedded HOME expansion\n'
printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git clone --separate-git-dir=/var/../$HOME/gd x /src/wt"}}\tseparate Git state cannot hide behind parent traversal\n'
printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git clone x $HOME/../outside-home/wt"}}\ta parent segment that leaves HOME is not over-blocked\n'
# The target may be HOME itself. End-of-command and whitespace terminate the
# token just as a slash does; punctuation that can extend a path does not.
printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git clone x $HOME"}}\tthe unbraced variable may name HOME exactly\n'
printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git clone x \\"$HOME\\""}}\tquotes do not change the exact HOME target\n'
printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git clone x ${HOME}"}}\tthe braced variable may name HOME exactly\n'
printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git clone x ~"}}\ttilde may name HOME exactly\n'
printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git worktree add $HOME topic"}}\twhitespace terminates an exact HOME target before another argument\n'
# Unquoted POSIX metacharacters terminate the target word even without spaces.
printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git clone x $HOME;echo x"}}\tsemicolon terminates an exact HOME target\n'
printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git clone x \\"$HOME\\"&& echo x"}}\tand-if terminates a quoted exact HOME target\n'
printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git clone x ${HOME}| cat"}}\ta pipe terminates a braced exact HOME target\n'
printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git clone x ~&"}}\tbackground operator terminates a tilde HOME target\n'
printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git clone x $HOME</dev/null"}}\tinput redirection terminates the target word\n'
printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git clone x $HOME>out"}}\toutput redirection terminates the target word\n'
printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"( git clone x $HOME)"}}\ta subshell close terminates the exact HOME target\n'
printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git clone x $HOME\\necho x"}}\ta literal newline terminates the target word\n'
printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git clone x $HOME_BACKUP/wt"}}\ta longer HOME-prefixed variable is a different path\n'
printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git clone x $HOMEBREW/wt"}}\tHOMEBREW is not HOME either\n'
printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git clone x $HOME.bak/wt"}}\ta dot continues the path token into a sibling name\n'
printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git clone x $HOME+bak/wt"}}\tplus is ordinary sibling filename content\n'
printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git clone x $HOME@bak/wt"}}\tat-sign is ordinary sibling filename content\n'
printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git clone x $HOME,bak/wt"}}\tcomma is ordinary sibling filename content\n'
printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git clone x $HOME:bak/wt"}}\tcolon is ordinary sibling filename content\n'
printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git clone x $HOME=bak/wt"}}\tequals is ordinary sibling filename content\n'
printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git clone x ${HOME}+bak/wt"}}\tbraced HOME plus suffix is still a sibling\n'
printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git clone x /home/tester+bak/wt"}}\ta literal plus-suffixed home path is a sibling\n'
printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git clone x /home/tester@bak/wt"}}\ta literal at-suffixed home path is a sibling\n'
printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git clone x $HOME+bak/wt;echo x"}}\ta later terminator does not turn a sibling into HOME\n'
printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git clone x $HOME@bak/wt&& echo x"}}\tand-if after a sibling preserves the allow\n'
printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git clone x \\"$HOME;bak/wt\\""}}\ta quoted semicolon is filename content, not a boundary\n'
printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git clone x $HOME\\\\;bak/wt"}}\tan escaped semicolon is filename content, not a boundary\n'
printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git clone x $HOME\\u001b/wt"}}\ta raw internal-marker byte is encoded as filename content\n'
printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git clone x /home/tester.bak/wt"}}\ta literal sibling path is not beneath HOME\n'
printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git clone x /home/testerx/wt"}}\ta longer literal basename is not HOME\n'
printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git clone x ~root/wt"}}\tanother account tilde is not this account HOME\n'
printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git clone x $HOME}/wt"}}\ta closing brace without an opening brace is a literal suffix\n'
printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git clone x ${HOME/wt"}}\tan opening brace without a close is not a HOME expansion\n'
# Quote removal must not create an expansion the shell never performs.
printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git clone x '"'"'$HOME'"'"'/wt"}}\tsingle-quoted HOME is a literal directory name\n'
printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git clone x \\\\$HOME/wt"}}\tan escaped dollar makes HOME literal outside quotes\n'
printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git clone x \\"\\\\$HOME\\"/wt"}}\tan escaped dollar makes HOME literal inside double quotes\n'
printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git clone x \\"~/wt\\""}}\ttilde does not expand inside double quotes\n'
printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git clone x '"'"'~/wt'"'"'"}}\ttilde does not expand inside single quotes\n'
printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git clone x \\\\~/wt"}}\tan escaped tilde is literal too\n'
printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git clone https://example.invalid/x /src/wt"}}\tcheckout onto a work filesystem is fine\n'
# Round ten: placement is decided by the destination and the one clone option
# that creates repository state elsewhere, not by every HOME-valued word in
# the command. Sources, templates, references, and environment are not targets.
printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"NOTE=$HOME git clone https://example.invalid/x /src/wt"}}\tan unrelated assignment carrying HOME is not checkout placement\n'
printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git clone --reference=$HOME https://example.invalid/x /src/wt"}}\ta HOME reference is an object source, not checkout placement\n'
printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"GIT_DIR=$HOME/x git clone https://example.invalid/x /src/wt"}}\tclone does not place its destination from ambient GIT_DIR\n'
printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git clone --template=$HOME/t https://example.invalid/x /src/wt"}}\ta HOME template source is not checkout placement\n'
printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git clone --separate-git-dir=$HOME/gd https://example.invalid/x /src/wt"}}\tseparate-git-dir explicitly places repository state under HOME\n'
printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git clone --separate-git-dir $HOME/gd https://example.invalid/x /src/wt"}}\tthe space-separated placement option is equivalent\n'
printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git worktree add --reason=$HOME/note /src/wt"}}\ta worktree reason is metadata, not its path\n'
printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git clone $HOME/source /src/wt"}}\ta HOME source with an explicit safe destination is not placement\n'
printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git clone --reference $HOME https://example.invalid/x /src/wt"}}\ta space-separated HOME reference remains a source\n'
printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git clone --template $HOME/t https://example.invalid/x /src/wt"}}\ta space-separated HOME template remains a source\n'
printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git clone 2>/dev/null https://example.invalid/x $HOME/wt"}}\ta redirection before clone arguments does not become the destination\n'
printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git clone --reference $HOME https://example.invalid/x $HOME/wt"}}\ta source option does not hide a later HOME destination\n'
# Round eleven: Git accepts boolean options as a rule-generated family,
# including --no-* negations. Each command below was checked with Git itself:
# `git clone <option> /nonexistent-src /nonexistent-dst` reaches the missing
# source instead of reporting an unknown option. The HOME word is the source,
# not the explicit /src destination, so Bash expansion is allowed here.
printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git clone --bare $HOME/source /src/wt"}}\tbare clone keeps its HOME source distinct from the safe destination\n'
printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git clone --mirror $HOME/source /src/wt"}}\tmirror is an accepted flag and does not consume the HOME source\n'
printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git clone --ipv4 $HOME/source /src/wt"}}\tipv4 is an accepted flag and does not consume the HOME source\n'
printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git clone --ipv6 $HOME/source /src/wt"}}\tipv6 is an accepted flag and does not consume the HOME source\n'
printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git clone --no-local $HOME/source /src/wt"}}\tgenerated no-local remains a flag rather than a placement option\n'
printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git clone --no-reject-shallow $HOME/source /src/wt"}}\tgenerated no-reject-shallow remains a flag rather than placement\n'
printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git clone -4 $HOME/source /src/wt"}}\tthe short IPv4 flag leaves the HOME word in source position\n'
printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git clone -6 $HOME/source /src/wt"}}\tthe short IPv6 flag leaves the HOME word in source position\n'
printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git clone --no-bare $HOME/source /src/wt"}}\tan unusual generated negation is accepted without enumeration\n'
printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git clone --no-sparse $HOME/source /src/wt"}}\tgenerated no-sparse is accepted without enumeration\n'
printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git clone --no-dissociate $HOME/source /src/wt"}}\tgenerated no-dissociate is accepted without enumeration\n'
printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git clone --no-shallow-submodules $HOME/source /src/wt"}}\ta long generated negation is accepted without enumeration\n'
printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git clone --no-quiet $HOME/source /src/wt"}}\tgenerated no-quiet is accepted without enumeration\n'
printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git clone --no-progress $HOME/source /src/wt"}}\tgenerated no-progress is accepted without enumeration\n'
printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git clone --no-recurse-submodules $HOME/source /src/wt"}}\tgenerated no-recurse-submodules is accepted without enumeration\n'
# Git also generates accepted long abbreviations and short-option bundles.
# The closed value-taking option grammar must consume their values correctly.
printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git clone --templ $HOME/t $HOME/source /src/wt"}}\tan accepted template abbreviation consumes metadata rather than the source\n'
printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git clone -qj 1 $HOME/source /src/wt"}}\ta short flag bundle ending in jobs consumes its separate value\n'
printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git clone -qb topic $HOME/source /src/wt"}}\ta short flag bundle ending in branch consumes its separate value\n'
printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git clone --separate-git-d=$HOME/gd https://example.invalid/x /src/wt"}}\tan accepted placement-option abbreviation remains blocked in attached form\n'
printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git clone --separate-git-d $HOME/gd https://example.invalid/x /src/wt"}}\tan accepted placement-option abbreviation remains blocked in separate form\n'
# Worktree boolean options have the same generated-negation grammar. The next
# positional is its real path, so safe paths allow and HOME paths still block.
printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git worktree add --no-force /src/wt"}}\tgenerated worktree no-force accepts a safe path\n'
printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git worktree add --no-detach /src/wt"}}\tgenerated worktree no-detach accepts a safe path\n'
printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git worktree add --no-lock /src/wt"}}\tgenerated worktree no-lock accepts a safe path\n'
printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git worktree add --no-guess-remote /src/wt"}}\ta long worktree negation accepts a safe path without enumeration\n'
printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git worktree add -d /src/wt"}}\tthe documented short detach flag accepts a safe path\n'
printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git worktree add -q /src/wt"}}\tthe documented short quiet flag accepts a safe path\n'
printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git worktree add --lock --rea $HOME/note /src/wt"}}\tan accepted reason abbreviation consumes metadata rather than the path\n'
printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git worktree add -fb $HOME/topic /src/wt"}}\ta short branch bundle consumes its HOME-valued branch before the safe path\n'
printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git worktree add -fb topic $HOME/wt"}}\ta short branch bundle does not hide the later HOME path\n'
# Upstream Git defines --orphan as a boolean flag; -b still carries the branch.
printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git worktree add --orphan /src/wt"}}\torphan mode accepts a safe path without consuming it as a value\n'
printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git worktree add --orphan $HOME/wt"}}\torphan mode does not hide its HOME path\n'
printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git worktree add --orphan -b $HOME/topic /src/wt"}}\torphan mode leaves HOME branch metadata to the branch option\n'
printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git worktree add --orphan -b topic $HOME/wt"}}\torphan mode plus a branch option preserves HOME path blocking\n'
# The optional second positional is commit-ish metadata, never placement.
# HOME expands here, but the explicit worktree path remains safely under /src.
printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git worktree add /src/wt $HOME/topic"}}\ta HOME-shaped commit-ish is not the worktree path\n'
printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git worktree add --no-force $HOME/wt"}}\ta generated worktree negation does not hide the HOME path\n'
printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git worktree add --no-guess-remote $HOME/wt"}}\ta long worktree negation preserves HOME placement blocking\n'
# Explicit placement options and later simple commands remain traps.
printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git clone --bare $HOME/source /src/wt && git clone x $HOME/wt"}}\ta boolean flag in one command does not hide a later HOME destination\n'
printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"git worktree add --no-force /src/wt; git clone x $HOME/wt"}}\ta worktree flag before a boundary does not hide later HOME placement\n'
# Routing this arm through the shared name site also repaired an over-block it
# had carried from the start: the old whole-command regex found `git` INSIDE a
# longer word, so these two were refused at every head before this commit.
# Same class as mycurl and curl-wrapper, and refusing them is how a guard gets
# routed around instead of repaired.
printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"mygit clone https://example.invalid/x $HOME/wt"}}\tmygit is a different program and its checkout is not ours\n'
printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"gitfoo clone https://example.invalid/x $HOME/wt"}}\tthe name has to end where git ends\n'
printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"curl -s -X GET https://git.example.invalid/api/v1/repos/a/b/pulls/1"}}\treads are never blocked\n'
printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"curl -X POST -d @b https://git.example.invalid/api/v1/repos/a/b/pulls/1/reviews"}}\treview write has a wrapper\n'
printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"curl -X POST -d @b https://git.example.invalid/api/v1/repos/a/b/pulls/1/merge"}}\tmerge write has a wrapper\n'
printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"curl -X POST -d @b https://api.github.com/repos/a/b/issues"}}\tGitHub host is covered too\n'
printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"curl -X POST -d @b https://git.example.invalid/api/v1/repos/a/b/releases"}}\tan endpoint with no wrapper passes\n'
printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"curl -X POST -d {\\"event\\":\\"APPROVE\\"} https://example.invalid/x"}}\tthe APPROVE token is caught anywhere\n'
printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"ls -la /src"}}\tordinary commands are untouched\n'
printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"MOSAIC_WRAPPER_OVERRIDE=1 curl -X POST -d @b https://git.example.invalid/api/v1/repos/a/b/pulls"}}\tbreak-glass works\n'
printf '0\t{"tool_input":{}}\tan empty payload does not block the session\n'
# --- bypasses an independent reviewer demonstrated against the first version.
# Each of these returned 0 (allowed) and each is a real write. They are pinned
# as fixtures rather than fixed-and-forgotten because the class is recurring:
# the guard reads text, so every spelling it does not know is a hole.
printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"curl -d@b https://git.example.invalid/api/v1/repos/a/b/pulls/1/reviews"}}\t-d@body with no space is still a body\n'
printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"curl --request=POST -d@b https://git.example.invalid/api/v1/repos/a/b/pulls/1/reviews"}}\t--request=POST equals-form is still a method\n'
printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"p=/api/v1/repo; q=s/a/b/pulls/1/reviews; curl -d@b https://git.example.invalid${p}${q}"}}\ta path split across variables is still that path\n'
printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"curl --data-binary @b https://git.example.invalid/api/v1/repos/a/b/issues/1/comments"}}\t--data-binary is a body\n'
printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"curl -F f=@b https://git.example.invalid/api/v1/repos/a/b/issues"}}\t-F multipart is a body\n'
# Reads must survive every one of those broadenings, or the guard gets disabled.
printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"curl -s https://git.example.invalid/api/v1/repos/a/b/pulls/1/reviews"}}\tno body and no verb is a read\n'
printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"grep -rn /pulls/ src/ | head -20"}}\ta path fragment in a grep is not an API call\n'
printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"curl -X POST -d @b https://registry.example.invalid/v2/x/manifests/latest"}}\tan unwrapped API is not this guard'"'"'s business\n'
# --- round two of the same review. Splitting the ENDPOINT TOKEN defeats any
# amount of fragment matching, because the endpoint does not exist until the
# shell expands it. The guard now refuses to clear a write whose URL it cannot
# read, rather than pretending it read one.
printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"a=/api/v1/repos/a/b/iss; b=ues/1/comments; curl -d@body https://git.example.invalid${a}${b}"}}\tan endpoint token split across variables is unreadable, not absent\n'
printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"a=/api/v1/repos/a/b/pu; b=lls/1/reviews; curl -d@body https://git.example.invalid${a}${b}"}}\tsame split, review endpoint\n'
printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"curl -X POST -d @payload https://hooks.example.invalid/services/${WEBHOOK_ID}"}}\tan opaque URL that is not forge-shaped stays allowed\n'
# --- round six changed the contract in this direction, and these fixtures are
# where it shows. They used to assert that discussing a call is not making one.
# Five rounds proved there is no textual way to tell a quoted example from a
# quoted command, so the guard stopped trying: it judges the payload, and a
# payload inside quotes is still a payload. Quoting one of these on a Bash
# command line is now refused, and the way to write the example is a
# file-writing tool. This is the deliberate cost of the mechanism change.
printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"grep -R \\"curl -d https://git.example.invalid/api/v1/repos/a/b/issues\\" docs/"}}\tquoting a wrapped write is refused even in a grep\n'
printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"echo \\"curl -d https://git.example.invalid/api/v1/repos/a/b/pulls\\" > note.txt"}}\t...and when written into a file\n'
printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"python3 -c '"'"'print(\\"curl -d https://git.example.invalid/api/v1/repos/a/b/issues\\")'"'"'"}}\t...and when printed from another language\n'
# The boundary that keeps this from being "block everything": what is refused
# is a WRITE to a WRAPPED endpoint. Mentioning either alone still passes, and
# these are asserted as hard as the blocks above.
printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"grep -R \\"curl -s https://git.example.invalid/api/v1/repos/a/b/issues/1/comments\\" docs/"}}\tquoting a READ example is untouched\n'
printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"echo \\"the wrapped endpoint is https://git.example.invalid/api/v1/repos/a/b/issues/1/comments\\" >> notes.md"}}\tnaming the endpoint without a body flag is untouched\n'
printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"grep -R \\"curl -d@b https://git.example.invalid/api/v1/repos/a/b/releases\\" docs/"}}\tquoting a write to an UNWRAPPED endpoint is untouched\n'
printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"issue-comment.sh --repo a/b --issue 1 --body @msg.md"}}\tthe wrapper itself carries a body flag and must never trip its own guard\n'
# Command position must still catch the real thing behind operators and env.
printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"cd /tmp && GITEA_TOKEN=$T curl -d@b https://git.example.invalid/api/v1/repos/a/b/pulls/1/merge"}}\ta real call behind && and an assignment is still a call\n'
# --- the case the AUTHOR hit twice while chasing the above: sending a message
# that QUOTED one of these fixtures. Under the old contract that was a defect
# to be parsed away; under this one it is the documented cost, and the message
# gets composed with a file-writing tool instead.
printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"send.sh -m \\"repro was: cd /tmp && curl -d@b https://git.example.invalid/api/v1/repos/a/b/pulls/1/merge\\""}}\tquoting the repro in a message is refused too\n'
printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"cat >> notes.md <<EOF\\nwe ran: curl -d@b https://git.example.invalid/api/v1/repos/a/b/issues\\nEOF"}}\ta heredoc body carrying the payload is refused with it\n'
# ...but quotes stop being data the moment something executes them.
printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"bash -c \\"curl -d@b https://git.example.invalid/api/v1/repos/a/b/pulls/1/merge\\""}}\tbash -c makes the quoted text code again\n'
# --- round three. Each of these four is a real write that a bare-name match
# for the client could not see, because an ordinary word sat in front of it.
# They are kept as fixtures after the mechanism change even though the guard no
# longer looks for a client at all: they are the evidence for WHY it stopped,
# and a future re-narrowing that reintroduced position would fail here first.
printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"env GITEA_TOKEN=$T curl -d@b https://git.example.invalid/api/v1/repos/a/b/issues/1/comments"}}\tenv VAR=... in front of the client is still the client\n'
printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"command curl -d@b https://git.example.invalid/api/v1/repos/a/b/issues/1/comments"}}\tcommand in front of the client is still the client\n'
printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"timeout 10 curl -d@b https://git.example.invalid/api/v1/repos/a/b/issues/1/comments"}}\ttimeout N in front of the client is still the client\n'
printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"/usr/bin/curl -d@b https://git.example.invalid/api/v1/repos/a/b/issues/1/comments"}}\tan absolute path to the client is still the client\n'
printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"echo timeout 10 curl -d@b https://git.example.invalid/api/v1/repos/a/b/issues/1/comments >> notes.md"}}\tnaming the call after echo carries the payload, so it is refused\n'
# A shell standing between quoted data and execution makes that data code,
# and the pipe is the form agents actually use. Filing it as data allowed the
# call to vanish from the skeleton while still running.
printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"printf '"'"'%%s\\\\n'"'"' '"'"'curl -d@b https://git.example.invalid/api/v1/repos/a/b/issues/1/comments'"'"' | sh"}}\tquoted code piped to a shell is code\n'
printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"cat <<EOF | sh\\ncurl -d@b https://git.example.invalid/api/v1/repos/a/b/issues/1/comments\\nEOF"}}\ta heredoc piped to a shell is code\n'
printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"sh -s <<EOF\\ncurl -d@b https://git.example.invalid/api/v1/repos/a/b/issues/1/comments\\nEOF"}}\tsh -s reads its script from the heredoc\n'
# ...and the questions that used to follow — is the pipe target a shell, does a
# shell on one line execute a string on another — no longer have to be answered
# at all. Both of these carry the payload, both are refused, and neither
# outcome depends on parsing what the pipe or the other line does.
printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"grep -R \\"curl -d@b https://git.example.invalid/api/v1/repos/a/b/issues/1/comments\\" docs/ | wc -l"}}\tpiping the payload to wc is refused without asking what wc is\n'
printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"docker run --rm alpine sh -c '"'"'echo hi'"'"'\\necho \\"example: curl -d@b https://git.example.invalid/api/v1/repos/a/b/issues/1/comments\\" >> notes.md"}}\tan unrelated shell on another line no longer changes the answer either way\n'
# --- round four. The guard was still reading the command as typed rather than
# as the shell will run it: a backslash before a newline is removed before
# anything else happens, so the endpoint token can be split across the join.
printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"curl -d@b https://git.example.invalid/api/v1/repos/a/b/iss\\\\\\nues/1/comments"}}\ta line continuation inside the endpoint token is still that endpoint\n'
printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"curl -d@b https://git.example.invalid/api/v1/repos/a/b/pu\\\\\\nlls/1/reviews"}}\tsame join, review endpoint\n'
printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"cat >> notes.md <<EOF\\nwe ran: curl -d@b https://git.example.invalid/api/v1/repos/a/b/iss\\\\\\nues/1/comments\\nEOF"}}\tthe join still runs first, and the joined payload is refused in a document too\n'
# Transparent prefixes take option VALUES, and the value was a word the list
# did not know — so the client went missing again behind an ordinary `sudo -u`.
printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"sudo -u root curl -d@b https://git.example.invalid/api/v1/repos/a/b/issues/1/comments"}}\tan option value after a prefix does not hide the client\n'
printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"timeout --signal TERM 10 curl -d@b https://git.example.invalid/api/v1/repos/a/b/issues/1/comments"}}\tan option pair plus a duration does not hide the client\n'
printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"xargs echo curl -d@b https://git.example.invalid/api/v1/repos/a/b/issues/1/comments"}}\tthe payload behind xargs echo is refused rather than adjudicated\n'
printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"sudo apt-get install curl"}}\tinstalling the client is not calling it\n'
# Execution through another command needed its own case under the old design.
printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"find . -maxdepth 0 -exec curl -d@b https://git.example.invalid/api/v1/repos/a/b/issues/1/comments ;"}}\tfind -exec runs the client\n'
# --- round five, and the finding that ended the parser. Command substitution
# inside a double-quoted span EXECUTES, while the skeleton was discarding that
# span as inert prose. The unquoted and process-substitution forms already
# blocked, which is what made it a classification defect rather than a spelling
# one: the same call was refused or allowed depending on a quote character.
printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"echo \\"$(curl -d@b https://git.example.invalid/api/v1/repos/a/b/issues/1/comments)\\""}}\tcommand substitution inside double quotes executes\n'
printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"echo \\"`curl -d@b https://git.example.invalid/api/v1/repos/a/b/issues/1/comments`\\""}}\tso does the backtick form\n'
printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"msg=\\"$(curl -d@b https://git.example.invalid/api/v1/repos/a/b/issues/1/comments)\\""}}\tand an assignment RHS is not data either\n'
printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"echo $(curl -d@b https://git.example.invalid/api/v1/repos/a/b/issues/1/comments)"}}\tthe unquoted form, which blocked before and must keep blocking\n'
printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"cat <(curl -d@b https://git.example.invalid/api/v1/repos/a/b/issues/1/comments)"}}\tprocess substitution, same\n'
printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"bash --command \\"curl -d@b https://git.example.invalid/api/v1/repos/a/b/issues/1/comments\\""}}\tthe long-option spelling of bash -c needs no entry in any list now\n'
# A client the guard was never taught is the point of dropping client
# detection: neither of these names curl at all.
printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"python3 -c '"'"'import requests; requests.post(\\"https://git.example.invalid/api/v1/repos/a/b/issues/1/comments\\", json={})'"'"'"}}\ta library call is a write with no flag and no curl\n'
printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"wget --post-data=x https://git.example.invalid/api/v1/repos/a/b/issues/1/comments"}}\twget spells its body differently and is still a write\n'
# Round six scoped the guard on `https?://`, and review found the absence shape
# had simply moved to that new boundary: a raw provider CLI carries no scheme,
# so the guard never reached the write question. These are the reported repros.
printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"gh api -X POST repos/a/b/issues -f title=x -f body=y"}}\tgh api is a raw write with no URL scheme at all\n'
printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"gh api -X POST repos/a/b/pulls/1/reviews -f event=APPROVE"}}\tand it reaches the endpoint the review wrapper owns\n'
printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"tea api -X POST repos/a/b/issues/1/comments -f body=x"}}\ttea api, same shape, different CLI\n'
printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"curl -X POST -d x git.example.invalid/api/v1/repos/a/b/issues"}}\ta scheme-less host path is still an API write\n'
printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"gh api repos/a/b/issues -f title=x"}}\tgh POSTs implicitly when handed a field, exactly as curl does with -d\n'
# ...and the boundary that stops a broader scope gate becoming block-everything.
printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"gh api repos/a/b/pulls/1"}}\treading through a provider CLI stays untouched\n'
printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"gh api -X POST repos/a/b/releases -f tag_name=v1"}}\tno wrapper owns releases, whoever calls it\n'
printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"tea pulls create --title x --repo a/b"}}\tprovider PORCELAIN is out of scope by decision, not by accident\n'
printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"rm -f /var/tmp/api/v1-issues-notes.txt"}}\t-f is only a body when it carries key=value\n'
printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"grep -f patterns.txt /src/api/v1/repos/a/b/issues.log"}}\tsame, on the flag agents actually collide with\n'
# Wrong remediation is its own defect: /issues/1/labels used to block with
# "use issue-create.sh", which is not the wrapper for that call. Round seven
# answered that by letting EVERY path under a numbered issue or PR through,
# and review showed the reasoning ("no wrapper owns these") was false in this
# tree. These are the reported repros, all rc 0 before round eight, and each
# asserts the wrapper the advice must name — not merely that a block happened.
printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"gh api -X PATCH repos/a/b/issues/1 -f title=x"}}\tan issue edit is issue-edit.sh, not a wrapper gap\tissue-edit.sh\n'
printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"curl -X PATCH -d @b https://git.example.invalid/api/v1/repos/a/b/issues/1"}}\tsame call through curl, same wrapper\tissue-edit.sh\n'
printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"gh api -X PATCH repos/a/b/issues/1/labels -f labels[]=bug"}}\tlabels are wrapped, and the advice says by which\tissue-edit.sh\n'
printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"gh api -X POST repos/a/b/issues/1/assignees -f assignees[]=u"}}\tassignees are issue-assign.sh\tissue-assign.sh\n'
printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"gh api repos/a/b/issues/1/assignees -f assignees[]=u"}}\tthe array field spelling is a body with no -X at all\tissue-assign.sh\n'
printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"curl -X PATCH -d @b https://git.example.invalid/api/v1/repos/a/b/pulls/1/labels"}}\ta PR is an issue where labels live, so the issue wrapper owns them\tissue-edit.sh\n'
printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"curl -X PATCH -d @b https://git.example.invalid/api/v1/repos/a/b/pulls/1"}}\tPR state is pr-close.sh, and the gap in that arm is stated\tpr-close.sh\n'
printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"curl -X PATCH -d @b https://git.example.invalid/api/v1/repos/a/b/milestones/4"}}\ta milestone state change is milestone-close.sh, not the create wrapper\tmilestone-close.sh\n'
# SPAN. A wrapper that owns a slice of an endpoint must not be advertised as
# owning the endpoint. milestone-close.sh takes only -t <title> and sends
# state=closed, so a title/description/due-date edit is a gap and the message
# has to say so — round eight named the wrapper and stopped there.
printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"curl -X PATCH -d @b https://git.example.invalid/api/v1/repos/a/b/milestones/1"}}\ta milestone edit blocks, but the advice states the close-only span\towns the CLOSE only\n'
printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"gh api -X PATCH repos/a/b/issues/1 -f assignee=u"}}\tissue-edit.sh cannot set an assignee, so the message names the one that can\tissue-assign.sh owns the assignee\n'
# The residue: still genuinely owned by nothing, and still flowing through.
# Requesting a reviewer is not submitting one; pr-review.sh files verdicts and
# nothing in the tree adds a requested reviewer.
printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"gh api -X POST repos/a/b/pulls/1/requested_reviewers -f reviewers[]=u"}}\tno wrapper requests a reviewer, so it is not refused with pr-review.sh\n'
# SPAN, applied to the guard's OWN fail-closed rule rather than to a wrapper.
# The scope gate admits three shapes; the unreadable-endpoint rule asked only
# for `https?://`, so a split endpoint in the other two was in scope to block,
# produced no readable endpoint, and fell through to allow. Same defect class
# as the milestone arm, one layer up. Each shape gets its own fixture, because
# a single one would have passed on the arm that already worked.
printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"p=repos/a/b/iss; q=ues; gh api -X POST ${p}${q} -f title=x"}}\ta split endpoint in a provider-CLI api call is unreadable, not absent\n'
printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"p=repos/a/b/issues/1/comm; q=ents; gh api -X POST ${p}${q} -f body=x"}}\tsame, comments\n'
printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"p=repos/a/b/pulls/1/rev; q=iews; gh api -X POST ${p}${q} -f event=APPROVED"}}\tsame, and a verdict is the costliest one to lose\n'
printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"p=repos/a/b/iss; q=ues; tea api -X POST ${p}${q} -f title=x"}}\tevery CLI the scope gate admits, not just gh\n'
printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"p=/api/v1/repos/a/b/iss; q=ues; curl -X POST -d x git.example.invalid${p}${q}"}}\ta schemeless forge host with a split path is unreadable too\n'
printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"h=git.example.invalid; q=ues; curl -X POST -d x ${h}/api/v1/repos/a/b/iss${q}"}}\tthe expansion may come first; the token is what matters\n'
# And the reason this is not "any variable blocks a write": a payload in a
# variable is the SAFE way to pass one and leaves the endpoint fully legible.
printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"gh api repos/a/b/git/refs -f sha=$SHA"}}\tan expansion in a body value leaves the endpoint readable\n'
printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"curl -X POST -d \\"$BODY\\" https://git.example.invalid/api/v1/repos/a/b/git/refs"}}\tsame for a quoted body on an unwrapped endpoint\n'
printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"gh api repos/${OWNER}/${REPO}/git/refs"}}\ta read with a split endpoint is still a read\n'
printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"curl -X PATCH -d @b https://git.example.invalid/api/v1/repos/a/b/issues/comments/5"}}\tediting a comment has no wrapper; only creating one does\n'
printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"curl -X POST -d @b https://git.example.invalid/api/v1/repos/a/b/issues/1/stopwatch/start"}}\tno wrapper owns a stopwatch, and none is invented for it\n'
printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"gh api -X POST repos/a/b/issues/1/times -f time=60"}}\tnor time tracking\n'
printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"gh api -X POST repos/a/b/issues/1/reactions -f content=+1"}}\tnor reactions\n'
# ...and the residue must be decided by the SEGMENT, never by a stray slash.
printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"gh api -X PATCH repos/a/b/issues/1 -f body=see-/docs/x"}}\ta slash inside the body is not a subresource\tissue-edit.sh\n'
# The arms above the numbered ones must keep blocking, with their own wrappers.
printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"curl -X POST -d @b https://git.example.invalid/api/v1/repos/a/b/issues/1/comments"}}\tthe wrapped subresource must not fall through\tissue-comment.sh\n'
printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"curl -X POST -d @b https://git.example.invalid/api/v1/repos/a/b/issues"}}\tnor may issue creation\tissue-create.sh\n'
printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"curl -X POST -d @b https://git.example.invalid/api/v1/repos/a/b/pulls"}}\tPR creation is wrapped and must not fall through with them\tpr-create.sh\n'
printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"curl -X POST -d @b https://git.example.invalid/api/v1/repos/a/b/pulls/1/reviews"}}\tand a review still names the review wrapper\tpr-review.sh\n'
# SPAN a third time, now in the scope gate itself: it asked for `/api/v[0-9]`,
# which is Gitea's spelling. GitHub's API carries no version segment at all
# (`api.github.com/repos/...`), so the schemeless Gitea write was in scope and
# the schemeless GitHub one was not — a gate calibrated to one dialect rather
# than to what identifies a provider API. `/repos/` is the marker both share.
# These endpoints are READABLE, so each asserts the wrapper it must name; a
# rc-only fixture here would pass on the unreadable arm and prove nothing.
printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"curl -X POST -d x api.github.com/repos/a/b/issues"}}\ta schemeless GitHub host is a provider API even with no version segment\tissue-create.sh\n'
printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"curl -X POST -d x api.github.com/repos/a/b/issues/1/comments"}}\tsame, and the subresource still names its own wrapper\tissue-comment.sh\n'
printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"host=api.github.com; curl -X POST -d x ${host}/repos/a/b/issues"}}\tthe host may be a variable; the path is what the guard reads\tissue-create.sh\n'
printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"curl -X POST -d x api.github.com/repos/a/b/pulls/1/reviews"}}\ta verdict is the costliest call to lose to a spelling\tpr-review.sh\n'
printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"p=/repos/a/b/iss; q=ues; curl -X POST -d x api.github.com${p}${q}"}}\tand the split form of it is unreadable, not absent\n'
# The end-of-options marker, which is the one option not spelled like one.
printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"p=repos/a/b/iss; q=ues; gh api -X POST -- ${p}${q} -f title=x"}}\ta bare -- must not walk the endpoint past the scanner\n'
# Widening a scope gate may not create a block. Reads and unwrapped endpoints
# in the newly admitted shape have to stay allowed, or this is a regression
# wearing a fix'"'"'s clothes.
printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"curl api.github.com/repos/a/b/issues"}}\tadmitting a shape to the gate does not make a read a write\n'
printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"curl -X POST -d x api.github.com/repos/a/b/git/refs"}}\tno wrapper owns git refs, on GitHub'"'"'s spelling either\n'
printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"gh api -- repos/a/b/issues"}}\tthe marker in a read is still a read\n'
# The APPROVE trap, in the spelling a provider CLI uses, and the value that
# must never trip it.
printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"curl -X POST -d {\\"event\\":\\"APPROVED\\"} https://git.example.invalid/api/v1/repos/a/b/releases"}}\tAPPROVED is the correct value and is never the trap\n'
# Documented over-block, pinned so it is a known boundary and not a surprise.
printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"python3 -c '"'"'print(\\"https://git.example.invalid/api/v1/repos/a/b/issues/1/comments .post(\\")'"'"'"}}\tprose carrying .post( near a wrapped URL is refused, by the same payload rule\n'
# --- round nine, all four from one adversarial pass, and three of them are
# the same shape: a test written over the WHOLE command text deciding an
# ALLOW. That is the fail-open form this file keeps rediscovering, and it had
# reached the break-glass itself.
#
# BREAK-GLASS. `case "$CMD" in *MOSAIC_WRAPPER_OVERRIDE=1*)` cleared the entire
# command if that string appeared anywhere in it — so quoting the override in a
# note, or naming a variable after it, disabled the guard for the call sitting
# beside it. The override is now read POSITIONALLY: leading `NAME=value`
# assignments only, exactly where the shell would honour one.
printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"echo \\"MOSAIC_WRAPPER_OVERRIDE=1 curl -d@b https://git.example.invalid/api/v1/repos/a/b/pulls/1/reviews\\" >> notes.md"}}\tquoting the override in a document does not arm it\n'
printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"NOTES=MOSAIC_WRAPPER_OVERRIDE=1 curl -d@b https://git.example.invalid/api/v1/repos/a/b/pulls/1/reviews"}}\tan assignment whose VALUE is the override is not the override\n'
printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"MOSAIC_WRAPPER_OVERRIDE=10 curl -d@b https://git.example.invalid/api/v1/repos/a/b/pulls/1/reviews"}}\t=10 matched the old substring test and is not the value 1\n'
printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"GITEA_TOKEN=$T MOSAIC_WRAPPER_OVERRIDE=1 curl -d@b https://git.example.invalid/api/v1/repos/a/b/pulls/1/reviews"}}\tthe override still works behind other assignments, as the shell reads it\n'
# The cost, pinned rather than discovered later: positional means positional.
printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"cd /tmp && MOSAIC_WRAPPER_OVERRIDE=1 curl -d@b https://git.example.invalid/api/v1/repos/a/b/pulls/1/merge"}}\tan override after && is not in command position and does not arm\n'
# SUBRESOURCE REFINEMENT, same defect one arm lower. It asked whether a
# subresource appears ANYWHERE in the command, so a numbered-object write was
# cleared on the strength of text in its own BODY. Inverted: clear only when
# EVERY numbered-object occurrence carries a subresource.
printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"gh api -X PATCH repos/a/b/issues/1 -f body=cf-/pulls/2/files"}}\ta subresource in the body does not clear a write to the numbered issue\tissue-edit.sh\n'
printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"gh api -X PATCH repos/a/b/issues/1 -f body=cf-/issues/3/reactions"}}\tsame, quoting a subresource of the same object type\tissue-edit.sh\n'
# ...and its documented cost, in the safe direction.
printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"gh api -X POST repos/a/b/issues/1/reactions -f content=cf-/issues/2"}}\tan unwrapped subresource write that quotes a bare issue is refused\n'
# -K/--config. curl reads the method, the body, the headers AND the URL from
# that file, so none of them are in the command: every write test above read 0
# and the call went through. An unreadable request is not a cleared one.
printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"curl --config /tmp/req https://git.example.invalid/api/v1/repos/a/b/pulls/1/reviews"}}\tthe request in a config file is unreadable, so it is refused\t--config/-K\n'
printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"curl -K /tmp/req https://git.example.invalid/api/v1/repos/a/b/issues"}}\tthe short spelling, same answer\t--config/-K\n'
# Cost, stated: this refuses a --config read against a host that has nothing
# to do with a forge. The alternative is to require a forge marker in a
# command whose URL may itself be in the file, which is the hole again.
printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"curl --config /tmp/req https://example.invalid/anything"}}\tan unrelated https URL with --config is refused too, by decision\t--config/-K\n'
printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"eslint --config .eslintrc.json src/"}}\t--config on a command that is not curl is nobody'"'"'s business\n'
# ROUND TEN. The --config check above was first written INSIDE the API-shape
# gate, so it was guarded by a condition that the capability it guards against
# removes. A config file can carry the URL; delete the URL from the command and
# nothing is API-shaped, the branch is never entered, and the guard reports
# clean on precisely the call it exists to refuse. It is now asked of any curl.
printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"curl --config /tmp/provider-write.cfg"}}\ta config file can own the URL, so there is nothing API-shaped left to gate on\t--config/-K\n'
printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"curl -K/tmp/provider-write.cfg"}}\tcurl accepts the value attached to the short flag\t--config/-K\n'
printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"curl -sK /tmp/provider-write.cfg"}}\tand inside a bundle, which a space-separated test does not see\t--config/-K\n'
printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"tar -K /tmp/archive.tar"}}\t-K on a command that is not curl is not this hook'"'"'s business\n'
# curl by any ordinary path spelling. The first version of the config check
# matched the bare word only, so these three executed the same wrapped write
# while the guard reported clean. Recognizing only the unqualified name is
# caller-name parsing, and that is the class this file exists to refuse.
printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"/usr/bin/curl --config /tmp/provider-write.cfg"}}\tan absolute path is the same invocation, not a different one\t--config/-K\n'
printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"env /usr/bin/curl -K/tmp/provider-write.cfg"}}\tand it is still curl behind env, with the value attached\t--config/-K\n'
printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"./curl --config /tmp/provider-write.cfg"}}\ta relative path costs two characters and used to be enough\t--config/-K\n'
# The prefix must end at a slash: a basename that merely ENDS in curl is a
# different program, and blocking it would be the over-block that gets a guard
# routed around rather than fixed.
printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"mycurl --config /tmp/provider-write.cfg"}}\tmycurl is not curl, and over-blocking is its own failure\n'
printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"/opt/x/curl-wrapper --config /tmp/provider-write.cfg"}}\tnor is curl-wrapper, whose name only starts the same way\n'
# And the same name once it is punctuated. The basename repair above fixed the
# UNQUOTED path spelling and nothing else, so two quote characters restored the
# bypass it had just closed: the check was still modelling one presentation of
# a shell word instead of the word. Every one of these executes the real curl.
printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"\\"/usr/bin/curl\\" --config /tmp/provider-write.cfg"}}\tquoting a path does not make it a different program\t--config/-K\n'
printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"'"'"'./curl'"'"' --config /tmp/provider-write.cfg"}}\tnor does quoting a relative one\t--config/-K\n'
printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"$(which curl) --config /tmp/provider-write.cfg"}}\tthe name is in the text even when a substitution supplies the path\t--config/-K\n'
printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"`which curl` --config /tmp/provider-write.cfg"}}\tand in the older spelling of the same substitution\t--config/-K\n'
# The provider-CLI SCOPE gate had the identical defect, untouched while the
# curl arm was repaired twice. It decides whether write detection runs at all,
# so failing to admit these is indistinguishable from allowing them — and no
# URL marker rescues them, because provider CLI paths carry no leading slash.
printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"/usr/bin/gh api -X POST repos/a/b/issues -f title=x"}}\tan absolute path to a provider CLI is still a provider CLI\n'
printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"./gh api -X POST repos/a/b/issues -f title=x"}}\tand a relative one still is too\n'
printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"/usr/local/bin/tea api -X POST repos/a/b/issues -f title=x"}}\tthe same is true of every CLI the gate names, not just the first\n'
printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"mygh api -X POST repos/a/b/issues -f title=x"}}\tmygh is not gh, and the scope gate must not over-admit either\n'
printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"/usr/bin/gh api repos/a/b/issues"}}\ta read through an absolute path is still a read\n'
# Quotes and backslashes INSIDE the word. The previous repair replaced quote
# characters with whitespace, which is token separation and not quote removal:
# a shell removes a quote without splitting the word around it, so `cu"rl"` is
# one word naming curl while whitespace made it two words naming neither.
# `"/usr/bin/curl"` passed under that version only because the inserted space
# happened to land after a slash, which established nothing.
printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"cu\\"rl\\" --config /tmp/provider-write.cfg"}}\ta quote inside the word does not make it another program\t--config/-K\n'
printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"cu'"'"'rl'"'"' --config /tmp/provider-write.cfg"}}\tand a single quote inside it is the same word again\t--config/-K\n'
printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"/usr/bin/cu\\\\rl --config /tmp/provider-write.cfg"}}\tescaping is ordinary word formation, not a disguise\t--config/-K\n'
# A backslash is NOT uniformly removed. It is literal inside single quotes,
# and inside double quotes when it precedes anything other than $, `, ",
# backslash, or newline. These spell a different program and must stay allowed.
printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"'"'"'cu\\\\rl'"'"' --config /tmp/provider-write.cfg"}}\ta backslash inside single quotes remains literal\n'
printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"\\"cu\\\\rl\\" --config /tmp/provider-write.cfg"}}\ta backslash before r inside double quotes remains literal\n'
printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"'"'"'g\\\\it'"'"' clone https://example.invalid/x $HOME/wt"}}\ta literal backslash in a single-quoted non-git name is not a checkout\n'
printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"\\"g\\\\it\\" clone https://example.invalid/x $HOME/wt"}}\ta literal backslash in a double-quoted non-git name is not a checkout\n'
# The other branch of the same rule: OUTSIDE quotes a backslash escapes the
# next character, so an escaped quote is a literal quote IN the name and the
# program is not curl. Held separately from the cases above because it is a
# different arm of the state machine, and an arm without a fixture is a rule
# that is not held.
printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"cu\\\\\\"rl\\\\\\" --config /tmp/provider-write.cfg"}}\tan escaped quote is a literal quote in the name\n'
# Three quoted segments concatenate into ONE word. This is the shape that
# distinguishes quote removal from token separation, so it is worth its own line.
printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"\\"cu\\"'"'"'r'"'"'\\"l\\" --config /tmp/provider-write.cfg"}}\tadjacent quoted segments are one word, and that word is curl\t--config/-K\n'
printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"g\\"h\\" api -X POST repos/a/b/issues -f title=x"}}\tthe CLI name is a word on the same terms\n'
printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"/usr/bin/g\\\\h api -X POST repos/a/b/issues -f title=x"}}\tincluding when it is escaped behind a path\n'
# The FLAG is the same recognition problem as the name, and is read the same
# way. No review raised this one; the name was simply the easier half to reach.
printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"curl --con\\"fig\\" /tmp/provider-write.cfg"}}\tone word spelling --config is still --config\t--config/-K\n'
# The unreadable-endpoint arm is the THIRD name consumer. It kept a private
# bare-name copy of the scope gate's regex, so a caller could be admitted by
# the repaired gate and then go unrecognized by the fail-closed refinement —
# a gate and its own refinement disagreeing about who the caller is.
printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"/usr/bin/gh api -X POST repos/a/b/$EP -f title=x"}}\ta path-qualified CLI with an assembled endpoint is still unreadable\n'
printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"g\\"h\\" api -X POST repos/a/b/$EP -f title=x"}}\tand so is a quoted one, which is where the two halves disagreed\n'
printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"mygh api -X POST repos/a/b/$EP -f title=x"}}\tmygh is still not gh, in the refinement as well as the gate\n'
# Shapes nobody raised. Written down because reasoning that they were already
# covered is precisely what produced two of the rounds above; each one below
# was measured, and the three that fail at df83a9ee are here on that evidence.
# `\curl` is the ordinary way to bypass a shell alias and is a thing people
# actually type, which makes it the least hypothetical entry in the file.
printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"\\\\curl --config /tmp/provider-write.cfg"}}\tescaping the leading character to dodge an alias still names curl\t--config/-K\n'
printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"cur\\"l\\" --config /tmp/provider-write.cfg"}}\tthe quote may sit at any offset in the word\t--config/-K\n'
printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"g\\"h\\" api -X POST \\"repos/a/b/$EP\\" -f title=x"}}\tboth halves dressed at once, which is where they last disagreed\n'
# Over-blocking is a real failure and not a safe direction: a guard that
# refuses legitimate work gets routed around instead of repaired. These four
# pass at both heads, which is what a regression guard is for.
printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"gh api \\"repos/a/b/issues\\""}}\ta quoted read is still a read\n'
printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"curl https://example.com/file.txt -o /tmp/f"}}\tan ordinary download is not a provider write\n'
printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"echo \\"$EP\\" && gh --version"}}\tno api subcommand, so nothing to refuse\n'
printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"echo \\"not a curl call\\""}}\tthe word inside a string, with no flag, is prose\n'
# Percent-encoded endpoints. Not hypothetical: /issues/1174 and /iss%%75es/1174
# both returned HTTP 200 with the same object from the live forge, so the
# encoded spelling IS the wrapped endpoint and the literal comparison below it
# sees a segment matching nothing. Refused rather than decoded — a decoder has
# to be exactly right about depth and normalization, which is the parser
# mistake this file declines everywhere else.
printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"gh api -X POST repos/a/b/iss%%75es/1/comments -f body=x"}}\tan encoded path segment reaches the wrapped endpoint\tpercent-escape\n'
printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"curl -X POST -d @b https://git.example.invalid/api/v1/repos/a/b/pulls/1/revi%%65ws"}}\tsame for the review endpoint, which is the one that matters most\tpercent-escape\n'
printf '2\t{"tool_input":{"command":"gh api -X POST repos/a/b/iss%%2575es/1/comments -f body=x"}}\tdouble-encoded too, which is why this refuses instead of decoding\tpercent-escape\n'
# Scoped to writes, deliberately. Reads are never blocked by this guard and a
# query string carrying %%20 is an ordinary URL, not a hazard.
printf '0\t{"tool_input":{"command":"curl -s https://git.example.invalid/api/v1/repos/a/b/issues?q=a%%20b"}}\ta percent-escape in a READ is not this hook'"'"'s business\n'
} > "$FIXTURES"
fail=0 n=0
while IFS=$'\t' read -r want payload why remedy; do
[ -n "${want:-}" ] || continue
n=$((n + 1))
out="$(printf '%s' "$payload" | "$GUARD" 2>&1)"
got=$?
if [ "$got" != "$want" ]; then
printf 'FAIL %s (want exit %s, got %s)\n' "$why" "$want" "$got"
fail=1
continue
fi
# A block that names the wrong wrapper is a defect in its own right, and until
# now it was invisible here: the harness read the exit code and nothing else,
# so /issues/1/labels blocking with "use issue-create.sh" passed every run for
# six rounds. Where a fixture states the remediation it expects, assert it.
if [ -n "${remedy:-}" ] && ! printf '%s' "$out" | grep -Fq -- "$remedy"; then
printf 'FAIL %s (blocked, but the advice does not name %s)\n' "$why" "$remedy"
fail=1
continue
fi
printf 'ok %s\n' "$why"
done < "$FIXTURES"
# ---- $HOME resolution ------------------------------------------------------
# These cannot be fixtures. Every case above varies the COMMAND; this defect
# varies the ENVIRONMENT, and the loop has no way to express that.
#
# The checkout arm built its pattern from "$HOME" without asking whether $HOME
# was a usable value. Three values it is not: unset (which is a crash under
# `set -u`, not a decision), empty (the pattern collapses to `/`, so `~|\$HOME|`
# matches whatever the empty alternative touches), and "/" (every absolute path
# is under it, so the comparison stops discriminating). An agent seat running
# with no HOME — a systemd unit without one, a container, `env -i` — got the
# checkout question answered by accident rather than on the merits.
#
# The fix resolves $HOME once, rejects all three, and BLOCKS the checkout it
# cannot adjudicate. A guard may not clear a question it was unable to ask. The
# blast radius of that fail-closed arm is asserted below to be one command shape
# and not the session: with no HOME at all, ordinary commands still pass and the
# API arms still block.
home_case() {
local why="$1" want="$2" homeval="$3" cmd="$4" needle="${5:-}"
local out got
n=$((n + 1))
local payload
payload="$(jq -nc --arg command "$cmd" '{tool_input:{command:$command}}')"
if [ "$homeval" = "@unset" ]; then
out="$(printf '%s' "$payload" | env -u HOME "$GUARD" 2>&1)"
else
out="$(printf '%s' "$payload" | env HOME="$homeval" "$GUARD" 2>&1)"
fi
got=$?
if [ "$got" != "$want" ]; then
printf 'FAIL %s (want exit %s, got %s)\n' "$why" "$want" "$got"
fail=1
return
fi
if [ -n "$needle" ] && ! printf '%s' "$out" | grep -Fq -- "$needle"; then
printf 'FAIL %s (exit %s, but the message does not say %s)\n' "$why" "$got" "$needle"
fail=1
return
fi
printf 'ok %s\n' "$why"
}
home_case 'HOME unset: a checkout is refused, not adjudicated' \
2 '@unset' 'git clone https://example.invalid/x /src/wt' 'unset or unusable'
home_case 'HOME empty: same, and it is not the same thing as unset' \
2 '' 'git clone https://example.invalid/x /src/wt' 'unset or unusable'
home_case 'HOME=/ : every path is under it, so it discriminates nothing' \
2 '/' 'git clone https://example.invalid/x /src/wt' 'unset or unusable'
home_case 'a usable HOME still allows a checkout onto a work filesystem' \
0 '/home/tester' 'git clone https://example.invalid/x /src/wt'
home_case 'a usable HOME still catches the literal path' \
2 '/home/tester' 'git clone https://example.invalid/x /home/tester/wt' 'checks a repository out under'
home_case 'a usable HOME catches the exact literal path without a trailing slash' \
2 '/home/tester' 'git clone https://example.invalid/x /home/tester' 'checks a repository out under'
home_case 'quotes around the exact literal HOME path do not change the target' \
2 '/home/tester' 'git clone https://example.invalid/x "/home/tester"' 'checks a repository out under'
home_case 'a quoted literal HOME segment remains contiguous with the suffix' \
2 '/home/tester' 'git clone https://example.invalid/x "/home/tester"/wt' 'checks a repository out under'
home_case 'a repeated leading slash is the same absolute HOME path' \
2 '/home/tester' 'git clone https://example.invalid/x //home/tester/wt' 'checks a repository out under'
home_case 'dot segments cannot disguise the literal HOME path' \
2 '/home/tester' 'git worktree add /var/../home/tester/./wt' 'checks a repository out under'
home_case 'parent traversal into HOME is normalized for separate Git state' \
2 '/home/tester' 'git clone --separate-git-dir=/home/other/../tester/gd x /src/wt' 'checks a repository out under'
home_case 'normalization still permits a literal HOME sibling' \
0 '/home/tester' 'git clone x /home/tester/../tester-sibling/wt'
home_case 'and the unexpanded $HOME spelling, which needs no resolution at all' \
2 '/home/tester' 'git worktree add $HOME/wt topic' 'checks a repository out under'
# Resolve the longest existing parent physically before appending a nonexistent
# destination. Lexical normalization alone cannot see a symlink into HOME, and
# it applies `..` in the wrong order when the preceding component is a symlink.
SYMLINK_HOME="$TMP/symlink-home"
SYMLINK_SAFE="$TMP/symlink-safe"
mkdir -p "$SYMLINK_HOME/nested" "$SYMLINK_SAFE"
ln -s "$SYMLINK_HOME" "$TMP/home-link"
ln -s "$SYMLINK_HOME/nested" "$TMP/home-nested-link"
ln -s "$SYMLINK_SAFE" "$TMP/safe-link"
home_case 'a clone path through a symlink into HOME is refused' \
2 "$SYMLINK_HOME" "git clone x $TMP/home-link/wt" 'checks a repository out under'
home_case 'a worktree path through a symlink into HOME is refused' \
2 "$SYMLINK_HOME" "git worktree add $TMP/home-link/wt" 'checks a repository out under'
home_case 'symlink resolution occurs before a following parent segment' \
2 "$SYMLINK_HOME" "git clone x $TMP/home-nested-link/../wt" 'checks a repository out under'
home_case 'a symlink to a physical path outside HOME remains allowed' \
0 "$SYMLINK_HOME" "git clone x $TMP/safe-link/wt"
# The fail-closed arm is scoped to checkouts. If it were not, a seat with no
# HOME would have every command it runs refused, which is how a guard gets
# disabled rather than fixed.
home_case 'HOME unset does not block an ordinary command' \
0 '@unset' 'ls -la /src'
home_case 'HOME unset does not stop the API arms doing their job' \
2 '@unset' 'curl -X POST -d @b https://git.example.invalid/api/v1/repos/a/b/pulls/1/reviews' 'pr-review.sh'
# ---- the guard standing on its own -----------------------------------------
# Every case above runs the guard from the directory holding its siblings, so
# `[ -x "$W/pr-review.sh" ]` succeeds and the $HOME fallback beside it never
# evaluates. That is a property of the HARNESS, not of the guard, and it hid a
# live fail-open: with the guard copied somewhere alone AND no HOME, the
# fallback expanded an unset variable under `set -u` and the script died at
# rc=1 — on EVERY arm, before any adjudication. A PreToolUse hook exiting
# nonzero-but-not-2 is a non-blocking error, so that seat ran with no guard and
# nothing reported it.
#
# The first remediation moved that expansion four lines earlier and called it
# closed. It was not closed, because the test could not reach it. So the guard
# is copied ALONE here — no siblings, no installed mosaic home — which is the
# deployment this file already claims to support ("still works from a repo
# checkout with no installed mosaic home").
LONE="$TMP/lone"; mkdir -p "$LONE"
cp "$GUARD" "$LONE/wrapper-guard.sh"; chmod +x "$LONE/wrapper-guard.sh"
lone_case() {
local why="$1" want="$2" homeval="$3" cmd="$4" needle="${5:-}"
local out got
n=$((n + 1))
if [ "$homeval" = "@unset" ]; then
out="$(printf '%s' "{\"tool_input\":{\"command\":\"$cmd\"}}" | env -u HOME "$LONE/wrapper-guard.sh" 2>&1)"
else
out="$(printf '%s' "{\"tool_input\":{\"command\":\"$cmd\"}}" | env HOME="$homeval" "$LONE/wrapper-guard.sh" 2>&1)"
fi
got=$?
if [ "$got" != "$want" ]; then
printf 'FAIL %s [standalone] (want exit %s, got %s)\n' "$why" "$want" "$got"
fail=1
return
fi
if [ -n "$needle" ] && ! printf '%s' "$out" | grep -Fq -- "$needle"; then
printf 'FAIL %s [standalone] (exit %s, but the message does not say %s)\n' "$why" "$got" "$needle"
fail=1
return
fi
printf 'ok %s [standalone]\n' "$why"
}
lone_case 'no siblings and no HOME: an ordinary command still passes, not rc=1' \
0 '@unset' 'ls -la /src'
lone_case 'no siblings and no HOME: a wrapped write is still refused' \
2 '@unset' 'curl -X POST -d @b https://git.example.invalid/api/v1/repos/a/b/pulls/1/reviews' 'pr-review.sh'
lone_case 'no siblings and no HOME: a checkout is refused, not adjudicated' \
2 '@unset' 'git clone https://example.invalid/x /src/wt' 'unset or unusable'
# Spelled without quotes on purpose. The payload is interpolated into a JSON
# string by the helper, so a fixture carrying bare double quotes produces
# malformed JSON, jq returns empty, and the guard exits 0 on an empty command —
# a PASS that measures nothing. That is what the first version of this case did.
lone_case 'no siblings and no HOME: the APPROVE trap still fires' \
2 '@unset' 'gh api -X POST repos/a/b/pulls/1/reviews -f event=APPROVE'
lone_case 'no siblings, usable HOME: ordinary commands unaffected' \
0 '/home/tester' 'ls -la /src'
printf '\n'
if [ "$fail" -eq 0 ]; then
printf 'wrapper-guard: %d/%d fixtures behaved as specified.\n' "$n" "$n"
else
cat <<'EOF'
wrapper-guard drifted from its contract.
A guard that blocks too much gets routed around, and a guard that blocks too
little is decoration. Both directions are failures here, which is why the
allowed cases are asserted as hard as the blocked ones.
EOF
fi
exit "$fail"
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
@@ -91,10 +91,12 @@ fi
if [[ -n "$dirty_files" ]]; then
echo " Modified files:"
echo "$dirty_files" | head -20 | while IFS= read -r line; do
echo " $line"
mapfile -t dirty_lines <<<"$dirty_files"
file_count="${#dirty_lines[@]}"
display_count=$((file_count < 20 ? file_count : 20))
for ((i = 0; i < display_count; i++)); do
echo " ${dirty_lines[$i]}"
done
file_count="$(echo "$dirty_files" | wc -l)"
if (( file_count > 20 )); then
echo " ... and $(( file_count - 20 )) more"
fi
@@ -64,12 +64,12 @@ if jq -e '.next_task == "T-001"' "$capsule_file" >/dev/null 2>&1; then pass_case
if grep -Fq 'Target runtime:** codex' <<< "$codex_continue_output"; then pass_case "continue prompt contains target runtime codex"; else fail_case "continue prompt contains target runtime codex"; fi
codex_run_prompt="$(MOSAIC_COORD_RUNTIME=codex bash "$SCRIPT_DIR/session-run.sh" --project "$tmp_project" --print)"
if [[ "$(printf '%s\n' "$codex_run_prompt" | head -n1)" == "Now initiating Orchestrator mode..." ]]; then pass_case "codex run prompt first line is mode declaration"; else fail_case "codex run prompt first line is mode declaration"; fi
if [[ "${codex_run_prompt%%$'\n'*}" == "Now initiating Orchestrator mode..." ]]; then pass_case "codex run prompt first line is mode declaration"; else fail_case "codex run prompt first line is mode declaration"; fi
if grep -Fq 'Do NOT ask clarifying questions before your first tool actions' <<< "$codex_run_prompt"; then pass_case "codex run prompt includes no-questions hard gate"; else fail_case "codex run prompt includes no-questions hard gate"; fi
if grep -Fq '"next_task": "T-001"' <<< "$codex_run_prompt"; then pass_case "codex run prompt embeds capsule json"; else fail_case "codex run prompt embeds capsule json"; fi
claude_run_prompt="$(MOSAIC_COORD_RUNTIME=claude bash "$SCRIPT_DIR/session-run.sh" --project "$tmp_project" --print)"
if [[ "$(printf '%s\n' "$claude_run_prompt" | head -n1)" == "## Continuation Mission" ]]; then pass_case "claude run prompt remains continuation prompt format"; else fail_case "claude run prompt remains continuation prompt format"; fi
if [[ "${claude_run_prompt%%$'\n'*}" == "## Continuation Mission" ]]; then pass_case "claude run prompt remains continuation prompt format"; else fail_case "claude run prompt remains continuation prompt format"; fi
echo ""
echo "Smoke test summary: pass=$PASS fail=$FAIL"
@@ -96,8 +96,8 @@ L="$WORK/live5.md"; G="$WORK/ledger5.md"; echo "# LEDGER" > "$G"
make_board "$L" 6 1 400
before_l=$(cat "$L"); before_g=$(cat "$G")
out=$(bash "$SUT" --live "$L" --ledger "$G" --cap 2000 --dry-run 2>&1) || note "dry-run exited nonzero: $out"
echo "$out" | grep -qi "dry run" || note "dry-run did not announce itself"
echo "$out" | grep -q "would roll" || note "dry-run did not report a plan"
grep -qi "dry run" <<<"$out" || note "dry-run did not announce itself"
grep -q "would roll" <<<"$out" || note "dry-run did not report a plan"
[[ "$(cat "$L")" == "$before_l" ]] || note "dry-run modified LIVE"
[[ "$(cat "$G")" == "$before_g" ]] || note "dry-run modified LEDGER"
@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ present=0
for entry in "${PRDY_REQUIRED_SECTIONS[@]}"; do
pattern="${entry#*|}"
if echo "$PRD_CONTENT" | grep -qiE "$pattern"; then
if grep -qiE "$pattern" <<<"$PRD_CONTENT"; then
present=$((present + 1))
fi
done
@@ -169,13 +169,13 @@ main() {
# classify_surface PATH → surface name (highest-risk match wins, mirrors TS)
classify_surface() {
local p="$1"
if printf '%s' "$p" | grep -qiE 'auth|login|session|token|permission|rbac|credential|secret'; then echo auth; return; fi
if printf '%s' "$p" | grep -qiE 'migration|prisma|schema|\.sql|entity|repository|seed'; then echo data; return; fi
if printf '%s' "$p" | grep -qiE 'docker|\.woodpecker|compose|traefik|deploy|helm|k8s|terraform'; then echo infra; return; fi
if printf '%s' "$p" | grep -qiE 'package\.json|tsconfig|turbo\.json|pnpm-|\.config\.|eslint|vite'; then echo build; return; fi
if printf '%s' "$p" | grep -qE '\.tsx|\.css|components/|apps/web/'; then echo ui; return; fi
if printf '%s' "$p" | grep -qE '\.spec\.|\.test\.|__tests__/'; then echo test; return; fi
if printf '%s' "$p" | grep -qE '\.md$|docs/'; then echo docs; return; fi
if grep -qiE 'auth|login|session|token|permission|rbac|credential|secret' <<<"$p"; then echo auth; return; fi
if grep -qiE 'migration|prisma|schema|\.sql|entity|repository|seed' <<<"$p"; then echo data; return; fi
if grep -qiE 'docker|\.woodpecker|compose|traefik|deploy|helm|k8s|terraform' <<<"$p"; then echo infra; return; fi
if grep -qiE 'package\.json|tsconfig|turbo\.json|pnpm-|\.config\.|eslint|vite' <<<"$p"; then echo build; return; fi
if grep -qE '\.tsx|\.css|components/|apps/web/' <<<"$p"; then echo ui; return; fi
if grep -qE '\.spec\.|\.test\.|__tests__/' <<<"$p"; then echo test; return; fi
if grep -qE '\.md$|docs/' <<<"$p"; then echo docs; return; fi
echo none
}
@@ -13,7 +13,12 @@ JSON_INPUT=$(cat)
if command -v jq &>/dev/null; then
FILE_PATH=$(echo "$JSON_INPUT" | jq -r '.tool_input.file_path // .tool_response.filePath // .file_path // empty' 2>/dev/null || echo "")
else
FILE_PATH=$(echo "$JSON_INPUT" | grep -o '"file_path"[[:space:]]*:[[:space:]]*"[^"]*"' | sed 's/.*"\([^"]*\)"$/\1/' | head -1)
file_path_pattern='"file_path"[[:space:]]*:[[:space:]]*"([^"]*)"'
if [[ "$JSON_INPUT" =~ $file_path_pattern ]]; then
FILE_PATH="${BASH_REMATCH[1]}"
else
FILE_PATH=""
fi
fi
# Only check TypeScript files
@@ -53,7 +58,7 @@ OUTPUT=$(npx tsc --noEmit --pretty --maxNodeModuleJsDepth 0 2>&1) || STATUS=$?
if [ "${STATUS:-0}" -ne 0 ]; then
# Filter output to only show errors related to the edited file (if possible)
BASENAME=$(basename "$FILE_PATH")
RELEVANT=$(echo "$OUTPUT" | grep -A2 "$BASENAME" 2>/dev/null || echo "$OUTPUT" | head -20)
RELEVANT=$(grep -A2 "$BASENAME" <<<"$OUTPUT" 2>/dev/null || sed -n '1,20p' <<<"$OUTPUT")
echo "TypeScript type errors detected after editing $FILE_PATH:"
echo "$RELEVANT"
@@ -0,0 +1,293 @@
#!/usr/bin/env bash
# check-tools-index.sh — assert every shipped tool is discoverable from the
# resident documentation an agent actually has in context.
#
# WHY THIS GATE EXISTS
# --------------------
# The framework ships 26 git wrappers. Before this gate, 20 of them were named
# in neither `defaults/TOOLS.md` nor `guides/TOOLS-REFERENCE.md`. One of the
# undocumented ones was `pr-review.sh` — the wrapper that carries the
# APPROVED/APPROVE provider-dialect split.
#
# The observable consequence, on a live fleet host: an agent needing to place a
# review verdict reached for raw `curl`, sent GitHub's `APPROVE` to a Gitea
# host, and got HTTP 200 with the review silently filed PENDING — three times,
# because nothing about the failure pointed at the wrapper that already handled
# it correctly. The agent was not ignoring Constitution gate 7. It was obeying
# an index that said the tool did not exist.
#
# That is not a discipline problem and no amount of prose fixes it. A wrapper
# that is not in the resident index is, from inside a session, indistinguishable
# from a wrapper that was never written. So the invariant is mechanical:
#
# shipping a tool and documenting it are the same commit, or CI fails.
#
# WHAT IT CHECKS
# --------------
# forward every non-excluded tool in an ENFORCED suite is named in at least
# one index document (missing tool -> undiscoverable -> FAIL)
# reverse every `<name>.sh` an index document attributes to an enforced
# suite exists on disk (stale reference -> agent runs a ghost -> FAIL)
#
# Suites outside the enforced set are reported with a coverage percentage but do
# not fail the build, so the ratchet can be tightened one suite per PR instead of
# landing as one unreviewable sweep. `--strict` fails on those too.
#
# WHY THE ENFORCED LIST LIVES HERE AND NOT IN A MARKER INSIDE THE DOC
# -------------------------------------------------------------------
# `TOOLS.md` is operator-owned (see framework-manifest.txt). A marker inside it
# would let an operator silence this gate by editing their own copy — the gate
# would then be strongest exactly where it is least needed and absent where it
# is needed most. The list is framework-owned and changes only through a
# reviewed PR.
#
# Usage:
# check-tools-index.sh [--tools-dir DIR] [--doc FILE]... [--strict] [--self-test]
#
# Exit: 0 = every enforced suite fully discoverable · 1 = drift · 2 = bad usage
set -euo pipefail
# Suites whose coverage is a HARD requirement. Add a suite here only together
# with the doc changes that make it pass.
#
# `git` is first because it is the suite Constitution gates 6-8 make mandatory:
# an undiscoverable git wrapper converts a hard gate into a coin flip.
ENFORCED_SUITES=(git)
# Files that are not agent-callable tools and must not be required in an index.
EXCLUDE_GLOBS=(
'test-*' # hermetic regression scripts, invoked by CI not by agents
'_*' # private helpers (_lib, _scripts internals)
'*.bak' # editor/installer debris
'*.pre-*' # pre-change backups (e.g. ci-queue-wait.sh.pre-404fix-bak)
'README.md'
)
STRICT=0
SELF_TEST=0
TOOLS_DIR=""
DOCS=()
die() { printf 'check-tools-index: %s\n' "$*" >&2; exit 2; }
while [ $# -gt 0 ]; do
case "$1" in
--tools-dir) TOOLS_DIR="${2:-}"; shift 2 ;;
--doc) DOCS+=("${2:-}"); shift 2 ;;
--strict) STRICT=1; shift ;;
--self-test) SELF_TEST=1; shift ;;
-h|--help) sed -n '2,48p' "$0" | sed 's/^# \{0,1\}//'; exit 0 ;;
*) die "unknown argument: $1" ;;
esac
done
# ---- location resolution ---------------------------------------------------
# Runs from two places with different layouts, and must not silently check the
# wrong tree: a CI checkout (repo-relative) and an installed host ($MOSAIC_HOME).
resolve_locations() {
local here framework
here="$(cd -- "$(dirname -- "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
# .../framework/tools/quality/scripts -> .../framework
framework="$(cd -- "$here/../../.." && pwd)"
if [ -z "$TOOLS_DIR" ]; then
if [ -d "$framework/tools" ]; then
TOOLS_DIR="$framework/tools"
else
TOOLS_DIR="${MOSAIC_HOME:-$HOME/.config/mosaic}/tools"
fi
fi
if [ ${#DOCS[@]} -eq 0 ]; then
# The two layouts are mutually exclusive on purpose. Unioning them would let
# a well-maintained operator TOOLS.md on the developer's own machine mask a
# gap in the shipped defaults — the check would pass locally and the defect
# would still install on every other host. Repo layout wins when present.
if [ -f "$framework/defaults/TOOLS.md" ]; then
DOCS+=("$framework/defaults/TOOLS.md")
[ -f "$framework/guides/TOOLS-REFERENCE.md" ] && DOCS+=("$framework/guides/TOOLS-REFERENCE.md")
else
local mosaic_home="${MOSAIC_HOME:-$HOME/.config/mosaic}"
[ -f "$mosaic_home/TOOLS.md" ] && DOCS+=("$mosaic_home/TOOLS.md")
[ -f "$mosaic_home/guides/TOOLS-REFERENCE.md" ] && DOCS+=("$mosaic_home/guides/TOOLS-REFERENCE.md")
fi
fi
[ -d "$TOOLS_DIR" ] || die "tools dir not found: $TOOLS_DIR"
[ ${#DOCS[@]} -gt 0 ] || die "no index documents found (pass --doc FILE)"
}
is_excluded() {
local name="$1" glob
for glob in "${EXCLUDE_GLOBS[@]}"; do
# shellcheck disable=SC2254 # glob is intentionally a pattern
case "$name" in $glob) return 0 ;; esac
done
return 1
}
# A tool counts as documented when its basename appears anywhere in the corpus.
# Deliberately permissive about *form* (table cell, code fence, prose) and strict
# about *presence*: the gate's job is "an agent can find it", not house style.
documented() { grep -qF -- "$1" "$CORPUS"; }
# ---- the check -------------------------------------------------------------
run_check() {
local rc=0 suite dir tool base enforced
CORPUS="$(mktemp)"; trap 'rm -f "$CORPUS"' RETURN
cat "${DOCS[@]}" > "$CORPUS"
printf 'tools: %s\n' "$TOOLS_DIR"
for d in "${DOCS[@]}"; do printf 'index: %s\n' "$d"; done
printf '\n'
for dir in "$TOOLS_DIR"/*/; do
[ -d "$dir" ] || continue
suite="$(basename -- "$dir")"
case " ${ENFORCED_SUITES[*]} " in *" $suite "*) enforced=1 ;; *) enforced=0 ;; esac
[ "$STRICT" -eq 1 ] && enforced=1
case "$suite" in _*) continue ;; esac
local total=0 found=0
local -a suite_missing=() suite_noexec=()
for tool in "$dir"*.sh; do
[ -e "$tool" ] || continue
base="$(basename -- "$tool")"
is_excluded "$base" && continue
total=$((total + 1))
if documented "$base"; then
found=$((found + 1))
# Documented AND present is not enough. The index presents these as
# commands to run, and every caller — the wrapper guard included —
# decides "is this tool here?" with `[ -x ]`. A 0644 wrapper is
# documented, present, and dead: it reads as absent to every check that
# matters while scoring 100% here. That is a false green, which is worse
# than a red, so it fails rather than warns.
[ -x "$tool" ] || suite_noexec+=("$base")
else
suite_missing+=("$base")
fi
done
[ "$total" -eq 0 ] && continue
local pct=$(( found * 100 / total ))
if [ "$enforced" -eq 1 ] && [ ${#suite_noexec[@]} -gt 0 ]; then
printf 'FAIL %-12s %3d%% (%d/%d) documented but not executable: %s\n' \
"$suite" "$pct" "$found" "$total" "${suite_noexec[*]}"
rc=1
fi
if [ "$enforced" -eq 1 ] && [ ${#suite_missing[@]} -gt 0 ]; then
printf 'FAIL %-12s %3d%% (%d/%d) undocumented: %s\n' \
"$suite" "$pct" "$found" "$total" "${suite_missing[*]}"
rc=1
elif [ "$enforced" -eq 1 ] && [ ${#suite_noexec[@]} -eq 0 ]; then
printf 'ok %-12s %3d%% (%d/%d) [enforced]\n' "$suite" "$pct" "$found" "$total"
else
printf 'info %-12s %3d%% (%d/%d) not yet enforced\n' "$suite" "$pct" "$found" "$total"
fi
# Reverse: an index that names a tool this suite does not have sends agents
# after something that cannot run. Only checked for enforced suites, where
# the naming is unambiguous enough to attribute.
if [ "$enforced" -eq 1 ]; then
local -a stale=()
local ref
while read -r ref; do
[ -n "$ref" ] || continue
is_excluded "$ref" && continue
[ -e "$dir$ref" ] || stale+=("$ref")
done < <(grep -oE "$suite/[a-z0-9][a-z0-9._-]*\.sh" "$CORPUS" \
| sed "s|^$suite/||" | sort -u)
if [ ${#stale[@]} -gt 0 ]; then
printf 'FAIL %-12s stale index references (no such file): %s\n' \
"$suite" "${stale[*]}"
rc=1
fi
fi
done
printf '\n'
if [ "$rc" -ne 0 ]; then
cat <<EOF
Undocumented tools are undiscoverable. An agent cannot obey a hard gate that
tells it to use a wrapper it has no way to learn exists — it will reach for raw
curl/gh/tea instead, and the wrapper's provider-dialect handling will be lost.
Fix by naming each tool above in one of the index documents listed at the top,
in the same commit that ships it.
EOF
else
printf 'every enforced suite is fully discoverable.\n'
fi
return "$rc"
}
# ---- self-test -------------------------------------------------------------
# Proves the gate can actually fail. A checker that only ever passes is
# indistinguishable from one that is not running, which is the failure mode this
# whole file exists to prevent — so it must demonstrate a red on demand.
self_test() {
local tmp rc
tmp="$(mktemp -d)"; trap 'rm -rf "$tmp"' RETURN
mkdir -p "$tmp/tools/git"
printf '#!/bin/sh\n' > "$tmp/tools/git/documented-tool.sh"
printf '#!/bin/sh\n' > "$tmp/tools/git/test-ignored.sh"
chmod +x "$tmp/tools/git/documented-tool.sh" "$tmp/tools/git/test-ignored.sh"
# run_check reads the TOOLS_DIR / DOCS globals; an array cannot ride in a
# command-prefix assignment, so point the globals at the fixture directly.
TOOLS_DIR="$tmp/tools"
DOCS=("$tmp/doc.md")
# Case 1: fully documented -> pass.
printf 'see tools/git/documented-tool.sh for details\n' > "$tmp/doc.md"
if run_check >/dev/null; then
printf 'self-test 1/4 ok (complete index passes)\n'
else
printf 'self-test 1/4 FAIL (complete index should pass)\n'; return 1
fi
# Case 2: an undocumented tool -> fail.
printf '#!/bin/sh\n' > "$tmp/tools/git/undocumented-tool.sh"
rc=0; run_check >/dev/null || rc=$?
if [ "$rc" -eq 1 ]; then
printf 'self-test 2/4 ok (undocumented tool fails the gate)\n'
else
printf 'self-test 2/4 FAIL (undocumented tool should fail, got rc=%s)\n' "$rc"; return 1
fi
# Case 3: a stale index reference -> fail.
rm "$tmp/tools/git/undocumented-tool.sh"
printf 'also tools/git/deleted-tool.sh\n' >> "$tmp/doc.md"
rc=0; run_check >/dev/null || rc=$?
if [ "$rc" -eq 1 ]; then
printf 'self-test 3/4 ok (stale index reference fails the gate)\n'
else
printf 'self-test 3/4 FAIL (stale reference should fail, got rc=%s)\n' "$rc"; return 1
fi
# Case 4: documented, present, and NOT executable -> fail. Found by an
# independent reviewer: a 0644 wrapper scored 100% here while reading as
# absent to every `[ -x ]` in the fleet, including the wrapper guard's.
sed -i '/deleted-tool/d' "$tmp/doc.md"
printf '#!/bin/sh\n' > "$tmp/tools/git/noexec-tool.sh"
chmod 0644 "$tmp/tools/git/noexec-tool.sh"
printf 'and tools/git/noexec-tool.sh\n' >> "$tmp/doc.md"
rc=0; run_check >/dev/null || rc=$?
if [ "$rc" -eq 1 ]; then
printf 'self-test 4/4 ok (documented but non-executable tool fails the gate)\n'
else
printf 'self-test 4/4 FAIL (non-executable tool should fail, got rc=%s)\n' "$rc"; return 1
fi
printf '\nself-test passed: the gate demonstrably reds on every drift direction.\n'
}
if [ "$SELF_TEST" -eq 1 ]; then
self_test
else
resolve_locations
run_check
fi
@@ -26,6 +26,9 @@ chk "F1 fresh: CONSTITUTION/AGENTS/STANDARDS/TOOLS seeded" \
"[ -f '$T1/CONSTITUTION.md' ] && [ -f '$T1/AGENTS.md' ] && [ -f '$T1/STANDARDS.md' ] && [ -f '$T1/TOOLS.md' ]"
chk "F1 fresh: AGENTS == shipped default" "cmp -s '$T1/AGENTS.md' '$DEFA/AGENTS.md'"
chk "F1 fresh: framework-version stamped 3" "[ \"\$(cat '$T1/.framework-version' 2>/dev/null)\" = 3 ]"
chk "F1 fresh: Pi goal extension deploys under Mosaic runtime" \
"cmp -s '$T1/runtime/pi/goal-extension.ts' '$FW/runtime/pi/goal-extension.ts'"
chk "F1 fresh: installer creates no nested main Pi config" "[ ! -e '$T1/.pi' ]"
# F2 — legacy install with a user-edited AGENTS.md (the sanctioned pre-constitution customization)
T2=$(mktemp -d); mkdir -p "$T2/credentials"
@@ -89,6 +92,8 @@ chk "F6 reseed: per-agent env bytes survive" "cmp -s '$T6/fleet/agents/coder0.en
chk "F6 reseed: heartbeat bytes survive" "cmp -s '$T6/fleet/run/coder0.hb' '$E6/run.expected'"
chk "F6 reseed: framework examples are refreshed" "grep -q orchestrator '$T6/fleet/examples/general.yaml'"
chk "F6 reseed: framework roster schema is refreshed" "cmp -s '$T6/fleet/roster.schema.json' '$FW/fleet/roster.schema.json'"
chk "F6 reseed: Pi goal extension is refreshed from framework source" \
"cmp -s '$T6/runtime/pi/goal-extension.ts' '$FW/runtime/pi/goal-extension.ts'"
rm -rf "$T1" "$T2" "$T3" "$T4" "$T5" "$T6" "$E6"
echo
@@ -176,8 +176,12 @@ run_snap() {
# Resolve the single pre-update-* snapshot dir under a state dir (newest if many).
snap_dir() {
find "$1/mosaic/backups" -maxdepth 1 -type d -name 'pre-update-*' 2>/dev/null \
| LC_ALL=C sort -r | head -1
local -a snapshots=()
mapfile -t snapshots < <(
find "$1/mosaic/backups" -maxdepth 1 -type d -name 'pre-update-*' 2>/dev/null \
| LC_ALL=C sort -r
)
printf '%s\n' "${snapshots[0]:-}"
}
echo "── Part 1/2/3: durable snapshot scope, perms, no-leak ──────────────────"
@@ -336,7 +336,7 @@ chk "[reset-fail] the manual-recovery pointer is emitted (not a silent set -e ex
"grep -q 'Snapshot restore could not reset' '$OUTG'"
chk "[reset-fail] the recovery message points at a preserved snapshot dir" \
"grep -q 'preserved at: .*mosaic-snapshot' '$OUTG'"
SNAP_E="$(grep -o '/[^ ]*mosaic-snapshot[^ ]*' "$OUTG" | head -1)"
SNAP_E="$(grep -m1 -o '/[^ ]*mosaic-snapshot[^ ]*' "$OUTG")"
chk "[reset-fail] the named snapshot directory actually survives for recovery" \
"[ -n '$SNAP_E' ] && [ -d '$SNAP_E' ]"
chk "[reset-fail] operator secret value never appears in installer output" \
@@ -353,7 +353,8 @@ chk "[control] without the D2 recovery line the operator gets no snapshot pointe
"! grep -q 'Snapshot restore could not reset' '$OUTH'"
[ -n "${SNAP_E:-}" ] && rm -rf "$SNAP_E"
# Reap any snapshot the reset-fail runs left in /tmp (reset failed → never cleaned).
grep -o '/[^ ]*mosaic-snapshot[^ ]*' "$OUTH" 2>/dev/null | head -1 | while read -r s; do rm -rf "$s"; done
orphan_snapshot="$(grep -m1 -o '/[^ ]*mosaic-snapshot[^ ]*' "$OUTH" 2>/dev/null || true)"
[ -n "$orphan_snapshot" ] && rm -rf "$orphan_snapshot"
# Cleanup (generated installer controls are also removed by the EXIT trap).
for d in "$HA" "$REFA" "$HB" "$REFB" "$HC" "$HD" "$HE" "$REFE" "$HF" "$REFF" "$HG" "$HH"; do rm -rf "$d"; done
@@ -32,7 +32,6 @@ packages/mosaic/framework/tools/tmux/test-send-message-socket.sh | requires a re
packages/mosaic/framework/tools/tmux/test-send-message-verdict.sh | requires real tmux-pane fixtures on a throwaway socket; CI image ships no tmux; #1017 burndown (same condition as its sibling)
# --- single-suite directories: unmeasured in CI ---
packages/mosaic/framework/tools/fleet/test-start-agent-session.sh | unmeasured in CI image; stubs tmux via a fake bin dir, likely CI-fit; #1017 burndown
packages/mosaic/framework/tools/glpi/test-list-http-status.sh | unmeasured in CI image; stub-based (#807 regression harness), likely CI-fit; #1017 burndown
packages/mosaic/framework/tools/orchestrator/test-board-roll.sh | unmeasured in CI image; file-fixture based, likely CI-fit; #1017 burndown
packages/mosaic/framework/tools/woodpecker/test-ci-wait-exit-matrix.sh | unmeasured in CI image; drives ci-wait.sh against a stub pipeline-status.sh, likely CI-fit; #1017 burndown
@@ -110,7 +110,7 @@ for attempt in $(seq 1 $((RETRIES + 1))); do
sleep 1.2
pane=$("${tmux_cmd[@]}" capture-pane -t "$EFFECTIVE_TARGET" -p 2>/dev/null)
if printf '%s' "$pane" | grep -qF "$QUEUED_RE"; then
if grep -qF "$QUEUED_RE" <<<"$pane"; then
status="queued"; break
fi
# Locate the REPL input box (prompt glyph). If we cannot see it, we have NO
@@ -121,7 +121,7 @@ for attempt in $(seq 1 $((RETRIES + 1))); do
fi
# Input box located AND still carrying our tail => unsubmitted draft. Flush + retry.
# (Submitted messages scroll up into history; a draft stays on the line.)
if [ -n "$snippet" ] && printf '%s' "$promptline" | grep -qF "$snippet"; then
if [ -n "$snippet" ] && grep -qF "$snippet" <<<"$promptline"; then
status="draft"; continue
fi
# Input box located AND clear of our tail => positively submitted. This is the
@@ -34,16 +34,20 @@ tmux new-session -d -s "$DEFAULT_TARGET" -c "$TMPDIR" 'PS1=" " exec bash --no
"$SEND_MESSAGE" -L "$SOCKET" -t "=$TARGET" -m "named socket hello" >/tmp/send-message-named.out
sleep 0.2
capture_named | grep -qF "named socket hello" || fail "send-message.sh did not deliver to named socket"
if capture_default | grep -qF "named socket hello"; then
named_pane="$(capture_named)" || fail "could not capture named socket pane"
grep -qF "named socket hello" <<<"$named_pane" || fail "send-message.sh did not deliver to named socket"
default_pane="$(capture_default)" || fail "could not capture default socket pane"
if grep -qF "named socket hello" <<<"$default_pane"; then
fail "send-message.sh leaked named-socket message to default tmux server"
fi
"$AGENT_SEND" -L "$SOCKET" -S "tester:source" -s "=$TARGET" -m "agent socket hello" >/tmp/agent-send-named.out
sleep 0.2
capture_named | grep -qF "[tester:source ->" || fail "agent-send.sh did not include preamble"
capture_named | grep -qF "agent socket hello" || fail "agent-send.sh did not deliver to named socket"
if capture_default | grep -qF "agent socket hello"; then
named_pane="$(capture_named)" || fail "could not capture named socket pane"
grep -qF "[tester:source ->" <<<"$named_pane" || fail "agent-send.sh did not include preamble"
grep -qF "agent socket hello" <<<"$named_pane" || fail "agent-send.sh did not deliver to named socket"
default_pane="$(capture_default)" || fail "could not capture default socket pane"
if grep -qF "agent socket hello" <<<"$default_pane"; then
fail "agent-send.sh leaked named-socket message to default tmux server"
fi
@@ -65,11 +69,11 @@ done
sleep 0.2
for i in $(seq 1 "$CONC_N"); do
pane=$(tmux -L "$SOCKET" capture-pane -t "=conc-$i:0.0" -p)
printf '%s' "$pane" | grep -qF "CONCPAYLOAD-${i}-END" \
grep -qF "CONCPAYLOAD-${i}-END" <<<"$pane" \
|| fail "concurrent send dropped payload for pane conc-$i"
for j in $(seq 1 "$CONC_N"); do
[ "$j" = "$i" ] && continue
if printf '%s' "$pane" | grep -qF "CONCPAYLOAD-${j}-END"; then
if grep -qF "CONCPAYLOAD-${j}-END" <<<"$pane"; then
fail "concurrent send cross-delivered payload $j to pane conc-$i"
fi
done
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ tmux -L "$SOCKET" new-session -d -s repl -c "$TMP" \
'PS1=" " exec bash --noprofile --norc -i'
sleep 0.3
out=$("$SEND" -L "$SOCKET" -t "=repl" -m "verdict fixture one delivered ok" 2>"$TMP/e1"); rc=$?
if [ "$rc" -eq 0 ] && printf '%s' "$out" | grep -qF "✓ delivered"; then
if [ "$rc" -eq 0 ] && grep -qF "✓ delivered" <<<"$out"; then
ok "delivered: -prompt REPL that submits => exit 0 ✓ delivered"
else
no "delivered: -prompt REPL that submits => exit 0 ✓ delivered" "rc=$rc out=[$out] err=[$(cat "$TMP/e1")]"
@@ -123,7 +123,7 @@ _manifest_val() {
# _manifest_val KEY — echo VALUE for KEY=VALUE in the manifest (blank if none).
local key="$1"
[ -f "$MANIFEST" ] || return 0
sed -n "s/^${key}=//p" "$MANIFEST" | head -n1 | tr -d '[:space:]'
awk -v key="$key" 'index($0, key "=") == 1 { sub(/^[^=]*=/, ""); gsub(/[[:space:]]/, ""); print; exit }' "$MANIFEST"
}
# _load_watchlist — validate the watch-list path + JSON + schema_version range.
@@ -267,7 +267,7 @@ _poll_source() {
if snap_json="$(jq -ce '.' <<<"$rawmeta" 2>/dev/null)"; then
snap_sha="$(jq -r 'if (.snapshot_sha|type) == "string" then .snapshot_sha else "" end' <<<"$snap_json")"
snap_ts="$(jq -r 'if (.snapshot_ts|type) == "number" then (.snapshot_ts|floor|tostring) else "" end' <<<"$snap_json")"
if [ -n "$snap_sha" ] && ! printf '%s' "$snap_sha" | grep -Eq '^[0-9a-f]{7,64}$'; then
if [ -n "$snap_sha" ] && ! grep -Eq '^[0-9a-f]{7,64}$' <<<"$snap_sha"; then
echo "detector.sh: source '$kind/$id' snapshot_sha rejected (not a 7-64 char lowercase-hex git sha) — snapshot metadata DROPPED, poll continues (#940)." >&2
snap_sha=""
snap_ts=""
@@ -275,7 +275,7 @@ _poll_source() {
# A ts must be a sane positive epoch BEFORE any arithmetic touches it: a
# negative or absurdly large value would make the shell integer comparison
# below error out and silently KEEP the bad ts — validate first, compare after.
if [ -n "$snap_ts" ] && ! printf '%s' "$snap_ts" | grep -Eq '^[0-9]{1,12}$'; then
if [ -n "$snap_ts" ] && ! grep -Eq '^[0-9]{1,12}$' <<<"$snap_ts"; then
echo "detector.sh: source '$kind/$id' snapshot_ts rejected (not a sane positive epoch) — snapshot_ts DROPPED, poll continues (#940)." >&2
snap_ts=""
fi
@@ -644,7 +644,8 @@ cmd_render() {
oseq="$(jq -r '.observed_seq // "?"' <<<"$line")"
oclass="$(jq -r '.class // "actionable"' <<<"$line")"
oloc="$(jq -c '.locators // {}' <<<"$line")"
olabel="$(_locator_line "$oloc" | head -n1)"
olabel="$(_locator_line "$oloc")"
olabel="${olabel%%$'\n'*}"
printf ' * seq %s [%s] %s\n' "$oseq" "$(_scrub_inline "$oclass")" "$olabel"
done <<<"$pending"
fi
@@ -146,7 +146,7 @@ EOF
_manifest_val() {
local key="$1"
[ -f "$MANIFEST" ] || return 0
sed -n "s/^${key}=//p" "$MANIFEST" | head -n1 | tr -d '[:space:]'
awk -v key="$key" 'index($0, key "=") == 1 { sub(/^[^=]*=/, ""); gsub(/[[:space:]]/, ""); print; exit }' "$MANIFEST"
}
# _load_watchlist — validate path + JSON + shape + Gate B schema range (mirrors
@@ -564,7 +564,7 @@ echo "== Q16 (guard): Q2's ENUM-B fixture must STAY address-free — the reconci
# Token concatenated so THIS guard's own source lines never contain the
# literal fixture id and cannot self-match.
enum_id='ENUM''-B'
fixture_line="$(has_match -F "\"id\":\"$enum_id\"" "$self" | has_match -F '"observed_seq":5' | head -n1)"
fixture_lines="$(has_match -F "\"id\":\"$enum_id\"" "$self")"; fixture_matches="$(has_match -F '"observed_seq":5' <<<"$fixture_lines")"; fixture_line="${fixture_matches%%$'\n'*}"
[ -n "$fixture_line" ] || fail_msg "Q16: could not locate Q2's $enum_id fixture line (renamed/renumbered? update this guard)"
fixture_json="$(printf '%s' "$fixture_line" | sed "s/.*'\({.*}\)'.*/\1/")"
# Positive controls FIRST (blind-instrument rule): the extraction must yield
@@ -179,8 +179,8 @@ echo "== P3: detector orders the cause line BEFORE the delta it explains =="
printf 'r1 state v2\n' >"$fx/repo_r1"
"$DET" poll-once >/dev/null 2>&1 || fail_msg "P3: second poll failed"
sd="$(state_dir)"
pre_seq="$(jq -r 'select(.locators.kind == "preimage") | .observed_seq' "$sd/pending.jsonl" | head -n1)"
src_seq="$(jq -r 'select(.locators.kind == "repo") | .observed_seq' "$sd/pending.jsonl" | head -n1)"
pre_seq="$(jq -nr 'first(inputs | select(.locators.kind == "preimage") | .observed_seq) // empty' "$sd/pending.jsonl")"
src_seq="$(jq -nr 'first(inputs | select(.locators.kind == "repo") | .observed_seq) // empty' "$sd/pending.jsonl")"
[ -n "$pre_seq" ] || fail_msg "P3: no preimage cause entry enqueued"
[ -n "$src_seq" ] || fail_msg "P3: no source delta entry enqueued"
if [ -n "$pre_seq" ] && [ -n "$src_seq" ]; then
@@ -343,8 +343,8 @@ echo "== P11: reconcile surfaces the cause line before its enumerations =="
printf '# adapter changed while detector down\n' >>"$fx/adapter.sh"
"$RECON" reconcile >/dev/null 2>&1 # rc 1 expected (unaccounted enumerated)
sd="$(state_dir)"
pre_seq="$(jq -r 'select(.locators.kind == "preimage") | .observed_seq' "$sd/pending.jsonl" | head -n1)"
enum_seq="$(jq -r 'select(.locators.reconciled == true) | .observed_seq' "$sd/pending.jsonl" | head -n1)"
pre_seq="$(jq -nr 'first(inputs | select(.locators.kind == "preimage") | .observed_seq) // empty' "$sd/pending.jsonl")"
enum_seq="$(jq -nr 'first(inputs | select(.locators.reconciled == true) | .observed_seq) // empty' "$sd/pending.jsonl")"
[ -n "$pre_seq" ] || fail_msg "P11: reconcile must enqueue the preimage cause line"
[ -n "$enum_seq" ] || fail_msg "P11: reconcile must still enumerate the unaccounted source"
if [ -n "$pre_seq" ] && [ -n "$enum_seq" ]; then
@@ -150,7 +150,7 @@ site_line() { # site_line FILE MARKER -> first physical line of that call
local f="$1" marker="$2" ln
ln="$(grep -n "# SITE:${marker}\$" "$f" | cut -d: -f1)"
# continuation marker sits on the tail line; the call starts one line up
if ! sed -n "${ln}p" "$f" | grep -Eq 'has_match|count_lines'; then
source_line="$(sed -n "${ln}p" "$f")"; if ! grep -Eq 'has_match|count_lines' <<<"$source_line"; then
ln=$((ln - 1))
fi
printf '%s' "$ln"
@@ -167,13 +167,13 @@ rcB=$?
sort "$LEDGER" >"$TMP/got-c1"
n_expected="$(grep -c . "$TMP/expected-c1")"
if [ "$rcA" -eq 0 ] && [ "$rcB" -eq 0 ] &&
printf '%s' "$outA" | grep -q 'mini-a: OK' &&
printf '%s' "$outB" | grep -q 'mini-b: OK' &&
grep -q 'mini-a: OK' <<<"$outA"&&
grep -q 'mini-b: OK' <<<"$outB"&&
[ "$n_expected" -gt 1 ] &&
cmp -s "$TMP/expected-c1" "$TMP/got-c1"; then
check C1 0 ""
else
check C1 1 "rcA=$rcA rcB=$rcB expected($n_expected)/got diff: $(diff "$TMP/expected-c1" "$TMP/got-c1" 2>&1 | head -n 10 | tr '\n' ' ')"
check C1 1 "rcA=$rcA rcB=$rcB expected($n_expected)/got diff: $(diff "$TMP/expected-c1" "$TMP/got-c1" 2>&1 | sed -n '1,10p' | tr '\n' ' ')"
fi
# --- C2: early exit -> short ledger, comparison catches it -----------------
@@ -201,12 +201,12 @@ abort_case() { # abort_case NAME MARKER HELPER
bash "$TMP/mini-a.sh" "$TMP" 2>&1)"
rc=$?
if [ "$rc" -ne 0 ] &&
! printf '%s' "$out" | grep -q 'mini-a: OK' &&
! printf '%s' "$out" | grep -q 'mini-a: FAILED' &&
printf '%s' "$out" | grep -q "WAKE-ASSERT ARMED: forcing real grep error at $site" &&
printf '%s' "$out" | grep -q "WAKE-ASSERT ABORT" &&
printf '%s' "$out" | grep -q "$site" &&
printf '%s' "$out" | grep -q "grep exit 2" &&
! grep -q 'mini-a: OK' <<<"$out"&&
! grep -q 'mini-a: FAILED' <<<"$out"&&
grep -q "WAKE-ASSERT ARMED: forcing real grep error at $site" <<<"$out"&&
grep -q "WAKE-ASSERT ABORT" <<<"$out"&&
grep -q "$site" <<<"$out"&&
grep -q "grep exit 2" <<<"$out"&&
grep -q "^${helper} ${site}\$" "$ledger"; then
check "$name" 0 ""
else
@@ -230,8 +230,8 @@ if [ "$got" = "1" ]; then check C8 0 ""; else check C8 1 "env-prefix did not rea
out="$(WAKE_ASSERT_FORCE_GREP_ERROR_AT="mini-a.sh:9999" bash "$TMP/mini-a.sh" "$TMP" 2>&1)"
rc=$?
if [ "$rc" -eq 0 ] &&
printf '%s' "$out" | grep -q 'mini-a: OK' &&
! printf '%s' "$out" | grep -q 'WAKE-ASSERT ARMED'; then
grep -q 'mini-a: OK' <<<"$out"&&
! grep -q 'WAKE-ASSERT ARMED' <<<"$out"; then
check C9 0 ""
else
check C9 1 "rc=$rc out=$(printf '%s' "$out" | tail -n 3 | tr '\n' ' ')"
@@ -248,8 +248,8 @@ chmod +x "$TMP/fake-bash"
out="$(WAKE_ASSERT_PIN_BASH="$TMP/fake-bash" bash -c '. "$WAKE_COMMON" && wake_assert_init && echo REACHED-PAST-INIT' 2>&1)"
rc=$?
if [ "$rc" -ne 0 ] &&
! printf '%s' "$out" | grep -q 'REACHED-PAST-INIT' &&
printf '%s' "$out" | grep -q 'WAKE-ASSERT INIT ABORT: BASH_LINENO convention violated'; then
! grep -q 'REACHED-PAST-INIT' <<<"$out"&&
grep -q 'WAKE-ASSERT INIT ABORT: BASH_LINENO convention violated' <<<"$out"; then
check C10 0 ""
else
check C10 1 "rc=$rc out=$(printf '%s' "$out" | tail -n 2 | tr '\n' ' ')"
@@ -283,8 +283,8 @@ out="$(WAKE_ASSERT_LEDGER="$LEDGER" bash "$TMP/mini-c.sh" "$TMP" 2>&1)"
rc=$?
summary_ln="$(site_line "$TMP/mini-c.sh" c-summary)"
if [ "$rc" -eq 1 ] &&
printf '%s' "$out" | grep -q 'wake mini-c harness: FAILED (1 assertion(s))' &&
! printf '%s' "$out" | grep -q 'all invariants passed' &&
grep -q 'wake mini-c harness: FAILED (1 assertion(s))' <<<"$out"&&
! grep -q 'all invariants passed' <<<"$out"&&
grep -q "^count_lines mini-c.sh:${summary_ln}\$" "$LEDGER"; then
check C11 0 ""
else
@@ -107,7 +107,7 @@ if cmp -s "$TMP/expected.txt" "$TMP/static.txt"; then
echo "STATIC-INVENTORY equals expected set ($(grep -c . "$TMP/static.txt") rows from source text)"
else
flag "static inventory (source text) differs from expected set (artifact):"
diff "$TMP/expected.txt" "$TMP/static.txt" | head -n 20 | sed 's/^/ /'
diff "$TMP/expected.txt" "$TMP/static.txt" | sed -n '1,20p' | sed 's/^/ /'
fi
# --- 3: green instrumented run ----------------------------------------------
@@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ LEDGER="$TMP/ledger"
for s in "${SUITES[@]}"; do
out="$(WAKE_ASSERT_LEDGER="$LEDGER" bash "$WAKE/$s" 2>&1)"
rc=$?
if printf '%s\n' "$out" | grep -Eq "$(sentinel_for "$s")"; then
if grep -Eq "$(sentinel_for "$s")" <<<"$out"; then
sent="present"
else
sent="ABSENT"
@@ -177,14 +177,14 @@ while read -r helper site form; do
rc=$?
bad=""
[ "$rc" -ne 0 ] || bad="$bad exit=0"
printf '%s\n' "$out" | grep -q "WAKE-ASSERT ARMED: forcing real grep error at $site" ||
grep -q "WAKE-ASSERT ARMED: forcing real grep error at $site" <<<"$out"||
bad="$bad no-ARMED-line"
printf '%s\n' "$out" | grep -q "WAKE-ASSERT ABORT: ${helper} at ${site}: grep exit" ||
grep -q "WAKE-ASSERT ABORT: ${helper} at ${site}: grep exit" <<<"$out"||
bad="$bad no-ABORT-line"
# AND-polarity check (a match is the defect): a grep error (rc>=2) must be
# its own loud arm — it cannot fall through as "no sentinel = pass".
rc_sent=0
printf '%s\n' "$out" | grep -Eq "$(sentinel_for "$f")" || rc_sent=$?
grep -Eq "$(sentinel_for "$f")" <<<"$out"|| rc_sent=$?
case "$rc_sent" in
0) bad="$bad sentinel-emitted" ;;
1) : ;;
+1 -1
View File
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@
"lint": "eslint src",
"typecheck": "tsc --noEmit",
"test": "vitest run --passWithNoTests && pnpm run test:framework-shell",
"test:framework-shell": "bash framework/tools/quality/scripts/check-test-enumeration.sh && bash framework/tools/quality/scripts/test-check-test-enumeration.sh && python3 src/lease-broker/daemon_deadline_unittest.py && python3 src/lease-broker/normative_fragments_unittest.py && python3 src/lease-broker/receipt_challenge_unittest.py && python3 src/lease-broker/context_recovery_unittest.py && python3 src/lease-broker/recovery_runtime_unittest.py && python3 src/lease-broker/recovery_b1_adversarial_unittest.py && python3 src/lease-broker/framework_skill_portability_unittest.py && python3 src/mutator-gate/runtime_tools_unittest.py && python3 src/mutator-gate/runtime_launch_guard_unittest.py && python3 src/mutator-gate/version_coupling_unittest.py && python3 framework/tools/lease-broker/check-runtime-launches.py --root ../.. && bash framework/tools/codex/test-pr-diff-context.sh && bash framework/tools/qa/test-deps-preflight.sh && bash framework/tools/git/test-pr-review-gitea-comment.sh && bash framework/tools/git/test-pr-review-repo-host-override.sh && bash framework/tools/git/test-ci-queue-wait-branch-absent.sh && bash framework/tools/git/test-ci-queue-wait-tristate.sh && bash framework/tools/git/test-ci-queue-wait-github-checks.sh && bash framework/tools/git/test-pr-merge-queue-branch.sh && bash framework/tools/git/test-pr-merge-head-pin.sh && bash framework/tools/git/test-pr-merge-message-field.sh && bash framework/tools/git/test-git-credential-mosaic.sh && bash framework/tools/git/test-gitea-token-identity.sh && bash framework/tools/git/test-explain-diagnostic-status-neutral.sh && bash framework/tools/git/test-detect-platform-outside-repo.sh && bash framework/tools/woodpecker/test-terminal-green-contract.sh && bash framework/tools/_scripts/test-install-ordering-guard.sh && bash framework/tools/tmux/agent-send.test.sh && bash framework/tools/wake/test-wake-store-ack.sh && bash framework/tools/wake/test-wake-store-enqueue-race.sh && bash framework/tools/wake/test-wake-digest-hmac.sh && bash framework/tools/wake/test-wake-digest-quarantine.sh && bash framework/tools/wake/test-wake-detector.sh && bash framework/tools/wake/test-wake-fn-oracle.sh && bash framework/tools/wake/test-wake-reconcile.sh && bash framework/tools/wake/test-wake-beacon.sh && bash framework/tools/wake/test-wake-preimage.sh && bash framework/tools/wake/test-wake-install.sh"
"test:framework-shell": "bash framework/tools/quality/scripts/check-test-enumeration.sh && bash framework/tools/quality/scripts/test-check-test-enumeration.sh && bash framework/tools/fleet/test-start-agent-session.sh && bash framework/systemd/user/test-fleet-units.sh && python3 src/lease-broker/daemon_deadline_unittest.py && python3 src/lease-broker/normative_fragments_unittest.py && python3 src/lease-broker/receipt_challenge_unittest.py && python3 src/lease-broker/context_recovery_unittest.py && python3 src/lease-broker/recovery_runtime_unittest.py && python3 src/lease-broker/recovery_b1_adversarial_unittest.py && python3 src/lease-broker/framework_skill_portability_unittest.py && python3 src/mutator-gate/runtime_tools_unittest.py && python3 src/mutator-gate/runtime_launch_guard_unittest.py && python3 src/mutator-gate/version_coupling_unittest.py && python3 framework/tools/lease-broker/check-runtime-launches.py --root ../.. && bash framework/tools/codex/test-pr-diff-context.sh && bash framework/tools/qa/test-deps-preflight.sh && bash framework/tools/git/test-pr-review-gitea-comment.sh && bash framework/tools/git/test-pr-review-repo-host-override.sh && bash framework/tools/git/test-ci-queue-wait-branch-absent.sh && bash framework/tools/git/test-ci-queue-wait-tristate.sh && bash framework/tools/git/test-ci-queue-wait-github-checks.sh && bash framework/tools/git/test-pr-merge-queue-branch.sh && bash framework/tools/git/test-pr-merge-head-pin.sh && bash framework/tools/git/test-pr-merge-message-field.sh && bash framework/tools/git/test-git-credential-mosaic.sh && bash framework/tools/git/test-gitea-token-identity.sh && bash framework/tools/git/test-explain-diagnostic-status-neutral.sh && bash framework/tools/git/test-detect-platform-outside-repo.sh && bash framework/tools/woodpecker/test-terminal-green-contract.sh && bash framework/tools/_scripts/test-install-ordering-guard.sh && bash framework/tools/tmux/agent-send.test.sh && bash framework/tools/wake/test-wake-store-ack.sh && bash framework/tools/wake/test-wake-store-enqueue-race.sh && bash framework/tools/wake/test-wake-digest-hmac.sh && bash framework/tools/wake/test-wake-digest-quarantine.sh && bash framework/tools/wake/test-wake-detector.sh && bash framework/tools/wake/test-wake-fn-oracle.sh && bash framework/tools/wake/test-wake-reconcile.sh && bash framework/tools/wake/test-wake-beacon.sh && bash framework/tools/wake/test-wake-preimage.sh && bash framework/tools/wake/test-wake-install.sh"
},
"dependencies": {
"@mosaicstack/brain": "workspace:*",
@@ -131,13 +131,14 @@ async function exists(path: string): Promise<boolean> {
}
describe('projectRosterV2AgentGeneratedEnv', (): void => {
it('maps a roster-v2 agent to exactly the eight generated projection keys', (): void => {
it('maps a roster-v2 agent to exactly the nine generated projection keys', (): void => {
const roster = parseRosterV2(rosterYaml, 'yaml');
const agent = roster.agents.find((candidate) => candidate.name === 'coder0');
expect(agent).toBeDefined();
const values = projectRosterV2AgentGeneratedEnv(roster, agent!);
expect(values).toEqual({
MOSAIC_AGENT_NAME: 'coder0',
MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY: 'coder0',
MOSAIC_AGENT_CLASS: 'code',
MOSAIC_AGENT_RUNTIME: 'pi',
MOSAIC_AGENT_MODEL: 'gpt-5.6-sol',
@@ -422,6 +422,7 @@ describe('fleet roster parsing', () => {
expect(generateAgentEnv(roster, getRosterAgent(roster, 'coder0'))).toBe(
[
'MOSAIC_AGENT_NAME=coder0',
'MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY=coder0',
// Reflects the roster's canonicalized compatibility class (A3a).
'MOSAIC_AGENT_CLASS=code',
'MOSAIC_AGENT_RUNTIME=codex',
@@ -3799,6 +3800,7 @@ describe('fleet add command', () => {
'utf8',
);
expect(envContent).toContain('MOSAIC_AGENT_NAME=coder0');
expect(envContent).toContain('MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY=coder0');
expect(envContent).toContain('MOSAIC_AGENT_RUNTIME=codex');
});
+1
View File
@@ -484,6 +484,7 @@ function generateAgentEnvValues(
const workingDirectory = agent.workingDirectory ?? roster.defaults.workingDirectory;
return {
MOSAIC_AGENT_NAME: agent.name,
MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY: agent.name,
MOSAIC_AGENT_CLASS: agent.className,
MOSAIC_AGENT_RUNTIME: agent.runtime,
MOSAIC_AGENT_MODEL: agent.modelHint ?? '',
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ import { tmpdir } from 'node:os';
import { join } from 'node:path';
import {
buildPiSkillArgs,
discoverPiExtensionArgs,
enumerateSkillDirs,
piForceSkillNames,
registerRuntimeLaunchers,
@@ -178,6 +179,52 @@ describe('buildPiSkillArgs', () => {
});
});
describe('discoverPiExtensionArgs', () => {
it('loads the core and goal extensions in deterministic order from Mosaic home', () => {
const root = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'mosaic-pi-extensions-'));
const runtimeDir = join(root, 'runtime', 'pi');
mkdirSync(runtimeDir, { recursive: true });
writeFileSync(join(runtimeDir, 'goal-extension.ts'), '// goal\n');
writeFileSync(join(runtimeDir, 'mosaic-extension.ts'), '// core\n');
try {
expect(discoverPiExtensionArgs(root)).toEqual([
'--extension',
join(runtimeDir, 'mosaic-extension.ts'),
'--extension',
join(runtimeDir, 'goal-extension.ts'),
]);
} finally {
rmSync(root, { recursive: true, force: true });
}
});
it('remains backward-compatible when the optional goal extension is absent', () => {
const root = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'mosaic-pi-extensions-'));
const runtimeDir = join(root, 'runtime', 'pi');
mkdirSync(runtimeDir, { recursive: true });
writeFileSync(join(runtimeDir, 'mosaic-extension.ts'), '// core\n');
try {
expect(discoverPiExtensionArgs(root)).toEqual([
'--extension',
join(runtimeDir, 'mosaic-extension.ts'),
]);
} finally {
rmSync(root, { recursive: true, force: true });
}
});
it('emits no extension arguments when Mosaic runtime assets are absent', () => {
const root = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'mosaic-pi-extensions-'));
try {
expect(discoverPiExtensionArgs(root)).toEqual([]);
} finally {
rmSync(root, { recursive: true, force: true });
}
});
});
describe('enumerateSkillDirs (real FS)', () => {
let root: string;
+10 -4
View File
@@ -715,9 +715,15 @@ export function buildPiSkillArgs(
return ['--no-skills', ...forcedSkillArgs];
}
function discoverPiExtension(): string[] {
const ext = join(MOSAIC_HOME, 'runtime', 'pi', 'mosaic-extension.ts');
return existsSync(ext) ? ['--extension', ext] : [];
const PI_EXTENSION_FILES = ['mosaic-extension.ts', 'goal-extension.ts'] as const;
export function discoverPiExtensionArgs(mosaicHome: string = MOSAIC_HOME): string[] {
const args: string[] = [];
for (const fileName of PI_EXTENSION_FILES) {
const extensionPath = join(mosaicHome, 'runtime', 'pi', fileName);
if (existsSync(extensionPath)) args.push('--extension', extensionPath);
}
return args;
}
// ─── Launch functions ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
@@ -792,7 +798,7 @@ function launchRuntime(runtime: RuntimeName, args: string[], yolo: boolean): nev
const prompt = buildRuntimePrompt('pi');
const cliArgs = ['--append-system-prompt', prompt];
cliArgs.push(...buildPiSkillArgs(args));
cliArgs.push(...discoverPiExtension());
cliArgs.push(...discoverPiExtensionArgs());
if (hasMissionNoArgs) {
cliArgs.push(missionPrompt);
} else {
@@ -209,6 +209,20 @@ describe('FileConfigAdapter.syncFramework — defaults seeding', () => {
);
});
it('deploys the Mosaic-owned Pi goal extension only inside the Mosaic runtime tree', async () => {
const sourceRuntime = join(fixture.sourceDir, 'runtime', 'pi');
mkdirSync(sourceRuntime, { recursive: true });
writeFileSync(join(sourceRuntime, 'goal-extension.ts'), '// persistent goal extension\n');
const adapter = new FileConfigAdapter(fixture.mosaicHome, fixture.sourceDir);
await adapter.syncFramework('fresh');
expect(
readFileSync(join(fixture.mosaicHome, 'runtime', 'pi', 'goal-extension.ts'), 'utf-8'),
).toBe('// persistent goal extension\n');
expect(existsSync(join(fixture.mosaicHome, '.pi'))).toBe(false);
});
it('is a no-op for seeding when defaults/ dir does not exist', async () => {
rmSync(fixture.defaultsDir, { recursive: true });
@@ -358,6 +358,7 @@ function generatedValues(
): Readonly<Record<string, string>> {
return {
MOSAIC_AGENT_NAME: agent.name,
MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY: agent.name,
MOSAIC_AGENT_CLASS: agent.className,
MOSAIC_AGENT_RUNTIME: agent.runtime,
MOSAIC_AGENT_MODEL: agent.model,
@@ -380,7 +380,7 @@ const COMMAND_RECORDS: Readonly<Record<string, RegExp>> = {
const DATA_PROFILE_BODIES: Readonly<Record<string, string>> = {
'DATA.DOTENV.FLEET_LAUNCH':
'MOSAIC_AGENT_NAME=<roster name>\nMOSAIC_AGENT_CLASS=<roster class>\nMOSAIC_AGENT_RUNTIME=<roster runtime>\nMOSAIC_AGENT_MODEL=<roster model hint>\nMOSAIC_AGENT_REASONING=<roster reasoning>\nMOSAIC_AGENT_TOOL_POLICY=<roster tool policy>\nMOSAIC_AGENT_WORKDIR=<absolute roster work directory>\nMOSAIC_TMUX_SOCKET=<roster socket or empty>',
'MOSAIC_AGENT_NAME=<roster name>\nMOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY=<roster name>\nMOSAIC_AGENT_CLASS=<roster class>\nMOSAIC_AGENT_RUNTIME=<roster runtime>\nMOSAIC_AGENT_MODEL=<roster model hint>\nMOSAIC_AGENT_REASONING=<roster reasoning>\nMOSAIC_AGENT_TOOL_POLICY=<roster tool policy>\nMOSAIC_AGENT_WORKDIR=<absolute roster work directory>\nMOSAIC_TMUX_SOCKET=<roster socket or empty>',
'DATA.TEXT_TABLE.FLEET_TASKS':
'| W-FLEET | in-progress | Fleet (agent-session execution layer) | Phase 2/5 | docs/fleet/TASKS.md | observability dogfooded on live stub fleet; control plane rides federation (W1) |',
'DATA.TEXT_DIAGRAM.BACKLOG_FLOW':
@@ -406,7 +406,7 @@ const DATA_PROFILE_BODIES: Readonly<Record<string, string>> = {
'DATA.JSON.MUTATION_RESULT':
'{\n "applied": false,\n "authoritativeRoster": "committed",\n "projections": "incomplete",\n "recovery": {\n "code": "projection-apply-failed",\n "action": "regenerate-projections-from-roster"\n }\n}',
'DATA.DOTENV.GENERATED_ENV':
'MOSAIC_AGENT_NAME=<roster name>\nMOSAIC_AGENT_CLASS=<roster class>\nMOSAIC_AGENT_RUNTIME=<roster runtime>\nMOSAIC_AGENT_MODEL=<roster model hint>\nMOSAIC_AGENT_REASONING=<roster reasoning>\nMOSAIC_AGENT_TOOL_POLICY=<roster tool policy>\nMOSAIC_AGENT_WORKDIR=<absolute roster work directory>\nMOSAIC_TMUX_SOCKET=<roster socket or empty>',
'MOSAIC_AGENT_NAME=<roster name>\nMOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY=<roster name>\nMOSAIC_AGENT_CLASS=<roster class>\nMOSAIC_AGENT_RUNTIME=<roster runtime>\nMOSAIC_AGENT_MODEL=<roster model hint>\nMOSAIC_AGENT_REASONING=<roster reasoning>\nMOSAIC_AGENT_TOOL_POLICY=<roster tool policy>\nMOSAIC_AGENT_WORKDIR=<absolute roster work directory>\nMOSAIC_TMUX_SOCKET=<roster socket or empty>',
'DATA.YAML.ROSTER_FIELDS':
'version: 2\ngeneration: 1\ntransport: tmux\ntmux:\n socket_name: mosaic-fleet\n holder_session: _holder\ndefaults:\n working_directory: ~/src\n runtime: pi\nruntimes:\n pi:\n reset_command: /new\nagents:\n - name: coder0\n alias: Coder 0\n class: code\n runtime: pi\n provider: openai\n model: gpt-5.6-sol\n reasoning: high\n tool_policy: code\n working_directory: ~/src\n persistent_persona: false\n reset_between_tasks: true\n lifecycle:\n enabled: true\n desired_state: stopped\n launch:\n yolo: true',
};
@@ -922,8 +922,8 @@ describe('fleet operator documentation', (): void => {
);
expect(
surfaces.filter((surface): boolean => surface.category === 'InlineLiteral'),
).toHaveLength(858);
expect(surfaces).toHaveLength(882);
).toHaveLength(863);
expect(surfaces).toHaveLength(887);
const rosterSource = await readFile(join(fleetDocs, 'examples', 'roster-v2.yaml'), 'utf8');
const auxiliary: CodeSurface = {
@@ -597,6 +597,7 @@ export function projectRosterV2AgentGeneratedEnv(
): Readonly<Record<string, string>> {
return {
MOSAIC_AGENT_NAME: agent.name,
MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY: agent.name,
MOSAIC_AGENT_CLASS: agent.className,
MOSAIC_AGENT_RUNTIME: agent.runtime,
MOSAIC_AGENT_MODEL: agent.model,
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ import {
const generatedValues = {
MOSAIC_AGENT_NAME: 'coder0',
MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY: 'coder0',
MOSAIC_AGENT_CLASS: 'code',
MOSAIC_AGENT_RUNTIME: 'pi',
MOSAIC_AGENT_MODEL: 'openai-codex/gpt-5.6-sol',
@@ -45,6 +46,7 @@ describe('generated fleet agent environment boundary', (): void => {
expect(renderGeneratedAgentEnvironment(generatedValues)).toBe(
[
'MOSAIC_AGENT_NAME=coder0',
'MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY=coder0',
'MOSAIC_AGENT_CLASS=code',
'MOSAIC_AGENT_RUNTIME=pi',
'MOSAIC_AGENT_MODEL=openai-codex/gpt-5.6-sol',
@@ -78,6 +80,22 @@ describe('generated fleet agent environment boundary', (): void => {
expect(String(error)).toMatch(/key=.*sha256=/);
});
it.each([
['unsafe-git-identity', 'other/identity'],
['git-identity-mismatch', 'reviewer0'],
])('rejects %s before any launch consumer can use it', (code: string, identity: string): void => {
expect((): void => {
renderGeneratedAgentEnvironment({
...generatedValues,
MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY: identity,
});
}).toThrow(
expect.objectContaining({
diagnostic: expect.objectContaining({ code, key: 'MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY' }),
}),
);
});
it('rejects unsafe generated paths before any launch consumer can use them', (): void => {
expect((): void => {
renderGeneratedAgentEnvironment({
@@ -73,6 +73,7 @@ export class AgentEnvBoundaryError extends Error {
export const GENERATED_AGENT_ENV_KEYS = [
'MOSAIC_AGENT_NAME',
'MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY',
'MOSAIC_AGENT_CLASS',
'MOSAIC_AGENT_RUNTIME',
'MOSAIC_AGENT_MODEL',
@@ -402,6 +403,7 @@ function assertGeneratedValues(values: Readonly<Record<string, string>>): void {
if (value === undefined) throw new AgentEnvBoundaryError('missing-key', key, '');
}
const name = requiredGeneratedValue(values, 'MOSAIC_AGENT_NAME');
const gitIdentity = requiredGeneratedValue(values, 'MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY');
const className = requiredGeneratedValue(values, 'MOSAIC_AGENT_CLASS');
const runtime = requiredGeneratedValue(values, 'MOSAIC_AGENT_RUNTIME');
const model = requiredGeneratedValue(values, 'MOSAIC_AGENT_MODEL');
@@ -412,6 +414,12 @@ function assertGeneratedValues(values: Readonly<Record<string, string>>): void {
if (!AGENT_NAME.test(name))
throw new AgentEnvBoundaryError('unsafe-agent-name', 'MOSAIC_AGENT_NAME', name);
if (!AGENT_NAME.test(gitIdentity)) {
throw new AgentEnvBoundaryError('unsafe-git-identity', 'MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY', gitIdentity);
}
if (gitIdentity !== name) {
throw new AgentEnvBoundaryError('git-identity-mismatch', 'MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY', gitIdentity);
}
if (!POLICY_NAME.test(className)) {
throw new AgentEnvBoundaryError('unsafe-class', 'MOSAIC_AGENT_CLASS', className);
}
@@ -1405,6 +1405,7 @@ function generatedValues(
): Readonly<Record<string, string>> {
return {
MOSAIC_AGENT_NAME: agent.name,
MOSAIC_GIT_IDENTITY: agent.name,
MOSAIC_AGENT_CLASS: agent.className,
MOSAIC_AGENT_RUNTIME: agent.runtime,
MOSAIC_AGENT_MODEL: agent.model,
@@ -0,0 +1,796 @@
import { afterEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest';
interface FakeEntry {
type: string;
customType?: string;
data?: unknown;
}
interface SentMessage {
message: {
customType: string;
content: string;
display: boolean;
};
options?: {
triggerTurn?: boolean;
deliverAs?: 'steer' | 'followUp' | 'nextTurn';
};
}
interface FakeContext {
cwd: string;
ui: {
notifications: Array<{ message: string; level?: string }>;
statuses: Map<string, string | undefined>;
notify(message: string, level?: string): void;
setStatus(key: string, value: string | undefined): void;
};
sessionManager: {
getBranch(): FakeEntry[];
};
isIdle(): boolean;
hasPendingMessages(): boolean;
abort(): void;
}
type EventHandler = (
event: Record<string, unknown>,
context: FakeContext,
) => unknown | Promise<unknown>;
type CommandHandler = (args: string, context: FakeContext) => unknown | Promise<unknown>;
interface FakeToolResult {
content: Array<{ type: string; text: string }>;
details?: unknown;
terminate?: boolean;
}
interface FakeTool {
name: string;
execute(
toolCallId: string,
params: Record<string, unknown>,
signal: AbortSignal | undefined,
onUpdate: undefined,
context: FakeContext,
): Promise<FakeToolResult>;
}
interface GoalExtensionFactory {
(api: FakePiApi): void;
}
interface GoalExtensionModule {
default: GoalExtensionFactory;
}
interface FakePiApi {
on(event: string, handler: EventHandler): void;
registerCommand(name: string, options: { description: string; handler: CommandHandler }): void;
registerTool(tool: FakeTool): void;
appendEntry(customType: string, data?: unknown): void;
sendMessage(message: SentMessage['message'], options?: SentMessage['options']): void;
}
function isGoalExtensionModule(value: unknown): value is GoalExtensionModule {
if (typeof value !== 'object' || value === null) return false;
return typeof Reflect.get(value, 'default') === 'function';
}
const goalExtensionUrl = new URL('../../framework/runtime/pi/goal-extension.ts', import.meta.url)
.href;
const importedGoalExtension: unknown = await import(goalExtensionUrl);
if (!isGoalExtensionModule(importedGoalExtension)) {
throw new Error('Pi goal extension must export a default registration function');
}
const registerGoalExtension = importedGoalExtension.default;
function isRecord(value: unknown): value is Record<string, unknown> {
return typeof value === 'object' && value !== null && !Array.isArray(value);
}
class FakePi {
readonly handlers = new Map<string, EventHandler[]>();
readonly commands = new Map<string, CommandHandler>();
readonly tools = new Map<string, FakeTool>();
readonly entries: FakeEntry[] = [];
readonly sentMessages: SentMessage[] = [];
readonly notifications: Array<{ message: string; level?: string }> = [];
readonly statuses = new Map<string, string | undefined>();
branch: FakeEntry[] = [];
idle = true;
pending = false;
abortCount = 0;
readonly context: FakeContext = {
cwd: '/tmp/project',
ui: {
notifications: this.notifications,
statuses: this.statuses,
notify: (message: string, level?: string): void => {
this.notifications.push({ message, level });
},
setStatus: (key: string, value: string | undefined): void => {
this.statuses.set(key, value);
},
},
sessionManager: {
getBranch: (): FakeEntry[] => [...this.branch],
},
isIdle: (): boolean => this.idle,
hasPendingMessages: (): boolean => this.pending,
abort: (): void => {
this.abortCount += 1;
},
};
readonly api: FakePiApi = {
on: (event: string, handler: EventHandler): void => {
this.handlers.set(event, [...(this.handlers.get(event) ?? []), handler]);
},
registerCommand: (
name: string,
options: { description: string; handler: CommandHandler },
): void => {
this.commands.set(name, options.handler);
},
registerTool: (tool: FakeTool): void => {
this.tools.set(tool.name, tool);
},
appendEntry: (customType: string, data?: unknown): void => {
const entry: FakeEntry = { type: 'custom', customType, data };
this.entries.push(entry);
this.branch.push(entry);
},
sendMessage: (message: SentMessage['message'], options?: SentMessage['options']): void => {
this.sentMessages.push({ message, options });
},
};
constructor(initialBranch: FakeEntry[] = []) {
this.branch = [...initialBranch];
registerGoalExtension(this.api);
}
async emit(event: string, value: Record<string, unknown> = {}): Promise<unknown[]> {
const results: unknown[] = [];
for (const handler of this.handlers.get(event) ?? []) {
results.push(await handler(value, this.context));
}
return results;
}
async goal(args: string): Promise<void> {
const handler = this.commands.get('goal');
if (handler === undefined) throw new Error('/goal was not registered');
await handler(args, this.context);
}
async report(params: Record<string, unknown>): Promise<FakeToolResult> {
const tool = this.tools.get('mosaic_goal_report');
if (tool === undefined) throw new Error('mosaic_goal_report was not registered');
return await tool.execute('goal-report-1', params, undefined, undefined, this.context);
}
}
function latestGoalStateData(pi: FakePi): Record<string, unknown> {
for (let index = pi.entries.length - 1; index >= 0; index -= 1) {
const entry = pi.entries[index];
if (entry?.customType === 'mosaic-goal-state' && isRecord(entry.data)) return entry.data;
}
throw new Error('No persisted Mosaic goal state found');
}
function stateField(pi: FakePi, field: string): unknown {
return latestGoalStateData(pi)[field];
}
function activeGoalStatementFromContext(result: unknown): string {
if (!isRecord(result)) throw new Error('Context handler did not return an object');
const messages = result['messages'];
if (!Array.isArray(messages)) throw new Error('Context result did not include messages');
const goalMessage = messages.find(
(message: unknown): boolean =>
isRecord(message) && message['customType'] === 'mosaic-goal-context',
);
if (!isRecord(goalMessage) || typeof goalMessage['content'] !== 'string') {
throw new Error('Goal context message was not injected');
}
return goalMessage['content'];
}
afterEach(() => {
vi.useRealTimers();
vi.unstubAllEnvs();
});
describe('Mosaic Pi goal extension commands', () => {
it('shows help and handles controls safely when no goal exists', async () => {
const pi = new FakePi();
await pi.goal('');
expect(pi.notifications.at(-1)?.message).toContain('/goal set');
await pi.goal('status');
expect(pi.notifications.at(-1)?.message).toContain('No Mosaic goal is set');
for (const command of ['pause', 'resume', 'cancel']) {
await pi.goal(command);
expect(pi.notifications.at(-1)?.level).toBe('warning');
}
expect(pi.entries).toHaveLength(0);
expect(pi.sentMessages).toHaveLength(0);
});
it('sets, reports, pauses, resumes, and cancels a bounded goal', async () => {
const pi = new FakePi();
await pi.goal('set Deliver the local goal extension with tests');
expect(stateField(pi, 'phase')).toBe('active');
expect(stateField(pi, 'statement')).toBe('Deliver the local goal extension with tests');
expect(pi.sentMessages).toHaveLength(1);
expect(pi.sentMessages[0]?.options?.triggerTurn).toBe(true);
await pi.goal('status');
expect(pi.notifications.at(-1)?.message).toContain('Deliver the local goal extension');
expect(pi.notifications.at(-1)?.message).toContain('active');
await pi.goal('pause');
expect(stateField(pi, 'phase')).toBe('paused');
pi.sentMessages.length = 0;
await pi.emit('agent_settled');
expect(pi.sentMessages).toHaveLength(0);
await pi.goal('resume');
expect(stateField(pi, 'phase')).toBe('active');
expect(pi.sentMessages).toHaveLength(1);
await pi.goal('cancel');
expect(stateField(pi, 'phase')).toBe('cancelled');
pi.sentMessages.length = 0;
await pi.emit('agent_settled');
expect(pi.sentMessages).toHaveLength(0);
});
it('accepts /goal <statement> shorthand but refuses to replace an active goal', async () => {
const pi = new FakePi();
await pi.goal('First goal');
const firstGoalId = stateField(pi, 'goalId');
await pi.goal('set Second goal');
expect(stateField(pi, 'goalId')).toBe(firstGoalId);
expect(stateField(pi, 'statement')).toBe('First goal');
expect(pi.notifications.at(-1)?.level).toBe('warning');
expect(pi.notifications.at(-1)?.message).toContain('/goal cancel');
});
it('rejects invalid phase transitions, aborts busy work, and supports clear as cancel', async () => {
const pi = new FakePi();
await pi.goal('set Preserve transition safety');
await pi.goal('resume');
expect(pi.notifications.at(-1)?.message).toContain('cannot be resumed');
pi.idle = false;
await pi.goal('pause maintenance window');
expect(stateField(pi, 'stopReason')).toBe('maintenance window');
expect(pi.abortCount).toBe(1);
await pi.goal('pause');
expect(pi.notifications.at(-1)?.message).toContain('cannot be paused');
await pi.goal('clear');
expect(stateField(pi, 'phase')).toBe('cancelled');
expect(pi.abortCount).toBe(2);
});
it('rejects empty and oversized goal statements without starting a run', async () => {
const pi = new FakePi();
await pi.goal('set');
await pi.goal(`set ${'x'.repeat(8_001)}`);
expect(pi.entries).toHaveLength(0);
expect(pi.sentMessages).toHaveLength(0);
expect(pi.notifications.at(-1)?.level).toBe('warning');
});
});
describe('Mosaic Pi goal lifecycle', () => {
it('injects one fresh active contract before every model context', async () => {
const pi = new FakePi();
await pi.goal('set Keep the agent oriented');
const existingGoalContext = {
role: 'custom',
customType: 'mosaic-goal-context',
content: 'stale',
};
const existingContinuation = {
role: 'custom',
customType: 'mosaic-goal-continuation',
content: 'stale continuation',
};
const first = await pi.emit('context', {
messages: [existingGoalContext, existingContinuation],
});
const second = await pi.emit('context', { messages: [] });
expect(activeGoalStatementFromContext(first[0])).toContain('Keep the agent oriented');
expect(activeGoalStatementFromContext(first[0])).toContain('mosaic_goal_report');
expect(activeGoalStatementFromContext(first[0])).not.toContain('stale');
if (!isRecord(first[0]) || !Array.isArray(first[0]['messages'])) {
throw new Error('Expected filtered context messages');
}
expect(first[0]['messages']).toHaveLength(1);
expect(activeGoalStatementFromContext(second[0])).toContain('Keep the agent oriented');
await pi.goal('cancel');
expect(
await pi.emit('context', {
messages: [existingGoalContext, existingContinuation],
}),
).toEqual([{ messages: [] }]);
});
it('lets an existing busy run adopt the goal and waits behind a pending message', async () => {
const busy = new FakePi();
busy.idle = false;
await busy.goal('set Join the current run safely');
expect(busy.sentMessages).toHaveLength(0);
busy.pending = true;
await busy.emit('agent_settled');
expect(busy.sentMessages).toHaveLength(0);
busy.pending = false;
busy.idle = true;
await busy.emit('agent_settled');
expect(busy.sentMessages).toHaveLength(1);
});
it('records every turn and continues once when an active run settles', async () => {
const pi = new FakePi();
await pi.goal('set Finish all acceptance criteria');
pi.sentMessages.length = 0;
await pi.emit('turn_end', { turnIndex: 0, message: {}, toolResults: [] });
expect(stateField(pi, 'turnCount')).toBe(1);
expect(stateField(pi, 'lastCheckSource')).toBe('turn');
await pi.emit('agent_settled');
await pi.emit('agent_settled');
expect(pi.sentMessages).toHaveLength(1);
expect(pi.sentMessages[0]?.message.content).toContain('Goal remains active');
await pi.emit('agent_start');
await pi.emit('agent_settled');
expect(pi.sentMessages).toHaveLength(2);
});
it('requires two consecutive evidence-bearing achievement reports', async () => {
const pi = new FakePi();
await pi.goal('set Prove the feature works');
pi.sentMessages.length = 0;
const first = await pi.report({
status: 'achieved',
summary: 'Focused tests pass',
evidence: ['pnpm test: 12 passed'],
});
expect(first.terminate).toBe(true);
expect(stateField(pi, 'phase')).toBe('verifying');
expect(stateField(pi, 'verificationPasses')).toBe(1);
await pi.emit('agent_settled');
expect(pi.sentMessages).toHaveLength(1);
expect(pi.sentMessages[0]?.message.content).toContain('verification pass');
await pi.emit('agent_start');
const second = await pi.report({
status: 'achieved',
summary: 'Independent recheck confirms completion',
evidence: ['rerun: 12 passed', 'framework path verified'],
});
expect(second.terminate).toBe(true);
expect(stateField(pi, 'phase')).toBe('achieved');
expect(stateField(pi, 'verificationPasses')).toBe(2);
pi.sentMessages.length = 0;
await pi.emit('agent_settled');
expect(pi.sentMessages).toHaveLength(0);
});
it('rejects malformed progress reports and reports submitted without an active goal', async () => {
const noGoal = new FakePi();
await expect(
noGoal.report({ status: 'continue', summary: 'work', evidence: [] }),
).rejects.toThrow(/No active Mosaic goal/);
const pi = new FakePi();
await pi.goal('set Validate report boundaries');
const invalidReports: Record<string, unknown>[] = [
{},
{ status: 'invalid', summary: 'work', evidence: [] },
{ status: 'continue', evidence: [] },
{ status: 'continue', summary: ' ', evidence: [] },
{ status: 'continue', summary: 'x'.repeat(2_001), evidence: [] },
{ status: 'continue', summary: 'work', evidence: 'not-an-array' },
{ status: 'continue', summary: 'work', evidence: Array.from({ length: 21 }, () => 'x') },
{ status: 'continue', summary: 'work', evidence: [4] },
{ status: 'continue', summary: 'work', evidence: [''] },
{ status: 'continue', summary: 'work', evidence: ['x'.repeat(1_001)] },
{ status: 'continue', summary: 'work', evidence: [], nextStep: 4 },
{ status: 'continue', summary: 'work', evidence: [], nextStep: ' ' },
{ status: 'continue', summary: 'work', evidence: [], nextStep: 'x'.repeat(2_001) },
];
for (const report of invalidReports) {
await expect(pi.report(report)).rejects.toThrow();
}
expect(stateField(pi, 'phase')).toBe('active');
});
it('rejects an achievement claim without evidence', async () => {
const pi = new FakePi();
await pi.goal('set Require evidence');
await expect(
pi.report({ status: 'achieved', summary: 'Trust me', evidence: [] }),
).rejects.toThrow(/evidence/i);
expect(stateField(pi, 'phase')).toBe('active');
});
it('redacts credential-shaped goal and report text before persistence or display', async () => {
const githubToken = `ghp_${'a'.repeat(32)}`;
const anthropicKey = `sk-ant-api03-${'b'.repeat(40)}`;
const bearerToken = 'header.payload.signature-canary';
const databaseUrl = 'postgresql://mosaic:[email protected]/mosaic';
const password = 'password-canary';
const pi = new FakePi();
await pi.goal(`set Rotate ${githubToken} without retaining it`);
const context = await pi.emit('context', { messages: [] });
expect(activeGoalStatementFromContext(context[0])).not.toContain(githubToken);
const result = await pi.report({
status: 'achieved',
summary: `Validated ${anthropicKey}`,
evidence: [`Authorization: Bearer ${bearerToken}`, `DATABASE_URL=${databaseUrl}`],
nextStep: `password=${password}`,
});
await pi.goal('status');
const persisted = JSON.stringify(latestGoalStateData(pi));
const displayed = pi.notifications.at(-1)?.message ?? '';
const toolOutput = JSON.stringify(result);
for (const secret of [githubToken, anthropicKey, bearerToken, databaseUrl, password]) {
expect(persisted).not.toContain(secret);
expect(displayed).not.toContain(secret);
expect(toolOutput).not.toContain(secret);
}
expect(persisted).toContain('[REDACTED-SECRET]');
});
it('preserves ordinary typed fields that resemble sensitive assignment names', async () => {
const typedFields = 'token: string, password: boolean, secret: false';
const pi = new FakePi();
await pi.goal(`set Preserve TypeScript fields: ${typedFields}`);
await pi.report({
status: 'continue',
summary: `Schema still contains ${typedFields}`,
evidence: [`interface Config { ${typedFields} }`],
nextStep: `Keep ${typedFields} unchanged`,
});
expect(stateField(pi, 'statement')).toContain(typedFields);
expect(JSON.stringify(stateField(pi, 'lastReport'))).toContain(typedFields);
expect(JSON.stringify(latestGoalStateData(pi))).not.toContain('[REDACTED-SECRET]');
});
it('stops autonomous continuation when the max-turn limit is reached', async () => {
vi.stubEnv('MOSAIC_GOAL_MAX_TURNS', '2');
const pi = new FakePi();
await pi.goal('set Bound this run');
pi.sentMessages.length = 0;
await pi.emit('turn_end', { turnIndex: 0, message: {}, toolResults: [] });
await pi.emit('turn_end', { turnIndex: 1, message: {}, toolResults: [] });
expect(stateField(pi, 'phase')).toBe('exhausted');
expect(pi.abortCount).toBe(1);
await pi.emit('agent_settled');
expect(pi.sentMessages).toHaveLength(0);
});
it('resets the no-progress sequence when a continuation report changes', async () => {
const pi = new FakePi();
await pi.goal('set Track changing progress');
await pi.report({
status: 'continue',
summary: 'First checkpoint',
evidence: ['file A changed'],
nextStep: 'Run focused tests',
});
await pi.report({
status: 'continue',
summary: 'Second checkpoint',
evidence: ['focused tests passed'],
nextStep: 'Review the diff',
});
expect(stateField(pi, 'phase')).toBe('active');
expect(stateField(pi, 'noProgressReports')).toBe(1);
await pi.goal('status');
expect(pi.notifications.at(-1)?.message).toContain('Next step: Review the diff');
expect(pi.notifications.at(-1)?.message).toContain('focused tests passed');
});
it('stops after a bounded number of identical no-progress reports', async () => {
vi.stubEnv('MOSAIC_GOAL_MAX_NO_PROGRESS', '2');
const pi = new FakePi();
await pi.goal('set Detect stalled work');
const report = {
status: 'continue',
summary: 'No change yet',
evidence: ['same observation'],
nextStep: 'Try again',
};
await pi.report(report);
await pi.report(report);
expect(stateField(pi, 'phase')).toBe('exhausted');
expect(stateField(pi, 'noProgressReports')).toBe(2);
pi.sentMessages.length = 0;
await pi.emit('agent_settled');
expect(pi.sentMessages).toHaveLength(0);
});
it('rejects a goal report mixed with another tool result in the same turn', async () => {
const pi = new FakePi();
await pi.goal('set Require a sole final report');
await pi.report({
status: 'achieved',
summary: 'Premature mixed claim',
evidence: ['one observation'],
});
await pi.emit('turn_end', {
turnIndex: 0,
message: {},
toolResults: [{ toolName: 'mosaic_goal_report' }, { toolName: 'read' }],
});
expect(stateField(pi, 'phase')).toBe('active');
expect(stateField(pi, 'verificationPasses')).toBe(0);
expect(stateField(pi, 'lastCheckOutcome')).toBe('mixed-goal-report-rejected');
expect(pi.notifications.at(-1)?.level).toBe('warning');
});
it('marks blocked reports terminal until the operator resumes', async () => {
const pi = new FakePi();
await pi.goal('set Stop on a real blocker');
await pi.report({
status: 'blocked',
summary: 'Missing required access',
evidence: ['provider returned 403'],
});
expect(stateField(pi, 'phase')).toBe('blocked');
pi.sentMessages.length = 0;
await pi.emit('agent_settled');
expect(pi.sentMessages).toHaveLength(0);
await pi.goal('resume');
expect(stateField(pi, 'phase')).toBe('active');
expect(stateField(pi, 'turnCount')).toBe(0);
expect(pi.sentMessages).toHaveLength(1);
});
});
describe('Mosaic Pi goal compaction and restoration', () => {
it('resets provisional verification and defers manual-compaction continuation until idle', async () => {
vi.useFakeTimers();
const pi = new FakePi();
await pi.goal('set Survive compaction');
await pi.report({
status: 'achieved',
summary: 'Initial claim',
evidence: ['focused test passed'],
});
expect(stateField(pi, 'phase')).toBe('verifying');
pi.sentMessages.length = 0;
await pi.emit('session_compact', { reason: 'manual', willRetry: false });
expect(stateField(pi, 'phase')).toBe('active');
expect(stateField(pi, 'verificationPasses')).toBe(0);
expect(stateField(pi, 'compactionCount')).toBe(1);
expect(stateField(pi, 'lastCheckSource')).toBe('compact');
expect(pi.sentMessages).toHaveLength(0);
await vi.runAllTimersAsync();
expect(pi.sentMessages).toHaveLength(1);
expect(pi.sentMessages[0]?.message.content).toContain('compaction');
});
it('does not re-enter an active automatic compaction and relies on the settled backstop', async () => {
vi.useFakeTimers();
const pi = new FakePi();
await pi.goal('set Avoid compaction races');
pi.sentMessages.length = 0;
pi.idle = false;
await pi.emit('session_compact', { reason: 'threshold', willRetry: false });
await vi.runAllTimersAsync();
expect(pi.sentMessages).toHaveLength(0);
pi.idle = true;
await pi.emit('agent_settled');
expect(pi.sentMessages).toHaveLength(1);
});
it('restores branch-specific state on session start and tree navigation', async () => {
vi.useFakeTimers();
const source = new FakePi();
await source.goal('set Restore this exact branch goal');
const activeState = latestGoalStateData(source);
const restored = new FakePi([
{ type: 'custom', customType: 'mosaic-goal-state', data: activeState },
]);
await restored.emit('session_start', { reason: 'resume' });
expect(restored.statuses.get('mosaic-goal')).toContain('active');
const context = await restored.emit('context', { messages: [] });
expect(activeGoalStatementFromContext(context[0])).toContain('Restore this exact branch goal');
await restored.goal('pause');
const pausedState = latestGoalStateData(restored);
restored.branch = [{ type: 'custom', customType: 'mosaic-goal-state', data: pausedState }];
await restored.emit('session_tree', {});
await vi.runAllTimersAsync();
expect(stateField(restored, 'phase')).toBe('paused');
expect(restored.sentMessages).toHaveLength(0);
});
it('restores only fully valid persisted states and ignores malformed entries', async () => {
vi.useFakeTimers();
const source = new FakePi();
await source.goal('set Validate persisted branch state');
await source.report({
status: 'continue',
summary: 'Valid report',
evidence: ['valid evidence'],
nextStep: 'Continue validation',
});
const valid = latestGoalStateData(source);
const validRestore = new FakePi([
{ type: 'custom', customType: 'mosaic-goal-state', data: valid },
]);
await validRestore.emit('session_start', { reason: 'resume' });
expect(stateField(validRestore, 'statement')).toBe('Validate persisted branch state');
await validRestore.emit('session_shutdown', { reason: 'reload' });
const validReport = latestGoalStateData(source)['lastReport'];
if (!isRecord(validReport)) throw new Error('Expected a valid persisted report fixture');
const integerFields = [
'turnCount',
'reportCount',
'verificationPasses',
'requiredVerificationPasses',
'noProgressReports',
'maxTurns',
'maxNoProgressReports',
'compactionCount',
];
const corruptions: Array<(state: Record<string, unknown>) => unknown> = [
(): unknown => null,
(state): unknown => ({ ...state, version: 99 }),
(state): unknown => ({ ...state, goalId: '' }),
(state): unknown => ({ ...state, statement: '' }),
(state): unknown => ({ ...state, statement: 'x'.repeat(8_001) }),
(state): unknown => ({ ...state, phase: 'unknown' }),
(state): unknown => ({ ...state, lastCheckSource: 'unknown' }),
(state): unknown => ({ ...state, startedAt: 4 }),
(state): unknown => ({ ...state, lastCheckAt: 4 }),
(state): unknown => ({ ...state, lastReport: null }),
(state): unknown => ({ ...state, lastProgressFingerprint: 4 }),
(state): unknown => ({ ...state, stopReason: 4 }),
...integerFields.map((field: string) => (state: Record<string, unknown>): unknown => ({
...state,
[field]: -1,
})),
];
corruptions.push(
(state: Record<string, unknown>): unknown => ({ ...state, maxTurns: 501 }),
(state: Record<string, unknown>): unknown => ({ ...state, maxNoProgressReports: 101 }),
(state: Record<string, unknown>): unknown => ({ ...state, requiredVerificationPasses: 3 }),
);
const reportCorruptions: Array<Record<string, unknown>> = [
{ ...validReport, status: 'bad' },
{ ...validReport, summary: '' },
{ ...validReport, evidence: 'bad' },
{ ...validReport, evidence: [4] },
{ ...validReport, fingerprint: '' },
{ ...validReport, reportedAt: '' },
{ ...validReport, nextStep: 4 },
];
for (const corruptReport of reportCorruptions) {
corruptions.push((state: Record<string, unknown>): unknown => ({
...state,
lastReport: corruptReport,
}));
}
for (const corrupt of corruptions) {
const candidate = corrupt(structuredClone(valid));
const restored = new FakePi([
{ type: 'custom', customType: 'mosaic-goal-state', data: candidate },
]);
await restored.emit('session_start', { reason: 'resume' });
expect(restored.statuses.get('mosaic-goal')).toBeUndefined();
expect(await restored.emit('context', { messages: [] })).toEqual([undefined]);
}
const failClosed = new FakePi([
{ type: 'custom', customType: 'mosaic-goal-state', data: valid },
{ type: 'custom', customType: 'mosaic-goal-state', data: { ...valid, version: 99 } },
]);
await failClosed.emit('session_start', { reason: 'resume' });
expect(failClosed.statuses.get('mosaic-goal')).toBeUndefined();
});
it('fails closed instead of reusing credential-bearing legacy branch state', async () => {
const source = new FakePi();
await source.goal('set Build a valid restore fixture');
const cleanState = latestGoalStateData(source);
const legacyState = structuredClone(cleanState);
legacyState['statement'] = `Legacy secret ghp_${'z'.repeat(32)}`;
const restored = new FakePi([
{ type: 'custom', customType: 'mosaic-goal-state', data: legacyState },
{ type: 'custom', customType: 'mosaic-goal-state', data: cleanState },
]);
await restored.emit('session_start', { reason: 'resume' });
expect(restored.statuses.get('mosaic-goal')).toBeUndefined();
expect(await restored.emit('context', { messages: [] })).toEqual([undefined]);
expect(restored.notifications.at(-1)?.level).toBe('warning');
expect(restored.notifications.at(-1)?.message).toContain('was not restored');
expect(restored.entries).toHaveLength(0);
});
it('schedules an active tree-restored goal and preserves terminal state through compaction', async () => {
vi.useFakeTimers();
const source = new FakePi();
await source.goal('set Restore active tree work');
const active = latestGoalStateData(source);
const restored = new FakePi();
restored.branch = [{ type: 'custom', customType: 'mosaic-goal-state', data: active }];
await restored.emit('session_tree', {});
await vi.runAllTimersAsync();
expect(restored.sentMessages).toHaveLength(1);
expect(restored.sentMessages[0]?.message.content).toContain('tree navigation');
await restored.goal('cancel');
await restored.emit('session_compact', { reason: 'manual', willRetry: false });
expect(stateField(restored, 'phase')).toBe('cancelled');
expect(stateField(restored, 'compactionCount')).toBe(1);
});
it('cancels deferred continuation when the session shuts down', async () => {
vi.useFakeTimers();
const pi = new FakePi();
await pi.goal('set Do not leak a stale timer');
pi.sentMessages.length = 0;
await pi.emit('session_compact', { reason: 'manual', willRetry: false });
await pi.emit('session_shutdown', { reason: 'reload' });
await vi.runAllTimersAsync();
expect(pi.sentMessages).toHaveLength(0);
});
});
+3 -2
View File
@@ -72,8 +72,9 @@ elif [[ -n "$DATA_DIR" ]]; then
while IFS= read -r file; do
[[ -z "$file" ]] && continue
done_total=$((done_total + 1))
if git -C "$DATA_DIR" log --since="${WINDOW_DAYS} days ago" --pretty='%s' -- "$file" 2>/dev/null \
| grep -qiE 'reopen|revert|fix|regression|wrong|incorrect|redo'; then
history_rc=0
history="$(git -C "$DATA_DIR" log --since="${WINDOW_DAYS} days ago" --pretty='%s' -- "$file" 2>/dev/null)" || history_rc=$?
if [[ "$history_rc" -eq 0 ]] && grep -qiE 'reopen|revert|fix|regression|wrong|incorrect|redo' <<<"$history"; then
detectable=$((detectable + 1))
fi
done < <(find "$DATA_DIR" -type f -name '*.json' 2>/dev/null)
+2 -2
View File
@@ -64,9 +64,9 @@ for line in "${LINES[@]}"; do
# - build/test/lint/type/ci signals → CI would have caught it
# - security/auth/permission/data/migration → human review would flag it
# - everything else (logic/UX/assumption/edge) → only-self-reflection bucket
if printf '%s' "$subj" | grep -qiE 'test|lint|type|build|ci|compile|typo'; then
if grep -qiE 'test|lint|type|build|ci|compile|typo' <<<"$subj"; then
ci=$((ci + 1))
elif printf '%s' "$subj" | grep -qiE 'security|auth|permission|rbac|secret|migration|data|sql|injection'; then
elif grep -qiE 'security|auth|permission|rbac|secret|migration|data|sql|injection' <<<"$subj"; then
human=$((human + 1))
else
selfonly=$((selfonly + 1))
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
[
"tools/matrix-presence-harness/run.sh:TSX_CLI=\"$(ls -d \"${REPO}\"/node_modules/.pnpm/tsx@*/node_modules/tsx/dist/cli.mjs 2>/dev/null | head -1)\"",
"tools/e2e-install-test.sh:if ! mosaic gateway --help 2>&1 | grep -q 'verify'; then",
"tools/install.sh:EXTRACTED_DIR=\"$(find \"$WORK_DIR\" -maxdepth 1 -mindepth 1 -type d | head -1)\"",
"scripts/analysis/reflect-board-history.sh:if git -C \"$DATA_DIR\" log --since=\"${WINDOW_DAYS} days ago\" --pretty='%s' -- \"$file\" 2>/dev/null | grep -qiE 'reopen|revert|fix|regression|wrong|incorrect|redo'; then",
"scripts/analysis/reflect-git-history.sh:if printf '%s' \"$subj\" | grep -qiE 'test|lint|type|build|ci|compile|typo'; then",
"scripts/analysis/reflect-git-history.sh:elif printf '%s' \"$subj\" | grep -qiE 'security|auth|permission|rbac|secret|migration|data|sql|injection'; then",
"packages/mosaic/framework/tools/authentik/user-create.sh:group_pk=$(echo \"$group_response\" | jq -r \".results[] | select(.name == \\\"$GROUP\\\") | .pk\" | head -1)",
"packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/mutate-push-guard.sh:PROSE_LO=\"$(grep -n '^usage() {' \"$BAK\" | head -1 | cut -d: -f1)\"",
"packages/mosaic/framework/tools/orchestrator/session-resume.sh:echo \"$dirty_files\" | head -20 | while IFS= read -r line; do",
"packages/mosaic/framework/tools/prdy/prdy-status.sh:if echo \"$PRD_CONTENT\" | grep -qiE \"$pattern\"; then",
"packages/mosaic/framework/tools/qa/reflect-stop-hook.sh:if printf '%s' \"$p\" | grep -qiE 'auth|login|session|token|permission|rbac|credential|secret'; then echo auth; return; fi",
"packages/mosaic/framework/tools/qa/reflect-stop-hook.sh:if printf '%s' \"$p\" | grep -qiE 'migration|prisma|schema|\\.sql|entity|repository|seed'; then echo data; return; fi",
"packages/mosaic/framework/tools/qa/reflect-stop-hook.sh:if printf '%s' \"$p\" | grep -qiE 'docker|\\.woodpecker|compose|traefik|deploy|helm|k8s|terraform'; then echo infra; return; fi",
"packages/mosaic/framework/tools/qa/reflect-stop-hook.sh:if printf '%s' \"$p\" | grep -qiE 'package\\.json|tsconfig|turbo\\.json|pnpm-|\\.config\\.|eslint|vite'; then echo build; return; fi",
"packages/mosaic/framework/tools/qa/reflect-stop-hook.sh:if printf '%s' \"$p\" | grep -qE '\\.tsx|\\.css|components/|apps/web/'; then echo ui; return; fi",
"packages/mosaic/framework/tools/qa/reflect-stop-hook.sh:if printf '%s' \"$p\" | grep -qE '\\.spec\\.|\\.test\\.|__tests__/'; then echo test; return; fi",
"packages/mosaic/framework/tools/qa/reflect-stop-hook.sh:if printf '%s' \"$p\" | grep -qE '\\.md$|docs/'; then echo docs; return; fi",
"packages/mosaic/framework/tools/qa/typecheck-hook.sh:FILE_PATH=$(echo \"$JSON_INPUT\" | grep -o '\"file_path\"[[:space:]]*:[[:space:]]*\"[^\"]*\"' | sed 's/.*\"\\([^\"]*\\)\"$/\\1/' | head -1)",
"packages/mosaic/framework/tools/qa/typecheck-hook.sh:RELEVANT=$(echo \"$OUTPUT\" | grep -A2 \"$BASENAME\" 2>/dev/null || echo \"$OUTPUT\" | head -20)",
"packages/mosaic/framework/tools/tmux/send-message.sh:if printf '%s' \"$pane\" | grep -qF \"$QUEUED_RE\"; then",
"packages/mosaic/framework/tools/tmux/send-message.sh:if [ -n \"$snippet\" ] && printf '%s' \"$promptline\" | grep -qF \"$snippet\"; then",
"packages/mosaic/framework/tools/wake/detector.sh:sed -n \"s/^${key}=//p\" \"$MANIFEST\" | head -n1 | tr -d '[:space:]'",
"packages/mosaic/framework/tools/wake/detector.sh:if [ -n \"$snap_sha\" ] && ! printf '%s' \"$snap_sha\" | grep -Eq '^[0-9a-f]{7,64}$'; then",
"packages/mosaic/framework/tools/wake/detector.sh:if [ -n \"$snap_ts\" ] && ! printf '%s' \"$snap_ts\" | grep -Eq '^[0-9]{1,12}$'; then",
"packages/mosaic/framework/tools/wake/digest.sh:olabel=\"$(_locator_line \"$oloc\" | head -n1)\"",
"packages/mosaic/framework/tools/wake/reconcile.sh:sed -n \"s/^${key}=//p\" \"$MANIFEST\" | head -n1 | tr -d '[:space:]'"
]
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
[
"packages/mosaic/framework/systemd/user/test-fleet-units.sh:if tmux -L \"$TEST_SOCKET\" show-environment -g LD_PRELOAD 2>/dev/null | grep -q '^LD_PRELOAD='; then",
"packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/test-issue-comment-readback.sh:write_response \"$(printf '%s' \"$result\" | head -n1)\" \"$(printf '%s' \"$result\" | tail -n +2)\"",
"packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/test-issue-comment-readback.sh:write_response \"$(printf '%s' \"$result\" | head -n1)\" \"$(printf '%s' \"$result\" | tail -n +2)\"",
"packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/test-lane-brief-pr-linkage.sh:contains() { printf '%s\\n' \"$1\" | grep -qx \"$2\"; }",
"packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/test-pr-review-gitea-comment.sh:write_response \"$(printf '%s' \"$result\" | head -n1)\" \"$(printf '%s' \"$result\" | tail -n +2)\"",
"packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/test-pr-review-repo-host-override.sh:echo \"$HELP_TEXT\" | grep -q -- '-r, --repo'",
"packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/test-pr-review-repo-host-override.sh:echo \"$HELP_TEXT\" | grep -q -- '-H, --host'",
"packages/mosaic/framework/tools/orchestrator/smoke-test.sh:if [[ \"$(printf '%s\\n' \"$codex_run_prompt\" | head -n1)\" == \"Now initiating Orchestrator mode...\" ]]; then pass_case \"codex run prompt first line is mode declaration\"; else fail_case \"codex run prompt first line is mode declaration\"; fi",
"packages/mosaic/framework/tools/orchestrator/smoke-test.sh:if [[ \"$(printf '%s\\n' \"$claude_run_prompt\" | head -n1)\" == \"## Continuation Mission\" ]]; then pass_case \"claude run prompt remains continuation prompt format\"; else fail_case \"claude run prompt remains continuation prompt format\"; fi",
"packages/mosaic/framework/tools/orchestrator/test-board-roll.sh:echo \"$out\" | grep -qi \"dry run\" || note \"dry-run did not announce itself\"",
"packages/mosaic/framework/tools/orchestrator/test-board-roll.sh:echo \"$out\" | grep -q \"would roll\" || note \"dry-run did not report a plan\"",
"packages/mosaic/framework/tools/quality/scripts/test-upgrade-durable-snapshot.sh:find \"$1/mosaic/backups\" -maxdepth 1 -type d -name 'pre-update-*' 2>/dev/null | LC_ALL=C sort -r | head -1",
"packages/mosaic/framework/tools/quality/scripts/test-upgrade-rollback.sh:SNAP_E=\"$(grep -o '/[^ ]*mosaic-snapshot[^ ]*' \"$OUTG\" | head -1)\"",
"packages/mosaic/framework/tools/quality/scripts/test-upgrade-rollback.sh:grep -o '/[^ ]*mosaic-snapshot[^ ]*' \"$OUTH\" 2>/dev/null | head -1 | while read -r s; do rm -rf \"$s\"; done",
"packages/mosaic/framework/tools/tmux/test-send-message-socket.sh:capture_named | grep -qF \"named socket hello\" || fail \"send-message.sh did not deliver to named socket\"",
"packages/mosaic/framework/tools/tmux/test-send-message-socket.sh:if capture_default | grep -qF \"named socket hello\"; then",
"packages/mosaic/framework/tools/tmux/test-send-message-socket.sh:capture_named | grep -qF \"[tester:source ->\" || fail \"agent-send.sh did not include preamble\"",
"packages/mosaic/framework/tools/tmux/test-send-message-socket.sh:capture_named | grep -qF \"agent socket hello\" || fail \"agent-send.sh did not deliver to named socket\"",
"packages/mosaic/framework/tools/tmux/test-send-message-socket.sh:if capture_default | grep -qF \"agent socket hello\"; then",
"packages/mosaic/framework/tools/tmux/test-send-message-socket.sh:printf '%s' \"$pane\" | grep -qF \"CONCPAYLOAD-${i}-END\" || fail \"concurrent send dropped payload for pane conc-$i\"",
"packages/mosaic/framework/tools/tmux/test-send-message-socket.sh:if printf '%s' \"$pane\" | grep -qF \"CONCPAYLOAD-${j}-END\"; then",
"packages/mosaic/framework/tools/tmux/test-send-message-verdict.sh:if [ \"$rc\" -eq 0 ] && printf '%s' \"$out\" | grep -qF \"✓ delivered\"; then"
]
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
[
"packages/mosaic/framework/tools/wake/test-wake-digest-quarantine.sh:fixture_line=\"$(has_match -F \"\\\"id\\\":\\\"$enum_id\\\"\" \"$self\" | has_match -F '\"observed_seq\":5' | head -n1)\"",
"packages/mosaic/framework/tools/wake/test-wake-preimage.sh:pre_seq=\"$(jq -r 'select(.locators.kind == \"preimage\") | .observed_seq' \"$sd/pending.jsonl\" | head -n1)\"",
"packages/mosaic/framework/tools/wake/test-wake-preimage.sh:src_seq=\"$(jq -r 'select(.locators.kind == \"repo\") | .observed_seq' \"$sd/pending.jsonl\" | head -n1)\"",
"packages/mosaic/framework/tools/wake/test-wake-preimage.sh:pre_seq=\"$(jq -r 'select(.locators.kind == \"preimage\") | .observed_seq' \"$sd/pending.jsonl\" | head -n1)\"",
"packages/mosaic/framework/tools/wake/test-wake-preimage.sh:enum_seq=\"$(jq -r 'select(.locators.reconciled == true) | .observed_seq' \"$sd/pending.jsonl\" | head -n1)\"",
"packages/mosaic/framework/tools/wake/validate-973/microtest-wake-assert.sh:if ! sed -n \"${ln}p\" \"$f\" | grep -Eq 'has_match|count_lines'; then",
"packages/mosaic/framework/tools/wake/validate-973/microtest-wake-assert.sh:printf '%s' \"$outA\" | grep -q 'mini-a: OK' &&",
"packages/mosaic/framework/tools/wake/validate-973/microtest-wake-assert.sh:printf '%s' \"$outB\" | grep -q 'mini-b: OK' &&",
"packages/mosaic/framework/tools/wake/validate-973/microtest-wake-assert.sh:check C1 1 \"rcA=$rcA rcB=$rcB expected($n_expected)/got diff: $(diff \"$TMP/expected-c1\" \"$TMP/got-c1\" 2>&1 | head -n 10 | tr '\\n' ' ')\"",
"packages/mosaic/framework/tools/wake/validate-973/microtest-wake-assert.sh:! printf '%s' \"$out\" | grep -q 'mini-a: OK' &&",
"packages/mosaic/framework/tools/wake/validate-973/microtest-wake-assert.sh:! printf '%s' \"$out\" | grep -q 'mini-a: FAILED' &&",
"packages/mosaic/framework/tools/wake/validate-973/microtest-wake-assert.sh:printf '%s' \"$out\" | grep -q \"WAKE-ASSERT ARMED: forcing real grep error at $site\" &&",
"packages/mosaic/framework/tools/wake/validate-973/microtest-wake-assert.sh:printf '%s' \"$out\" | grep -q \"WAKE-ASSERT ABORT\" &&",
"packages/mosaic/framework/tools/wake/validate-973/microtest-wake-assert.sh:printf '%s' \"$out\" | grep -q \"$site\" &&",
"packages/mosaic/framework/tools/wake/validate-973/microtest-wake-assert.sh:printf '%s' \"$out\" | grep -q \"grep exit 2\" &&",
"packages/mosaic/framework/tools/wake/validate-973/microtest-wake-assert.sh:printf '%s' \"$out\" | grep -q 'mini-a: OK' &&",
"packages/mosaic/framework/tools/wake/validate-973/microtest-wake-assert.sh:! printf '%s' \"$out\" | grep -q 'WAKE-ASSERT ARMED'; then",
"packages/mosaic/framework/tools/wake/validate-973/microtest-wake-assert.sh:! printf '%s' \"$out\" | grep -q 'REACHED-PAST-INIT' &&",
"packages/mosaic/framework/tools/wake/validate-973/microtest-wake-assert.sh:printf '%s' \"$out\" | grep -q 'WAKE-ASSERT INIT ABORT: BASH_LINENO convention violated'; then",
"packages/mosaic/framework/tools/wake/validate-973/microtest-wake-assert.sh:printf '%s' \"$out\" | grep -q 'wake mini-c harness: FAILED (1 assertion(s))' &&",
"packages/mosaic/framework/tools/wake/validate-973/microtest-wake-assert.sh:! printf '%s' \"$out\" | grep -q 'all invariants passed' &&",
"packages/mosaic/framework/tools/wake/validate-973/validate-973.sh:diff \"$TMP/expected.txt\" \"$TMP/static.txt\" | head -n 20 | sed 's/^/ /'",
"packages/mosaic/framework/tools/wake/validate-973/validate-973.sh:if printf '%s\\n' \"$out\" | grep -Eq \"$(sentinel_for \"$s\")\"; then",
"packages/mosaic/framework/tools/wake/validate-973/validate-973.sh:printf '%s\\n' \"$out\" | grep -q \"WAKE-ASSERT ARMED: forcing real grep error at $site\" ||",
"packages/mosaic/framework/tools/wake/validate-973/validate-973.sh:printf '%s\\n' \"$out\" | grep -q \"WAKE-ASSERT ABORT: ${helper} at ${site}: grep exit\" ||",
"packages/mosaic/framework/tools/wake/validate-973/validate-973.sh:printf '%s\\n' \"$out\" | grep -Eq \"$(sentinel_for \"$f\")\" || rc_sent=$?"
]
+207
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,207 @@
import assert from 'node:assert/strict';
import { spawnSync } from 'node:child_process';
import { chmod, mkdtemp, readFile, rm, writeFile } from 'node:fs/promises';
import { tmpdir } from 'node:os';
import path from 'node:path';
import test from 'node:test';
const ROOT = new URL('../', import.meta.url);
const EXPECTED_BASELINE_SITES = 26;
const EXPECTED_TEST_BASELINE_SITES = 22;
const EXPECTED_WAKE_BASELINE_SITES = 26;
const TARGETS = [
'tools/matrix-presence-harness/run.sh',
'tools/e2e-install-test.sh',
'tools/install.sh',
'scripts/agent/session-start.sh',
'scripts/analysis/reflect-board-history.sh',
'scripts/analysis/reflect-git-history.sh',
'packages/mosaic/framework/templates/repo/scripts/agent/session-start.sh',
'packages/mosaic/framework/tools/authentik/user-create.sh',
'packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/mutate-push-guard.sh',
'packages/mosaic/framework/tools/orchestrator/session-resume.sh',
'packages/mosaic/framework/tools/prdy/prdy-status.sh',
'packages/mosaic/framework/tools/qa/reflect-stop-hook.sh',
'packages/mosaic/framework/tools/qa/typecheck-hook.sh',
'packages/mosaic/framework/tools/tmux/send-message.sh',
'packages/mosaic/framework/tools/wake/detector.sh',
'packages/mosaic/framework/tools/wake/digest.sh',
'packages/mosaic/framework/tools/wake/reconcile.sh',
'packages/mosaic/framework/systemd/user/test-fleet-units.sh',
'packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/test-issue-comment-readback.sh',
'packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/test-lane-brief-pr-linkage.sh',
'packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/test-pr-review-gitea-comment.sh',
'packages/mosaic/framework/tools/git/test-pr-review-repo-host-override.sh',
'packages/mosaic/framework/tools/orchestrator/smoke-test.sh',
'packages/mosaic/framework/tools/orchestrator/test-board-roll.sh',
'packages/mosaic/framework/tools/quality/scripts/test-upgrade-durable-snapshot.sh',
'packages/mosaic/framework/tools/quality/scripts/test-upgrade-rollback.sh',
'packages/mosaic/framework/tools/tmux/test-send-message-socket.sh',
'packages/mosaic/framework/tools/tmux/test-send-message-verdict.sh',
'packages/mosaic/framework/tools/wake/test-wake-digest-quarantine.sh',
'packages/mosaic/framework/tools/wake/test-wake-preimage.sh',
'packages/mosaic/framework/tools/wake/validate-973/microtest-wake-assert.sh',
'packages/mosaic/framework/tools/wake/validate-973/validate-973.sh',
];
// These statuses are explicitly non-load-bearing or unreachable at designed input.
// They remain inventoried until the final #1099 tranche records every verdict.
const ACCEPTED = [
['tools/install.sh', 'mosaic-bak-', '|| true'],
['tools/install.sh', 'mosaicstack-mosaic-*.tgz', 'head -1'],
['tools/install.sh', 'mosaicstack-gateway-*.tgz', 'head -1'],
['scripts/agent/session-start.sh', 'docs/scratchpads/*.md', '|| true'],
[
'packages/mosaic/framework/templates/repo/scripts/agent/session-start.sh',
'docs/scratchpads/*.md',
'|| true',
],
];
const earlyExit =
/(?<!\|)\|(?!\|)[^;\n]*(?:grep\b[^;\n]*(?:-[A-Za-z]*q|--quiet|-m\s*1)|head\b(?:\s|$))/;
function scan(sources) {
const found = [];
for (const [file, rawSource] of sources) {
const source = rawSource.replace(/\\\n\s*/g, ' ');
for (const rawLine of source.split('\n')) {
const line = rawLine.trim();
if (!earlyExit.test(line)) continue;
const accepted = ACCEPTED.some(
([acceptedFile, ...fragments]) =>
acceptedFile === file && fragments.every((item) => line.includes(item)),
);
if (!accepted) found.push(`${file}:${line}`);
}
}
return found;
}
async function currentSources() {
return Promise.all(
TARGETS.map(async (file) => [file, await readFile(new URL(file, ROOT), 'utf8')]),
);
}
async function assertBaselineFixture(file, expectedCount, expectedUnique = expectedCount) {
const baseline = JSON.parse(await readFile(new URL(file, ROOT), 'utf8'));
assert.equal(baseline.length, expectedCount);
assert.equal(new Set(baseline).size, expectedUnique);
const fixtureSources = baseline.map((site) => {
const separator = site.indexOf(':');
assert.ok(separator > 0, `invalid baseline site: ${site}`);
return [site.slice(0, separator), site.slice(separator + 1)];
});
assert.deepEqual(scan(fixtureSources), baseline);
}
test('the registered runtime baseline denominator is exactly 26 unsafe sites', async () => {
await assertBaselineFixture(
'scripts/fixtures/pipefail-early-exit-baseline.json',
EXPECTED_BASELINE_SITES,
);
});
test('the registered test baseline denominator is exactly 22 unsafe sites', async () => {
await assertBaselineFixture(
'scripts/fixtures/pipefail-early-exit-test-baseline.json',
EXPECTED_TEST_BASELINE_SITES,
21,
);
});
test('the registered wake baseline denominator is exactly 26 unsafe sites', async () => {
await assertBaselineFixture(
'scripts/fixtures/pipefail-early-exit-wake-baseline.json',
EXPECTED_WAKE_BASELINE_SITES,
25,
);
});
test('load-bearing pipefail paths do not pipe into early-exiting consumers', async () => {
assert.deepEqual(scan(await currentSources()), []);
});
test('gateway verify capability preserves the complete help-probe truth table', async () => {
const directory = await mkdtemp(path.join(tmpdir(), 'gateway-help-probe-'));
const mosaic = path.join(directory, 'mosaic');
const probe = new URL('tools/e2e-gateway-verify-supported.sh', ROOT).pathname;
try {
await writeFile(
mosaic,
'#!/usr/bin/env bash\nprintf \'%s\\n\' "${MOCK_HELP_OUTPUT:-}"\nexit "${MOCK_HELP_RC:-0}"\n',
);
await chmod(mosaic, 0o755);
const run = (rc, output) =>
spawnSync('bash', [probe], {
env: {
...process.env,
PATH: `${directory}:${process.env.PATH}`,
MOCK_HELP_RC: String(rc),
MOCK_HELP_OUTPUT: output,
},
}).status;
assert.equal(run(0, 'commands: verify'), 0);
assert.equal(run(0, 'commands: install'), 1);
assert.equal(run(1, 'commands: verify'), 1);
} finally {
await rm(directory, { recursive: true, force: true });
}
});
test('wake JSONL selectors take the first match across the complete input stream', async () => {
const source = await readFile(
new URL('packages/mosaic/framework/tools/wake/test-wake-preimage.sh', ROOT),
'utf8',
);
assert.equal((source.match(/jq -nr 'first\(inputs \| select\(/g) ?? []).length, 4);
const directory = await mkdtemp(path.join(tmpdir(), 'wake-jsonl-first-'));
const input = path.join(directory, 'pending.jsonl');
const filter = 'first(inputs | select(.locators.kind == "preimage") | .observed_seq) // empty';
try {
await writeFile(
input,
'{"locators":{"kind":"repo"},"observed_seq":1}\n' +
'{"locators":{"kind":"preimage"},"observed_seq":4}\n' +
'{"locators":{"kind":"preimage"},"observed_seq":9}\n',
);
let result = spawnSync('jq', ['-nr', filter, input], { encoding: 'utf8' });
assert.equal(result.status, 0, result.stderr);
assert.equal(result.stdout, '4\n');
await writeFile(input, '{"locators":{"kind":"repo"},"observed_seq":1}\n');
result = spawnSync('jq', ['-nr', filter, input], { encoding: 'utf8' });
assert.equal(result.status, 0, result.stderr);
assert.equal(result.stdout, '');
await writeFile(input, '{invalid json}\n');
result = spawnSync('jq', ['-nr', filter, input], { encoding: 'utf8' });
assert.notEqual(result.status, 0);
} finally {
await rm(directory, { recursive: true, force: true });
}
});
test('board-history preserves non-git data-dir as a non-detectable result', async () => {
const directory = await mkdtemp(path.join(tmpdir(), 'reflect-board-non-git-'));
try {
await writeFile(path.join(directory, 'task.json'), '{}\n');
const result = spawnSync(
'bash',
[
new URL('scripts/analysis/reflect-board-history.sh', ROOT).pathname,
'--data-dir',
directory,
],
{ encoding: 'utf8' },
);
assert.equal(result.status, 0, result.stderr);
assert.match(result.stdout, /"done_tasks": 1/);
assert.match(result.stdout, /"detectable_outcomes": 0/);
} finally {
await rm(directory, { recursive: true, force: true });
}
});
+10
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
#!/usr/bin/env bash
# Exit 0 only when the capability probe itself succeeds and advertises verify.
# A failed help command and a successful response without verify are both
# unsupported, matching the historical e2e-install-test.sh conditional.
set -uo pipefail
gateway_help_rc=0
gateway_help="$(mosaic gateway --help 2>&1)" || gateway_help_rc=$?
[[ "$gateway_help_rc" -eq 0 ]] || exit 1
grep -q 'verify' <<<"$gateway_help"
+1 -1
View File
@@ -136,7 +136,7 @@ fi
echo "=== [inner] Running mosaic gateway verify ==="
# `gateway verify` was added in feat/mosaic-first-run-ux.
# If the installed version pre-dates this, skip gracefully.
if ! mosaic gateway --help 2>&1 | grep -q 'verify'; then
if ! bash /repo/tools/e2e-gateway-verify-supported.sh; then
echo "[SKIP] 'mosaic gateway verify' not available in installed version ${INSTALLED_VERSION}."
echo "[SKIP] This command was added in the feat/mosaic-first-run-ux release."
echo "[SKIP] Re-run after the new version is published to validate this step."
+8 -4
View File
@@ -308,13 +308,17 @@ ensure_monorepo() {
exit 1
fi
# Gitea archives extract to <repo-name>/ inside the work dir
EXTRACTED_DIR="$(find "$WORK_DIR" -maxdepth 1 -mindepth 1 -type d | head -1)"
if [[ -z "$EXTRACTED_DIR" ]] || [[ ! -d "$EXTRACTED_DIR" ]]; then
fail "Could not locate extracted source in archive."
# Gitea archives extract to exactly one <repo-name>/ inside the work dir.
# Read the complete population so a malformed multi-root archive reaches the
# named diagnostic instead of aborting on an upstream SIGPIPE under pipefail.
local -a extracted_dirs=()
mapfile -d '' -t extracted_dirs < <(find "$WORK_DIR" -maxdepth 1 -mindepth 1 -type d -print0)
if [[ "${#extracted_dirs[@]}" -ne 1 ]] || [[ ! -d "${extracted_dirs[0]:-}" ]]; then
fail "Could not locate exactly one extracted source directory in archive."
ls -la "$WORK_DIR" >&2
exit 1
fi
EXTRACTED_DIR="${extracted_dirs[0]}"
}
# Build @mosaicstack/mosaic + @mosaicstack/gateway from source and install both
+4 -1
View File
@@ -35,7 +35,10 @@ export DARK_THRESHOLD_MS="${DARK_THRESHOLD_MS:-6000}"
export AGENT_SLUGS="${AGENT_SLUGS:-alpha,bravo,charlie}"
export VICTIM_SLUG="${VICTIM_SLUG:-charlie}"
TSX_CLI="$(ls -d "${REPO}"/node_modules/.pnpm/tsx@*/node_modules/tsx/dist/cli.mjs 2>/dev/null | head -1)"
shopt -s nullglob
TSX_CANDIDATES=("${REPO}"/node_modules/.pnpm/tsx@*/node_modules/tsx/dist/cli.mjs)
shopt -u nullglob
TSX_CLI="${TSX_CANDIDATES[0]:-}"
if [[ -z "${TSX_CLI}" ]]; then
echo "run.sh: tsx not found under node_modules — run pnpm install first" >&2
exit 1